## Executive Summary (wpiea2026175-source-pdf)

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### Key findings on climate-finance challenges and importance
- Climate-related shocks from extreme weather events pose risks to both macroeconomic and financial stability (FSB, 2025a).
- Investments for a smooth transition to a low-carbon economy and for economic resilience are of critical macroeconomic importance.
- Raising adequate private finance for these investments is challenging for many countries, especially emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs).
- Domestic financial markets in many countries lack depth; a significant proportion of climate financing would be from foreign sources; foreign direct investment (FDI) with longer horizons can strengthen long-term balance of payments outcomes.
- The quality of a country’s institutions and resulting high cost of capital are significant constraints to scaling up climate finance in EMDEs; addressing climate finance is therefore fundamentally a development challenge.
- COP29/COP30 context:
  - COP29 calls on “all actors” to mobilize at least USD 1.3 trillion by 2035.
  - COP30 emphasized at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 and the importance of reducing the cost of capital, innovative instruments, balanced adaptation/mitigation allocation, financial-sector reforms, MDB balance-sheet optimization, and de-risking instruments to crowd in private capital, particularly in EMDEs.

### Analytical framework and instruments to mobilize private finance
- Projects categorized along a financing spectrum by risk-return profiles.
- Three key instrument sets:
  - Macro-structural reforms:
    - Mitigate economy-wide risks, lower costs of doing business, expand the pool of commercially financeable projects.
  - Climate measures:
    - Create credible and durable price signals (e.g., carbon pricing, technology development subsidies) to improve risk-adjusted returns for low-carbon projects relative to high-carbon alternatives.
  - Blended financing:
    - Deploy public resources (e.g., guarantees, concessional debt) to de-risk specific exposures and mobilize private investment at project or portfolio levels; particularly relevant for projects close to private profitability but requiring safeguards to contain fiscal risks.

### Fiscal constraints and the role of concessional finance
- Most blended financing mechanisms and some climate measures require public support; many macro-structural and climate measures can be budget neutral or budget positive.
- Menu of measures depends on authorities’ ability to finance them through the budget, including by reallocating resources spent on fossil fuel subsidies or securing international concessional financing.
- Key funding and target figures:
  - COP29/COP30 collective calls (see above): mobilize at least USD 1.3 trillion by 2035; triple adaptation finance by 2035.
  - UNEP 2025: global adaptation finance gap of US$284–339 billion per year until 2035.
  - Current adaptation finance flows: US$26 billion in public finance and US$4 billion in private finance (UNEP 2025 comparison).
  - International concessional climate financing has only just passed the goal of US$ 100 billion annually.
  - IEA estimates around $100 billion annually in blended finance structures will be necessary to meet net zero targets for the energy sector in EMDEs.
  - G20 IEG estimates an additional $3 trillion annually over the 2030 horizon; roughly $2 trillion annually would need to come from the domestic public sector’s budget.

*Source: IMF Working Paper — Private finance and climate investment needs: an analytical framework (Executive Summary).*

---

### Climate-related investment needs and financing flows

### Scale and uncertainty of needs (key quantitative estimates)
- EMDEs’ gross needs for climate finance: between $1.4 – 5 trillion annually for the next decade.
- Adaptation needs: USD 400 billion – USD 1 trillion of the annual needs up to 2030 (IMF, 2023a).
- Global mitigation investment needs: USD 2 – 9 trillion globally, with about a third needed in EMDEs.
- Maximum required investment for adaptation: another USD 1 trillion.
- EMDEs (excluding China) constitute only 15 percent of global clean energy expenditure.
- Future climate investment needs are at least 12 percent of total EMDE investments (relative to the current 3 percent, IMF 2023a).
- UNEP 2025: total adaptation financing needs of US$365 billion annually are 12–14 times greater than current flows.
- Representative transition (energy) estimates (per year):
  - US$1.4–US$1.9 trillion — Net-zero by 2050; Through 2030; IEA and IFC (2023) — Energy only (excluding China).
  - US $1.3 -US$1.7 trillion — 1.5 C target; Through 2030; Songwe et al. (2022) — Energy only.
  - US$1.4–US$2.8 trillion — 1.5–2 C target; Through 2030; IPCC (2022).
  - US$3.9 trillion — Net-zero by 2050; Through 2050; McKinsey (2022).
- Selected adaptation estimates (per year):
  - US$250 billion — Through 2030; Bhattacharya, Songwe, Soubeyran and Stern (2024) — EMDEs other than China.
  - US$244 billion — Through 2030; UNEP (2023).
  - US$417.2 billion — Through 2030; Aligishiev, Massetti, and Bellon (2022).
  - US$764–US$835 billion — Through 2030; UNFCCC 2021 (78 countries’ NDCs).
  - US$160–US$340 billion — Through 2030; Sakai and others (2022).
  - US$315–US$565 billion — Through 2050; (aggregate cited).
  - US$47–US$1,088 billion (median $295 billion a year) — Through 2050; IPCC (2022).

### Supply and demand bottlenecks
- Supply-side constraints:
  - High perceived risks, weak regulatory environments, insufficient risk-mitigation instruments limit institutional investors, MDBs, and climate funds from mobilizing funds.
- Demand-side constraints:
  - Limited pipeline of bankable, investment-ready projects in EMDEs due to inadequate project preparation capacity, unclear policy signals, and underdeveloped financial ecosystems.
- Strengthening the investment environment reduces risks and cost of capital and expands viable projects.

---

### Channels and policy responses to scale private climate finance

### Three reform channels and objectives
- I. Macro-structural reforms — Main objective: Reduce economy-wide cost of capital.
  - Example measures:
    - Improving institutions, governance, and the business environment.
    - Market-based sectoral reforms (e.g., energy sector liberalization).
    - Public investment management.
- II. Climate measures — Main objective: Improve profitability and reduce the cost of capital of climate-related investments.
  - Example measures:
    - Eliminating fossil fuel subsidies and implementing carbon pricing.
    - Increasing renewable energy subsidies.
    - Regulation (energy efficiency standards, zoning laws, building codes).
    - Climate policy roadmaps.
    - Financial sector policies, including robust climate information architecture (transition taxonomies and plans, disclosures, climate data).
- III. Blended finance — Main objective: Crowd-in private investments using public resources.
  - Example measures:
    - Equity or debt participation.
    - Loan guarantees.
    - Public-private partnerships.

### Design considerations and complementarities
- Macro-structural reforms lower the national "risk floor" (sovereign risk premia, currency/convertibility risks, macro volatility) and expand commercially financeable projects.
- Climate measures that internalize externalities (carbon pricing, technology subsidies) create credible price signals and can be budget neutral or budget positive; others require public support.
- Blended finance is effective for projects close to private profitability but requires strong safeguards to contain fiscal risks.
- Policy sequencing and complementarity:
  - Structural reforms enhance effectiveness of climate policies (evidence: top-quartile reform progress associated with higher energy taxes and lower emissions).
  - Where reforms make brown investments more attractive, complementary climate measures are needed to address relative attractiveness of brown vs green investments.
  - Heterogeneous country circumstances require tailored mixes (e.g., high-debt countries prioritize business environment and governance; large emerging markets prioritize financial market development).

---

### Box 1 & Box 2 — Measurement, transition finance, and conceptual concessional needs

### Measurement and taxonomy issues (Box 1 summary)
- Tracked climate finance: explicitly labeled climate finance flows.
- Private climate finance instrument types:
  - (i) raised with conditions on use of proceeds;
  - (ii) outcome-based cost-of-capital reductions tied to sustainability conditions;
  - (iii) ESG-rating based instruments.
- Practical measurement challenges:
  - Funds may be used in non-climate projects or used for climate projects but not explicitly labelled.
- Taxonomy approaches (e.g., Climate Policy Initiative, OECD Rio Markers) help mitigate greenwashing and aid project selection.

### Transition finance scope and tracking
- Transition investments: support decarbonization in hard-to-abate/high-emission sectors, can include declining high-emission investments in absence of viable low-emission substitutes, and can embed adaptation/resilience investments.
- Tracking difficulties: transition finance may not meet low-carbon thresholds or may lack explicit labeling.
- G20 Transition Finance Framework criteria examples:
  - a) compliance with high performance country-/sector-specific standards;
  - b) not hampering development of low-emission activities;
  - c) not leading to carbon lock-in.

### Conceptual concessional finance need (Box 2 summary)
- Projects ranked by financial returns; concessional financing need equals area where financial returns fall below cost of capital (red triangle).
- Public concessional finance rationale: positive externalities where social returns exceed private returns.
- Endogeneity: reforms (macro-structural, climate measures) reduce cost of capital or increase profitability, shrinking concessional need (orange triangle post-reform).
- Macro-structural reforms examples and effects:
  - Macroeconomic stability, governance, external sector stability, business regulation, financial regulation, public investment management.
  - Evidence from CDS spreads (2015–2025): investment-grade spreads under 100 bps; B-rated spreads surged near 800 bps during crises.
- Price-based climate measures examples:
  - Carbon taxes, Emission Trading Systems, fuel/excise taxes, feed-in tariffs, technology subsidies.
  - IMF research: fossil fuel price reform could reduce global CO2 emissions to an estimated 43 percent below baseline levels in 2030, raise revenues worth 3.6 percent of global GDP, and prevent 1.6 million local air pollution deaths per year (Black and others 2023).
- Climate information architecture three tiers:
  1. Robust backward- and forward-looking data.
  2. Harmonized climate-related disclosure requirements embedded into law/regulation.
  3. Transition taxonomies and plans.
- Blended finance empirical mobilization metric:
  - Blended finance infrastructure deals attracted 40 cents of private capital for every $1 worth of public or philanthropic money during 2013–2023 (World Bank 2024).

---

### Box 3 — Country Platforms and IMF engagement

### Objectives, generations, and enabling conditions
- Country platforms:
  - Political agreement underpinning shared plan.
  - Alignment of international finance with national plan.
  - Acceleration of climate action.
- Three generations:
  - First generation: Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JTEPs).
  - Second generation: more targeted platforms (e.g., Egypt's Nexus for Water, Food, and Energy).
  - Emerging third generation: transform national economies (Sevilla Platform for Action, July 2025).
- Enabling conditions:
  - High-ambition government plan integrated with planning and budgeting capacities.
  - Early private sector involvement and financial coordination with development partners.
  - Programmatic approach linking development strategies, NDCs, NAPs, and long-term strategies.
  - Ministries of Finance and Development/Planning as key enablers.

### Country examples and figures
- Bangladesh: Climate and Development Platform activated end of 2023.
- North Macedonia: in-country platform established December 2023.
- Brazil: launched platform October 2024; targets seven projects with total investment target of $10 billion focusing on energy, industry, mobility, and nature-based solutions.
- Colombia: launched platform January 2025; features 316 projects with a funding goal of $38 million aimed at socio-ecological transition.

### IMF role and convening
- IMF under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) framework:
  - Facilitates macro-critical policy reforms (fiscal, sectoral, financial).
  - Provides capacity development.
  - Convenes stakeholders via roundtables.
  - Roundtables held as of May 2026 in Barbados, Rwanda, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Bangladesh, Senegal, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Papua New Guinea, Madagascar, and The Gambia.

### Budget and concessional financing context (selected figures)
- EMDE climate investments largely financed domestically (CPI 2022); international concessional financing just passed US$ 100 billion annually.
- IMF 2023a estimate: with appropriate policies, EMDE government budget and international concessional financing for climate projects can be scaled up by 50 percent, with remaining financing coming from private sector.
- IEA estimates up to $726 billion available from redirecting fossil fuel investments (2020); up to $1 trillion from phasing out fossil fuel subsidies (2022); up to $750 billion from phasing out subsidies (2010–21); up to $7 trillion when including potential carbon price revenues (2022, IMF estimate).
- G20 IEG: additional $3 trillion annually over the 2030 horizon; roughly $2 trillion annually from domestic public sector budgets.

---

### Annex 1 & Annex I) — Barriers, structured finance, and instruments

### Barriers to scaling climate finance in EMDEs
- Market-wide constraints:
  - Lack of investment-grade sovereign credit rating: only about 60% of these markets and 8% of developing economies have an investment-grade rating.
  - Credit rating agencies do not reward middle- and lower-income countries implementing better climate measures.
  - Low domestic capital market development, insufficient investable project pipelines, foreign exchange risk management challenges.
  - Renewable energy projects face high upfront fixed capital costs, policy risks, supply chain and grid integration issues; a target ratio of around 4:1 renewable over fossil fuel investment required globally throughout this decade.
- Adaptation-specific constraints:
  - Private sector engagement limited because many priority adaptation projects are public goods:
    - Approximately 40 percent of publicly identified priority adaptation investments are classified as public goods.
    - A further 35 percent are in areas typically provided by the public sector (quasi-public goods/essential services) (UNEP 2025).
  - Conventional adaptation financing via government debt constrained by limited tax bases, borrowing capacities, and rising debt levels.
  - Technical, knowledge, data, and institutional barriers and fragmentation of adaptation finance architecture.

### Structured finance and instruments (Annex I)
- Structured finance:
  - Closed-end fixed income funds: pool bank loans into green bonds with public sector assuming credit risk; requires existing bank loans and technical assistance.
- Result-based financing instruments:
  - Sustainability-linked bonds/loans linked to KPIs; pricing adjusts based on KPI achievement; may require guarantees or higher returns to mitigate risk.
- Pay-for-success bonds:
  - Environmental impact bonds or conservation impact bonds: repay investors based on agreed environmental outcomes; high structuring costs and political/financial risks.
- Payment for ecosystem services (PES):
  - Transfers from beneficiaries to providers; requires monitoring, technical capacity, and tailored contracts.
- Financial risk management instruments:
  - MDBs/DFIs provide equity/mezzanine/guarantees to de-risk infrastructure and complex projects.
  - Green revolving funds: capital pools used to fund sustainability projects that replenish from savings; require seed funding and regular replenishment.
  - Public-private partnerships (PPPs): long-term contracts to provide public assets/services, with risk allocation determined by project features and public sector capacity.

---

### Policy implications, priorities, and research agenda

### Synthesis of policy recommendations
- Prioritize macro-structural reforms to reduce economy-wide risks, lower borrowing costs, and expand commercially viable project pipelines.
- Implement durable climate measures providing credible price signals (e.g., carbon pricing, technology development subsidies) to improve risk-adjusted returns for low-carbon investments.
- Deploy blended finance selectively to de-risk near-commercial projects, while instituting strong fiscal safeguards.
- Expand international concessional financing and reallocate domestic fiscal resources (including fossil fuel subsidy reform) to enable public support where necessary.
- Strengthen project preparation capacity and regulatory certainty to increase the supply of bankable projects in EMDEs.
- Coordinate policy and finance mobilization efforts in line with international calls (COP29/COP30) to reduce cost of capital, mobilize innovative instruments, optimize MDB balance sheets, and maintain balance between adaptation and mitigation finance.

### Operational priorities and sequencing
- Tailor reform agendas by country circumstances (e.g., prioritize FDI-attraction in high-debt/external vulnerability contexts; prioritize financial market development in large emerging markets).
- Sequence reforms to maximize impact: structural reforms can increase effectiveness of climate measures; reforms should precede or accompany major climate taxation/price signals to avoid unintended effects.
- Reserve scarce concessional funds for projects where private finance cannot be mobilized and where social returns justify public support.

### Areas for future research
- Measuring effectiveness of different instrument combinations and sequencing across country circumstances; ranking instruments by effectiveness and scope.
- Examining global coordination on allocating international concessional financing, domestic revenue mobilization, and targeting government spending toward climate goals.
- Refining distinctions between measures most conducive to financing adaptation versus transition and prioritizing climate finance needs amid broader development needs.

*Source: IMF Working Paper — Private Finance and Climate Investment Needs: An Analytical Framework (wpiea2026175-source-pdf).*

### Executive Summary ......................................................................................................

### Executive Summary (wpiea2026175-source-pdf)

### Key findings on climate-finance challenges and importance
- Climate-related shocks from extreme weather events pose risks to both macroeconomic and financial stability (FSB, 2025a).
- Investments for a smooth transition to a low-carbon economy and for economic resilience are of critical macroeconomic importance.
- Raising adequate private finance for these investments is challenging for many countries, especially emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs).
- Domestic financial markets in many countries lack depth, so a significant proportion of climate financing would be from foreign sources; foreign direct investment (FDI) with longer horizons can strengthen long-term balance of payments outcomes.
- The quality of a country’s institutions and resulting high cost of capital are significant constraints to scaling up climate finance in EMDEs; addressing climate finance is therefore fundamentally a development challenge.

### Analytical framework and instruments to mobilize private finance
- The paper develops an analytical framework categorizing projects along a financing spectrum by risk-return profiles.
- Three key sets of instruments to attract private investment are identified:
  - Macro-structural reforms: mitigate economy-wide risks, lower costs of doing business, expand the pool of commercially financeable projects.
  - Climate measures: create credible and durable price signals (e.g., carbon pricing, technology development subsidies) to improve risk-adjusted returns for low-carbon projects relative to high-carbon alternatives.
  - Blended financing: deploy public resources (e.g., guarantees, concessional debt) to de-risk specific exposures and mobilize private investment at project or portfolio levels; particularly relevant for projects close to private profitability but requiring safeguards to contain fiscal risks.

### Fiscal constraints and the role of concessional finance
- Many macro-structural and climate measures can be budget neutral or budget positive, but most blended financing mechanisms and some climate measures require public support.
- The menu of measures available depends on authorities’ ability to finance them through the budget, including by reallocating resources spent on fossil fuel subsidies or securing international concessional financing, particularly for developing economies.
- The paper echoes elements of the COP29 decision on a new collective quantified goal (NCQG) calling on “all actors” to mobilize at least USD 1.3 trillion by 2035; COP30 emphasized at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 and the importance of reducing the cost of capital, innovative instruments, balanced adaptation/mitigation allocation, financial-sector reforms, MDB balance-sheet optimization, and de-risking instruments to crowd in private capital, particularly in EMDEs.

---

### Introduction and framing

### Macroeconomic and financial stability context
- Underinvestment in climate change adaptation and the energy transition may lead to global financial stability risks (IMF 2022).
- Global capital allocation remains skewed toward high-carbon activities; financing for low-carbon and climate-resilient activities remains severely inadequate (IPCC 2022, Robins 2022).
- The energy transition requires shifting investments from high-carbon to low-carbon sectors and adaptation finance is critical for adjusting socioeconomic systems to current and expected climate shocks.

### Scope and focus of analysis
- The paper focuses on private climate finance driven by commercial financial institutions and corporations, excluding household-driven investments such as residential energy efficiency and small-scale solar (see CPI 2025 for those dynamics).
- Although focused on EMDEs, the general framework also applies to Advanced Economies (AEs).
- The paper examines channels through which domestic reforms and financial instruments affect private climate finance flows, covering structural reforms, climate measures, blended finance, and public/concessional financing roles.

---

### Climate-related investment needs and financing flows

### Scale and uncertainty of needs
- Climate investment needs estimates vary widely by scope and assumptions; EMDEs’ climate investment needs are consistently in the magnitude of USD trillions.
- Typical distinctions in flows include transition (mitigation) vs adaptation, international vs domestic, AEs vs EMDEs, public vs private, and market-based vs concessional rates.
- Key assumptions affecting estimates: temperature targets (carbon budgets), policy scenarios, timing of investments, technological change and productivity, and costs of higher-order effects such as just transition.

### Quantitative estimates and gaps
- EMDEs’ gross needs for climate finance range between $1.4 – 5 trillion annually for the next decade.
- Adaptation needs constitute USD 400 billion – USD 1 trillion of the annual needs up to 2030 (IMF, 2023a).
- Estimates for gross global mitigation investment needs range from USD 2 – 9 trillion globally, with about a third needed in EMDEs.
- The maximum required investment for adaptation needs amounts to another USD 1 trillion.
- EMDEs (excluding China) constitute only 15 percent of global clean energy expenditure.
- Future climate investment needs are at least 12 percent of total EMDE investments (relative to the current 3 percent, IMF 2023a).
- UNEP 2025 estimates the global adaptation finance gap at US$284–339 billion per year until 2035; total adaptation financing needs of US$365 billion annually are 12–14 times greater than current flows (US$26 billion in public finance and US$4 billion in private finance).
- Despite global climate finance more than doubling between 2018 and 2023, global climate finance needs still significantly outstrip flows (CPI 2025).

### Supply and demand bottlenecks
- Supply-side constraints: high perceived risks, weak regulatory environments, insufficient risk-mitigation instruments limit institutional investors, MDBs, and climate funds from mobilizing funds.
- Demand-side constraints: limited pipeline of bankable, investment-ready projects in EMDEs due to inadequate project preparation capacity, unclear policy signals, and underdeveloped financial ecosystems (World Bank 2023).
- Strengthening the investment environment reduces risks and cost of capital and expands viable projects, helping bridge the supply-demand gap.

---

### Channels and policy responses to scale private climate finance

### Role of macro-structural reforms
- Macro-structural reforms reduce economy-wide risks, improve institutional quality, and lower the cost of capital; they expand the universe of commercially financeable projects.
- Sovereign risk premia, currency and convertibility risks, macroeconomic volatility, and regulatory and policy uncertainty strongly influence required returns for investments in EMDEs.

### Role of climate measures
- Climate measures that internalize externalities (e.g., carbon pricing, technology subsidies) create credible price signals and can tilt the investment frontier toward green assets and away from brown assets.
- Some climate measures can be budget neutral or budget positive, though others require public support.

### Role and design of blended finance
- Blended financing (guarantees, concessional debt) strategically de-risks investments to mobilize private capital at project/portfolio levels.
- Blended finance is particularly effective for projects close to private profitability.
- Strong safeguards are required to contain associated fiscal risks from blended finance.

### Interaction with fiscal space and concessional financing
- Fiscal sustainability concerns and limited international concessional financing constrain public investment space in EMDEs.
- EMDEs currently finance most climate investments domestically (CPI, 2022) but face high debt levels and rising interest rates (Adrian, Gaspar and Gourinchas, 2024).
- Reallocating fossil fuel subsidies and securing international concessional finance are identified as important avenues to finance climate measures and blended instruments.
- For some projects, concessional financing will be essential, requiring drawing on government budgets and international official funds.

---

### Policy implications and priorities (synthesis of recommendations)
- Prioritize macro-structural reforms to reduce economy-wide risks, lower borrowing costs, and expand commercially viable project pipelines.
- Implement durable climate measures that provide credible price signals (e.g., carbon pricing, technology development subsidies) to improve risk-adjusted returns for low-carbon investments.
- Deploy blended finance selectively to de-risk near-commercial projects, while instituting strong fiscal safeguards.
- Expand international concessional financing and reallocate domestic fiscal resources (including fossil fuel subsidy reform) to enable the use of public support where necessary.
- Strengthen project preparation capacity and regulatory certainty to increase the supply of bankable projects in EMDEs.
- Coordinate policy and finance mobilization efforts in line with international calls (COP29/COP30) to reduce cost of capital, mobilize innovative instruments, optimize MDB balance sheets, and maintain balance between adaptation and mitigation finance.

*Source: IMF Working Paper — Private finance and climate investment needs: an analytical framework (Executive Summary).*

### Box 1. Challenges in tracking climate finance flows

### Box 1. Challenges in tracking climate finance flows

### Measurement challenges
- Explicitly labeled climate finance flows are considered “tracked” climate finance.
- Private climate finance instruments are generally of three main types:
  - (i) raised with conditions on the use of proceeds (e.g., building renewable energy infrastructure);
  - (ii) outcome-based, where the cost of capital is reduced if certain sustainability conditions are met; and
  - (iii) based on ESG ratings, where the company’s overall performance is rated, which then determines its cost of capital.
- Practical measurement challenges:
  - (i) the funds raised using these instruments may sometimes be used in projects without explicit transition or adaptation objectives; or
  - (ii) the funds are used for transition or adaptation projects but not explicitly labelled as such11.
- Similar challenges apply to public climate finance flows, which either arise in domestic government budgets or are provided through bilateral and multilateral channels.

### Taxonomies and alternative identification methods
- Taxonomy-based approach: identify projects that correspond to specific criteria; investments in these projects are considered climate finance flows.
  - Example: Climate Policy Initiative identifies projects based on its own taxonomy.
  - OECD’s measure of bilateral and multilateral official climate finance flows uses donor-provided information and the Rio Markers as criteria for whether the project fulfils climate objectives (OECD 2017).
- Benefits of taxonomies and labels:
  - Help mitigate “greenwashing” (e.g., ICMA’s Green Bond Principles).
  - Provide frameworks for project selection and use of proceeds (NGFS 2022).

### Transition finance: scope and tracking issues
- Definition and scope:
  - Transition investments support decarbonization of entities or activities in hard-to-abate or other high emission sectors (e.g., diversification of energy production activities).
  - Can include continued—but declining—high-emission investments in sectors without credible low-emissions substitutes which are economically viable (OECD 2022, ETC 2023).
  - Under specific circumstances, can encompass investments for energy security or managed phase-out purposes (e.g., financing coal plant decommissioning projects).
  - Can embed adaptation and resilience investments (e.g., early warning systems, resilient infrastructure and processes).
- Tracking difficulties:
  - Transition finance may not be tracked if underlying investments do not meet low-carbon (or other climate) thresholds or are not explicitly labelled or directly traceable to climate projects12 (e.g., supply chain resilience, energy efficiency benefits).
- Measurement criteria example:
  - The G20 Transition Finance Framework13 includes criteria such as:
    - a) compliance with high performance country- or sector-specific standards, benchmarks or thresholds for emissions (i.e., included in transition taxonomies);
    - b) not hampering the development of low-emission activities; and
    - c) not leading to carbon lock-in.
  - These criteria are detailed in IMF, World Bank Group and OECD, 2023.

### Financial sector policies, transition planning, and disclosures
- Emerging priority: develop financial sector policies to support credibility of transition finance.
- Market and corporate transparency measures:
  - Require non-financial and financial companies to articulate transition plans14 and related disclosures, including concrete climate targets, actions, and accountability mechanisms on a multi-year basis (RMI 2025).
  - Objectives of transition plans:
    - Support alignment of companies’ investments with jurisdictional (and/or regional) net-zero objectives;
    - Help monitor adjustments to climate risk drivers in the real economy;
    - Support adaptation and resilience (International Transition Plan Network 2024);
    - Manage climate-related risks (FSB 2025b, OECD 2024, Tshazibana 2024)15.
- Transition taxonomies and their roles:
  - Identify economic activities, technologies, and industrial processes that can significantly lower emissions while managing climate-related risks.
  - Align incentives, reduce due diligence costs, boost investor confidence, enable banks to finance client transitions, and translate climate commitments into concrete actions (Kachenoura and others 2024, Caldecott 2024, ICMA 2024, Wong 2024).
  - Aim to improve understanding of which investments support a transition in line with the goals of the Paris agreement16.
  - Targets and criteria may match a country’s NDCs, long-term strategies, adaptation commitments, and sector-specific targets (IMF 2023a)17.
  - Reinforce a feedback loop among government plans, corporate strategies, and financial institutions’ plans, supporting decarbonization and resilience planning and influencing valuations and investment, lending, and underwriting (CFMCA 2024)18.

### Channels affecting private climate finance flows
- To raise private climate finance flows, measures fall into three main reform areas:
  - Investors base decisions primarily on trade-offs between expected financial returns and investment risks; increasing private financing requires reducing perceived investment risk (approximated by the cost of capital) and improving private returns19.
  - Well-designed reforms can be effective regardless of country size, income level, or market depth.
- The framework distinguishes three main channels (Table 1):
  - I. Macro-structural reforms — Main objective: Reduce economy-wide cost of capital.
    - Example measures:
      - Improving institutions, governance, and the business environment;
      - Market-based sectoral reforms (for example, energy sector liberalization);
      - Public investment management.
  - II. Climate measures — Main objective: Improve profitability and reduce the cost of capital of climate-related investments.
    - Example measures:
      - Eliminating fossil fuel subsidies and implementing carbon pricing;
      - Increasing renewable energy subsidies;
      - Regulation (for example, energy efficiency standards, zoning laws, and building codes);
      - Climate policy roadmaps;
      - Financial sector policies, including robust climate information architecture (transition taxonomies and plans, disclosures, climate data).
  - III. Blended finance — Main objective: Crowd-in private investments using public resources.
    - Example measures:
      - Equity or debt participation;
      - Loan guarantees;
      - Public-private partnerships.
- Conceptual note (Box 2 reference):
  - The amount of private finance needed (versus blended and public finance) is a function of financial returns and the cost of capital in each jurisdiction.
  - Financially viable projects should be financed privately; projects with negative financial returns but efficient (e.g., seawall protection against floods) likely need government support.
  - Different reforms can increase the share of projects financeable privately and reduce the magnitude of government support.

*Source: IMF Working Papers — Private finance and climate investment needs: an analytical framework (Box 1).*

### Box 2: Conceptualizing the Concessional Finance Need

### Box 2: Conceptualizing the Concessional Finance Need

### Conceptual framework: projects, returns, and concessional need
- Climate investment needs are defined as the minimum set of projects required to reach climate-related goals in a jurisdiction that meet country authorities’ criteria, selected from the set of all possible projects.
- Visual representation (Figure B.1):
  - Individual projects ranked from high to low financial returns; bar height = financial return (approximated by internal rate of return), bar length = project investment need.
  - Aggregated curve’s downward slope may vary across countries and time (e.g., due to technological progress and other cost reductions).
  - Green triangle = private sector (investor) surplus = difference between cost of capital and financial return.
  - Red triangle = negative surplus = concessional financing need; area of red triangle = grant equivalent of total concessional financing need (value required to raise project returns above cost of capital to attract private investors).
- Main rationale for public concessional financing: presence of positive externalities (social returns > private returns).

### Endogeneity of private-finance share and role of reforms (Figure B.2)
- The proportion of projects financeable privately is endogenous to policy choices, notably:
  - Implementation of macro-structural reforms.
  - Implementation of climate measures.
- Reducing the cost of capital (economy-wide or for climate projects) or increasing project profitability expands the set of projects viable for full private financing and reduces concessional finance needs.
- Lower cost of capital associated with foreign investments reduces overall external financing needs and balance-of-payments vulnerabilities.
- Post-reform situation represented by an orange triangle (smaller concessional financing need).

### Macro-structural reforms: mechanisms and examples
- Macrostructural reforms reduce economy-wide cost of capital, stimulating private investment flows (including climate-related).
- Structural factors (trade and capital openness, rule of law, human capital) account for cross-country variations in "green" FDI among EMDEs (Jaumotte et al. 2024) and generally lead to increased net FDI inflows (Budina and others 2023).
- Evidence from CDS spreads (2015–2025):
  - Investment-grade spreads: under 100 bps (stable).
  - B-rated sovereign spreads: surged near 800 bps during crises (extreme volatility).
  - High sovereign risk establishes a national "risk floor" anchoring premiums for domestic commercial debt and projects.
- Reforms and policy areas that reduce cost of capital (Table 2 examples):
  - Macroeconomic stability: Low and stable inflation; Debt sustainability.
  - Governance: Control of corruption; Rule of law; Political stability; Regulatory quality / policy predictability.
  - External sector: Exchange rate stability; Trade and capital market openness.
  - Business regulation: Market liberalization in climate-relevant sectors; Reducing administrative requirements / bureaucracy costs.
  - Financial regulation: Financial market development (capital and credit); Improving interest rate controls.
- Additional institutional reforms:
  - Public investment management reforms to create a pipeline of bankable projects (single-entry strategic pipeline, robust appraisal and selection, transparent procurement, institutional capacity for project preparation and management).
  - Tailoring of reform agendas by country circumstances (e.g., prioritizing FDI-attraction in high-debt or external vulnerability contexts; prioritizing financial market development in large emerging markets).

### Climate measures and instruments
- Strengthened climate measures correct market failures, alter relative prices, provide policy certainty, and secure large, front-loaded investments—thereby improving project profitability and risk-return profiles and reducing concessional financing needs.
- Two broad types:
  - Price-based measures (economic efficiency focus):
    - Direct carbon pricing: Carbon taxes; Emission Trading Systems; Carbon crediting mechanisms; Tradable performance standards.
    - Fuel/excise taxes; Fossil fuel subsidies (production); VAT deviations (VAT differential on fuels).
    - Indirect carbon pricing / technology & production incentives: Feed-in tariffs; Technology development subsidies; Clean energy standards; Tradable renewable portfolio standards; Energy efficiency tax credits; VAT differential on machinery; Vehicle taxes.
    - IMF research estimate: fossil fuel price reform could reduce global carbon dioxide emissions to an estimated 43 percent below baseline levels in 2030, raise revenues worth 3.6 percent of global GDP, and prevent 1.6 million local air pollution deaths per year (Black and others 2023).
  - Non-price-based measures:
    - Regulations and standards: Zoning laws, emission/technology standards, building standards, disclosure policies.
    - Climate policy roadmaps with mid- to long-term measures, targets, timing, reliable data, project preparation, milestones, and integrated investment planning.
    - Financial sector policy tools and climate information architecture (see below).
- Table 3 typology:
  - Price-based measures address carbon externalities and technology market failures.
  - Non-price-based measures address information, behavioral, and financial barriers (standards, public investment, information and financial sector policies).

### Climate information architecture and financial-sector policies
- Climate information architecture (“prerequisite” policy package) three tiers:
  1. Robust climate-related backward- and forward-looking data.
  2. Harmonized climate-related disclosure requirements embedded into law/regulation, supported by standards on indicators and metrics.
  3. Transition taxonomies and plans, supported or not by mandatory disclosure requirements.
- Benefits:
  - Reduces information asymmetry and greenwashing risks.
  - Enables dynamic, forward-looking climate risk analysis (stranded assets, disorderly transitions).
  - Supports prudential policies and supervisory guidance for better climate risk identification, pricing, and management.
  - Can help revise cost of capital for high- and low-carbon investments.
  - Helps stabilize balance of payments by enabling more investment in green and transitioning sectors and improving access to international finance.
- Additional conduct and financial sector policies:
  - Certification, product labeling and rating (financial and non-financial).
  - Climate information architecture (transition taxonomies, disclosures).
  - Financial market conduct and prudential policies to develop sustainable financial securities and ensure integrity of climate claims.
  - Strengthening corporate and sovereign credit risk frameworks to incorporate climate factors and address welfare biases.
  - For Advanced Economy regulators: review whether existing regulations inadvertently obstruct scaling sustainable investment flows to EMDEs.

### Blended finance: role, limits, and operational considerations
- Blended finance combines private capital, development finance (MDBs, DFIs), and public/concessional capital (ODA, philanthropies) to achieve development and climate objectives by mitigating risk and improving return profiles.
- Typical aims:
  - Provide market returns for private investors while supporting projects with highest social returns (mitigation: GHG reductions; adaptation: climate risk and cost reduction).
- Structure examples:
  - Portfolio-level blending: fund using public resources to attract private capital for a portfolio of debt and/or equity.
  - Project-level blending: public capital as guarantee or first-loss to raise private instruments to investment-grade by reducing risk.
- Empirical mobilization metric:
  - Blended finance infrastructure deals attracted 40 cents of private capital for every $1 worth of public or philanthropic money during 2013–2023 (World Bank 2024).
- Optimization considerations:
  - Use of grants, concessional equity, loans, guarantees, securitization, tranching tailored to project and country circumstances.
  - Fund structures mixing public equity and private sector debt can provide scale and diversification benefits.
  - National Development Banks (NDBs) can leverage local knowledge, co-financing, partial credit guarantees, and blended finance to mobilize private capital for infrastructure and renewable energy.
- Key challenges and risks:
  - Concessional funds are scarce; aim to provide minimum support needed to make projects commercially viable and attract maximum private finance.
  - Governance and institutional capacity are critical, especially for PPPs.
  - Blended financing can elevate fiscal risks if fiscal outlook deteriorates or public debt is high; public financial management improvements and global guidance can help mitigate fiscal risks.
  - Reliance on blended finance without reforms can be costly; therefore, priority should be given to reforms that lower cost of capital and boost project profitability before deploying costly public funds.
- Recommended reserve use:
  - Blended finance may be reserved for particularly challenging projects (long payback periods, high upfront capital intensity, significant demand uncertainty) where market solutions are insufficient.

### Interactions and policy sequencing
- Structural reforms make climate policies more effective: energy taxes are more effective at decarbonizing when preceded by macrostructural reforms (Budina et al. 2023).
- Countries in top-quartile of structural reform progress implement higher energy taxes and achieve lower emissions relative to bottom-quartile peers, without significant adverse impacts on outputs.
- Complementarity required: where reforms also make “brown” investment more attractive, complementary climate measures are needed to address relative attractiveness of brown vs green investments.
- Heterogeneity implies tailored policy mixes:
  - High-debt or externally vulnerable countries: prioritize business environment and governance improvements to attract stable FDI.
  - Large emerging markets with macro stability: prioritize financial market development and market liberalization to incentivize climate finance flows.

_Italic: Source: IMF staff, Box 2: Conceptualizing the Concessional Finance Need, wpiea2026175-source-pdf._

### Box 3. Country Platforms as a Solution to Scale Financing

### Box 3. Country Platforms as a Solution to Scale Financing

### Objectives and Role of Country Platforms
- Country platforms have emerged as a transformative approach to scaling financing for development and climate action 32.
- Core elements:
  - A political agreement that underpins a shared plan.
  - Alignment of international finance with this plan.
  - Acceleration of climate action (Hadley and others 2022).
- They continue the “development effectiveness” agenda highlighted by the G20 Eminent Persons Group on Global Financial Governance in 2018 33.
- Recent literature identifies three generations of platforms:
  - First generation: Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JTEPs) — sector-specific, requiring strong capacity for long-term planning and political commitment (examples: South Africa, Indonesia, Vietnam, Senegal).
  - Second generation: More targeted platforms (example: Egypt's Nexus for Water, Food, and Energy).
  - Emerging third generation: Aims to transform national economies to meet climate and development goals; an initiative part of the Sevilla Platform for Action launched at the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in July 2025 to scale country-driven approaches, including Integrated National Financing Frameworks and country platforms.

### Enabling conditions, design, and implementation
- Effective platforms depend on a high-ambition government plan integrated with well-coordinated 34 planning and budgeting capacities and detailed investment objectives for endorsement by development partners.
- Early involvement of the private sector and financial coordination with development partners are vital to scale blended finance (Finance for Development Lab and C3A 2025).
- Overarching aim: provide countries with a package of concessional financing that supports national goals while aiding debt relief and enhancing aid effectiveness.
- Enabling conditions during design, planning, and implementation:
  - Adopt a programmatic approach and transition planning linking development strategies, NDCs, NAPs, and long-term strategies (LTS).
  - Build institutional capacity and government arrangements; ensure whole-of-government and whole-of-society consultation to maintain political alignment and establish key performance indicators.
  - Converge around core principles while retaining flexibility to adapt to local contexts; avoid one-size-fits-all solutions 35.
- Platform typologies and governance:
  - Country platforms can vary from broad national programs to narrower sector-specific partnerships emphasizing country partnership and coordinated finance 36.
  - Ministries of Finance and Development and/or Planning serve as key enablers and coordinators, collaborating with line ministries (e.g., Ministry of Environment) and regulatory bodies 34.

### Country examples and IMF engagement
- Bangladesh: At end of 2023, a Climate and Development Platform was activated to enhance capacity to mitigate and adapt to climate impacts (IMF, 2023).
- North Macedonia: December 2023 — established an in-country platform to expedite a just energy transition, signing a partnership agreement as part of the Just Energy Transition Investment Platform 37.
- Brazil: Launched its platform in October 2024 38. Features:
  - An overarching ecological transformation plan including taxonomy design, carbon market development, sovereign green bond issuance, and industrial policies.
  - Coordinated by a task force including the ministries of finance, environment, foreign affairs, and the national development bank.
  - Targets advanced projects able to attract external funding (e.g., seven projects with a total investment target of $10 billion concentrating on energy, industry, mobility, and nature-based solutions, many potentially benefiting from blended finance such as green hydrogen, offshore wind, and biofuels).
- Colombia: Launched its country platform in January 2025 39:
  - Features 316 projects with a funding goal of $38 million aimed at facilitating a socio-ecological transition.
  - Objectives: decarbonize energy and transportation sectors; attract private climate finance through a stable regulatory framework; promote social inclusion and climate justice.
  - Relies on guarantees and concessional financing with inter-ministerial coordination and capacity development at public, private, local, and sub-national levels.
- IMF role within the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) framework:
  - Facilitates macro-critical policy reforms (fiscal, sectoral, financial) to create a conducive environment for climate finance.
  - Provides capacity development to empower national authorities to manage climate-related challenges.
  - Convenes stakeholders through roundtables to foster dialogue among country authorities, international organizations, and the private sector.
  - As of May 2026, roundtables have taken place in Barbados, Rwanda, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Bangladesh, Senegal, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Papua New Guinea, Madagascar, and The Gambia.

### Role of budget and international concessional financing
- Many macrostructural and climate measures can be budget neutral or budget positive, but most blended financing mechanisms and some climate measures require public resources.
- Governments choose policy options and financial instruments based on project risk-return profiles and available fiscal space; instruments include grants, concessional debt, and guarantees to crowd in private finance.
- Public resources originate chiefly from domestic public budgets or international concessional sources (MDBs and other donors).
- Current financing context:
  - EMDE climate investments are largely financed domestically (CPI 2022).
  - International concessional climate financing has only just passed the goal of US$ 100 billion annually.
  - Rising climate investment needs: at least 12 percent of total EMDE investments (relative to the current 3 percent; IMF 2023a) will soon far exceed available domestic public or private financing capacity (Prasad and others 2022).
  - High private sector debt and capital costs (IMF 2023c) will weigh on the cost of capital, reducing projects financeable by the private sector.
  - Many EMDE governments face high debt levels and rising interest rates, magnifying macro-financial risks and constraining fiscal space for climate spending.
- Potential reallocation of fossil-fuel-related funds:
  - IEA estimates up to $1 trillion available from phasing out fossil fuel subsidies and an additional $726 billion from redirecting fossil fuel investments (Table 4).
- Table 4. Potential Funds Available for Green and Resilience Investments by Repricing Carbon
  - Redirecting fossil fuel investments: Up to $726 billion (2020) — IEA estimates for 2020.
  - Phasing out fossil fuel subsidies: Up to $1 trillion (2022); Up to $750 billion (2010–21) — IEA estimates for 2022 and between 2010 and 2021 (only consumption subsidies).
  - Phasing out fossil fuel subsidies and including potential carbon price revenues: Up to $7 trillion (2022) — IMF estimates for 2022 (includes implicit environmental costs and foregone carbon taxes).
- IMF 2023a estimates that with appropriate policies, EMDE government budget and international concessional financing for climate projects can be scaled up by 50 percent, with the remaining financing coming from the private sector.
- IEA estimates around $100 billion annually in blended finance structures will be necessary to meet net zero targets for the energy sector in EMDEs.
- The G20 Independent Expert Group (IEG) estimates climate challenges and progress towards SDGs requires an additional $3 trillion annually over the 2030 horizon; roughly $2 trillion annually would need to come from the domestic public sector’s budget to complement ODA and private inflows.

### Innovative financial instruments
- Debt-for-climate swaps: partial debt relief conditional on debtor climate investments; generally considered less efficient than conditional grants and/or broad debt restructuring (Chamon and others 2022), but can expand fiscal space when grants and concessional resources are not available.
- Pay-for-success instruments (e.g., environmental impact bonds) tie financial return to environmental success (Brand and others 2021).
- Outcome-based instruments (e.g., sustainability-linked sovereign debt instruments) feature contractually agreed sustainability performance targets linked to key performance indicators and can adjust bond coupons (IMF 2022).
- Implementation challenges: these instruments face regulatory and institutional prerequisites and a variety of implementation challenges; Annex II elaborates on innovative finance instruments.

### Conclusion and areas for future research
- The paper outlines three intervention types to increase private finance flows for climate investments:
  - (i) Macro-structural reforms to reduce the economy-wide cost of capital.
  - (ii) Climate measures to improve profitability and reduce the cost of capital of low-carbon and sustainable projects.
  - (iii) Blended financing to crowd-in private investments, leveraging concessional public resources.
- Key constraints to undertaking climate investments at the required speed and scale:
  - (a) Structural reforms have significant long-term impact but take time to implement.
  - (b) Climate measures affect sectoral investment decisions, incomes, and consumption and must be timed to mitigate impacts on vulnerable populations.
  - (c) Fiscal sustainability concerns limit the quantum of public finance available for direct investment and blended finance instruments.
- Policy implications:
  - Appropriate instrument choice requires understanding country-level climate risks, priorities, relevant sectors, and investments.
  - Building a project pipeline with appropriate sequencing is essential to avoid large-scale economic disruptions.
  - Robust frameworks with ambitious and credible targets are key to attracting private investment.
  - Macroeconomic circumstances — public fiscal space, availability of official financial flows, and access to international financial markets — will shape countries’ financing mix.
  - The balance of private versus public financing will differ by jurisdiction; EMDEs with stronger state capacity and market access may gain more from private capital mobilization, while smaller LICs with weaker capacity may prioritize public investment efficiency and official aid.
  - Climate measures should be evaluated for effects on other development objectives.
- Two important areas for future research:
  - Measuring the effectiveness of different instrument combinations and appropriately sequencing them for varied country circumstances, including ranking instruments by effectiveness and scope.
  - Examining global coordination on allocating international concessional financing, domestic revenue mobilization, and targeting government spending toward climate goals.
  - Further refinement to distinguish measures most conducive to financing adaptation versus transition, and how to prioritize climate finance needs amid broader development needs.

*Source: IMF Working Paper — Box 3. Country Platforms as a Solution to Scale Financing (excerpt).*

### Annex 1. Estimating climate finance needs and

### Annex 1. Estimating climate finance needs and barriers to scale up climate finance in EMDEs

### EMDE investment needs for transition (mitigation and energy)
- EMDE’s annual financing needs are in the magnitude of trillions by mid-century.
- EMDE investment needs for transition make up about one-third of global needs, ranging from above US$1 trillion to US$4 trillion per year.
- Representative estimates (per year):
  - US$1.4–US$1.9 trillion — Net-zero by 2050; Through 2030; IEA and IFC (2023). Note: Energy only, based on achieving SDG 7 by 2030 (excluding China).
  - US $1.3 -US$1.7 trillion — 1.5 C target; Through 2030; Songwe et al. (2022). Note: Energy only; investment needs for energy transformation, including renewable energy expansion, investment in infrastructure, productivity improvement and decarbonizing end-use, green hydrogen, and cost of phasing out coal (excluding China).
  - US$1.4–US$2.8 trillion — 1.5–2 C target; Through 2030; IPCC (2022). Note: Across four sectors including energy efficiency, transport, electricity, and broad land use systems (Including China).
  - US$3.9 trillion — Net-zero by 2050; Through 2050; McKinsey (2022). Note: Total investment needs in fossil-fuel producing regions and developing countries (excluding China). Aggregate across seven energy and land use systems.
- Contextual points:
  - Global “net” investment needs for net-zero transition could be between 30 – 40 percent of the gross total.
  - Repurposing EMDE fossil fuel subsidies toward low-emission assets could be part of the solution; global spending on fossil fuel subsidies, concentrated in EMDEs, amounts to US$1 trillion annually (IEA 2023).
  - Garnering multi-trillion financing is extremely challenging for EMDEs due to substantially high capital costs reflecting investors’ risk perceptions on conditions such as the exchange rate, institutional quality, and general investment climate.

### Adaptation finance needs for EMDEs
- Adaptation finance needs vary substantially across estimates due to uncertainties in timing of investments, assumed climate scenarios, and methodologies.
- Selected estimates (per year):
  - US$250 billion — Through 2030; Bhattacharya, Songwe, Soubeyran and Stern (2024). Note: For EMDEs other than China.
  - US$244 billion — Through 2030; UNEP (2023). Note: Aggregate costs over 12 sectors, including costs in developing countries, Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States.
  - US$417.2 billion — Through 2030; Aligishiev, Massetti, and Bellon (2022). Note: Bottom-up aggregates. Strengthening resilience of infrastructure investment and stocks to current flood and storm risks as well as rising sea levels. (Translated into US dollars from estimates of 0.6 percent of GDP for EMDEs.)
  - US$764–US$835 billion — Through 2030; UNFCCC 2021 on cost adaptation actions in NDCs. Note: Bottom-up aggregates: summarizing cost information from 78 countries’ own estimations.
  - US$160–US$340 billion — Through 2030; Sakai and others (2022). Note: Top-down, model-driven projections. Range depends on climate impact scenarios and other model assumptions.
  - US$315–US$565 billion — Through 2050; (aggregate cited in source table).
  - US$47–US$1,088 billion (median $295 billion a year) — Through 2050; IPCC (2022). Note: Summarizing projections from various sources. Range depends on climate impact scenarios and other model assumptions. The estimation includes very low estimations smaller than the current global goal for adaptation finance.
- Key observations on adaptation estimates:
  - Aligishiev et al. (2022) find global public adaptation needs estimated to average about 0.25 per cent of world GDP annually when restricted to adapting existing public assets and expanding small island state public assets.
  - Country self-assessments can indicate requirements sometimes reaching 100 to 250 times the global average for certain lower-income vulnerable countries.
  - Adaptation finance needs rise when global mitigation actions are insufficient or delayed; costs are closely linked to warming trajectories.
  - There is a trade-off between the amount of adaptation undertaken and residual damage costs: more adaptation reduces impacts but increases costs.
- Methodological and data challenges:
  - Framing differences: adapting to current climate conditions versus future circumstances; separating adaptation needs from broader development needs.
  - “Bottom-up” (country aggregates) versus “top-down” (model-driven) approaches produce divergent regional/EMDE estimates.
  - Other methodological challenges include definitional variations, limited disclosures of resilient investments and lack of impact metrics, context dependency of resilience outcomes, and institutional data and reporting barriers.

### Barriers to scale up climate finance in EMDEs
- Market-wide constraints:
  - Lack of investment-grade sovereign credit rating is a significant constraint; only about 60% of these markets and 8% of developing economies have an investment-grade rating.
  - Credit rating agencies do not reward middle- and lower-income countries that implement better climate measures, limiting benefits for credit ratings and financing costs.
  - Capital allocation decisions by global financial institutions are driven by perceived risk-return profiles, difficulties navigating EMDE complexities, reputational risk, and stringent ESG regulations in advanced economies.
  - EMDEs often lack well-structured, investable project pipelines, have low domestic capital market development, and face challenges managing foreign exchange risk that hinder cross-border investments and local debt market development.
  - Renewable energy projects in EMDEs have high upfront fixed capital costs and significant policy risks; integration challenges include prerequisite infrastructures, intermittency and storage, supply chain issues, permits, and grid integration. Investment in renewable energy in EMDEs still lags fossil fuel investments, with a target ratio of around 4:1 for renewable over fossil fuel investment required globally throughout this decade.
- Adaptation-specific constraints:
  - Conventional approach—to finance adaptation via government debt—faces limits because of limited tax bases, borrowing capacities, and increasing debt levels that constrain domestic public investment in adaptation.
  - Uncertainty about economic consequences of climate impacts and the efficiency of adaptation technologies are notable and country-specific challenges.
  - Private sector engagement is limited because many priority adaptation projects are public goods:
    - Approximately 40 percent of publicly identified priority adaptation investments are classified as public goods.
    - A further 35 percent are in areas typically provided by the public sector, such as quasi-public goods or essential public services (UNEP 2025).
    - Consequently, private sector investment is often unattractive due to underpriced risks, lack of access to finance in EMDEs, lack of economies of scale and bankable projects, insufficient pricing of climate-related risks, gaps in climate data and models, challenges of quantifying societal benefits, and limited laws and regulations to internalize adaptation benefits.
  - Additional barriers include technical and knowledge-based constraints and fragmentation of the adaptation finance architecture, intensifying institutional and governance barriers.
- Public sector roles and market failures:
  - Public finance and international support are often required where activities are true public goods or yield below-market returns.
  - Market failures, network resilience issues, high upfront costs, confidentiality and data protection concerns, fragmented reporting, and complex data collection arrangements further impede scaling private finance for adaptation and resilience.

*Source: IMF staff compilation from Annex 1 of the provided IMF working paper chapter.*

### Annex I).

### wpiea2026175-source-pdf - Annex I)

### Structured finance
- Closed-end fixed income funds (e.g., pooled investment funds) can pool existing bank loans into green bonds, with the public sector assuming credit risk.
- Benefits: reduces credit risk (by elevating to investment-grade finance), scales, diversifies, and potentially reduces currency risk via pooling; credibility enhanced by selection of qualified bank loans and standard green bond certification.
- Public finance share in an investment can influence project development.
- Implementation requires existing bank loans and technical assistance for banks to issue green bonds.
- Use case: green bonds issued by EMDE banks (against green loans) that are securitized.

### Result-based financing instruments (Outcome-based debt instruments)
- Instruments: sustainability-linked bonds and loans (instruments linked to issuer achievement of climate or broader sustainability goals).
- Features:
  - Linked to predefined KPIs; progress or lack thereof can impact the instrument's coupon pricing structure.
  - Do not have use-of-proceeds criteria and can be used for general purposes of firm or government operations with explicit sustainability targets.
  - Each KPI is linked to a trigger event that can modify the instrument's pricing structure if not achieved by a predetermined date.
- Design considerations:
  - Guarantees or a greater rate of return may be required to mitigate (real or perceived) risk and boost investor trust.
  - Sustainability performance targets determine potential climate impacts; financial penalties serve as a commitment device and need to be high enough to motivate issuers to achieve targets (IMF 2022).
  - Need to be supported by a plan to meet KPIs and are not suitable for all borrowers or issuers, depending on their sustainability credentials and their debt absorption capacity.
  - Borrower/project-funded sustainability-linked instruments need to meet credit and default risk thresholds.
- Potential to expand use by adding impact metrics that capture climate resilience improvements to increase financing for adaptation outcomes.

### Pay-for-success bonds (environmental impact bonds, conservation impact bonds)
- Purpose: provide capital from private investors for environmental projects using a pay-for-success approach; typically issued for one project or initiative and used to pilot riskier investments or scale up existing solutions.
- Mechanism: investors pay for deploying environmental solutions; payers repay investors based on achievement of agreed-upon environmental outcomes.
- Usefulness:
  - Helpful where projects deliver climate change adaptation benefits but lack traditional revenue streams.
  - Can address capacity limits in complex environmental projects and potential public sector investment inefficiencies.
- Requirements and risks:
  - High financial and political risks for private investors; payers typically public institutions or philanthropic foundations.
  - Require a third party for structuring costs; case-specific, time-intensive, and costly.
  - Issuing these bonds can demonstrate funding willingness and set specific targets for success.
- Support modalities: direct investment; technical assistance.

### Payment for ecosystem services (PES)
- Definition: transfers used for regulating ecosystem services, involving payments from beneficiaries to providers (e.g., farmers' land trusts, stewards of protected areas).
- Principle: "beneficiary pays principle" generating income and funding for providers; payments linked to successful provision of ecosystem services or execution of activities that improve them.
- Focus: often target climate change mitigation and adaptation benefits; require tailored schemes and flexible contracts with suppliers.
- Implementation needs:
  - Technical knowledge and monitoring capabilities by public authorities.
  - Subsidized schemes and technical assistance for limited-income owners.
- Modalities: grants, direct payments by governments, PES uses public institutions and private property rights to provide benefits.

### Financial risk management instruments
- Blended finance for infrastructure and complex projects:
  - MDBs or public sector provide equity or mezzanine investment or guarantees to de-risk and crowd in private investors, typically for new infrastructure projects or adoption of new technologies with potentially greater risks (such as in agriculture).
  - Benefits: reduction of credit and political risks, resolution of information asymmetry issues.
  - Requirements: own resources for equity/mezzanine investment and guarantees; provide specialized expertise and technical assistance for project design and selection.
  - Risks and constraints: complex contractual arrangements and large equity investments can lead to moral hazard and lower returns for equity investors; guarantor balance sheets often provide guarantees for the entire amount, making guarantees less common than loans due to lower costs and collateral; guarantors need to select initiatives that are close to being "fundable" without guarantees.
- Green revolving funds:
  - Definition: internal capital pool used to fund sustainability projects that generate cost savings; funds are then used to replenish and reinvest.
  - Typically capitalized by public sources; used to support small projects in developing countries, including adaptation.
  - Use cases: enable community members to access funds at low interest rates with long repayment periods.
  - Requirements and constraints: direct investment by governments, especially to finance adaptation projects; seed funding by MDBs and DFIs; sufficient cash needed to seed the fund; funds must repay/reseed regularly, which may make it difficult to support long-term initiatives.
- Public-private partnerships (PPPs):
  - Definition: long-term agreement between a private company and a government organization to provide a public asset or service.
  - Purpose: deliver public assets or services at lower cost and with more efficiency than purely public projects; distribute counterparty risks between public and private partners.
  - Risk allocation: determined by project features, revenues, commercial counterparty competence, and public sector institutional capabilities; public sector bears risks best suited for it.
  - Climate adaptation/integration: PPPs may include adaptation and resilience into infrastructure projects, with increased public funding guaranteeing that projects account for expected physical climate hazards and risks.
  - Support needs: technical assistance, direct participation in the contract; require long-term contracts, legal competence, tight terms, monitoring and assessment capabilities to meet PPP criteria.

*Source: IMF staff.*

### References

### References — Private Finance and Climate Investment Needs: An Analytical Framework

### Evidence and empirical findings
- “Higher-for-Longer Interest Rate Environment is Squeezing More Borrowers,” IMF Blog, 10 October 2023 (Adrian, Tobias).  
- “The Fiscal and Financial Risks of a High-Debt, Slow-Growth World”. IMF blog, 28 March 2024 (Adrian, Tobias; Vitor Gaspar; Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas).  
- “Nature Loss and Sovereign Credit Ratings”. Finance For Biodiversity Initiative, 2022 (Agawarla, Matthew; Matt Burke; Patrycja Klusak; Moritz Kraemer; Ulrich Volz).  
- “Higher cost of finance exacerbates a climate investment trap in developing economies.” Nature Communications 12, no. 1 (2021): 1-12 (Ameli, Nadia, et al.).  
- “Climate Change and Select Financial Instruments: An Overview of Opportunities and Challenges for Sub-Saharan Africa.” IMF Staff Climate Note 2022/009 (Belianska, Anna, et al.).  
- “Model-based financial regulations impair the transition to net-zero carbon emissions”. Nature Climate Change, 2024 (Gasparini, Matteo; Matthew C. Ives; Ben Carr; Sophie Fry; Eric Beinhocker).  
- “Sovereign Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Investing: Chasing Elusive Sustainability”. IMF Working Paper No. 2024/102 (Gratcheva, Ekaterina; Bryan Gurhy).

### Policy frameworks and institutional responses
- “Structural Reforms to Accelerate Growth, Ease Policy Trade-offs, and Support the Green Transition in Emerging Market and Developing Economies.” Discussion note, 2023 (Budina, Nina, et al.).  
- “Financial Sector Policies to Unlock Private Climate Finance in Emerging Market and Developing Economies.” Global Financial Stability Report, October 2023 (IMF).  
- “Fiscal Monitor—Climate Crossroads: Fiscal Policies in a Warming World.” Washington, DC, October 2023 (IMF).  
- “Policies to Foster Green FDI: Best Practices for Emerging Market and Developing Economies” IMF Staff Climate Note 2024/004 (Jaumotte, Florence; Jaden Kim; Samuel Pienknagura; Gregor Schwerhoff).  
- “An introduction to responsible investment: climate adaptation and resilience.” 2025 (Principles for Responsible Investment).  
- “Assessment of Climate-related Vulnerabilities: Analytical framework and toolkit”. January 2025 (Financial Stability Board (FSB) 2025a).  
- “The Relevance of Transition Plans for Financial Stability”. January 2025 (FSB 2025b).  
- “Activating Alignment: Applying the G20 Principles for Sustainable Finance Alignment with a Focus on Climate Change Mitigation.” 2023 (IMF, World Bank Group and OECD).

### Finance instruments, mobilization, and blended finance
- “Debt-for-Climate Swaps: Analysis, Design, and Implementation.” IMF Working Paper 2022/162 (Chamon, Marcos; Erik Klok; Vimal Thakoor; Jeromin Zettelmeyer).  
- “Scaling Up Blended Finance for Climate Mitigation and Adaptation in Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs)”. December 2023 (Network For Greening the Financial System).  
- “Scaling up blended finance. The role of financial regulators”. Keynote address, 25 June 2024 (Tshazibana, Fundi).  
- “Global Landscape of Climate Finance: A Decade of Data.” Climate Policy Initiative (CPI), 2022; “Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2025.” CPI, 2025.  
- COP30 Circle of Finance Ministers, Report on the Baku to Belem Roadmap to US$1.3 trillion, October 2025.  
- “The tipping point for climate finance. Making financial flows consistent with the Paris Agreement”, November 2023 (Aviva Investors; used by Coalition of Climate Ministers for Climate Action 2024).  
- “Blended finance in infrastructure in Infrastructure Monitor 2023”, February 2024 (World Bank).

### Climate risks, adaptation, and resilience
- IPCC. 2022. Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report.  
- IPCC. 2023. “Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report.” Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report.  
- “Adaptation Gap Report 2022: Too Little, Too Slow—Climate Adaptation Failure Puts World at Risk.” UNEP, 2022.  
- “Adaptation Gap Report 2023: Underfinanced. Underprepared. Inadequate investment and planning on climate adaptation leaves world exposed”. UNEP, 2023.  
- “Adaptation Gap Report 2024: Come hell and high water — As fires and floods hit the poor hardest, it is time for the world to step up adaptation actions”. UNEP, 2024.  
- “Adaptation Gap Report 2025: Running on empty — The world is gearing up for climate resilience — without the money to get there”. UNEP, 2025.  
- “Mobilizing adaptation finance to build resilience.” Climate Financial Risk Forum, October 2024.  
- “The Catalytic Impact of Resilience and Sustainability Arrangements”. IMF Working Paper WP/26/38, 2026 (Diallo, Yoro; Patricia L Escalante; Linda Kaltani; Tümer Kapan; Friederike Langowski; Dan Nyberg).

### Energy transition, clean energy investment, and cost of capital
- International Energy Agency (IEA). 2021. “Financing Clean Energy Transitions in Emerging and Developing Economies.”  
- IEA. 2023a. “Fossil Fuels Consumption Subsidies 2022”.  
- IEA. 2023b. “Net Zero Roadmap: A Global Pathway to Keep the 1.5 °C Goal in Reach.”  
- IEA and IFC. 2023. “Scaling Up Private Finance for Clean Energy in Emerging and Developing Economies.”  
- IEA 2024a. Reducing the Cost of Capital. Strategies to unlock clean energy investment in emerging market and developing economies.  
- IEA 2024b. World Energy Investment.  
- “How to Unlock Pipelines of Bankable Renewable Energy Projects in Emerging Markets and Developing Countries?” World Bank, December 2023 (Sustainable Renewables Risk Mitigation Initiative).  
- “The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bring”. McKinsey Global Institute, 2022.  
- “Corporate Net Zero Transition and Financing Cost: Evidence of Impact from Global Energy and Utilities Sectors.” 10 Sept. 2024 (Zhou, Xiaoyan, et al.).

### Market standards, taxonomies, and greenwashing
- “Final Report on Greenwashing Response to the European Commission’s request for input on ‘greenwashing risks and the supervision of sustainable finance policies’.” European Securities Markets Authority, 2024.  
- “Enhancing Market Transparency in Green and Transition Finance”. Network For Greening the Financial System, Technical Document, April 2022.  
- “Considering climate-related risks and transition impact in the sovereign investments of central banks. Data, metrics and implementation issues”. Technical Document, May 2024 (NGFS).  
- “Transition Finance in the Debt Capital Market”, International Capital Markets Association (ICMA), February 2024.  
- “The Transition Finance Nexus: A primer on the connections among transition pathways, planning, assessment, and finance in the banking sector.” Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI), April 2025.

### Development finance, country platforms, and multilateral roles
- “Planning and Implementing the Climate and Development Transformation: Country Platforms as Enablers”. Finance for Development Lab, C3A, January 2025.  
- “The realities of country platforms for LDCs and SIDs: ten key lessons”, Briefing Paper, International Institute for Environment and Development, April 2025 (Gul Mohsen, Ebony Holland, Anaa Hassan, Liam Upson).  
- “Blending from the Ground Up: Multilateral and National Development Bank Collaboration to Scale Climate Finance.” 2025 (Mariotti, C.; Kozul-Wright, R.K.; Bhandary, R.R.; K.P. Gallagher).  
- “Mobilising Private Capital for Climate Action and Growth in the Global South”, T20 Policy Brief, 2023 (Lankes, Hans Peter; Nick Robins).  
- “Unlocking local currency financing in emerging markets and developing economies: What role can donors, development finance institutions and multilateral development banks play?” OECD Development Co-operation Working Papers, No. 117 (Horrocks, P., et al.), 2025.

### Data, modeling, and analytical tools
- “IMF Fossil Fuel Subsidies Data: 2023 Update.” IMF Working Paper 2023/169 (Black, Simon; Antung Liu; Ian Parry; Nate Vernon).  
- “Research on transmission mechanisms from sustainable finance to the real economy.” Review of World Economics, May 2024 (Caldecott, Ben, et al.).  
- “For an articulated approach to economic policy and financial regulation to deal with climate challenges.” Institute for Climate Economics (I4CE), November 2023.  
- “Green transition, investment horizon, and dynamic portfolio decisions.” Ann Oper Res 334, 265–286 (Semmler, W., Lessmann, K., Tahri, I. et al.), 2024.  
- “Stocktake on Financial Institutions’ Transition Plans and their Relevance to Micro-prudential Authorities”. NGFS, May 2023.  
- “Building Climate-ready Transition Plans: Including adaptation and resilience for comprehensive transition planning approaches.” International Transition Plan Network, Advisory Paper, November 2024.

*Private Finance and Climate Investment Needs: An Analytical Framework — Working Paper No. WP/2026/175*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2026/english/wpiea2026175-source-pdf.pdf_
