## wpiea2026182-source-pdf - Section 3 describes the model, while Section 4 presents the results of calibrating the model

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### Literature review and contribution
- Builds on three strands: (i) migration flows, (ii) role of immigration policy on migration flows and macro/labor outcomes, and (iii) determinants of remittances and their impact on source countries.
- Empirical findings and gaps:
  - Immigration patterns influenced by wage differences and intensity of immigration enforcement.
  - Immigration alters host-country labor market outcomes by changing skill composition.
  - Tightening immigration policy often focuses on irregular (low-skilled) migration; effects depend on substitution elasticities and complementarities across skill groups.
  - Tighter immigration policies in one destination redirect migrant flows to alternative destinations rather than reducing aggregate migration.
  - Remittances respond to deportation risk and income instability; earlier models treated remittances as exogenous, recent models endogenize migration and remittances but often abstract from skill heterogeneity or skill-selective immigration policy.
- This paper’s contributions:
  - Introduces endogenous migration of both skilled and unskilled workers and endogenous remittances.
  - Incorporates skill heterogeneity and allows immigration policies to restrict skilled and unskilled flows separately.
  - Models remittances adjusting on extensive (number of migrants) and intensive (remittances per migrant) margins.
  - Enables joint assessment of skill-selective immigration policies on migration flows, remittances, wages, and welfare in both origin and destination.

### Model overview: agents, markets, production, and preferences
- Agents and markets:
  - Four household types: skilled and unskilled in home (host/destination) and foreign (origin/source).
  - International markets incomplete: only skilled households trade risk-free assets; unskilled do not trade any asset.
  - Skilled households can trade home or foreign bonds; unskilled households in foreign can choose to migrate and send remittances.
- Preferences:
  - Households maximize E_t sum_{τ=t}^{∞} β^{τ−t} ( ε^b_t ln c_{j,τ} − χ_j l_{j,τ}^{1+ψ_j} / (1+ψ_j) ).
  - Parameters include β (discount factor), ψ (inverse Frisch elasticity), ε^b_t (intertemporal demand shock).
- Production and aggregation (home):
  - Total output: ˜Y_t = [ γ^{1/θ} Y_{1,t}^{(θ−1)/θ} + (1−γ)^{1/θ} Y_{2,t}^{(θ−1)/θ} ]^{θ/(θ−1)} (Equation (3)).
  - Unskilled composite: Y_{1,t} = L_{u,t} + L^*_{u,t} (Equation (4)) — native and immigrant unskilled labor perfectly substitutable.
  - Skilled–capital composite: nested CES with parameters λ, η, η_L governing substitution (Equation (5)).
  - Key production parameters: γ, s, λ, ζ, θ, η, η_L.
- Capital accumulation (both countries and both skill types):
  - k_{j,t+1} = (1−δ) k_{j,t} + ε^i_t i_{j,t} (Equations (2) and (9)); δ is depreciation rate.

### Home households: constraints and choice variables
- Skilled budget constraint (home):
  - w_{s,t} l_{s,t} + r_{s,t} k_{s,t} + (1 + r^b_t) b_{h,t} + (1 + r^{b*}_t) Q_t b_{f,t} + T_{s,t} ≥ c_{s,t} + i_{s,t} + b_{h,t+1} + π/2 (b_{h,t+1})^2 + Q_t b_{f,t+1} + π/2 Q_t (b_{f,t+1})^2.
  - Choice variables: c_{s,t}, l_{s,t}, i_{s,t}, b_{f,t+1}, b_{h,t+1}.
- Unskilled budget constraint (home):
  - w_{u,t} l_{u,t} + r_{u,t} k_{u,t} ≥ c_{u,t} + i_{u,t} (Equation (1)).
  - Choice variables: c_{u,t}, l_{u,t}, i_{u,t}.

### Foreign households: mobility dynamics, constraints, and choice variables
- Skilled mobility:
  - l^i_{s,t} = (1−δ^e_s) ( l^i_{s,t−1} + l^e_{s,t−1} ) (Equation (6)); δ^e_s exogenous return fraction.
  - Skilled foreign budget constraint includes local earnings w^*_{s,t}(l^*_{s,t} − l^i_{s,t}), immigrant earnings w^i_{s,t} Q^{-1}_t l^i_{s,t}, sunk emigration cost f^e_{s,t}, and bond positions.
  - Choice variables: c^*_{s,t}, l^*_{s,t}, l^e_{s,t}, i^*_{s,t}, b^*_{f,t+1}, b^*_{host,t+1}.
- Unskilled mobility:
  - l^i_{u,t} = (1−δ^e_u) ( l^i_{u,t−1} + l^e_{u,t−1} ) (Equation (7)); δ^e_u exogenous return fraction.
  - Unskilled foreign budget constraint: w^*_{u,t} (l^*_{u,t} − l^i_{u,t}) + w^i_{u,t} Q^{-1}_t l^i_{u,t} + r^*_{u,t} k^*_{u,t} ≥ c^*_{u,t} + f^e_{u,t} w^i_{u,t} Q^{-1}_t l^e_{u,t} + i^*_{u,t} (Equation (8)).
  - Choice variables: c^*_{u,t}, l^*_{u,t}, l^e_{u,t}, i^*_{u,t}.

### Current account, remittances, and remittance rule
- Foreign composite good aggregation:
  - ˜Y^*_t = [ ω^{*1/μ^*} Y^*_{f,t}^{(μ^*−1)/μ^*} + (1−ω^*)^{1/μ^*} Y^*_{h,t}^{(μ^*−1)/μ^*} ]^{μ^*/(μ^*−1)} (Equation (13)).
  - ˜Y^*_t equals C^*_{s,t} − C^i_{s,t} Q^{-1}_t + C^*_{u,t} − C^i_{u,t} Q^{-1}_t + I^*_{s,t} + I^*_{u,t} + f^e_{s,t} Q^{-1}_t L^e_{s,t} + f^e_{u,t} Q^{-1}_t L^e_{u,t}.
- Immigrant labor income use and remittances:
  - w^i_{j,t} l^i_{j,t} = Q_t ˜G_{j,t} + c^i_{j,t} for j∈{s,u} (Equation (14)).
  - Per-unit remittances: g_{j,t} = ˜G_{j,t} / l^i_{j,t}.
  - Aggregate remittances: G_{u,t} = (1−s^*) ˜G_{u,t}; G_{s,t} = s^* ˜G_{s,t}.
- Remittance rule (intensive margin):
  - g_{u,t} = ( w^i_{u,t} / w^*_{u,t} )^{φ} ̄g_u (Equation (15)); analogous for skilled remittances.
  - Parameter φ governs sensitivity of remittances to the wage gap.

### Optimization and key mechanisms
- Each household type optimizes given its skill and country.
- Key mechanisms linking policy and outcomes:
  - Skill-specific emigrant/immigrant flows governed by wage gaps (w^i_{j,t}/Q_t versus w^*_{j,t}), sunk emigration costs f^e_{j,t}, and return fractions δ^e_j.
  - Remittances respond on both extensive (migrant stock) and intensive (per-worker transfers via φ) margins.
  - Only skilled households participate in international asset markets, creating asymmetry in external adjustment channels.
- Stock variables emphasized:
  - Capital k_{j,t+1} and stock of migrants l^i_{j,t}.

### Calibration and shock design (Section 4)
- Baseline calibration: host = U.S., source = Guatemala; Mexico used as alternative calibration.
- Restrictive immigration policy: simulated as a positive, one-standard-deviation shock to the sunk cost parameter for either unskilled migrant flows (ε^f_u_t) or skilled migrant flows (ε^f_s_t), representing roughly a 40 percent increase in this cost.
- Shock interprets enforcement, visa barriers, and frictions that restrict new inflows; return probabilities unchanged.
- Selected calibration parameters (Table 1, selected):
  - γ (Host): 0.08
  - s (Host): 0.92
  - λ (Host): 0.36
  - ζ (Host): 8.36
  - γ* (Source): 0.40
  - s* (Source): 0.30
  - ζ* (Source): 4.95
  - β, β* Discount factor: 0.99
  - δ Capital depreciation rate: 0.025
  - f^e_u Sunk cost of unskilled migration: 2.8
  - δ^e_u Return probability for unskilled migrants: 0.07
  - f^e_s Sunk cost of skilled migration: 1.5
  - δ^e_s Return probability for skilled migrants: 0.01
- Targeted moments for Guatemala (Table 2, Data vs. Model):
  - Wage Premium (Host): Data 2.20, Model 2.56
  - Wage Premium (Source): Data 3.50, Model 5.31
  - Migrant Share of Labor Force: Data 0.10, Model 0.27
  - Remittances/GDP (Source): Data 0.19, Model 0.31
- Model reproduces host wage premium closely; source wage premium, migrant share, and remittance ratio are overstated in the model. Steady-state remittances-to-GDP for Guatemala: 0.31 (31%) vs. observed ~0.19 (19%) in 2025.

### Results — immigration flows and stocks (Section 4.1)
- Shock magnitude: one-standard-deviation increase in sunk cost ≈ roughly a 40 percent increase.
- Restricting unskilled immigration (unskilled shock, blue):
  - Immigrant inflows of unskilled workers drop by roughly 40 percent on impact relative to steady state.
  - After 30 quarters, immigrant inflows remain about 10 percent below steady state.
  - Immigrant stock of unskilled migrants persists at about 10 percent below steady state.
  - Decline in unskilled immigrant stock reduces available unskilled labor, contracting output and lowering demand for skilled labor; skilled inflows and stocks also decline.
- Restricting skilled immigration (skilled shock, red):
  - Smaller and much less persistent impacts on both skilled and unskilled flows and stocks.
  - Declines reflect smaller baseline stock share of skilled immigrants and weaker general-equilibrium effects.
- Policy implication:
  - Policies aimed at unskilled migrants generate broad spillovers across both skill groups; policies aimed at skilled migrants are largely confined to the skilled margin.

### Results — labor market outcomes (Section 4.2)
- Labor market architecture: nested CES with unskilled labor complementary to capital–skilled-labor composite.
- Unskilled-migration restriction (blue):
  - Unskilled wage in host rises by about 8 percent above steady state.
  - Skilled wage in host declines by roughly 1 percent.
  - Net effect: compression of the skill premium in the home economy despite policy targeting only unskilled immigration.
- Skilled-migration restriction (red):
  - Skilled wage in host declines by about 0.5 percent.
  - Negligible impact on unskilled wages.
  - Net effect: smaller compression of the skill premium than under an unskilled shock.
- Source-country wages transmit via labor supply adjustments; both skilled and unskilled wages in the source country respond.

### Results — remittances (Section 4.3)
- Remittances respond on intensive (per-worker) and extensive (migrant stock) margins per rule g_{j,t} = (w^i_{j,t}/w^*_{j,t})^{φ} ̄g_j.
- Unskilled-migration restriction (blue):
  - Host–source unskilled wage gap widens: host unskilled wages rise; source unskilled wages fall.
  - Remittances per unskilled worker increase by about 10 percent above steady state.
  - Large decline in unskilled migrant stock dominates → total unskilled remittances decline.
  - Remittances per skilled worker fall by about 2 percent; total skilled remittances decline roughly 2 percent below steady state.
  - Aggregate total remittances decline by about 1.5 percent compared to steady state.
- Skilled-migration restriction (red):
  - Wage gap for skilled labor widens; remittances per skilled worker increase.
  - Modest decline in skilled migrant stock is dominated by per-worker increase → total skilled remittances show a small increase.
  - Minor negative effects on unskilled remittances; aggregate total remittances show very limited increase overall.
- Emphasis: outcomes driven by relative strength of intensive vs. extensive margins and parameter φ.

### Results — host-country macro aggregates (Section 4.4)
- Both unskilled and skilled immigration restrictions are contractionary for host:
  - Removal of productive labor reduces output, consumption, and capital stock.
- Quantitative responses (unskilled restriction, blue):
  - Output falls by about 1 percent.
  - Consumption falls by roughly 0.6 percent.
  - Capital stock falls by about 0.6 percent.
  - GDP per capita rises because the reduction in immigrant unskilled population is proportionally larger than the fall in aggregate GDP.
- Skilled restriction (red):
  - GDP falls almost in the same amount as the fall in the immigrant stock, leaving GDP per capita roughly unchanged.
- Consumption dynamics:
  - Consumption contraction smaller than output contraction due to higher unskilled wages cushioning aggregate consumption.
  - Decline in aggregate consumption persists beyond 30 quarters because of reduced returns on capital and lower capital accumulation.
- Channel summary:
  - Unskilled immigrants account for a larger share of effective labor input and are strongly complementary to capital and skilled labor → larger and more persistent contractions under unskilled restrictions.

### Results — source-country aggregates (Guatemala) (Section 4.5)
- Restricting unskilled migration (blue):
  - Keeps a large pool of unskilled workers in foreign country → depresses foreign unskilled wages.
  - Capital accumulation increases by about 2 percent.
  - Output rises by roughly 3.5 percent above steady state.
  - GDP per capita falls by about 0.8 percent.
  - Consumption falls by about 0.8 percent, driven by lower average unskilled wages and a decline in received remittances.
- Restricting skilled migration (red):
  - Modest aggregate effects because skilled migrant pool is small.
  - Barely changes resident labor force; limited impacts on capital, output, and consumption.
  - GDP per capita shows only a small decline; remittance changes limited in aggregate effect.
- Mechanisms:
  - Complementarity between unskilled labor and capital–labor composite: more unskilled labor raises returns to capital → induces capital accumulation and higher aggregate output.
  - Population vs. production: output can rise while GDP per capita falls if population increases more than production.
  - Declines in remittances amplify consumption declines in source country.
- Caveats and model assumptions:
  - No labor market frictions (no unemployment): restricting immigrant labor increases wages as labor demand adjusts; introducing unemployment would alter quantitative effects.
  - Model omits inefficiencies in capital allocation; including such inefficiencies would lower the rise in output and increase consumption and per-capita losses.
  - Primary drivers: assumption of complementarity between unskilled labor and the skilled-labor–capital composite.

### Mexico calibration — key quantitative differences
- Calibration differences: Mexico has different γ* and s* (larger share of skilled workers, less reliant on unskilled labor).
- Targeted moments (Mexico, Data vs. Model):
  - Wage Premium (Host): Data 2.20, Model 1.99
  - Wage Premium (Source): Data 2.50, Model 2.31
  - Migrant Share of Labor Force: Data 0.10, Model 0.25
  - Remittances/GDP (Source): Data 0.04, Model 0.14
- Immigration flows and stocks (Mexico calibration):
  - Unskilled inflows plunge by roughly 60 percent on impact under unskilled restriction (vs. 40 percent for Guatemala).
  - Unskilled migrant stock declines by about 10 percent below steady state.
  - Skilled inflows decline by about 20 percent under the unskilled restriction (roughly double the Guatemala spillover).
- Remittances (Mexico calibration):
  - Remittances per unskilled worker rise by roughly 10 percent under the unskilled shock.
  - Remittances per skilled worker fall by about 1 percent.
  - Total remittances decline by about 2 percent under the unskilled shock (roughly one-third larger decline than Guatemala’s 1.5 percent).
- Source-country aggregates (Mexico calibration, under unskilled restriction):
  - Output rises by about 3 percent.
  - Capital stock increases by approximately 2 percent.
  - Consumption falls by roughly 0.6 percent.
  - GDP per capita falls by about 1.5 percent.
- Interpretation:
  - Mexico’s less unskilled-intensive production structure (lower γ*) and larger share of skilled workers (higher s*) amplify population-driven per-capita declines relative to Guatemala.

### Comparative policy implications and recommended extensions
- Host-country trade-offs when restricting unskilled migration:
  - Potential reductions in wage inequality and increases in average incomes and output per capita.
  - Concurrent reductions in aggregate output, consumption, and capital accumulation.
- Source-country trade-offs when restricting unskilled migration:
  - Capital accumulation and aggregate output can rise, while aggregate consumption and GDP per capita can fall due to lower wages and reduced remittances.
- Skilled migration restrictions:
  - More limited aggregate effects in both host and source countries because skilled migrant pools are smaller and remittance dynamics partially offset reductions in migrant numbers.
- Suggested extensions and further research:
  - Incorporate unemployment and richer labor market dynamics (automation, offshoring, training).
  - Model cases where skilled migrants take unskilled jobs.
  - Introduce informal labor in source countries and model its wage dynamics.
  - Account for inefficiencies in capital allocation to assess how constraints alter output and welfare responses.

*Source: wpiea2026182-source-pdf - Section 3 describes the model, while Section 4 presents the results of calibrating the model*

### Section 3 describes the model, while Section 4 presents the results of calibrating the model

### wpiea2026182-source-pdf - Section 3 describes the model, while Section 4 presents the results of calibrating the model

### Literature review: previous approaches and gaps
- Paper builds on several strands: (i) migration flows, (ii) role of immigration policy on migration flows and macro/labor outcomes, and (iii) determinants of remittances and their impact on source countries.
- Empirical findings summarized:
  - Immigration patterns are influenced by wage differences and intensity of immigration enforcement.
  - Immigration affects host-country labor market outcomes by altering skill composition.
  - Tightening immigration policy changes benefits, costs, and risks, often focusing on irregular (low-skilled) migration (Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999); Chiquiar and Hanson (2005)).
  - Wage effects depend on substitution elasticities and complementarities across skill groups (Borjas (2003); Ottaviano and Peri (2012)).
  - Tighter immigration policies in one destination redirect migrant flows to alternative destinations rather than reducing aggregate migration (International Monetary Fund 2025).
- Remittances literature:
  - Tightening immigration policy increases deportation risk and income instability, which can raise the likelihood and share of income remitted (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006); Amuedo-Dorantes and Puttitanun (2014); Weber and Massey 2023).
  - Early models treated remittances as exogenous; recent models endogenize migration and remittances but often abstract from skill heterogeneity or skill-selective immigration policy (Acosta et al. 2009; Durdu and Sayan 2010; Lim et al. 2023).
- DSGE and migration/remittance models:
  - Mandelman and Zlate 2012: two-country DSGE with endogenous unskilled labor migration and rule-based remittances linked to relative wages; migration constrained by a sunk migration cost calibrated to U.S.-Mexico apprehension data; remittances provide insurance and respond endogenously.
- Contribution of this paper:
  - Augments Mandelman and Zlate (2012) by introducing endogenous migration of both skilled and unskilled workers and endogenous remittances.
  - Incorporates skill heterogeneity in migration decisions and allows immigration policies to restrict skilled and unskilled flows separately.
  - Models remittances adjusting on extensive (number of migrants) and intensive (remittances per migrant) margins.
  - Enables joint assessment of skill-selective immigration policies on migration flows, remittances, wages, and welfare in both origin and destination.

### Model overview (Section 3): agents, markets, and main mechanisms
- Economy structure:
  - Four household types: skilled and unskilled in home (host/destination) and foreign (origin/source).
  - International markets are incomplete: only skilled households trade risk-free assets; unskilled do not trade any asset.
  - Skilled households can trade home or foreign bonds; unskilled households in foreign can choose to migrate and send remittances.
- Preferences (shared structure):
  - Households maximize E_t sum from τ=t to ∞ of β^{τ−t} ( ε^b_t ln c_{j,τ} − χ_j l_{j,τ}^{1+ψ_j} / (1+ψ_j) ).
  - β is the discount factor; ψ is inverse Frisch elasticity; ε^b_t is an intertemporal demand shock.
- Production and aggregation:
  - Home total output: ˜Y_t = [ γ^{1/θ} Y_{1,t}^{(θ−1)/θ} + (1−γ)^{1/θ} Y_{2,t}^{(θ−1)/θ} ]^{θ/(θ−1)} (Equation (3)).
  - Unskilled production composite (home): Y_{1,t} = L_{u,t} + L^*_{u,t} (Equation (4)) — perfectly substitutable native and immigrant unskilled labor.
  - Skilled-capital composite (home): complex nested CES with parameters λ, η, η_L governing capital vs skilled labor and native vs immigrant skilled labor substitution (Equation (5)).
  - Main home production parameters: γ (share of unskilled labor), s (share of skilled households), λ (share of capital in capital-skill composite), ζ (relative productivity of skilled vs unskilled), θ (elasticity between unskilled composite and capital-skilled composite), η (elasticity between capital and skilled labor), η_L (elasticity between native and immigrant skilled labor).
  - Foreign analogues: ˜Y^*_t defined with γ^*, λ^*, θ^*, η^*, s^* (Equation (10) and (12)).
- Capital accumulation (both countries and both skill types):
  - k_{j,t+1} = (1−δ) k_{j,t} + ε^i_t i_{j,t} (Equations (2) and (9)); δ is depreciation rate.

### Home households: constraints and choice variables
- Skilled households budget constraint:
  - w_{s,t} l_{s,t} + r_{s,t} k_{s,t} + (1 + r^b_t) b_{h,t} + (1 + r^{b*}_t) Q_t b_{f,t} + T_{s,t} ≥ c_{s,t} + i_{s,t} + b_{h,t+1} + π/2 (b_{h,t+1})^2 + Q_t b_{f,t+1} + π/2 Q_t (b_{f,t+1})^2.
  - w_s: skilled wage; l_s: labor supply; r_s: gross rental rate on capital; k and i: capital and investment; b_h and b_f: home and foreign bond holdings; r^b and r^{b*}: bond interest rates; Q: real exchange rate; π/2 bond adjustment costs; T_s,t adjustment cost rebated to skilled households.
- Unskilled households budget constraint:
  - w_{u,t} l_{u,t} + r_{u,t} k_{u,t} ≥ c_{u,t} + i_{u,t} (Equation (1)).
- Home choice variables summarized:
  - Skilled: c_{s,t}, l_{s,t}, i_{s,t}, b_{f,t+1}, b_{h,t+1}.
  - Unskilled: c_{u,t}, l_{u,t}, i_{u,t}.

### Foreign households: mobility, constraints, and choice variables
- Skilled cross-border mobility:
  - Skilled foreign households can work locally l^*_{s,t} or as immigrants in home country l^i_{s,t}.
  - Migration dynamic: l^i_{s,t} = (1−δ^e_s) ( l^i_{s,t−1} + l^e_{s,t−1} ) (Equation (6)); δ^e_s is exogenous fraction returning each period.
- Skilled foreign budget constraint:
  - w^*_{s,t} (l^*_{s,t} − l^i_{s,t}) + w^i_{s,t} Q^{-1}_t l^i_{s,t} + r_{s,t} k^*_{s,t} + (1 + r^b_t) Q^{-1}_t b^*_{host,t} + (1 + r^{b*}_t) b^*_{source,t} ≥ c^*_{s,t} + f^e_{s,t} w^i_{s,t} Q^{-1}_t l^e_{s,t} + i^*_{s,t} + Q^{-1}_t b^*_{host,t+1} + π/2 Q^{-1}_t (b^*_{host,t+1})^2 + b^*_{source,t+1} + π/2 (b^*_{source,t+1})^2.
  - f^e_{s,t} is sunk emigration cost for skilled; T^*_s,t analogous rebate.
- Unskilled cross-border mobility:
  - Migration dynamic: l^i_{u,t} = (1−δ^e_u) ( l^i_{u,t−1} + l^e_{u,t−1} ) (Equation (7)); δ^e_u is exogenous return fraction.
  - Unskilled households face sunk emigration cost f^e_{u,t}; calibration ensures w^i_{u,t} (home wage) > w^*_{u,t} (origin wage).
- Unskilled foreign budget constraint:
  - w^*_{u,t} (l^*_{u,t} − l^i_{u,t}) + w^i_{u,t} Q^{-1}_t l^i_{u,t} + r^*_{u,t} k^*_{u,t} ≥ c^*_{u,t} + f^e_{u,t} w^i_{u,t} Q^{-1}_t l^e_{u,t} + i^*_{u,t} (Equation (8)).
- Foreign choice variables summarized:
  - Skilled: c^*_{s,t}, l^*_{s,t}, l^e_{s,t}, i^*_{s,t}, b^*_{f,t+1}, b^*_{host,t+1}.
  - Unskilled: c^*_{u,t}, l^*_{u,t}, l^e_{u,t}, i^*_{u,t}.

### Current account, remittances, and remittance rule
- Foreign composite good:
  - ˜Y^*_t = [ ω^{*1/μ^*} Y^*_{f,t}^{(μ^*−1)/μ^*} + (1−ω^*)^{1/μ^*} Y^*_{h,t}^{(μ^*−1)/μ^*} ]^{μ^*/(μ^*−1)} (Equation (13)).
  - ˜Y^*_t also equals C^*_{s,t} − C^i_{s,t} Q^{-1}_t + C^*_{u,t} − C^i_{u,t} Q^{-1}_t + I^*_{s,t} + I^*_{u,t} + f^e_{s,t} Q^{-1}_t L^e_{s,t} + f^e_{u,t} Q^{-1}_t L^e_{u,t}.
- Immigrant labor income use:
  - For each skill j∈{s,u}: w^i_{j,t} l^i_{j,t} = Q_t ˜G_{j,t} + c^i_{j,t} (Equation (14)).
  - ˜G_{j,t} is total remittances per household migrants of type j send from home to foreign (in foreign composite good units). Per-unit remittances g_{j,t} = ˜G_{j,t} / l^i_{j,t}.
  - Aggregate remittances: G_{u,t} = (1−s^*) ˜G_{u,t}; G_{s,t} = s^* ˜G_{s,t}. Aggregate immigrant consumption: C^i_{u,t} = (1−s^*) c^i_{u,t}; C^i_{s,t} = s^* c^i_{s,t}.
- Remittances as consumption smoothing:
  - Unskilled remittances per unit rule: g_{u,t} = ( w^i_{u,t} / w^*_{u,t} )^{φ} ̄g_u (Equation (15)).
  - Analogous rule for skilled remittances g_{s,t}.
  - Parameter φ governs sensitivity of remittances to the wage gap.
  - Interpretation: when host-country wage for a skill group rises relative to foreign wage, migrants of that group increase per-worker transfers (and vice versa); remittances act as altruistic/insurance compensation.

### Understanding the optimization and model mechanics (summary)
- Unity of household optimization across skills/countries: each household optimizes as a unified unit for its skill type and country.
- Home choice variables:
  - Skilled: c_{s,t}, l_{s,t}, i_{s,t}, b_{f,t+1}, b_{h,t+1}.
  - Unskilled: c_{u,t}, l_{u,t}, i_{u,t}.
- Foreign choice variables:
  - Skilled: c^*_{s,t}, l^*_{s,t}, l^e_{s,t}, i^*_{s,t}, b^*_{f,t+1}, b^*_{host,t+1}.
  - Unskilled: c^*_{u,t}, l^*_{u,t}, l^e_{u,t}, i^*_{u,t}.
- Key mechanisms linking policy and outcomes:
  - Skill-specific emigrant/immigrant flows governed by wage gaps (w^i_{j,t}/Q_t versus w^*_{j,t}) and by skill-specific policy frictions (sunk emigration costs f^e_{j,t} and exogenous return fractions δ^e_j).
  - Remittances respond on both extensive and intensive margins and are rule-based functions of wage gaps with sensitivity parameter φ.
  - Only skilled households participate in international asset markets, creating asymmetries in external adjustment channels.

*Source: wpiea2026182-source-pdf - Section 3 describes the model, while Section 4 presents the results of calibrating the model*

### 2.  Given this, the stock variables will be:  capital (k

### 2.  Given this, the stock variables will be:  capital (k
j,t+1
) and stock of migrants (l
i
j,t
).

### 4. Results — baseline calibration and shock design
- Baseline calibration uses data from the U.S. (host) and Guatemala (source); an alternative foreign economy, Mexico, is reported in the Appendix.
- Restrictive immigration policy is simulated as a positive, one-standard-deviation shock to the sunk cost parameter for either unskilled migrant flows (ε
fu
t
) or skilled migrant flows (ε
fs
t
), representing roughly a 40 percent increase in this cost.
- The sunk-cost shock models real-world measures that increase migration difficulty (enforcement, visa barriers, frictions) and restricts new inflows; return probabilities remain unchanged.
- Table 1 (calibration) key parameter values (selected):
  - γ Share of unskilled labor in production (Host): 0.08
  - s Share of skilled households (Host): 0.92
  - λ Share of capital in capital-skill composite (Host): 0.36
  - ζ Relative productivity of skilled labor (Host): 8.36
  - γ* Share of unskilled labor in production (Source): 0.40
  - s* Share of skilled households (Source): 0.30
  - ζ* Relative productivity of skilled labor (Source): 4.95
  - β, β* Discount factor: 0.99
  - δ Capital depreciation rate: 0.025
  - f
e,u
 Sunk cost of unskilled migration: 2.8
  - δ
e
u Return probability for unskilled migrants: 0.07
  - f
e,s
 Sunk cost of skilled migration: 1.5
  - δ
e
s Return probability for skilled migrants: 0.01
- Table 2 (targeted moments, Guatemala) — Data vs. Model:
  - Wage Premium (Host): Data 2.20, Model 2.56
  - Wage Premium (Source): Data 3.50, Model 5.31
  - Migrant Share of Labor Force: Data 0.10, Model 0.27
  - Remittances/GDP (Source): Data 0.19, Model 0.31
- Model reproduces host-economy wage premium closely; source-economy wage premium, migrant share, and remittance ratio are overstated in the model. The steady-state remittances-to-GDP ratio for Guatemala is 0.31 (31%) in the model vs. an observed value of about 19% in 2025.

### 4.1 Immigration flows and stocks
- Shock magnitude: one-standard-deviation increase in sunk cost ≈ roughly a 40 percent increase.
- Restricting unskilled immigration (unskilled shock, blue):
  - Immigrant inflows of unskilled workers drop by roughly 40 percent on impact relative to steady state.
  - After 30 quarters, immigrant inflows remain about 10 percent below steady state.
  - Immigrant stock of unskilled migrants persists at about 10 percent below steady state (after adjustment).
  - Decline in unskilled immigrant stock reduces available unskilled labor, contracting output and lowering demand for skilled labor; skilled inflows and stocks also decline.
- Restricting skilled immigration (skilled shock, red):
  - Smaller and much less persistent impacts on both skilled and unskilled flows and stocks.
  - Declines reflect smaller baseline stock share of skilled immigrants and weaker general-equilibrium effects.
- Policy implication: Policies aimed at unskilled migrants generate broad spillovers across both skill groups; policies aimed at skilled migrants are largely confined to the skilled margin.

### 4.2 Labor market outcomes (wages)
- Labor market architecture: nested CES with unskilled labor complementary to a capital–skilled-labor composite.
- Unskilled-migration restriction (blue):
  - Unskilled wage in host rises by about 8 percent above steady state.
  - Skilled wage in host declines by roughly 1 percent.
  - Net effect: compression of the skill premium in the home economy despite policy targeting only unskilled immigration.
- Skilled-migration restriction (red):
  - Skilled wage in host declines by about 0.5 percent.
  - Negligible impact on unskilled wages.
  - Net effect: compression of the skill premium, but smaller and more confined than under an unskilled shock.
- Source-country wages:
  - Changes in host wages transmit to source wages through labor supply adjustments; figures show both skilled and unskilled wages in the source country respond (see Figure 2 descriptions).

### 4.3 Remittances
- Remittances defined by altruistic compensation rule: remittances per worker respond to host–source wage gaps for each skill group (intensive margin), while total remittances also depend on migrant stock (extensive margin).
- Unskilled-migration restriction (blue):
  - Wage gap for unskilled labor widens (host unskilled wages rise; source unskilled wages fall due to higher labor supply).
  - Remittances per unskilled worker increase by about 10 percent above steady state.
  - Large decline in unskilled migrant stock dominates, so total remittances by unskilled workers decline (middle right chart Figure 3, blue line).
  - Remittances per skilled worker fall by about 2 percent; total skilled remittances decline roughly 2 percent below steady state.
  - Aggregate total remittances decline by about 1.5 percent compared to steady state (bottom chart Figure 3, blue line).
- Skilled-migration restriction (red):
  - Wage gap for skilled labor widens (drop in skilled wages larger in source than in host), increasing remittances per skilled worker.
  - Modest decline in skilled migrant stock is dominated by per-worker increase, so total skilled remittances show a small increase (top right chart Figure 3, red line).
  - Minor negative effects on unskilled remittances.
  - Aggregate total remittances show only a very limited increase overall (bottom chart Figure 3, red line).
- Mechanism emphasis: intensive margin (per-worker remittances linked to wage gaps via parameter φ) vs. extensive margin (number of migrants sending remittances).

### 4.4 Macroeconomic aggregates in the host country
- Both unskilled and skilled immigration restrictions are contractionary: output, aggregate consumption, and capital stock fall because productive labor is removed from the capital–labor composite.
- Quantitative responses (unskilled restriction, blue):
  - Output falls by about 1 percent.
  - Consumption falls by roughly 0.6 percent.
  - Capital stock falls by about 0.6 percent.
  - GDP per capita rises because reduction in immigrant unskilled population is proportionally larger than fall in aggregate GDP.
- Skilled restriction (red):
  - GDP falls almost in the same amount as the fall in the immigrant stock, leaving GDP per capita roughly unchanged.
- Consumption dynamics:
  - Consumption contraction is smaller than output contraction (0.6 percent vs. 1 percent) because higher unskilled wages cushion aggregate consumption.
  - Decline in aggregate consumption persists beyond 30 quarters due to reduced returns on capital and lower capital accumulation.
- General equilibrium channel: unskilled immigrants account for a bigger share of effective labor input and are strongly complementary to capital and skilled labor, explaining larger and more persistent contractions under unskilled-migration restrictions.

*Source: IMF working paper content (section excerpts provided).*

### 4.5    Macroeconomic Aggregates in Source Country

### 4.5    Macroeconomic Aggregates in Source Country

### Main results for the source country (Guatemala)
- Restricting unskilled migration (blue):
  - Keeps a large pool of unskilled workers in the foreign country, depressing foreign unskilled wages.
  - Triggers an increase in capital accumulation by about 2 percent.
  - Raises output by roughly 3.5 percent above steady state.
  - GDP per capita falls by about 0.8 percent.
  - Consumption falls by about 0.8 percent, driven by lower average unskilled wages and a decline in received remittances.
- Restricting skilled migration (red):
  - Has only modest aggregate effects because the skilled migrant pool is small.
  - Barely changes the resident labor force, with limited impact on capital, output, and consumption.
  - GDP per capita shows only a small decline; changes in remittances are limited in aggregate effect.

### Mechanisms and channels emphasized
- Complementarity between unskilled labor and the capital–labor composite:
  - More available unskilled labor increases returns to capital, inducing capital accumulation and higher aggregate output.
- Population versus production dynamics:
  - Output can rise while GDP per capita falls if population increases more than production.
- Remittances channel:
  - Declines in remittances amplify the consumption decline in the source country when migration is restricted.
- Role of wage dynamics:
  - Depressed unskilled wages in the source country reduce household consumption despite higher aggregate output.

### Results interpretation and model caveats
- Model assumptions with important implications:
  - No labor market frictions (no unemployment): restricting immigrant labor increases wages in the home country as labor demand adjusts to lower supply.
  - In a model with unemployment, wage increases (especially for unskilled) could be more limited, muting income and per-capita GDP effects but potentially enlarging declines in aggregate consumption in the home country.
  - In the source country, including an unemployed pool could amplify wage declines, reduce the change in the wage gap across countries, and lead to a smaller decline in remittances than this model implies.
- Capital allocation inefficiencies:
  - The model does not account for inefficiency in capital allocation; with such constraints the rise in output in the foreign country would be lower, and losses in aggregate consumption and output per capita would be larger because investment would be lower.
- Primary drivers:
  - Results are primarily driven by the assumption of complementarity between unskilled labor and the skilled-labor–capital composite. Comparable qualitative patterns arise even with labor market frictions in related models (e.g., Oikonomou (2023)).

### Mexico calibration — key quantitative differences and dynamics
- Calibration changes relative to Guatemala:
  - Mexico differs in the share of unskilled labor in production (γ*) and the share of skilled households (s*); Mexico has a larger share of skilled workers and is less reliant on unskilled labor.
- Targeted moments (Data vs. Model):
  - Wage Premium (Host): Data 2.20, Model 1.99
  - Wage Premium (Source): Data 2.50, Model 2.31
  - Migrant Share of Labor Force: Data 0.10, Model 0.25
  - Remittances/GDP (Source): Data 0.04, Model 0.14
- Immigration flows and stocks (Mexico calibration):
  - Unskilled inflows plunge by roughly 60 percent on impact under an unskilled restriction (vs. 40 percent for Guatemala).
  - Unskilled migrant stock declines by about 10 percent below steady state.
  - Skilled inflows decline by about 20 percent under the unskilled restriction (roughly double the Guatemala spillover).
- Remittances (Mexico calibration):
  - Remittances per unskilled worker rise by roughly 10 percent under the unskilled shock.
  - Remittances per skilled worker fall by about 1 percent.
  - Total remittances decline by about 2 percent under the unskilled shock (roughly one-third larger decline than Guatemala’s 1.5 percent).
- Source-country aggregates (Mexico calibration):
  - Under an unskilled restriction:
    - Output rises by about 3 percent.
    - Capital stock increases by approximately 2 percent.
    - Consumption falls by roughly 0.6 percent.
    - GDP per capita falls by about 1.5 percent (larger than the Guatemala decline).
  - Differences relative to Guatemala reflect Mexico’s less unskilled-intensive production structure (lower γ*) and larger share of skilled workers (higher s*), which amplify population-driven per-capita declines.

### Comparative host- and source-country aggregate implications (policy trade-offs)
- Host-country effects of restricting unskilled migration:
  - Can reduce wage inequality and increase average incomes and output per capita in the host economy.
  - Also lower aggregate output, consumption, and capital accumulation in the host economy by reducing the supply of a productive input.
  - Result is consistent with evidence that greater access to low-skilled immigrant workers increases firms’ production without reducing aggregate employment among U.S. workers (Clemens and Lewis 2026).
- Source-country effects of restricting unskilled migration:
  - Capital accumulation and aggregate output can rise due to increased domestic labor supply.
  - Aggregate consumption and GDP per capita can fall due to lower wages and reduced remittances and because population increases are not matched proportionally by output.
- Skilled migration restrictions:
  - Tend to have more limited aggregate effects in both host and source countries because skilled migrant pools are smaller and remittance dynamics partially offset reductions in migrant numbers.

### Suggested extensions and further research directions
- Incorporate unemployment and richer labor market dynamics (automation, offshoring, training).
- Model cases where skilled migrants take unskilled jobs.
- Introduce informal labor in source countries and model its specific wage dynamics.
- Account for inefficiencies in capital allocation to assess how constraints alter output and welfare responses.

*Source: Chapter 4.5, "Macroeconomic Aggregates in Source Country," Assessing the Impact of Restricting Skilled and Unskilled Migration: A General Equilibrium Approach, Working Paper No. WP/2026/182.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2026/english/wpiea2026182-source-pdf.pdf_
