## Financial Deepening in Mexico (WP/17/19) — Sections 1–2

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### A. Introduction
- International comparisons show credit depth in Mexico is exceptionally low even after controlling for explanatory factors.
- Bank credit in Mexico is about a quarter of the level observed in other emerging markets (including Brazil) and is just 1/6th of advanced economy average.
- Total credit is also comparatively low; informal credit may be important given the large informal sector.
- Credit to firms has been especially low; firm credit is empirically important for growth (Angeles, 2015).
- Given prudent macroeconomic policies, low intermediation is not attributed to financial repression; bank credit to the public sector is also quite low.
- Key tradeoffs:
  - Financial deepening can boost growth (evidence in Sahay and others (2015)).
  - Excessive credit growth increases risks to financial stability, particularly in an environment of rising interest rates (Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012)).

### B. Credit Depth in Mexico — cyclical and structural assessment
- Short-term cyclical gap:
  - The cyclical credit gap is small; credit is currently growing close to its trend rate.
  - Credit cycles tend to lag output cycles in Mexico.
  - Credit and real cycles are synchronized but not strongly; credit cycles have been shorter and more volatile on average.
- Synchronization (1980-2014) — number of cycles, average cycle duration (years), amplitude, synchronization ratio with GDP:
  - GDP: Number of cycles 8; Average cycle duration (in years) 4.4; Amplitude 0.3; Synchronization Ratio with GDP 1.00
  - Total credit: Number of cycles 12; Average cycle duration (in years) 2.9; Amplitude 0.8; Synchronization Ratio with GDP 0.54
  - Commercial bank credit: Number of cycles 10; Average cycle duration (in years) 3.5; Amplitude 1.0; Synchronization Ratio with GDP 0.56
  - Other credit: Number of cycles 13; Average cycle duration (in years) 2.7; Amplitude 0.9; Synchronization Ratio with GDP 0.49
- Long-term structural gap (random-effects panel regressions linking BCPS/GDP to fundamentals following Cottarelli and others (2005)):
  - Explanatory variables include: public debt/GDP, ln(GDP/population), inflation (threshold specification), capital account openness (Chinn and Ito (2006)), bank regulation indicators, German legal origin dummy, and a time trend.
  - Main empirical relationships:
    - Increase in public debt is associated with less credit to the private sector.
    - Rising incomes are associated with greater credit depth (statistically significant in the emerging market sample).
    - Capital account openness is associated with deeper credit.
    - Structural variables on banking regulation and legal background turn out insignificant.
    - In the full sample, a positive time trend reflects a worldwide increase in credit.
  - Predicted credit depth for Mexico given fundamentals:
    - Full sample estimate: expected bank credit near almost 100 percent of GDP.
    - Emerging market sample estimate: expected bank credit near 60 percent of GDP.
    - Given current credit levels of around 20 percent of GDP, implied structural long-term bank credit gap between 40 and 80 percent of GDP.
  - Adding banking-crisis history (years in crisis from Laeven and Valencia (2012)):
    - Mexican credit depth appears in line with expectations during crisis years.
    - After the year 2000, when macroeconomic policy stabilized, expected credit would have been much higher.
    - In recent years, the resulting gap is virtually the same as without the crisis variable.

- Selected random-effect regression coefficients (countries other than Mexico; robust standard errors in parentheses):
  - Regression (1) Full sample (Observations: 784; Number of countries: 34; R-squared, overall: 15.7):
    - Public debt/GDP: -0.15* (0.08)
    - ln(GDP/population): -0.20 (7.27)
    - Inflation variable, inflation <=4 percent: 0.11*** (0.02)
    - Inflation variable, inflation >4 percent: -48.09 (37.75)
    - Capital account openness: 5.67** (2.61)
    - Bank accounting quality: 11.95 (9.62)
    - German legal origin dummy: 12.68 (15.03)
    - Trend: 1.71*** (0.41)
    - Constant: 8.64 (56.68)
  - Regression (2) EM sample (Observations: 268; Number of countries: 12; R-squared, overall: 0.8):
    - Public debt/GDP: -0.14** (0.06)
    - ln(GDP/population): 20.11*** (7.34)
    - Inflation variable, inflation <=4 percent: 0.64 (0.78)
    - Inflation variable, inflation >4 percent: 5.64 (33.37)
    - Capital account openness: 3.70** (1.82)
    - Bank accounting quality: 8.88 (27.35)
    - German legal origin dummy: -15.92 (27.29)
    - Trend: 0.10 (0.51)
    - Constant: 54.91 (135.75)
  - Regression (3) Full sample with bank crisis dummy (Observations: 193; Number of countries: 10; R-squared, overall: 53.0):
    - Public debt/GDP: -0.55** (0.27)
    - ln(GDP/population): 8.32 (12.05)
    - Inflation variable, inflation <=4 percent: 5.69 (4.95)
    - Inflation variable, inflation >4 percent: 428.42*** (104.84)
    - Capital account openness: -4.22 (3.22)
    - Bank accounting quality: 5.43 (13.90)
    - German legal origin dummy: -9.70 (21.21)
    - Bank crisis dummy: -2.75 (3.65)
    - Trend: -1.86* (0.96)
    - Constant: 47.71 (123.32)
  - Significance notation: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

- Measures of financial development and access:
  - Mexico has fallen behind the LA5 (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay) though remains above the overall LAC average.
  - Financial development index components: market development is quite strong; institutions lag behind the LA5.
  - Institutional components weak: access and depth—low depth driven by low credit figures, low deposits, and small insurance and mutual fund assets.
  - Low access driven by a comparatively small network of branches and a comparative scarcity of ATMs.
- Financial inclusion statistics:
  - World Bank Financial Inclusion Database: 51 percent of adults borrowed some money in 2014; only 10 percent used a formal financial institution (up from 8 percent in 2011).
  - World Bank 2010 enterprise survey:
    - Small firms: 27 percent had access to credit (38 percent average in Latin America; 29 percent worldwide).
    - Medium-sized firms: 27 percent had access to credit (56 percent average in Latin America; 43 percent worldwide).
  - CNBV data: credit amounts growing for most categories; number of businesses obtaining loans stagnated for medium-sized firms and recently fallen for microenterprises.
  - Doing Business 2015: Mexico rank of 12 for ease of getting credit; distance to frontier of 20 percentage points (down from 25 percentage points in 2014); subcomponent strength of legal rights scored 8 out of 12 points.

### C. Reasons for the Low Level of Financial Intermediation
- History of banking crises:
  - Two major banking crises since 1980.
  - 1982 debt crisis: banks nationalized, reduced in number through mergers, tight regulations (interest rate caps and credit allocation) limited credit growth.
  - Early 1990s: liberalization and reprivatization led to a credit boom with low lending standards and weaknesses in financial supervision.
  - 1994 currency crisis: severe impact on banks via international funding difficulties and rising NPLs; variable rate mortgages were affected by interest rate rises.
  - Rescue program (partly financed by IMF and the U.S.) addressed short-term funding and recapitalization via convertible debt and purchase of NPLs above market value; some banks required government intervention and takeover; debtor support programs (particularly for mortgages) were also implemented.
  - Estimated cost of financial sector support about 15 percent of GDP (McQuerry (1999)).
  - Lasting effects:
    - Erosion of trust in financial institutions by savers and borrowers.
    - Loss of banking know-how after nationalization due to tightly regulated system offering different skill sets and lower rewards.
    - Legacy of years of slow credit and deposit growth affects current stocks, though growth is now at a healthy pace.
- Structure of the banking sector:
  - Lack of competition may play a role but does not seem to be a major impediment (discussion continues beyond provided excerpt).

### D. Banking competition, disequilibrium, and credit supply constraints
- Banking competition and concentration:
  - H-statistic: updated H-statistic shows a slow improvement over time.
  - Herfindahl concentration index: 0.13, indicating that the commercial banking sector is moderately concentrated.
  - Lending and deposit rate developments: spreads are coming down, particularly for micro enterprises.
- Credit supply and demand (disequilibrium analysis):
  - Methodology:
    - Disequilibrium approach following Everaert and others (2015) and Laffont and Garcia (1977).
    - Equations: CD = β1′X1 + εD; CS = β2′X2 + εS; C = min(CD, CS).
    - Estimation: maximum likelihood method of Maddala and Nelson (1974).
    - Demand and supply specifications both include the real lending rate; demand includes NPL ratio, consumer confidence, stock market growth; supply includes NPL ratio, deposit rate, and banking system capital as a share of the minimum capital requirement.
  - Main finding:
    - Since 2008, credit was mostly supply driven — credit supply has been insufficient to meet demand by about MXN (of 2010) 300 billion in recent months.
    - The gap estimates are sensitive to explanatory variables, but the supply-driven conclusion is robust across specifications.
- Bank credit relative to deposits and international comparisons:
  - Long-run relationship estimated via pooled mean regression (similar to Hansen and Sulla (2013)):
    - BCPS/GDP = α + β Deposits/GDP + ui + εit.
  - Estimated coefficients (international panel, countries other than Mexico):
    - Full sample: α̂ = 12.1 (14.4), β̂ = 1.1 (0.2).
    - Emerging market sample: α̂ = -19.3 (20.3), β̂ = 1.5 (0.5).
  - Interpretation:
    - Credit and deposits are both low in Mexico, but the long-run relationship between them is in line with other emerging markets.
    - Given Mexico’s level of deposits, credit provision is close to what would be expected based on coefficients from other emerging markets.
    - Results suggest the constraint is overall lack of financial depth (both loans and deposits), not inability to transform deposits into loans.

### E. Issues beyond the banking sector
- Financial literacy and education:
  - Financial education may be lacking in some sectors and regions. Campero and Kaiser (2013) show households with greater schooling are more likely to be aware of credit sources; regions with greater average schooling show greater use of formal credit.
- Informality:
  - Large informal sector impedes access to financial services: informal participants find it harder to document financial situation and may prefer cash.
  - Campero and Kaiser (2013) find households employed in the formal sector are 5.7 times more likely to use bank credit than those in the informal sector.
- Rule of law and collateral:
  - Repossession of collateral is difficult and costly to enforce.

### F. Current trends, regulatory measures, and macro implications
- Regulatory strengthening and safety nets:
  - Post-1994 measures tightened regulation on net open foreign currency positions.
  - Mexico has adopted Basel III standards; risk-based capital and liquidity rules assessed as compliant (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015).
  - Liquidity Coverage Ratio applies from 2015, phased in to a final value of 100 percent in 2019.
  - Deposit insurance institution (IPAB) set up in 1999; insures deposits of up to MXN 2.1 million. (Legally fixed at 400,000 UDIs.)
- Improvements in credit quality enforcement and information:
  - 2014 financial reform created a legal instrument for quicker execution of client collateral; Doing Business distance to frontier for resolving bankruptcy improved by 6.5 percentage points.
  - More mercantile matters to be shifted to federal courts (not yet implemented).
  - Information sharing between private credit bureaus improved and will include public mortgage lenders (Infonavit and FOVISSSTE).
- Financial education and consumer protection:
  - CONDUSEF provides online tools; a new Financial Entities Bureau enables product comparisons and lists abusive clauses and bad practices.
  - Move toward cashless salaries and benefits familiarizes recipients with financial services.
- Competition-enhancing measures from 2014 reform:
  - Portability of bank accounts and mortgages facilitated; banks obliged to publish comparable interest rates.
- Oversight of credit provision mandate:
  - Secretary of Finance mandated to assess banks’ compliance with objective to support productive sectors; first report prepared in 2016 with recommendations. Banks assessed as providing insufficient credit must prepare action plans.
- Credit growth and macro effects:
  - Current credit growth rate: around 15 percent, which exceeds nominal GDP growth.
  - Forecasted bank credit share: 19 percent of GDP (as forecast for 2016).
  - Growth elasticities from Arcand and others (2015):
    - Increasing the share of bank credit by 1 percentage point of GDP to 19 percent of GDP would boost growth by 0.03 percentage points.
    - Increasing the ratio of bank credit to GDP to 60 percent would boost growth rates by 0.8 percentage points.
  - Simulated paths to 60 percent BCPS/GDP:
    - At a credit growth rate of around 15 percent, and assuming nominal growth of 6 percent over the medium term (potential growth of 3 percent and 3 percent inflation), the predicted bank credit ratio of 60 percent of GDP would be reached in about 13 years.
    - If credit growth falls to 10 percent, it would take 30 years to reach 60 percent of GDP.
  - Rapid financial deepening carries risks: Sahay and others (2015) show fast financial deepening increases growth volatility and financial instability; feasible credit growth also depends on bank capital adequacy, nonperforming loans, provisioning, the economic cycle, and sentiment.
- Past sectoral excesses:
  - Consumer credit—especially credit cards—grew rapidly between 2004 and 2007 with low standards; NPLs rose and expansion stopped in 2008.
  - Nonperforming credit card loans rose from 3.1 percent of credit in January 2004 to a peak of 12.6 percent in May 2009.

### G. Conclusions and policy recommendations
- Overall assessment:
  - Credit depth has been exceptionally low in Mexico for decades, but credit growth is recovering.
  - Key challenge: encourage further credit expansion without jeopardizing financial stability.
- Policy priorities (selected):
  - Continue tight regulation and maintain high credit standards; avoid excessively rapid credit growth.
  - Build a resilient financial sector where lenders and borrowers have full trust; strong financial regulation must be maintained and not sacrificed to boost credit.
  - Address structural banking-sector aspects causing low financial intermediation—evidence indicates supply-side constraints and lagging credit cycles relative to business cycles.
  - Strongly implement recent financial reforms and pursue further evolutionary changes:
    - Urgently implement the shift of more mercantile matters to federal courts to improve bankruptcy procedures and collateral recovery.
    - Put IPAB on a stronger financial footing—current fund contains just a very small percentage of the insured deposits.
    - Exercise caution in implementing the Finance Secretary’s mandate to scrutinize banks’ lending objectives to avoid perceptions of pressure that could harm financial stability.
    - Monitor and align Mexican law as international Basel III developments evolve.

*Prepared by Alexander Herman and Alexander Klemm; IMF Working Paper WP/17/19, January 2017. Source: wp1719 - Sections 1–2*

### Section 1

### Financial Deepening in Mexico (WP/17/19) — Section 1

### A. Introduction
- International comparisons show credit depth in Mexico is exceptionally low even after controlling for explanatory factors.
- Bank credit in Mexico is about a quarter of the level observed in other emerging markets (including Brazil) and is just 1/6th of advanced economy average.
- Total credit is also comparatively low; informal credit may be important given the large informal sector.
- Credit to firms has been especially low; firm credit is empirically important for growth (Angeles, 2015).
- Given prudent macroeconomic policies, low intermediation is not attributed to financial repression; bank credit to the public sector is also quite low.
- Key tradeoffs:
  - Financial deepening can boost growth (evidence in Sahay and others (2015)).
  - Excessive credit growth increases risks to financial stability, particularly in an environment of rising interest rates (Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012)).

### B. Credit Depth in Mexico
- Short-term cyclical gap:
  - The cyclical credit gap is small in Mexico; credit is currently growing close to its trend rate.
  - Credit cycles tend to lag output cycles in Mexico.
  - Credit and real cycles are synchronized but not strongly; credit cycles have been shorter and more volatile on average.
- Table: Synchronization of Credit and Real Cycles (1980-2014)
  - GDP: Number of cycles 8; Average cycle duration (in years) 4.4; Amplitude 0.3; Synchronization Ratio with GDP 1.00
  - Total credit: Number of cycles 12; Average cycle duration (in years) 2.9; Amplitude 0.8; Synchronization Ratio with GDP 0.54
  - Commercial bank credit: Number of cycles 10; Average cycle duration (in years) 3.5; Amplitude 1.0; Synchronization Ratio with GDP 0.56
  - Other credit: Number of cycles 13; Average cycle duration (in years) 2.7; Amplitude 0.9; Synchronization Ratio with GDP 0.49
- Long-term structural gap (international panel regressions):
  - Method: Random-effects regression linking bank credit to the private sector (BCPS/GDP) to fundamentals following Cottarelli and others (2005). Explanatory variables include: public debt/GDP, ln(GDP/population), inflation (threshold specification), capital account openness (Chinn and Ito (2006)), bank regulation indicators, German legal origin dummy, and a time trend.
  - Samples: full sample (advanced + emerging markets, excluding Mexico) and emerging market sample (excluding Mexico).
  - Main regression findings:
    - Increase in public debt is associated with less credit to the private sector.
    - Rising incomes are associated with greater credit depth (statistically significant in emerging market sample).
    - Capital account openness is associated with deeper credit.
    - Structural variables on banking regulation and legal background turn out insignificant.
    - In the full sample, a positive time trend reflects worldwide increase in credit.
  - Predicted credit depth for Mexico given fundamentals:
    - Full sample estimate: expected bank credit near almost 100 percent of GDP.
    - Emerging market sample estimate: expected bank credit near 60 percent of GDP.
    - Given current credit levels of around 20 percent of GDP, implied structural long-term bank credit gap between 40 and 80 percent of GDP.
  - Adding banking-crisis history (number of years in crisis from Laeven and Valencia (2012)):
    - Mexican credit depth appears in line with expectations during crisis years.
    - After the year 2000, when macroeconomic policy stabilized, expected credit would have been much higher.
    - In recent years, the resulting gap is virtually the same as without the crisis variable.

- Selected regression coefficients (Table 2, Random effect estimation on all countries other than Mexico; robust standard errors in parentheses):
  - Regression (1) Full sample:
    - Public debt/GDP: -0.15* (0.08)
    - ln(GDP/population): -0.20 (7.27)
    - Inflation variable, inflation <=4 percent: 0.11*** (0.02)
    - Inflation variable, inflation >4 percent: -48.09 (37.75)
    - Capital account openness: 5.67** (2.61)
    - Bank accounting quality: 11.95 (9.62)
    - German legal origin dummy: 12.68 (15.03)
    - Trend: 1.71*** (0.41)
    - Constant: 8.64 (56.68)
    - Observations: 784; Number of countries: 34; R-squared, overall: 15.7
  - Regression (2) EM sample:
    - Public debt/GDP: -0.14** (0.06)
    - ln(GDP/population): 20.11*** (7.34)
    - Inflation variable, inflation <=4 percent: 0.64 (0.78)
    - Inflation variable, inflation >4 percent: 5.64 (33.37)
    - Capital account openness: 3.70** (1.82)
    - Bank accounting quality: 8.88 (27.35)
    - German legal origin dummy: -15.92 (27.29)
    - Trend: 0.10 (0.51)
    - Constant: 54.91 (135.75)
    - Observations: 268; Number of countries: 12; R-squared, overall: 0.8
  - Regression (3) Full sample with bank crisis dummy:
    - Public debt/GDP: -0.55** (0.27)
    - ln(GDP/population): 8.32 (12.05)
    - Inflation variable, inflation <=4 percent: 5.69 (4.95)
    - Inflation variable, inflation >4 percent: 428.42*** (104.84)
    - Capital account openness: -4.22 (3.22)
    - Bank accounting quality: 5.43 (13.90)
    - German legal origin dummy: -9.70 (21.21)
    - Bank crisis dummy: -2.75 (3.65)
    - Trend: -1.86* (0.96)
    - Constant: 47.71 (123.32)
    - Observations: 193; Number of countries: 10; R-squared, overall: 53.0
  - Significance notation: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

- Measures of financial development and access:
  - Mexico has fallen behind the LA5 (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay) though remains above the overall LAC average.
  - Financial development index components: market development is quite strong; institutions lag behind the LA5.
  - Institutional components weak: access and depth—low depth driven by low credit figures, low deposits, and small insurance and mutual fund assets.
  - Low access driven by a comparatively small network of branches and a comparative scarcity of ATMs.
- Financial inclusion statistics:
  - World Bank Financial Inclusion Database: 51 percent of adults borrowed some money in 2014; only 10 percent used a formal financial institution (up from 8 percent in 2011).
  - World Bank 2010 enterprise survey:
    - Small firms: 27 percent had access to credit (38 percent average in Latin America; 29 percent worldwide).
    - Medium-sized firms: 27 percent had access to credit (56 percent average in Latin America; 43 percent worldwide).
  - CNBV data: credit amounts growing for most categories; number of businesses obtaining loans stagnated for medium-sized firms and recently fallen for microenterprises.
  - Doing Business 2015: Mexico rank of 12 for ease of getting credit; distance to frontier of 20 percentage points (down from 25 percentage points in 2014); subcomponent strength of legal rights scored 8 out of 12 points.

### C. Reasons for the Low Level of Financial Intermediation
- History of banking crises:
  - Two major banking crises since 1980.
  - 1982 debt crisis: banks nationalized, reduced in number through mergers, tight regulations (interest rate caps and credit allocation) limited credit growth.
  - Early 1990s: liberalization and reprivatization led to a credit boom with low lending standards and weaknesses in financial supervision.
  - 1994 currency crisis: severe impact on banks via international funding difficulties and rising NPLs; variable rate mortgages were affected by interest rate rises.
  - Rescue program (partly financed by IMF and the U.S.) addressed short-term funding and recapitalization via convertible debt and purchase of NPLs above market value; some banks required government intervention and takeover; debtor support programs (particularly for mortgages) were also implemented.
  - Estimated cost of financial sector support about 15 percent of GDP (McQuerry (1999)).
  - Lasting effects:
    - Erosion of trust in financial institutions by savers and borrowers.
    - Loss of banking know-how after nationalization due to tightly regulated system offering different skill sets and lower rewards.
    - Legacy of years of slow credit and deposit growth affects current stocks, though growth is now at a healthy pace.
- Structure of the banking sector:
  - Lack of competition may play a role but does not seem to be a major impediment (discussion continues beyond provided excerpt).

*Prepared by Alexander Herman and Alexander Klemm; IMF Working Paper WP/17/19, January 2017.*

### Section 2

### wp1719 - Section 2

### Banking competition and concentration
- H-statistic: measured competitiveness indicator where one equals perfect competition; authors’ updated H-statistic shows a slow improvement over time (Figure 7).  
- Herfindahl concentration index: 0.13, indicating that the commercial banking sector is moderately concentrated.  
- Lending and deposit rate developments: spreads are coming down, particularly for micro enterprises (Figure 8).

### Credit supply and demand (disequilibrium analysis)
- Methodology:
  - Disequilibrium approach following Everaert and others (2015) and Laffont and Garcia (1977).  
  - Equations: CD = β1′X1 + εD; CS = β2′X2 + εS; C = min(CD, CS).  
  - Estimation: maximum likelihood method of Maddala and Nelson (1974).  
  - Demand and supply specifications both include the real lending rate; demand includes NPL ratio, consumer confidence, stock market growth; supply includes NPL ratio, deposit rate, and banking system capital as a share of the minimum capital requirement.
- Main finding:
  - Since 2008, credit was mostly supply driven — credit supply has been insufficient to meet demand by about MXN (of 2010) 300 billion in recent months.  
  - The gap estimates are sensitive to explanatory variables, but the supply-driven conclusion is robust across specifications (Figure 9).

### Bank credit relative to deposits and international comparisons
- Long-run relationship estimated via pooled mean regression similar to Hansen and Sulla (2013): BCPS/GDP = α + β Deposits/GDP + ui + εit.  
- Estimated regression coefficients (international panel, countries other than Mexico):
  - Full sample: α̂ = 12.1 (14.4), β̂ = 1.1 (0.2).  
  - Emerging market sample: α̂ = -19.3 (20.3), β̂ = 1.5 (0.5).
- Interpretation:
  - Credit and deposits are both low in Mexico, but the long-run relationship between them is in line with other emerging markets.  
  - Given Mexico’s level of deposits, credit provision is close to what would be expected based on coefficients from other emerging markets.  
  - Results suggest the constraint is overall lack of financial depth (both loans and deposits), not inability to transform deposits into loans.

### Issues beyond the banking sector
- Financial literacy and education:
  - Financial education may be lacking in some sectors and regions. Campero and Kaiser (2013) show households with greater schooling are more likely to be aware of credit sources; regions with greater average schooling show greater use of formal credit.
- Informality:
  - Large informal sector impedes access to financial services: informal participants find it harder to document financial situation and may prefer cash.  
  - Campero and Kaiser (2013) find households employed in the formal sector are 5.7 times more likely to use bank credit than those in the informal sector.
- Rule of law and collateral:
  - Repossession of collateral is difficult and costly to enforce.

### Current trends and policy measures
- Regulatory strengthening and safety nets:
  - Post-1994 measures tightened regulation on net open foreign currency positions.  
  - Mexico has adopted Basel III standards; risk-based capital and liquidity rules assessed as compliant (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015).  
  - Liquidity Coverage Ratio applies from 2015, phased in to a final value of 100 percent in 2019.  
  - Deposit insurance institution (IPAB) set up in 1999; insures deposits of up to MXN 2.1 million. (Legally fixed at 400,000 UDIs.)
- Improvements in credit quality enforcement and information:
  - 2014 financial reform created a legal instrument for quicker execution of client collateral; Doing Business distance to frontier for resolving bankruptcy improved by 6.5 percentage points.  
  - More mercantile matters to be shifted to federal courts (not yet implemented).  
  - Information sharing between private credit bureaus improved and will include public mortgage lenders (Infonavit and FOVISSSTE).
- Financial education and consumer protection:
  - CONDUSEF provides online tools; a new Financial Entities Bureau enables product comparisons and lists abusive clauses and bad practices.  
  - Move toward cashless salaries and benefits familiarizes recipients with financial services.  
- Competition-enhancing measures from 2014 reform:
  - Portability of bank accounts and mortgages facilitated; banks obliged to publish comparable interest rates.
- Oversight of credit provision mandate:
  - Secretary of Finance mandated to assess banks’ compliance with objective to support productive sectors; first report prepared in 2016 with recommendations. Banks assessed as providing insufficient credit must prepare action plans.
- Credit growth and macro effects:
  - Current credit growth rate: around 15 percent, which exceeds nominal GDP growth.  
  - Forecasted bank credit share: 19 percent of GDP (as forecast for 2016). Increasing the share of bank credit by 1 percentage point of GDP to 19 percent of GDP would boost growth by 0.03 percentage points (Arcand and others, 2015). Increasing the ratio of bank credit to GDP to 60 percent would boost growth rates by 0.8 percentage points.  
  - At a credit growth rate of around 15 percent, and assuming nominal growth of 6 percent over the medium term (potential growth of 3 percent and 3 percent inflation), the predicted bank credit ratio of 60 percent of GDP would be reached in about 13 years.  
  - If credit growth falls to 10 percent, it would take 30 years to reach 60 percent of GDP.  
  - Rapid financial deepening carries risks: Sahay and others (2015) show fast financial deepening increases growth volatility and financial instability; feasible credit growth also depends on bank capital adequacy, nonperforming loans, provisioning, the economic cycle, and sentiment.
- Past sectoral excesses:
  - Consumer credit—especially credit cards—grew rapidly between 2004 and 2007 with low standards; NPLs rose and expansion stopped in 2008.  
  - Nonperforming credit card loans rose from 3.1 percent of credit in January 2004 to a peak of 12.6 percent in May 2009.

### Conclusions and policy recommendations
- Overall assessment:
  - Credit depth has been exceptionally low in Mexico for decades, but credit growth is recovering.  
  - Key challenge: encourage further credit expansion without jeopardizing financial stability.
- Policy priorities:
  - Continue tight regulation and maintain high credit standards; avoid excessively rapid credit growth.  
  - Build a resilient financial sector where lenders and borrowers have full trust; strong financial regulation must be maintained and not sacrificed to boost credit.  
  - Address structural banking-sector aspects causing low financial intermediation—evidence indicates supply-side constraints and lagging credit cycles relative to business cycles.  
  - Strongly implement recent financial reforms and pursue further evolutionary changes:
    - Urgently implement the shift of more mercantile matters to federal courts to improve bankruptcy procedures and collateral recovery.  
    - Put IPAB on a stronger financial footing—current fund contains just a very small percentage of the insured deposits.  
    - Exercise caution in implementing the Finance Secretary’s mandate to scrutinize banks’ lending objectives to avoid perceptions of pressure that could harm financial stability.  
    - Monitor and align Mexican law as international Basel III developments evolve.

*Source: wp1719 - Section 2*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/wp1719.pdf_
