## g20-report-on-strong-sustainable-balanced-and-inclusive-growth

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [g20-report-on-strong-sustainable-balanced-and-inclusive-growth](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/research/imf-and-g20/2021/g20-report-on-strong-sustainable-balanced-and-inclusive-growth.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/files/research/imf-and-g20/2021/g20-report-on-strong-sustainable-balanced-and-inclusive-growth.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/research/imf-and-g20/2021/g20-report-on-strong-sustainable-balanced-and-inclusive-growth.pdf.json)

---

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY — Key findings
- The global recovery is underway amid uneven prospects and substantial downside risks.
- Large-scale vaccination programs and considerable policy support have helped save lives and lift economic activity in many economies.
- Vaccine access is lagging in many poorer economies, holding back recoveries and weighing on economic prospects, including from crisis-induced increases in unemployment.
- A number of factors have led to a rise in inflation, elevated public and private debt levels have raised vulnerabilities, and climate change continues to threaten growth and livelihoods.
- Downside risks to growth dominate.

### Immediate G-20 joint actions recommended
- Close financing gaps and share doses to end the pandemic:
  - Further action is needed to vaccinate 40 percent of the population in every country by the end of the year.
  - Vaccine surpluses need to be urgently shared, and an additional $20 billion of up-front grant-based financing is needed for treatments, testing, and the procurement and distribution of vaccines in developing countries.
- Help developing countries cope financially:
  - Further support through grants and concessional financing is essential.
  - Improving the implementation of the G-20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments would ensure it is available when needed.
  - G-20 support for channeling SDRs from the strongest economies to those more vulnerable would help further strengthen liquidity.
- Commit to a comprehensive package to reach net-zero carbon emissions by mid-century:
  - A G-20 agreement on a carbon price floor, with differentiated price floors and the possibility of implementation equivalents, should be urgently sought.
  - The carbon price floor would be the centerpiece of a comprehensive package encompassing green technology R&D, green infrastructure investment, and redistributive measures to compensate those most affected by the transition.
- Address other long-standing global challenges:
  - A global minimum corporate tax should be speedily implemented.
  - Resolving trade and technology tensions and agreeing on WTO reforms and new market-opening actions would ensure a more open and transparent rules-based trading system.

### Macroeconomic setting and risks
- Global growth and divergence:
  - After a sharp contraction of 3.1 percent in 2020, the global economy is projected to grow by 5.9 percent in 2021 and 4.9 percent in 2022.
  - The aggregate outlook masks significant cross-country differences driven principally by differences in policy support and vaccine coverage.
  - Projected medium-term output losses are largest for economies still struggling to gain widespread access to vaccines.
- Vaccination coverage:
  - Many G-20 advanced and some emerging market economies have fully vaccinated over 50 percent of their populations; vaccinations in low-income countries and many emerging market economies continue to lag.
- Inflation and commodity prices:
  - Global food prices have risen by more than 30 percent over the past year, adding to food insecurity.
  - Factors contributing to upward pressure on headline inflation include base effects from subdued inflation in 2020; resurgent commodity prices; shortages of shipping containers and microchips; and an increase in demand from the release of pent-up excess savings as economies reopen.
  - Core inflation measures remain more stable than headline inflation, and medium-term inflation expectations are generally anchored around targets.
  - Elevated price pressures are likely to persist in 2022 in some economies as higher food and oil prices continue to pass through to consumer prices.
- Asset prices and financing conditions:
  - House prices have risen sharply across most G-20 advanced and some emerging market economies—often faster than disposable incomes and rents.
  - Equity prices have risen strongly on the back of accommodative policies and ongoing recoveries; credit conditions have generally improved in the corporate sector though variation remains across countries and sectors.
  - Hard-currency bond issuance by sovereigns, non-financial corporations, and financials has been robust across major regions.
- Global imbalances:
  - Global excessive imbalances remained broadly unchanged in 2020 at about 1.2 percent of world GDP, after adjusting for pandemic-related factors.
  - Among the G-20 in 2020, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States had the largest excess current account deficits; Germany, Mexico, and Russia had the largest excess surpluses.
- Debt and vulnerabilities:
  - Elevated public and private sector debt is adding to vulnerabilities.
  - Creditor and debtor stock positions remain historically high, with valuation effects from changes in exchange rates and domestic equity prices affecting positions for some economies.

### Debt vulnerabilities continue to build
- Public debt and fiscal measures:
  - Revenue and spending measures in G-20 economies in response to the crisis amounted to about $9½ trillion as of mid-2021.
  - Another $5½ trillion were provided in the form of equity injections and loans and guarantees.
  - Sovereign debt ratios have soared to historic highs, averaging about 110 percent of GDP across the G-20.
  - Planned debt-financed public investment can help fill critical infrastructure gaps and boost growth in several economies (e.g., European Union, United States), but some face risks to debt sustainability despite contained servicing costs.
- Corporate and private-sector debt:
  - Corporate debt rose by about 12 percent of GDP on average across the G-20 during 2020.
  - Public sector support and low interest rates enabled companies to take on new debt to survive lockdowns; however, higher corporate debt levels may complicate the normalization of monetary policy and the withdrawal of crisis support.
  - Risks if withdrawal is not carefully carried out include: sudden wave of bankruptcies; impaired corporate balance sheets; undermined investment and weaker medium-term growth.
- Foreign-currency-denominated debt and external vulnerabilities:
  - Gross external debt and financing needs remain sizable in a few economies (e.g., Argentina, Turkey).
  - In some economies, more than half of non-financial corporate debt is denominated in foreign currency (e.g., Argentina, Turkey).
  - Such exposures heighten vulnerabilities to sudden capital flow reversals—particularly concerning amid divergent recoveries.
- Downside risks to growth highlighted:
  - The pandemic: Emergence of new highly infectious variants could trigger larger outbreaks and containment responses, disrupting supply chains.
  - Inflation and financial conditions: Continued supply-demand mismatches could sustain price pressures longer than expected, triggering faster-than-expected monetary policy normalization and tighter global financial conditions; some emerging market and low-income economies with limited policy space could come under pressure.
  - Financial market volatility: Stretched asset valuations could lead to rapid shifts in investor sentiment; failure to implement a lasting agreement on the United States’ debt ceiling could have serious market implications; large-scale disorderly corporate debt defaults or restructuring (for instance in China’s property sector) could reverberate widely.
  - Policy support: Smaller-than-expected fiscal packages (for example in the United States) could reduce global growth.
  - Unrest: Intensifying social unrest in response to high unemployment and rising food prices could damage sentiment and set back recoveries.
  - Real estate: Shifts toward online retail and remote work could reduce demand for some commercial real estate segments; sustained rapid house price growth could heighten expectations and lead to excessive risk taking.
  - The trading system: Continued trade tensions between the United States and China, supply restrictions related to vaccine production, and increasingly protectionist policies could compound risks.

### Health, social, and human-capital implications
- Labor market and inclusion:
  - Unemployment remains significant among vulnerable groups—including women, youth, and the low-skilled—with potential scarring to medium-term prospects.
  - In G-20 emerging market economies, employment rates remain well below pre-crisis levels, particularly for youth.
- Education and health:
  - Disruptions to schooling undermine human capital formation, particularly among poorer students and in economies with lower access to electricity and the internet.
  - The number of children missing routine vaccinations (e.g., against measles) jumped by 3.7 million globally in 2020.
  - Absent additional resources and decisive actions, long-term impacts on health and earnings will likely be severe.

### Policy recommendations and international cooperation (pandemic)
- Vaccination targets and actions:
  - Vaccinating at least 40 percent of the population in all economies by end-2021 and at least 70 percent by mid-2022 (IMF staff proposal endorsed by WHO, WTO, and the World Bank).
  - Ramp up supply and sharing of vaccines with developing economies (including delivery swaps with COVAX/AVAT and accelerating deliveries of existing dose sharing commitments).
  - Remove trade barriers on vaccines and related materials.
  - Address financing gaps (including through about US$20 billion in grants) to ensure adequate supplies of diagnostics and therapeutics and to support procurement and distribution of vaccines.
  - Diversify production of vaccines and other health tools, including supporting expansion of regional manufacturing capacity in developing economies through financing and technology transfer solutions.
- Strengthen the global financial safety net:
  - Extension of the G-20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) to end-2021 has freed up resources for developing economies.
  - G-20 Common Framework for the Treatment of Debt beyond the DSSI is a welcome step; remaining implementation challenges need resolution.
  - The recent $650 billion SDR allocation will help address the long-term global need for reserves.
  - About US$275 billion of the new allocation will go to emerging market and developing economies, including low-income countries.
  - G-20 backing for voluntary channeling of SDRs from economies with strong external positions to more vulnerable economies would help strengthen liquidity, meet health-related expenditures, and support more inclusive and sustainable recoveries.
  - Additional loans and subsidies to support concessional financing for poorer economies would be welcome.

### Decisive climate action (including COP26 context)
- Net-zero goal and comprehensive package:
  - Implement a comprehensive policy package to reach the goal of net zero emissions by 2050 in a growth and employment-friendly manner.
  - A comprehensive package should ideally encompass: carbon pricing or regulatory equivalents; green R&D; green infrastructure investment; redistribution to support vulnerable groups and workers in industries adversely impacted by the transition.
- Public investment priorities:
  - Renewable energy generation; improved energy efficiency; infrastructure for low-carbon transport systems, including electric vehicles (examples cited: encouraging adoption of electric vehicles as done in China, France, and Germany; enhancing green energy production and use as done in Korea and Saudi Arabia).
  - Public investment would catalyze private investment, which could be supported through incentives (e.g., credit enhancements, tax credits).
- Carbon pricing and international coordination:
  - Consider an international carbon price floor to support the transition.
  - Design considerations: a differentiated price floor by level of development; the possibility of implementation equivalents.
  - Policy scenarios illustrated include:
    - a global carbon tax/price floor of $50/ton for all countries; or
    - differentiated tax rates by level of development, with example rates: $75/ton for advanced economies; $500/ton for high-income emerging market economies (e.g., China); $25/ton for low-income emerging market economies (e.g., India).
  - Purported benefits: facilitate transparency; help prevent potential adverse impacts on competitiveness from unilateral action; mitigate the desire for unilateral aggressive carbon pricing to implement border carbon adjustments.
- Support for emerging market and developing economies:
  - Support mitigation and adaptation efforts through financial and technology transfers.
  - Financing under the proposed IMF-administered Resilience and Sustainability Trust could support efforts to mobilize resources for climate action.

### Macroeconomic policy guidance — monetary and fiscal
- Monetary policy:
  - Monetary policy is projected to remain appropriately accommodative in most economies in the near term.
  - Major G-20 central banks should avoid raising policy rates prematurely in response to temporary spikes in inflation, but should stand ready to tighten if risks of de-anchoring inflation expectations become tangible.
  - Additional monetary policy support would be beneficial where inflation is undershooting the target and the monetary stance is somewhat tight (example: China).
  - Some economies would benefit from a looser-than-projected stance in 2022 (examples: China, Korea, Mexico, Russia).
  - A firmer policy stance in Turkey would help buttress credibility and contain inflation.
  - Clear communication by central banks on inflation and policy intentions is critical to guide expectations and limit financial market volatility.
  - Specific operational notes:
    - Korea became the first G-20 advanced economy central bank to raise policy interest rates since the onset of the pandemic (in August).
    - The United States Federal Reserve signaled that tapering of asset purchases could begin by end-2021 while keeping interest rates unchanged at current accommodative levels.
    - The European Central Bank signaled a possible slowing of the pace of asset purchases, while maintaining flexibility to act.
- Fiscal policy:
  - Fiscal policy has helped support households and firms but options for further measures are increasingly constrained.
  - Projection and stance:
    - Nearly all G-20 economies are projected to maintain 2021 and 2022 fiscal balances below 2019 levels—despite some withdrawal of support as crisis measures gradually expire.
    - Notable policy support remains present relative to pre-pandemic projections.
    - Fiscal space is increasingly limited and debt levels elevated in several emerging market economies.
  - Tailoring and sequencing:
    - Near-term policy support will need to be tailored to local conditions; priority is to ensure adequate support for healthcare and the most vulnerable people.
    - Strengthening medium-term fiscal frameworks (transparent institutions and rules) would help buy time and space for near-term support while rebuilding fiscal space over the longer term and enhance scope for monetary policy to maintain support.
    - In some economies, job retention programs and expanded unemployment benefits may be warranted; support to viable firms facing temporary liquidity or solvency risks can help prevent excess bankruptcies.
    - As recoveries progress, support for firms and short-term work schemes should be gradually scaled back to preserve fiscal space and avoid hindering reallocation of resources to growing sectors, while ensuring protection for workers in transition.
  - Medium-term fiscal objective:
    - Nearly all G-20 economies are projected to withdraw fiscal support over the medium term to help put public sector debt on a downward path.
    - Additional measures beyond projections are advisable in several economies (examples: France, India, Italy, South Africa, Spain, Turkey).
    - Germany should use its ample fiscal space to further ramp up public investment over the medium term to help lift potential growth.

### Financial sector policy
- Recommended actions:
  - Implement macroprudential tools and tighten measures where appropriate to contain buildup of vulnerabilities.
  - Strengthen corporate resolution mechanisms to address non-viable and distressed firms as policy support is withdrawn.
  - Monitor increases in house prices in many economies (example: United States) and tighten macroprudential policies where needed.
- Financial stability risks and monitoring priorities:
  - Credit risks from structural realignments in the commercial real-estate sector (e.g., Germany, United States) related to the shift to online shopping and remote work should be monitored closely.
  - Consider introduction of appropriate macroprudential tools to address real-estate sector risks.
  - Amid persistently low interest rates, challenges remain for the banking sector and nonbank financial institutions (example: nonbank mortgage lenders in the United States).
  - Policymakers should consider whether available tools are sufficient for careful monitoring and assessment of risks in the nonbank financial sector.
  - In China, strengthen corporate restructuring and insolvency frameworks to facilitate market-based exit of nonviable firms; be ready to take necessary steps to safeguard financial stability if signs of systemic financial stress were to develop.

### Structural reforms, education, health, and inclusion
- Structural reform priorities (consensus IMF and OECD staff assessment):
  - Further easing of product market regulations across most economies.
  - Implementation of active labor market policies to facilitate resource reallocation.
  - Support for childcare and other reforms to increase women’s participation in the labor market.
  - Tax structure reform to increase the share of consumption and property taxes in total tax revenue.
  - In several advanced economies: reforms to boost R&D to support digitalization, productivity, and development of low-carbon technologies.
- Education and health priorities:
  - Policies to minimize pandemic-related learning losses and adverse health outcomes are critical.
  - Suggested measures to mitigate student learning losses include remedial training for teachers, tutoring for students, and adjusting school years.
  - Further investments to restore health care services, including programs for routine immunizations, are needed.
  - Increased funding to the education sector, investments in early childhood education programs, better health care, and greater access to digital infrastructure (including internet access) are recommended.
  - Some economies need to expand coverage of benefits and transfers (examples: China, Mexico) and undertake reforms aimed at job creation (examples: Argentina, Brazil, South Africa).

### Macro effects of implementing IMF staff recommendations
- Near term (2021–2022):
  - Adjusting policies from current settings to IMF staff recommendations would help lift aggregate real GDP in the G-20.
  - Additional fiscal support relative to projections on current policy settings in China and some other emerging market economies (example: India, Mexico), combined with looser monetary policy in a few economies (example: China, Mexico), would provide a sizable impetus to growth this year and next.
- Medium and long term:
  - Gains from structural reforms would carry growth forward, while fiscal policy would focus on rebuilding buffers.
  - Additional fiscal consolidation will likely be needed to contain debt levels and reduce sovereign risk across several G-20 economies.
  - Spillovers from implementing recommended policies across the G-20 will add to the boost in activity and allow governments to expand resources devoted to tackling inequality.
- Modeling:
  - The macroeconomic impact of adjusting policy settings is assessed using the IMF’s G-20 Model.

### Fiscal space classification (assessments as of July 2021)
- "Substantial" fiscal space: AUS, DEU, KOR, RUS
- "Some" fiscal space: CAN, CHN, FRA, GBR, IDN, JPN, MEX, SAU, TUR, USA
- Fiscal space "at risk": BRA, ESP, IND, ITA
- "None" (i.e., no fiscal space): ARG, ZAF

### Key statistics and projections — Selected entries from Table 1 (Real GDP Growth, percent change)
- Notes: Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2021. G-20 aggregations exclude European Union.
- Selected series (as presented: 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026):
  - World: 2.8 -3.1 5.9 4.9 3.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0
  - Advanced Economies: 1.7 -4.5 5.2 4.5 1.6 -0.4 0.1 0.0
  - Euro area: 1.5 -6.3 5.0 4.3 1.4 0.4 0.0 0.0
  - G-20 1/: 2.9 -2.9 6.3 5.0 3.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0
  - Advanced G-20 2/: 1.7 -4.6 5.2 4.6 1.5 -0.6 0.2 0.0
  - Emerging G-20 3/: 4.0 -1.5 7.3 5.4 4.5 0.1 -0.1 0.1
  - Argentina: -2.1 -9.9 7.5 2.5 1.8 1.1 0.1 0.0
  - Australia: 1.9 -2.4 3.5 4.1 2.6 -1.8 1.1 0.0
  - Brazil: 1.4 -4.1 5.2 1.5 2.1 -0.1 -0.4 0.0
  - Canada: 1.9 -5.3 5.7 4.9 1.5 -0.6 0.4 0.0
  - China: 6.0 2.3 8.0 5.6 4.9 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
  - France: 1.8 -8.0 6.3 3.9 1.4 0.5 -0.3 0.0
  - Germany: 1.1 -4.6 3.1 4.6 1.1 -0.5 0.5 0.0
  - India: 4.0 -7.3 9.5 8.5 6.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
  - Indonesia: 5.0 -2.1 3.2 5.9 5.2 -0.7 0.0 0.0
  - Italy: 0.3 -8.9 5.8 4.2 1.0 0.9 0.0 0.0
  - Japan: 0.0 -4.6 2.4 3.2 0.5 -0.4 0.2 0.0
  - Korea: 2.2 -0.9 4.3 3.3 2.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0
  - Mexico: -0.2 -8.3 6.2 4.0 2.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0
  - Russia: 2.0 -3.0 4.7 2.9 1.6 0.3 -0.2 0.0
  - Saudi Arabia: 0.3 -4.1 2.8 4.8 2.8 0.4 0.0 0.0
  - South Africa: 0.1 -6.4 5.0 2.2 1.3 1.0 0.0 0.0
  - Spain: 2.1 -10.8 5.7 6.4 1.5 -0.5 0.6 0.0
  - Turkey: 0.9 1.8 9.0 3.3 3.3 3.2 0.0 0.0
  - United Kingdom: 1.4 -9.8 6.8 5.0 1.5 -0.2 0.2 0.0
  - United States: 2.3 -3.4 6.0 5.2 1.7 -1.0 0.3 0.0
  - European Union: 1.9 -5.9 5.1 4.4 1.7 0.4 0.0 0.1

*Source: IMF — G-20 report on strong, sustainable, balanced, and inclusive growth (chapter content supplied).*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ____________________________________________________________________________ 3

### g20-report-on-strong-sustainable-balanced-and-inclusive-growth - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY — Key findings
- The global recovery is underway amid uneven prospects and substantial downside risks.
- Large-scale vaccination programs and considerable policy support have helped save lives and lift economic activity in many economies.
- Vaccine access is lagging in many poorer economies, holding back recoveries and weighing on economic prospects, including from crisis-induced increases in unemployment.
- A number of factors have led to a rise in inflation, elevated public and private debt levels have raised vulnerabilities, and climate change continues to threaten growth and livelihoods.
- Downside risks to growth dominate.

### Immediate G-20 joint actions recommended
- Close financing gaps and share doses to end the pandemic:
  - Further action is needed to vaccinate 40 percent of the population in every country by the end of the year.
  - Vaccine surpluses need to be urgently shared, and an additional $20 billion of up-front grant-based financing is needed for treatments, testing, and the procurement and distribution of vaccines in developing countries.
- Help developing countries cope financially:
  - Further support through grants and concessional financing is essential.
  - Improving the implementation of the G-20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments would ensure it is available when needed.
  - G-20 support for channeling SDRs from the strongest economies to those more vulnerable would help further strengthen liquidity.
- Commit to a comprehensive package to reach net-zero carbon emissions by mid-century:
  - A G-20 agreement on a carbon price floor, with differentiated price floors and the possibility of implementation equivalents, should be urgently sought.
  - The carbon price floor would be the centerpiece of a comprehensive package encompassing green technology R&D, green infrastructure investment, and redistributive measures to compensate those most affected by the transition.
- Address other long-standing global challenges:
  - A global minimum corporate tax should be speedily implemented.
  - Resolving trade and technology tensions and agreeing on WTO reforms and new market-opening actions would ensure a more open and transparent rules-based trading system.

### Macroeconomic setting and risks
- Global growth and divergence:
  - After a sharp contraction of 3.1 percent in 2020, the global economy is projected to grow by 5.9 percent in 2021 and 4.9 percent in 2022.
  - The aggregate outlook masks significant cross-country differences driven principally by differences in policy support and vaccine coverage.
  - Projected medium-term output losses are largest for economies still struggling to gain widespread access to vaccines.
- Vaccination coverage:
  - Many G-20 advanced and some emerging market economies have fully vaccinated over 50 percent of their populations; vaccinations in low-income countries and many emerging market economies continue to lag.
- Inflation and commodity prices:
  - Global food prices have risen by more than 30 percent over the past year, adding to food insecurity.
  - Several pandemic-related factors have contributed to upward pressure on headline inflation: base effects from subdued inflation in 2020; resurgent commodity prices; shortages of shipping containers and microchips; and an increase in demand from the release of pent-up excess savings as economies reopen.
  - Core inflation measures remain more stable than headline inflation, and medium-term inflation expectations are generally anchored around targets.
  - Elevated price pressures are likely to persist in 2022 in some economies as higher food and oil prices continue to pass through to consumer prices.
- Asset prices and financing conditions:
  - House prices have risen sharply across most G-20 advanced and some emerging market economies—often faster than disposable incomes and rents.
  - Equity prices have risen strongly on the back of accommodative policies and ongoing recoveries; credit conditions have generally improved in the corporate sector though variation remains across countries and sectors.
  - Hard-currency bond issuance by sovereigns, non-financial corporations, and financials has been robust across major regions.
- Global imbalances:
  - Global excessive imbalances remained broadly unchanged in 2020 at about 1.2 percent of world GDP, after adjusting for pandemic-related factors.
  - Among the G-20 in 2020, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States had the largest excess current account deficits; Germany, Mexico, and Russia had the largest excess surpluses.
- Debt and vulnerabilities:
  - Elevated public and private sector debt is adding to vulnerabilities.
  - Creditor and debtor stock positions remain historically high, with valuation effects from changes in exchange rates and domestic equity prices affecting positions for some economies.

### ECONOMIC PROSPECTS DIFFER MARKEDLY — Drivers and sectoral outcomes
- Cross-country divergence:
  - In many G-20 advanced economies, widespread vaccination and policy measures are supporting economic activity, though supply disruptions pose challenges.
  - In some advanced economies output surpassed pre-pandemic levels in the second quarter (examples given: Australia, Korea, United States).
  - In some emerging market economies activity has picked up (examples given: Brazil, Mexico), but growth has been set back in several emerging market economies with low vaccine coverage (examples given: India, Indonesia).
- Labor markets and inclusion:
  - Unemployment remains significant among the most vulnerable groups—including women, youth, and the low-skilled—and potential scarring to medium-term prospects is sizable.
- Supply-side bottlenecks:
  - Shortages of shipping containers and microchips have impacted supply chains (e.g., for cars), weighing on production and contributing to price pressures.

### Policy guidance — macro and structural
- Macroeconomic policy tailoring:
  - Carefully tailor macroeconomic policies to circumstances.
  - Monetary policy should see through transitory increases in inflation but be prepared to act quickly if risks of rising inflation expectations become tangible.
  - Clear communication to avoid adverse spillovers is emphasized.
  - Fiscal support must be calibrated to local conditions, while ensuring adequate support for healthcare and the most vulnerable and being embedded in strong medium-term frameworks.
  - Macroprudential tools can help mitigate macro-financial risks amid rising vulnerabilities.
- Finetuning policy settings:
  - Continued near-term macroeconomic support, as policy space allows, followed by gradual fiscal consolidation over the medium term, and combined with structural reforms, would significantly lift long-term growth and help enhance access to opportunities for everyone.

*Prepared under the guidance of Shekhar Aiyar; prepared based on information available as of October 14, 2021.*

### 7. Debt vulnerabilities continue to build.

### 7. Debt vulnerabilities continue to build.

### Public debt and fiscal measures
- Revenue and spending measures in G-20 economies in response to the crisis amounted to about $9½ trillion as of mid-2021.
- Another $5½ trillion were provided in the form of equity injections and loans and guarantees.
- These measures were instrumental in protecting vulnerable households and firms and preventing an even worse crisis.
- Sovereign debt ratios have soared to historic highs, averaging about 110 percent of GDP across the G-20.
- Planned debt-financed public investment can help fill critical infrastructure gaps and boost growth in several economies (e.g., European Union, United States), but some face risks to debt sustainability despite contained servicing costs.

### Corporate and private-sector debt
- Corporate debt rose by about 12 percent of GDP on average across the G-20 during 2020.
- Public sector support and low interest rates enabled companies to take on new debt to survive lockdowns; however, higher corporate debt levels may complicate the normalization of monetary policy and the withdrawal of crisis support.
- Risks if withdrawal is not carefully carried out:
  - Sudden wave of bankruptcies.
  - Impaired corporate balance sheets.
  - Undermined investment and weaker medium-term growth.

### Foreign-currency-denominated debt and external vulnerabilities
- Gross external debt and financing needs remain sizable in a few economies (e.g., Argentina, Turkey).
- In some economies, more than half of non-financial corporate debt is denominated in foreign currency (e.g., Argentina, Turkey).
- Such exposures heighten vulnerabilities to sudden capital flow reversals—particularly concerning amid divergent recoveries.

### Implications and downside risks to growth
- Downside risks dominate the outlook. Key risks highlighted:
  - The pandemic: Emergence of new highly infectious variants could trigger larger outbreaks and containment responses, disrupting supply chains.
  - Inflation and financial conditions: Continued supply-demand mismatches could sustain price pressures longer than expected, triggering faster-than-expected monetary policy normalization and tighter global financial conditions; some emerging market and low-income economies with limited policy space could come under pressure.
  - Financial market volatility: Stretched asset valuations could lead to rapid shifts in investor sentiment; failure to implement a lasting agreement on the United States’ debt ceiling could have serious market implications; large-scale disorderly corporate debt defaults or restructuring (for instance in China’s property sector) could reverberate widely.
  - Policy support: Smaller-than-expected fiscal packages (for example in the United States) could reduce global growth.
  - Unrest: Intensifying social unrest in response to high unemployment and rising food prices could damage sentiment and set back recoveries.
  - Real estate: Shifts toward online retail and remote work could reduce demand for some commercial real estate segments; sustained rapid house price growth could heighten expectations and lead to excessive risk taking.
  - The trading system: Continued trade tensions between the United States and China, supply restrictions related to vaccine production, and increasingly protectionist policies could compound risks.

### Related social and human-capital pressures (contextual implications)
- Labor market conditions have improved since the height of the crisis, with unemployment rates falling across many economies, but youth, women, and low-skilled people continue to face challenges.
- In G-20 emerging market economies, employment rates remain well below pre-crisis levels, in particular for youth.
- Disruptions to schooling undermine human capital formation, particularly among poorer students and in economies with lower access to electricity and the internet.
- The number of children missing routine vaccinations (e.g., against measles) jumped by 3.7 million globally in 2020.
- Absent additional resources and decisive actions, long-term impacts on health and earnings will likely be severe.

### Policy recommendations and international cooperation
- Urgent action by the G-20 is needed to save lives and support the global economy, including:
  - Sharing surplus vaccine doses and support to the poorest economies to close financing gaps for vaccines, testing, and therapeutics and to ensure sufficient liquidity through the crisis.
  - Decisive actions to transition towards a carbon-neutral economy should not be postponed.
  - Implementing a global minimum corporate tax and buttressing the international trade system.
- Key elements of the IMF staff proposal endorsed by WHO, WTO, and the World Bank:
  - Vaccinating at least 40 percent of the population in all economies by end-2021 and at least 70 percent by mid-2022.
  - Tracking and insuring against downside risks.
  - Addressing financing gaps to ensure widespread availability of vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics.
- Immediate priorities to reach vaccination goals:
  - Ramp up supply and sharing of vaccines with developing economies (including delivery swaps with COVAX/AVAT and accelerating deliveries of existing dose sharing commitments).
  - Remove trade barriers on vaccines and related materials.
  - Address financing gaps (including through about US$20 billion in grants) to ensure adequate supplies of diagnostics and therapeutics and to support procurement and distribution of vaccines.
  - Diversify production of vaccines and other health tools, including supporting expansion of regional manufacturing capacity in developing economies through financing and technology transfer solutions.
- Strengthen the global financial safety net:
  - Extension of the G-20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) to end-2021 has freed up resources for developing economies.
  - G-20 Common Framework for the Treatment of Debt beyond the DSSI is a welcome step; remaining implementation challenges need resolution.
  - The recent $650 billion SDR allocation will help address the long-term global need for reserves.
  - About US$275 billion of the new allocation will go to emerging market and developing economies, including low-income countries.
  - G-20 backing for voluntary channeling of SDRs from economies with strong external positions to more vulnerable economies would help strengthen liquidity, meet health-related expenditures, and support more inclusive and sustainable recoveries.
  - Additional loans and subsidies to support concessional financing for poorer economies would be welcome.

*Source: g20-report-on-strong-sustainable-balanced-and-inclusive-growth — 7. Debt vulnerabilities continue to build.*

### 14.  Decisive action to counter climate change, including at the upcoming COP26 summit,

### 14. Decisive action to counter climate change, including at the upcoming COP26 summit

### Climate action and net-zero goal
- New pledges ahead of the COP26 Summit for reaching net-zero carbon emissions are welcome; concrete plans are essential.
- Implement a comprehensive policy package to reach the goal of net zero emissions by 2050 in a growth and employment-friendly manner.
- A comprehensive package should ideally encompass:
  - carbon pricing or regulatory equivalents;
  - green R&D;
  - green infrastructure investment;
  - redistribution to support vulnerable groups and workers in industries adversely impacted by the transition.
- Helpful public investments cited:
  - renewable energy generation;
  - improved energy efficiency;
  - infrastructure for low-carbon transport systems, including electric vehicles (examples cited: encouraging adoption of electric vehicles as done in China, France, and Germany; enhancing green energy production and use as done in Korea and Saudi Arabia).
- Public investment would catalyze private investment, which could be supported through incentives (e.g., credit enhancements, tax credits).
- Evidence cited: increasing the share of renewable electricity generation and enhancing energy efficiency has the potential to create more jobs in energy generation than are lost from the reduction in fossil-fuel-based generation, because renewable technologies are more labor-intensive than fossil-fuel technologies (Figure 15, left panel).
- The broader labor market impact depends on the overall policy mix employed to attain climate objectives.

### Carbon pricing and international coordination
- Consider an international carbon price floor to support the transition.
- Building consensus among the G-20 to implement a carbon price floor arrangement could be instrumental in putting the world on a stronger path toward carbon-neutrality (Figure 15, right panel).
- Design considerations noted:
  - a differentiated price floor by level of development;
  - the possibility of implementation equivalents.
- Purported benefits of an international price floor:
  - facilitate transparency;
  - help prevent potential adverse impacts on competitiveness from unilateral action;
  - internationally coordinated carbon pricing would mitigate the desire for economies with unilateral aggressive carbon pricing to implement border carbon adjustments.
- Policy scenarios illustrated (right chart, Figure 15) include:
  - a global carbon tax/price floor of $50/ton for all countries; or
  - differentiated tax rates by level of development, with example rates: $75/ton for advanced economies; $500/ton for high-income emerging market economies (e.g., China); $25/ton for low-income emerging market economies (e.g., India).

### Support for emerging market and developing economies
- Support mitigation and adaptation efforts in emerging market and developing economies through financial and technology transfers.
- Rationale:
  - Emerging market and developing economies are expected to incur greater costs along the transition and likely face sizable investment needs for climate adaptation as well as higher costs of sovereign debt.
  - Many of the world’s lowest-cost mitigation opportunities are in emerging market and developing economies; it is in the global interest to make sure these are pursued.
- Financing note: financing under the proposed IMF-administered Resilience and Sustainability Trust could support efforts to mobilize resources for climate action.

### Broader policy priorities: corporate taxation and trade
- Implement a global corporate minimum tax.
  - The recent endorsement of G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of a global minimum corporate tax is welcomed.
  - A global agreement puts a floor on tax competition, limits profit shifting, and incentivizes countries to attract investment on the basis of structural competitiveness.
  - It is essential that it is speedily implemented.
- Address disputes and challenges related to the international trading system.
  - Recent steps to resolve long-standing trade disputes (e.g., the European Union and the United States regarding aircrafts) and the reversal of many pandemic-induced restrictions on medical goods are welcome.
  - Much of the sharp increase in pre-pandemic trade restrictions remain in place, including the tariffs imposed in 2018–19 between China and the United States, and should be lifted.
  - Actions recommended to buttress an open, stable, transparent, and rules-based trading system:
    - resolve bilateral trade and technology tensions;
    - strengthen WTO rules on farm and industrial subsidies;
    - restore effective dispute settlement; and
    - conclude new market-opening agreements in areas such as digital trade, investment facilitation, and services.

### Macroeconomic policy context relevant to climate and recovery
- Fiscal policy will need to be tailored to local economic and pandemic conditions; monetary policy should be prepared to act if risks of de-anchoring of inflation expectations become tangible.
- As the recovery takes hold, a gradual return to rebuilding buffers will be warranted; combined with structural reforms, implementation of IMF staff policy recommendations would facilitate a stronger, more sustainable, more balanced, and more inclusive growth.

Key monetary and fiscal observations and recommendations
- Monetary policy:
  - Monetary policy remains accommodative in most economies, despite some tightening.
  - Several emerging market economies have started to raise policy interest rates (Figure 17).
  - Korea became the first G-20 advanced economy central bank to raise policy interest rates since the onset of the pandemic (in August).
  - The United States Federal Reserve signaled that tapering of asset purchases could begin by end-2021 while keeping interest rates unchanged at current accommodative levels.
  - The European Central Bank signaled a possible slowing of the pace of asset purchases, while maintaining flexibility to act.
  - Projections and guidance:
    - Monetary policy is projected to remain appropriately accommodative in most economies in the near term.
    - Major G-20 central banks should avoid raising policy rates prematurely in response to temporary spikes in inflation, but should stand ready to tighten if risks of de-anchoring inflation expectations become tangible.
    - Additional monetary policy support would be beneficial where inflation is undershooting the target and the monetary stance is somewhat tight (example: China).
    - Some economies would benefit from a looser-than-projected stance in 2022 (examples: China, Korea, Mexico, Russia).
    - A firmer policy stance in Turkey would help buttress credibility and contain inflation.
    - Clear communication by central banks on inflation and policy intentions is critical to guide expectations and limit financial market volatility.
- Fiscal policy:
  - Fiscal policy has helped support households and firms but options for further measures are increasingly constrained.
  - Examples of targeted support measures taken:
    - utilizing existing financial inclusion programs and institutions (e.g., China, India);
    - targeted support to children (e.g., Russia);
    - expanding unemployment benefits and measures to protect displaced workers (e.g., Germany, United States), including for informal workers (e.g., Brazil) and migrants (e.g., China);
    - measures to maintain employer-employee relationships (e.g., Australia, Germany, Japan, United States);
    - targeted support to affected sectors and firms (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Spain), including in ways that pushed forward climate objectives (e.g., France).
  - Projection and stance:
    - Nearly all G-20 economies are projected to maintain 2021 and 2022 fiscal balances below 2019 levels—despite some withdrawal of support as crisis measures gradually expire.
    - Notable policy support remains present relative to pre-pandemic projections.
    - Fiscal space is increasingly limited and debt levels elevated in several emerging market economies.
  - Tailoring and sequencing:
    - Near-term policy support will need to be tailored to local conditions; priority is to ensure adequate support for healthcare and the most vulnerable people.
    - Strengthening medium-term fiscal frameworks (transparent institutions and rules) would help buy time and space for near-term support while rebuilding fiscal space over the longer term and enhance scope for monetary policy to maintain support.
    - In some economies, job retention programs and expanded unemployment benefits may be warranted; support to viable firms facing temporary liquidity or solvency risks can help prevent excess bankruptcies.
    - Some economies would benefit from greater-than-projected fiscal support in 2021 before gradually shifting to tighter stances later on (example: China — medium-term rebalancing facilitated by more accommodative near-term fiscal policy combined with compositional shift away from investment and toward household support and strengthened social safety nets).
    - Some economies with limited fiscal space or high debt should gradually withdraw support in line with recommendations (examples: Brazil, South Africa).
  - As recoveries progress:
    - Support for firms and short-term work schemes should be gradually scaled back to preserve fiscal space and avoid hindering reallocation of resources to growing sectors, while ensuring protection for workers in transition.
    - Measures to facilitate transition: training and reskilling, job search and matching assistance, hiring subsidies.
    - Incorporating green and digital investments in recovery packages can help lift demand and employment, enhance access to opportunities, and address climate change.
  - Medium-term fiscal objective:
    - Nearly all G-20 economies are projected to withdraw fiscal support over the medium term to help put public sector debt on a downward path.
    - Additional measures beyond projections are advisable in several economies (examples: France, India, Italy, South Africa, Spain, Turkey).
    - Germany should use its ample fiscal space to further ramp up public investment over the medium term to help lift potential growth.

### Financial sector policy
- Financial sector policies should focus on mitigating risks to help ensure stability.
- Recommended actions:
  - implement macroprudential tools and tighten measures where appropriate to contain buildup of vulnerabilities;
  - strengthen corporate resolution mechanisms to address non-viable and distressed firms as policy support is withdrawn;
  - monitor increases in house prices in many economies (example: United States) and tighten macroprudential policies where needed.

### Fiscal space classification and related notes (figure annotations)
- Fiscal space classifications (assessments latest available as of July 2021):
  - "Substantial" fiscal space: AUS, DEU, KOR, RUS;
  - "Some" fiscal space: CAN, CHN, FRA, GBR, IDN, JPN, MEX, SAU, TUR, USA;
  - fiscal space "at risk": BRA, ESP, IND, ITA;
  - "None" (i.e., no fiscal space): ARG, ZAF.
- Projections note:
  - Nearly all G-20 economies are projected to maintain 2021 and 2022 fiscal balances below 2019 levels.
  - Figures and charts referenced include Figure 15 (jobs and emissions), Figure 16 (trade restrictions), Figure 17 (policy interest rates), Figure 18 (monetary policy stance recommendations), Figure 19 (policy space and change in overall fiscal balances), and Figure 20 (fiscal policy CAPB recommendations).

*Source: IMF — G-20 report on strong, sustainable, balanced, and inclusive growth (chapter content supplied).*

### 2021. ARG:

### g20-report-on-strong-sustainable-balanced-and-inclusive-growth - 2021. ARG

### Fiscal stance: Projected vs. recommended change in CAPB (summary)
- Country-level stance differences (labels reflect the difference between recommended and projected change in CAPB):
  - FRA: Substantially more expansionary / Substantially more contractionary / Moderately more contractionary
  - DEU: Substantially more expansionary / Substantially more contractionary / Substantially more contractionary
  - ITA: Substantially more expansionary / Substantially more contractionary / Moderately more contractionary
  - KOR: Substantially more expansionary / Unchanged / Moderately more contractionary
  - EU: Substantially more expansionary / Substantially more contractionary / Moderately more contractionary
  - AUS: Unchanged / Substantially more contractionary / Substantially more contractionary
  - ESP: Moderately more contractionary / Substantially more contractionary / Unchanged
  - GBR: Moderately more contractionary / Substantially more contractionary / Moderately more contractionary
  - CAN: Substantially more contractionary / Substantially more contractionary / Substantially more contractionary
  - JPN: Substantially more contractionary / Substantially more contractionary / Moderately more contractionary
  - USA: Substantially more contractionary / Moderately more contractionary / Substantially more contractionary
  - ARG: Substantially more expansionary
  - IND: Moderately more expansionary / Moderately more contractionary / Moderately more contractionary
  - IDN: Moderately more expansionary / Substantially more contractionary / Moderately more contractionary
  - MEX: Moderately more expansionary / Moderately more contractionary / Moderately more contractionary
  - TUR: Moderately more expansionary / Moderately more contractionary / Unchanged
  - BRA: Substantially more contractionary / Substantially more contractionary / Moderately more contractionary
  - CHN: Substantially more contractionary / Substantially more contractionary / Substantially more contractionary
  - RUS: Substantially more contractionary / Moderately more contractionary / Moderately more contractionary
  - SAU: Substantially more contractionary / Substantially more contractionary / Substantially more contractionary
  - ZAF: Substantially more contractionary / Moderately more contractionary / Moderately more contractionary

- Key (difference between recommended and projected change in CAPB):
  - Substantially more expansionary or less contractionary: ∆ d(CAPB) < -0.5 ppt. of potential GDP
  - Moderately more expansionary: -0.5 ≤ ∆ d(CAPB) < -0.1 ppt. of potential GDP
  - Unchanged: -0.1 ≤ ∆ d(CAPB) ≤ 0.1 ppt. of potential GDP
  - Moderately more contractionary: 0.1 < ∆ d(CAPB) ≤ 0.5 ppt. of potential GDP
  - Substantially more contractionary or less expansionary: ∆ d(CAPB) > 0.5 ppt. of potential GDP

- Key (stance legend used in figures):
  - Substantially expansionary
  - Moderately expansionary
  - Neutral
  - Moderately contractionary
  - Substantially contractionary

### Financial stability risks and policy guidance
- Areas of concern and recommended monitoring/actions:
  - Credit risks from structural realignments in the commercial real-estate sector (e.g., Germany, United States) related to the shift to online shopping and remote work should be monitored closely.
  - Consider introduction of appropriate macroprudential tools to address real-estate sector risks.
  - Amid persistently low interest rates, challenges remain for the banking sector and nonbank financial institutions (example: nonbank mortgage lenders in the United States).
  - Policymakers should consider whether available tools are sufficient for careful monitoring and assessment of risks in the nonbank financial sector.
  - In China, strengthen corporate restructuring and insolvency frameworks to facilitate market-based exit of nonviable firms.
  - Chinese authorities should be ready to take necessary steps to safeguard financial stability if signs of systemic financial stress were to develop.

### Structural reforms: priorities and recommendations
- Rationale: Implementing growth-enhancing reforms would boost human capital and productivity and support a sustainable recovery.
- Consensus IMF and OECD staff assessment highlights (country-specific priorities; not comparable across countries):
  - Across most economies:
    - Further easing of product market regulations is needed.
    - Implementation of active labor market policies to facilitate resource reallocation from shrinking to expanding sectors and firms.
    - Support for childcare and other reforms to support women’s participation in the labor market to support growth and inclusion.
    - Tax structure reform to increase the share of consumption and property taxes in total tax revenue.
  - In several advanced economies:
    - Reforms to boost R&D to support digitalization, productivity, and development of low-carbon technologies for the green transition.
- Figure 21 (consensus priority ratings by country for specific reform areas) categories and examples (ratings scale: 1 High / 1.5 Medium / 2 Low as per key):
  - Easing product market regulations
  - Trade liberalization/facilitation
  - Easing employment protection legislation
  - Tax structure reform (Increase the share of consumption and property taxes in total tax revenues)
  - Research and Development
  - Reducing labor tax wedge
  - Childcare spending or other reforms to increase FLFP (Female labor force participation)
  - Active labor market policies
  - Reducing unemployment benefit replacement rate
- Note: ESP is a permanent invitee. EU degree of priority based on average of EU member countries; non-G-20 EU members use only IMF ratings.

### Education, health, and inclusion: addressing pandemic-related losses
- Key messages:
  - Policies to minimize pandemic-related learning losses and adverse health outcomes are critical to promote human capital accumulation, productivity, and inclusion.
  - Severe schooling losses in many G-20 economies, especially among emerging market economies, require additional action to repair the damage.
  - Suggested measures to mitigate student learning losses include remedial training for teachers, tutoring for students, and adjusting school years.
  - To minimize damage to health outcomes, many countries need further investments to restore health care services, including programs for routine immunizations.
  - To build more inclusive post-pandemic economies:
    - Increased funding to the education sector is essential in many economies to ensure all children have access to basic education.
    - Investments in early childhood education programs and better health care are recommended.
    - Greater access to digital infrastructure, including internet access, remains important for enhancing access to opportunities and online learning.
    - Some economies need to expand coverage of benefits and transfers (examples: China, Mexico) and undertake reforms aimed at job creation (examples: Argentina, Brazil, South Africa).

### Macro effects of implementing IMF staff recommendations
- Near term (2021–2022):
  - Adjusting policies from current settings to IMF staff recommendations would help lift aggregate real GDP in the G-20.
  - Additional fiscal support relative to projections on current policy settings in China and some other emerging market economies (example: India, Mexico), combined with looser monetary policy in a few economies (example: China, Mexico), would provide a sizable impetus to growth this year and next, despite some policy tightening elsewhere.
  - Aggregate GDP would rise further above the baseline as the benefits of structural reforms begin to materialize.
- Medium and long term:
  - Gains from structural reforms would carry growth forward, while fiscal policy would focus on rebuilding buffers.
  - Additional fiscal consolidation will likely be needed to contain debt levels and reduce sovereign risk across several G-20 economies, which may dampen macroeconomic support for activity.
  - Sizable gains from structural reform efforts would gradually materialize.
  - Spillovers from implementing recommended policies across the G-20 will add to the boost in activity.
  - The additional growth induced by recommended policies would allow governments to expand resources devoted to tackling inequality.
- Modeling and sources:
  - The macroeconomic impact of adjusting policy settings is assessed using the IMF’s G-20 Model.
  - References: IMF, World Economic Outlook, Chapter 2, April; UNICEF, Press release, July; IMF, Fiscal Monitor, Chapter 2, April.

### Debt outlook, external balances, and demand composition effects
- Debt sustainability:
  - Recommended actions would enhance debt sustainability.
  - Growth boosts in economies with some fiscal space, including from growth-enhancing structural reforms, would lower debt ratios in the medium term, despite recommendations for more near-term fiscal support in a few such economies (example: China).
  - Gradual consolidation of fiscal balances over the medium term in economies with no fiscal space or fiscal space at risk (examples: Italy, South Africa, Spain), combined with growth benefits from structural reforms, would allow for significant reduction in debt levels as a share of GDP, helping to strengthen fiscal buffers.
- Current account and demand composition:
  - Shifts in the composition of demand would help support rebalancing and lift demand, including through increased incentives for additional private investment.
  - Among advanced economies with excess current account surpluses, additional fiscal support in Germany (where fiscal space is substantial) would further lift demand and help reduce trade and current account balances.
  - Medium-term fiscal consolidation in some economies with excess current account deficits (examples: South Africa, Turkey) would moderately increase current account balances.
  - Groupings based on external balance assessments in IMF, 2021, External Sector Report:
    - Economies with excess surpluses: DEU, MEX, RUS
    - Economies with excess deficits: ARG, CAN, FRA, SAU, ZAF, TUR, GBR, USA
    - Broadly balanced: AUS, BRA, CHN, IDN, IND, ITA, JPN, KOR, ESP

### Key statistics and projections (Table 1. Real GDP Growth, percent change)
- Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2021.
- Notes:
  - 1/ G-20 aggregations exclude European Union.
  - 2/ Includes Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, United Kingdom, and United States.
  - 3/ Includes Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey.
  - 4/ India's real GDP growth rates are calculated as per national accounts: with base year 2011/12.
  - 5/ Permanent invitee.
- Selected entries (as presented):
  - World: 2.8 -3.1 5.9 4.9 3.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0
  - Advanced Economies: 1.7 -4.5 5.2 4.5 1.6 -0.4 0.1 0.0
  - Euro area: 1.5 -6.3 5.0 4.3 1.4 0.4 0.0 0.0
  - G-20 1/: 2.9 -2.9 6.3 5.0 3.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0
  - Advanced G-20 2/: 1.7 -4.6 5.2 4.6 1.5 -0.6 0.2 0.0
  - Emerging G-20 3/: 4.0 -1.5 7.3 5.4 4.5 0.1 -0.1 0.1
  - Argentina: -2.1 -9.9 7.5 2.5 1.8 1.1 0.1 0.0
  - Australia: 1.9 -2.4 3.5 4.1 2.6 -1.8 1.1 0.0
  - Brazil: 1.4 -4.1 5.2 1.5 2.1 -0.1 -0.4 0.0
  - Canada: 1.9 -5.3 5.7 4.9 1.5 -0.6 0.4 0.0
  - China: 6.0 2.3 8.0 5.6 4.9 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
  - France: 1.8 -8.0 6.3 3.9 1.4 0.5 -0.3 0.0
  - Germany: 1.1 -4.6 3.1 4.6 1.1 -0.5 0.5 0.0
  - India 4/: 4.0 -7.3 9.5 8.5 6.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
  - Indonesia: 5.0 -2.1 3.2 5.9 5.2 -0.7 0.0 0.0
  - Italy: 0.3 -8.9 5.8 4.2 1.0 0.9 0.0 0.0
  - Japan: 0.0 -4.6 2.4 3.2 0.5 -0.4 0.2 0.0
  - Korea: 2.2 -0.9 4.3 3.3 2.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0
  - Mexico: -0.2 -8.3 6.2 4.0 2.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0
  - Russia: 2.0 -3.0 4.7 2.9 1.6 0.3 -0.2 0.0
  - Saudi Arabia: 0.3 -4.1 2.8 4.8 2.8 0.4 0.0 0.0
  - South Africa: 0.1 -6.4 5.0 2.2 1.3 1.0 0.0 0.0
  - Spain 5/: 2.1 -10.8 5.7 6.4 1.5 -0.5 0.6 0.0
  - Turkey: 0.9 1.8 9.0 3.3 3.3 3.2 0.0 0.0
  - United Kingdom: 1.4 -9.8 6.8 5.0 1.5 -0.2 0.2 0.0
  - United States: 2.3 -3.4 6.0 5.2 1.7 -1.0 0.3 0.0
  - European Union: 1.9 -5.9 5.1 4.4 1.7 0.4 0.0 0.1

*International Monetary Fund (excerpt from G-20 report: "G20 - Report on Strong, Sustainable, Balanced and Inclusive Growth", 2021).*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/research/imf-and-g20/2021/g20-report-on-strong-sustainable-balanced-and-inclusive-growth.pdf_