## 5.  Strengthening the Architecture of the International Financial System

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [5.  Strengthening the Architecture of the International Financial System](https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-flagship-issues/external/pubs/ft/ar/1999/pdf/_file1pdf.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-flagship-issues/external/pubs/ft/ar/1999/pdf/_file1pdf.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-flagship-issues/external/pubs/ft/ar/1999/pdf/_file1pdf.pdf.json)

---

### Transparency, Standards, and Surveillance
- Major focus in 1998/99: improve IMF transparency and develop/disseminate internationally accepted standards and codes of good practice.
- Measures taken:
  - Released Public Information Notices (PINs) following Board discussions of member countries’ Article IV consultations; PINs were released for more than 70 percent of Article IV consultations in 1998/99.
  - Began presumption that member countries would release Letters of Intent, Memoranda of Economic and Financial Policies, and Policy Framework Papers underpinning IMF-supported programs (approved March–April 1999).
  - Established an 18-month pilot project for member countries’ voluntary public release of Article IV staff reports.
  - Released Chairman’s concluding statements following Executive Board decisions on the use of IMF resources.
  - Expanded public access to the IMF’s archives and increased public access to information on IMF liquidity and members’ accounts via the IMF website.
- Standards and assessment work:
  - Strengthened the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS), notably on international reserves and external debt.
  - Developed a code of good practice on fiscal transparency and another on transparency in monetary and financial policies.
  - In conjunction with other institutions, developed a handbook for assessing implementation of the Basle Core Principles for banking supervision.
  - Strengthened IMF–World Bank collaboration on financial sector issues (IMF–Bank Financial Sector Liaison Committee).

### Financial Resources, Lending, and Crisis-Prevention Instruments
- Quotas and borrowing:
  - Quota increase under the Eleventh General Review of Quotas took effect; as of April 30, 1999, total paid-in quotas stood at SDR 208 billion ($281 billion).
  - With establishment of the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) in November 1998, IMF borrowing capacity under the GAB and NAB rose to SDR 34 billion ($46 billion).
- Use and commitments of IMF resources in financial year May 1, 1998–April 30, 1999:
  - Use of IMF resources amounted to SDR 22.2 billion ($30.0 billion).
  - Committed resources under Stand-By and Extended Arrangements: SDR 28.4 billion ($38.4 billion).
  - Drawings under the Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF): SDR 2.6 billion ($3.5 billion).
  - ESAF commitments: SDR 1.0 billion ($1.4 billion).
  - Largest credit commitments: Brazil SDR 13.0 billion; Indonesia SDR 6.4 billion; Russia SDR 8.5 billion (including under the CCFF).
  - As of April 30, 1999, 9 Stand-By Arrangements, 12 Extended Arrangements, and 35 ESAF Arrangements were in effect.
  - Outstanding IMF credit (net of repayments) reached SDR 67.2 billion ($90.8 billion) on April 30, 1999, up from SDR 56 billion ($75.4 billion) a year earlier.
- Liquidity and ratios:
  - Net uncommitted usable resources (adjusted): SDR 56.7 billion ($76.6 billion) as of April 30, 1999, from SDR 22.6 billion ($30.4 billion) a year earlier.
  - Liquid liabilities: SDR 63.6billion ($85.9 billion) on April 30, 1999, from SDR 50.3 billion ($67.7billion) a year earlier.
  - Liquidity ratio (net uncommitted usable resources / liquid liabilities): 89 percent (almost doubled).
- New crisis-prevention mechanism:
  - Contingent Credit Lines (CCL) established in April 1999 as a precautionary line of defense for well-managed economies against financial contagion.
  - CCL objective: provide incentives for strong policies, adherence to standards, and private sector involvement; signal IMF willingness to provide financing if contagion strikes.

### Lessons from Financial Crises and IMF Program Design
- Context:
  - Asian crisis (from first half of 1997), then contagion to Russia and Brazil in 1998; heavy demand for IMF financing in 1998/99.
- Executive Board lessons and agreed emphases:
  - Regularly analyze appropriateness of exchange rate regimes in surveillance.
  - Provide accurate, full, and clear financial information on both public and private sectors continuously.
  - Strengthen regulatory and prudential regimes and adapt creditor-country institutions/regulations to improve pricing of risk and deter “bandwagon” behavior.
  - Promote stronger disclosure requirements for all investors, including highly leveraged institutions.
  - Base IMF-supported programs on macroeconomic projections that account fully for likely regional spillovers and curtailed access to private external financing.
  - Analyze severe banking and financial sector weaknesses in greater depth.
  - Encourage decisive actions at the outset to demonstrate ownership and public leadership of programs.
  - Coordinate communication with authorities to explain program contents clearly without raising unrealistic expectations.
  - Be flexible in adapting programs to changing circumstances and secure early agreement with authorities and other international financial institutions on comprehensive structural reform strategies.
  - Emphasize strengthened social safety nets as an essential element of programs to cushion the adverse impact on the poor.

### Capital Account Issues and Private Sector Involvement
- Capital account liberalization:
  - Broad consensus: financial integration brings substantial benefits but carries risks; liberalization must be carefully managed.
  - Executive Directors agreed that liberalization must be supported by:
    - A consistent macroeconomic framework (monetary and exchange rate policies).
    - Adequate institutional setup for financial intermediaries and market participants to manage risk.
    - Careful determination of speed and sequencing of liberalization.
  - Views on capital controls:
    - Most Directors: reimposition of controls on capital outflows generally not effective in a crisis; controls on inflows are not a substitute for fundamental policy actions and must be part of a broader policy package.
    - Several Directors: temporary reimposition of capital controls could play a useful role in a crisis.
  - Ongoing work: refine analysis and review country experiences with specific controls.
- Involving the private sector:
  - Viewed as critical to more orderly adjustment, limiting moral hazard, strengthening market discipline, and helping emerging market borrowers manage volatility/contagion.
  - 1998/99 work areas and continuing 1999/2000 work:
    - Enhance information flows and regulatory environments to prevent crises.
    - Modify bank capital standards and bond contracts.
    - Explore contingent financing and debt-service insurance.
  - Staff study (advance copy referenced): Involving the Private Sector in Forestalling and Resolving Financial Crises.

### Strengthening Financial Systems and Surveillance Scope
- Surveillance priorities broadened beyond macroeconomic imbalances to “second-generation reforms”:
  - Strengthen financial sector efficiency (e.g., financial system stability assessments jointly with the World Bank).
  - Improve data collection and disclosure.
  - Enhance transparency of government budgets and monetary/financial policy.
  - Promote autonomy and operational independence of central banks.
  - Promote legal reforms and good governance.
- Regional surveillance examples during the financial year:
  - European Economic and Monetary Union (including launch of the euro on January 1, 1999).
  - West African Economic and Monetary Union.
- External evaluations and outreach:
  - Commissioned external evaluations of IMF surveillance and economic research activities.

### ESAF, HIPC Initiative, and Low-Income Country Policies
- Objectives: improve effectiveness of concessional financing and debt-relief efforts to help poor countries achieve growth, external viability, and poverty reduction.
- Progress and financing:
  - As of April 1999, IMF and World Bank Executive Boards had reviewed the eligibility of 12 heavily indebted poor countries for the HIPC Initiative.
  - Seven countries had qualified for debt relief and three others were expected to follow.
  - Debt relief committed to the seven qualified countries: $6 billion in nominal terms ($3 billion in 1998 net present value terms).
  - Assistance for Uganda and Bolivia had been released.
- Policy discussions and reforms:
  - Considered options for enhancing the HIPC Initiative; widespread concern that HIPC had not provided adequate debt relief for poor countries to escape debt-service burdens.
  - IMF and World Bank staffs prepared a technical note (April 1999) estimating costs of various proposals from member governments and civil society; posted for public feedback.
  - Board agreed that decisions to strengthen the HIPC Initiative would have to be made in step with securing necessary financing.
  - Agreed on modifications to postconflict emergency assistance policy to provide more appropriate terms and longer periods when warranted.
- ESAF operational adjustments:
  - Continued discussions to improve the effectiveness of ESAF-supported programs, including stronger IMF–World Bank collaboration on program design and social sector issues.

### Technical Assistance and Institutional Capacity Building
- Growing demand:
  - Technical assistance absorbed about 15 percent of the IMF’s total administrative expenditures in 1998/99.
  - Annual volume of IMF technical assistance requires about 300 person-years in the late 1990s, compared with about 130 person-years in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
- Focus areas:
  - Monetary and fiscal macroeconomic management.
  - Statistics and data dissemination.
  - Financial law and regulation.
  - Social safety nets and social security reform.
  - IMF financial accounting and operations.
  - Information technology.
- Purpose: strengthen government human resources and institutional capacity for effective economic management, promote better governance, and create conditions for long-term equitable growth.

*Source: ANNUAL REPORT 1999 — "Strengthening the Architecture of the International Financial System"*

### 1.  Main Developments in the World Economy in 1998/99  . . . . . . . . . . . .    13

### 1. Main Developments in the World Economy in 1998/99

### Overview of major chapters and subtopics
- "Emerging Market Economies" — page 15
- "Advanced Economies" — page 19

### Related topical breakdown (as presented in the source)
- Section 2: "World Economic Outlook" — page 21
  - "United States, Japan, and Europe" — page 22
  - "Crisis-Afflicted Economies" — page 23
  - "Other Emerging Economies" — page 24
  - "Preventing Contagion" — page 24

- Section 3: "International Capital Markets" — page 26
  - "Annual Review" — page 26
  - "Asian Crisis and Other Emerging Market Developments" — page 26
  - "Mature Market Countries" — page 27
  - "Interim Review" — page 28
  - "Factors Behind Markets’ Response" — page 29
  - "Role of Public Policy" — page 29

- Section headed "III. The IMF in 1998/99"

- Section 4: "Evolution of the Economic Crisis in Emerging Market Economies" — page 33
  - "IMF-Supported Programs in Asian Crisis Countries" — page 33
  - "The Board’s Assessment" — page 36
  - "Russia and Brazil" — page 39

*Source: _file1pdf - 1.  Main Developments in the World Economy in 1998/99  . . . . . . . . . . . .    13*

### 5.  Strengthening the Architecture of the International

### 5.  Strengthening the Architecture of the International Financial System

### Transparency, Standards, and Surveillance
- Major focus in 1998/99: improve IMF transparency and develop/disseminate internationally accepted standards and codes of good practice.
- Measures taken:
  - Released Public Information Notices (PINs) following Board discussions of member countries’ Article IV consultations; PINs were released for more than 70 percent of Article IV consultations in 1998/99.
  - Began presumption that member countries would release Letters of Intent, Memoranda of Economic and Financial Policies, and Policy Framework Papers underpinning IMF-supported programs (approved March–April 1999).
  - Established an 18-month pilot project for member countries’ voluntary public release of Article IV staff reports.
  - Released Chairman’s concluding statements following Executive Board decisions on the use of IMF resources.
  - Expanded public access to the IMF’s archives and increased public access to information on IMF liquidity and members’ accounts via the IMF website.
- Standards and assessment work:
  - Strengthened the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS), notably on international reserves and external debt.
  - Developed a code of good practice on fiscal transparency and another on transparency in monetary and financial policies.
  - In conjunction with other institutions, developed a handbook for assessing implementation of the Basle Core Principles for banking supervision.
  - Strengthened IMF–World Bank collaboration on financial sector issues (IMF–Bank Financial Sector Liaison Committee).

### Financial Resources, Lending, and Crisis-Prevention Instruments
- Quotas and borrowing:
  - Quota increase under the Eleventh General Review of Quotas took effect; as of April 30, 1999, total paid-in quotas stood at SDR 208 billion ($281 billion).
  - With establishment of the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) in November 1998, IMF borrowing capacity under the GAB and NAB rose to SDR 34 billion ($46 billion).
- Use and commitments of IMF resources in financial year May 1, 1998–April 30, 1999:
  - Use of IMF resources amounted to SDR 22.2 billion ($30.0 billion).
  - Committed resources under Stand-By and Extended Arrangements: SDR 28.4 billion ($38.4 billion).
  - Drawings under the Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF): SDR 2.6 billion ($3.5 billion).
  - ESAF commitments: SDR 1.0 billion ($1.4 billion).
  - Largest credit commitments: Brazil SDR 13.0 billion; Indonesia SDR 6.4 billion; Russia SDR 8.5 billion (including under the CCFF).
  - As of April 30, 1999, 9 Stand-By Arrangements, 12 Extended Arrangements, and 35 ESAF Arrangements were in effect.
  - Outstanding IMF credit (net of repayments) reached SDR 67.2 billion ($90.8 billion) on April 30, 1999, up from SDR 56 billion ($75.4 billion) a year earlier.
- Liquidity and ratios:
  - Net uncommitted usable resources (adjusted): SDR 56.7 billion ($76.6 billion) as of April 30, 1999, from SDR 22.6 billion ($30.4 billion) a year earlier.
  - Liquid liabilities: SDR 63.6billion ($85.9 billion) on April 30, 1999, from SDR 50.3 billion ($67.7billion) a year earlier.
  - Liquidity ratio (net uncommitted usable resources / liquid liabilities): 89 percent (almost doubled).
- New crisis-prevention mechanism:
  - Contingent Credit Lines (CCL) established in April 1999 as a precautionary line of defense for well-managed economies against financial contagion.
  - CCL objective: provide incentives for strong policies, adherence to standards, and private sector involvement; signal IMF willingness to provide financing if contagion strikes.

### Lessons from Financial Crises and IMF Program Design
- Context: Asian crisis (from first half of 1997), then contagion to Russia and Brazil in 1998; heavy demand for IMF financing in 1998/99.
- Executive Board lessons and agreed emphases:
  - Regularly analyze appropriateness of exchange rate regimes in surveillance.
  - Provide accurate, full, and clear financial information on both public and private sectors continuously.
  - Strengthen regulatory and prudential regimes and adapt creditor-country institutions/regulations to improve pricing of risk and deter “bandwagon” behavior.
  - Promote stronger disclosure requirements for all investors, including highly leveraged institutions.
  - Base IMF-supported programs on macroeconomic projections that account fully for likely regional spillovers and curtailed access to private external financing.
  - Analyze severe banking and financial sector weaknesses in greater depth.
  - Encourage decisive actions at the outset to demonstrate ownership and public leadership of programs.
  - Coordinate communication with authorities to explain program contents clearly without raising unrealistic expectations.
  - Be flexible in adapting programs to changing circumstances and secure early agreement with authorities and other international financial institutions on comprehensive structural reform strategies.
  - Emphasize strengthened social safety nets as an essential element of programs to cushion the adverse impact on the poor.

### Capital Account Issues and Private Sector Involvement
- Capital account liberalization:
  - Broad consensus: financial integration brings substantial benefits but carries risks; liberalization must be carefully managed.
  - Executive Directors agreed that liberalization must be supported by:
    - A consistent macroeconomic framework (monetary and exchange rate policies).
    - Adequate institutional setup for financial intermediaries and market participants to manage risk.
    - Careful determination of speed and sequencing of liberalization.
  - Views on capital controls:
    - Most Directors: reimposition of controls on capital outflows generally not effective in a crisis; controls on inflows are not a substitute for fundamental policy actions and must be part of a broader policy package.
    - Several Directors: temporary reimposition of capital controls could play a useful role in a crisis.
  - Ongoing work: refine analysis and review country experiences with specific controls.
- Involving the private sector:
  - Viewed as critical to more orderly adjustment, limiting moral hazard, strengthening market discipline, and helping emerging market borrowers manage volatility/contagion.
  - 1998/99 work areas and continuing 1999/2000 work:
    - Enhance information flows and regulatory environments to prevent crises.
    - Modify bank capital standards and bond contracts.
    - Explore contingent financing and debt-service insurance.
  - Staff study (advance copy referenced): Involving the Private Sector in Forestalling and Resolving Financial Crises.

### Strengthening Financial Systems and Surveillance Scope
- Surveillance priorities broadened beyond macroeconomic imbalances to “second-generation reforms”:
  - Strengthen financial sector efficiency (e.g., financial system stability assessments jointly with the World Bank).
  - Improve data collection and disclosure.
  - Enhance transparency of government budgets and monetary/financial policy.
  - Promote autonomy and operational independence of central banks.
  - Promote legal reforms and good governance.
- Regional surveillance examples during the financial year:
  - European Economic and Monetary Union (including launch of the euro on January 1, 1999).
  - West African Economic and Monetary Union.
- External evaluations and outreach:
  - Commissioned external evaluations of IMF surveillance and economic research activities.

### ESAF, HIPC Initiative, and Low-Income Country Policies
- ESAF and HIPC objectives: improve effectiveness of concessional financing and debt-relief efforts to help poor countries achieve growth, external viability, and poverty reduction.
- Progress and financing:
  - As of April 1999, IMF and World Bank Executive Boards had reviewed the eligibility of 12 heavily indebted poor countries for the HIPC Initiative.
  - Seven countries had qualified for debt relief and three others were expected to follow.
  - Debt relief committed to the seven qualified countries: $6 billion in nominal terms ($3 billion in 1998 net present value terms).
  - Assistance for Uganda and Bolivia had been released.
- Policy discussions and reforms:
  - Considered options for enhancing the HIPC Initiative; widespread concern that HIPC had not provided adequate debt relief for poor countries to escape debt-service burdens.
  - IMF and World Bank staffs prepared a technical note (April 1999) estimating costs of various proposals from member governments and civil society; posted for public feedback.
  - Board agreed that decisions to strengthen the HIPC Initiative would have to be made in step with securing necessary financing.
  - Agreed on modifications to postconflict emergency assistance policy to provide more appropriate terms and longer periods when warranted.
- ESAF operational adjustments:
  - Continued discussions to improve the effectiveness of ESAF-supported programs, including stronger IMF–World Bank collaboration on program design and social sector issues.

### Technical Assistance and Institutional Capacity Building
- Growing demand:
  - Technical assistance absorbed about 15 percent of the IMF’s total administrative expenditures in 1998/99.
  - Annual volume of IMF technical assistance requires about 300 person-years in the late 1990s, compared with about 130 person-years in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
- Focus areas:
  - Monetary and fiscal macroeconomic management.
  - Statistics and data dissemination.
  - Financial law and regulation.
  - Social safety nets and social security reform.
  - IMF financial accounting and operations.
  - Information technology.
- Purpose: strengthen government human resources and institutional capacity for effective economic management, promote better governance, and create conditions for long-term equitable growth.

*Source: ANNUAL REPORT 1999 — "Strengthening the Architecture of the International Financial System"*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-flagship-issues/external/pubs/ft/ar/1999/pdf/_file1pdf.pdf_
