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### Asian Crisis Countries: Developments and IMF Response Through the End of April 1999 (Box 1)
- Staff assessment:
  - Crisis rooted primarily in financial system vulnerabilities and structural weaknesses amid financial market globalization.
  - Conventional fiscal imbalances relatively small; significant real exchange rate misalignments evident only in Thailand.
  - Common weaknesses in Indonesia, Korea, Thailand:
    - Weak regulation and supervision of financial systems.
    - Heavy government involvement in credit allocation and government guarantees → misallocation of credit and inflated asset prices.
    - Large, unhedged, private short-term foreign currency debt with limited exchange rate flexibility and a highly leveraged corporate sector.
      - In Korea and Thailand, debt intermediated mainly through banking system.
      - In Indonesia, corporations had heavier direct exposures.
- Economic impact (1998):
  - Real GDP fell by an estimated 6 percent in Korea, 8 percent in Thailand, and 15 percent in Indonesia.
  - Current account adjustments (corrections in external current account balances): Korea: 15 percentage points of GDP; Thailand: 14 percentage points of GDP; Indonesia: 5 percentage points of GDP.
  - Slump largely reflected massive withdrawal of foreign capital and flight of domestic capital; huge currency depreciations worsened corporate debt profiles.
- Monetary and exchange rate developments:
  - Objectives: prevent depreciation–inflation spiral while avoiding excessive liquidity squeeze.
  - Countries leaned against substantial depreciation rather than pursuing fixed exchange rate targets.
  - Exchange rate movements (nominal, U.S. dollar per national currency):
    - Thailand: initial 24 percent depreciation during July 1997; culminated in a 26 percent depreciation from beginning of December 1997 to mid-January 1998.
    - Korea: substantial depreciation avoided until late October 1997; slipped more steeply to weakest point in late December 1997.
    - Indonesia: cumulative depreciation more than 80 percent by late January 1998 (steady depreciation beginning July 1997).
  - Policy tradeoffs led to high interest rates initially; as stabilization evidence emerged, interest rates were reduced.
- Country program highlights:
  - Indonesia:
    - Stand-By Arrangement fell off track; Executive Board cancelled Stand-By and approved Extended Fund Facility (EFF) on August 25, 1998.
    - Rupiah hit all-time low of Rp16,745 against the U.S. dollar in mid-June; cumulative depreciation 85 percent from June 1997.
    - On March 25, 1999, Board completed fourth EFF review and augmented program by SDR 714 million (about $1 billion).
    - As of end-April 1999: policy implementation generally satisfactory; major macro targets for 1998–99 met; slower progress on financial and corporate restructuring; fragile market sentiment.
  - Korea:
    - Stand-By Arrangement remained on track during 1998–99.
    - Government launched sovereign bond issue; capital began flowing into domestic bond and stock markets; Korea rebuilt usable reserves.
    - By July 1998, won had appreciated permitting reduction of interest rates to precrisis levels.
    - Began repaying loans taken at onset of program in December 1997.
    - As of end-April 1999: signs of modest recovery expected to pick up during the year.
  - Thailand:
    - Baht began to strengthen in February 1998; interest rates lowered from around mid-1998 to precrisis levels or below.
    - Fiscal policy relaxed; additional social safety net measures announced.
    - In April 1999, sixth Stand-By review allowed additional $500 million from bilateral and multilateral sources; IMF contributed SDR 100 million (about $135 million).
    - As of April 1999: external position improving, inflation low, output decline arrested; broad recovery delayed by weak domestic demand; fiscal stimulus plan unveiled in March 1999 expected to help resume growth in second half of 1999.

### 1998: A limited recovery in the next several months (Summary and Indicators)
- Country snapshots and monetary developments:
  - Korea and Thailand: sharp depreciations in May–June 1998 largely recovered by mid-October; interest rate peaks of "some 32 percent" (Korea) and "25 percent" (Thailand); rates fell to "slightly below precrisis levels" by summer 1998.
  - Indonesia: monetary developments off track by December 1997; inflation "reaching over 100 percent in the early months of 1998"; rupiah recovered more than half of peak depreciation by later 1998.
  - Russia (mid-1998 crisis): consumer prices "rose by more than 75 percent" over last five months of 1998; ruble depreciated "by about 70 percent"; real GDP fell "by about 5 percent"; real investment declined "by close to 10 percent"; foreign direct investment fell to "$2.5 billion from $6.2 billion in 1997"; federal government revenues fell to "below 10 percent of GDP in 1998"; federal government deficit amounted to "6 percent of GDP."
  - Brazil: official interest rates rose to "nearly 43 percent"; IMF-led package committed "$41.5 billion"; three-year Stand-By Arrangement equivalent to "SDR13 billion ($18.1 billion)"; fiscal deficit estimated "8 percent of GDP in 1998"; external current account deficit "4!/2percent of GDP in 1998"; real initially depreciated by more than 40 percent; first and second Stand-By reviews allowed additional IMF drawings of "SDR 3.6 billion ($4.9 billion)", bringing total borrowings under the program to "SDR 7.1 billion ($9.6 billion)."
- Key economic indicators (1998 Est.):
  - Real GDP (percent change): Indonesia: –15.3; Korea: –5.8; Thailand: –8.0.
  - Real total domestic demand (percent change): Indonesia: –20.4; Korea: –18.7; Thailand: –21.9.
  - Inflation (CPI) (percent change): Indonesia: 61.1; Korea: 7.5; Thailand: 8.0.
  - Government balance (percent of GDP), 1998 Est.: Korea: –3.8; Thailand: –5.3; Indonesia: ". . .".
  - Current account (percent of GDP), 1998 Est.: Indonesia: 3.0; Korea: 13.3; Thailand: 11.4.
  - Total external debt (billion U.S. dollars), selected: Indonesia 1990 = 86.7; 1995 = 130.2; 1996 = 137.9; 1998 Est. = ". . ."; Korea 1996 = 164.3; 1997 = 158.1; 1998 Est. = 151.5; Thailand 1990 = 51.7; 1995 = 90.5; 1996 = 93.4; 1997 = 85.4.
  - Total external debt, short-term (billion U.S. dollars): Indonesia 1990 = 8.1; 1995 = 28.0; Korea 1996 = 93.0; 1997 = 63.2; 1998 Est. = 32.5; Thailand 1990 = 22.9; 1995 = 37.6; 1996 = 34.8; 1997 = 25.0.
  - Reserves (billion U.S. dollars; end of period): Indonesia gross reserves 1998 Est. = 21.5; 1997 = 23.8; Korea usable reserves 1996 = 29.4; 1997 = 91.4; 1998 Est. = 48.5; Thailand gross reserves 1996 = 38.7; 1997 = 27.0; 1998 Est. = 29.5.

### Board findings, program design, and policy lessons
- Origins and vulnerabilities:
  - Deep-seated financial and nonbank corporate sector vulnerabilities.
  - Domestic interest rates above international rates encouraged excessive external borrowing.
  - Fixed-exchange-rate commitments encouraged foreign exchange exposure; creditors assumed implicit government guarantees.
  - Inadequate banking regulation and prudential rules; highly leveraged institutional investors aggravated crisis.
- Program design and financing implications:
  - Need to base programs on macro projections that account for regional spillovers and loss of private external financing.
  - Emphasize early, decisive actions demonstrating ownership and clear communication to markets and public.
  - Secure early agreement with authorities and other IFIs on comprehensive structural reform strategy with attention to sequencing.
  - Financing: promote greater private sector involvement; examine appropriate levels of official financing; avoid substituting official resources for private financing.
- Monetary and fiscal lessons:
  - Monetary: flexible approaches ("leaning against the wind") favored; endorsing tightening to arrest excessive depreciation; concern about credit crunch but strains seen as unavoidable given leverage and unhedged FX exposures.
  - Fiscal: initial limited adjustment broadened to allow deficits to expand as recessions worsened; Directors welcomed easing but noted practical constraints on using expansionary budgets (time to develop social spending programs; maintaining quality of government spending).
- Structural reforms, governance, safety nets:
  - Priority on addressing financial sector weaknesses, corporate imbalances, improving governance, and strengthening/creating safety nets.
  - Success depended on cooperation with other IFIs (World Bank, Asian Development Bank).

### Recommendations to forestall crises (Directors’ highlights)
- Regularly analyze exchange rate regime appropriateness in IMF surveillance.
- Provide markets with accurate, full, and clear financial information on public and private sectors.
- Strengthen regulatory and prudential regimes globally.
- Adapt creditor-country institutions to ensure appropriate pricing of risk and inhibit bandwagon behavior.
- Strengthen disclosure requirements for all investors, including highly leveraged institutions.

### Strengthening the international financial architecture (selected initiatives)
- Promote transparency, internationally accepted standards and codes, and strengthen the SDDS with respect to international reserves and external debt.
- IMF transparency initiatives (1998/99):
  - Policy on release of Public Information Notices (PINs) following Article IV consultations; PINs released for "more than 70 percent" of Article IV consultations during 1998/99.
  - Presumption of public release of Letters of Intent, Memoranda of Economic and Financial Policies, and Policy Framework Papers underpinning IMF-supported programs.
  - Pilot project for voluntary public release of Article IV staff reports ending on October 4, 2000.
  - Expanded public access to IMF archives (waiting period reduced to 5 years for Executive Board documents and to 20 years for other archived documents).
  - Strengthening SDDS; as of end-April 1999 there were "47 subscribers to the SDDS."
  - Development/publication of a manual on fiscal transparency and progress on a draft Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies.
  - Work on draft handbook for assessing implementation of the Basle Core Principles for banking supervision.

### Practical actions and monitoring
- Directors emphasized adapting IMF surveillance to monitor standards observance and substance of policies, while preserving confidential advisory role.
- Experimental case studies on transparency practices prepared; second round covering a wider range of countries to be undertaken with concrete proposals by the 1999 Annual Meetings.

### Strengthening the SDDS and Access to Debt Data (Box 2)
- Key SDDS strengthening decisions (March 26, 1999):
  - Strengthen prescriptions for international reserve data category, disseminating detailed reserve assets and reserve-related liabilities.
  - Prescribe full reserve template data monthly with lag not more than one month; total reserve assets still monthly with lag not more than a week.
  - Encourage dissemination of full template weekly with one-week lag.
  - Introduce separate category for external debt with possible quarterly disaggregation by sector and maturity (transition period after further consultation).
  - Set three-year transition period for international investment position data.
  - Staff to monitor subscribers’ observance of key SDDS commitments (data dimension and advance release calendars).
  - By end-1999 require mandatory hyperlinks between IMF’s Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board and national summary data pages.
  - Establish quarterly certification by subscribers of accuracy of metadata on the Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board.
- Inter-Agency Task Force (IMF chaired) implemented joint presentation of external debt statistics from BIS, OECD, World Bank, IMF for more comprehensive, timely data.

### Next steps and role of standards (Box 2)
- Refine transition period proposals for external debt prescription; examine inclusion of macro-prudential indicators in SDDS.
- Encourage fiscal transparency assessments and provide technical assistance where needed.
- Further work on Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies; submit revised version for Interim Committee endorsement at 1999 Annual Meetings.
- IMF surveillance role: focus monitoring on four core areas—data dissemination; fiscal policy transparency; monetary and financial policy transparency; banking supervision (with other organizations for noncore standards).

### Strengthening financial systems and legal frameworks (Box 2)
- International/regional efforts: IMF, World Bank, Basle Committee, others increased development/dissemination of principles and good practices.
- Basle Committee reviewed gaps in 1988 Capital Accord; task force established; reports on banks’ interactions with highly leveraged institutions issued.
- Financial Stability Forum established three working groups: highly leveraged institutions, offshore financial centers, and short-term capital flows.
- Progress on international accounting standards (IASC) and OECD corporate governance principles.
- Legal environment/insolvency: IMF staff report on orderly insolvency procedures prepared; World Bank to develop guidelines; UNCITRAL proposed model law on cross-border insolvency.

### Capital account liberalization and controls (Box 2)
- Board discussions (1998/99):
  - Capital account liberalization must be supported by consistent macroeconomic framework and adequate institutional setup.
  - Diverse approaches to speed and sequencing; differing views on usefulness/effectiveness of capital controls.
- Views on controls:
  - Most Directors: reimposition of controls on capital outflows not effective in crisis unless wide-ranging and strict; could interfere with commercial transactions and debt service.
  - Some Directors: reimposition of controls on outflows—together with private sector involvement and broader adjustment—could be useful.
  - Controls on inflows: may shift composition toward longer maturities but are not a substitute for fundamental policy action; could be justified on prudential grounds in weak institutional settings.
- Next steps: refine analysis of controls and liberalization experiences; improve reporting and monitoring of capital flows, especially private short-term flows and interbank credit lines.

### Involving the private sector and preventing crises (Box 2 & Box 4)
- Rationale: private sector involvement critical to orderly adjustment, limit moral hazard, and strengthen market discipline.
- Measures to involve private sector (Box 4 & Box 5 highlights):
  - Ex ante instruments: private contingent credit lines, debt-service insurance (structured notes), call options in interbank credit lines, official guarantees of new debt (with caveats).
  - Case experiences: concerted rollovers (Korea) stabilized situation but may not be replicable; restructuring international sovereign bonds requires case-by-case consideration.
  - Policy directions: encourage reassessment of capital standards by Basle Committee; modify bond contracts (sharing clauses, collective action provisions, British-style trust deed bonds as models); consider contingent financing and debt-service insurance.
- Systemic measures:
  - Countries should maintain appropriate debt profiles, avoid excessive short-term debt accumulation, ensure adequate official reserves and banking liquidity.
  - Establish high-frequency monitoring of private external liabilities.
  - Restrain official sector off-balance-sheet transactions and ensure supervisory attention to financial derivatives vulnerabilities.
  - Enhance communication between emerging market borrowers and private capital markets.

### Contingent Credit Lines (CCL) — Preventive Instrument (Box 5)
- Purpose:
  - Established end-April 1999 as Contingent Credit Lines for members with strong policies as a precautionary defense against balance of payments problems from international financial contagion.
  - Designed to signal IMF confidence and incentivize adherence to standards; established for two years and to be reviewed after one year’s experience.
- Eligibility and safeguards:
  - Member must be implementing policies unlikely to give rise to need to use IMF resources and not already facing contagion-related difficulties.
  - Positive assessment in last Article IV consultation; subscription to SDDS and satisfactory progress toward its requirements.
  - Constructive relations with private creditors and satisfactory progress in limiting external vulnerability.
  - Member must submit satisfactory economic and financial program with quantified framework.
- Access, terms, and repayment:
  - CCL not subject to general IMF access limits.
  - Commitments expected in range of 300–500 percent of member’s quota unless exceptional circumstances; commitments up to one year.
  - At activation review Board decides immediate release amount, phasing, and conditionality.
  - Repayment expected within one to one and one-half years of each disbursement (Board may extend by up to one year).
  - Surcharge during first year following first drawing: 300 basis points above rate of charge; surcharge increases by 50 basis points every six months up to maximum of 500 basis points.

### Measures for extreme situations and IMF policy adjustments (Box 4 & Box 5)
- If ex ante mechanisms and voluntary restructuring fail, members may face defaults on sovereign bonds and imposition of exchange controls with uncertain outcomes.
- IMF financing assurances and arrears policies modified to permit case-by-case lending into arrears to support adjustment during protracted debt negotiations.
- Need to ensure orderly debt negotiation processes in extreme situations; unresolved Board issues remain on conditions for IMF proceeding to lend into arrears.

### IMF facilities, resources, and liquidity (Box 4)
- Supplemental Reserve Facility reviewed January 1999.
- April 1999: instrument of Contingent Credit Lines established as addition to SRF.
- Resource enhancements:
  - New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) came into force on November 17, 1998. Combined NAB and GAB resources: SDR 34 billion (about $46 billion).
  - Quota increase under Eleventh General Review effective January 22, 1999: overall quotas rose to SDR 212 billion (about $290 billion) from SDR 146 billion (about $200 billion).
  - IMF liquidity ratio at end-April 1999: 89 percent, compared with 45 percent a year earlier.
- Ongoing challenges: securing full financing for ESAF and IMF participation in HIPC Initiative; ensuring adequate resources for poorest members’ structural adjustment and agreed debt relief.

### Stability and Growth Pact, EMU, and ECB relations (Box 7 & Box 8)
- Stability and Growth Pact:
  - Implements excessive deficit procedure and medium-term surveillance; 3 percent of GDP reference value for general government deficit.
  - Medium-term objective: general government positions near balance or in surplus.
  - Directors’ guidance: provide convincing evidence in 1999 budgets and stability programs that positions will align with medium-term goal not later than 2001; initial reforms should focus on reductions in primary expenditures.
  - Structural reforms and labor-market flexibility emphasized to reduce structural unemployment.
- IMF operational/legal aspects of EMU:
  - Transfer of monetary powers to EMU institutions does not affect countries’ legal relationship with the IMF.
  - Surveillance over euro-area members requires intensified discussions with ECB and EU institutions; Article IV consultations proceed but require discussion with EU institutions.
  - Directors called for granting the ECB observer status at the IMF.
- IMF grants observer status to ECB (effective January 1, 1999):
  - ECB invited to send representative to Board discussions on IMF surveillance under Article IV over euro-area common and member policies, the euro’s role, world economic outlook, international capital markets, and related topics.
  - Directors noted euro depreciation reflected U.S. strength and euro-area growth uncertainties; commended ECB’s prudent approach; urged improved communication and possibly an explicit lower bound for inflation.
  - Fiscal consolidation needed in some euro-area countries; appropriate policy mix (monetary and fiscal) important to support domestic demand.
  - Directors recommended ECB observer status and enhanced data transfers from ECB/Eurostat to IMF.

### Regional and transition economy issues (Box 8 & Box 9)
- Impact on non-EU countries:
  - Non-euro countries urged to strengthen structural reforms, financial sector reforms, and orderly capital account liberalization; EU partners should maintain open trade regimes.
  - IMF surveillance should examine spillovers and implications for non-EU countries.
- WAEMU:
  - Improved performance since 1994 CFA franc devaluation; suggested actions: enhance regional interbank market, zone-wide bank licensing, privatization of banking system, raise capital ratios, and improve tax administration and data availability.
- Transition economies (Conference “A Decade of Transition: Achievements and Challenges”, Feb 1–3, 1999):
  - Achievements: striking reduction in inflation and robust output growth in many central European and Baltic countries; Asian transition economies recorded high growth.
  - Key lessons: fiscal and monetary stability, sound financial sector, privatization, institution building, addressing income inequality, and strong rule of law.
  - Conference summary (IMF Deputy Managing Director Shigemitsu Sugisaki): fiscal and monetary stability essential; sound financial sector indispensable; privatization key; measures to address income inequality important; institution building central to transition.

*Source: Excerpts from ANNUAL REPORT 1999 (Box 1; "1998. A limited recovery in the next several months"; Box 2; Box 4; Box 5; Box 7; Box 8; Box 9) contained in _file3pdf.*

### Box 1), and in December 1998 it discussed a staff

### Box 1) Asian Crisis Countries: Developments and IMF Response Through the End of April 1999

### Summary of developments and IMF response
- The IMF published a first systematic, albeit preliminary, internal assessment of the policy response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, focusing on Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand.
- The staff’s assessment: the Asian financial crisis was rooted primarily in financial system vulnerabilities and other structural weaknesses in the context of an unprecedented move toward financial market globalization.
- Conventional fiscal imbalances were relatively small; only in Thailand were significant real exchange rate misalignments evident.
- Common weaknesses across Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand:
  - Weak regulation and supervision of financial systems.
  - History of heavy governmental involvement in credit allocation, including through government guarantees, leading to misallocation of credit and inflated asset prices.
  - Large, unhedged, private short-term foreign currency debt in a setting of limited exchange rate flexibility and a highly leveraged corporate sector.
    - In Korea and Thailand, this debt was mainly intermediated through the banking system.
    - In Indonesia, corporations had heavier direct exposures to such debt.

### Economic impact and macroeconomic developments
- The Asian financial crisis plunged the countries into deep recessions:
  - In 1998, real GDP fell by an estimated 6 percent in Korea, by 8 percent in Thailand, and by 15 percent in Indonesia.
- The slowdown in economic activity was greater than had been assumed when formulating the programs in 1997; IMF-supported programs in the three countries were subsequently revised.
- The slump in 1998 largely reflected the massive withdrawal of foreign capital and flight of domestic capital; the reversal of capital flows necessitated sizable current account adjustments brought about in part by huge currency depreciations, which worsened corporate debt profiles.
- Current account adjustments (corrections in external current account balances):
  - Korea: 15 percentage points of GDP.
  - Thailand: 14 percentage points of GDP.
  - Indonesia: 5 percentage points of GDP.
- Output declines were associated with a collapse in domestic demand, while net external demand expanded.

### Monetary and exchange rate developments
- Monetary policy objectives: prevent a spiral of depreciation and inflation while avoiding an excessive liquidity squeeze.
- These countries did not pursue fixed exchange rate targets but leaned against substantial depreciation.
- Exchange rate movements (nominal terms, U.S. dollar per national currency):
  - Thailand: initial 24 percent depreciation during July 1997; series of smaller monthly depreciations culminated in a 26 percent depreciation from the beginning of December 1997 to mid-January 1998 (rate bottomed out).
  - Korea: substantial depreciation avoided until late October 1997; exchange rate slipped more steeply to weakest point in late December 1997.
  - Indonesia: exchange rate depreciated fairly steadily beginning in July 1997, with cumulative depreciation reaching more than 80 percent by late January 1998.
- Policy tradeoffs led to high interest rates initially in some cases; as stabilization evidence emerged, interest rates were reduced.

### Indonesia: developments and IMF program response
- IMF support: Stand-By Arrangement initially; program fell off track because of policy reversals, increasing macroeconomic turmoil, and financial system collapse amid severe civil unrest; President Suharto resigned on May 21, 1998.
- Economic disruptions: production, exports, and domestic supply channels disrupted; banking activities paralyzed.
- Exchange rate shock: rupiah hit an all-time low of Rp16,745 against the U.S. dollar in mid-June, with a cumulative depreciation of 85 percent from June 1997.
- By July 1998 (Board’s second review), major dislocations to economic activity were evident.
- Immediate priorities: restoration of the distribution system and strengthening of the social safety net.
- Policy measures:
  - Strengthened bank-restructuring plans to deal with deteriorating financial conditions.
  - Further steps to facilitate corporate debt restructuring.
- On August 25, 1998, the Executive Board approved cancellation of the Stand-By Arrangement and approved an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement.
- On March 25, 1999, the Board completed the fourth review under the EFF and augmented the program by SDR 714 million (about $1 billion).
- As of the end of April 1999:
  - Policy implementation was generally satisfactory.
  - Indonesia had met the major macroeconomic targets under the program for 1998–99.
  - Progress with financial and corporate restructuring was less rapid than had been hoped.
  - Market sentiment remained fragile, reflecting continuing structural problems, political uncertainties, and civil unrest.

### Korea: developments and IMF program response
- IMF support: Stand-By Arrangement; the economic reform program remained on track during 1998–99.
- Market confidence strengthened in the new administration’s commitment to reforms.
- Market developments:
  - Government successfully launched a sovereign bond issue.
  - Capital began flowing into domestic bond and stock markets.
  - Korea significantly rebuilt its usable reserves.
- Exchange rate and interest rates:
  - By July 1998, the won had appreciated against the U.S. dollar, permitting authorities to reduce interest rates to precrisis levels.
- Structural reforms emphasized rationalization and strengthening of the banking sector, and corporate restructuring.
- During the year, Korea began repaying loans taken at the onset of the program in December 1997.
- As of the end of April 1999, the economy showed signs of emerging from the severe downturn of 1997–98, with economic data pointing toward a modest recovery expected to pick up during the year.

### Thailand: developments and IMF program response
- Exchange rate and monetary policy:
  - The Thai baht, after substantial depreciation in 1997, began to strengthen in February 1998.
  - Monetary policy initially focused on the exchange rate with interest rates maintained at a high level until sustained stabilization evidence emerged; from around mid-1998, rates were lowered substantially to precrisis levels or below.
- Fiscal and social policy:
  - Fiscal policy was relaxed to support economic activity.
  - Additional measures to strengthen the social safety net were announced.
- Financial and corporate restructuring approach was elaborated and broadened significantly.
- IMF reviews and financing:
  - In April 1999, the IMF completed a sixth review by the Stand-By Arrangement; as a result, Thailand could borrow an additional $500 million from bilateral and multilateral sources, with the IMF contributing SDR 100 million (about $135 million).
  - The additional assistance resulted from Thailand’s good policy implementation under the Stand-By Arrangement program, which had further consolidated financial stability.
- As of April 1999:
  - Strengthened exchange rate remained stable, allowing further declines in interest rates.
  - The external position continued to improve.
  - Inflation had been kept low and the output decline arrested.
  - Broad recovery was delayed owing to continued weakness in domestic demand and a difficult external environment.
  - In March 1999, Thai authorities unveiled a plan to revive domestic demand through additional fiscal stimulus measures.
  - These measures, together with progress in advancing structural reforms, were expected to lead to a resumption of growth in the second half of 1999.

*Source: Box 1, "Asian Crisis Countries: Developments and IMF Response Through the End of April 1999," ANNUAL REPORT 1999, Chapter 4.*

### 1998. A limited recovery in the next several months

### 1998. A limited recovery in the next several months

### Overview and country snapshots
- Korea and Thailand: Currencies experienced sharp depreciations in May and June 1998, most of which "was recovered by mid-October." Interest rates were raised sharply—peaks of "some 32 percent" in Korea and "25 percent" in Thailand—to contain and reverse excessive currency depreciation; once currencies strengthened, rates were reduced and by summer 1998 had "fallen to slightly below precrisis levels" in Korea and Thailand.
- Indonesia: Monetary developments were "already headed seriously off track in December 1997" amid political turbulence and extreme financial system weakness, with spiraling inflation "reaching over 100 percent in the early months of 1998," rising risk premiums, continued capital flight, and a collapse of economic activity. By later months of 1998, the rupiah had "recovered more than half of the depreciation that had occurred at the peak of the crisis."
- Russia: Devalued the ruble and unilaterally restructured domestic government debt in mid-1998. Over the last five months of 1998, consumer prices "rose by more than 75 percent," the ruble depreciated "by about 70 percent," real GDP fell "by about 5 percent," real investment declined "by close to 10 percent," foreign direct investment fell to "$2.5 billion from $6.2 billion in 1997," federal government revenues fell to "below 10 percent of GDP in 1998," and the federal government deficit amounted to "6 percent of GDP."
- Brazil: Faced severe pressures in late 1998 and early 1999. Official interest rates rose to "nearly 43 percent." The IMF-led package announced in November 1998 committed balance of payments support totaling "$41.5 billion," with a three-year Stand-By Arrangement equivalent to "SDR13 billion ($18.1 billion)." The fiscal deficit was estimated to have reached "8 percent of GDP in 1998," and the external current account deficit was "4!/2percent of GDP in 1998." After widening the real’s exchange rate band and then allowing the currency to float, the real "initially depreciated by more than 40 percent" against the U.S. dollar. On March 30, 1999, approval of the first and second reviews under Brazil’s Stand-By Arrangement allowed further IMF drawings of "SDR 3.6 billion ($4.9 billion)," bringing total borrowings under the program to "SDR 7.1 billion ($9.6 billion)."

### Key economic indicators (Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, extracts)
- Real GDP (percent change), 1998 Est.
  - Indonesia: –15.3
  - Korea: –5.8
  - Thailand: –8.0
- Real total domestic demand (percent change), 1998 Est.
  - Indonesia: –20.4
  - Korea: –18.7
  - Thailand: –21.9
- Inflation (CPI) (percent change), 1998 Est.
  - Indonesia: 61.1
  - Korea: 7.5
  - Thailand: 8.0
- Government balance (in percent of GDP), 1998 Est.
  - Korea: –3.8
  - Thailand: –5.3
  - Indonesia: data entry shows ". . ." for 1998 Est.
- Current account (in percent of GDP), 1998 Est.
  - Indonesia: 3.0
  - Korea: 13.3
  - Thailand: 11.4
- Total external debt (in billions of U.S. dollars), selected years and 1998 data
  - Indonesia: 1990 = 86.7; 1995 = 130.2; 1996 = 137.9; 1998 Est. = ". . ."
  - Korea: 1996 = 164.3; 1997 = 158.1; 1998 Est. = 151.5
  - Thailand: 1990 = 51.7; 1995 = 90.5; 1996 = 93.4; 1997 = 85.4
- Total external debt, short-term (in billions of U.S. dollars), selected entries
  - Indonesia: 1990 = 8.1; 1995 = 28.0; other years show ". . ."
  - Korea: 1996 = 93.0; 1997 = 63.2; 1998 Est. = 32.5
  - Thailand: 1990 = 22.9; 1995 = 37.6; 1996 = 34.8; 1997 = 25.0
- Reserves (in billions of U.S. dollars; end of period), selected entries
  - Indonesia: gross reserves 1998 Est. = 21.5; 1997 = 23.8
  - Korea: usable reserves 1996 = 29.4; 1997 = 91.4; 1998 Est. = 48.5
  - Thailand: gross reserves 1996 = 38.7; 1997 = 27.0; 1998 Est. = 29.5
- Notes from table: "All data are on a calendar-year basis, except as indicated." "General government balance including the interest costs of financial sector restructuring." "Data are on a fiscal-year basis" for one Thailand series.

### Board assessment: origins, vulnerabilities, and crisis dynamics
- Crisis origins and preconditions identified by Directors:
  - Deep-seated vulnerabilities in the financial and nonbank corporate sectors.
  - Domestic interest rates remained well above international rates, encouraging excessive external borrowing.
  - Long-standing commitments to exchange rate regimes with limited flexibility encouraged excessive foreign exchange exposure.
  - Creditors had incorrectly assumed implicit government guarantees against default losses on certain types of loans.
  - Inadequate banking regulation and prudential rules led to inefficient intermediation, overinvestment, unsustainable asset prices, high exposure to international capital flows, and fragilities in balance sheets.
  - Operations of highly leveraged institutional investors played a role in aggravating the crisis.
- Policy implications drawn by Directors:
  - Need for more effective monitoring systems, better regulation and supervision of domestic financial institutions, and efforts to strengthen the international financial system and to set appropriate incentives for pricing risk.
  - IMF surveillance itself required evaluation and strengthening (external evaluation ongoing, see Chapter 6 in source).

### Comprehensive approach and program design
- Directors agreed on a comprehensive approach combining macroeconomic and structural policies and external financing.
- Structural reforms emphasized as essential, particularly:
  - Addressing financial sector weaknesses and corporate sector imbalances.
  - Improving governance.
  - Strengthening or creating safety nets.
- Views on sequencing and pacing:
  - Several Directors thought some structural reforms beyond core financial and corporate reforms could have been paced differently or postponed to a poststabilization phase.
  - Many Directors believed core banking and corporate reforms needed early prioritization.
- Official financing:
  - Convincing policy packages and external financing were essential because official funds fell far short of near-term exposure to capital outflows.
  - Directors cautioned against providing a full guarantee of a country’s short-term external liabilities or substituting official resources for private financing.
  - Some Directors argued larger and more front-loaded official packages could have restored confidence more quickly; most emphasized that financing should not substitute for nor delay required policy adjustments.

### Program projections, monetary and fiscal policy lessons
- Program projections underestimated the severity of the downturn because they were predicated on program success; capital outflows far exceeded expectations, triggering large depreciations and sharp declines in domestic demand.
- Monetary policy:
  - Main goal: avert a depreciation–inflation spiral.
  - Programs adopted flexible monetary approaches—"leaning against the wind"—rather than fixed exchange rate targets.
  - Directors generally endorsed monetary tightening to arrest and reverse excessive depreciation; some felt tightening should have been more aggressive and rapid.
  - Some concern about reports of a credit crunch; most Directors saw strains on borrowers as unavoidable in the context of excessive leverage and large unhedged foreign currency exposures, and emphasized distributional problems of credit.
  - As of December 1998, interest rates in Korea and Thailand had "moved back to below precrisis levels," and market conditions in Indonesia were "stabilizing."
- Fiscal policy:
  - Initial IMF-supported programs included limited fiscal adjustment to help current account adjustment and finance quasi-fiscal costs of restructuring.
  - Beginning in early 1998, fiscal deficits were allowed to expand considerably in the three countries as recessions worsened.
  - Directors welcomed adaptation of programs toward easing fiscal policy, though some thought easing should have been quicker.
  - Practical constraints limited countries’ ability to use the scope for expansionary budgets (time needed to develop social spending programs; tension with maintaining quality of government spending).

### Structural reforms, governance, and safety nets
- Structural reforms were necessary to address root causes and lay the groundwork for medium-term sustainable growth; success depended on cooperation with other IFIs (World Bank, Asian Development Bank).
- Governance improvements were fundamental to reducing vulnerabilities and fostering reforms across financial, corporate, competition, trade liberalization, and privatization policies.
- Strengthening social safety nets and better-targeted social expenditure were essential to cushion adverse crisis impacts on the poor; World Bank efforts were noted positively.

### Summing up: Actions to forestall crises (Directors’ highlights)
- Analyze regularly, in the context of IMF surveillance, the appropriateness of exchange rate regimes in light of changing fundamentals.
- Provide markets continually with accurate, full, and clear financial information on both public and private sectors to minimize negative surprises.
- Strengthen regulatory and prudential regimes in all countries.
- Adapt institutions and regulations in creditor countries to ensure appropriate pricing of risk and inhibit "bandwagon" behavior.
- Promote actions to reduce systemic risk associated with financial market turbulence, including strengthening disclosure requirements for all investors, including highly leveraged institutions.

### Issues related to program design and financing (Directors’ highlights)
- Program design and implementation:
  - Base programs on macroeconomic projections that account for likely regional spillovers and loss of private external financing during crises.
  - Further analyze issues arising from severe banking and financial sector weaknesses in crisis contexts (bank closures, blanket guarantees, moral hazard, regulatory forbearance).
  - Encourage authorities to take decisive initial actions to demonstrate ownership of programs.
  - Communicate program content clearly to markets and the public, coordinated with authorities, while avoiding eliciting unrealistic expectations.
  - Exercise flexibility in adapting programs to changing circumstances.
  - Secure early agreement with authorities and other IFIs on a comprehensive structural reform strategy, with attention to timeliness and sequencing.
- Financing of programs:
  - Promote greater private sector involvement in forestalling and resolving crises.
  - Examine appropriate levels of official financing and enhance credibility of official financing packages by establishing clear understandings on disbursement conditions.

### Toward a strengthened international financial architecture
- Crisis experience in Asia, Russia, and Brazil spurred broad consensus on strengthening the global financial architecture, with proposals including:
  - Promoting transparency and accountability and developing internationally accepted standards and codes of good practice (including strengthening the SDDS with respect to international reserves and external debt).
  - Strengthening financial systems and supervision.
  - Paying attention to orderly liberalization of capital markets.
  - Involving the private sector more in crisis prevention and resolution.
  - Ensuring appropriateness of exchange rate regimes.
  - Ensuring adequacy of IMF resources.
- IMF transparency and standards initiatives noted in 1998/99:
  - Policy on release of Public Information Notices (PINs) following Article IV consultations; PINs released for "more than 70 percent" of Article IV consultations during 1998/99.
  - Presumption that member countries would release Letters of Intent, Memoranda of Economic and Financial Policies, and Policy Framework Papers underpinning IMF-supported programs.
  - Pilot project for voluntary public release of Article IV staff reports ending on October 4, 2000.
  - Expanded public access to IMF archives (waiting period reduced to 5 years for Executive Board documents and to 20 years for other archived documents).
  - Strengthening of the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS); as of end-April 1999 there were "47 subscribers to the SDDS."
  - Development and publication of a manual on fiscal transparency and progress on a draft Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies.
  - Work on a draft handbook on methodology for assessing implementation of the Basle Core Principles for banking supervision.

*Source: ANNUAL REPORT 1999 — "1998. A limited recovery in the next several months".*

### Box 2

### Box 2

### Strengthening the SDDS and Improving Access to Debt Data
- On March 26, 1999, the IMF announced that its Executive Board had strengthened the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) established in 1996. Key decisions included:
  - Strengthening the prescriptions for the international reserve data category, including dissemination of detailed information on reserve assets and information on reserve-related liabilities and other potential drains on reserves.
  - The Board prescribed disseminating full data corresponding to the new reserve template monthly, with a lag of not more than one month; data on total reserve assets would still be prescribed for dissemination monthly with a lag of not more than a week.
  - The dissemination of data for the full template weekly, with a one-week lag, will be encouraged.
  - Introducing a separate category for external debt that could include quarterly disaggregation by sector and maturity. The transition period will be determined after further consultation with countries, users, and international organizations.
  - Setting a three-year transition period for disseminating data on the international investment position.
  - Staff monitoring of subscribing countries’ observance of key SDDS commitments, namely, the data dimension (i.e., the coverage, periodicity, and timeliness of release of data) and the provision of advance release calendars, indicating clearly the timetable for release of key data.
  - By the end of 1999, requiring mandatory hyperlinks between the IMF’s Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board and national summary data pages on the Internet, to facilitate monitoring and help meet the needs of data users.
  - Establishing a quarterly certification by subscribers of the accuracy of the metadata on the Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board.
- The Inter-Agency Task Force on Finance Statistics, chaired by the IMF, implemented a joint presentation of external debt statistics from the BIS, the OECD, the World Bank, and the IMF to meet needs for more comprehensive, timely, and accessible data, particularly for shorter maturities. This presentation is available on the external websites of all of these organizations.

### Next steps in developing and refining standards
- For the SDDS:
  - Refining proposals on the transition period for observance of the new prescription on external debt, following further consultation with countries, users, and other international organizations.
  - Examining the inclusion of macro-prudential indicators in the SDDS.
  - Implementing the agreed monitoring procedures.
  - Reassessing prescriptions for the periodicity and timeliness of reserve data dissemination in the context of the next review of the SDDS, to be conducted toward the end of 1999.
- Encouraging all countries to make assessments of fiscal transparency; where lack of fiscal transparency affects policy formulation and implementation, national authorities are being encouraged to identify weaknesses and improve practices, with technical assistance provided where necessary.
- Further work on the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies, with the expectation that a revised version be submitted for Interim Committee endorsement at the 1999 Annual Meetings; a supporting paper setting out examples of good practices will be developed.

### Role of Standards in IMF Surveillance
- Emerging consensus within the Executive Board (as of the end of April 1999) included:
  - Standards relevant for the functioning of domestic and international financial systems cover data dissemination; fiscal, monetary, and financial policy transparency; banking regulation and supervision; securities and insurance regulation; accounting and auditing; bankruptcy; and corporate governance.
  - The official sector can play a role in strengthening incentives for adopting standards—including by some form of monitoring the extent to which countries observe them—and in helping focus efforts on improving transparency.
  - Monitoring observance of standards may need to go beyond disclosure of elements of particular standards, and also consider, to the extent feasible, the substance of members’ policies relative to the standard.
  - Care should be taken in the approach to monitoring to ensure it does not undermine the IMF’s traditional role as confidential advisor.
- Experimental work:
  - A first round of experimental case studies of transparency practices of individual member countries was prepared by IMF staff and published to illuminate practical considerations involved in monitoring observance of standards.
  - The Executive Board agreed that a second round of experimental case studies—covering a wider range of countries, including those where implementation of standards is less advanced—should be undertaken to help develop the IMF’s role, with a view to having concrete proposals by the 1999 Annual Meetings.
- Issues requiring further consideration:
  - The role of the IMF in monitoring observance of international standards in areas of direct operational (core) concern: IMF expertise permits assessment in four core areas—data dissemination; transparency of fiscal policy; transparency of monetary and financial policies; and, with other organizations, banking supervision.
  - IMF involvement with noncore standards (accounting, auditing, bankruptcy, corporate governance, insurance and securities regulation) will require other international financial organizations or groups to provide systematic assessments for these areas to be monitored.
  - Using the expertise of other organizations in particular areas and drawing this work effectively into the IMF’s surveillance to better identify vulnerabilities.

### Strengthening Financial Systems
- International and regional efforts:
  - The IMF, the World Bank, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, other key international groupings, and financial supervisors across regions stepped up efforts in developing and disseminating international principles and good practices of sound financial systems.
- Key actions during the financial year:
  - Review by many national financial supervisory and regulatory agencies of their ongoing procedures to enhance oversight of financial sectors, including with respect to highly leveraged institutions.
  - Review by the Basle Committee of gaps in existing work (including data-related issues, dealing with weak banks, safety nets, licensing, governance, and legal and judicial issues); establishment of a task force, with input from the IMF and World Bank, to review the 1988 Capital Accord; and issuance by the Basle Committee of reports on standards for banks’ interactions with highly leveraged institutions.
  - Establishment of the Financial Stability Forum to strengthen cooperation among international organizations, regulatory associations, and expert groups; the forum set up three working groups on highly leveraged institutions, offshore financial centers, and potential problems associated with short-term capital flows.
  - Actions by the IMF and the World Bank to ensure effective collaboration, particularly with regard to the financial sector.
  - Completion by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) of its work program in developing a core set of international accounting standards for international cross-border listings.
  - Progress by the OECD in finalizing principles of corporate governance.
- Legal environment and insolvency:
  - Several countries have taken actions to improve bankruptcy laws and procedures; IMF staff prepared a report on orderly and effective insolvency procedures identifying key design and applicability issues.
  - The World Bank intends to develop guidelines for effective insolvency regimes for developing countries.
  - UNCITRAL has proposed a model law on cross-border insolvency and expressed interest in collaborating with the IMF and World Bank.
  - The Interim Committee, in its April 1999 communiqué, welcomed the IMF’s work on insolvency laws and called on continued collaboration with the World Bank, UNCITRAL, and other relevant institutions.

### Capital Account Issues
- Context and Board discussions:
  - In 1998/99, the Board addressed capital account liberalization on two occasions, with the March 1999 session addressing members’ experiences with the use of capital controls and their liberalization.
  - The Board agreed that capital account liberalization must be fully supported by a consistent macroeconomic framework, including monetary and exchange rate policies, and by an adequate institutional setup to strengthen the ability of financial intermediaries and other market participants to manage risk and to support monetary and exchange rate policies.
  - Directors noted diverse approaches to speed and sequencing of liberalization and differing views on the usefulness and effectiveness of capital controls.
- Lessons from recent crises:
  - Poorly sequenced or poorly supported liberalization and inconsistent monetary and exchange rate policies contributed to imbalances preceding crises in emerging markets.
  - Excessive accumulation of short-term debt and highly leveraged positions in banking and corporate sectors increased vulnerability to external shocks or loss of confidence.
  - Once financial turmoil began, even countries with seemingly appropriate policies were affected by volatile international capital markets.
  - Countries that maintained consistent monetary and exchange rate policies and supported liberalization with financial sector reforms were better able to handle inflows and reversals.
- Views on controls:
  - Most Directors concluded that reimposition of controls on capital outflows was not an effective policy instrument in a crisis; to be effective, controls had to be wide ranging and strict, which could interfere with commercial transactions and debt service and discourage debt rollovers and new inflows.
  - Several Directors considered that, in a crisis, reimposition of controls on capital outflows—together with appropriate private sector involvement and as part of a broader adjustment effort—could play a useful role.
  - There was more debate over controls on capital inflows; evidence suggested controls could shift the composition of inflows toward the longer end of the market, but countries using controls had not avoided severe reversals when policies were inappropriate.
  - Directors emphasized that controls on inflows were not a substitute for fundamental policy action and, when adopted, must be part of a broader policy package; controls might be justified on prudential grounds in situations of weak domestic institutional and regulatory environments.
- Next steps agreed by Directors:
  - IMF staff will continue to refine analysis and review country experiences with the use and effectiveness of specific controls and with liberalizing different components of the capital account.
  - Further efforts to ensure IMF surveillance focuses on appropriate sequencing of capital account liberalization and that effective safeguards are in place to help ensure resilience of the economy, particularly the financial sector, to possible shocks.
  - Work to improve reporting and monitoring of capital flows will continue, including assisting countries to improve monitoring of private sector short-term flows, particularly with respect to interbank credit lines.

### Involving the Private Sector in Forestalling and Resolving Crises
- Rationale:
  - Better involvement of the private sector is seen as critical to more orderly adjustment, limiting moral hazard, strengthening market discipline, and helping emerging market borrowers protect themselves against volatility and contagion.
- Experience and approaches:
  - The past two years’ experience suggests a case-by-case approach achieved some success, though some Directors thought a framework with clarified ex ante rules for private financial markets would be appropriate.
  - Country approaches (Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, Thailand) combined strengthened economic policies, official financing, and varying approaches to private sector involvement.
  - In Korea, Indonesia, and Ukraine, moral suasion by the international community helped secure continued private sector financing in support of adjustment programs.
  - Brazil reached voluntary agreement with commercial bank creditors to maintain their exposure.
  - Cooperative efforts maintained exposures and achieved some burden sharing, but questions remained about general applicability and potential adverse effects.
- Executive Board view (March 1999):
  - More needs to be done to create market-based incentives and instruments for the private sector to remain involved.

### Intensifying Efforts at Preventing Crises
- Main elements agreed by Directors:
  - Countries should maintain an appropriate debt profile by avoiding excessive accumulation of short-term debt or an excessively rigid debt structure, and by ensuring adequate levels of both official reserves and banking system liquidity to help provide for orderly handling of a temporary reduction in capital market access.
  - Countries should establish or strengthen systems for the high-frequency monitoring of private external liabilities, to better monitor short-term capital flows, and to provide early warning of emerging difficulties.
  - Countries should exercise appropriate restraint with respect to the official sector’s off-balance-sheet transactions, including the use of financial derivatives, and ensure supervisory authorities take account of financial entities’ vulnerability to financial derivatives. IMF staff will give more attention to vulnerabilities associated with debt structures and financial derivatives in surveillance and the use of IMF resources.
  - Effective communication between emerging market borrowers and private capital markets should be enhanced.

*Source: _file3pdf - Box 2 (IMF Annual Report 1999).*

### Box 4

### Box 4 — Measures for Involving the Private Sector in Resolving Crises

### Ex Ante Measures
- Private contingent credit lines that could be drawn on in times of difficulty, if fairly priced, could provide efficient insurance against adverse market developments, including liquidity risk, and could contribute to effective burden sharing during periods of stress.
- Hedging strategies of private financial institutions could lead to offsetting transactions with the country concerned, or shift pressures to other markets, or both.
- Members should be encouraged to explore contingent credit lines with private financial institutions.
- Call options in interbank credit lines could provide a contractual basis for extending maturities under specified conditions.
  - Interbank credit lines are often a key source of short-term liquidity for countries, and the triggering of such options could lead to a loss of maturing short-term credit lines in advance of a call, thereby worsening liquidity difficulties.
- Debt-service insurance, including instruments commonly known as “structured notes” that can be adapted to generate a debt-service burden that varies countercyclically against overall economic developments of the country, could help reduce the risk of crisis.
  - Such instruments are more likely to be feasible for members that have highly concentrated exports (such as many oil or primary commodities exporters), where contracts can be linked mainly to external developments.
- Official guarantees of new debt through full or partial guarantees of new sovereign or private debt instruments may hold promise at times when market access is very limited, for example, while emerging from a crisis.
  - Questions can be raised about the effectiveness of guarantees. The World Bank recently reviewed its experience with guarantees and proposed a limited policy-based guarantee program; the experience with this program will be assessed at a later date.

### Other Measures (Case Experiences and Risks)
- Concerted rollovers of external debt, in Korea, against a background of hemorrhaging official reserves, successfully stabilized a critical situation and facilitated a restructuring of interbank claims into sovereign guaranteed bonds.
  - Korea’s success reflected some special circumstances and could be difficult to replicate elsewhere.
  - Concerted operations risk causing creditors to withdraw credit lines in advance of a crisis elsewhere for fear of a concerted rollover.
- Restructuring international sovereign bonds raises difficult issues and requires case-by-case consideration.
  - Trade-off: immediate cash flow relief from bond restructuring versus a resulting reduction over the medium term in the country’s ability to mobilize resources from private creditors.
- Some Directors saw a possibility that creditor litigation could block progress toward orderly debt restructuring and challenge the IMF’s ability to provide effective support for a member’s adjustment efforts.
  - Further consideration could be given to the possibility of adopting some mechanism to allow the official community to endorse a temporary stay on creditor litigation, possibly through an amendment of Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement.

### Measures to Facilitate Private Sector Involvement (Policy Directions)
- Prevention should be buttressed by measures designed and adapted ex ante to better ensure private sector involvement in crisis avoidance or orderly resolution.
  - Mechanisms should precommit private sector participants to maintain or provide additional net exposure, or reduce debt-service burdens, in times of crisis, while limiting moral hazard and distortion to markets in normal times.
  - Mechanisms are also needed for extreme situations when ex ante measures do not deliver the needed support and it is not possible to agree on orderly refinancing or debt restructuring.
- Two main principles in considering options: contracts should be honored, and care is required to ensure solutions in one case do not have broader adverse effects.
- As of March 1999, agreement seemed to be emerging within the Board in three areas:
  1. Encourage the reassessment of capital standards by the Basle Committee to include measures to reduce the perceived bias toward short-term interbank credit lines from industrial countries to emerging market banks.
     - (The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) subsequently announced reforms of the Basle Capital Accord in June 1999.)
  2. Move forward with modification of bond contracts.
     - Possible modifications: sharing clauses, provisions for the modification of terms by qualified majorities, collective representation provisions, or other modifications to achieve the same objectives.
     - British-style trust deed bonds contained such clauses and could serve as a useful model for future issues.
     - Options to encourage adoption: concerted action by major industrial countries to encourage emerging market borrowers to modify new issue terms; demonstration effect via Group of Ten inclusion; coordinated regulatory requirement for new sovereign issues admitted to domestic markets to meet specified minimum contractual provisions.
     - The IMF would encourage members to include terms that would facilitate restructuring in bond issues and support building consensus among financial institutions involved in issuing and underwriting sovereign bonds.
  3. Consider contingent financing and debt-service insurance.
     - Borrowers should explore with their creditors possibilities for private contingent credit lines and other debt instruments that provide additional liquidity, or reduce debt-service burdens, in periods of severe balance of payments difficulties.

### Extreme Situations and IMF Policy Adjustments
- If ex ante mechanisms fail, voluntary restructuring efforts fail, and external pressures do not abate, members may face the need to consider some combination of a default on sovereign bonds and the imposition of exchange controls.
  - Such measures could interrupt the ability of nonsovereign states to service their external debts.
  - Little modern experience exists with restructuring sovereign bonds or renegotiating private debt caught up in exchange controls, making outcomes difficult to predict.
- To permit the IMF to support a member’s adjustment policies during a potentially protracted period of debt negotiations following such action, the IMF’s financing assurances and arrears policies have been modified to permit the IMF to lend, case by case, into arrears.
  - Certain issues remain for the Board to resolve regarding the conditions under which the IMF would proceed.
- Ways must be explored to ensure that, in extreme situations, the process of debt negotiation following default, even if protracted, remains orderly.

### Systemic Issues and Lessons
- Stable exchange rates in some East Asian countries may have led borrowers and creditors to largely disregard currency risks, perceiving implicit guarantees against related losses.
- Adoption of a more flexible exchange rate regime is not a panacea; vulnerabilities will continue and strengthened financial systems, transparency, and accountability standards remain required.
- Board plans before the 1999 Annual Meetings include addressing:
  - Volatility of the exchange value of major currencies and scope for measures to moderate such volatility.
  - Consequences for the exchange rate policies of emerging market economies.
  - Systemic aspects of major swings in capital flows to developing countries and possible general measures to moderate the boom phase of the cycle on the side of lenders as well as borrowers.

### Developing IMF Facilities and Strengthening Resources
- Progress in 1998/99 in adapting IMF facilities:
  - The Board reviewed the Supplemental Reserve Facility in January 1999 to ensure readiness to respond promptly and effectively to a member’s need for balance of payments financing.
  - The Board agreed in April 1999 to establish the instrument of Contingent Credit Lines as an addition to the Supplemental Reserve Facility.
    - Purpose: prevent crises, create incentives for adoption of strong policies and adherence to internationally recognized standards, encourage constructive private sector involvement, and reduce risks of financial market contagion.
- Important actions to strengthen IMF financial resources:
  - The New Arrangements to Borrow came into force on November 17, 1998.
    - The combined amount of resources available to the IMF under the NAB and the General Arrangements to Borrow is SDR 34 billion (about $46 billion), double the amount under the GAB alone.
  - The IMF quota increase under the Eleventh General Review of Quotas came into effect on January 22, 1999, raising overall quotas to SDR 212 billion (about $290 billion) from SDR 146 billion (about $200 billion).
    - The increase in usable quota resources enabled repayment of amounts borrowed earlier under the GAB and NAB.
    - At the end of April 1999, the IMF’s liquidity ratio stood at 89 percent, compared with 45 percent a year earlier.
- Ongoing challenges:
  - Securing full financing for the ESAF and the IMF’s participation in the HIPC Initiative remains a major challenge.
  - Further efforts are urgently needed to ensure the IMF has adequate resources to support structural adjustment programs of the poorest members and to provide agreed debt relief.

*Source: Box 4, _file3pdf - Box 4, Annual Report 1999*

### Box 5

### Box 5 — To Tighten Defenses Against Contagion, IMF Establishes Contingent Credit Lines

### Purpose and Rationale
- Established end-April 1999 as Contingent Credit Lines (CCL) for member countries with strong economic policies to serve as a precautionary line of defense against future balance of payments problems arising from international financial contagion.
- Intended to signal the IMF’s confidence in a member’s policies and in the member’s determination to adjust policies if contagion strikes.
- Established for a two-year period and to be reviewed after one year’s experience.
- Designed as a crisis-prevention instrument by:
  - creating further incentives for members to adopt strong policies, notably debt management and sustainable exchange rate policies, and adhere to internationally accepted standards;
  - encouraging the constructive involvement of the private sector, thereby containing the risks of financial market contagion while taking into account the potential impact on the IMF’s liquidity; and
  - signaling the IMF’s willingness to provide financing to a member struck by contagion.

### Relationship to Existing IMF Instruments
- Provides short-term financing to help members overcome exceptional balance of payments financing needs arising from a sudden and disruptive loss of market confidence owing to contagion—circumstances largely beyond the member’s control and stemming primarily from adverse developments in international capital markets consequent upon developments in other countries.
- Takes the form of an addition to the IMF’s existing decision on the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF).
- Key distinction: SRF is for members already in the throes of a crisis; the CCL is preventive and intended solely for members not facing a crisis at the time of commitment.

### Access, Eligibility, and Safeguards
- At Board approval of a CCL commitment, the member must be implementing policies considered unlikely to give rise to a need to use IMF resources and must not already be facing contagion-related balance of payments difficulties.
- The member’s economic performance must have been assessed positively by the IMF in the last Article IV consultation and thereafter, taking into account progress in adhering to relevant internationally accepted standards; in particular, the member should have subscribed to the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) and be judged to be making satisfactory progress toward meeting its requirements.
- The member should be maintaining constructive relations with private creditors to facilitate appropriate private sector involvement and should have made satisfactory progress in limiting external vulnerability through management of its external debt and international reserves.
- The member should submit a satisfactory economic and financial program, including a quantified framework, which the member stands ready to adjust as needed.

### Activation and Conditionality
- When a member requests actual use of CCL resources, a special “activation” review will be conducted expeditiously by the Board.
- At activation reviews, the Board must ascertain that the member, having successfully implemented its program to date, is nevertheless severely affected by a crisis stemming from contagion and is committed to adjusting its policies as needed.

### Financial Terms, Access Limits, and Repayment
- The CCL is not subject to general IMF access limits.
- Commitments under the CCL are expected to be in the range of 300–500 percent of the member’s quota in the IMF, unless otherwise warranted by exceptional circumstances, and with due regard to the IMF’s liquidity position.
- CCL commitments are to be made for up to one year.
- At the time of the special activation review, the Board decides on the amount to be released immediately, the phasing of the balance remaining, and the associated conditionality.
- Countries drawing under the CCL are expected to repay within one to one and one-half years of the date of each disbursement (the Board may extend this repayment period by up to one year).
- During the first year following the first drawing of CCL resources, the member will pay a surcharge of 300 basis points above the rate of charge on regular IMF drawings (the rate of charge is a weighted average of short-term interest rates in the domestic money markets of the five countries whose currencies make up the SDR valuation basket).
- The surcharge increases by 50 basis points every six months thereafter up to a maximum of 500 basis points.

*Source: Box 5, _file3pdf - Box 5_*

### Box 7

### Box 7

### The Stability and Growth Pact
- In June 1997, the European Council concluded negotiations on the Stability and Growth Pact to secure budgetary discipline in member states during the final stage of the European Economic and Monetary Union.
- The Pact covers both the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure specified in the Maastricht Treaty and the medium-term surveillance of fiscal policies.
- Under the excessive-deficit procedure, EU countries that breach the 3 percentof GDP reference value for the general government deficit are deemed to be in excessive deficit, unless exceptional circumstances apply, and will receive advice from the Economic and Financial Council of Ministers of the European Union (ECOFIN) on correcting the excessive deficit.
- Failure to follow up effectively on this advice will result in fines for countries in the euro area.
- Countries are expected to submit medium-term stability programs, updated annually, that identify how governments plan to meet and maintain the Pact’s medium-term objective of general government positions that are near balance or in surplus.

### Fiscal posture, medium-term objectives, and policy guidance
- Rationale for a near-balance or surplus medium-term target included:
  - providing room for automatic stabilizers in normal cyclical fluctuations,
  - adequate scope for discretionary countercyclical policies,
  - providing room for dealing with interest rate shocks,
  - general uncertainty in the measurement of output gaps,
  - preparing public finances for the longer-term challenges associated with population aging.
- Despite convergence progress, deterioration in projected general government primary structural balances, especially for 1998, indicated significant risk that some countries would not achieve the medium-term goal of the Stability and Growth Pact.
- Concern that policymakers might focus too much on actual rather than cyclically adjusted deficits, potentially introducing expansionary measures during economic upswings.
- Directors’ guidance:
  - Governments needed to provide convincing evidence in their budgets for 1999 and in the stability programs to be presented to the EU’s Council of Economic and Finance Ministers by the end of 1998 that fiscal positions would be brought into line with the medium-term goal of near balance, or surplus, not later than 2001.
  - This was particularly important for those countries with high levels of public debt.
  - The objective implied a relatively moderate pace of fiscal adjustment, allowing attention to reform of fiscal systems—including pension and welfare schemes—as part of a broad package of structural reforms addressing high unemployment and low labor participation rates.
  - Initial reforms should focus on reductions in primary expenditures.
  - Spending reforms could directly impact labor market incentives and create scope for cuts in taxes and social security contributions.

### Structural reforms and labor-market flexibility
- At the August 1998 discussion, Directors underscored the need to complement fiscal reforms with structural changes to enhance real economy flexibility.
- Accelerated action was needed to achieve greater product and labor market flexibility to help reduce the high level of structural unemployment.
- While progress had been made in addressing structural rigidities, it was not sufficient to have a noticeable impact on structural unemployment in most countries.
- Institutional and market structures must allow sufficient flexibility to deal with asymmetric shocks.

### Coordination, surveillance, and IMF role
- Given national policy-making’s role in the euro area and potential spillovers, Directors emphasized the importance of effective coordination of national economic policies.
- Some Directors judged that current EU practice, bolstered by the Stability and Growth Pact, appropriately balanced limiting policy spillovers with allowing scope to adapt policies to national circumstances.
- Directors underlined the role IMF regional surveillance could play in fostering a desirable overall policy stance and appropriate policy mix, to be complemented by IMF consultations with individual countries.

### Interest rates and monetary stance (as of late 1998)
- Directors observed that, for the euro area as a whole, a slack-absorbing recovery (as of the end of August 1998) was still in its early stages and that considerable spare capacity remained.
- Price inflation was low; developments in wages and monetary aggregates gave little ground for concern about inflation prospects; historically low long-term interest rates indicated markets were not concerned about inflation.
- These considerations warranted keeping short-term interest rates in the core countries of the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) stable, with rates in other euro-area countries converging toward this level.
- Downside risks from developments in Russia and Asia and weakening in several emerging markets argued against premature tightening of monetary policy; any increase in interest rates would need a further maturing of the recovery and clearer indication of the effects of external factors.
- The Board agreed to a wait-and-see approach to interest rate policy.

### Operational and legal aspects for the IMF and EMU
- In September 1998, the Board discussed operational and legal aspects of EMU for the IMF.
- Directors agreed the transfer of monetary powers by members of the euro area to EMU institutions would not affect their countries’ legal relationship with the IMF under its Articles of Agreement, as the IMF is a country-based institution; euro-area members would remain members of the IMF in their own individual capacity as countries.
- The exercise of individual rights and fulfillment of obligations of members may be affected by adoption of a common currency and transfer of competencies to common institutions within the euro area.
- Surveillance implications noted:
  - Adoption of a single monetary policy under an independent European Central Bank had important implications for IMF surveillance.
  - The IMF’s responsibility to conduct surveillance over members’ external and exchange rate policies required intensifying discussions with EU and euro-area institutions, especially the ECB.
  - Article IV consultations with euro-area members would proceed as usual but could not be completed without discussion of core policies such as monetary and exchange rate policies that fall within the IMF’s mandate.
  - Discussions with representatives of relevant EU institutions—the ECB, the Council of Ministers and the Economic and Financial Committee—would need to take place as part of Article IV consultations with individual euro-area countries.
  - Modalities envisaged included twice-yearly staff discussions with the EU institutions responsible for common policies in the euro area, and an annual IMF staff report and Board discussion on the monetary and exchange rate policies of the euro area in the context of Article IV consultations with these countries.
  - To the extent possible, discussions with individual euro-area countries would be clustered around discussions with the EU institutions.
  - Subject to consent of members concerned, Public Information Notices could be issued following the conclusion of the Board discussion on euro-area surveillance.
  - Directors called for granting the ECB observer status at the IMF (see Box 8).
  - Directors highlighted implications for national and regional data and information provision to the IMF from the move to the euro and directed staff to make arrangements with the ECB and the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat) for regular and timely transfer of data sets.

### Euro-area monetary and exchange rate policies (post-euro launch)
- In March 1999, following the January 1 launch of the euro, Executive Directors discussed for the first time the monetary and exchange rate policies of the euro area in the context of Article IV consultations with euro-area countries.
- Achievements and remaining challenges noted:
  - EMU offered potential for greater economic stability and performance.
  - A solid framework had been put in place to guide monetary and fiscal policies.
  - Price stability had been achieved and seemed secure for the foreseeable future.
  - Headway in fiscal consolidation had been made in satisfying the Maastricht convergence criteria.
  - The internal market program had substantially increased market integration in the European Union.
  - Important challenges remained: need for further fiscal adjustment and urgent action by national authorities to address structural rigidities impeding employment and economic growth.
- The weakening of short-term growth prospects in the preceding six months complicated policymakers’ tasks.
- Policies should remain focused on medium-term requirements but be adequately attuned to supporting domestic demand.
- The euro area required a sustained period of strong domestic demand to help close a sizable output gap and absorb the cyclical component of unemployment.
- Most Directors believed the euro area should play a greater role in supporting global demand.
- With price stability assured and limited scope for automatic fiscal stabilizers in many countries, any easing should come from monetary policy.
- Short-term interest rates in the euro area had declined significantly over the past year, supporting economic activity.
- The case for a further interest rate reduction had increased because of:
  - continuing uncertainties regarding the strength of the expected economic recovery in the euro area,
  - further heightening of global economic risks,
  - continued downward pressures on inflation in the euro area.
- Directors agreed the European Central Bank should act decisively if the slowdown appeared to be persisting; a reduction in interest rates would be warranted if the global environment deteriorated further.

*Source: _file3pdf - Box 7*

### Box 8

### Box 8

### IMF grants observer status to European Central Bank
- On December 22, 1998, the Executive Board granted observer status at the IMF to the European Central Bank (ECB), effective January 1, 1999.
- The ECB was invited to send a representative to attend Board discussions on:
  - IMF surveillance under Article IV over the common monetary and exchange rate policies of the euro area;
  - IMF surveillance under Article IV over the policies of individual euro-area member countries;
  - the role of the euro in the international monetary system;
  - the world economic outlook;
  - international capital markets reports; and
  - world economic and market developments.
- The ECB was also invited to send a representative to Board meetings on agenda items recognized by the ECB and the IMF to be of mutual interest in fulfilling their mandates.

### Board and Directors’ assessment of the euro area and the ECB
- Directors observed:
  - The depreciation of the euro since its introduction reflected the continuing strength of the U.S. economy and uncertainties about growth prospects in the euro area.
  - The importance, at the early stages of the ECB, of public understanding and confidence in the monetary framework given uncertainties in the outlook for the euro area and the global economy.
  - Commendation of the ECB’s approach to monetary policy as sensible and pragmatic in light of the uncertainties of the change in regime.
- Communication and accountability:
  - Several Directors felt that the ECB needed to specify an explicit lower bound for inflation to help improve policy discipline and accountability.
  - Directors encouraged the ECB’s efforts to develop further its communication strategy and to provide greater detail of its assessment of inflation prospects and how it would adapt monetary policy to changing economic conditions.
  - A few Directors noted limits to what could be conveyed by statements of intent, emphasizing that public understanding would come from seeing the ECB in action and hearing explanations for its actions.
- Fiscal policy and macroeconomic mix:
  - Directors emphasized that an understanding of how the ECB would respond to macroeconomic developments was important for fiscal authorities in gauging the appropriate stance of fiscal policy.
  - The need for further fiscal consolidation in a number of euro-area countries—especially those with relatively large deficits or debts—and the lack of underlying fiscal adjustments in 1998 and in budgets for 1999 constrained the extent to which automatic stabilizers could be allowed to operate in the face of weaker activity.
  - The appropriate use of stabilizers depended on the pace of economic activity and on the degree of support provided by monetary policy.
  - Directors emphasized that the policy mix from fiscal and monetary policies should foster an appropriate level of aggregate demand in the euro area.
- Structural reforms and labor markets:
  - Demand management alone would not cure slow growth and high unemployment; determined reforms of government spending and taxation systems and forceful attack on structural rigidities were essential.
  - Early action on reforms would boost confidence and ease policymakers’ tasks.
  - Countries needed to:
    - train large numbers of unskilled workers, many without recent job experience;
    - address pervasive rigidities in labor and product markets;
    - cut the heavy tax burden on labor; and
    - reduce disincentives from the interaction of generous unemployment and welfare benefits, their long duration, and inadequate tests of availability for work.
  - Further trade liberalization, especially in agriculture, would contribute to a more efficient allocation of resources and help maintain price stability.
- Financial sector and supervision:
  - Directors were reassured that the ECB considered euro-area financial institutions in sound financial condition in the face of the recent global financial crisis, with no evidence of a credit crunch.
  - Given increasing integration and complex operations, existing arrangements should be reviewed to assess capability to deal with rapidly emerging financial problems in European markets.
  - It was especially important to ensure efficient and rapid flow of information between national supervisory authorities and the European central banking system.

### Interim Committee and policy priorities
- On April 27, 1999, the Interim Committee:
  - welcomed the start of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which should contribute to financial stability and sustainable growth in the euro area and globally;
  - welcomed the early April reduction by the European Central Bank of all three of its leading interest rates;
  - emphasized the importance of open and competitive markets to sustain growth and stability in the global economy;
  - urged the euro area to attack the root causes of high unemployment;
  - stressed that an appropriate policy mix to support stronger domestic demand, accompanied by structural reforms in labor, capital, and product markets, was essential for enhancing growth and employment prospects, especially in the medium term.

### Impact of EMU on selected non-EU countries
- Context and recommendations:
  - In July 1998, the Board considered EMU’s impact on selected countries outside the European Union—Eastern and Central Europe, the Mediterranean Basin, and the CFA franc zone.
  - While noting significant medium-term benefits of EMU for non-EU countries, Directors stressed the need for financial and structural policies to minimize risks and maximize opportunities arising from the euro’s introduction.
- Policy actions urged for non-euro countries:
  - Strengthen structural reforms to increase openness and competitiveness to mitigate trade- and investment-diversion effects from reduced transaction costs within the euro area.
  - Strengthen financial sector reforms in response to stronger competition from EU financial markets.
  - Give high priority to orderly and well-sequenced capital account liberalization, with priority on financial sector restructuring for potential EU members.
  - EU countries should maintain open trade regimes to broaden and deepen trade and investment relations.
- Exchange rate and spillover considerations:
  - Directors generally considered that the likely continuation of strong monetary policy credibility under EMU meant that short-term exchange rate volatility was not a major cause for concern for closely linked countries.
  - Directors saw the need to address possible spillover effects more explicitly in IMF surveillance over euro-area members, particularly on structural rigidities and maintaining appropriately tight fiscal stances.
  - IMF surveillance should give greater attention to implications for non-EU countries of changes in euro-area economic and financial conditions and to financial sector issues.
  - For future EU members, IMF surveillance should offer policy advice on complementary macroeconomic and structural reforms, including legal and institutional frameworks and steps to increase market flexibility.

### West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)
- Background and performance:
  - Executive Directors met in May 1998 to discuss strengthening IMF surveillance of regional developments in Africa through a formal dialogue with WAEMU institutions.
  - Economic performance of WAEMU members had improved since the devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994; sustainability depended on sound macroeconomic policies and intensified structural reforms.
  - The overdue exchange rate realignment of 1994 improved competitiveness and resulted in strong increases in growth of output and exports; nevertheless, the real exchange rate had tended to appreciate since 1994 and competitiveness indicators needed close review.
- Monetary and financial policies:
  - The monetary policy of the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) contributed to macroeconomic stability, including stability of the exchange rate peg, which had been modified only once since 1948.
  - There was agreement on constraints placed on regional monetary policy by the fixed exchange rate regime and absence of scope for monetary policy at the national level.
  - Indirect monetary policy instruments introduced since 1993 seemed broadly adequate, but efforts to enhance their effectiveness were important.
  - Importance of adhering to ceilings on monetary financing of governments in the context of fiscal consolidation.
  - Quality of financial intermediation would benefit from:
    - stronger functioning of the regional interbank market;
    - introduction of a single zone-wide licensing agreement for banks in the WAEMU;
    - more competition between financial institutions.
  - Importance of improving the functioning of the judiciary system and promptly completing bank-restructuring programs; governments were recommended to seek full privatization of the banking system and raise capital ratios to international standards.
- Trade, taxation, and convergence:
  - The Board supported steps toward liberalizing the region’s trade regime through adoption of a common external tariff, to become fully effective by January 2000.
  - The tariff structure should raise potential output by improving productivity, enhancing competition, and promoting integration into the world economy.
  - Government revenue shortfalls from trade liberalization should be addressed primarily by eliminating tax and customs duty exemptions and strengthening tax administration and collection.
  - Efforts under way to harmonize indirect taxation and adopt a common investment code aimed at eliminating or substantially reducing exemptions from customs duties or value-added tax were welcomed.
  - Directors encouraged continued efforts to promote regional convergence of economic performance in line with the WAEMU Treaty and welcomed progress toward observing convergence criteria on the fiscal balance, the domestic contribution to public investment, and payments arrears reduction.
  - Progress in timely availability of reliable data on national accounts, domestic debt, and the balance of payments was essential to enhance surveillance.

### Experience of transition economies
- General assessment:
  - In November 1998, the Executive Board discussed growth and disinflation in transition economies.
  - Economic recovery was mixed and countries were at different stages of transition.
  - For several Central European and Baltic countries, transition was far advanced and issues were progressively similar to those faced by middle-income market economies; progress on structural reforms played a key role.
  - For most CIS countries and some in southeast Europe, a long unfinished agenda of market-oriented reforms remained.
- Specific country observations:
  - In some Central European and Baltic countries—such as Poland, Hungary, Estonia, and Latvia—economic recovery might be running ahead of itself, generating risks of overheating and reversals of capital flows.
  - Future growth should depend more on mobilization of savings and efficient intermediation by the financial sector, underlining the need to put the banking system on a sound footing.
  - Much more effort was needed to rationalize expensive social programs while ensuring adequate safety nets.
  - For the CIS and parts of southeast Europe, tasks included completing large-scale privatization, imposing hard budget constraints (noted for Bulgaria and Romania), initiating serious reforms in Belarus and Turkmenistan, and restarting reform in Uzbekistan.
  - Privatization was a key mechanism for achieving efficiency and new growth, contingent on imposing hard budget constraints and establishing legal frameworks to protect property rights and rule of law.
- Disinflation experience:
  - Directors agreed that rapid disinflation had been achieved by many transition economies during 1993–97 at minimal output cost.
  - This had been possible because strong stabilization packages had been introduced at a relatively early stage, before inflation expectations had taken root.
  - Small inflation inertia was due to limited use of wage and price indexation and the rapidity of price liberalization.

*Source: Box 8, ANNUAL REPORT 1999 — SURVEILLANCE*

### Box 9

### Box 9

### Conference purpose and overview
- Conference title: “A Decade of Transition: Achievements and Challenges.”
- Dates: February 1–3, 1999.
- Objective: Identify lessons from the 10-year transition experience and distill them into better policies and more effective reforms for an increasingly diverse group of transition economies.
- Opening speaker: IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus, who discussed the legacy of the past decade of transition, the future agenda, the importance of enforcing the rule of law, and key questions for the future.

### Inflation, growth, and macroeconomic stabilization
- Early 1990s: transition countries in Europe saw a striking reduction in inflation, which led to robust output growth.
- Most economies, especially in central Europe and the Baltics, had made good progress on growth and faced issues similar to those of middle-income market economies, although a long agenda of unfinished reforms remained.
- Asian transition economies (China, Mongolia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Vietnam) generally recorded growth greater than that of countries in central and eastern Europe.
- Growth was generally fastest in areas where reforms were most far-reaching, especially in agriculture, aided by favorable initial conditions such as a relatively large agricultural sector and rural labor surpluses.
- Directors’ observations (later section): hardening of budget constraints, central bank independence, and tightening limits on central bank credit to the government were at the core of stabilization packages.
- Episodes of relapses into high inflation during 1993–97 were critically linked to financial instability rooted in weak banking systems.
- Directors were concerned about the fallout from the crisis in Russia, which came to a head in August 1998; the crisis reinforced lessons that:
  - incomplete structural reforms to strengthen property rights and governance jeopardize the sustainability of financial stabilization; and
  - the cost of incomplete reform in terms of lost output and renewed inflation can be severe.

### Structural reforms, privatization, and banking sector reform
- Privatization generally improved financial and operating performance, but its mixed record—especially in the countries of the former Soviet Union—raised questions about methods and outcomes.
- Consensus: there was no alternative to privatization; the state should channel efforts into more effective privatizations, for example by seeking ways to enlarge capital and ensure sales to strategic investors.
- Three pillars of effective bank restructuring identified:
  - corporate governance,
  - competition, and
  - prudential regulation and supervision.
- Prudential regulation and supervision was not optimal in any country in the region, but strong performers shared features such as effective foreign and domestic bank entry and exit regulations during liberalization and new private commercial banking.
- Weak performers shared characteristics including: lack of competition, poor asset quality, lack of sector-specific expertise, significant state ownership, low levels of corporate lending, and an unstable macroeconomic environment.

### Institution building, capital inflows, and the role of government
- Total capital inflows to transition countries had risen to significant levels; early reliance on exceptional financing gave way to foreign investment and other flows, enhanced by a positive legal and political climate.
- The role of government changes during transition: shock therapy was the first step in adjustment, but the more difficult step was the slow process of developing new institutions, changing incentives, and rethinking the role of government.
- The underground economy may account for more than 40 percent of total GDP in several countries of the former Soviet Union, and over 20 percent in many others.
  - Drivers of underground activity were identified as excessive regulatory discretion, weak rule of law, and corruption—not high taxes.
  - To break the cycle leading to hidden firm activity and weakened legal institutions, governments need to:
    - reduce regulatory discretion,
    - reform bureaucracies,
    - simplify and enforce laws,
    - create an independent judiciary, and
    - enhance government transparency and public oversight.

### Social outcomes and diversity of transition experience
- Transition to market economies accompanied by a large increase in income inequality, since income from self-employment and property (traditionally unequal) now makes up a larger proportion of national income, while some former state employees remain unemployed and social transfers sometimes fail to reach the poor.
- By conference end: experience with privatization, income inequality, and institutional needs was becoming increasingly diverse, partly because of historical and geographical differences.
- Achievement of macroeconomic stabilization is necessary but only the first step; the vital next stage is to strengthen or create the legal, fiscal, and regulatory infrastructures—and incentives—needed for the operation of a market economy.

### Conference summary: IMF Deputy Managing Director Shigemitsu Sugisaki
- Fiscal and monetary stability are essential for successful transition.
- A sound financial sector is an indispensable component of macroeconomic stability.
- Privatization is key to forming a viable market-oriented economy.
- Measures to address income inequality are increasingly important.
- At the heart of the transition process is the complex and time-consuming task of institution building that helps states support market-oriented economies.

*Source: Box 9, Conference on the Transition Experience (February 1–3, 1999), _file3pdf - Box 9.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-flagship-issues/external/pubs/ft/ar/1999/pdf/_file3pdf.pdf_
