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### Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) and Contingent Credit Lines (CCL)
- SRF purpose: financing for members with exceptional balance of payments needs resulting from a sudden and disruptive loss of market confidence reflected in pressure on the capital account and the member’s reserves.
- SRF modifications and observations:
  - Directors agreed the facility continued to be an appropriate way to help such countries and that its structure was broadly appropriate.
  - Timetable amendment: the rate of charge escalation was to run from the date of the first purchase (i.e., borrowing) and then apply to all purchases outstanding under the facility.
  - Flexibility introduced in the timing of SRF reviews and in the release of associated SRF drawings—used for Brazil’s IMF-supported arrangement—was considered a valuable innovation and could be used, on a case-by-case basis, for future SRF arrangements.
  - Some Directors raised issues for further review as additional experience was gained, including ways of involving the private sector.
- SRF charging and repayment terms (from Box 10 content):
  - Financing committed for up to 1 year.
  - Repurchases are expected to be made within 1 to 1!/2 years, and must be made within 2 to 2!/2 years, from the date of each purchase.
  - For the first year, the rate of charge on SRF financing is subject to a surcharge of 300 basis points above the usual rate of charge on other IMF loans; the surcharge then increases by 50 basis points every six months until it reaches 500 basis points.
- CCL creation and purpose:
  - In April 1999, the Board endorsed the creation of Contingent Credit Lines to provide short-term financing—if the need arises—to help members with fundamentally sound and well-managed economies overcome exceptional balance of payments financing needs arising from a sudden and disruptive loss of market confidence owing to contagion.
  - The Interim Committee at its April 1999 meeting called the CCL an important component of efforts to strengthen the architecture of the international financial system.
- Key distinctions between SRF and CCL (from Box 10):
  - SRF: for members already in the midst of a crisis.
  - CCL: preventive measure solely for members concerned with potential vulnerability to contagion but not facing a crisis at the time of the commitment.
  - Eligibility for CCL: confined to members implementing policies considered unlikely to give rise to a need to use IMF resources; whose economic performance—and progress in adhering to relevant internationally accepted standards—has been assessed positively by the IMF in the latest Article IV consultation and thereafter; and who have constructive relations with private sector creditors to facilitate private sector involvement.
  - Resources committed under a CCL can be activated only if the Board determines that exceptional balance of payments financing needs faced by a member have arisen owing to contagion.
  - CCL commitments are expected to range from 300 percent to 500 percent of the member’s quota.
  - The maturity of and rate of charge on CCL resources are the same as for SRF resources.
- Directors’ views on broader CCL implementation:
  - The CCL was agreed to be provided for a two-year period (as of April 1999).

### Assistance to Postconflict Countries
- 1995 policy expansion: emergency assistance policy coverage expanded to include postconflict countries to help meet special economic needs arising from political turmoil, civil unrest, or international armed conflict.
- Components of emergency assistance: technical assistance, policy advice, and quick disbursement of limited financial assistance.
- April 1999 Board discussion outcomes:
  - Ways to enhance assistance by providing financial assistance on terms more appropriate to poor, postconflict countries, and in larger amounts over a longer period when warranted.
  - Emphasis that new IMF measures must be supportive of stronger and coordinated international community efforts to ensure maintenance of peace and assist in orderly transition to stabilization and high-quality growth.
- Measures to reduce costs and improve access:
  - Directors agreed to give further consideration to seeking interest subsidies from bilateral donors on a case-by-case basis, or in the context of establishing an administered account, to reduce the cost of using IMF emergency assistance for poor, postconflict countries.
  - Directors agreed to permit early replacement of the IMF’s nonconcessional general resources provided under emergency postconflict assistance with resources provided under the concessional ESAF for low-income countries when the member was in a position to obtain ESAF support for its economic program.
  - For postconflict countries that take longer than expected to move to an IMF arrangement with upper credit tranche conditionality, Directors agreed access of up to an additional 25 percent of quota in the form of outright purchases could be provided when there was sufficient evidence of the authorities’ commitment to reform and capacity to implement appropriate policies.

### Postconflict Countries with Arrears to International Institutions
- IMF collaborative approach to members with overdue obligations has succeeded in preventing new cases of protracted arrears and resolving most cases.
- Challenges and conditional actions:
  - Special efforts to accelerate IMF financial assistance in arrears cases pose difficulties relative to the IMF’s arrears strategy and could raise moral hazard and creditor-status issues if not carefully circumscribed.
  - Directors agreed that, in the pre-arrears clearance stage, the IMF could consider, on a case-by-case basis, relaxing its calls for payments as a test of cooperation provided the member was judged to be cooperating on policies and that all other multilaterals to which the member was in arrears took at least comparable action.
  - Emphasis that a solid track record, determined flexibly in light of each country’s circumstances, remained essential for arrears clearance.
  - Arrears clearance plans to be developed based on individual circumstances and coordinated with other creditors.
  - In the absence of concessional financing, arrears could likely be cleared through a bridge to a new arrangement in the IMF’s (nonconcessional) General Resources Account (GRA).
  - The idea of the IMF matching rescheduling operations of the Paris Club or other creditor groups was considered inconsistent with the monetary character of the IMF.
  - In exceptional cases, the IMF might consider using Articles of Agreement provisions relating to postponement of repurchases, or payment of GRA charges in domestic currency, or both, assessed case by case in light of financing requirements and possibilities at the time of arrears clearance.
  - For some heavily indebted postconflict countries, arrears clearance and resumption of net financing flows may not result in sustainable debt-service positions; in such cases, following a satisfactory track record under a follow-on arrangement, debt to the IMF and other creditors could be subject to action under the HIPC Initiative.

### IMF Financial Facilities and Key Terms (Box 10 catalog)
- General:
  - IMF financing is provided through both its general resources and its concessional financing facility.
  - Extension of IMF credit is subject to Executive Board approval and, in most cases, to the member’s commitment to address causes of its payments imbalance.
  - Members “purchase” other members’ currencies or SDRs by using an equivalent amount of their own currency; IMF levies charges and members must “repurchase” their own currency within a specified time.
- Regular facilities and key terms:
  - Reserve Tranche:
    - A member may draw up to the full amount of its reserve tranche position at any time, subject only to the member’s representation of a balance of payments need.
    - A reserve tranche drawing does not constitute a use of IMF credit and is not subject to charges or to an expectation or obligation to repurchase.
  - Credit Tranches:
    - First credit tranche: 25 percent of a member’s quota; members must demonstrate reasonable efforts to overcome balance of payments difficulties.
    - Upper credit tranches: any segment above 25 percent of quota; drawings made in installments and released when performance targets are met; normally associated with Stand-By or Extended Arrangements.
  - Stand-By Arrangements:
    - Give members the right to draw up to a specified amount during a prescribed period.
    - Drawings normally phased on a quarterly basis, conditional on meeting performance criteria and periodic reviews.
    - Typically range from 12 to 18 months (can extend up to three years).
    - Repayments made within 3!/4 to 5 years of each drawing.
  - Extended Fund Facility (EFF):
    - Designed for longer periods and generally larger amounts than Stand-By Arrangements.
    - Extended Arrangements normally run for three years (can be extended for a fourth).
    - Repayments made within 4!/2 to 10 years of each drawing.
- Concessional facility — ESAF:
  - Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF):
    - Established in 1987 and extended and enlarged in February 1994.
    - Principal means for highly concessional loans to low-income members facing protracted balance of payments problems.
    - Eligible members must develop a three-year policy framework paper (PFP) with IMF and World Bank staff assistance.
    - ESAF loans disbursed semiannually; repaid in 10 equal semiannual installments beginning 5!/2 years and ending 10 years after disbursement.
    - Interest rate on ESAF loans is 0.5 percent a year.
- Special facilities (additional notes from Box 10):
  - Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF): compensatory element for temporary shortfalls in export earnings or excess cereal import costs; contingency element helps members with IMF arrangements cope with unexpected adverse external shocks.
  - Buffer Stock Financing Facility (BSFF): helps finance contributions to approved international buffer stocks; no drawings since January 1984.
  - Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF): described above.
  - Contingent Credit Lines (CCL): commitments expected to range from 300 percent to 500 percent of quota; maturity and rate of charge same as SRF resources.

### Other Forms of Financial Assistance (Box 5 highlights)
- Support for Currency Stabilization Funds:
  - 1995 decision to provide financial support for establishment of currency stabilization funds to bolster confidence in exchange-rate-based stabilization strategies.
  - Preconditions: sufficiently tight economic policies so inflation compatible with targeted exchange rate anchor, implying little use for exchange market intervention.
  - Implementation status: IMF has not actually provided this assistance to date.
- Emergency Financing Mechanism (EFM):
  - Purpose: procedures allowing quick Board approval of IMF financial support while ensuring sufficient conditionality in rare crisis circumstances.
  - Established in September 1995.
  - Used in 1997 for the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea, and in 1998 for Russia.
- Emergency Assistance (natural disaster and postconflict):
  - Natural disaster assistance: outright purchases usually limited to 25 percent of quota; conditional on member cooperating with the IMF; typically followed by an arrangement under a regular facility.
  - Postconflict assistance (policy expanded in 1995): eligibility and conditionality tailored to disrupted institutional capacity, urgent balance of payments need, catalytic IMF support as part of concerted international effort; requires statement of economic policies, quantified macroeconomic framework to extent possible, and intent to move to upper credit tranche or ESAF arrangements.

### Staff-Monitored Programs and Social Issues
- Staff-Monitored Programs:
  - Tool for intensive policy advice outside IMF-supported arrangement; informal surveillance with no formal IMF endorsement.
  - Purposes: establish or reestablish policy track record, maintain close IMF–country dialogue, signal commitment to creditors and markets.
  - Board guidance: framework drafted by staff; Directors requested internal guidance note and reiterated broad support.
- Social Issues:
  - IMF addresses social dimensions of economic policies (social safety nets, equity, composition of public spending).
  - ESAF-supported programs emphasize poverty reduction via growth and better targeting/delivery of health, education, and safety nets.
  - In crisis contexts (Indonesia, Korea, Thailand) Board recognized creation/strengthening of social safety nets as essential.
  - IMF actions: ensure social agendas are defined; collaborate with governments and agencies (notably World Bank); encourage ILO tripartite approach for major policy changes.
  - IMF held a conference in June 1998 on economic policy and equity.

### Conference on Economic Policy and Equity (Box 11)
- Conference held June 8–9, 1998; objectives included integrating social dimensions into IMF policy work.
- Seminar consensus points (selected):
  - Sound macroeconomic policies necessary to promote equity over medium and long term.
  - Equity is multidimensional; focus on improving prospects of the least fortunate via access to education, health, credit, and justice; cost-effective, well-targeted safety nets essential.
  - Governments should improve public services and tax systems to finance empowerment initiatives and safety nets.
  - Technological change has contributed more than globalization to growing wage disparity between skilled and unskilled workers.
  - IMF should continue addressing equity issues in its core activities.
- Operational implications highlighted:
  - Incorporate social safety nets into IMF-supported programs.
  - Curb unproductive spending; increase public expenditure on basic needs.
  - Emphasize second-generation structural reforms (rule of law, dismantling monopolies, labor market reform).
  - Conduct country-specific studies on poverty and income distribution and improve collection of social expenditure data.
- Closing commitment: IMF to examine how best to incorporate seminar contributions into operational work.

### Macroeconomic Projections and Selected Country Programs
- Overview projections (selected passages):
  - External current account deficit narrowed to 10.2 percent of GDP in 1999.
  - Primary budget surplus targets: 0.8 percent in 1998 and 0.5 percent in 1999.
  - Revenue-to-GDP ratio targets: 13 percent of GDP in 1998 and 12.5 percent of GDP in 1999.
  - Estimated revenue losses from customs duty cuts: 0.3 percent of GDP in 1998 and 1 percent in 1999.
- Policy directions:
  - Expenditure policy: remain prudent with a gradual increase in share of spending for health and education.
  - Structural reforms: expand privatization; strengthen farmers’ organizations; withdraw public sector from rice marketing; reinforce farmers’ cooperatives in cotton sector; open new cotton regions to private operators.
  - Civil service reforms: create merit-based promotion system; strengthen personnel training; improve governance and responsiveness.
  - Social goals: increase primary school enrollment, vaccination rates, and number of health centers meeting minimum operating standards.
- Selected country financial support and program objectives (preserve numeric values exactly):
  - Cameroon: second annual ESAF Arrangement for SDR 54.04 million ($74 million) on September 18, 1998; targets include average annual GDP growth of at least 5 percent, inflation less than 2 percent, external current account deficit stabilized to less than 2!/2percent of GDP.
  - Central African Republic: three-year ESAF Arrangement for SDR49.4 million ($66 million) on July 20, 1998; targets include average real GDP growth about 5 percent a year, inflation about 2!/2percent a year, external current account deficit at 5 percent of GDP by 2000.
  - Republic of Congo: purchase of SDR 7.24 million ($10 million) under emergency postconflict assistance on July 15, 1998; projected primary fiscal balance: 11.9 percent of GDP in 1998, as against 6.4 percent in 1997.
  - Djibouti: Stand-By Arrangement extended and augmented to SDR 8.25 million ($11 million) on June 1, 1998.
  - Dominican Republic: emergency assistance for SDR 39.7 million ($56 million) on October 29, 1998.
  - El Salvador: 17-month Stand-By Arrangement for SDR 37.68 million ($52 million) on September 23, 1998; GDP growth targets: 4 percent in 1998 and 4.5 percent in 1999; inflation targets: 3.5 percent in 1998 and 3 percent in 1999; increase net international reserves to equivalent of seven months of imports.
  - Ethiopia: second annual ESAF arrangement for SDR29.5 million ($42 million) on October 23, 1998; medium-term GDP growth target between 8 percent and 9.4 percent; inflation less than 4 percent.
  - The Gambia: three-year ESAF Arrangement for SDR20.6 million ($27 million) on June 29, 1998; real GDP growth target 4.5–5 percent a year; inflation about 3 percent a year.
  - Georgia: third annual ESAF arrangement for SDR55.5 million ($74 million) on July 27, 1998; 1998 targets: GDP growth of 10 percent, reduce inflation to 6 percent, increase gross official reserves to equivalent of 2.3 months of imports.
  - Guyana: three-year ESAF arrangement for SDR53.76 million ($71 million) on July 15, 1998; average real GDP growth about 4 percent a year for 1998–01; limit average inflation to about 4!/4 percent.
  - Haiti: emergency financial assistance of SDR15.2 million ($21 million) on November 30, 1998 for Hurricane Georges relief; program based on 2 percent output growth and inflation about 8 percent.
  - Honduras: SDR47.5 million ($66 million) in emergency assistance on December 7, 1998; three-year ESAF Arrangement for SDR 156.75 million ($215 million) on March 26, 1999; growth recovery to about 5 or 6 percent a year by 2000–01 after expected decline of 2 to 3 percent in 1999; inflation targets: 13–14 percent by December 1999 and 8 percent by end of 2001; program projected combined public sector deficit widening in 1999 to about 8!/2percent of GDP.
  - Armenia, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Republic of Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe: program objectives and policies specified with numeric targets preserved in source text (see section for each country).

### HIPC Initiative: Rationale, Status, and Options (as of April 1999)
- Objective: help countries with good track records achieve overall external debt sustainability with participation of all external creditors.
- Status as of April 1999:
  - Executive Boards reviewed eligibility of 12 heavily indebted poor countries; work under way on others.
  - Seven countries had qualified for debt relief, and three others were expected to follow.
  - Debt relief committed to the seven qualified countries: $6 billion in nominal terms ($3 billion in 1998 net present value terms).
  - Assistance released for two countries: Uganda and Bolivia.
- Implementation changes and operational points:
  - Extended initial two-year entry period into Initiative from end-September 1998 until end-2000 (one-time extension).
  - Amended ESAF-HIPC Trust Instrument to allow consideration of performance under emergency assistance programs for postconflict countries as part of first-stage track record.
  - Reassessment option where policy implementation problems cause protracted delays.
- First and second stage features (summary):
  - First Stage: Paris Club flow rescheduling on Naples terms (up to 67 percent NPV reduction on eligible maturities) and comparable treatment by other creditors; multilateral adjustment support; establish first three-year track record.
  - Decision Point: Paris Club stock-of-debt operation on Naples terms judged insufficient; country requests additional support; IMF and World Bank determine eligibility.
  - Second Stage: deeper Paris Club stock-of-debt reduction up to 80 percent in present value terms; comparable treatment by other creditors; multilateral institutions reduce NPV of claims; country establishes second track record.
  - Completion Point: coordinated actions completed; country exits with sustainable debt position.
- Options and Board discussion areas:
  - Principles: debt relief should reinforce policy-based/project lending and poverty reduction; strengthen incentives for adjustment and reform; focus on poorer countries; provide clear irrevocable exit with cushion against shocks; simplify and increase transparency.
  - Some Directors suggested considering lower NPV-of-debt-to-exports target of 150 percent and NPV-of-debt-to-fiscal-revenue target of 250 percent for deepest poverty cases or exceptional performers.
  - Views on track record timing varied: some supported shortening to three years; others preferred current flexibility.
  - Several Directors supported consideration of interim assistance ahead of completion point.
  - Social linkages: debt relief could incentivize and resource poverty reduction; further work to tighten linkage in Phase 2 of 1999 review.
  - External actions urged: larger official development assistance flows and reinvigoration of trade liberalization to improve market access for HIPC exports.
- HIPC costing and financing:
  - Technical note (April 1999) on estimated costs prepared for public feedback ahead of decisions at fall 1999 Annual Meetings.
  - Estimated financing requirement for ESAF-HIPC Trust on “as-needed” basis: SDR 2.9 billion ($3.9 billion) using revised baseline cost.
  - By end-April 1999, six members (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands) indicated they would provide additional SDR 1.6 billion ($2.2 billion) in loan resources for ESAF Trust.
  - On April 28, 1999, NAB participants decided one-third of surcharge on Brazil’s outstanding SRF purchases be transferred to ESAF-HIPC Trust.
  - Directors noted many pledged contributions remained conditional; delays in financing caused significant forgone income; stressed need for burden sharing and additional contributions.

### ESAF Evaluations, Program Design, and Operational Lessons
- Disbursements as of April 30, 1999:
  - ESAF disbursements: SDR 7.2 billion ($9.7 billion) under 81 ESAF arrangements for 51 countries.
  - SAF predecessor disbursements: SDR 1.8 billion ($2.4 billion) under 38 arrangements for 37 countries.
- Key design emphases for ESAF-supported programs:
  - Target substantial increases in national saving over three-year ESAF arrangements; higher public saving rates should lead.
  - Quality of fiscal adjustment as important as quantity; shift toward less distortionary broad-based consumption taxes (e.g., VAT) and simple income/profit taxes.
  - Improve quality and composition of public spending; protect/increase productive spending on health, education, and infrastructure; social safety nets more prominent.
  - Single-digit inflation central objective; fiscal restraint prerequisite; consider effective nominal anchors with caution and exit strategies.
  - Address structural weaknesses with attention to sequencing; prioritize reforms stimulating private investment; further trade liberalization; establish sound banking system and privatize public enterprises; improve data on banking sector and public enterprises.
  - External viability analysis should use indicators based on exports, GDP, and revenues and include private external debt monitoring.
- Implementation, ownership, monitoring, and social policies:
  - Programs must be well-designed and consistently implemented; national ownership improves prospects.
  - IMF staff to help build national consensus; resident representatives to engage more with civil society; publication of Policy Framework Papers and Letters of Intent encouraged.
  - Missions should have flexibility to agree alternative policy mixes consistent with objectives; include other ministries in structural/sectoral discussions.
  - IMF to seek prior actions where structural reforms are fundamental; staff reports should assess environment for implementation (technical capacity, assistance needs, potential roadblocks).
  - Social impact assessments during program design; incorporate protective measures; monitor social impact during implementation.
  - IMF to rely on World Bank expertise for social assessments; six “pilot” countries: Cameroon, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Tajikistan, Vietnam, Zimbabwe.
  - Amendment to ESAF Trust Instrument permits semiannual performance criteria, reviews, and disbursements and possible quarterly monitoring in exceptional cases; amendment approved in November 1998.

### IMF–World Bank Collaboration, Technical Assistance, and Training
- Collaboration priorities:
  - Joint work on public enterprise and banking sector reforms to ensure early reform of enterprises posing fiscal risk and identify bank restructuring costs.
  - Coordinate technical assistance across IMF, World Bank, and other agencies to build institutional capacity and meet timetables.
  - Assess absorptive capacity for higher aid inflows in countries with macro stability to consider increased access to official financing.
  - Maintain delineation of responsibilities while allowing flexibility in pilot cases; IMF retains ultimate responsibility for ESAF program content before the Executive Board.
- Monitoring:
  - Endorsed more intensive program monitoring where helpful; amended ESAF Trust Instrument to permit semiannual/quarterly monitoring as appropriate.
- Technical assistance and training:
  - Technical assistance described as the “third leg” of IMF work.
  - 1998/99: technical assistance activity represented about 15 percent of IMF’s total administrative expenditures.
  - Delivery by multiple IMF departments and the IMF Institute; focus areas include monetary and fiscal management, statistics, financial law, social security reform, IMF operations, and IT.
  - IMF Institute programs: headquarters and overseas courses; distance learning introduced.
  - Technical Assistance Committee coordinates priorities.
  - Emphasis on strengthening governance, human resources, and institutional capacity to reduce long-run need for IMF financing.
  - Limited resources require much assistance be directed at immediate problem solving and supporting implementation.
- IMF Institute and Regional Institutions (Box 13):
  - Four program components: strengthen traditional training at headquarters; in-house training for IMF economists; collaborative arrangements with regional partners; distance learning and information access.
  - Technical assistance volumes and shifts:
    - Annual technical assistance about 300 person-years in late 1990s; effective person-year defined as 260 days.
    - Regional shifts: European departments’ share fell from ~40 percent to 23 percent in 1998/99; Asia and Pacific share rose to 20 percent.
    - Large-scale integrated multiyear TA programs cofinanced with donors implemented in multiple postcrisis countries.
  - Donor financing:
    - Japan largest external financier in 1998/99.
    - Framework Administered Account for Technical Assistance Activities attracted multiple contributors.
    - In 1998/99, about 30 percent of IMF’s technical assistance and training activities were financed from external sources; two-thirds of experts recruited were financed from external sources.
  - Key statistics (effective person-years, Table 6 highlights):
    - Total technical assistance resources by year: 1995/96: 309.0; 1996/97: 277.0; 1997/98: 285.7; 1998/99: 301.7 (Estimated).
    - IMF technical assistance resources by category (1995/96, 1996/97, 1997/98, 1998/99): Staff: 108.6; 97.1; 103.9; 98.9. Headquarters-based consultants: 23.5; 20.1; 20.8; 21.2. Experts: 79.3; 55.5; 64.9; 81.6.
    - External technical assistance resources by source (1995/96, 1996/97, 1997/98, 1998/99): United Nations Development Program: 25.0; 21.5; 24.4; 14.4. Japan: 65.0; 67.3; 55.6; 70.9. Other: 7.5; 15.4; 16.2; 15.0.
    - Total resources by department (1995/96, 1996/97, 1997/98, 1998/99): Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department: 137.3; 114.6; 110.6; 120.8. Fiscal Affairs Department: 99.8; 96.2; 98.8; 101.7. Statistics Department: 39.2; 36.6; 39.0; 38.9. IMF Institute: 14.0; 11.0; 12.1; 15.4. Legal Department: 11.0; 9.3; 10.3; 10.7. Other: 7.7; 9.3; 14.9; 14.3. Total regional use by department: 280.1; 251.0; 258.7; 274.9.
    - Regional use (1995/96, 1996/97, 1997/98, 1998/99): African Department: 62.4; 54.4; 65.8; 72.2. Asia and Pacific Department: n.a.; 49.0; 42.5; 58.1. European I Department: 24.4; 22.5; 23.8; 22.4. European II Department: 73.5; 57.6; 52.6; 47.1. Middle Eastern Department: 23.4; 26.5; 29.5; 32.5. Western Hemisphere Department: 32.3; 31.2; 35.2; 32.1. Interregional: 11.7; 9.6; 8.6; 8.8. Nonregional use: 28.9; 26.1; 26.9; 27.7. Total technical assistance use: 309.0; 277.0; 285.7; 301.7.
- Oversight and evaluation:
  - IMF’s Office of Internal Audit and Inspection reviewed the technical assistance program in 1998/99; Board and management to consider recommendations during 1999/2000.

### IMF Engagement and Emergency Responses (Box 12 highlights)
- Managing Director visits in November 1998 to Nicaragua, Honduras, and other Central American countries affected by Hurricane Mitch to discuss reconstruction and recovery.
- Emergency financial assistance and approvals:
  - SDR47.5 million ($66 million) assistance package for Honduras approved December 7 (1998) under emergency assistance policy.
  - Nicaragua review completed and augmentation of SDR 48 million ($66 million) approved February 12, 1999.
  - Three-year ESAF Arrangement for Honduras for SDR 156.8 million ($215 million) approved March 26, 1999.
- Coordination with multilateral institutions and donors:
  - IMF, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank agreed to comprehensive assessments of external debt situations for Honduras and Nicaragua.
  - Consultative Group for the Reconstruction and Transformation of Central America met in December 1998 to brief donors and seek initial assistance commitments; follow-up meeting planned for Stockholm in May 1999.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-flagship-issues/external/pubs/ft/ar/1999/pdf/_file4pdf.pdf*

### Box 10), a short-term lending facility introduced in late

### _file4pdf - Box 10), a short-term lending facility introduced in late

### Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) and Contingent Credit Lines (CCL)
- SRF purpose: financing for members with exceptional balance of payments needs resulting from a sudden and disruptive loss of market confidence reflected in pressure on the capital account and the member’s reserves.
- SRF modifications and observations:
  - Directors agreed the facility continued to be an appropriate way to help such countries and that its structure was broadly appropriate.
  - Timetable amendment: the rate of charge escalation was to run from the date of the first purchase (i.e., borrowing) and then apply to all purchases outstanding under the facility.
  - Flexibility introduced in the timing of SRF reviews and in the release of associated SRF drawings—used for Brazil’s IMF-supported arrangement—was considered a valuable innovation and could be used, on a case-by-case basis, for future SRF arrangements.
  - Some Directors raised issues for further review as additional experience was gained, including ways of involving the private sector.
- SRF charging and repayment terms (from Box 10 content):
  - Financing committed for up to 1 year.
  - Repurchases are expected to be made within 1 to 1!/2 years, and must be made within 2 to 2!/2 years, from the date of each purchase.
  - For the first year, the rate of charge on SRF financing is subject to a surcharge of 300 basis points above the usual rate of charge on other IMF loans; the surcharge then increases by 50 basis points every six months until it reaches 500 basis points.
- CCL creation and purpose:
  - In April 1999, the Board endorsed the creation of Contingent Credit Lines to provide short-term financing—if the need arises—to help members with fundamentally sound and well-managed economies overcome exceptional balance of payments financing needs arising from a sudden and disruptive loss of market confidence owing to contagion.
  - The Interim Committee at its April 1999 meeting called the CCL an important component of efforts to strengthen the architecture of the international financial system.
- Key distinctions between SRF and CCL (from Box 10):
  - SRF: for members already in the midst of a crisis.
  - CCL: preventive measure solely for members concerned with potential vulnerability to contagion but not facing a crisis at the time of the commitment.
  - Eligibility for CCL: confined to members implementing policies considered unlikely to give rise to a need to use IMF resources; whose economic performance—and progress in adhering to relevant internationally accepted standards—has been assessed positively by the IMF in the latest Article IV consultation and thereafter; and who have constructive relations with private sector creditors to facilitate private sector involvement.
  - Resources committed under a CCL can be activated only if the Board determines that exceptional balance of payments financing needs faced by a member have arisen owing to contagion.
  - CCL commitments are expected to range from 300 percent to 500 percent of the member’s quota.
  - The maturity of and rate of charge on CCL resources are the same as for SRF resources.
- Directors’ views on broader CCL implementation:
  - The CCL was agreed to be provided for a two-year period (as of April 1999).

### Assistance to Postconflict Countries
- 1995 policy expansion: emergency assistance policy coverage expanded to include postconflict countries to help meet special economic needs arising from political turmoil, civil unrest, or international armed conflict.
- Components of emergency assistance: technical assistance, policy advice, and quick disbursement of limited financial assistance.
- April 1999 Board discussion outcomes:
  - Ways to enhance assistance by providing financial assistance on terms more appropriate to poor, postconflict countries, and in larger amounts over a longer period when warranted.
  - Emphasis that new IMF measures must be supportive of stronger and coordinated international community efforts to ensure maintenance of peace and assist in orderly transition to stabilization and high-quality growth.
- Measures to reduce costs and improve access:
  - Directors agreed to give further consideration to seeking interest subsidies from bilateral donors on a case-by-case basis, or in the context of establishing an administered account, to reduce the cost of using IMF emergency assistance for poor, postconflict countries.
  - Directors agreed to permit early replacement of the IMF’s nonconcessional general resources provided under emergency postconflict assistance with resources provided under the concessional ESAF for low-income countries when the member was in a position to obtain ESAF support for its economic program.
  - For postconflict countries that take longer than expected to move to an IMF arrangement with upper credit tranche conditionality, Directors agreed access of up to an additional 25 percent of quota in the form of outright purchases could be provided when there was sufficient evidence of the authorities’ commitment to reform and capacity to implement appropriate policies.

### Postconflict Countries with Arrears to International Institutions
- IMF collaborative approach to members with overdue obligations has succeeded in preventing new cases of protracted arrears and resolving most cases.
- Challenges and conditional actions:
  - Special efforts to accelerate IMF financial assistance in arrears cases pose difficulties relative to the IMF’s arrears strategy and could raise moral hazard and creditor-status issues if not carefully circumscribed.
  - Directors agreed that, in the pre-arrears clearance stage, the IMF could consider, on a case-by-case basis, relaxing its calls for payments as a test of cooperation provided the member was judged to be cooperating on policies and that all other multilaterals to which the member was in arrears took at least comparable action.
  - Emphasis that a solid track record, determined flexibly in light of each country’s circumstances, remained essential for arrears clearance.
  - Arrears clearance plans to be developed based on individual circumstances and coordinated with other creditors.
  - In the absence of concessional financing, arrears could likely be cleared through a bridge to a new arrangement in the IMF’s (nonconcessional) General Resources Account (GRA).
  - The idea of the IMF matching rescheduling operations of the Paris Club or other creditor groups was considered inconsistent with the monetary character of the IMF.
  - In exceptional cases, the IMF might consider using Articles of Agreement provisions relating to postponement of repurchases, or payment of GRA charges in domestic currency, or both, assessed case by case in light of financing requirements and possibilities at the time of arrears clearance.
  - For some heavily indebted postconflict countries, arrears clearance and resumption of net financing flows may not result in sustainable debt-service positions; in such cases, following a satisfactory track record under a follow-on arrangement, debt to the IMF and other creditors could be subject to action under the HIPC Initiative.

### IMF Financial Facilities and Policies (Box 10 — catalog of facilities and key terms)
- General description:
  - IMF financing is provided through both its general resources and its concessional financing facility.
  - Extension of IMF credit is subject to Executive Board approval and, in most cases, to the member’s commitment to address causes of its payments imbalance.
  - Members “purchase” other members’ currencies or SDRs by using an equivalent amount of their own currency; IMF levies charges and members must “repurchase” their own currency within a specified time.
- Regular facilities and key terms:
  - Reserve Tranche:
    - A member may draw up to the full amount of its reserve tranche position at any time, subject only to the member’s representation of a balance of payments need.
    - A reserve tranche drawing does not constitute a use of IMF credit and is not subject to charges or to an expectation or obligation to repurchase.
  - Credit Tranches:
    - First credit tranche: 25 percent of a member’s quota; members must demonstrate reasonable efforts to overcome balance of payments difficulties.
    - Upper credit tranches: any segment above 25 percent of quota; drawings made in installments and released when performance targets are met; normally associated with Stand-By or Extended Arrangements.
  - Stand-By Arrangements:
    - Give members the right to draw up to a specified amount during a prescribed period.
    - Drawings normally phased on a quarterly basis, conditional on meeting performance criteria and periodic reviews.
    - Typically range from 12 to 18 months (can extend up to three years).
    - Repayments made within 3!/4 to 5 years of each drawing.
  - Extended Fund Facility (EFF):
    - Designed for longer periods and generally larger amounts than Stand-By Arrangements.
    - Extended Arrangements normally run for three years (can be extended for a fourth).
    - Repayments made within 4!/2 to 10 years of each drawing.
- Concessional facility — ESAF:
  - Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF):
    - Established in 1987 and extended and enlarged in February 1994.
    - Principal means for highly concessional loans to low-income members facing protracted balance of payments problems.
    - Eligible members must develop a three-year policy framework paper (PFP) with IMF and World Bank staff assistance.
    - ESAF loans disbursed semiannually; repaid in 10 equal semiannual installments beginning 5!/2 years and ending 10 years after disbursement.
    - Interest rate on ESAF loans is 0.5 percent a year.
- Special facilities (additional notes from Box 10):
  - Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF): compensatory element for temporary shortfalls in export earnings or excess cereal import costs; contingency element helps members with IMF arrangements cope with unexpected adverse external shocks.
  - Buffer Stock Financing Facility (BSFF): helps finance contributions to approved international buffer stocks; no drawings since January 1984.
  - Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF): described in earlier subsection.
  - Contingent Credit Lines (CCL): described in earlier subsection; commitments expected to range from 300 percent to 500 percent of quota; maturity and rate of charge same as SRF resources.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-flagship-issues/external/pubs/ft/ar/1999/pdf/_file4pdf.pdf*

### Box 5.)

### Box 5.) Other Forms of Financial Assistance

### Support for Currency Stabilization Funds
- In 1995 the IMF decided to provide financial support for the establishment of currency stabilization funds to bolster confidence in countries’ exchange-rate-based stabilization strategies—preferably an exchange rate peg with relatively narrow margins or a preannounced crawl.
- Preconditions: countries’ economic policies must be sufficiently tight so that inflation would be compatible with the targeted exchange rate anchor, implying little use of the currency stabilization fund for exchange market intervention.
- Implementation status: So far, the IMF has not actually provided this type of assistance.

### Emergency Financing Mechanism (EFM)
- Purpose: a set of procedures allowing quick Board approval of IMF financial support while ensuring sufficient conditionality.
- Intended use: rare circumstances representing or threatening a crisis in a member’s external accounts requiring an immediate IMF response.
- Establishment and use:
  - The EFM was established in September 1995.
  - It was used in 1997 for the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea, and in 1998 for Russia.

### Emergency Assistance (natural disaster and postconflict)
- Natural disaster assistance:
  - Provided through outright purchases, usually limited to 25 percent of quota.
  - Conditional on the member cooperating with the IMF to find a solution to its balance of payments problem.
  - In most cases, followed by an arrangement with the IMF under one of its regular facilities.
- Postconflict assistance (policy expanded in 1995):
  - Eligibility conditions:
    - Member’s institutional or administrative capacity disrupted by conflict but still has sufficient capacity for planning and policy implementation and a demonstrated commitment on the part of the authorities;
    - There is an urgent balance of payments need;
    - IMF support could be catalytic and is part of a concerted international effort.
  - Conditions for assistance include:
    - A statement of economic policies;
    - A quantified macroeconomic framework to the extent possible;
    - A statement of the authorities’ intention to move as soon as possible to an upper credit tranche Stand-By or Extended Arrangement or to an ESAF Arrangement.
  - Conditionality is tailored to the individual country situation and to rebuilding the country’s administrative and institutional capacity.

### Access limits, quota increase, and related facilities
- At the Eleventh General Review, the Board decided in January 1999 to maintain the access limits in the credit tranches and under the EFF constant in proportion to the new quotas, implying an increase of some 45 percent in average access in SDR terms.
- Directors looked forward to a more fundamental review of access policy at a later date.
- Regarding the Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF) and the Buffer Stock Financing Facility (BSFF), a majority of Directors were willing to reduce the access limits in percent of quota to keep them broadly unchanged in SDR terms on average, pending a more thorough review later in the year.
- Regarding access limits and norms for the ESAF:
  - All Directors recognized the importance of providing additional resources to the IMF’s poorest members.
  - Most Directors felt access limits and norms for the ESAF would need to be reduced in percent of quota, thus remaining broadly unchanged in SDR terms on average, since the resources of the ESAF Trust would not increase when the quota increase went into effect.

### Staff-Monitored Programs
- Role: an important and flexible tool for providing intensive policy advice outside the context of an IMF-supported arrangement; a means of informal surveillance whereby IMF staff monitor a country’s economic program and regularly discuss progress with the authorities—with no formal IMF endorsement.
- Rationale and purposes noted by Directors:
  - Serve as a kind of extended prior action for members seeking to establish, or reestablish, a policy track record;
  - A vehicle to maintain a particularly close dialogue between the member country and the IMF, including after the completion of an IMF-supported arrangement;
  - A means to signal to official creditors and donors and financial markets a member’s commitment to credible and sound macroeconomic policies.
- Board discussion and guidance:
  - In August 1998, the Executive Board discussed a framework drafted by staff and reiterated broad support for the concept.
  - Directors raised concerns including delineating different types of staff-monitored programs, maintaining a minimum standard across countries and categories, transparency, and the degree of Board involvement.
  - Directors asked staff to propose a guidance note for internal use setting out a framework for informal monitoring by staff, taking into account Board views.
  - In December 1998, Directors considered a preliminary version of the note and underscored broad support for continuing such informal staff monitoring.

### Social Issues
- The IMF has for well over a decade addressed the social dimensions of economic policies in its dialogue with members, providing advice on social safety nets, equity aspects of overall economic policy, and the composition of public spending—focusing on reallocating expenditure from unproductive to growth-enhancing outlays.
- Emphasis in low-income member programs:
  - ESAF-supported programs give significant attention to social issues.
  - Countries entering into an ESAF Arrangement may be asked to tackle poverty through faster economic growth and by improving delivery and targeting of basic health, education, and social safety net services.
  - To mitigate impact of subsidy cuts on the poorest, ESAF-supported programs often suggest protecting or even increasing budgetary expenditure on essential social services.
- Role in crisis contexts:
  - Creation and strengthening of social safety nets to cushion the adverse impact of the crisis on the poor is recognized by the Board as essential in the Asian crisis countries of Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand.
  - The Executive Board has welcomed ongoing improvements in targeting of social expenditure and increased efforts of the World Bank.
- Three ways the IMF endeavored to bring focus and momentum to improving equity:
  - by ensuring that a social agenda is defined;
  - by collaborating with governments and other agencies—in particular, the World Bank—in preparing a policy framework that ensures coherence among a country’s economic and social objectives; and
  - by strongly encouraging the International Labor Organization’s tripartite approach—involving representatives of workers and employers along with governments—when endorsing major changes in economic policy.
- Reflecting concern with social issues, the IMF held a conference in June 1998 on economic policy and equity.

### Economic Impact of the Kosovo Crisis
- On April 23, 1999, the Board discussed a preliminary assessment of the regional economic cost of the Kosovo crisis and the external financing needs of the affected countries in the vicinity prepared jointly by the staffs of

*Source: Box 5.) Other Forms of Financial Assistance (excerpt) from the IMF Annual Report 1999.*

### Box 11

### Box 11

### Conference overview
- The IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department hosted a conference on economic policy and equity on June 8 and 9, 1998.
- The conference brought together a wide range of academics, senior policymakers, labor representatives, and religious leaders to discuss the social dimensions of economic reforms.
- In his opening remarks, First Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer noted that equity issues were of concern to the IMF because, as a matter of social justice, all members of society should share the benefits of economic growth.
- Since it organized a conference in 1995 on income distribution and sustainable growth, the IMF has continued to help countries incorporate social safety nets into their IMF-supported programs and curb unproductive spending (such as excessive military expenditure) while increasing their public expenditure on basic needs, such as basic health care and primary education.
- The IMF has increased its emphasis on second-generation structural reforms, such as strengthening the rule of law, dismantling monopolies, and reforming labor markets, so that the benefits of growth are widely distributed.
- The IMF staff has carried out country-specific studies on poverty and income distribution, with the objective of integrating the results into IMF policy advice to countries.
- The staff is improving its collection of data on social expenditure in member countries, and the results of the external evaluation of ESAF programs are being incorporated into the IMF’s operational work.
- Mr. Fischer said that the IMF had been particularly mindful of the social dimensions of reforms when designing, with members, IMF-supported programs in Asia.
- The conference proceedings have been published as Economic Policy and Equity, ed. by Vito Tanzi, Ke-young Chu, and Sanjeev Gupta (Washington: IMF, 1999).

### Seminar consensus points (four sessions and a roundtable)
- Sound macroeconomic policies are necessary to promote equity over the medium and long term. The pursuit of equity need not hamper economic growth and might reinforce it.
- Equity is a multidimensional concept that goes beyond income distribution to include equitable distribution of opportunity, wealth, productive assets, and consumption, as well as availability of employment opportunities. There is no single index of poverty nor one best policy prescription to address all equity concerns.
- Policymakers should focus on improving the prospects of the least fortunate by reducing poverty and social exclusion. The best way to do so is to empower them, for example, through improved access to education, health services, credit, and justice. At the same time, cost-effective and well-targeted social safety nets are essential to shelter the most vulnerable.
- Governments should strive to improve public services to enhance equity and build wider ownership ofand support for reforms. This requires making the tax system more efficient and fair to generate resources for empowerment initiatives and safety nets, especially in countries with inefficient bureaucracies and relatively high levels of corruption. In these countries, the benefits of social safety nets tend to be captured primarily by the urban middle class.
- In heavily indebted poor countries, debt forgiveness would provide resources for increasing outlays on basic education, primary health, and basic infrastructure.
- Technological change has played more of a role than globalization in the growing disparity between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers, in both industrial and developing countries.
- Social norms play an important role in determining how much inequality is acceptable in a society. Governments should engage civil society in the design and implementation of policies that help improve equity. Also, dialogue within government, between different ministries, should be improved, as should communication between the IMF, the World Bank, and other international institutions.
- The IMF should continue addressing equity issues when it conducts its core activities.

### Operational implications and IMF actions highlighted
- Continued incorporation of social safety nets into IMF-supported programs.
- Efforts to curb unproductive spending (such as excessive military expenditure) and increase public expenditure on basic needs, including basic health care and primary education.
- Greater emphasis on second-generation structural reforms: strengthening the rule of law, dismantling monopolies, and reforming labor markets.
- Country-specific studies on poverty and income distribution to integrate findings into IMF policy advice.
- Improved collection of data on social expenditure in member countries.
- Incorporation of the results of the external evaluation of ESAF programs into IMF operational work.
- Special attention to social dimensions when designing IMF-supported programs in Asia.

### Closing commitment
- Mr. Fischer concluded the conference by promising that the IMF would carefully examine how best to incorporate the seminar participants’ ideas and contributions into its operational work.

*Source: Box 11, Conference on Economic Policy and Equity (IMF).*

### 2.5 percent over the two years, and a narrowing of the

### _file4pdf - 2.5 percent over the two years, and a narrowing of the

### Overview of macroeconomic projections (selected passages)
- External current account deficit narrowed to 10.2 percent of GDP in 1999.
- Primary budget surplus targets: 0.8 percent in 1998 and 0.5 percent in 1999.
- Revenue-to-GDP ratio targets: 13 percent of GDP in 1998 and 12.5 percent of GDP in 1999.
- Estimated revenue losses from customs duty cuts: 0.3 percent of GDP in 1998 and 1 percent in 1999.

### Policy directions (general)
- Expenditure policy: remain prudent with a gradual increase in the share of spending for health and education.
- Structural reforms focus:
  - expand privatization;
  - strengthen farmers’ organizations;
  - continue withdrawal of the public sector from rice marketing;
  - reinforce the role of farmers’ cooperatives in the cotton sector;
  - open up new cotton regions to private operators.
- Civil service reforms:
  - create a merit-based promotion system;
  - strengthen personnel training;
  - improve governance and responsiveness of the civil service.
- Social goals:
  - increase primary school enrollment rates;
  - increase vaccination rates;
  - increase number of health centers meeting minimum operating standards.

### Cameroon
- Financial Support:
  - IMF approved a second annual ESAF Arrangement for SDR 54.04 million ($74 million) on September 18, 1998.
- Program Objectives:
  - restore external and internal viability;
  - steer the economy onto a sustainable growth path;
  - substantially reduce poverty.
  - Targets for 1998/99–2000/01: average annual GDP growth of at least 5 percent, inflation less than 2 percent, external current account deficit stabilized to less than 2!/2percent of GDP.
- Policies:
  - continue macroeconomic policies and reinforce structural reforms to enhance external competitiveness and build economic and social infrastructure;
  - focus on increasing public and private investment and raising domestic tax revenue base;
  - key budgetary objectives: raise non-oil revenue to 13 percent of GDP and contain overall budget deficit to 2.7 percent of GDP;
  - structural reforms: privatization or placement under private management of the majority of public enterprise sector assets, focus on agro industry, public utilities, petroleum, transport, and financial sectors;
  - social objectives: improve living standards through poverty-reduction programs and sustained growth, emphasis on primary health care and education, ensure access to clean drinking water and generic drugs;
  - improve management and transparency of the expenditure process to meet budgetary priorities for social sectors and infrastructure.

### Central African Republic
- Financial Support:
  - IMF approved a three-year ESAF Arrangement for SDR49.4 million ($66 million) on July 20, 1998.
- Program Objectives:
  - maintain average real GDP growth of about 5 percent a year;
  - stabilize inflation at about 2!/2percent a year;
  - contain external current account deficit at 5 percent of GDP by 2000.
- Policies:
  - improve fiscal position through tighter tax policy implementation and greater transparency;
  - strengthen institutional capacity and macroeconomic management;
  - fiscal consolidation: reduction of the overall fiscal deficit by about 2 percentage points of GDP during 1998–2000 to 4.6 percent of GDP through improved revenue collection;
  - expenditure measures: contain the wage bill and nonpriority outlays to ensure resources for social spending and infrastructure investment;
  - structural measures: privatization, banking and financial sector reform, revamping legal and regulatory framework, resumption of civil service reform;
  - social measures: raise school enrollment and literacy rates and increase supply and quality of health care.

### Republic of Congo
- Financial Support:
  - IMF approved a request for purchase of SDR 7.24 million ($10 million) under emergency postconflict assistance on July 15, 1998.
- Program Objectives:
  - resume non-oil economic growth;
  - lower inflation;
  - reduce external current account deficit as a ratio of GDP;
  - regularize external arrears;
  - projected primary fiscal balance: 11.9 percent of GDP in 1998, as against 6.4 percent in 1997.
- Policies:
  - step up collection of oil revenues and improve non-oil revenue collection by implementing 1998 budget tax measures;
  - prudent wage policy and strict adherence to expenditure priorities and control procedures;
  - structural reforms: institution building, rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure, restructure and privatize commercial banks, prepare privatization of public enterprises, open key sectors to competition, pursue civil service reform;
  - short-term emergency priorities: health and education, reform social security system.

### Djibouti
- Financial Support:
  - IMF approved an extension of Djibouti’s Stand-By Arrangement through end-March 1999 and augmented arrangement by SDR 1.65 million to SDR 8.25 million ($11 million) on June 1, 1998.
- Program Objectives:
  - reduce fiscal imbalances;
  - remain current on external obligations;
  - reduce domestic arrears in an orderly fashion.
- Policies:
  - reduce the wage bill, strengthen expenditure control, and improve program monitoring;
  - pursue structural reforms including diagnosis of nine major public enterprises for restructuring, privatization, or liquidation to improve competitiveness.

### Dominican Republic
- Financial Support:
  - IMF approved emergency assistance for SDR 39.7 million ($56 million) on October 29, 1998) to aid recovery from Hurricane Georges and support economic adjustment program.
- Program Objectives:
  - achieve sustained increase in real GDP;
  - reduce inflation;
  - increase international reserves;
  - gradually reduce quasi-fiscal losses;
  - eliminate domestic arrears.

### El Salvador
- Financial Support:
  - IMF approved a 17-month Stand-By Arrangement for SDR 37.68 million ($52 million) on September 23, 1998 (authorities intended to treat as precautionary).
- Program Objectives:
  - maintain sustainable high growth while containing inflation to that of trading partners in context of fixed exchange rate;
  - achieve GDP growth of 4 percent in 1998 and 4.5 percent in 1999;
  - contain inflation to 3.5 percent in 1998 and 3 percent in 1999;
  - increase net international reserves to equivalent of seven months of imports.
- Policies:
  - fiscal program: increase overall deficit of nonfinancial public sector from about 2 percent of GDP in 1997 to less than 3 percent of GDP a year in 1998–99 (reflecting wage bill increase after wage freeze since July 1995);
  - tax revenue to increase via economic recovery and improved tax administration;
  - compensate revenue shortfalls with expenditure cuts;
  - structural reforms: public sector and pension reform, privatization of sugar mill and Mortgage Bank, strengthen bank supervision and prudential regulations, improve monetary policy instruments, lower import tariffs;
  - social strategy: use interest on privatization proceeds to provide permanent revenue source for social expenditure.

### Ethiopia
- Financial Support:
  - IMF approved a second annual ESAF arrangement for SDR29.5 million ($42 million) on October 23, 1998.
- Program Objectives:
  - within medium-term strategy, increase GDP growth to between 8 percent and 9.4 percent;
  - hold inflation to less than 4 percent;
  - contain external current account deficit excluding official transfers at about 8 percent of GDP.
- Policies:
  - external current account deficit projected to remain at about 8–8.5 percent of GDP due to growing imports and weak coffee export prospects;
  - private sector investment expected to increase over medium term because of regulatory and infrastructure improvements;
  - structural reforms: financial sector reforms, trade liberalization, strengthen legal and regulatory framework, raise health and education standards;
  - other reforms: environmental protection and poverty alleviation through rural development.

### The Gambia
- Financial Support:
  - IMF approved a three-year ESAF Arrangement for SDR20.6 million ($27 million) on June 29, 1998.
- Program Objectives:
  - achieve real GDP growth of 4.5–5 percent a year;
  - hold inflation to about 3 percent a year;
  - reduce external current account deficit (excluding official transfers) to less than 10 percent of GDP by 2000;
  - keep gross official reserves above equivalent of five months of imports.
- Policies:
  - raise domestic investment to 20.7 percent of GDP in 2000 from 17.2 percent in 1997;
  - increase savings to 11.4 percent of GDP by 2000;
  - fiscal policy: reduce overall budget deficit excluding grants to 4.5 percent of GDP in 1998 and to 2 percent by 2000;
  - external tariff reform: reduce maximum duty rate to 25 percent in July 1998 and to 20 percent in 1999;
  - structural reforms: modernize legal environment, improve public services quality, normalize financial relations with public enterprise sector, resume divestiture of public enterprises, reform telecommunications and energy sectors, rehabilitate groundnut sector, simplify regulatory framework, improve primary and secondary markets, strengthen banking soundness;
  - social/environmental strategy: develop human resources, alleviate poverty, improve management of natural resources, raise enrollment rates in basic education, improve delivery and access to primary and secondary health services.

### Georgia
- Financial Support:
  - IMF approved a third annual ESAF arrangement for SDR55.5 million ($74 million) on July 27, 1998.
- Program Objectives (medium term):
  - consolidate macroeconomic stabilization gains;
  - achieve greater external viability;
  - accelerate structural reforms;
  - keep economy on sustainable growth path while strengthening social safety net.
  - 1998 targets: GDP growth of 10 percent, reduce inflation to 6 percent, increase gross official reserves to equivalent of 2.3 months of imports.
- Policies:
  - overall fiscal deficit to narrow to 2.9 percent of GDP in 1998 from about 4.2 percent of GDP in 1997 on a cash basis (figures revised later owing to reclassification of privatization proceeds from revenue to financing);
  - eliminate expenditure arrears by end-December 1998;
  - prudent monetary and credit policies;
  - structural policies: urban and industrial land privatization, faster privatization of medium- and large-scale enterprises, removal of trade restrictions, restructuring of electricity sector, strengthen banks' prudential regulations;
  - social objective: alleviate poverty by eliminating arrears on wages, pensions, and social transfers and increasing spending on health and education.

### Guyana
- Financial Support:
  - IMF approved a three-year ESAF arrangement for SDR53.76 million ($71 million) on July 15, 1998.
- Program Objectives:
  - achieve satisfactory growth with low inflation, stronger balance of payments, and robust exit from debt-rescheduling after HIPC assistance;
  - achieve average real GDP growth of about 4 percent a year for 1998–01;
  - limit average inflation to about 4!/4 percent for the period;
  - narrow current account deficit while maintaining gross international reserves at equivalent of four to five months of imports.
- Policies:
  - emphasize reducing fiscal deficit, tightening credit policy, achieving more flexible exchange rate policy, continue structural reforms;
  - new revenue measures: upward adjustment of fees and charges for government services, increase taxes on tobacco and related products, strengthen tax administration;
  - central government expenditure to be reduced by 1!/2percent of GDP in 1998 due to lower interest payments and cuts in nonpriority capital expenditures;
  - structural reforms: reduce public sector role, create environment for private-sector development, reform financial sector, improve business environment, restructure public enterprises, reform civil service;
  - social measures: emphasize health and education, well-targeted poverty-reduction programs, manage natural resources, improve urban areas.

### Haiti
- Financial Support:
  - IMF approved emergency financial assistance of SDR15.2 million ($21 million) on November 30, 1998 to assist relief and rehabilitation from Hurricane Georges, in addition to support under an ESAF Arrangement approved in October 1996.
- Program Objectives:
  - maintain prudent macroeconomic policies and progress structural reforms while dealing with Hurricane Georges damage;
  - program based on 2 percent output growth aimed to keep inflation at about 8 percent;
  - maintain adequate official international reserves while earmarking 0.8 percent of GDP of public spending for hurricane relief and reconstruction.
- Policies:
  - fiscal discipline while providing reconstruction expenditures;
  - revenue measures: strengthen tax and customs administration and tighten administration of tax exemptions;
  - expenditure measures: limit government spending to revenue collection and programmed financing, restrict ministerial discretionary accounts, phase in civil service wage increases, tighten hiring procedures, restrict low-priority capital outlays unrelated to hurricane damage.

### Honduras
- Financial Support:
  - IMF approved SDR47.5 million ($66 million) in emergency financial assistance on December 7, 1998 to assist recovery from Hurricane Mitch and support recovery program;
  - IMF approved a three-year ESAF Arrangement for SDR 156.75 million ($215 million) on March 26, 1999.
- Program Objectives:
  - achieve rapid, sustained recovery and address social needs exacerbated by Hurricane Mitch;
  - bring growth recovery to about 5 or 6 percent a year by 2000–01 after expected decline in real GDP by 2 to 3 percent in 1999;
  - reduce 12-month inflation rate to 13–14 percent by December 1999 and to 8 percent by end of 2001;
  - maintain international reserve position equivalent to 3!/2to 4 months of imports;
  - program projected marked widening of combined public sector deficit in 1999 to about 8!/2percent of GDP, to be financed almost entirely by concessional loans and debt relief;
  - IMF, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank staffs began comprehensive reassessment of debt situation and prospects for debt relief in context of HIPC.
- Policies:
  - continue reforms to stimulate private investment and growth, increase public sector savings to meet social needs medium-term, strengthen financial system;
  - public sector measures: transfer control of telephone company to private partner, conclude privatization of electricity distribution network, grant management concessions for public works and airports to private sector;
  - civil service reform: eliminate duplication/overlap among institutions and reclassify positions.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-flagship-issues/external/pubs/ft/ar/1999/pdf/_file4pdf.pdf*

### Box 12

### Box 12

### IMF engagement and missions
- In November 1998, IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus visited Nicaragua, Honduras, and other Central American countries affected by Hurricane Mitch.
- He met with government officials; business, labor, and religious leaders; community groups; and non-governmental organizations.
- In Nicaragua, discussions focused on developing a national consensus for a reconstruction program.
- In Honduras, the Managing Director assured the authorities that the IMF and its staff were committed to supporting the country in its recovery from the crisis.

### Emergency financial assistance and approvals
- On December 7, the Executive Board approved an SDR47.5 million ($66 million) assistance package for Honduras under the IMF’s emergency assistance policy to support the government’s economic recovery program and associated relief and rehabilitation efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch.
- On February 12, 1999, the Board completed Nicaragua’s review under the first annual ESAF Arrangement and approved an augmentation of resources of SDR 48 million ($66 million) (equal to 50 percent of Nicaragua’s quota) to help cover additional financing needs resulting from the hurricane.
- On March 26, 1999, the IMF approved a three-year ESAF Arrangement for Honduras for SDR 156.8 million ($215 million) to support the government’s economic program for 1999–01.

### Coordination with other multilateral institutions and donors
- In November 1998, the IMF, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank agreed to undertake with the governments of Honduras and Nicaragua a comprehensive assessment of their external debt situation and related requirements for debt relief.
- The institutions also ensured that debt-service payments of these countries would not impede the reconstruction and recovery efforts.
- In December 1998, the Managing Director participated in a meeting of the Consultative Group for the Reconstruction and Transformation of Central America, held in Washington, with objectives to:
  - bring donors up-to-date on estimates of the extent of the damage to the affected countries and on the progress being made in emergency relief and reconstruction;
  - seek initial commitments of assistance on the basis of preliminary estimates of the countries’ priority needs and financing requirements.
- Work was to continue, with more definitive estimates of needs and firm commitments on donor assistance to be presented at a follow-up Consultative Group meeting in Stockholm in May 1999.

*Source: _file4pdf - Box 12*

### 3.3 percent in 1997. Increased domestic savings, sup-

### Support for Member Countries’ Adjustment

### Country Programs and Financial Support (selected cases)
- Armenia: Increased domestic savings, supported by strong fiscal adjustment and combined with steady net foreign financing, would facilitate an increase in investment to 13 percent of GDP in 2001 from 7 percent in 1997.
- Tanzania:
  - Financial Support: On February 8, 1999, the IMF approved a third annual ESAF Arrangement for SDR58.76 million ($82 million).
  - Program objectives (1998/99–2000/01): achieve real GDP growth of at least 4 percent in 1998/99, rising to 6 percent in 2001; reduce annual inflation to 7.5 percent in 1998/99 and further to about 4 percent in 2001; build gross international reserves to four months of imports of goods and services by June 2000, and maintain that level thereafter; achieve an external current account deficit that is sustainable in terms of external assistance and long-term private inflows.
  - Policies: fiscal policy to increase health and education expenditure and improve physical infrastructure while maintaining a stance allowing adequate growth in credit to the private sector; priority on restructuring and privatizing public utilities (telecommunications, water and sewerage); continued financial sector reform to foster competition, narrow spreads, and strengthen mobilization/allocation of financial resources; increase social sector spending within medium-term plans; develop plans for substantial transfer of responsibilities to local authorities.
- Uganda:
  - Financial Support: On November 11, 1998, the IMF approved a second annual ESAF Arrangement for SDR 33.5 million ($46 million).
  - Program objectives: average real growth of 7 percent a year, contain inflation at 5 percent, maintain gross international reserves at about five months of imports of goods and nonfactor services; overall fiscal deficit excluding grants to increase to 6.7 percent of GDP during 1998/99 and decline to 6.0 percent by 2000/01; fiscal revenue to rise to 12.1 percent of GDP in 1998/99 from 11.4 percent in 1997/98 and to 13 percent of GDP by 2000/01.
  - Policies: revenue increases via tax and customs administration improvements and additional revenue measures (including combating smuggling and enforcing penalties for tax evasion); address expenditure control weaknesses, domestic arrears, payroll management, pension reform, and public utility restructuring; deepen financial sector reforms (bank supervision, prudential enforcement); shift public expenditures toward social programs and priorities.
- Ukraine:
  - Financial Support: On September 4, 1998, the IMF approved a three-year EFF Arrangement for SDR 1.65 billion ($2.2 billion).
  - Program objectives: achieve 4 percent growth in GDP by 2001; reduce inflation to 7 percent by 2001; raise gross international reserves to the equivalent of seven weeks of import cover in 2001.
  - Policies: tighter fiscal policies, debt restructuring, adoption of a new and wider exchange rate band; fiscal measures including a 10 percentage point reduction in payroll taxes, public administration reform, scaling down subsidy programs; maintain tight monetary policy to control inflation; structural reforms: strengthen fiscal/monetary institutions, reduce government size, privatization, deregulation, administrative reforms, energy and agricultural sector reforms; social efforts to rationalize and streamline social protection, improve targeting, eliminate most budgetary privileges, strengthen pension system.
- Uruguay:
  - Financial Support: On March 29, 1999, the IMF approved a 12-month Stand-By Arrangement for SDR70 million ($95 million); government treats it as precautionary and does not intend to draw.
  - Program objectives: bring 12-month inflation down to around 5 percent by year’s end; hold contraction in real GDP to about 1 percent.
  - Policies: maintain fiscal discipline through reduction of current expenditures and public investment outlays; transfer infrastructure investment to private sector, partial privatization, joint ventures; broaden investment instruments for private pension funds; reduce armed forces personnel; pass bankruptcy, factoring/discounting, and receivables market laws; Bank of the Republic to extend contract with private consultant to continue reforms.
- Republic of Yemen:
  - Financial Support: On March 23, 1999, the IMF approved a second annual ESAF arrangement for SDR88 million ($120 million).
  - Program objectives: focus on financial discipline and market-oriented reforms to encourage private non-oil sector growth while protecting health and education expenditure and social safety net outlays; reduce the external current account deficit by about 2.5 percent of GDP; aim at an inflation rate of about 9 percent, including effects of increases in wheat and flour prices; increase budget expenditure on social needs from less than 7 percent of GDP in 1997 to close to 12 percent over the medium term.
  - Policies: deepen civil service reforms; income tax and sales tax reform; strengthen bank supervision; customs reform; privatization of public enterprises; elimination of import bans; pension and judicial reform; increase provision and targeting of social assistance through Social Welfare Fund to mitigate subsidy cuts.
- Zambia:
  - Financial Support: On March 25, 1999, the IMF approved a three-year ESAF arrangement for SDR254.5 million ($349 million).
  - Program objectives: achieve real GDP growth of 4 percent, reduce inflation to 15 percent, strengthen gross reserves to the equivalent of 1!/2 months of imports, reduce overall budget deficit to 3 percent of GDP.
  - Policies: increase revenue yield !/2 of 1 percentage point of GDP in 1999; control public wage bill; increase public investment; increase total revenue and grants to 28 percent of GDP; control broad money growth; privatization (including ZCCM), divestiture of large state-owned enterprises in non-mining sector, tendering railway concessions, management rights for National Airports Corporation; public service workforce reduction of 7,000 employees via retrenchment, natural attrition, and hiving off institutions; reorient public expenditure toward health and education to alleviate poverty.
- Zimbabwe:
  - Financial Support: On June 1, 1998, the IMF approved a 13-month Stand-By Arrangement for SDR130.65 million ($174.5 million), of which SDR39.2 million was available immediately.
  - Program objectives: ensure exchange rate depreciation substantially improves competitiveness through fiscal consolidation and monetary restraint; reduce budget deficit excluding grants and privatization proceeds to 5.5 percent of GDP.
  - Policies: reduce stock of domestic debt to enable Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to tighten domestic credit and build foreign reserves without constraining bank credit to private sector; accelerate privatization (expected proceeds almost 2 percent of GDP in 1998); pursue land reform and redistribution in an orderly and transparent manner to protect agricultural output and welfare of workers; protect vulnerable populations by raising allocations for social spending.

### HIPC Initiative: Rationale and Status as of April 1999
- Objective: help countries with good track records achieve overall external debt sustainability with participation of all external creditors.
- Status as of April 1999:
  - Executive Boards reviewed eligibility of 12 heavily indebted poor countries; work under way on others.
  - Seven countries had qualified for debt relief, and three others were expected to follow.
  - Debt relief committed to the seven qualified countries: $6 billion in nominal terms ($3 billion in 1998 net present value terms).
  - Assistance released for two countries: Uganda and Bolivia.
- Concerns in 1998/99: Initiative had not provided adequate debt relief for some poor countries; calls for strengthening the Initiative from NGOs, religious groups, media, international organizations, and governments.

### HIPC Implementation Progress and Modifications
- Board decisions and operational changes:
  - Extended initial two-year entry period into Initiative from end-September 1998 until end-2000 (one-time extension).
  - Amended the ESAF-HIPC Trust Instrument to allow consideration of performance under emergency assistance programs for postconflict countries as part of first-stage track record.
  - Countries’ eligibility and committed assistance might be reassessed where policy implementation problems cause protracted delays to completion point; option to return to beginning of second stage to be decided by IMF and World Bank Executive Boards in such cases.
- First and second stage features (summary from Initiative diagram):
  - First Stage: Paris Club flow rescheduling on Naples terms (up to 67 percent NPV reduction on eligible maturities) and comparable treatment by other creditors; multilateral adjustment support; establish first three-year track record (performance prior to start can be counted).
  - Decision Point: Paris Club stock-of-debt operation on Naples terms judged insufficient to achieve sustainability by completion point; country requests additional support; IMF and World Bank determine eligibility.
  - Second Stage: coordinated creditor action; deeper Paris Club stock-of-debt reduction up to 80 percent in present value terms; comparable treatment by other creditors; multilateral institutions reduce NPV of claims taking into account other assistance and preferred creditor status; country establishes second track record.
  - Completion Point: coordinated actions completed; country exits with sustainable debt position.

### Options for Enhancing the HIPC Initiative (Board discussions)
- Principles agreed in joint World Bank–IMF statement:
  - Debt relief should reinforce policy-based and project lending and donor assistance, promoting sustainable development and poverty reduction.
  - Debt relief should strengthen incentives for debtor countries to adopt strong adjustment and reform programs.
  - Enhanced debt relief should focus on poorer countries where excessive debt is a severe development obstacle.
  - Debt relief should provide a clear, irrevocable exit from unsustainable debt with appropriate cushion against external shocks and remove debt overhangs.
  - Enhanced debt relief should be provided to all members who qualify under revised thresholds, including those that already reached decision/completion points.
  - Implementation should be simplified and more transparent, and proposals for enhanced relief should be accompanied by proposals on financing major multilateral creditors' contributions.
- Board discussion areas: depth, breadth, timing of debt relief, and related policy conditionality.
- Some Directors expressed interest in considering lower NPV-of-debt-to-exports target of 150 percent and NPV-of-debt-to-fiscal-revenue target of 250 percent for deepest poverty cases or exceptional performers.
- Views on track record timing:
  - Some supported shortening performance track record to three years.
  - Others favored maintaining current flexibility and generally not shortening track record to ensure time for structural reforms.
- Interim assistance: several Directors supported consideration of interim assistance by IMF, World Bank, and multilateral creditors ahead of completion point.
- Social linkages: Directors agreed debt relief could incentivize and resource poverty reduction and social development; further work to tighten linkage in Phase 2 of the 1999 review, led by World Bank expertise.
- External actions: many Directors urged larger official development assistance flows targeting HIPCs that implemented strong policies and reinvigoration of trade liberalization to improve market access for HIPC exports.

### HIPC Costing, Review Process, and Financing
- IMF and World Bank prepared a technical note (April 1999) on estimated costs of proposals for changes; material posted for public feedback with objective to reach decisions for endorsement at fall 1999 Annual Meetings.
- Interim Committee (April 1999) encouraged Executive Boards to develop specific proposals to strengthen HIPC that enhance debt relief while reinforcing incentives for adjustment, reform, and good governance.
- Financing concerns:
  - Estimated financing requirement for ESAF-HIPC Trust on “as-needed” basis: SDR 2.9 billion ($3.9 billion) using revised baseline cost for HIPC Initiative.
  - By end-April 1999, six members (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands) indicated they would provide additional SDR 1.6 billion ($2.2 billion) in loan resources for ESAF Trust.
  - On April 28, 1999, NAB participants decided one-third of surcharge on Brazil’s outstanding SRF purchases be transferred to ESAF-HIPC Trust.
  - Directors noted many pledged contributions remained conditional; delays in financing caused significant forgone income; stressed need for appropriate burden sharing and additional contributions from developed countries.

### Distilling Lessons from ESAF Evaluations and ESAF Program Design
- ESAF disbursements as of April 30, 1999: SDR 7.2 billion ($9.7 billion) under 81 ESAF arrangements for 51 countries; predecessor SAF disbursements: SDR 1.8 billion ($2.4 billion) under 38 arrangements for 37 countries.
- Evaluations (staff and external) led Directors to endorse proposals to improve ESAF program design and implementation.
- Key aspects emphasized for ESAF-supported programs:
  - Target substantial increases in national saving over three-year ESAF arrangements; higher public saving rates should lead given slow short-run private saving responses.
  - Quality of fiscal adjustment as important as quantity; balance revenue increases and expenditure savings considering efficiency and distributive aspects; shift toward less distortionary broad-based consumption taxes (e.g., VAT) and simple income/profit taxes; facilitate tariff cuts with customs improvements.
  - Improve quality and composition of public spending; protect and, in most cases, increase productive spending on health, education, and basic infrastructure; social safety nets more prominent; generate savings via civil service and public enterprise reform and cuts in unproductive spending.
  - Achievement and maintenance of single-digit inflation should be central; fiscal restraint prerequisite; consider effective nominal anchors (exchange rate pegs, money ceilings, inflation targets) with caution where countries are vulnerable to external shocks and identify exit strategies.
  - Address remaining structural weaknesses with attention to sequencing; prioritize reforms that stimulate private investment and entrepreneurship; further trade liberalization including regional dimensions; streamline regulatory and legal frameworks; establish sound banking system and privatize public enterprises; improve data on banking sector and public enterprises and incorporate fiscal costs of restructuring early.
  - External viability analysis should use indicators based on exports, GDP, and revenues and broader coverage of external obligations including private external debt monitoring.

### Implementation, Ownership, Monitoring, and Social Policies in ESAF Programs
- Implementation lessons:
  - Programs must be well-designed and consistently implemented; national ownership greatly improves sustained implementation prospects.
  - IMF staff should help authorities build national consensus by explaining program content and rationale; resident representatives to engage more with civil society; publication of Policy Framework Papers and Letters of Intent encouraged.
  - Staff missions should have flexibility to agree alternative policy mixes consistent with program objectives, with scope defined in advance.
  - Encourage inclusion of other relevant ministries in discussions of structural/sectoral policies and interministerial consultations on measures’ impacts.
  - IMF should more frequently seek prior actions where structural reforms are fundamental; staff reports requesting ESAF support should assess environment for implementation (technical capacity, technical assistance needs and plans, potential roadblocks, efforts to build consensus).
- Social policies:
  - Conduct social impact assessments during program design; incorporate protective measures for the poor; monitor social impact during implementation.
  - Pay attention to real levels of social spending (nominal spending and relative price of social services) and poverty alleviation.
  - IMF to rely on World Bank expertise for social assessments and welcomed six “pilot” country cases: Cameroon, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Tajikistan, Vietnam, Zimbabwe to demonstrate closer IMF–World Bank collaboration.
  - Recognized data inadequacies but expected gradual improvement.

### IMF–World Bank Collaboration and Program Monitoring
- Collaboration priorities:
  - More effective joint work on public enterprise and banking sector reforms to ensure early reform of enterprises posing fiscal risk and to identify bank restructuring costs for macroeconomic frameworks.
  - Coordinate technical assistance across IMF, World Bank, and other agencies to meet country timetables and build institutional capacity.
  - Assess absorptive capacity for higher aid inflows in countries with macro stability and policies promoting domestic saving to consider increased access to official financing from ESAF, World Bank, and bilateral donors; create conditions for private capital inflows through open markets and transparent regulatory/legal systems.
  - Maintain delineation of responsibilities between IMF and World Bank staffs while allowing flexibility in pilot cases; IMF retains ultimate responsibility for ESAF program content before the Executive Board.
- Monitoring:
  - Endorsed more intensive program monitoring where helpful; amended ESAF Trust Instrument to permit semiannual performance criteria, reviews, and disbursements for all ESAF Arrangements and possible quarterly monitoring in exceptional cases.
  - Extension of IMF general resource operational guidelines to ESAF Arrangements approved after amendment date; amendment approved in November 1998.

### Technical Assistance and Training
- Technical assistance described as the “third leg” of IMF work alongside surveillance and financial assistance.
- 1998/99: technical assistance activity represented about 15 percent of IMF’s total administrative expenditures.
- Delivery: IMF departments supplying assistance include Fiscal Affairs, Monetary and Exchange Affairs, Statistics, IMF Institute, Legal, Policy Development and Review, Bureau of Computing Services; assistance delivered by IMF staff, experts, and short- and long-term advisors.
- Focus areas: monetary and fiscal macroeconomic management, statistics, financial law, social security reform, IMF financial organization and operations, information technology.
- IMF Institute programs:
  - Headquarters: basic, intermediate, and advanced courses on financial programming and policies; shorter courses on exchange rate policies and monetary/inflation targeting; high-level seminar on trade reform and regional integration in Africa.
  - Overseas: focus on formulation and implementation of economic adjustment programs.
- Technical Assistance Committee coordinates priorities and policies and advises management.
- Emphasis: strengthen governance, human resource and institutional capacities for economic management to reduce long-run need for IMF financing and improve surveillance dialogue.
- Preventive vs. remedial focus: limited resources require much assistance be directed at immediate problem solving and supporting implementation of IMF-supported reforms.

*Italic source attribution line.*

### Box 13

### Box 13 IMF Institute and Regional Institutions

### Overview
- Globalization increased both the quantity and complexity of member countries’ demand for IMF technical assistance and training.
- The IMF Institute adopted a strategy to deliver a quality program responsive to an expanding clientele, with four program components described below.
- The IMF quantifies technical assistance in units of “person-years” of services provided. An effective person-year of technical assistance is 260 days.

### IMF Institute program components
- (1) Strengthening traditional training at headquarters
  - Standard courses: financial analysis and programming; specialized courses in macroeconomic statistics, public finance, and monetary and exchange operations.
  - Introduced a three-tier system for junior, mid-level, and senior officials.
  - Trimmed schedule of longer Washington courses to introduce one- to two-week intensive advanced courses on current issues for high-level officials.
- (2) In-house training for IMF economists
  - Expanded in 1996 to keep IMF economists at the forefront of the profession.
  - Courses featured prominent academics, well-known outside policy experts, and cutting-edge researchers.
- (3) Collaborative arrangements and regional partner institutions
  - Increased reliance on partners to provide overseas training to strengthen institutional capacity.
  - Joint Vienna Institute (JVI) established in 1992; curriculum revised for the region in 1999 and beyond.
  - Joint Africa Institute (JAI) established in 1999 in Côte d’Ivoire in equal partnership with the African Development Bank and the World Bank.
  - Participation in training activities of COFEB, BEAC, MEFMI, WAIFEM.
  - IMF-Singapore Regional Training Institute (STI) established in 1998; collaboration with SEACEN.
  - Joint Regional Training Program (RTP) established in 1999 in Abu Dhabi with the Arab Monetary Fund.
  - Continued lecturing assistance and cooperation with CEMLA, the Islamic Development Bank (since 1994), and the Asian Development Bank (since 1995).
- (4) Distance learning and information access
  - Expanded use of video conferencing and CD-ROMs.
  - Introduced two distance-learning courses: one on financial programming and policies and another on introductory macroeconomics.
  - Set up a website to increase access to information regarding Institute course offerings (see http://www.institute.imf.org).
- Forward priorities stated:
  - Continue to adapt current communication technologies for distance learning.
  - Rely more on regional training efforts.
  - Strengthen internal training to ensure IMF economists remain at the forefront of analytical and policy thinking.

### Technical assistance delivery: volumes, regional shifts, and modalities
- Annual volume of IMF technical assistance in the past few years: about 300 person-years, compared with about 130 person-years in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
- Regional distribution shifts since the mid-1990s:
  - The two IMF European Departments (EUI and EUII) absorbed approximately 40 percent of technical assistance resources in the mid-1990s; this proportion fell to 23 percent in 1998/99.
  - The share of Asian and Pacific countries rose to 20 percent, reflecting increased demand in the context of the Asian financial crisis.
- Application in postcrisis countries:
  - Practice arose of preparing large-scale, integrated, multiyear technical assistance programs cofinanced with other donors for countries emerging from crises.
  - Programs implemented or being implemented in Albania, Angola, Cambodia, Haiti, Lebanon, Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, and Yemen; plans under way for Nigeria.
  - Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Center in Fiji (PFTAC) provides technical assistance to 15 countries in the Pacific area with financing from UNDP, the Asian Development Bank, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Forum.
  - Regional approaches to delivery have been developed where appropriate.

### Donor financing and external resources
- Japan was the single largest source of external financing for IMF-provided technical assistance in 1998/99 and responded flexibly to demands arising from the Asian crisis.
- The Framework Administered Account for Technical Assistance Activities (established by the IMF in 1995) attracted contributions from Australia, France, Japan (for a scholarship program), Switzerland, and Denmark.
- Other donor arrangements:
  - Sweden and Norway supported UNDP projects for which the IMF is the executing agency.
  - The United Kingdom, the European Union, and the Inter-American Development Bank agreed to coordinate technical assistance cofinancing arrangements with the IMF.
  - Several developing country members have used proceeds from World Bank loans and credits to finance IMF-provided technical assistance.
- External financing statistics for 1998/99:
  - In 1998/99, about 30 percent of the IMF’s total technical assistance and training activities were financed from external sources.
  - Two-thirds of the experts the IMF recruited to serve in member countries in 1998/99 were financed from external sources.
  - It is hoped that this level of external financing can be maintained in a time of growing austerity among donors.

### Key statistics from Table 6: Technical Assistance Delivery (Effective person-years)
- Total technical assistance resources by year:
  - 1995/96: 309.0
  - 1996/97: 277.0
  - 1997/98: 285.7
  - 1998/99: 301.7 (Estimated)
- IMF technical assistance resources by category (1995/96, 1996/97, 1997/98, 1998/99):
  - Staff: 108.6; 97.1; 103.9; 98.9
  - Headquarters-based consultants: 23.5; 20.1; 20.8; 21.2
  - Experts: 79.3; 55.5; 64.9; 81.6
- External technical assistance resources by source (1995/96, 1996/97, 1997/98, 1998/99):
  - United Nations Development Program: 25.0; 21.5; 24.4; 14.4
  - Japan: 65.0; 67.3; 55.6; 70.9
  - Other: 7.5; 15.4; 16.2; 15.0
- Total resources by department (1995/96, 1996/97, 1997/98, 1998/99):
  - Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department: 137.3; 114.6; 110.6; 120.8
  - Fiscal Affairs Department: 99.8; 96.2; 98.8; 101.7
  - Statistics Department: 39.2; 36.6; 39.0; 38.9
  - IMF Institute: 14.0; 11.0; 12.1; 15.4
  - Legal Department: 11.0; 9.3; 10.3; 10.7
  - Other: 7.7; 9.3; 14.9; 14.3
  - Total regional use by department: 280.1; 251.0; 258.7; 274.9
- Regional use (1995/96, 1996/97, 1997/98, 1998/99):
  - African Department: 62.4; 54.4; 65.8; 72.2
  - Asia and Pacific Department: n.a.; 49.0; 42.5; 58.1
  - Central Asia Department: 27.5; n.a.; n.a.; n.a.
  - Southeast Asia and Pacific Department: 25.0; n.a.; n.a.; n.a.
  - European I Department: 24.4; 22.5; 23.8; 22.4
  - European II Department: 73.5; 57.6; 52.6; 47.1
  - Middle Eastern Department: 23.4; 26.5; 29.5; 32.5
  - Western Hemisphere Department: 32.3; 31.2; 35.2; 32.1
  - Interregional: 11.7; 9.6; 8.6; 8.8
  - Nonregional use: 28.9; 26.1; 26.9; 27.7
  - Total technical assistance use: 309.0; 277.0; 285.7; 301.7
- Notes from Table 6:
  - 1 An effective person-year of technical assistance is 260 days.
  - 2 Estimated.
  - 3 “Other” includes the Policy Development and Review Department, Bureau of Computing Services, and Technical Assistance Secretariat.
  - 4 Effective January 1, 1997, the Central Asia and Southeast Asia and Pacific Departments were merged into a single Asia and Pacific Department.

### Oversight and evaluation
- During 1998/99, the IMF’s Office of Internal Audit and Inspection undertook a review of the IMF’s technical assistance program, examining its effectiveness, focus, and delivery modalities.
- The Board and management will consider recommendations made in the review during 1999/2000.

*Box 13 IMF Institute and Regional Institutions*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-flagship-issues/external/pubs/ft/ar/1999/pdf/_file4pdf.pdf_
