## _061407a - Introduction

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---

### Purpose and scope
- Provides background material to the Board paper on “Aid Inflows—The Role of the Fund and Operational Issues for Program Design.”
- Draws operational implications for program design of increased and volatile aid inflows based on:
  - Selected case studies (Annex I).
  - A review of program conditionality (Annex II).
  - Findings on recent developments in official donor assistance (ODA) and meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Annex III).

### Conditionality review: coverage and methodology
- Coverage:
  - Includes quantitative fiscal and monetary targets and associated adjusters in:
    - The first annual programs of 26 arrangements immediately following establishment of the PRGF (“first generation programs”).
    - All 34 of the current or most recent PRGF-supported programs or Policy Support Instruments (PSIs) (“second generation programs”), including all successors to first generation programs (Annex II).
- Data sources:
  - Recent programs: latest published staff report on the use of Fund resources (UFR).
  - Predecessors: program design at time of request of the first UFR staff report following PRGF establishment.
- Purpose of generational comparison:
  - Enables comparative-static analysis of gradual changes in program design over time for the 26 cases with programs in 1999/2000 and 2005/06.

### Case studies: focus and analytical approach
- Focus:
  - Reviews Fund-supported program design since 1999 with emphasis on aid-related issues (Annex I).
- Key topics addressed:
  - Accuracy of aid projections.
  - Implementation of a “spend-and-absorb” approach to aid.
  - Management of aid volatility.
  - Expenditure management issues.
  - Concerns related to debt sustainability and competitiveness.
- Quantitative assessment approach:
  - Degree of spending and absorption of higher (or lower) aid assessed largely by comparing changes in programmed aid with changes in spending, current account balances, and reserves.
  - Limitation noted: approach does not systematically incorporate impacts of other shocks (e.g., terms of trade); discussed in IMF (2005).

### Definition of aid concepts used
- “Fiscal aid” — defined as budgetary grants plus net foreign financing of the budget.
- “Balance of payments aid” — includes grants and concessional loans outside the budget, as well as interim HIPC debt relief in the form of flow rescheduling.
- Distinction between grants and loans acknowledged as crucial for debt sustainability, but this review focuses on macroeconomic management of aid rather than the grants/loans split.
- Flow impact of debt relief is largely excluded, mainly due to data limitations.

### Aid and growth: literature and interpretation
- Two broad strands summarized:
  - Conditional effects literature:
    - Finds aid has little unconditional effect on growth but can have positive effects conditional on factors such as fiscal, monetary, and trade policies; export price shocks; climatic shocks; institutional quality; warfare; authoritarianism; and economic freedom.
    - Example cited: Burnside and Dollar (2000).
  - Unconditional nonlinear effects literature:
    - Finds aid can influence growth in a nonlinear manner with diminishing returns.
    - Examples cited: Hadjimichael et al. (1995); Dunbarry et al. (1998); Lensink and White (2001); Dalgaard and Hansen (2000); Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001); Clement, Radelet and Bhavani (2004).
- Ongoing debate and robustness concerns:
  - Roodman (2003) and Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004) find interaction coefficients often sensitive to influential observations and not robust.
  - Rajan and Subramanian (2005a, 2005b) find little evidence that aid affects growth conditionally and argue that aid can adversely affect recipient competitiveness.

### Observations from case studies on macroeconomic outcomes
- Inflation and competitiveness concerns frequently influenced policy discussions and program design.
- Instances where inflation increased notably following spending of higher aid include:
  - Mozambique (2002)
  - Burundi (2003)
  - Rwanda (2004)
- Case studies also show episodes dominated by nonaid shocks.

### Case study countries: Macroeconomic Outcomes and Aid, 2000–05 (key indicators reproduced exactly)
- Table heading: Case Study Countries: Macroeconomic Outcomes and Aid, 2000–05
- Subheading: (In percent)
- Inflation
  - Burundi: 249-111813
  - Ethiopia: 6-5-715 9 7
  - Ghana: 253315271315
  - Madagascar: 11716-11418
  - Mozambique: 1391713136
  - Nicaragua: 10546910
  - Rwanda: 4327129
  - Tanzania: 655444
  - Uganda: 65-2658
  - Zambia: 262222211818
- GDP growth
  - Burundi: -124-151
  - Ethiopia: 681-41310
  - Ghana: 445566
  - Madagascar: 56-131055
  - Mozambique: 2138878
  - Nicaragua: 431354
  - Rwanda: 679146
  - Tanzania: 567677
  - Uganda: 557467
  - Zambia: 4535.15.45.2
- (National Currency per U.S. dollar) Exchange rate (nominal)
  - Burundi: 7218309311,0831,1011,075
  - Ethiopia: 889999
  - Ghana: 5,4557,1717,9338,6779,0059,073
  - Madagascar: 1,3571,3181,3181,2411,8712,006
  - Mozambique: 15,68920,70723,66623,78222,58023,061
  - Nicaragua: 131314151617
  - Rwanda: 393443476538575556
  - Tanzania: 8008769631,0391,0911,127
  - Uganda: 1,5111,7631,7551,8831,9351,738
  - Zambia: 3,1113,6084,3074,7344,7794,464
- (Index; 2000 = 100) Exchange rate (real effective)
  - Burundi: 1009682646471
  - Ethiopia: 1009187908591
  - Ghana: 10010110010099109
  - Madagascar: 1001121201068085
  - Mozambique: 1008790808385
  - Nicaragua: 10010197918988
  - Rwanda: 1009387737075
  - Tanzania: 10010091756866
  - Uganda: 1009793828589
  - Zambia: 100112111102108135
- (In percent of GDP) Aid
  - Burundi: 36111215
  - Ethiopia: 9141511
  - Ghana: 0112588
  - Madagascar: 66681510
  - Mozambique: 122018141310
  - Nicaragua: 1289101110
  - Rwanda: 111312101717
  - Tanzania: 569101110
  - Uganda: 55323
  - Zambia: 11912866
- Sources listed in the original: WEO; IMF country reports; and Fund staff estimates.

### Annex I — Selected country case-study findings and operational implications (high-level)
- Burundi
  - Programs allowed full spending of anticipated aid and accommodated aid volatility through target adjusters.
  - PRGF (2004–07) envisaged foreign exchange sales to control liquidity; competitiveness concerns did not materialize.
  - Inflation consolidated to single digits in 2004; growth picked up to 4.8 percent; 2005 growth close to 1 percent with increased inflationary pressures from droughts and higher petroleum prices.
  - Key debt indicators (2001): foreign debt stock 161 percent of GDP; accumulated stock of arrears 22 percent of GDP; scheduled debt service over 104 percent of exports; NPV of external debt estimated at 1800 percent of exports in 2004.
- Ethiopia
  - Under March 2001–October 2004 PRGF, external support initially used to stabilize the economy (not spent), later spending rose and then declined roughly in line with external assistance.
  - Adjusters: full adjustment for surpluses (with specified exceptions); partial adjustment (50 percent) for shortfalls up to caps ($20 million initially, later $50 million).
  - Aid disbursement history affected by delayed $150 million IDA credit (about 2.3 percent of GDP).
  - Reserves fell to 2.2 months of import cover in 1999/2000; some absorption in 2001/02; authorities chose to build reserves thereafter.
  - Drought 2002/03 raised inflation to 24 percent per annum in June 2003.
- Ghana
  - PRGF programs emphasized fiscal consolidation and building buffers; cautious approach limited spending/absorption of aid until 2006 when spend-and-absorb encouraged.
  - Projected aid (1999–2005): 4.7 6.8 6.8 5.3 3.8 3.6 7.6
  - Actual aid (1999–2005): 3.9 -0.4 10.7 1.5 5.3 8.3 7.8
  - Average swing in fiscal aid inflows during 1999–2005 more than 5 percent of GDP; forecast errors averaged 3.2 percent of GDP.
- Madagascar
  - Programs tracked external assistance closely since 2002; appeared to both spend and absorb aid, with spending exceeding absorption.
  - Projected aid (1999–2005): 7.4 8.6 8.4 8.9 7.9 13.0 10.1
  - Actual aid (1999–2005): 4.8 6.3 6.0 5.8 7.9 14.6 9.5
  - Aid over-projected 1999–2002 by average 2.6 percentage points of GDP; forecasts improved over time.
- Mozambique
  - PRGF1 (2000–03) designed to spend and absorb expected surge; PRGF2 focused on fiscal consolidation amid projected aid decline; later adopted explicit spend-and-absorb under scaling up.
  - During 2000–03 nonaid current account deterioration as percent of incremental aid close to 66 percent.
  - PRGF1: average real depreciation around 5.5 percent; nominal depreciation close to 13.3 percent.
- Nicaragua
  - Program strategy moved from no spending/partial absorption toward spend-and-absorb in later reviews; projected and actual aid (1999–2005; percent of GDP) provided as:
    - Projected aid: 9.9, 8.2, 7.7, 9.3, 10.4, 8.3, 7.6
    - Actual aid: 11.5, 8.4, 8.8, 9.5, 11.1, 9.7, 7.8
  - Programs aimed to raise international reserves to over three months of imports — goal never achieved.
- Rwanda
  - Shifted from limited aid-based spending toward spend-and-absorb in 2004; large aid increases since 2004 made fiscal-monetary coordination urgent.
  - Actual aid (2000–2005; percent of GDP): 11.3, 13.4, 12.2, 10.4, 16.5, 16.5
  - Projected aid (2000–2005; percent of GDP): 7.6, 6.0, 6.2, 16.9, 16.2, 13.8
  - Programs emphasized debt sustainability and required grant element at least 50 percent for some borrowing.
- Tanzania
  - Successive programs supported spend-and-absorb; aid fully spent, absorption lagged but rose in 2003–05; GDP growth averaged 6 percent from 2001 to 2005.
  - Program adjusters asymmetric: no adjustment for excess aid flows; allowed for larger NDF/NDA and lower NIR targets if aid shortfalls.
  - Shift from NDA to reserve money anchor encouraged foreign exchange sales to sterilize and increase absorption.
- Uganda
  - Net donor inflows rose from 8 percent of GDP a year in 1997/98 to peak 12 percent in 2003/04.
  - PAF expenditures tripled to about 6 percent of GDP; fiscal deficit excluding grants increased from 6½ percent to 10 percent of GDP.
  - Most aid not absorbed as authorities sterilized liquidity; reserve coverage improved by about one month of imports (equivalent to about 100 percent of reserve money).
- Zambia
  - PRGF programs focused on growth and inflation reduction; repeated aid shortfalls prompted above-program domestic financing and money growth; HIPC completion point in 2005; MDRI relief in 2006.
  - Reserves dropped to 1.3 months of imports in 2003; program targeted increase to 1.7 months by end-2006.
  - Real exchange rate movements driven more by terms of trade than aid; 2005 real appreciation pressured nontraditional exports.

### Annex II — Conditionality patterns (summary of findings)
- Annex II contains stylized tables of conditionality across PRGF programs with exact terminology preserved.
- Fiscal conditionality examples: "Ceiling", "Floor", specific expenditure items such as "Wages", "Wages and health spending", "Social Fund contributions", "Priority spending", "Domestic primary spending", "Poverty Action Fund".
- Monetary conditionality examples: RM (reserve money), NIR/NFA (net international reserves/net foreign assets), NDA (net domestic assets) with entries "Ceiling", "Floor", or "...".
- Adjustor and aid-type entries preserved verbatim, including: "All"; "Program support loans (excluding EU)"; "Program support and debt relief"; "Program support and HIPC debt relief"; "Program support (WB, IDB) and MDRI debt relief 6/".
- Effect on nonprogrammed aid rows use exact phrases: "Spend all", "Spend zero", "Spend up to cap", "Cut all", "Cut zero", "Cut above cap".

### Annex III — ODA trends, volatility, scaling-up, and MDG implications
- ODA trends, 2000–05:
  - Total official development assistance to all PRGF-eligible countries increased from $22.6 billion in 2000 to $47.7 billion in 2005.
  - Total ODA has remained below 32 percent of PRGF-country GDP since 2002.
  - Annual growth of total net ODA slowed from a peak of about 19 percent in 2002 to about 8 percent in 2004.
  - Excluding Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Tsunami aid—equivalent to $2.2 billion—net ODA flows to PRGF-eligible countries fell by more than 6 percent in 2005.
- Composition of ODA and debt forgiveness:
  - Almost 40 percent of the 2004 debt relief grants went to seven countries: Bolivia, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Madagascar, Nicaragua, and Senegal.
  - Almost 40 percent of the 2005 debt relief benefited Nigeria; the Republic of Congo received another 10 percent of the 2005 debt relief grants.
  - Net of debt forgiveness, grant disbursements to PRGF-eligible countries grew by 17 percent in 2005—the slowest rate since 2002.
  - Share of grant financing in total gross ODA financing excluding debt forgiveness rose from 57 percent in 2000 to 70 percent in 2005.
- Country-level changes and scaling-up:
  - Twelve countries (16 percent of all PRGF-eligible countries) received less aid in US$-terms in 2005 than in 2000: Armenia, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominica, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Saint Vincent, Timor Leste, Uzbekistan, and Vanuatu.
  - Aid flows more than doubled in 20 countries (about one quarter of PRGF-eligible countries) between 2000 and 2005: Afghanistan, Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Grenada, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Maldives, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.
  - Scaling-up defined as increase in aid by more than 5 percent of GDP.
  - Measured relative to GDP, aid flows were smaller in 2005 than in 2000 in 36 countries (almost 50 percent of PRGF-eligible countries).
  - Fifteen countries (less than 20 percent) saw scaling up of aid as a share of GDP between 2000 and 2005: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Grenada, Haiti, Kiribati, Madagascar, Maldives, Nigeria, Rwanda, Solomon Islands, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.
- Volatility of aid inflows:
  - Fluctuations in aid flows have generally been around 1–3 percent of GDP for many countries.
  - Volatility tends to be higher in smaller countries; Afghanistan, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo are outliers.
- Prospects and international initiatives:
  - Prospects for aid depend on implementation and donor support for HIPC Initiative, MDRI, and commitments to help meet the MDGs.
  - Bilateral donors and IFIs delivered $31 billion in HIPC assistance (end-2005 NPV terms) and $38 billion for MDRI debt relief (nominal terms) to date; additional resources will be required to ensure all identified HIPC countries could benefit from MDRI and HIPC Initiative relief.
- Progress toward the MDGs:
  - Proportion living on under $1 a day fell by an estimated 10 percent since the turn of the millennium.
  - Regional patterns: East and South Asia best record; Latin America growth too low for rapid poverty reduction despite recent upturn; Africa performed worst in aggregate with little change since 1990.
  - Human development MDGs progress uneven; South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa offtrack on all goals.
- Estimates of additional ODA needed:
  - World Bank and UN estimates suggest extra ODA on the order of $40–60 billion a year needed to meet the MDGs.
  - OECD estimates ODA from OECD DAC countries would rise by $50 billion in real terms between 2004 and 2010 under the Gleneagles 2005 commitment to double aid to Africa.

*Source: _061407a - Introduction.*

### Introduction............................................................................................................

### _061407a - Introduction............................................................................................................

### Purpose and scope
- Provides background material to the Board paper on “Aid Inflows—The Role of the Fund and Operational Issues for Program Design.”
- Draws operational implications for program design of increased and volatile aid inflows based on:
  - Selected case studies (Annex I).
  - A review of program conditionality (Annex II).
  - Findings on recent developments in official donor assistance (ODA) and meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Annex III).

### Conditionality review: coverage and methodology
- Includes quantitative fiscal and monetary targets and associated adjusters in:
  - The first annual programs of 26 arrangements immediately following establishment of the PRGF (“first generation programs”).
  - All 34 of the current or most recent PRGF-supported programs or Policy Support Instruments (PSIs) (“second generation programs”), including all successors to first generation programs (Annex II).
- Data sources:
  - Recent programs: latest published staff report on the use of Fund resources (UFR).
  - Predecessors: program design at time of request of the first UFR staff report following PRGF establishment.
- Purpose of generational comparison:
  - Enables comparative-static analysis of gradual changes in program design over time for the 26 cases with programs in 1999/2000 and 2005/06.

### Case studies: focus and analytical approach
- Case studies review Fund-supported program design since 1999 with emphasis on aid-related issues (Annex I).
- Key topics addressed:
  - Accuracy of aid projections.
  - Implementation of a “spend-and-absorb” approach to aid.
  - Management of aid volatility.
  - Expenditure management issues.
  - Concerns related to debt sustainability and competitiveness.
- Quantitative assessment approach:
  - Degree of spending and absorption of higher (or lower) aid is assessed largely by comparing changes in programmed aid with changes in spending, current account balances, and reserves.
  - Limitation noted: approach does not systematically incorporate impacts of other shocks (e.g., terms of trade); discussed in IMF (2005).

### Definition of aid concepts used
- “Fiscal aid” — defined as budgetary grants plus net foreign financing of the budget.
- “Balance of payments aid” — includes grants and concessional loans outside the budget, as well as interim HIPC debt relief in the form of flow rescheduling.
- Distinction between grants and loans acknowledged as crucial for debt sustainability, but this review focuses on macroeconomic management of aid rather than the grants/loans split.
- Flow impact of debt relief is largely excluded, mainly due to data limitations.

### Aid and growth: literature and interpretation
- Empirical literature on aid and growth shows considerable variation depending on methodology, time-horizon, and sample.
- Two broad strands summarized:
  - Conditional effects literature:
    - Finds aid has little unconditional effect on growth but can have positive effects conditional on factors such as fiscal, monetary, and trade policies; export price shocks; climatic shocks; institutional quality; warfare; authoritarianism; and economic freedom.
    - Example cited: Burnside and Dollar (2000).
  - Unconditional nonlinear effects literature:
    - Finds aid can influence growth in a nonlinear manner with diminishing returns.
    - Examples cited: Hadjimichael et al. (1995); Dunbarry et al. (1998); Lensink and White (2001); Dalgaard and Hansen (2000); Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001); Clement, Radelet and Bhavani (2004).
- Ongoing debate and robustness concerns:
  - Roodman (2003) and Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004) find interaction coefficients often sensitive to influential observations and not robust.
  - Rajan and Subramanian (2005a, 2005b) find little evidence that aid affects growth conditionally and argue that aid can adversely affect recipient competitiveness.

### Observations from case studies on macroeconomic outcomes
- Inflation and competitiveness concerns frequently influenced policy discussions and program design.
- Instances where inflation increased notably following spending of higher aid include:
  - Mozambique (2002)
  - Burundi (2003)
  - Rwanda (2004)
- Case studies also show episodes dominated by nonaid shocks.

### Case study countries: Macroeconomic Outcomes and Aid, 2000–05 (key indicators reproduced exactly)
- Table heading: Case Study Countries: Macroeconomic Outcomes and Aid, 2000–05
- Subheading: (In percent)
- Inflation
  - Burundi: 249-111813
  - Ethiopia: 6-5-715 9 7
  - Ghana: 253315271315
  - Madagascar: 11716-11418
  - Mozambique: 1391713136
  - Nicaragua: 10546910
  - Rwanda: 4327129
  - Tanzania: 655444
  - Uganda: 65-2658
  - Zambia: 262222211818
- GDP growth
  - Burundi: -124-151
  - Ethiopia: 681-41310
  - Ghana: 445566
  - Madagascar: 56-131055
  - Mozambique: 2138878
  - Nicaragua: 431354
  - Rwanda: 679146
  - Tanzania: 567677
  - Uganda: 557467
  - Zambia: 4535.15.45.2
- (National Currency per U.S. dollar) Exchange rate (nominal)
  - Burundi: 7218309311,0831,1011,075
  - Ethiopia: 889999
  - Ghana: 5,4557,1717,9338,6779,0059,073
  - Madagascar: 1,3571,3181,3181,2411,8712,006
  - Mozambique: 15,68920,70723,66623,78222,58023,061
  - Nicaragua: 131314151617
  - Rwanda: 393443476538575556
  - Tanzania: 8008769631,0391,0911,127
  - Uganda: 1,5111,7631,7551,8831,9351,738
  - Zambia: 3,1113,6084,3074,7344,7794,464
- (Index; 2000 = 100) Exchange rate (real effective)
  - Burundi: 1009682646471
  - Ethiopia: 1009187908591
  - Ghana: 10010110010099109
  - Madagascar: 1001121201068085
  - Mozambique: 1008790808385
  - Nicaragua: 10010197918988
  - Rwanda: 1009387737075
  - Tanzania: 10010091756866
  - Uganda: 1009793828589
  - Zambia: 100112111102108135
- (In percent of GDP) Aid
  - Burundi: 36111215
  - Ethiopia: 9141511
  - Ghana: 0112588
  - Madagascar: 66681510
  - Mozambique: 122018141310
  - Nicaragua: 1289101110
  - Rwanda: 111312101717
  - Tanzania: 569101110
  - Uganda: 55323
  - Zambia: 11912866
- Sources listed in the original: WEO; IMF country reports; and Fund staff estimates.

*Source: _061407a - Introduction.*

### Annex I. Case Studies of Fund Program Design and the Use of Aid (1999–2006)

### Annex I. Case Studies of Fund Program Design and the Use of Aid (1999–2006)

### A. Burundi — Summary and Key Issues
- Two Fund-supported programs allowed for the full spending of anticipated aid and accommodated aid volatility through target adjusters.
- The PRGF-supported program (2004–07) envisaged foreign exchange sales to control liquidity in light of sizeable aid inflows and thus provided the financing for a rapidly widening current account deficit.
- Competitiveness concerns did not materialize.
- Macroeconomic stability was consolidated and average inflation rate fell to single digit levels in 2004, while growth picked up to 4.8 percent.
- In 2005, real GDP growth was close to 1 percent and inflationary pressures increased due to droughts in the northern part of the country and higher petroleum prices.

### A. Burundi — Background
- Extended civil conflict and post-conflict transition to a democratically elected government in mid-2005.
- Ethnic tensions escalated to civil conflict in 1993; Arusha peace accord in August 2000; last rebel movement ceasefire agreement in September 2006.
- October 2001: Staff Monitored Program (SMP) to stabilize macroeconomic situation and facilitate donor assistance.
- October 2002: First of two successive programs under the Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) Facility.
- January 2004: Three-year PRGF arrangement approved.

### A. Burundi — Program Design
- PRGF conditionality specified:
  - Ceilings on net credit to the government from the banking sector.
  - Ceilings on net domestic assets (NDA) of the central bank (BRB).
  - Floor on the net foreign assets (NFA) of the BRB.
  - Ceiling on outstanding external payments arrears.
  - Zero ceilings on short-term external debt.
  - Small nonzero ceiling on foreign nonconcessional borrowing (Fbu 1.0 billion allowed for working credits from embassy suppliers).
- Aid-adjuster rules:
  - Symmetric 75-percent adjustment to ceilings on NDA and credit to government and to the floor on NFA for deviations from projected aid disbursement (initially).
  - From 2005 onward: symmetric 100-percent adjustment in case of aid deviations and zero ceiling on nonconcessional borrowing.
  - Grant element in concessional borrowing raised to 50 percent from the standard 35 percent.
  - 2006 program: ceiling on net credit from banking sector changed to a ceiling on net domestic financing.

### A. Burundi — Projected and Actual Aid
- 2002–04: Programs were conservative and under-predicted foreign assistance; actual aid disbursements exceeded program projections.
- 2005 and 2006 (estimates): actual aid disbursements fell short of programmed assistance.
  - 2005 shortfall largely reflected delayed World Bank disbursements.
  - 2006 shortfall reflected donor concerns over governance.

### A. Burundi — Fiscal Policy, Spending of Aid, and Debt Sustainability
- Fund-supported programs allowed full spending of anticipated aid and accommodated aid volatility through target adjusters.
- Debt relief obtained from the Paris Club in 2004 and through the HIPC Initiative in 2005 increased expected aid and allowed for higher spending.
- Actual aid flows in excess of program projections led to actual budget spending above program forecasts.
- Aid composition issues:
  - Budget support disbursements were significantly delayed in 2004–06.
  - Project grants were disbursed in excess of program projections, requiring higher domestic counterpart funding and contributing to higher-than-programmed deficit and bank financing outturns.
- 2007 program budget: nonpriority expenditure and disbursement assumptions back-loaded; spending of 0.5 percent of GDP contingent on confirmation of additional budget support.
- Debt indicators and concerns:
  - Foreign debt stock reached 161 percent of GDP in 2001.
  - Accumulated stock of arrears stood at 22 percent of GDP in 2001.
  - Scheduled debt service amounted to over 104 percent of exports in 2001.
  - Net present value (NPV) of external debt estimated at 1800 percent of exports in 2004.
  - Burundi reached HIPC decision point in August 2005; completion point expected at end-2007.

### A. Burundi — Monetary Policy and Aid Absorption
- Authorities liberalized current account transactions and lifted restrictions on foreign exchange operations.
- Exchange rate regime: managed floating; BRB intervenes to limit short-term exchange rate volatility and to reach reserve money-consistent international reserves target.
- Monetary operations: foreign exchange weekly auctions and liquidity auctions.
- PRGF envisaged continued foreign exchange sales to sterilize liquidity from sizeable aid inflows despite competitiveness concerns.
- Exchange rate and reserves outcomes:
  - Real effective exchange rate remained competitive through 2006.
  - 10 percent nominal appreciation of the currency against the U.S. dollar in 2005; exchange rate stabilized in early 2006.
  - Real effective exchange rate remained well below its 2000 level.
  - Current account excluding aid widened by almost 10 percentage points of GDP in 2005 over the previous year.
  - Gross official reserves increased to 2.9 months of imports in 2005 from 2.2 months of imports in 2004.
- Authorities and staff agreed main impediments to external competitiveness are structural; recommended reforms to liberalize the economy and reduce government intervention, especially in the coffee sector.
- Policy rationale: use of foreign exchange sales to sterilize high aid inflows deemed more appropriate than crowding-out private investment.

---

### B. Ethiopia — Summary and Key Issues
- Under the March 2001–October 2004 PRGF-supported program, the use of aid varied:
  - External support initially not spent but used to stabilize the economy by reducing a substantial deficit.
  - Spending increased subsequently and then declined somewhat, largely in line with external assistance.
- Program targets and adjusters generally precluded spending budget support surpluses and accommodated higher domestic financing for only a share of shortfalls.
- Authorities generally did not make full use of flexibility and consistently overperformed on fiscal and other program targets.
- Early in the program aid was partially absorbed, but authorities chose to accumulate reserves, contributing to a slight depreciation.
- Debt sustainability was a concern throughout and contributed to lower borrowing and a sharp shift toward grants.

### B. Ethiopia — Background
- End of hostilities with Eritrea in 2000:
  - Led to a sharp increase in external support for post-conflict demobilization and reconstruction project spending.
  - Allowed reorientation toward poverty-reducing spending and away from defense outlays.
- Agriculture accounts for about half of output; outcomes heavily affected by weather-related shocks and high growth volatility.
- Key macro outcomes:
  - Bumper crop contributed to 8 percent growth in 2001 and negative inflation in 2001 and 2002 (unexpectedly large food aid inflows also a factor).
  - Worst drought in nearly 20 years caused sharp slowdown in growth in 2002, negative growth in 2003, and inflation of 15 percent in 2003 following deflation of 7 percent in 2002.
  - Growth recovered sharply after the drought and inflation fell gradually.

### B. Ethiopia — Program Design
- Performance criteria included:
  - Floor on net foreign assets (NFA).
  - Ceiling on net domestic assets (NDA).
  - Ceiling on net domestic financing (NDF).
  - Zero ceilings on external payments arrears and nonconcessional external debt (less than 35 percent grant element), apart from some initial arrears.
- Adjuster rules for budget support:
  - Fully adjust for surpluses in budget support, with exceptions:
    - Initially for special programs related to post-conflict recovery up to $50 million.
    - Subsequently also for poverty-related spending up to $50 million.
  - Partially adjust for shortfalls: 50 percent of the shortfall, initially up to a cap of $20 million and subsequently up to a cap of $50 million.
    - $20 million represented about 0.3 percent of GDP.
    - $50 million represented about 0.6–0.8 percent of GDP.

### B. Ethiopia — Projected and Actual Aid
- Aid rose sharply in 2000/01 but disbursements fell far short of projections.
- Aid disbursements exceeded projections in 2001/02 and 2002/03.
- Aid again fell short of projections in 2003/04.
- A delayed $150 million IDA credit (about 2.3 percent of GDP) from 2000/01 to 2001/02 greatly affected outcomes.
- Spike in assistance for post-conflict recovery and subsequent fall complicated aid forecasting.

### B. Ethiopia — Fiscal Policy and the Spending of Aid
- Initial program objective: use higher external assistance to reduce fiscal deficit and domestic borrowing (after-grants deficit reached 11.5 percent of GDP in 2000/01, with domestic financing of 8.6 percent of GDP).
- Aid projections optimistic in 2000/01, but Ethiopia achieved a smaller after-grants deficit than programmed due to much lower spending.
- After initial fiscal stabilization, program generally allowed aid to be spent.
- Actual spending tracked external assistance:
  - Rose sharply in 2001/02, remained roughly at that level in 2002/03, and fell in 2003/04.
- Staff agreed to wider deficit targets for 2001/02 and 2002/03 given expected higher external assistance, but argued for narrower deficits in subsequent years.
- Outcomes:
  - Aid exceeded projections in 2001/02 and 2002/03; spending and deficit levels were somewhat above program forecasts.
  - Overperformance on revenue collection enabled Ethiopia to stay well below performance criteria limiting net domestic financing.
  - Ethiopia overperformed on net domestic financing throughout the program and did not use the full fiscal flexibility allowed.
  - After initial stabilization, aid increases were partially spent in 2001/02 and more than spent in 2002/03; spending fell somewhat more than the decrease in aid in 2003/04.
- Staff emphasis increased on debt sustainability, limiting domestic borrowing, and macro challenges/risks of scaling up and aid-dependence.

### B. Ethiopia — Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies and the Absorption of Aid
- Reserves fell to 2.2 months of import cover in 1999/2000; program initially sought to build reserves, so only a small amount of the aid increase was absorbed in 2000/01.
- Shocks in 2001 and 2002 (slower world growth, lower coffee prices) worsened external outlook; reserve targets were lowered and access augmented by about $17 million (10 percent of quota).
- Program envisioned some widening of the current account deficit, particularly in 2003/04, following larger-than-expected aid inflows in 2001/02 and 2002/03.
- Outcomes on reserves and absorption:
  - Some absorption in 2001/02, but current account deficit remained essentially flat thereafter despite changes in aid.
  - Authorities chose to build reserves even after coverage improved to close to four months of imports at end-2002/03.
  - Ethiopia consistently overperformed on the program’s net foreign assets performance criteria.
- Exchange rate and competitiveness:
  - Despite substantial aid inflows, the birr depreciated slightly in nominal and real terms over the program period; competitiveness not considered a problem.
  - Exchange rate regime liberalized and characterized as a managed float by end of program period.
  - De facto regime appeared to be a very slow crawling peg to the U.S. dollar (the birr depreciated by only).

*Annex I. Case Studies of Fund Program Design and the Use of Aid (1999–2006)*

### 5.5 percent in nominal terms between 1999/2000 and 2003/04). Somewhat surprisingly,

### 5.5 percent in nominal terms between 1999/2000 and 2003/04). Somewhat surprisingly,

### Inflation, food prices, and domestic credit (Ethiopia)
- Inflation was not a key concern as broad money growth had been contained with a relatively low level of domestic credit growth.
- A fall in food prices limited inflation and real exchange rate pressures, except during the severe drought in 2002/03 when inflation reached 24 percent per annum in June 2003.

### Debt sustainability and response to the 2002/03 drought (Ethiopia)
- Debt Sustainability: debt sustainability was a concern throughout the program and contributed to lower IDA lending beginning in 2002/03 and a marked shift toward grants.
- Staff recommended seeking grants to cover a sizeable food security spending plan following the 2002 and 2003 droughts given the high level of domestic debt; staff also suggested that use of foreign exchange reserves might be considered if grants were not forthcoming.
- Standard debt-related conditionality was used.

*Italicized figures/graphics referenced: Ethiopia: Aid, Spending, and CA Deficit, 1999/2000–03/04 (In percent of GDP); Ethiopia: Change in Aid, Spending and CA Deficit, 2000/01–03/04 (In percent of GDP).*

### Ghana — Summary and key issues
- Two PRGF-supported programs since 1999.
- Programs stressed fiscal consolidation, later anchored by domestic debt reduction targets, and building buffers against external shocks.
- Cautious approach limited spending and absorbing of aid; partly a response to high aid volatility during 1999–2003.
- Since 2006, the PRGF-supported program has encouraged a spending and absorbing approach.

### Ghana — Background and macro outcomes
- Real GDP growth: more than 6 percent (since 2003).
- Inflation: steadily reduced (since 2003).
- Real exchange rate: started to appreciate, reflecting in part increased foreign aid inflows.
- Note: IMF (2005) identified Ghana as an example where incremental aid inflows were neither absorbed nor spent.

### Ghana — Program design and conditionality
- Main fiscal target: ceiling on net domestic financing of the central government, supplemented by a floor on the primary surplus (later changed to an indicative target).
- Monetary framework: standard NDA/NIR framework with RM as indicative target after NDA replaced RM as a performance criterion (PC) during the third review of the 1999–2002 program.
- NDF and NIR targets were to be adjusted in both directions in response to higher or lower program support (with caps); adjustors removed in mid-2006.

### Ghana — Projected and actual fiscal aid (1999–2005)
- Projected aid: 4.7 6.8 6.8 5.3 3.8 3.6 7.6
- Actual aid: 3.9 -0.4 10.7 1.5 5.3 8.3 7.8
- The average swing in fiscal aid inflows during 1999–2005 was more than 5 percent of GDP.
- Forecast errors reached as high as 7.2 percent of GDP in 2000 and averaged 3.2 percent of GDP for the whole period.

### Ghana — Fiscal policy and treatment of aid
- 2003–06 PRGF program adopted an ambitious domestic debt reduction plan calling for halving Ghana’s domestic debt stock from the end-2002 level of about 29 percent of GDP.
- Most foreign aid was programmed to be saved rather than spent; 20 percent of HIPC Initiative assistance was earmarked for domestic debt reduction.
- Program adjustors precluded spending or absorbing excess aid inflows because such disbursements would lead to higher NIR and lower NDF targets.
- Actual behavior: in 2001 an aid surge of more than 11 percent of GDP led to an increase in the fiscal deficit (before grant) of only about 4 percent of GDP; during 2002–04 the fiscal balance was little changed despite steadily increasing aid.

### Ghana — Monetary, exchange rate policy, and aid absorption
- Objective: improve international reserve cover (below one month of imports at end-2000).
- Absorption of aid inflows limited; increases in aid in 2001 and 2003 did not lead to a similar worsening of the nonaid current account balance.
- Central bank behavior: consistent overperformance on NIR targets, above-target inflation, and a very stable cedis/dollar exchange rate suggest resistance to appreciation pressures and partial sterilization of reserve money impact from domestic debt repayments.
- Exchange rate: following massive depreciation in 2000, nominal exchange rate against the U.S. dollar continued to depreciate at a slow pace; REER remained broadly stable.
- Debt sustainability: zero-ceiling on medium- to long-term nonconcessional external borrowing throughout program periods; required grant element to be excluded from this ceiling was 35 percent; separate nonzero ceiling on short-term external debt stock.

### Madagascar — Summary and key issues
- Fund-supported programs (ESAF/PRGF through 2000; PRGF 2001–2005) tracked external assistance closely since 2002.
- Madagascar appears to have both spent and absorbed aid, although spending exceeded absorption.
- Program design initially restrictive of using additional aid; aid forecasts were consistently optimistic from 1999–2002 and only exceeded by actual amounts in 2004.
- Programs emphasized lowering very high initial debt levels through HIPC and MDR Initiatives and stressed restrained borrowing and close monitoring following debt relief.

### Madagascar — Background and macro and social context
- Very low per capita income: $282 in 2005.
- Revenue collection: 7–12 percent of GDP over 1999–2005.
- From 1999–2005, grants and loans averaged nearly 8 percent of GDP per year, peaking at 14.6 percent of GDP in 2004.
- External shocks: multiple cyclones (three in 2000, two in 2004), a 60 percent drop in the terms of trade between 2002 and 2006, political turmoil in 2002 causing real output contraction of 13 percent.

### Madagascar — Program design and performance criteria
- PCs included: floor on net foreign assets (NFA); ceiling on net domestic assets (NDA); ceiling on net domestic financing (NDF); floor on tax revenue; zero ceilings on domestic arrears, external arrears, and nonconcessional external debt (minimum 35 percent grant element).
- Adjusters and targets revised over time; 2006 PRGF more accommodating:
  - Caps NFA, NDA, and NDF adjustments for budget support shortfall at SDR 15 million.
  - Allows surpluses of up to SDR 15 million to be used.

### Madagascar — Projected and actual fiscal aid, 1999–2005
- Projected: 7.4 8.6 8.4 8.9 7.9 13.0 10.1
- Actual: 4.8 6.3 6.0 5.8 7.9 14.6 9.5
- Aid was over-projected for 1999–2002 by an average of 2.6 percentage points of GDP; forecasts became more accurate over time.

### Madagascar — Fiscal policy, aid spending, and absorption
- Changes in external assistance were generally reflected in Madagascar’s overall fiscal deficit, particularly beginning in 2003.
- Early years: weak revenue collection and shortfalls in aid and privatization receipts led to compression of capital expenditure to meet fiscal and NDF targets.
- Thereafter, fiscal developments more closely mirrored changes in aid; Madagascar sought to use external support to accelerate public investment while containing inflation.

### Madagascar — Monetary/exchange rate policy, reserves, and inflation
- Reserves fell in 1999 to less than 2.5 months of import cover; 2000 program sought three months coverage but was hindered by cyclones and lower external support.
- 2001: strong export growth sharply narrowed the current account deficit and raised international reserves; reserve coverage maximum of 3.3 months in 2001 (except 2002 spike to 4.1 months due to fall in imports).
- 2002 political crisis: U.S. dollar value of reserves fell by 16 percent; 2002 real output contraction and volatility affected targets.
- Inflation targets often ambitious (at times seeking inflation of 5 percent or less) but frequently unmet due to shocks and NFA increases contributing to reserve money growth.
- Debt sustainability: very high debt with NPV debt-to-exports ratio over 240 percent in 1999; HIPC/MDRI relief central; staff stressed importance of grants and concessional financing post-relief to prevent debt reaccumulation.
- Conditionality: no external borrowing with grant element less than 35 percent.

### Mozambique — Summary and key issues
- Two Fund-supported arrangements since 1999: PRGF1 (three-year ESAF/PRGF, ended 2003) and PRGF2 (three-year PRGF, approved 2004).
- PRGF1 policies designed to spend and absorb an expected aid surge while maintaining macro stability; PRGF2 targeted fiscal consolidation amid programmed aid decline.
- More recently, program adopted an explicit spend-and-absorb strategy under possible scaling up of foreign aid.

### Mozambique — Background and macro outcomes
- High inflows in late 1990s with substantial increase beginning in 2000 (flood year).
- During aid surge (2000–03) government spending increased but aid absorption lagged, causing injection of domestic liquidity, high inflation, and exchange rate depreciation.
- Fiscal consolidation 2004–06 to limit monetary financing and pressures on domestic interest rates and nominal exchange rate; consolidation driven by expenditure restraint while keeping priority expenditure above PRS target.
- Growth declined to 8 percent by 2005.

### Mozambique — Program design and aid-related adjusters
- Fiscal and monetary conditionality: ceilings on central government domestic primary deficit (PFD) and the stock of net domestic assets (NDA) of the Bank of Mozambique; floor on net international reserves (NIR).
- Aid-related adjusters changed over time:
  - Initially, NIR floor adjusted upward (downward) for excess (shortfall) in foreign program grants and loans; NDA ceiling adjusted downward (upward) for excess (shortfall) in foreign aid.
  - PRGF2 included adjuster for PFD ceiling to accommodate extra capital outlays covered by higher-than-envisaged external grants.
  - By the fourth review of PRGF2, PFD ceiling replaced by ceiling on net claims of the central government (NCG).
  - Aid-related adjusters set asymmetrically to permit full spending of higher-than-anticipated aid flows.
  - NIR floor and NCG ceiling were not adjusted for any excess in disbursements of foreign program assistance; NIR floor (NCG ceiling) adjusted downward (upward) by 100 percent of any shortfall in external program aid up to a maximum of $50 million.

### Mozambique — Projected vs actual aid and reserves
- Aid inflows volatile and unpredictable for 2000–05; flood-related surge peaked in 2001; actual aid declined thereafter.
- Aid projections were below actual levels until 2003 and have been more optimistic since, remaining above actual levels after 2003.
- Actual NIR remained above program values for 2004 and 2005 as authorities were cautious about reserve accumulation due to aid volatility.

### Mozambique — Macroeconomic policies, absorption, and exchange rate effects
- PRGF1 (2000–03): domestic primary deficit target raised to accommodate flood-related expenditures and HIPC-funded poverty-reducing spending.
- Result: actual government expenditures increased by well over 100 percent of the increment in aid, but aid was not fully channeled into higher imports and not fully absorbed, leading to domestic liquidity injection, inflation, and nominal depreciation.
- Authorities reluctant to sell foreign currency during PRGF1; NIR always remained above program targets implying partial absorption.
- Between pre-aid surge (1999–2000) and aid surge (2001–03), the nonaid current account deterioration as percent of incremental aid was close to 66 percent.
- PRGF2: policies geared to macro stability amid programmed aid decline; 2004 fiscal consolidation reduced nonaid fiscal deficit to below-program levels.
- PRGF2 later aimed explicitly to spend-and-absorb under a scaling-up scenario; since end-2005 budget envisaged increased spending toward PRS targets and monetary program considered sterilization by selling foreign currency to absorb liquidity.
- Exchange rate and depreciation:
  - PRGF1 (2000–03): average real depreciation around 5.5 percent; nominal depreciation close to 13.3 percent.
  - Result: little evidence of Dutch disease during 2000–03, though partial aid absorption via NIR accumulation may have reflected fear of Dutch disease effects.
  - 2004: real appreciation accelerated; by third review program noted real exchange rate appreciation to somewhat overvalued levels, corrected when Mozambique moved to a more flexible exchange rate regime.

*Italicized graphics referenced: Mozambique: Fiscal Deficit Excluding Aid, 1999–2005 (In percent of GDP); Mozambique: Net International Reserves, 1999–2005 (In millions of U.S. dollars).*

_Italic: Source — content unit from the supplied IMF PDF chapter/section._

### introduction of foreign exchange auctions in January 2005. The real exchange rate

### _061407a - introduction of foreign exchange auctions in January 2005. The real exchange rate

### Nicaragua
- Summary and Key Issues:
  - Second annual program under the 1998–2002 ESAF converted to a PRGF-supported program in 1999, followed by another PRGF-supported program in 2002–06.
  - Program focus: improving medium-term fiscal sustainability (combined public sector balance) and external viability (international reserve cover).
  - Managing aid inflows: resulted in no spending and partial absorption under a substitute-for-domestic-financing strategy; more recently shifted toward a spend-and-absorb approach.
  - Under a crawling peg regime, monetary management in face of high aid inflows remains challenging.
- Background and macro outcomes:
  - Economic growth accelerated from about 1 percent in 2002 to about 4–5 percent in 2004 and 2005.
  - Inflation steadily increased to about 10 percent.
  - Real effective exchange rate continued to depreciate as inflation differentials were more than offset by nominal depreciation.
- Program design (quantitative targets and adjusters):
  - Quantitative targets included: floor on the combined public sector (and/or central government) balance; ceiling on net domestic financing of the combined public sector; ceiling on NDA; floor on NIR.
  - 2002–06 program initially included a floor on net reduction of domestic debt accumulated by the central bank from the 2000–01 banking crisis.
  - In 2006, a wage ceiling was introduced to contain rapid growth of the public sector wage bill.
  - NDF and NIR targets adjusted in both directions in response to higher or lower program support.
- Projected and actual aid (1999–2005; percent of GDP):
  - Projected aid: 9.9, 8.2, 7.7, 9.3, 10.4, 8.3, 7.6 (by year sequence shown in source).
  - Actual aid: 11.5, 8.4, 8.8, 9.5, 11.1, 9.7, 7.8 (by year sequence shown in source).
- Fiscal policy and spending of aid:
  - Aid projections conservative; outturns better than projections in all years.
  - Program called for paying down central bank’s U.S. dollar-denominated or indexed domestic debt.
  - Program adjusters automatically lowered the NDF ceiling with unexpected higher program aid inflows.
  - Actual fiscal performance: fiscal deficit (before grants) steadily falling during review period except 2001.
  - Until end-2005 adjustors mainly safeguarded fiscal consolidation; later reviews capped tightening and allowed most higher aid inflows to be absorbed and spent.
  - MDRI savings from the Fund explicitly allowed to be fully absorbed and spent.
- Monetary/exchange rate policy and aid absorption:
  - Programs aimed at raising international reserves to over three months of imports—goal never achieved.
  - Programs generally accommodated lower reserve covers during reviews when aid inflows revised upward, facilitating absorption.
  - Nicaragua under crawling peg since 1996; limited exchange rate flexibility constrained liquidity management.
  - Central bank actions: stepped up open market operations, raised reserve requirements, slowed domestic debt redemption to mop up excess liquidity.
  - Excess liquidity remained an issue; inflation targets often missed.
- Debt sustainability:
  - Zero ceiling on nonconcessional borrowing (short term and medium to long term) throughout program periods.
  - Required grant element to be excluded from this ceiling: 35 percent.

*Source: _061407a - introduction of foreign exchange auctions in January 2005. The real exchange rate*

### Rwanda
- Summary and Key Issues:
  - ESAF/PRGF arrangement 1998–2002, second PRGF arrangement 2002–06.
  - Overriding concern: promoting debt sustainability, especially before HIPC Completion Point in April 2005.
  - Program evolution: initially limited aid-based fiscal spending; shifted in 2004 to a spend-and-absorb approach.
  - Since 2004 rapid aid increases made coordination between fiscal and monetary policy urgent.
- Background and macro outcomes:
  - Growth generally at 6–9 percent per year (except 2003 due to drought and policy slippage).
  - Large credit expansion to government in 2003 and higher aid inflows since 2004 led to above-program inflation under a managed floating exchange rate regime.
  - External debt sustainability deteriorated until HIPC Completion Point due to excessive borrowing and weak export performance.
- Program design:
  - Fiscal and monetary conditionality: floor on NFA; ceiling on reserve money (replacing NDA ceiling in 2002); ceiling on net domestic credit to government.
  - Adjusters on NIR and NCG originally required higher-than-projected program inflows to be fully saved; lower inflows could be offset by higher domestic borrowing (up to a ceiling).
  - Restriction later relaxed for higher-than-expected grants.
  - Conditional on monetary program on track, additional spending of up to 2 percent of GDP allowed in fourth review of 2002–06 PRGF.
  - Floor on recurrent social spending introduced in 1999 and expanded in 2001.
- Projected and actual aid (2000–2005; percent of GDP):
  - Actual aid: 11.3, 13.4, 12.2, 10.4, 16.5, 16.5 (by year sequence shown in source).
  - Projected aid: 7.6, 6.0, 6.2, 16.9, 16.2, 13.8 (by year sequence shown in source).
  - Aid underprojected until 2003 at about half of actual levels; projections more buoyant since 2003; actual aid declined in 2003.
- Fiscal policy and spending of aid:
  - Program design aimed at partial spending of aid to reduce domestic debt: inclusion of domestic debt repayment, cautious aid projections, adjusters to save positive aid surprises.
  - Actual policy not always aligned: 2003 program saw aid plummet and spending exceed projections financed through domestic borrowing.
  - Programs for 2004 and 2005 applied spend-and-absorb approach supported by improving debt outlook.
- Monetary/exchange rate policy and aid absorption:
  - Reserves comfortable (~five months of imports or more) since 1998, so programs generally did not aim to increase reserve coverage.
  - Since 2004 managing absorption and monetary impact of higher aid became serious concern.
  - Dutch disease risk identified; programs emphasized export promotion rather than limiting spending and absorption.
  - Monetary authorities reluctant to step up foreign exchange sales (concerned about nominal and real appreciation harming competitiveness and exporters’ loan repayment); extensive domestic sterilization deemed too costly.
  - Result: higher-than-programmed reserve accumulation (limited aid absorption), faster reserve and broad money growth.
  - In 2005 spending based on program support made contingent on compliance with monetary program via an adjuster on contingent spending equal to 2 percent of GDP.
- Debt sustainability:
  - Risks of debt distress prominent; program promoted external debt sustainability via zero limit on contracting nonconcessional debt with required grant element at least 50 percent (above 35 percent common threshold), shift to more concessional loans and grants, and structural conditionality supporting export promotion.

*Source: _061407a - introduction of foreign exchange auctions in January 2005. The real exchange rate*

### Tanzania
- Summary and Key Issues:
  - Successive Fund-supported programs emphasized managing aid flows and generally supported a spend-and-absorb strategy.
  - Programs designed to fully spend aid by accommodating larger budget deficits financed by aid and programmed widening current account deficits to encourage aid absorption.
  - Aid was actually fully spent under successive PRGF-supported programs; aid absorption lagged but increased in 2003–05.
  - PRGF1 launched in 2000, PRGF2 in 2003, and a three-year PSI in February 2007.
- Macroeconomic outcomes:
  - Macroeconomic stability preserved with increased aid inflows.
  - GDP growth averaged 6 percent from 2001 to 2005.
  - Inflation remained stable—initially via sale of treasury bills to sterilize, later stepped-up foreign exchange sales.
- Program design:
  - Conditionality specified ceilings on net domestic financing of government and net domestic assets of BoT, and a floor on net international reserves of BoT; zero ceilings on budgetary arrears, external payments arrears, and nonconcessional external borrowing.
  - In July 2004 (second PRGF2 review) a ceiling on reserve money introduced.
  - Program adjusters specified no adjustment in case of excess aid flows, while allowing for larger NDF, NDA, and lower NIR targets if program aid fell short—an asymmetric adjustment intended to allow aid spending.
  - Shifting nominal monetary anchor from NDA of BoT to reserve money under PRGF2 encouraged greater use of foreign exchange sales to sterilize aid impact, encouraging greater aid absorption.
- Projected and actual aid:
  - Program projections underestimated both budget aid and BoP aid; actual aid flows often greater than expected.
  - Balance of payments aid fairly stable; budget aid doubled over PRGF period exceeding 10 percent of GDP in 2004/05.
- Fiscal policy, spending of aid, and debt sustainability:
  - Program design accommodating of aid spending; adjusters allowed for full spending of unprogrammed aid flows.
  - Larger budget deficits programmed to be financed fully through aid inflows.
  - Debt sustainability not a concern due to extensive debt relief: HIPC Completion Point in 2001 and MDRI debt relief in January 2006.
- Monetary/exchange rate policy and aid absorption:
  - Authorities managed sterilization tradeoffs differently over time:
    - Early PRGF1 (2000): sterilization via sale of treasury bills to lower inflation; increased interest rates and crowding-out.
    - Later PRGF1: unsterilized foreign reserves accumulation—loose monetary conditions but not inflationary.
    - PRGF2: move toward reserve money target, increasing foreign exchange sales to meet reserve money target.
  - Staff encouraged reliance on foreign exchange sales rather than T-bills to mop up excess liquidity.
  - Authorities concerned about currency appreciation but judged Dutch disease effects small given cumulative 40 percent depreciation of REER from 2001 to 2004.
  - Successive programs expected widening of current account deficit to be financed by aid; authorities often accumulated reserves in response to excess capital flows.

*Source: _061407a - introduction of foreign exchange auctions in January 2005. The real exchange rate*

### Uganda
- Summary and Key Issues:
  - Donor support increased substantially over last 10 years: net donor inflows rose from 8 percent of GDP a year in 1997/98 to a peak of 12 percent in 2003/04.
  - Poverty Action Fund (PAF) expenditures tripled to about 6 percent of GDP during same period and protected by conditionality under ESAF, PRGF, and PSI.
  - Fiscal deficit (excluding grants) increased from 6½ percent to 10 percent of GDP due to surge in donor support.
  - Most aid was not absorbed as authorities sterilized liquidity impact of growing aid inflows.
  - Aid inflows excluding MDRI projected to decline as share of GDP.
- Program design:
  - PRGF included quantitative performance criteria and benchmarks on: increase in base money liabilities of Bank of Uganda (ceiling); increase in net claims on central government by banking system (ceiling); minimum PAF expenditures (floor); public administration expenditure (ceiling); minimum increase in net international reserves of BoU (floor).
  - Ceiling on cumulative increase in NCG and floor on cumulative increase in NIR adjusted for deviations in import support, grants and loans, HIPC assistance, and debt service projections as specified.
- Projected and actual aid:
  - Net donor inflows began to exceed expectations under PRGF; actual disbursements topped estimates by several percentage points of GDP.
  - Aid volatility and disbursement timing affected program outturns; a significant shortfall in fiscal year 1999/2000 offset one year later.
- Fiscal policy and spending of aid:
  - Aid was spent: actual grant and net foreign financing of public expenditures mostly exceeded net donor inflows in programmed and executed budgets.
  - Upward revisions in expected aid largely incorporated into updated fiscal projections during program reviews.
  - ESAF included a capped upward adjuster to PAF floor for import support in excess of programmed amounts (adjuster dropped under PRGF).
  - Spending overruns on defense and public administration and temporary aid shortfalls necessitated cuts in nonstatutory spending not protected under PAF.
- Monetary and exchange rate policy and aid absorption:
  - Indicators suggest aid was absorbed more slowly than spent: current account improved and international reserves coverage improved by about one month of imports (equivalent to about 100 percent of reserve money).
  - Monetary/exchange rate policies focused on sterilizing liquidity from aid-induced reserve accumulation:
    - Episodes of substantial net issues of treasury bills alternated with large foreign exchange sales to control reserve money growth.
    - Yields on treasury bills remained at high levels throughout PRGF period.
  - Conditionality on net international reserves repeatedly relaxed to allow larger foreign exchange sales for stabilization, especially in second half of PRGF.
  - Flexible exchange rate regime used interventions for monetary policy; nominal shilling rate fluctuated significantly.
  - PRGF switched anchor from net domestic asset to reserve money target; reserve money target automatically relaxed under PRGF up to a maximum if inflation and commercial banks’ excess reserves remained below thresholds.
- Debt sustainability:
  - Uganda reached HIPC Completion Point in May 2000; debt sustainability concerns diminished thereafter.
  - If MDRI delivered, 2007 PPG external debt-to-GDP (exports) ratio could fall from estimated 50 percent of GDP (170 percent of exports) to about 10 percent (50 percent).

*Source: _061407a - introduction of foreign exchange auctions in January 2005. The real exchange rate*

### Zambia
- Summary and Key Issues:
  - Two three-year PRGF arrangements (1999–2003; 2004–present) focused on bolstering growth and reducing inflation via monetary tightening and fiscal restraint.
  - Aid shortfalls repeatedly prompted above-program domestic financing and money growth; performance slippages in 1999, 2001, and 2003.
  - 2004 SMP extension improved performance leading to new PRGF and HIPC completion point in 2005; MDRI relief in 2006.
  - Baseline program projections generally accommodated aid through a spend-and-absorb strategy.
- Background and macro outcomes:
  - Mining-based economy recovering since mid-1990s.
  - Annual GDP growth relatively stable since 2003 at 5–6 percent.
  - Inflation: more than 40 percent in 1994–95; 20–30 percent in 1997–2002; 15–20 percent during 2003–05; below 10 percent in 2006.
  - Fiscal slippage, quasi-fiscal copper sector losses, sharp wage increases, and aid shortfalls triggered above-program fiscal and monetary expansion.
- Program design:
  - PRGF programs placed ceilings on central bank NDA and a floor on NIR; ceiling on net domestic financing (NDF) of government; zero ceilings on external payment arrears, nonconcessional external borrowing, and domestic arrears.
  - 2004 PRGF included indicative ceiling on central government wage bill and zero indicative ceiling on wage arrears.
  - Limits on NDA, NIR, and NDF subject to adjuster (up to a cap) for shortfalls in program support; since 2002 programs included full adjuster for higher-than-programmed support.
  - Structural conditionality focused on public expenditure management.
- Projected and actual aid:
  - Repeated shortfalls in external budget support—largest in 2001 and 2004—contributed to higher government borrowing.
  - Aid trended downward since beginning of decade.
- Fiscal policy and spending of aid:
  - Program strategy of containing domestic financing aligned projected aid and programmed overall deficit before grant with gradual decline over 2001–06.
  - Actual developments more erratic due to aid shortfalls and fiscal discipline variation.
  - Large aid shortfall in 2001 offset by higher domestic financing (beyond capped adjuster); 2003 saw large wage and unbudgeted outlays increasing domestic financing; 2004 shortfall matched by spending restraint.
- Monetary/exchange rate policy and aid absorption:
  - Until 2004, fiscal dominance led to budget overruns covered by higher government lending and money creation; inflation targets often missed and revised upward.
  - Fiscal consolidation in 2004 relaxed pressures on inflation and interest rates.
  - Aid absorbed: nonaid current account broadly tracked changes in aid.
  - Exchange rate regime: managed float aimed at smoothing exchange rate developments and meeting reserve targets.
  - Reserves weak: dropped to 1.3 months of imports in 2003; program targeted gradual reserve coverage increase to 1.7 months by end-2006.
  - Real exchange rate fluctuated strongly, driven more by terms of trade changes than aid changes.
  - 2005 strong real appreciation (higher copper prices and private capital inflows plus confidence effects of debt relief) pressured nontraditional exports.
  - Program emphasized accelerated structural reforms (including financial intermediation) and infrastructure improvements; staff supported sterilized interventions to smooth exchange rate while building reserves.

*Source: _061407a - introduction of foreign exchange auctions in January 2005. The real exchange rate*

### Annex II. Tables on Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs

### Annex II. Tables on Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs

### Overview of tables and scope
- Annex contains stylized tabular summaries of conditionality in PRGF programs across countries organized into:
  - Table 1a–1c: PRGF Programs: Latest Design (Stylized), by Country.
  - Table 2a–2c: PRGF Programs: First Design (Stylized), by Country.
- Key dimensions covered in the tables:
  - Fiscal conditionality: Deficit, Tax revenue, Expenditure items (including specific entries such as Wages, Social Fund contributions, Priority spending, Domestic primary spending).
  - Monetary conditionality: Reserve money (RM), Net international reserves / Net foreign assets (NIR/NFA), Net domestic assets/credit (NDA).
  - Adjustors and types of aid: program support, grants, debt relief, project loans, net foreign borrowing, MDRI, HIPC.
  - Treatment of nonprogrammed aid: effect on additional grants/net lending and on shortfalls for project and program aid.

### Fiscal and monetary conditionality (representative entries and language preserved exactly)
- Fiscal conditionality terminology observed in country rows (examples preserved verbatim):
  - "Ceiling"
  - "Floor"
  - "..."
  - Specific expenditure items referenced: "Wages", "Wages and health spending", "Social Fund contributions", "Replenishment of HIPC account", "Priority spending", "Domestic primary spending", "Poverty Action Fund", "Wage and poverty spending".
- Monetary conditionality columns and entries (terms preserved verbatim):
  - RM: entries such as "Ceiling" or "..."
  - NIR/NFA: entries such as "Ceiling", "Floor", or "..."
  - NDA: entries such as "Ceiling", "Floor", or "..."
- Representative country lines (verbatim samples from tables):
  - Afghanistan: Fiscal: "Ceiling 1/ 2/"; Monetary: "Ceiling" (RM), "Floor 3/" (NIR/NFA), "..." (NDA).
  - Albania: Fiscal: "..." ; Monetary: "Ceiling" (RM), "Floor" (NIR/NFA); Expenditure: "..." ; Revenue: "Floor"; Monetary/other: "Ceiling".
  - Benin: Fiscal: "Ceiling 2/"; Monetary: "Ceiling"; Expenditure items: "..." .
  - Malawi: Expenditure items: "Wages and health spending"; Monetary: "Ceiling", "1/", "Floor", "Ceiling".
- Footnotes (preserved verbatim):
  - "Source: IMF country documents."
  - "1/ Indicative target. 2/ Excluding grants. 3/Total revenue. 4/ Excluding foreign-financed investment. 5/ Monetary targets are adjusted for program loans as well. 6/ Monetary targets only. 7/ Not adjusted for capital spending. 8/Social spending only. 9/ Some to be used for external arrears clearance."
  - In Table 2 notes: "1/ Indicative target. 2/ Excluding grants. 3/ Domestic balance. 4/ Domestic financing only. 5/ Monetary targets only."

### Adjustors and types of aid (verbatim types and examples)
- Types of adjustors and aid listed (preserved exactly):
  - "All"
  - "Program support loans (excluding EU)"
  - "Program support and debt relief"
  - "Program support and external debt service"
  - "Program support grants"
  - "Grants"
  - "Project loans, program grants, and debt relief 5/"
  - "Net foreign borrowing"
  - "Foreign borrowing"
  - "Program support (WB, IDB) and MDRI debt relief 6/"
  - "Program support and debt service"
  - "Program support and HIPC debt relief"
- Representative country entries (verbatim):
  - Afghanistan: "All"
  - Albania: "Program support loans (excluding EU)"
  - Benin: "Program support and debt relief"
  - Guyana: "Project loans, program grants, and debt relief 5/"
  - Honduras (Table 1b): "Net foreign borrowing"
  - Mozambique: "Program support and debt service"
  - Nicaragua: "Program support (WB, IDB) and MDRI debt relief 6/"

- Symmetry and caps (verbatim indicators present in table):
  - Symmetric column entries: "Yes" or "No".
  - "Cap for aid above program" and "Cap for aid below program" columns populated with "Yes", "No", or "..." in different country rows.

### Effect on nonprogrammed aid (verbatim outcomes and patterns)
- Outcomes reported consistently in Tables 1c and 2c use exact phrases:
  - For additional grants and net lending (project and program): "Spend all", "Spend zero", "Spend up to cap".
  - For shortfalls (project and program): "Cut all", "Cut zero", "Cut above cap", "Cut up to cap".
- Representative verbatim entries by country:
  - Afghanistan (Table 1c): All four cells "Spend zero"; All four shortfall cells "Cut zero".
  - Albania (Table 1c): Project grants/net lending "Spend all"; Program grants/net lending "Spend zero"; Project shortfalls "Cut all"; Program shortfalls "Cut zero".
  - Benin (Table 1c): Additional grants/net lending "Spend zero"; Shortfalls: project "Cut all", program "Cut above cap".
  - Burkina Faso (Table 1c): Additional project grants "Spend all"; Additional program grants "Spend up to cap 8/"; Shortfalls: project "Cut all", program "Cut above cap".
  - Mozambique (Table 1c): Additional "Spend all" (project), "Spend up to cap" (program); Shortfalls "Cut all" (both).
  - Rwanda (Table 1c): Additional grants: project "Spend zero", program "Spend zero"; Shortfalls: project "Cut all", program "Cut above cap".
- Recurrent special notations preserved exactly where they appear:
  - "Spend up to cap  8/" appears in multiple rows.
  - Table 2c contains analogous entries with identical phrasing, e.g., "Spend all", "Spend zero", "Cut all", "Cut above cap", including country-specific variants such as "Cur all" (as printed).

*Source: IMF country documents as presented in the tables above.*

### Annex III. Recent Developments in Official Development Assistance and Meeting the

### Annex III. Recent Developments in Official Development Assistance and Meeting the Millennium Development Goals

### ODA trends, 2000–05
- Total official development assistance to all PRGF-eligible countries increased from $22.6 billion in 2000 to $47.7 billion in 2005.
- Total ODA has remained below 32 percent of PRGF-country GDP since 2002.
- Annual growth of total net ODA slowed from a peak of about 19 percent in 2002 to about 8 percent in 2004.
- Excluding Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Tsunami aid—equivalent to $2.2 billion—net ODA flows to PRGF-eligible countries fell by more than 6 percent in 2005.

### Composition of ODA and debt forgiveness
- Almost 40 percent of the 2004 debt relief grants went to seven countries: Bolivia, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Madagascar, Nicaragua, and Senegal.
- Almost 40 percent of the 2005 debt relief benefited Nigeria; the Republic of Congo received another 10 percent of the 2005 debt relief grants.
- Net of debt forgiveness, grant disbursements to PRGF-eligible countries grew by 17 percent in 2005—the slowest rate since 2002.
- The share of grant financing in total gross ODA financing excluding debt forgiveness increased from 57 percent in 2000 to 70 percent in 2005.
- OECD-DAC definition noted: ODA consists of concessional funds provided by OECD-DAC members and multilateral institutions to developing countries, including grants (project, program, technical cooperation, food aid, emergency relief, and debt forgiveness grants) and nongrant financing with a grant element of at least 25 percent.

### Country-level changes and scaling-up
- Twelve countries (16 percent of all PRGF-eligible countries) received less aid in US$-terms in 2005 than in 2000: Armenia, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominica, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Saint Vincent, Timor Leste, Uzbekistan, and Vanuatu.
- Aid flows more than doubled in 20 countries (about one quarter of PRGF-eligible countries) between 2000 and 2005: Afghanistan, Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Grenada, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Maldives, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.
- Scaling-up is defined as an increase in aid by more than 5 percent of GDP or more. At this level, additional aid inflows are assumed to affect macroeconomic and institutional capacity.
- Measured relative to GDP, aid flows were smaller in 2005 than in 2000 in 36 countries (almost 50 percent of PRGF-eligible countries).
- Fifteen countries (less than 20 percent) saw scaling up of aid as a share of GDP between 2000 and 2005: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Grenada, Haiti, Kiribati, Madagascar, Maldives, Nigeria, Rwanda, Solomon Islands, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.
- Factors influencing scaling-up or lack thereof include recipient country needs, surging remittances, FDI, portfolio investment, other private capital, resource revenue windfalls used for fiscal consolidation, and extraordinary needs from debt overhang, democracy building, or natural disasters.

### Volatility of aid inflows
- Fluctuations in aid flows have generally been around 1–3 percent of GDP for many countries.
- Volatility tends to be higher in smaller countries.
- Afghanistan, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo are outliers due to surges in aid flows.
- Table 3 summarizes mean, average, and standard deviation measures of ODA disbursements (in U.S.$ millions and in percent of 2005 GDP) for 2000–05 (source: OECD-DAC, WEO, and IMF staff estimates).

### Prospects for aid and international initiatives
- Prospects for aid flows to low-income countries depend importantly on implementation and donor support for two international initiatives:
  - HIPC Initiative and multilateral debt relief (MDRI).
  - Commitment to help low-income countries achieve the MDGs.
- Bilateral donors and the IFIs have so far delivered $31 billion in HIPC assistance (in end-2005 NPV terms) and $38 billion for MDRI debt relief (in nominal terms).
- Additional resources will be required to ensure all identified HIPC countries could benefit from MDRI and HIPC Initiative debt relief in due course.

### Progress toward the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
- The proportion of people living on under $1 a day fell by an estimated 10 percent since the turn of the millennium.
- Regional patterns:
  - East and South Asia: best record of poverty reduction.
  - Latin America: despite a recent upturn, growth remains too low for rapid poverty reduction.
  - Africa: performed worst in aggregate, with little change in the poverty headcount since 1990 and few countries projected to meet the poverty-MDG target on current trends, though considerable variation exists with several African countries performing well due to better policies and foreign aid.
- Human development MDGs progress is uneven:
  - All regions are offtrack in meeting some goals; South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa are offtrack on all goals.
  - Improvements: increase in number of countries ontrack for universal primary education since 2000 and narrowing gender disparities; accelerating progress on child mortality in some countries; strong improvement in women’s access to trained birth attendants in East Asia and more modest improvement in Latin America; signs of a decline in HIV/AIDS infection rates in high-prevalence countries such as Haiti, Uganda, and Zimbabwe; global efforts against malaria yielding better prevention and treatment.

### Estimates of additional ODA needed
- Several recent studies estimate extra ODA required to meet the MDGs:
  - World Bank and UN estimates suggest extra ODA on the order of $40–60 billion a year is needed to meet the MDGs.
  - Based on the G-8 commitment in Gleneagles in 2005 to double aid to Africa, the OECD estimates that ODA from the OECD DAC countries would rise by $50 billion in real terms between 2004 and 2010.

*Source: Annex III. Recent Developments in Official Development Assistance and Meeting the Millennium Development Goals (PDF)._061407a*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/2007/eng/_061407a.pdf_
