## _071706 ## Source details **Canonical URL:** [_071706](https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2006/_071706.pdf) ## Other formats - [Markdown version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2006/_071706.pdf.md) - [Structured JSON version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2006/_071706.pdf.json) --- ### Executive Summary - Period covered: 2001–2004. - Sierra Leone was generally among the 10 countries in the world receiving the most MFD Technical Assistance (TA) over 2001–2004. - Program contribution: substantial IMF contribution to post-conflict reconstruction after the civil war that ended in 2000. - Banking supervision - Substantial implementation of past action plans, especially drafting manuals and guidelines and training staff. - On-site supervision measures have been implemented. - Next stage: enforcement of supervisory requirements and bank restructuring will be particularly challenging. - Monetary operations - Many early action-plan elements were not implemented. - Shortfalls attributed in part to over optimism about Bank of Sierra Leone (BSL) staff capacity and resources. - Action plan refocused to clarify intervening steps toward full money market development. - Payments system - Important improvements in line with recommendations. - Shortfalls: limited interest from the banking sector (possibly due to cost concerns); delays on critical components such as the BankMaster contract to implement an automated general ledger. - Prioritization - Other areas were given lower priority; program focused on a limited number of areas given delivery and absorptive capacity constraints. - Staff capacity - Considerable enhancement of staff capacity over the past three years. - BSL retained the bulk of its staff and ensured relative continuity in many key positions. - Staff shortages in some newly emerging subject areas where redeployments have not matched increasing demands. - Risks - Macroeconomic developments may impede BSL’s ability to operate monetary policy successfully. - Increasing dependence on other agencies, particularly the Ministry of Finance (MOF), will require intensified cooperation. - Risk in sustainability of capacity: transfer of skills to the institution as a whole may be tenuous; written manuals, guidelines, and documentation remain central to TA. - Overall assessment - Remarkable successes: completion of off-site manuals, development of on-site banking supervision capacity, development of the treasury bill market and initial secondary market steps, and introduction of a book entry system for payments and settlement. - Program design elements contributing to success: integrated delivery from November 2001 with careful prioritization and sequencing; clear objectives and interim stages; continuity and selectivity in expert assignments; integration with periodic multi-topic missions. - Areas with slower than expected progress: liquidity forecasting, development of monetary instruments, and payments-side delays. - Lessons: start at rudimentary levels when capacity constrained; formalize forward process (e.g., steering committee) to maintain momentum; explicit ownership by senior management (e.g., signature on program document) could motivate staff and encourage decisive action. ### I. Introduction and Purpose - Purpose: evaluate the MFD TA program to Sierra Leone over 2001–2004 to assess what works, refine remaining stages, and provide guidance for other TA programs. - Basis of evaluation: review of relevant documents, questionnaire sent to BSL, and discussions with individuals in Sierra Leone and IMF staff. - November 2001 mission: MFD-led diagnostic review to identify priority areas and agree initial action plan; included experts in central bank organization and banking supervision. - Mission conclusion: central bank organizational structure relatively sound; urgent assistance needed in banking supervision, monetary operations, and payments system. ### II. Inputs of the Program - Ownership - Action plans elucidated by MFD missions with efforts to ensure shared ownership with BSL. - Initial action plans largely identified by IMF missions due to initial lack of BSL capacity. - BSL generally shared objectives and structure, demonstrated by welcoming missions and requesting further engagement. - Some shortfalls in implementation were ascribed by BSL staff to limited support at times from higher BSL management. - Liquidity forecasting requirement driven by need to implement monetary component of Sierra Leone’s PRGF program. - Strategy and action plans - 2001 mission produced action plans designed to cover 12 months. - Indexed action items: 15 topics for action in banking supervision, 9 in monetary operations and liquidity forecasting, and 3 in payments systems. - Sequenced capacity-build strategy: banking supervision staged as training/regulations → on-site supervision → enforcement and restructuring. - Successive action plans overlapped and were updated backward- and forward-looking. - Choice of areas - Priority focus on banking supervision, monetary operations, and payments systems given central bank critical functions and resource constraints. - Central bank organization and foreign-exchange-market issues had earlier attention and were lower priority at this stage. - Counterpart and coordination - BSL was the principal counterpart; BSL responsible for all TA-covered areas. - Coordination with other official bodies was undertaken to foster support and coordination; future stages (e.g., banking sector restructuring) will increasingly involve the MOF. - Interaction with other TA providers - MFD was principal supplier. - Additional assistance from Bank of England bilateral links and experts financed through the FIRST Initiative. - Coordination generally worked well (e.g., Bank of England expert visit coincided with MFD mission; FIRST Initiative payments expert worked closely with MFD mission). - Some coordination gaps: FIRST Initiative-financed expert on supervision of nonbank financial institutions was not coordinated with bank supervision counterparts. - Modalities of delivery - MFD TA delivered by IMF headquarters staff and identified experts with direct operational experience from central banks/regulatory authorities. - Frequency of MFD staff visits declined over the three-year period; December 2004 visit was the first since November 2003. - Pace of expert visits maintained and may be intensified; MFD staff set framework and strategic guidance while experts provide ongoing capacity building. - Delivery format: combination of ongoing individual expert visits (up to four weeks) and multi-topic visits (IMF staff and experts staying one to two weeks). - Since 2001: four multi-topic visits and 28 expert visits. - Prospective missions and visits were roughly scheduled up to a year in advance and adhered to more closely than in many other TA programs. - Emphasis on continuity in MFD staff and experts, and substantial continuity of BSL counterparts despite occasional staff rotation and shortages. - TA focus: transfer of knowledge to BSL staff; experts in advisory roles; peripatetic expert visits underscore BSL responsibility for implementation. - Delivery methods: hands-on one-on-one involvement, presentations, meetings with BSL management, end-of-mission reports, final reports, and remote assistance via e-mail. - Selection of experts and constraints - MFD uses its roster of experts and supplements it with specialists identified through links with central banks and regulatory institutions. - Security and logistical constraints in early post-conflict period influenced expert selection and precluded long-term in-country assignments. - UN classification phases noted: Phase IV in Freetown and Phase V elsewhere in early stages; entire country reduced to Phase III in 2003. - Security never directly imperiled experts but logistics, communications, and living conditions were challenging. - Four experts suffered from potentially serious diseases; one staff suffered an accidental injury. - Hazardous in-country transportation (e.g., between airport and Freetown) restricted ability to attract peripatetic experts and precluded installing a long-term expert. - BSL satisfaction: BSL indicated high satisfaction with most experts, including those active at the time of reporting. - Example: in banking supervision, the first expert was a specialist in drafting regulations. ### Expert assignments and staffing - An expert particularly experienced in on-site supervision was brought in after initial work completion; plans exist for this supervision expert to be succeeded or supplemented by a restructuring expert as banking work moves into issues of restructuring. - On the payments side, a single expert has been involved in various missions and visits since early 2003. - In monetary operations, initial lack of progress was ascribed in part to the background of the experts; a third expert in this area has been working successfully with the BSL since mid 2004. - The BSL emphasized direct operational experience and the ability to transfer that experience as the major factor in positive assessments of experts. - Where BSL evaluations were less-than-positive, this was ascribed to the expert’s lack of operational experience or ability to transfer that experience; in at least one case the mission decided problems were more of appropriate fit and the expert was rotated. ### Outputs — Implementation of action plans - Banking supervision - Substantial implementation of past action plans. - Early stages focused on drafting manuals and guidelines, and training staff; later reports indicate substantial completion. - Measures regarding on-site supervision have been implemented. - The BSL is well on the way to developing a high quality banking supervision function; the next stage will critically include enforcement of supervisory requirements and will be particularly challenging. - Monetary operations - Experience is more mixed; many early elements were not implemented at the time. - Shortfalls attributed in part to mis-sequencing and over-optimistic estimates of BSL staff capacity and resources. - Some recommendations focused on developing a repo market despite limited understanding of primary government debt markets. - The BSL only recently desisted from standing ready to buy back TBs without penalty. - Continued issues concerning financing of fiscal deficits complicated monetary policy operation. - More recently, BSL staff have made good progress in establishing the framework for successful operation of monetary policy and fostering secondary-market activity. - Example: The BSL recently changed the formula for pricing of TBs submitted for early redemption to make redemption at the BSL penal, thus serving to stimulate secondary market activity. - The action plan was refocused to set out more clearly the intervening steps toward full money market development. - Footnote: During 2004 the expert was financed through the FIRST Initiative and was not formally part of the MFD program; as from early 2005, the expert will be financed by the Japanese subaccount at the IMF and will come fully under the MFD program. - Payments system - Important improvements in line with program recommendations, but much remains to be done. - Disappointments: apparent lack of interest from the banking sector (perhaps due to banks’ concern about cost implications) and delays on critical components such as the implementation of the contract to acquire the BankMaster system for the BSL. - Program focus and scope - Other areas were given lower priority; the program focused on a limited number of areas due to clear need and limited delivery and absorptive capacity. - BSL organization was not pursued after the initial visit; foreign exchange markets were handled only as a subsidiary element within monetary operations. - Following BSL requests, foreign exchange and reserve management issues may be added into the program. ### Enhancement of personnel capacity - BSL staff, IMF staff, experts, and outside observers consider there has been a considerable enhancement of staff capacity over the past three years. - Discussions now cover issues far along the development process compared with three years ago. - Substantial implementation of earlier action plans in all priority areas has helped capacity enhancement. - The BSL has managed to retain the bulk of its staff and ensure relative continuity in key positions. - BSL staff have recently been used as an expert on MFD TA elsewhere in the region. - Remaining issues: - Staff shortages in some newly emerging subject areas as redeployments have not matched increasing demands. - Continued efforts needed to ensure skills transferred to direct TA counterparts are disseminated widely within respective departments. ### Risks to the program - Macroeconomic risks - Excess fiscal borrowing or shortfalls in donor financing may reduce the ability to manage the fiscal deficit, impeding development of money and debt markets and making it hard for the BSL to operate monetary policy successfully. - Inter-agency dependence - BSL will be increasingly dependent on other agencies, in particular the MOF, for bank restructuring and forecasting of fiscal flows. - Intensified cooperation with the MOF will be needed; establishing regular meetings of MOF/BSL committees, both at a policy and technical level, can mitigate these risks. - Institutionalization and sustainability risk - Possible tenuousness in the transfer of skills in some areas could undermine sustainability. - Enhanced capacity will only be sustainable if newly-acquired skills are passed from individuals to the institution as a whole. - Preparation of written manuals, guidelines, and documentation on BSL continues to be a central element of the TA program. - In the absence of such documentation, past enhancements in capacity will be particularly vulnerable to staff turnover or outside interference. ### Summary observations and lessons - Overall assessment of the Sierra Leone TA program of 2001–2004 - Remarkable successes include completion of off-site manuals, development of on-site banking supervision capacity, development of the treasury bill market and initial steps toward secondary market activity, and the introduction of a book-entry system for payments and settlement enhancements. - Program design features linked to success - From November 2001, an integrated approach for TA delivery was adopted with careful prioritization and sequencing; clear specification of program objectives and interim stages; continuity and selectivity in expert assignments; and integration with periodic multi-topic missions. - Areas with slower-than-expected development - Liquidity forecasting remains at a relatively early stage. - Limited initial progress in developing monetary instruments. - Delays in payments side implementation, e.g., BankMaster contract. - Major challenges ahead in enforcement and restructuring for banking supervision. - Explanations for delays and shortfalls - Ambitious initial scheduling or refocusing of the agenda. - Overestimation of BSL capacity on the monetary side. - Some experts may have lacked adequate skill in transferring expertise. - Resource problems and limited redeployment of staff toward priority areas. - Lack of explicit ownership by some senior management may have reduced staff commitment. - Lessons for other intensive TA programs - 1) Capacity constraints may require starting at a rudimentary level to get a program going. - 2) Formalization of the process for taking a program forward—such as a steering committee of all key participants meeting regularly—could help maintain momentum, including between missions. - 3) Explicit assertion of ownership by senior management at principal TA recipient institutions—for instance, by signature on a document setting out main program elements—could help motivate staff and encourage decisive action. ### List of MFD Missions to Sierra Leone, 2001–2004 - November 2001 Multi-Topic: Banking Supervision, Central Bank Organization — 2 staff, 2 experts - March 2002 Monetary Operations Expert - March/April 2002 Banking Supervision Expert - March/April 2002 Payments Systems Expert - April/June 2002 Monetary Operations Expert - August 2002 Banking Supervision Expert - December 2002 Multi-Topic: Banking Supervision, Monetary Operations — 2 staff, 1 expert - May/June 2003 Multi-Topic: Monetary Operations, Banking Supervision, Payment Systems — 1 staff, 3 experts - September 2003 Monetary Operations Expert - September 2003 Payment Systems Expert - November 2003 Multi-Topic: Monetary Operations, Banking Supervision, Payment Systems — 1 staff, 3 expert - November/December 2003 Banking Supervision Expert — 1 Expert’s visit continued after multi-topic mission. - February/March 2004 Banking Supervision Expert - February/March 2004 Monetary Operations Expert - February/March 2004 Payment Systems Expert - April 2004 Banking Supervision Expert - June 2004 Banking Supervision Expert - June/July 2004 Monetary Operations Expert - November 2004 Banking Supervision Expert - December 2004 Multi-Topic: Monetary Operations, Banking Supervision, [Payment Systems], TA Assessment — 3 staff, 3 experts, One expert financed by FIRST on a multi-country contract. *Source: _071706 - Section 1 and Section 2* ### Section 1 ### _071706 - Section 1 ### Executive Summary - Period covered: 2001–2004. - Sierra Leone was generally among the 10 countries in the world receiving the most MFD Technical Assistance (TA) over 2001–2004. - Program contribution: substantial IMF contribution to post-conflict reconstruction after the civil war that ended in 2000. - Banking supervision - Substantial implementation of past action plans, especially drafting manuals and guidelines and training staff. - On-site supervision measures have been implemented. - Next stage: enforcement of supervisory requirements and bank restructuring will be particularly challenging. - Monetary operations - Many early action-plan elements were not implemented. - Shortfalls attributed in part to over optimism about Bank of Sierra Leone (BSL) staff capacity and resources. - Action plan refocused to clarify intervening steps toward full money market development. - Payments system - Important improvements in line with recommendations. - Shortfalls: limited interest from the banking sector (possibly due to cost concerns); delays on critical components such as the BankMaster contract to implement an automated general ledger. - Prioritization - Other areas were given lower priority; program focused on a limited number of areas given delivery and absorptive capacity constraints. - Staff capacity - Considerable enhancement of staff capacity over the past three years. - BSL retained the bulk of its staff and ensured relative continuity in many key positions. - Staff shortages in some newly emerging subject areas where redeployments have not matched increasing demands. - Risks - Macroeconomic developments may impede BSL’s ability to operate monetary policy successfully. - Increasing dependence on other agencies, particularly the Ministry of Finance (MOF), will require intensified cooperation. - Risk in sustainability of capacity: transfer of skills to the institution as a whole may be tenuous; written manuals, guidelines, and documentation remain central to TA. - Overall assessment - Remarkable successes: completion of off-site manuals, development of on-site banking supervision capacity, development of the treasury bill market and initial secondary market steps, and introduction of a book entry system for payments and settlement. - Program design elements contributing to success: integrated delivery from November 2001 with careful prioritization and sequencing; clear objectives and interim stages; continuity and selectivity in expert assignments; integration with periodic multi-topic missions. - Areas with slower than expected progress: liquidity forecasting, development of monetary instruments, and payments-side delays. - Lessons: start at rudimentary levels when capacity constrained; formalize forward process (e.g., steering committee) to maintain momentum; explicit ownership by senior management (e.g., signature on program document) could motivate staff and encourage decisive action. ### I. Introduction - Purpose: evaluate the MFD TA program to Sierra Leone over 2001–2004 to assess what works, refine remaining stages, and provide guidance for other TA programs. - Basis of evaluation: review of relevant documents, questionnaire sent to BSL, and discussions with individuals in Sierra Leone and IMF staff. - November 2001 mission: MFD-led diagnostic review to identify priority areas and agree initial action plan; included experts in central bank organization and banking supervision. - Mission conclusion: central bank organizational structure relatively sound; urgent assistance needed in banking supervision, monetary operations, and payments system. ### II. Inputs of the Program - Ownership - Action plans elucidated by MFD missions with efforts to ensure shared ownership with BSL. - Initial action plans largely identified by IMF missions due to initial lack of BSL capacity. - BSL generally shared objectives and structure, demonstrated by welcoming missions and requesting further engagement. - Some shortfalls in implementation were ascribed by BSL staff to limited support at times from higher BSL management. - Liquidity forecasting requirement driven by need to implement monetary component of Sierra Leone’s PRGF program. - Strategy and action plans - 2001 mission produced action plans designed to cover 12 months. - Indexed action items: 15 topics for action in banking supervision, 9 in monetary operations and liquidity forecasting, and 3 in payments systems. - Sequenced capacity-build strategy: banking supervision staged as training/regulations → on-site supervision → enforcement and restructuring. - Successive action plans overlapped and were updated backward- and forward-looking. - Choice of areas - Priority focus on banking supervision, monetary operations, and payments systems given central bank critical functions and resource constraints. - Central bank organization and foreign-exchange-market issues had earlier attention and were lower priority at this stage. - Counterpart - BSL was the principal counterpart; BSL responsible for all TA-covered areas. - Coordination with other official bodies was undertaken to foster support and coordination; future stages (e.g., banking sector restructuring) will increasingly involve the MOF. - Interaction with other TA providers - MFD was principal supplier. - Additional assistance from Bank of England bilateral links and experts financed through the FIRST Initiative. - Coordination generally worked well (e.g., Bank of England expert visit coincided with MFD mission; FIRST Initiative payments expert worked closely with MFD mission). - Some coordination gaps: FIRST Initiative-financed expert on supervision of nonbank financial institutions was not coordinated with bank supervision counterparts. - Modalities of delivery - MFD TA delivered by IMF headquarters staff and identified experts with direct operational experience from central banks/regulatory authorities. - Frequency of MFD staff visits declined over the three-year period; December 2004 visit was the first since November 2003. - Pace of expert visits maintained and may be intensified; MFD staff set framework and strategic guidance while experts provide ongoing capacity building. - Delivery format: combination of ongoing individual expert visits (up to four weeks) and multi-topic visits (IMF staff and experts staying one to two weeks). - Since 2001: four multi-topic visits and 28 expert visits. - Prospective missions and visits were roughly scheduled up to a year in advance and adhered to more closely than in many other TA programs. - Emphasis on continuity in MFD staff and experts, and substantial continuity of BSL counterparts despite occasional staff rotation and shortages. - TA focus: transfer of knowledge to BSL staff; experts in advisory roles; peripatetic expert visits underscore BSL responsibility for implementation. - Delivery methods: hands-on one-on-one involvement, presentations, meetings with BSL management, end-of-mission reports, final reports, and remote assistance via e-mail. - Selection of experts - MFD uses its roster of experts and supplements it with specialists identified through links with central banks and regulatory institutions. - Security and logistical constraints in early post-conflict period influenced expert selection and precluded long-term in-country assignments. - UN classification phases noted: Phase IV in Freetown and Phase V elsewhere in early stages; entire country reduced to Phase III in 2003. - Security never directly imperiled experts but logistics, communications, and living conditions were challenging. - Four experts suffered from potentially serious diseases; one staff suffered an accidental injury. - Hazardous in-country transportation (e.g., between airport and Freetown) restricted ability to attract peripatetic experts and precluded installing a long-term expert. - BSL satisfaction: BSL indicated high satisfaction with most experts, including those active at the time of reporting. - Example: in banking supervision, the first expert was a specialist in drafting regulations. *Prepared by staff independent of earlier stages of the TA program.* ### Section 2 ### _071706 - Section 2 ### Expert assignments and staffing - An expert particularly experienced in on-site supervision was brought in after initial work completion; plans exist for this supervision expert to be succeeded or supplemented by a restructuring expert as banking work moves into issues of restructuring. - On the payments side, a single expert has been involved in various missions and visits since early 2003. - In monetary operations, initial lack of progress was ascribed in part to the background of the experts; a third expert in this area has been working successfully with the BSL since mid 2004. - The BSL emphasized direct operational experience and the ability to transfer that experience as the major factor in positive assessments of experts. - Where BSL evaluations were less-than-positive, this was ascribed to the expert’s lack of operational experience or ability to transfer that experience; in at least one case the mission decided problems were more of appropriate fit and the expert was rotated. ### Outputs of the program — Implementation of action plans - Banking supervision: - Substantial implementation of past action plans. - Early stages focused on drafting manuals and guidelines, and training staff; later reports indicate substantial completion. - Measures regarding on-site supervision have been implemented. - The BSL is well on the way to developing a high quality banking supervision function; the next stage will critically include enforcement of supervisory requirements and will be particularly challenging. - Monetary operations: - Experience is more mixed; many early elements were not implemented at the time. - Shortfalls were attributed in part to mis-sequencing and over-optimistic estimates of BSL staff capacity and resources. - Some recommendations focused on developing a repo market despite limited understanding of primary government debt markets. - The BSL only recently desisted from standing ready to buy back TBs without penalty. - Continued issues concerning financing of fiscal deficits complicated monetary policy operation. - More recently, BSL staff have made good progress in establishing the framework for successful operation of monetary policy and fostering secondary-market activity. - Example: The BSL recently changed the formula for pricing of TBs submitted for early redemption to make redemption at the BSL penal, thus serving to stimulate secondary market activity. - The action plan was refocused to set out more clearly the intervening steps toward full money market development. - Footnote: During 2004 the expert was financed through the FIRST Initiative and was not formally part of the MFD program; as from early 2005, the expert will be financed by the Japanese subaccount at the IMF and will come fully under the MFD program. - Payments system: - Important improvements in line with program recommendations, but much remains to be done. - Disappointments: apparent lack of interest from the banking sector (perhaps due to banks’ concern about cost implications) and delays on critical components such as the implementation of the contract to acquire the BankMaster system for the BSL. - Program focus and scope: - Other areas were given lower priority; the program focused on a limited number of areas due to clear need and limited delivery and absorptive capacity. - BSL organization was not pursued after the initial visit; foreign exchange markets were handled only as a subsidiary element within monetary operations. - Following BSL requests, foreign exchange and reserve management issues may be added into the program. ### Enhancement of personnel capacity - BSL staff, IMF staff, experts, and outside observers consider there has been a considerable enhancement of staff capacity over the past three years. - Discussions now cover issues far along the development process compared with three years ago. - Substantial implementation of earlier action plans in all priority areas has helped capacity enhancement. - The BSL has managed to retain the bulk of its staff and ensure relative continuity in key positions. - BSL staff have recently been used as an expert on MFD TA elsewhere in the region. - Remaining issues: - Staff shortages in some newly emerging subject areas as redeployments have not matched increasing demands. - Continued efforts needed to ensure skills transferred to direct TA counterparts are disseminated widely within respective departments. ### Risks to the program - Macroeconomic risks: - Excess fiscal borrowing or shortfalls in donor financing may reduce the ability to manage the fiscal deficit, impeding development of money and debt markets and making it hard for the BSL to operate monetary policy successfully. - Inter-agency dependence: - BSL will be increasingly dependent on other agencies, in particular the MOF, for bank restructuring and forecasting of fiscal flows. - Intensified cooperation with the MOF will be needed; establishing regular meetings of MOF/BSL committees, both at a policy and technical level, can mitigate these risks. - Institutionalization and sustainability risk: - Possible tenuousness in the transfer of skills in some areas could undermine sustainability. - Enhanced capacity will only be sustainable if newly-acquired skills are passed from individuals to the institution as a whole. - Preparation of written manuals, guidelines, and documentation on BSL continues to be a central element of the TA program. - In the absence of such documentation, past enhancements in capacity will be particularly vulnerable to staff turnover or outside interference. ### Summary observations - Overall assessment of the Sierra Leone TA program of 2001–2004: - Remarkable successes include completion of off-site manuals, development of on-site banking supervision capacity, development of the treasury bill market and initial steps toward secondary market activity, and the introduction of a book-entry system for payments and settlement enhancements. - Program design features linked to success: - From November 2001, an integrated approach for TA delivery was adopted with careful prioritization and sequencing; clear specification of program objectives and interim stages; continuity and selectivity in expert assignments; and integration with periodic multi-topic missions. - Areas with slower-than-expected development: - Liquidity forecasting remains at a relatively early stage. - Limited initial progress in developing monetary instruments. - Delays in payments side implementation, e.g., BankMaster contract. - Major challenges ahead in enforcement and restructuring for banking supervision. - Explanations for delays and shortfalls: - Ambitious initial scheduling or refocusing of the agenda. - Overestimation of BSL capacity on the monetary side. - Some experts may have lacked adequate skill in transferring expertise. - Resource problems and limited redeployment of staff toward priority areas. - Lack of explicit ownership by some senior management may have reduced staff commitment. - Lessons for other intensive TA programs: - 1) Capacity constraints may require starting at a rudimentary level to get a program going. - 2) Formalization of the process for taking a program forward—such as a steering committee of all key participants meeting regularly—could help maintain momentum, including between missions. - 3) Explicit assertion of ownership by senior management at principal TA recipient institutions—for instance, by signature on a document setting out main program elements—could help motivate staff and encourage decisive action. ### List of MFD Missions to Sierra Leone, 2001–2004 - November 2001 Multi-Topic: Banking Supervision, Central Bank Organization — 2 staff, 2 experts - March 2002 Monetary Operations Expert - March/April 2002 Banking Supervision Expert - March/April 2002 Payments Systems Expert - April/June 2002 Monetary Operations Expert - August 2002 Banking Supervision Expert - December 2002 Multi-Topic: Banking Supervision, Monetary Operations — 2 staff, 1 expert - May/June 2003 Multi-Topic: Monetary Operations, Banking Supervision, Payment Systems — 1 staff, 3 experts - September 2003 Monetary Operations Expert - September 2003 Payment Systems Expert - November 2003 Multi-Topic: Monetary Operations, Banking Supervision, Payment Systems — 1 staff, 3 expert - November/December 2003 Banking Supervision Expert — 1 Expert’s visit continued after multi-topic mission. - February/March 2004 Banking Supervision Expert - February/March 2004 Monetary Operations Expert - February/March 2004 Payment Systems Expert - April 2004 Banking Supervision Expert - June 2004 Banking Supervision Expert - June/July 2004 Monetary Operations Expert - November 2004 Banking Supervision Expert - December 2004 Multi-Topic: Monetary Operations, Banking Supervision, [Payment Systems], TA Assessment — 3 staff, 3 experts, One expert financed by FIRST on a multi-country contract. *Source: _071706 - Section 2* --- _Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2006/_071706.pdf_