## _122206a

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### Paragraph 4 of the Board of Governors Resolution on Quota and Voice Reform — Background and mandate
- Resolution 61-5 adopted effective September 18, 2006, requests the Executive Board to propose an amendment of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement concerning basic votes.
- Timing requirement: Executive Board to put forward a specific proposal by the Annual Meetings in 2007, and no later than the Annual Meetings in 2008.
- Paragraph 4(a) requirements:
  - (a) provide for at least a doubling of the “basic” votes that each member possesses pursuant to Article XII, Section 5(a), thereby at a minimum protecting the existing voting share of low income countries as a group; and
  - (b) ensure that the ratio of the sum of the “basic” votes of all members to the sum of members’ total voting power remains constant following the increase under (a) in the event of any subsequent changes in the total voting power of members.
- The Executive Board’s final recommendation on the basic votes amendment is to be made together with recommendations regarding a second round of ad-hoc quota increases (paragraph 3). The second round shall not become effective until the basic votes amendment enters into force.

### Existing voting structure and motivation for reform
- Article XII, Section 5(a) current wording: “Each member shall have two hundred fifty votes plus one additional vote for each part of its quota equivalent to one hundred thousand special drawing rights.”
- Voting components:
  - basic votes: equal amount to each member, currently set at two hundred fifty votes;
  - quota-based votes: one vote for each part of a member’s quota equivalent to SDR 100,000.
- Aggregate/historical figures preserved:
  - 250 basic votes per current member amount to 46,000 basic votes in the aggregate, representing 2.1 percent of the current total voting power in the Fund.
  - Participants in the Bretton Woods conference would have had aggregate basic votes of 11,250, representing 11.3 percent of the anticipated total voting power at that time.
- Effect of basic votes:
  - basic votes increase the relative voting power of members with quotas below the average quota of the Fund’s membership.
  - the degree to which an increase in basic votes enhances (or diminishes) a member’s relative voting power depends on whether the member’s quota is below (or above) the average quota.

### Illustrative amendment text and key design features
- Proposed replacement structure (key provisions):
  - “The total votes of each member shall be equal to the sum of its basic votes and its quota-based votes.”
  - (i) basic votes of each member shall be the number of votes that results from the equal distribution among all the members of ____ percent of the aggregate sum of the total voting power of all the members, provided that there shall be no fractional basic votes.
  - (ii) quota-based votes remain: one vote for each part of its quota equivalent to one hundred thousand special drawing rights.
- Key design features:
  - Following entry into force, aggregate basic votes will correspond to the percentage of total voting power specified in the amendment (subject to rounding).
  - The specified percentage will be chosen to reflect “at least a doubling” of basic votes as required by paragraph 4(a) and to protect the existing share of low income countries as a group, taking into account the second round of ad-hoc quota increases.
  - Aggregate basic votes corresponding to the specified percentage divided by the number of Fund members determines basic votes per member.
  - Adjustments to aggregate basic votes (and basic votes per member) occur automatically upon changes in quotas and/or number of Fund members; no action by any organ of the Fund required.
  - Fractional basic votes excluded. Rounding convention: fractional amounts of 0.5 and above are rounded up; fractional amounts of less than 0.5 are rounded down.
  - Commentary will confirm approach and identify rounding convention; acknowledgement that after rounding the aggregate basic votes allocated may slightly exceed or fall short of the specified percentage.

### Implications of the amendment — dynamics and specific scenarios
- Factors affecting basic votes:
  - (i) changes in members’ quotas; and
  - (ii) changes in the number of Fund members.
- Effects of quota changes:
  - Any increases in quotas will trigger an increase in both the aggregate number of basic votes and the number of basic votes allocated to each member, maintaining the ratio of total basic votes to total voting power established by the amendment.
  - Any decrease in a member’s quota in absolute terms (with the member’s consent) would result in a decrease in both aggregate basic votes and basic votes per member.
- Effects of membership changes:
  - Admission or withdrawal affects both aggregate basic votes (except in cases of dissolution and merger) and the divisor (number of members) used to calculate basic votes per member.
  - Admission cases:
    - If the quota of an admitted member is higher than the average quota at the time of admission, there will be an increase in both aggregate basic votes and basic votes per member.
    - If the quota of an admitted member is smaller than the average quota, the aggregate basic votes will increase but basic votes per member will decrease.
  - Withdrawal: converse outcomes apply.
  - Succession and merger:
    - Dissolution with succession by successor states: aggregate quotas would not change (the quota of the dissolved member is allocated among successors), so aggregate basic votes would not change, but the number of members would increase, decreasing basic votes per member.
    - Merger of two members: aggregate quotas would not change (quotas combined), aggregate basic votes would not change, but the number of members would decline, increasing basic votes per remaining member.
- Limits of protection for low income members:
  - The increase in basic votes will be designed, at a minimum, to protect the relative voting power of low income members as a group from the effects of the second round of ad hoc quota increases under paragraph 3.
  - Maintaining a constant ratio of basic votes to total voting power after the second round will mitigate—but will not prevent—erosion of the relative voting power of low income members if other members receive additional non-equiproportional quota increases after the second round.

### Effect of the amendment on basic votes and voting power — mechanics and examples
- The amendment will change the absolute number of basic votes allocated to members, but “the percentage of total voting power that is represented by basic votes, as incorporated in the amendment, will not change.”
- Aggregate basic votes, and number allocated to each member, will increase or decrease over time reflecting changes in members’ quotas and in the number of Fund members, while ensuring that the specified ratio of total basic votes to total voting power remains constant.
- Current and illustrative levels referenced exactly:
  - Current level: “250 basic votes.”
  - Examples used: “Basic votes = 750”, “Basic votes = 500.”

### Suspension of voting rights — policy issue and proposed fix
- Issue:
  - Schedule L provides that when a member’s voting rights are suspended pursuant to Article XXVI, Section 2(c), the number of votes allotted to the member “shall not be included in the calculation of the total voting power” (except for acceptance of SDR Department amendments).
  - If Schedule L remains unamended, automatic reduction in total voting power when a member’s voting rights are suspended would reduce both aggregate basic votes and basic votes per member.
  - Policy concern: whether “such an outcome is desirable” since “the voting rights of all members would be affected as a result of the sanctions imposed against a single member.”
- Proposed remedy:
  - Add a proviso to paragraph 2 of Schedule L stating that votes allotted to members with suspended voting rights are not to be excluded from total voting power for purposes of calculating basic votes under the Articles.
  - Rationale: aligns with intent of Section 2 of Schedule L to ensure suspension of a member’s voting rights would not distort the voting process for other members.
- Illustrative amendment text (Box 2) — verbatim:
  - 2. The number of votes allotted to the member shall not be cast in any organ of the Fund. They shall not be included in the calculation of the total voting power, except for purposes of: (a) the acceptance of a proposed amendment pertaining exclusively to the Special Drawing Rights Department and (b) the calculation of basic votes pursuant to Article XII, Section 5(a)(i).

### Amendment of the Fund’s Articles — adoption procedure and timing
- Acceptance threshold for entry into force for all members: accepted by “three-fifths of the Fund’s members having eighty-five percent of the total voting power.”
- Three-stage adoption practice (Article XXVIII):
  1. Executive Board decides to propose a draft text of the amendment for approval by the Board of Governors (decision taken by a majority of the votes cast) and forwards an Executive Board report as official Commentary.
  2. Board of Governors approves the proposed amendment by a majority of the votes cast.
  3. Acceptance by three-fifths of the members, having eighty-five percent of the total voting power; members must complete domestic-law steps before communicating acceptance.
- Entry into force: Amendments enter into force for all members three months after certification by the Fund, unless a shorter period is specified.

### Relation to Resolution No. 61-5 and linked quota/voice reform measures
- Resolution 61-5 requested a two-year reform program including:
  - Increasing quotas for China, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey to amounts shown in the Annex (Annex “Proposed Quota (In millions of SDRs)” lists: China 8090.1; Korea 2927.3; Mexico 3152.8; Turkey 1191.3).
  - Executive Board to reach agreement on a new quota formula with higher weight on gross domestic product and consideration of openness; start discussions soon after the Annual Meetings in Singapore and complete work before the Annual Meetings in 2007 and not later than Spring 2008 meeting of the IMFC.
  - Executive Board to recommend further increases in quotas by the Annual Meetings in 2007 and no later than Annual Meetings 2008; such increases shall not become effective until the Articles amendment (on basic votes) has entered into force.
  - Executive Board to propose an amendment that would: (a) provide for at least a doubling of the “basic” votes each member possesses pursuant to Article XII, Section 5(a), thereby at a minimum protecting the existing voting share of low income countries as a group; and (b) ensure the ratio of sum of “basic” votes of all members to sum of members’ total voting power remains constant following the increase in basic votes.
  - Specific timing: Executive Board to put forward a specific proposal by the Annual Meetings in 2007, and no later than the Annual Meetings in 2008.
- Payment requirement in Resolution paragraph 1 preserved exactly:
  - “Each member shall pay 25 percent of its increase either in special drawing rights or in the currencies of other members specified, with their concurrence, by the Fund, or in any combination of special drawing rights and such currencies. The balance of the increase shall be paid by each member in its own currency.” Payment deadline: “not later than 30 days after the date of this Resolution”; Executive Board may extend the period.

### Directors’ discussion points and views (Chairman’s Summing Up, January 19, 2007; January 25, 2007)
- Objectives restated per Resolution 61-5:
  - Provide for an increase in the current number of 250 basic votes for each member by at least the greater of:
    - (a) an amount that would double the existing number of basic votes of each member, or
    - (b) an amount that would protect the voting share of low-income countries as a group from effects of the first and second rounds of ad hoc quota increases.
  - Ensure the ratio of the sum of basic votes of all members to sum of members’ total voting power resulting from this increase remains constant in the event of subsequent changes in total voting power.
- Directors’ views and design considerations:
  - Amendment integral to the two-year reform program; basic votes design should parallel work on a new quota formula.
  - General endorsement of the illustrative text in Box 1 of the staff paper.
  - Broad agreement that:
    - basic vote adjustments should occur automatically upon changes in quotas and/or Fund membership;
    - fractional basic votes should be precluded;
    - aggregate basic votes would change in absolute terms but the specified ratio to total voting power would remain constant.
  - Some Directors suggested considering more than doubling basic votes, or restoring the ratio of basic votes to total voting power that existed at Fund founding.
  - Alternative selective increases targeted explicitly to low-income members were discussed but considered divisive or not responsive to Resolution 61-5 and operationally difficult.
  - Directors agreed with staff proposal to amend Schedule L to prevent suspension of one member’s voting rights from decreasing the basic votes of all members; they endorsed the illustrative text in Box 2.

### Key statistics and numeric references (preserved verbatim)
- Basic votes current level: “250 basic votes.”
- Alternative basic votes illustrated: “Basic votes = 750”, “Basic votes = 500.”
- Acceptance threshold for amendments: “three-fifths of the Fund’s members having eighty-five percent of the total voting power.”
- Dates:
  - Resolution submission date to Governors: August 31, 2006.
  - Resolution effective date: “The Board of Governors adopted the foregoing Resolution, effective September 18, 2006.”
  - Chairman’s Summing Up dates: “January 19, 2007” and page header “January 25, 2007.”
- Annex proposed quota numbers (In millions of SDRs): China 8090.1; Korea 2927.3; Mexico 3152.8; Turkey 1191.3.
- Payment requirement: “Each member shall pay 25 percent of its increase ...” Payment deadline: “not later than 30 days after the date of this Resolution”; Executive Board may extend the period.

*Source: Paragraph 4 of the Board of Governors Resolution on Quota and Voice Reform (Resolution 61-5), as presented in the referenced staff paper; _122206a - IMF PDF chapter/section.*

### 1.     Paragraph 4 of the Board of Governors Resolution on Quota and Voice Reform

### Paragraph 4 of the Board of Governors Resolution on Quota and Voice Reform

### Background and context
- Resolution 61-5 was adopted effective September 18, 2006, and paragraph 4 requests the Executive Board to propose an amendment of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement concerning basic votes.
- Paragraph 4 requires the Executive Board to put forward a specific proposal by the Annual Meetings in 2007, and no later than the Annual Meetings in 2008.
- Paragraph 4(a) requests:
  - (a) provide for at least a doubling of the “basic” votes that each member possesses pursuant to Article XII, Section 5(a), thereby at a minimum protecting the existing voting share of low income countries as a group; and
  - (b) ensure that the ratio of the sum of the “basic” votes of all members to the sum of members’ total voting power remains constant following the increase under (a) in the event of any subsequent changes in the total voting power of members.
- The Executive Board’s final recommendation on the basic votes amendment is to be made together with its recommendations regarding a second round of ad-hoc quota increases (paragraph 3 of Resolution 61-5).
- The second round of ad-hoc increases shall not become effective until the basic votes amendment enters into force.

### Existing voting structure and motivation for reform
- Article XII, Section 5(a) currently provides: “Each member shall have two hundred fifty votes plus one additional vote for each part of its quota equivalent to one hundred thousand special drawing rights.”
- Voting rights components:
  - basic votes: equal amount to each member, currently set at two hundred fifty votes;
  - quota-based votes: one vote for each part of a member’s quota equivalent to SDR 100,000.
- Current aggregate and historical figures:
  - 250 basic votes per current member amount to 46,000 basic votes in the aggregate, representing 2.1 percent of the current total voting power in the Fund.
  - Participants in the Bretton Woods conference would have had aggregate basic votes of 11,250, representing 11.3 percent of the anticipated total voting power at that time.
- Effect of basic votes:
  - basic votes increase the relative voting power of members with quotas below the average quota of the Fund’s membership.
  - the degree to which an increase in basic votes enhances (or diminishes) a member’s relative voting power depends on whether the member’s quota is below (or above) the average quota.

### Illustrative amendment text and key design features
- Box 1 (Illustrative New Text of Article XII, Section 5(a)) sets out proposed replacement text; key provisions included in the illustrative text:
  - “The total votes of each member shall be equal to the sum of its basic votes and its quota-based votes.”
  - (i) The basic votes of each member shall be the number of votes that results from the equal distribution among all the members of ____ percent of the aggregate sum of the total voting power of all the members, provided that there shall be no fractional basic votes.
  - (ii) The quota-based votes of each member shall be the number of votes that results from the allocation of one vote for each part of its quota equivalent to one hundred thousand special drawing rights.
- Key features summarized:
  - Following entry into force, aggregate basic votes will correspond to the percentage of total voting power specified in the amendment (subject to rounding).
  - The specified percentage will be chosen to reflect “at least a doubling” of basic votes as required by paragraph 4(a) and to protect the existing share of low income countries as a group, taking into account the second round of ad-hoc quota increases.
  - The aggregate number of basic votes corresponding to the specified percentage will be divided by the number of Fund members to determine basic votes per member.
  - Adjustments to the aggregate number of basic votes (and basic votes per member) will take place automatically upon relevant changes (changes in quotas and/or number of Fund members); no action by any organ of the Fund will be required to give effect to such changes.
  - The amendment will exclude fractional basic votes; the basic rounding convention specified is: fractional amounts of 0.5 and above are rounded up to the next whole number while fractional amounts of less than 0.5 are rounded down to the next whole number.
  - The proviso excluding fractional votes acknowledges that after rounding the aggregate number of basic votes actually allocated may exceed or fall short of the specified percentage by a very small margin; the Commentary to the amendment would confirm the approach and identify the rounding convention.

### Implications of the amendment
- Changes affecting basic votes:
  - Both the aggregate number of basic votes and the number allocated to each member will be affected by:
    - (i) changes in members’ quotas; and
    - (ii) changes in the number of Fund members.
- Effects of quota changes:
  - Any increases in quotas will trigger an increase in both the aggregate number of basic votes and the number of basic votes allocated to each member, thereby maintaining the ratio of total basic votes to total voting power established by the amendment.
  - Any decrease in a member’s quota in absolute terms (with the member’s consent) would result in a decrease in both aggregate basic votes and basic votes per member.
- Effects of changes in membership:
  - Admission or withdrawal affects both the aggregate number of basic votes (except in cases of dissolution and merger) and the divisor (number of members) used to calculate basic votes per member.
  - Specific outcomes depend on whether the quota of the admitted or withdrawing member is above or below the average quota at the time:
    - If the quota of an admitted member is higher than the average quota at the time of admission, there will be an increase in both aggregate basic votes and basic votes per member.
    - If the quota of an admitted member is smaller than the average quota, the aggregate basic votes will increase but basic votes per member will decrease.
    - The converse applies for withdrawal.
  - Succession and merger scenarios:
    - Dissolution with succession by successor states: aggregate quotas would not change (the quota of the dissolved member is allocated among successors), so aggregate basic votes would not change, but the number of members would increase, decreasing basic votes per member.
    - Merger of two members: aggregate quotas would not change (quotas combined), aggregate basic votes would not change, but the number of members would decline, increasing basic votes per remaining member.
- Limits of protection for low income members:
  - The increase in basic votes will be designed, at a minimum, to protect the relative voting power of low income members as a group from the effects of the second round of ad hoc quota increases under paragraph 3.
  - Maintaining a constant ratio of basic votes to total voting power after the second round will mitigate—but will not prevent—erosion of the relative voting power of low income members in the event that other members receive additional non-equiproportional quota increases after the second round.

*Source: Paragraph 4 of the Board of Governors Resolution on Quota and Voice Reform (Resolution 61-5), as presented in the referenced staff paper.*

### 21.     It should be emphasized that, while all of the above changes will affect the

### _122206a - 21.     It should be emphasized that, while all of the above changes will affect the

### Effect of the amendment on basic votes and voting power
- The amendment will change the absolute number of basic votes allocated to members, but “the percentage of total voting power that is represented by basic votes, as incorporated in the amendment, will not change.”
- Under the proposed design, the aggregate number of basic votes, and the number allocated to each member, will increase or decrease over time reflecting changes in members’ quotas and in the number of Fund members; however, the amendment ensures that the specified ratio of total basic votes to total voting power remains constant at all times.
- The current level of basic votes referenced is “250 basic votes.” Examples used in analysis and figures include “Basic votes = 750” and “Basic votes = 500.”

### Suspension of voting rights — policy issue and proposed fix
- Issue:
  - Schedule L provides that when a member’s voting rights are suspended pursuant to Article XXVI, Section 2(c), the number of votes allotted to the member “shall not be included in the calculation of the total voting power” (except for acceptance of amendments pertaining exclusively to the SDR Department).
  - If Schedule L is left unamended, the automatic reduction in total voting power when a member’s voting rights are suspended would reduce both the aggregate number of basic votes and the number of basic votes allocated to each member.
  - Policy concern: “such an outcome is desirable” is questioned because “the voting rights of all members would be affected as a result of the sanctions imposed against a single member.”
- Proposed remedy:
  - Include an additional proviso to paragraph 2 of Schedule L to state that votes allotted to members with suspended voting rights are not to be excluded from total voting power for purposes of calculating basic votes under the Articles.
  - Rationale: “The inclusion of this proviso would be consistent with the underlying intention of Section 2 of Schedule L, which was to ensure that the suspension of a member’s voting rights would not distort the voting process for other members.”

- Illustrative amendment text (Box 2) — verbatim:
  - 2. The number of votes allotted to the member shall not be cast in any organ of the Fund. They shall not be included in the calculation of the total voting power, except for purposes of: (a) the acceptance of a proposed amendment pertaining exclusively to the Special Drawing Rights Department and (b) the calculation of basic votes pursuant to Article XII, Section 5(a)(i).

### Amendment of the Fund’s Articles — adoption procedure and timing
- Acceptance threshold for entry into force for all members: accepted by “three-fifths of the Fund’s members having eighty-five percent of the total voting power.”
- Three-stage adoption procedure (Article XXVIII and practice):
  1. Executive Board decides to propose a draft text of the amendment for approval by the Board of Governors (decision taken by a majority of the votes cast). The proposed text is accompanied by an Executive Board report to the Board of Governors, which becomes the official Commentary on the amendment.
  2. Board of Governors approves the proposed amendment by a majority of the votes cast.
  3. Acceptance by three-fifths of the members, having eighty-five percent of the total voting power. Before communicating acceptance, a member must take all necessary steps under its domestic law to accept new treaty obligations and ensure the amendment has full force and effect under domestic law.
- Entry into force: Amendments enter into force for all members three months after the Fund certifies completion via formal communication, unless a shorter period is specified.

### Relation to Resolution No. 61-5 and quota/voice reform measures
- The Board of Governors’ Resolution No. 61-5 (adopted effective September 18, 2006) requested a two-year reform program, which includes:
  - Increasing quotas for China, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey to amounts shown in the Annex (Annex “Proposed Quota (In millions of SDRs)” lists: China 8090.1; Korea 2927.3; Mexico 3152.8; Turkey 1191.3).
  - Requesting the Executive Board to reach agreement on a new quota formula, with higher weight on gross domestic product and consideration of openness; start discussions soon after the Annual Meetings in Singapore and complete work before the Annual Meetings in 2007 and not later than Spring 2008 meeting of the IMFC.
  - Requesting further increases in quotas to be recommended by the Executive Board by the Annual Meetings in 2007 and no later than Annual Meetings 2008; any such increases shall not become effective until the Articles amendment (on basic votes) has entered into force.
  - Requesting that the Executive Board propose an amendment that would: (a) provide for at least a doubling of the “basic” votes each member possesses pursuant to Article XII, Section 5(a), thereby at a minimum protecting the existing voting share of low income countries as a group; and (b) ensure that the ratio of the sum of the “basic” votes of all members to the sum of members’ total voting power remains constant following the increase in basic votes.
  - Specific procedural timings: Executive Board to put forward a specific proposal by the Annual Meetings in 2007, and no later than the Annual Meetings in 2008.

### Directors’ discussion points and views (Chairman’s Summing Up, January 19, 2007; January 25, 2007)
- Objectives of the basic votes amendment per Resolution 61-5:
  - Provide for an increase in the current number of 250 basic votes for each member by at least the greater of: (a) an amount that would double the existing number of basic votes of each member, or (b) an amount that would protect the voting share of low-income countries as a group from effects of the first and second rounds of ad hoc quota increases.
  - Ensure the ratio of the sum of basic votes of all members to sum of members’ total voting power resulting from this increase remains constant in the event of subsequent changes in total voting power.
- Views and design considerations:
  - Directors emphasized that the amendment is integral to the two-year reform program and that basic votes design should parallel work on a new quota formula.
  - Directors generally endorsed the illustrative text of the amendment set forth in Box 1 of the staff paper.
  - Most Directors agreed that:
    - Basic vote adjustments should occur automatically upon changes in quotas and/or Fund membership.
    - Fractional basic votes should be precluded.
    - The aggregate basic votes would change in absolute terms but the specified ratio to total voting power would remain constant.
  - Some Directors suggested:
    - Considering more than doubling basic votes, or restoring the ratio of basic votes to total voting power that existed at Fund founding.
    - Alternative selective increases targeted explicitly to low-income members were discussed but considered divisive or not responsive to Resolution 61-5 and operationally difficult.
  - Directors agreed with the staff proposal to amend Schedule L to prevent suspension of one member’s voting rights from decreasing the basic votes of all members; they endorsed the illustrative text of the amendment of Schedule L set forth in Box 2.

### Key statistics and numeric references preserved exactly from the source
- Basic votes current level: “250 basic votes.”
- Alternative basic votes illustrated: “Basic votes = 750”, “Basic votes = 500.”
- Acceptance threshold for amendments: “three-fifths of the Fund’s members having eighty-five percent of the total voting power.”
- Dates:
  - Resolution submission date to Governors: August 31, 2006 (as stated in the Resolution heading).
  - Resolution effective date: “The Board of Governors adopted the foregoing Resolution, effective September 18, 2006.”
  - Chairman’s Summing Up dates: “January 19, 2007” and page header “January 25, 2007.”
- Annex proposed quota numbers (In millions of SDRs): China 8090.1; Korea 2927.3; Mexico 3152.8; Turkey 1191.3.
- Payment requirement in Resolution paragraph 1: “Each member shall pay 25 percent of its increase either in special drawing rights or in the currencies of other members specified, with their concurrence, by the Fund, or in any combination of special drawing rights and such currencies. The balance of the increase shall be paid by each member in its own currency.” Payment deadline: “not later than 30 days after the date of this Resolution”; Executive Board may extend the period.

*Source: _122206a - 21.     It should be emphasized that, while all of the above changes will affect the — IMF PDF chapter/section (text and boxes as provided).*

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