## 1. Use of Fund Credit Among Current Members, 1945-2008

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---

### I. INTRODUCTION
- Purpose of the paper: raise and discuss issues related to how the Fund provides financial assistance to its members as part of the strategic review to ensure the Fund remains relevant and effective.
- Objective: not to increase Fund lending, but to make sure the Fund has the right instruments and policies to help all of its members—with appropriate protection of Fund resources—as they integrate into a world of growing and increasingly complex cross-border flows.
- Other institutions (including major central banks and the World Bank) are also retooling lending instruments and grappling with similar issues.
- The paper offers a high-level view and does not make specific policy proposals; policy proposals will be presented in follow-up papers, some planned for Board discussion later in 2008.
- Prepared by Mr. Erickson von Allmen, Mr. MacArthur, and Ms. Gust, with input from Ms. Alonso-Gamo and Mr. John.

### II. MEMBERS’ NEEDS AND THE SERVICES PROVIDED THROUGH THE FUND’S INSTRUMENTS
- Legal anchor: Article I purpose — “To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.”
- Key findings:
  - About four out of five Fund members have used Fund credit at least once (Table 1), although use has been more concentrated since the 1980s.
  - Fund assistance evolved from smoothing short-term (seasonal) trade fluctuations to supporting adjustment and catalyzing financing for a wide range of balance of payments problems, including terms of trade shocks, natural disasters, post-conflict situations, broad economic transitions, poverty reduction and economic development, sovereign debt restructuring, and confidence-driven banking and currency crises.
- Instrument evolution and features:
  - Stand-by arrangement established in 1952; its use has been declining but it has remained the workhorse for middle-income countries.
  - Financing under the stand-by model is provided in support of adjustment to a balance of payments need and disbursed in tranches (phasing) based on conditions.
  - Since 1999, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) has been the primary vehicle for concessional balance of payments assistance to low-income members.
  - In some cases (small financing related to exogenous shocks or post-conflict needs), phasing is not required and a sensible policy statement suffices as conditionality.
  - Outright purchases in the credit tranches are possible; in recent years outright purchases have been used only under the policy of emergency assistance.
- Analytical point:
  - The model of financing in support of adjustment will remain integral, but should not be a straitjacket; a rethink of the lending model and the taxonomy of Fund instruments is needed as member needs change with deeper market access and evolving risks.

### III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE FUND
- Observed demand trends:
  - The demand for the Fund’s general resources has dropped sharply in recent years, along with a more modest decline in demand for the Fund’s concessional resources.
  - In the recent period of ample global liquidity and strong growth, many members strengthened policy frameworks and reduced vulnerabilities, lowering the need for balance of payments financing.
  - Many low-income members have received substantial debt relief, seen a pick-up in private capital inflows, and benefited from new sources of official financing.
- Fund Credit Outstanding (chart referenced):
  - “Fund Credit Outstanding, 1947- July 2008” — “In billions of SDR, end of period.”
  - Axis marks include 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70 and years from 1947 through 2007; separate series labeled “GRA” and “Concessional.”
- Two contrasting interpretations of declining demand:
  - View A: Decline is not problematic — Fund should be a lender of last resort; low demand reflects historically low balance of payments needs and successful policy adoption.
  - View B: Decline signals a problem — many members shun the Fund and seek solutions outside it (regional pooling, self-insurance through reserves, contingent World Bank financing).
- Examples of alternate arrangements members pursue:
  - Regional reserve pooling and financing arrangements (e.g., Chiang Mai Initiative, Latin American Reserve Fund, European Union and European Central Bank) though largely untested in crisis.
  - Accumulation of substantial international reserves for self-insurance; for some, reserves have reached levels that are high by most metrics.
  - Use or exploration of the World Bank’s Deferred Drawdown Option in conjunction with adjustment loans.
  - Central bank bilateral swap lines (example: U.S. Federal Reserve swap lines to the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank during credit market turmoil).
  - May 2008: central banks of Sweden, Norway and Denmark entered into a Euro/Icelandic krona swap facility agreement with the Central Bank of Iceland.
  - At least two members engaged in collateralized borrowing from the Bank for International Settlements for balance of payments purposes.
  - Several members exploring development policy loans from the World Bank with longer repayment periods and somewhat lower interest rates than the Fund and conditionality tied only to an appropriate macroeconomic policy framework.
- Questions raised for the Fund:
  - Do members have balance of payments needs or risks for which the Fund does not offer attractive solutions?
  - Could there be a role for the Fund along the lines of central banks’ swap transactions?
  - If official balance of payments financing or protection is needed, what role should the Fund play?
  - Concerns include: Fund resources may be too small for relevance, instruments may send negative signals, come with too many conditions, too little financing, and be too costly.
- Box 1 — Concerns About Stigma (key points):
  - Stigma associated with Fund-supported programs may deter members from approaching the Fund until crises are advanced and can hinder crisis prevention.
  - Sources of stigma: past Fund experience, market perception that approaching the Fund signals worse problems, domestic political concerns, and associations of PRGF with lack of development or debt sustainability risks (due to HIPC Initiative association).
  - Fund’s accountability for unpopular reforms and any tarnishing of Fund credibility exacerbate stigma.
  - Central banks have also faced stigma (example: U.S. Federal Reserve’s discount window usage in 2007; Fed measures to de-stigmatize included cutting the discount rate, loosening collateral standards, creating the Term Auction Facility; Bank of England’s Special Liquidity Scheme prohibits publication of who used it).
  - The Fund has difficulty tackling stigma directly; tailoring instruments and considering a “quiet” Fund facility are suggested mitigants.

### IV. SOME BROADER ISSUES REGARDING FUND LENDING
- Underpinning principles and rationale:
  - Article I provides a broad, continuing framework for Fund lending.
  - Fund lending promotes international public goods: balance of payments stability, an open system of international trade and exchange, and reduced externalities from contagion, disruptive adjustments, and defaults.
- Specific rationales:
  - Fund financing smooths adjustment to shocks, helping members avoid overly disruptive economic adjustment or default and limiting contagion.
  - Fund-supported programs can catalyze other financing via conditionality and the Fund’s signal (“stamp of approval”), reinforcing policy credibility even when the Fund’s own financial contribution is small.
  - Fund lending can help prevent crisis by making available large access up front in support of strong policies, improving confidence and reducing incentives for investor runs; current instruments are not ideally suited for preventive support.
- Comparative advantage:
  - Private sector and bilateral creditors cannot be counted on to provide the same services because of costs, needed resources, legitimacy concerns, and political difficulty in making hard decisions.
  - The Fund’s professional expertise and multilateral mandate provide a comparative advantage.
- Role and concerns about conditionality:
  - Most Fund lending is disbursed in tranches and subject to conditionality to ensure problems are resolved without destructive adjustments and to limit risks to the Fund.
  - Phasing allows time for adjustments; conditionality can reinforce credibility, catalyze other financing, and speed confidence restoration.
  - Members sometimes seek conditionality to signal policy commitment.
  - Concerns: conditionality may be excessive, undermine ownership, or interfere with sovereignty.
  - The Fund has rewritten guidelines to ensure conditionality is applied judiciously (Guidelines on Conditionality, Decision No. 12864-(02/102), September 25, 2002; Implementation Plan in Response to Board-Endorsed Recommendations Arising From the Independent Evaluation Office’s Evaluation of Structural Conditionality, April 8, 2008).
  - Difficulty remains in separating conditions critical to program success from those that are “good” but nonessential; tailoring conditionality and alternative models not based on conditionality are questions as membership diversifies.
- Open question: What should be the basis for Fund lending going forward as member needs and global financial integration evolve?

### Balance of payments need and modernization
- Article V, Section 3 condition for drawing: a member “represents that it has a need to make the purchase because of its balance of payments or its reserve position or developments in its reserves”.
- Financial market liberalization and integration blur the resident/nonresident distinction central to the definition of balance of payments.
- Open capital accounts and globalization have led to active secondary markets for debt, enabling debt instruments to move rapidly across borders.
- Practical difficulties: specifying the “need” criterion when Fund financing is directed toward the budget (currency unions, currency boards, domestic funding problems) or to support a domestic lender-of-last-resort function in foreign currency.
- Posed question: should the Fund consider modernizing the way balance of payments need is defined?

### How should Fund lending be organized?
- Single-facility option:
  - Could provide all assistance under only one facility — simple and transparent.
  - Terms (including concessionality) would need tailoring to members’ balance of payments needs and economic circumstances — operationally potentially similar to multiple facilities.
- Multiple-facility option:
  - Allows the Fund to tackle special balance of payments problems faced by a small number of members without undermining other operations.
  - Challenge: ensure the taxonomy of instruments is relevant to members’ balance of payments needs.

### Potential gaps and new instruments (identified for exploration)
- Categories of potential new instruments:
  - (i) a pure signaling instrument;
  - (ii) a credit line designed to help forestall capital account shocks;
  - (iii) a liquidity instrument for fast drawings of short maturity;
  - (iv) a “quiet” instrument.
- A pure signaling instrument:
  - Today middle-income members wanting endorsement and monitoring purely for signaling can request a stand-by arrangement and treat it as precautionary.
  - PSI was limited to low-income members to avoid undermining precautionary arrangements; the Fund could consider making the PSI available to all members or creating a similar signaling instrument for middle-income members.
- A crisis-prevention instrument:
  - Members worry about capital account shocks when integrating into global capital markets.
  - Stand-by is not ideal due to quarterly phasing and an on-off pattern for availability.
  - Consideration of a Rapid Access Line (RAL) to fortify defenses against capital account crisis.
  - Two Executive Directors proposed the Financial Stability Line (FSL) focusing on countries that announce programs to strengthen regulatory/supervisory frameworks, develop domestic financial markets, and gradually liberalize the capital account.
  - A new instrument could embody elements of both the FSL and the RAL.
- A short-term liquidity instrument:
  - Advanced Fund members can experience short-term foreign exchange liquidity needs they currently meet via foreign exchange swaps with other central banks.
  - Proposal referenced: standing network of currency swaps, collateral policies and account arrangements to mobilize liquidity quickly (Timothy F. Geithner, Financial Times, June 9, 2008).
  - The Fund might consider a quick-disbursing short-term liquidity facility providing one outright purchase, available to members with very strong policy track record and sound policy framework; primary safeguard would be selective qualification assessment.
- A “quiet” facility:
  - Could the Fund provide financing with little immediate public information to reduce stigma and mirror central bank lender-of-last-resort transactions conducted swiftly and quietly?

### Support specific to low-income members
- PRGF framework remains central for low-income members, focusing on poverty reduction and growth based on country-owned strategies (PRSs); PRGF will remain important for those needing support for longer-term structural reforms or that have not reached HIPC completion point.
- Potential reforms to PRGF might include “re-branding” to reduce stigma and avoid the implication that PRGF is only or primarily for countries in need of HIPC debt relief; more than half of the 23 HIPC completion point countries have had new PRGF arrangements approved.
- Many low-income members have improved policies and institutions, strengthened balance of payments, and some are gaining access to private capital markets and non-traditional donors; needs may shift toward short-term balance of payments support, policy advice, and signaling resembling emerging market needs.
- Instruments for evolving low-income needs:
  - PSI has proven valuable for signaling and engagement.
  - Some countries may benefit from instruments supporting short-term stabilization without the PRGF’s emphasis on longer-term reforms and PRS requirement.
- Immediate priority: staff paper “Proposed Reforms to the Exogenous Shocks Facility” is considering modifications to the ESF to enhance rapid assistance and flexibility while preserving donors’ objectives; ESF became effective in January 2006 but has not yet been used.
- The Fund could establish a low-income stand-by arrangement with PRGF terms via the PRGF Trust to address short-term stabilization needs, including due to domestic challenges that lead to balance of payments needs.
- Further work: review initial experience under the PSI; streamline documentation requirements for PRGF and PSI reviews; further consider Fund engagement with “fragile states.” The Board will be presented with papers on these issues in due course.

### Streamlining existing instruments
- Three instruments identified as prime candidates for elimination or reform based on current usage:
  - The Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF)
    - Created in December 1997 during the Asian crisis as the Fund’s financing instrument for capital account crises.
    - Carries high surcharges and short maturity; designed for cases where quick recovery is expected, but since Korea no crisis has fit a V-shaped pattern.
    - Review of charges and maturities will consider aligning surcharges on high access across instruments; this could remove one distinguishing feature of the SRF and prompt consideration of its usefulness.
  - The Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF)
    - Created in 1963 to provide low-conditionality assistance for balance of payments needs caused by temporary and largely exogenous export shortfalls or excess costs of cereal imports.
    - Last used in 1999.
    - Most appropriate for middle-income members (resources are nonconcessional), but these countries generally have access to market financing; countries with underlying balance of payments problems could only use the CFF in combination with an arrangement with upper-credit tranche conditionality.
    - If unused in the current episode of high food prices, it may be time to eliminate it.
  - The Extended Fund Facility (EFF)
    - Established in 1974 to provide assistance where balance of payments difficulties are expected to be relatively long-term, including limited access to private capital and structural reform needs.
    - Rarely used nowadays and typically blended with PRGF resources — the last stand-alone EFF was approved in 2002.
    - The EFF might still be useful for countries transitioning from low-income to emerging market status.
- Blended resources combine financing from the PRGF Trust and the general resources account for low-income member countries with higher income levels or non-concessional financing alternatives; blending is intended to help conserve scarce PRGF resources.

### Globalization, integration, and conditionality
- Conditionality should enable, not hinder, nimble policymaking that "responds quickly to changing circumstances."
- Application of conditionality should take into account the member’s circumstances and could be tailored further within the Conditionality Guidelines.
- Situations where less conditionality might be appropriate:
  - "access is low"
  - "the shock is exogenous and self-correcting"
  - "the member has high policy credibility"
- Situations where conditionality remains key:
  - "access is high"
  - "the shock is self-inflicted or requires policy adjustment"
  - "the member has a need for signaling and to establish policy credibility"
- Alternative conditionality modalities discussed:
  - Selective qualification tests and reviews-only monitoring instead of standard periodic test dates and performance criteria (grant more policy space to the member; could be considered for instruments aimed at members "with a strong policy record and no major adjustment needs (as in the case of the RAL)"; disadvantages include potentially less clarity over financing availability).
  - Providing support as outright purchases rather than under arrangements (outright purchases currently limited to emergency assistance; proposal to consider one outright purchase subject to selective qualification criteria for members with very strong policy track records).
  - Exploring collateral (allowed under the Articles of Agreement but not used) as an alternative safeguard; collateral can replace safeguards role of conditionality but not replace the role of ensuring appropriate adjustment and raises complex signaling and implementation issues.

### Financial terms: access limits, cost structure, and Fund size
- Observations on Fund size and liquidity:
  - "The relative size of Fund resources is declining" versus "world GDP, trade, and capital flows" and for individual members relative to their balance of payments flows.
  - "Fund liquidity has reached very high levels," implying financing constraints are unlikely except in a systemic crisis.
  - High liquidity may indicate "the size of Fund lending is too small or conditional to be useful" and be a reason for "self-insurance."
  - "No general quota increase was approved in the context of the 13th general review of quotas."
- Access limits and exceptional access (exact text preserved):
  - "The annual limit is 100 percent of quota and the cumulative limit is 300 percent of quota (net of scheduled repurchases). There are also separate limits of 100 percent of quota annually, and 300 percent of quota cumulatively (net of scheduled repurchases) on overall access by a member to the Fund’s general resources."
  - Access above these limits "can be approved by the Board in exceptional cases" and involves "strengthened due diligence in the form of tests against formal criteria, early Board consultations, and enhanced reporting."
  - The Board reviewed access limits in February 2008 and "left them unchanged," but there have been calls since then "for the Fund to consider raising the limits."
  - The recent quota reform "increases the potential borrowing of a number of emerging markets within the access limits" though "most members received only a small or no increase under the reform."
  - Access limits "have not in practice prevented the Fund from providing high, even exceptional, financing where warranted and the access limits have little direct impact."
- Cost structure of Fund lending:
  - Concessional financing: "a flat 0.5 percent interest rate, subject to availability of subsidy resources."
  - General resources cost elements:
    - "A commitment fee on undrawn amounts under an arrangement that is refunded if purchases are made."
    - "A basic rate of charge on drawn amounts (it is the sum of the SDR rate, which fluctuates, and a Board-approved margin)."
    - "An adjustment for burden sharing added on top of the basic rate."
    - "A service charge levied on each purchase."
    - "Surcharges on high access. There is one schedule of surcharges for purchases in the credit tranches or under the EFF, and one for drawings under the SRF."
  - Upcoming reviews will consider aligning surcharges on high access across instruments and potentially streamlining fee and surcharge structures.
- Considerations in setting cost structures:
  - The Fund is "not a profit-maximizing institution but a cooperative one" and cost should not deter members from seeking assistance.
  - Cost structure should reflect "public good aspects of Fund lending and the Fund’s preferred creditor status."
  - Surcharges serve to "reinforce the revolving nature of Fund resources in high access cases" and "help mitigate risks" by providing revenue to build precautionary balances.
  - Under the new income model, "the margin over the basic rate of charge is also set to allow reserve accumulation."
  - Key questions: whether surcharges "should be aligned across Fund instruments," "how high they should be," and whether "they should increase with the level of access, over time, or both."
  - Implications of the new income model for adequacy of the Fund’s reserves will be discussed in the forthcoming review of precautionary balances and the role and structure of surcharges will be considered in the review of charges and maturities.

### Next steps and issues for discussion
- Next steps:
  - "More detailed proposals will be developed later" and the work program "already envisages Board consideration of some of the issues raised in this paper."
- Issues for Directors to consider (questions posed):
  - To what extent is the decline in demand for Fund credit due to positive global and country-specific developments versus problems with the Fund’s financing toolkit?
  - Do Directors see stigma as a problem for the Fund, and if so, what might be considered to reduce it?
  - Are current lending and signaling instruments adequate for low-income, middle-income, and advanced countries, and what changes might be made? In particular, views on:
    - (i) a pure signaling instrument for middle-income members;
    - (ii) a crisis prevention instrument, such as the FSL and the RAL;
    - (iii) a short-term liquidity instrument; and
    - (iv) a "quiet" facility.
  - Should the Fund reconsider whether a balance of payments need should remain the organizing principle for Fund lending?
  - Do Directors consider the SRF, CFF and EFF as candidates for elimination?
  - Are there ways to tailor the use of conditionality to better address diverse membership needs while maintaining adequate safeguards and uniformity of treatment? Could there be circumstances where a different model (i.e. not based on conditionality) could be used?
  - Are there other areas of reform that should be considered?

*Source: _082808 - 1. Use of Fund Credit Among Current Members, 1945-2008*

### 1. Use of Fund Credit Among Current Members, 1945-2008..................................................21

### 1. Use of Fund Credit Among Current Members, 1945-2008..................................................21

### I. INTRODUCTION
- Paper raises and discusses issues related to how the Fund provides financial assistance to its members as part of the strategic review to ensure the Fund remains relevant and effective.
- Objective: not to increase Fund lending, but to make sure the Fund has the right instruments and policies to help all of its members—with appropriate protection of Fund resources—as they integrate into a world of growing and increasingly complex cross-border flows.
- Other institutions (including major central banks and the World Bank) are also retooling lending instruments and grappling with similar issues.
- The paper offers a high-level view and does not make specific policy proposals; policy proposals will be presented in follow-up papers, some planned for Board discussion later in 2008.
- Prepared by Mr. Erickson von Allmen, Mr. MacArthur, and Ms. Gust, with input from Ms. Alonso-Gamo and Mr. John.

### II. MEMBERS’ NEEDS AND THE SERVICES PROVIDED THROUGH THE FUND’S INSTRUMENTS
- Article I purpose cited: “To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.”
- Key findings:
  - About four out of five Fund members have used Fund credit at least once (Table 1), although use has been more concentrated since the 1980s.
  - Fund financial assistance has evolved from smoothing short-term (seasonal) trade fluctuations to supporting adjustment and catalyzing financing for a wide range of balance of payments problems, including terms of trade shocks, natural disasters, post-conflict situations, broad economic transitions, poverty reduction and economic development, sovereign debt restructuring, and confidence-driven banking and currency crises.
- Instrument evolution and features:
  - Stand-by arrangement established in 1952; though its use has been declining, it has remained the workhorse for middle-income countries seeking financial assistance.
  - Financing under the stand-by model is provided in support of adjustment to a balance of payments need and disbursed in tranches (phasing) based on conditions.
  - Since 1999, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) has been the primary vehicle for concessional balance of payments assistance to low-income members.
  - In some cases (small financing related to exogenous shocks or post-conflict needs), phasing is not required and a sensible policy statement suffices as conditionality.
  - Outright purchases in the credit tranches are possible; in recent years outright purchases have been used only under the policy of emergency assistance.
- Analytical point:
  - The model of financing in support of adjustment will remain integral, but should not be a straitjacket; a rethink of the lending model and the taxonomy of Fund instruments is needed as member needs change with deeper market access and evolving risks.

### III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE FUND
- Observed demand trends:
  - The demand for the Fund’s general resources has dropped sharply in recent years, along with a more modest decline in demand for the Fund’s concessional resources.
  - In the recent period of ample global liquidity and strong growth, many members strengthened policy frameworks and reduced vulnerabilities, lowering the need for balance of payments financing.
  - Many low-income members have received substantial debt relief, seen a pick-up in private capital inflows, and benefited from new sources of official financing.
- Fund Credit Outstanding note:
  - Chart referenced: “Fund Credit Outstanding, 1947- July 2008” — “In billions of SDR, end of period.” Axis marks include 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70 and years from 1947 through 2007; separate series labeled “GRA” and “Concessional.”
- Two contrasting views on the decline in Fund lending demand:
  - View A: Decline is not problematic—Fund should be a lender of last resort; low demand reflects historically low balance of payments needs and successful policy adoption.
  - View B: Decline signals a problem—many members shun the Fund and seek solutions outside it; members pursue alternatives such as regional pooling, self-insurance through reserves, or contingent World Bank financing.
- Examples of alternative arrangements members pursue:
  - Regional reserve pooling and financing arrangements (e.g., Chiang Mai Initiative, Latin American Reserve Fund, European Union and European Central Bank) though largely untested in crisis.
  - Accumulation of substantial international reserves for self-insurance; for some, reserves have reached levels that are high by most metrics.
  - Use or exploration of the World Bank’s Deferred Drawdown Option in conjunction with adjustment loans.
  - Central bank bilateral swap lines for liquidity management (example: U.S. Federal Reserve extended swap lines to the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank during credit market turmoil in advanced economies).
  - In May 2008, central banks of Sweden, Norway and Denmark entered into a Euro/Icelandic krona swap facility agreement with the Central Bank of Iceland.
  - At least two members engaged in collateralized borrowing from the Bank for International Settlements for balance of payments purposes.
  - Several members exploring development policy loans from the World Bank with longer repayment periods and somewhat lower interest rates than the Fund and conditionality tied only to an appropriate macroeconomic policy framework.
- Questions raised for the Fund:
  - Do members have balance of payments needs or risks for which the Fund does not offer attractive solutions?
  - Could there be a role for the Fund along the lines of central banks’ swap transactions?
  - If official balance of payments financing or protection is needed, what role should the Fund play?
  - Concerns voiced that Fund resources may be too small for relevance, instruments may send negative signals, come with too many conditions, too little financing, and be too costly.
- Box 1 — Concerns About Stigma (summary of key points):
  - Stigma associated with Fund-supported programs may deter members from approaching the Fund until crises are advanced and can hinder crisis prevention.
  - Sources of stigma include: past Fund experience, market perception that approaching the Fund signals worse problems, domestic political concerns, and associations of PRGF with lack of development or debt sustainability risks (due to its association with the HIPC Initiative).
  - Fund’s own accountability for unpopular reforms and any tarnishing of Fund credibility exacerbate stigma.
  - Central banks also face stigma (example: U.S. Federal Reserve’s discount window usage in 2007; Fed actions to de-stigmatize included cutting the discount rate, loosening collateral standards, creating the Term Auction Facility; Bank of England’s Special Liquidity Scheme prohibits publication of who used it to tackle stigma).
  - The Fund has difficulty tackling stigma directly; tailoring instruments better to members’ needs and considering a “quiet” Fund facility are suggested mitigants.

### IV. SOME BROADER ISSUES REGARDING FUND LENDING
- Underpinning principles and rationale:
  - Article I provides a broad, continuing framework for Fund lending.
  - Fund lending promotes international public goods: balance of payments stability, an open system of international trade and exchange, and reduced externalities from contagion, disruptive adjustments, and defaults.
- Specific rationales identified:
  - Fund financing smooths adjustment to shocks, helping members avoid overly disruptive economic adjustment or default that can be costly domestically and via contagion.
  - Fund-supported programs can catalyze other financing via conditionality and the Fund’s signal (“stamp of approval”), reinforcing policy credibility even when the Fund’s own financial contribution is small.
  - Fund lending can help prevent crisis by making available large access up front in support of strong policies, improving confidence and reducing incentives for investor runs; current instruments are not ideally suited for this preventive support.
- Comparative advantage of the Fund:
  - The private sector and bilateral creditors cannot be counted on to provide the same services because of costs, needed resources, legitimacy concerns, and political difficulty in making hard decisions; the Fund’s professional expertise and multilateral mandate provide a comparative advantage.
- Role of conditionality:
  - Most Fund lending is disbursed in tranches and subject to conditionality to ensure problems are resolved without destructive adjustments and to limit risks to the Fund.
  - Phasing allows time for adjustments; conditionality can reinforce credibility, catalyze other financing, and speed confidence restoration.
  - Members sometimes seek conditionality to signal policy commitment.
  - Concerns exist that conditionality may be excessive, undermine ownership, or interfere with sovereignty.
  - Fund has rewritten guidelines to ensure conditionality is applied judiciously (see Guidelines on Conditionality, Decision No. 12864-(02/102), September 25, 2002, and Implementation Plan in Response to Board-Endorsed Recommendations Arising From the Independent Evaluation Office’s Evaluation of Structural Conditionality, April 8, 2008).
  - Difficulty remains in separating conditions critical to program success from those that are “good” but nonessential; as membership diversifies, questions arise about tailoring conditionality and alternative models not based on conditionality.
- Open question highlighted: What should be the basis for Fund lending going forward as member needs and global financial integration evolve?

*Source: _082808 - 1. Use of Fund Credit Among Current Members, 1945-2008..................................................21*

### 17.      All Fund financing is committed on the basis of actual or potential balance of

### _082808 - 17.      All Fund financing is committed on the basis of actual or potential balance of payments need.

### Balance of payments need and modernization
- Article V, Section 3 condition for drawing: a member “represents that it has a need to make the purchase because of its balance of payments or its reserve position or developments in its reserves”.
- Financial market liberalization and integration are making the distinction between resident and nonresident transactions—central to the definition of balance of payments—increasingly irrelevant from an economic point of view.
- Open capital accounts and globalization have led to active secondary markets for debt, enabling debt instruments to move rapidly across borders.
- Practical difficulties arise in specifying the “need” criterion when Fund financing is directed toward the budget (currency unions, currency boards, domestic funding problems) or to support a domestic lender-of-last-resort function in foreign currency.
- The document poses the question: should the Fund consider modernizing the way balance of payments need is defined?

### How should Fund lending be organized?
- Could the Fund provide all assistance under only one facility?
  - A single-facility structure would be simple and transparent.
  - To address individual circumstances the terms (including concessionality) would need tailoring to members’ balance of payments needs and economic circumstances—potentially operationally similar to multiple facilities.
  - A multiplicity of instruments can allow the Fund to tackle special balance of payments problems faced by a small number of members without undermining other operations.
- With multiple facilities the challenge is to ensure the taxonomy of instruments is relevant to members’ balance of payments needs.

### Potential gaps and new instruments
- Several potential gaps in the toolkit may be explored: 
  - (i) a pure signaling instrument;
  - (ii) a credit line designed to help forestall capital account shocks;
  - (iii) a liquidity instrument for fast drawings of short maturity;
  - (iv) a “quiet” instrument.
- A pure signaling instrument:
  - Today a middle-income member wanting endorsement and monitoring purely for signaling can request a stand-by arrangement and treat it as precautionary.
  - PSI was limited to low-income members to avoid undermining precautionary arrangements; the Fund could consider making the PSI available to all members or creating a similar signaling instrument for middle-income members.
- A crisis-prevention instrument:
  - Members worry about capital account shocks when integrating into global capital markets.
  - Stand-by is not ideal due to quarterly phasing and an on-off pattern for availability.
  - The Fund has considered a new liquidity instrument (e.g., Rapid Access Line, RAL) to fortify members’ defenses against capital account crisis.
  - Two Executive Directors proposed the Financial Stability Line (FSL) focusing on countries that announce programs to strengthen regulatory/supervisory frameworks, develop domestic financial markets, and gradually liberalize the capital account.
  - The RAL would focus on countries with a meaningful degree of capital market integration and no large reform needs; a new instrument could embody elements of both the FSL and the RAL.
- A short-term liquidity instrument:
  - Advanced Fund members can experience short-term foreign exchange liquidity needs they currently meet via foreign exchange swaps with other central banks.
  - The President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York proposed a standing network of currency swaps, collateral policies and account arrangements to mobilize liquidity quickly (Timothy F. Geithner, Financial Times, June 9, 2008).
  - The Fund might consider a quick-disbursing short-term liquidity facility providing one outright purchase, available to members with very strong policy track record and sound policy framework; primary safeguard would be selective qualification assessment.
- A “quiet” facility:
  - Could the Fund provide financing with little immediate public information to reduce stigma and mirror central bank lender-of-last-resort transactions conducted swiftly and quietly?

### Support specific to low-income members
- The Executive Board considered these issues in “The Role of the Fund in Low-Income Countries.”
- The PRGF framework remains central for low-income members, focusing on poverty reduction and growth based on country-owned strategies (PRSs); PRGF will remain important for those needing support for longer-term structural reforms or that have not reached HIPC completion point.
- Potential reforms to PRGF might include “re-branding” to reduce stigma and avoid the implication that PRGF is only or primarily for countries in need of HIPC debt relief; more than half of the 23 HIPC completion point countries have had new PRGF arrangements approved.
- Many low-income members have improved policies and institutions, strengthened balance of payments, and some are gaining access to private capital markets and non-traditional donors; needs may shift toward short-term balance of payments support, policy advice, and signaling resembling emerging market needs.
- Instruments for evolving low-income needs:
  - PSI has proven valuable for signaling and engagement.
  - Some countries may benefit from instruments supporting short-term stabilization without the PRGF’s emphasis on longer-term reforms and PRS requirement.
- Immediate priority: a staff paper “Proposed Reforms to the Exogenous Shocks Facility” is considering modifications to the ESF to enhance rapid assistance and flexibility while preserving donors’ objectives; ESF became effective in January 2006 but has not yet been used.
- The Fund could establish a low-income stand-by arrangement with PRGF terms via the PRGF Trust to address short-term stabilization needs, including due to domestic challenges that lead to balance of payments needs.
- Further efforts: review initial experience under the PSI; streamline documentation requirements for PRGF and PSI reviews; further consider Fund engagement with “fragile states.” The Board will be presented with papers on these issues in due course.

### Streamlining existing instruments
- Three instruments identified as prime candidates for elimination or reform based on current usage:
  - The Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF)
    - Created in December 1997 during the Asian crisis as the Fund’s financing instrument for capital account crises.
    - Carries high surcharges and short maturity; designed for cases where quick recovery is expected, but since Korea no crisis has fit a V-shaped pattern.
    - The review of charges and maturities will consider aligning surcharges on high access across instruments; this could remove one distinguishing feature of the SRF and prompt consideration of its usefulness.
  - The Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF)
    - Created in 1963 to provide low-conditionality assistance for balance of payments needs caused by temporary and largely exogenous export shortfalls or excess costs of cereal imports.
    - Last used in 1999.
    - Most appropriate for middle-income members (resources are nonconcessional), but these countries generally have access to market financing; countries with underlying balance of payments problems could only use the CFF in combination with an arrangement with upper-credit tranche conditionality.
    - If unused in the current episode of high food prices, it may be time to eliminate it.
  - The Extended Fund Facility (EFF)
    - Established in 1974 to provide assistance where balance of payments difficulties are expected to be relatively long-term, including limited access to private capital and structural reform needs.
    - Rarely used nowadays and typically blended with PRGF resources—the last stand-alone EFF was approved in 2002.
    - The EFF might still be useful for countries transitioning from low-income to emerging market status.
- Blended resources combine financing from the PRGF Trust and the general resources account for low-income member countries with higher income levels or non-concessional financing alternatives; blending is intended to help conserve scarce PRGF resources.

*Source: _082808 - 17.      All Fund financing is committed on the basis of actual or potential balance of payments need.*

### 37.      Globalization and integration place a premium on credible and nimble policymaking

### Globalization and integration place a premium on credible and nimble policymaking

### Conditionality: tailoring to member circumstances
- Conditionality should enable, not hinder, nimble policymaking that "responds quickly to changing circumstances."
- Application of conditionality should take into account the member’s circumstances and could be tailored further within the Conditionality Guidelines.
- Situations where less conditionality might be appropriate:
  - "access is low"
  - "the shock is exogenous and self-correcting"
  - "the member has high policy credibility"
- Situations where conditionality remains key:
  - "access is high"
  - "the shock is self-inflicted or requires policy adjustment"
  - "the member has a need for signaling and to establish policy credibility"

### Alternative conditionality modalities (options discussed)
- Use of selective qualification tests and reviews-only monitoring instead of standard periodic test dates and performance criteria:
  - Would "grant more policy space to the member" and allow program discussions to focus "more on the forest than the trees."
  - Could be considered for instruments aimed at members "with a strong policy record and no major adjustment needs (as in the case of the RAL)."
  - Would give the Fund "greater leeway in judging whether a program is on track" and thereby "strengthen the safeguards to the Fund."
  - Disadvantages: "potentially less clarity to the member over the availability of financing, and tougher judgments for the Fund when programs go off track."
- Providing support as outright purchases rather than under arrangements:
  - Currently "outright purchases are provided only in very limited amounts and only for emergency assistance."
  - Proposal: consider "providing support in the form of one outright purchase, subject to selective qualification criteria, rather than in tranches subject to ongoing conditionality," for members "with a very strong policy track record and a sound policy framework in place."
  - Benefit: "allow for a quicker response to foreign exchange liquidity pressures than when a full-blown program has to be negotiated."
  - Primary safeguard: "assessment that, based on past record and current policies, the Fund is confident that the member will adjust policies appropriately."
- Exploring collateral (e.g., central banks) as an alternative safeguard:
  - Collateral "is allowed under the Articles of Agreement but has not been used."
  - Collateral "can replace the safeguards role of conditionality" but "cannot replace the role of ensuring appropriate adjustment."
  - Use of collateral raises "a range of complex signaling and implementation issues" including "the type of collateral the Fund could accept."

### Financial terms: access limits and cost of Fund credit
- Observations on Fund size and liquidity:
  - "The relative size of Fund resources is declining" versus "world GDP, trade, and capital flows" and for individual members relative to their balance of payments flows.
  - "Fund liquidity has reached very high levels," implying financing constraints are unlikely except in a systemic crisis.
  - High liquidity may indicate "the size of Fund lending is too small or conditional to be useful" and be a reason for "self-insurance."
  - "No general quota increase was approved in the context of the 13th general review of quotas."
- Access limits and exceptional access:
  - "Access by a member to the Fund’s resources in the credit tranches and under the EFF is subject to an annual and a cumulative limit, and these limits have remained unchanged since 1994."
  - Exact limits (footnote text preserved): "The annual limit is 100 percent of quota and the cumulative limit is 300 percent of quota (net of scheduled repurchases). There are also separate limits of 100 percent of quota annually, and 300 percent of quota cumulatively (net of scheduled repurchases) on overall access by a member to the Fund’s general resources."
  - Access above these limits "can be approved by the Board in exceptional cases" and involves "strengthened due diligence in the form of tests against formal criteria, early Board consultations, and enhanced reporting."
  - The Board reviewed access limits in February 2008 and "left them unchanged," but there have been calls since then "for the Fund to consider raising the limits."
  - The recent quota reform "increases the potential borrowing of a number of emerging markets within the access limits" though "most members received only a small or no increase under the reform."
  - Access limits "have not in practice prevented the Fund from providing high, even exceptional, financing where warranted and the access limits have little direct impact."
- Cost structure of Fund lending (general resources and concessional):
  - Concessional financing: "a flat 0.5 percent interest rate, subject to availability of subsidy resources."
  - General resources cost elements:
    - "A commitment fee on undrawn amounts under an arrangement that is refunded if purchases are made."
    - "A basic rate of charge on drawn amounts (it is the sum of the SDR rate, which fluctuates, and a Board-approved margin)."
    - "An adjustment for burden sharing added on top of the basic rate."
    - "A service charge levied on each purchase."
    - "Surcharges on high access. There is one schedule of surcharges for purchases in the credit tranches or under the EFF, and one for drawings under the SRF."
  - The upcoming review will consider "aligning surcharges on high access across instruments."
  - The Fund "could consider streamlining its fee and surcharge structures." (Comparison: "The World Bank recently implemented a significant simplification and reduction in its IBRD loan and guarantee pricing.")
- Considerations in setting cost structures:
  - The Fund is "not a profit-maximizing institution but a cooperative one" and cost should not deter members from seeking assistance.
  - Cost structure should reflect "public good aspects of Fund lending and the Fund’s preferred creditor status."
  - Surcharges serve to "reinforce the revolving nature of Fund resources in high access cases" and "help mitigate risks" by providing revenue to build precautionary balances.
  - Under the new income model, "the margin over the basic rate of charge is also set to allow reserve accumulation."
  - Key questions for surcharges: whether "they should be aligned across Fund instruments," "how high they should be," and whether "they should increase with the level of access, over time, or both."
  - "Implications of the new income model for the adequacy of the Fund’s reserves will be discussed in the forthcoming review of precautionary balances and the role and structure of surcharges will be considered in the review of charges and maturities."

### Next steps and issues for discussion
- Next steps:
  - "More detailed proposals will be developed later" and the work program "already envisages Board consideration of some of the issues raised in this paper."
- Issues for Directors to consider (questions posed):
  - "To what extent do Directors think the decline in demand for Fund credit is due to positive global and country-specific developments and to what extent might it also reflect problems with the financing toolkit the Fund offers its members?"
  - "Do Directors see stigma as a problem for the Fund, and if so, what might be considered to reduce it?"
  - Are current lending and signaling instruments adequate for low-income, middle-income, and advanced countries, and what changes might be made? In particular views on:
    - "(i) a pure signaling instrument for middle-income members;"
    - "(ii) a crisis prevention instrument, such as the FSL and the RAL;"
    - "(iii) a short-term liquidity instrument;" and
    - "(iv) a 'quiet' facility."
  - "Should the Fund reconsider whether a balance of payments need should remain the organizing principle for Fund lending?"
  - "Do Directors consider the SRF, CFF and EFF as candidates for elimination?"
  - "Are there are ways to tailor the use of conditionality, to better address the diverse needs of the membership while maintaining adequate safeguards for the Fund and uniformity of treatment? Could there be circumstances where a different model (i.e. not based on conditionality) could be used?"
  - "Are there other areas of reform that should be considered?"

*Source: IMF paper excerpt (2008).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2008/_082808.pdf_
