## The Policy Support Instrument (PSI), introduced in October 2005, enables the Fund to support low-income countries that do not need Fund financial assistance.

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [The Policy Support Instrument (PSI), introduced in October 2005, enables the Fund to support low-income countries that do not need Fund financial assistance.](https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2009/_060409.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2009/_060409.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2009/_060409.pdf.json)

---

### Overview and purpose
- PSI intended for low-income countries that have secured macroeconomic stability and completed basic structural reforms but wish to remain engaged with the Fund to consolidate macroeconomic performance and pursue second-generation reforms to secure higher and sustainable growth.
- PSI engagement can:
  - support the development of policy programs;
  - build reform commitment through the Fund endorsed program;
  - identify priorities for technical assistance;
  - signal to others the implementation of a reform program meeting upper credit tranche conditionality;
  - facilitate a rapid move to Fund financial support should conditions change.

### Review scope and timing
- The Fund’s Executive Board called for a review after three years.
- The deadline for the interim review was originally December 31, 2008, but was subsequently extended to June 30, 2009.
- The experience reviewed: Seven PSIs approved for six member countries; each concluded or had at least two reviews completed (i.e., covering at least one year of program experience).
- The review draws on empirical evidence, surveys, and anecdotal evidence; conclusions are preliminary and tentative given small sample sizes.

### Four dimensions examined in the review
- Characteristics of PSI users: assessment of whether PSI users are “mature stabilizers” (defined by four macroeconomic criteria and institutional/policy development).
- Program design and implementation: assessed against members’ success in meeting program goals; baselines include previous PRGF-supported programs for PSI users and contemporaneous PRGF programs for similar comparator countries.
- Comparative macroeconomic performance: variables such as growth and inflation compared with previous PRGF programs and contemporaneous comparator countries to control for transient global factors.
- Perceptions of the PSI’s role: input collected via written surveys to PSI users, other PRGF-eligible members, donors, private investors; outreach to CSOs and other stakeholders via teleconferences, meetings, seminars; country team inputs.

### Definition and screening of “mature stabilizers”
- Original criteria: “achieved a reasonable growth performance, low-underlying inflation (comparable to that obtaining in their major trading partners), an adequate level of official international reserves, and begun to establish (external and net domestic) debt sustainability.”
- For this review, quantitative measures applied with thresholds set at the average or an above-average level among PRGF-eligible countries or near/above conventional policy “rule-of-thumb” (example: reserves equal to three months of imports).
- Variables averaged over five years where data permit to capture sustained performance; for inflation, both a maximum annual threshold and a five-year average threshold were used.
- Structural policies captured via an additional criterion: countries below the mid-point of the “medium institutional capacity” category in the World Bank’s CPIA index were excluded from comparator class.

### Comparator group and representativeness
- The comparator group, defined by the methodology, accounts for one quarter of PRGF-eligible members and encompasses all but one of the PSI users.
- Nigeria was the exception; it met four of the five criteria and “did not meet the institutional quality criterion.”
- Comparator group includes:
  - PSI users (month/year of PSI approval): Cape Verde (7/06); Mozambique (6/07); Nigeria (10/05)*; Senegal (11/07); Tanzania (2/07); Uganda (2/06, 12/06)
  - PRGF comparator countries (month/year of PRGF approval): Albania (2/06); Armenia (5/05); Honduras (2/04); Kenya (11/03); Kyrgyz Republic (2/05); Mali (6/04, 5/08); Moldova (5/06); Rwanda (6/06)
  - Other comparator countries: Azerbaijan; India; Lesotho; Pakistan; St. Lucia; Vietnam
- The evidence suggests the PSI has largely been used by its intended target group of mature stabilizers.
- The PSI has not fully displaced other forms of engagement among mature stabilizers:
  - Four comparator countries had new PRGF arrangements approved after October 2005.
  - Of the five countries with low-access PRGF arrangements approved after October 2005, two were among the comparator countries.

### Program design expectations
- Executive Board view: content of PSI-supported programs should closely follow that for the PRGF.
- PSI-supported programs expected to meet the standard of upper credit tranche conditionality (same standard as programs supported by Fund facilities such as the PRGF).
- The Standard Guidelines on Conditionality apply to PSIs.
- Documentation for PSI-supported programs was expected to be able to be more concise than for financial arrangements.

### Comparative findings on program design and implementation
- Methodology: PSI-supported programs compared with PRGF-supported programs for PRGF comparator countries and with previous PRGF-supported programs for PSI users to control for country-specific factors.
- Number of conditions:
  - PRGF-supported programs with both mature stabilizers and other LICs had roughly one quarter more conditions per review than PSI-supported programs.
  - The lower number of conditions in PSI-supported programs extended to both quantitative and structural conditions.
  - The number of conditions in PSI-supported programs was roughly similar to that in the previous PRGF-supported programs for the same PSI countries, suggesting country-specific factors influence conditionality.
- Implementation/adherence to structural conditionality:
  - PSI-supported programs have a somewhat higher level of adherence to structural conditionality than contemporaneous PRGF-supported programs.
  - Adherence in PSI-supported programs most closely resembled that of the previous PRGF-supported programs in PSI countries.
- Areas of structural conditionality (most common across groups): revenue mobilization, debt and expenditure management, and banking and financial sector conditions.
  - Debt and expenditure management measures were relatively more common for PSI-supported programs.
  - Revenue mobilization was relatively less important in PSI-supported programs than banking and financial sector conditions.
- Fixed review schedule:
  - All reviews under PSI-supported programs have been completed on schedule.
  - The fixed review schedule does not appear to weaken program implementation or design.
  - Adherence to conditionality is similar in PSI and PRGF-supported programs; PSI users have not required more waivers.
  - PSI users have similar numbers of conditions under the PSI and their previous PRGF arrangements.
  - The fixed review schedule appears effective in encouraging policy discipline.

### Conclusions and implications
- Preliminary conclusion: economic performance of PSI users has been at least as strong as that under PRGF-supported programs.
- Member countries deem the PSI a useful alternative to conventional instruments where there is no immediate need for Fund financing.
- The PSI has functioned as a voluntary, demand-driven tool expanding instruments for Fund engagement with low-income countries.
- Given small sample sizes and that many PSIs were still ongoing at the time of review, conclusions are tentative.
- The reform of LIC facilities under parallel work is not expected to alter the case for the PSI as a complement to financing instruments.

### Box 2. Senegal: Promoting Structural Reforms under the PSI
- Assessment under three PRGFs (since 1994):
  - An assessment was critical of Senegal’s performance on structural reforms under its three PRGFs since 1994.
  - Only about three-fifths of structural performance criteria were met on time.
  - About half of the structural benchmarks were met on time.
  - Instances of delays or noncompliance exceeded the observance of structural conditionality continuously since mid-2000.
  - Some reforms succeeded only after several attempts.
  - Reforms related to transparency in the financing of the new airport had been a major obstacle and delayed completion of past reviews under the PRGF.
- Performance under the PSI:
  - Since the start of the PSI program, Senegal has met all prior actions and all structural assessment criteria.
  - Senegal has implemented two-thirds of the structural benchmarks on time.
  - The remainder of structural benchmarks were implemented either partially or with a slight delay.
- Factors behind improved implementation:
  - Both the authorities and the staff team considered that the PSI’s predetermined review schedule was an important factor behind the improved implementation of structural reforms.
  - The Minister of Finance reportedly expressed the view to management and staff that the schedule imposed significant discipline on decision-making within the government and led to more timely decisions.
  - One cited instance: when budgetary slippages were uncovered in 2008, strong corrective actions were quickly taken, laying the foundation for a positive staff recommendation to complete the second PSI review.
  - Prompt corrective action in this case helped put Senegal in a stronger position to face the impact of the global economic crisis that was breaking at that time.

### Survey results: motivations, drawbacks, perceptions (PSI users, donors, other LICs, private sector)
- PSI users: motivations for using the PSI (response/rank distributions)
  - a. to intensify your policy dialogue with the IMF. — 16.7 16.7 − 16.7 50
  - b. to reinforce your efforts to maintain fiscal and monetary discipline. — 50 − 33.3 − 16.7 −
  - c. to provide a framework for policy reform, including through the requirement for a recent poverty reduction strategy paper. — 16.7 33.3 33.3 − 16.7 −
  - d. to give confidence to the domestic private sector. — − − − 50 16.7 33.3
  - e. to give confidence to donors, and thereby improve prospects for donor support. — 16.7 33.3 16.7 16.7 − 16.7
  - f. to give confidence to foreign investors. — 16.7 16.7 − 33.3 33.3 −
- Whether experience with the PSI changed weighting of motivations:
  - Yes: 20
  - No: 80
- Drawbacks of using the PSI (responses and rank distributions)
  - a. the need for fixed reviews. — − 16.7 33.3 16.7 − 16.7 16.7
  - b. the lack of financing. — − 16.7 − − 33.3 − 50
  - c. the requirement for a recent poverty reduction strategy paper. — − − 50.0 − − 33.3 16.7
  - d. donors regard signals from other programs as stronger and clearer. — − 16.7 − 16.7 50 − 16.7
  - e. foreign investors regard signals from other programs as stronger and clearer. — 16.7 16.7 − 33.3 − 33.3 −
  - f. debt concessionality requirements are too stringent. — 16.7 33.3 16.7 − 16.7 16.7 −
  - g. too much structural criteria. — 50 − − 33.3 − − −
  - h. other — 16.7 − − − − − −
- Whether experience with the PSI changed weighting of drawbacks:
  - Yes: 20
  - No: 80
- PSI-using countries: views on PSI performance and design (response distributions)
  - 5. IMF’s assessments delivered clear and timely signals about the strength of policies. — 20 80 − − − −
  - 6. PSI-supported program promoted close policy dialogue with the IMF. — 60 40 − − − −
  - 7. Fixed review schedule under the PSI improved the frequency of IMF signals. — 16.7 66.7 16.7 − − −
  - 8. Performance under PSI has been an important input into donor aid decisions. — 16.7 66.7 − − − 16.7
  - 9. Fixed review schedule helped facilitate donor coordination. — − 66.7 − 16.7 − 16.7
  - 10. Absence of IMF financing in the PSI has not constrained implementation of economic reform strategy. — 20 60 − 20 − −
  - 11. PSI signals have been useful in attracting private sector interest. — − 60 40 − − −
  - 12. PSI more appropriate to your needs than a PRGF arrangement. — 20 40 40 − − −
  - 13. Country ownership under PSI-supported program has been sufficiently emphasized. — 40 60 − − − −
  - 14. PSI-supported program sufficiently aligned with poverty reduction strategies. — 20 60 20 − − −
  - 15. PSI policy framework focused on consolidating macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability. — 60 40 − − − −
  - 16. Structural measures focused on areas critical to maintenance of macroeconomic stability. — 40 60 − − − −
  - 17. Modifications to the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) and the PSI making concurrent ESFs and PSIs possible make the PSI more attractive. — 33.3 33.3 16.7 16.7 − −
  - 18. Non-concessional debt limits under PSI-supported programs are appropriate. — 20 60 20 − − −
  - 19. Implementation of macroeconomic policies under the PSI-supported program has been [    ] than it would have been under a PRGF arrangement. — 20 60 − 20 − −
  - 20. Implementation of structural measures under the PSI-supported program has been [    ] than it would have been under a PRGF arrangement. — 20 60 20 − − −

- Donors’ responses on PSI-supported programs (percent of total responses)
  - 1. IMF assessments delivered clear and timely signals of the strength of policies. — 10.5 79.0 5.3 − − 5.3
  - 2. Country performance under a PSI has been an important input into donor aid decisions. — 31.6 47.4 5.3 − − 15.8
  - 3. PSI-supported programs promoted close policy dialogue between the IMF and user countries. — 47.4 47.4 − − − 5.3
  - 4. Fixed review schedule improved frequency of IMF signals. — 15.8 47.4 26.3 5.3 − 5.3
  - 5. Fixed review schedule helped coordination among donors and with country authorities. — 10.5 52.6 21.1 5.3 − 10.5
  - 6. Absence of IMF financing in the PSI has not constrained implementation of the country's economic reform strategy. — 26.3 36.8 21.1 15.8 − −
  - 7. PSI policy frameworks focused on consolidating macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability. — 15.8 79.0 5.3 − − −
  - 8. Structural measures focused on areas critical to maintenance of macroeconomic stability. — 15.8 36.8 47.4 − − −
  - 9. Country ownership under a PSI-supported program has been sufficiently emphasized. — 21.1 47.4 21.1 − − 10.5
  - 10. PSI-supported programs sufficiently aligned with countries’ poverty reduction strategies. — 10.5 52.6 21.1 5.3 − 10.5
  - 11. Non-concessional debt limits under PSI-supported programs are appropriate. — 17.7 52.9 11.8 5.9 − 11.8
  - 12. PSI users have been “mature stabilizers.” — 5.3 79.0 15.8 − − −
  - 13. Relative to surveillance, the PSI has been [   ] useful for making aid decisions. — 40.0 40.0 − 20.0
  - 14. Relative to a PRGF arrangement, the PSI has been [    ] useful for making aid decisions. — − 64.7 11.8 24
  - 15. Implementation of macroeconomic policies under PSIs has been [    ] than it would have been under a PRGF arrangement. — 5.6 11.1 61.1 − − 22.2
  - 16. Implementation of structural measures under PSIs has been [    ] than it would have been under a PRGF arrangement. — − 5.6 72.2 5.6 − 16.7

- Other low-income countries: motivations and drawbacks if considering PSI in future (percent distributions)
  - Motivations (rank distributions):
    - a) intensify policy dialogue with the IMF. — 6.3 6.3 18.8 25.0 18.8 25.0
    - b) reinforce efforts to maintain fiscal and monetary discipline. — 37.5 18.8 6.3 12.5 18.8 6.3
    - c) provide framework for policy reform, incl. PRSP requirement. — 12.5 25.0 6.3 18.8 18.8 18.8
    - d) give confidence to domestic private sector. — 0.0 18.8 31.3 12.5 25.0 12.5
    - e) give confidence to donors, improve prospects for donor support. — 31.3 18.8 12.5 6.3 12.5 18.8
    - f) give confidence to foreign investors. — 12.5 12.5 25.0 25.0 6.3 18.8
  - Drawbacks (rank distributions):
    - a) need for fixed reviews. — 6.3 − 13.3 6.7 26.7 21.4 27.3
    - b) lack of financing. — 50 12.5 13.3 − 6.7 7.1 9.1
    - c) requirement for a recent poverty reduction strategy paper. — − − 13.3 26.7 26.7 7.1 27.3
    - d) donors regard signals from other programs as stronger and clearer. — 12.5 18.8 − 13.3 13.3 35.7 18.2
    - e) foreign investors regard signals from other programs as stronger and clearer. — − 18.8 26.7 6.7 13.3 21.4 18.2
    - f) debt concessionality requirements are too stringent. — 6.3 18.8 26.7 40.0 6.7 − −
    - g) too much structural criteria. — 25 31.3 6.7 6.7 6.7 7.1 −

- Other low-income countries: views on attractiveness and program effects
  - If little or no need to borrow, PSI as attractive alternative:
    - a) surveillance-only relationship: 18.8 56.3 − 6.3 12.5 6.3
    - b) low-access PRGF arrangement: 14.3 35.7 28.6 14.3 7.1 −
  - IMF-supported program as important input into donor funding decisions. — 50.0 43.8 6.3 − − −
  - Fixed review schedule under a PSI would improve the frequency of IMF signals. — 18.8 62.5 12.5 6.3 − −
  - Fixed review schedule would improve coordination among donors and authorities. — 18.8 56.3 12.5 12.5 − −
  - Modifications to ESF and PSI allowing concurrent ESFs and PSIs make the PSI more attractive. — 25.0 43.8 18.8 6.3 − 6.3

- Private sector responses on PSI-supported program (percent distributions)
  - 1. IMF assessments have delivered clear and timely signals of the strength of country policies. — 25 50 25 − − −
  - 2. Country performance under PSI has been an important input into business decisions. — 25 50 25 − − −
  - 3. Limits on non-concessional borrowing under PSI properly formulated. — 25 − 25 25 25 −
  - 4. PSI users have been “mature stabilizers.” — 25 25 25 25 − −
  - 5. Relative to a surveillance-only relationship, the PSI has been useful for making business decisions. — 100 − − −
  - 6. Relative to a PRGF arrangement, the PSI has been useful for making business decisions. — 50 − 50 −
  - 7. Implementation of macroeconomic policies under a PSI has been [    ] than under PRGF arrangements. — − 25 50 25 − −
  - 8. Relative importance of IMF involvement (ranked):
    - a) signal of the strength of economic policies: − 100 − − −
    - b) financial support: 25 − 50 50 −
    - c) strengthening transparency: 75 − − − −
    - d) frequency of the assessment: − 50 50 −
    - e) others: − − − − 100

*Source: _060409*

### 1.      The Policy Support Instrument (PSI), introduced in October 2005, enables the

### The Policy Support Instrument (PSI), introduced in October 2005, enables the Fund to support low-income countries that do not need Fund financial assistance.

### Overview and purpose
- PSI intended for low-income countries that have secured macroeconomic stability and completed basic structural reforms but wish to remain engaged with the Fund to consolidate macroeconomic performance and pursue second-generation reforms to secure higher and sustainable growth.
- PSI engagement can:
  - support the development of policy programs;
  - build reform commitment through the Fund endorsed program;
  - identify priorities for technical assistance;
  - signal to others the implementation of a reform program meeting upper credit tranche conditionality;
  - facilitate a rapid move to Fund financial support should conditions change.

### Review scope and timing
- The Fund’s Executive Board called for a review after three years.
- The deadline for the interim review was originally December 31, 2008, but was subsequently extended to June 30, 2009.
- The experience reviewed: Seven PSIs approved for six member countries; each concluded or had at least two reviews completed (i.e., covering at least one year of program experience).
- The review draws on empirical evidence, surveys, and anecdotal evidence; conclusions are preliminary and tentative given small sample sizes.

### Four dimensions examined in the review
- Characteristics of PSI users: assessment of whether PSI users are “mature stabilizers” (defined by four macroeconomic criteria and institutional/policy development).
- Program design and implementation: assessed against members’ success in meeting program goals; baselines include previous PRGF-supported programs for PSI users and contemporaneous PRGF programs for similar comparator countries.
- Comparative macroeconomic performance: variables such as growth and inflation compared with previous PRGF programs and contemporaneous comparator countries to control for transient global factors.
- Perceptions of the PSI’s role: input collected via written surveys to PSI users, other PRGF-eligible members, donors, private investors; outreach to CSOs and other stakeholders via teleconferences, meetings, seminars; country team inputs.

### Definition and screening of “mature stabilizers”
- Original criteria (as stated when PSI was created): “achieved a reasonable growth performance, low-underlying inflation (comparable to that obtaining in their major trading partners), an adequate level of official international reserves, and begun to establish (external and net domestic) debt sustainability.”
- For this review, quantitative measures applied with thresholds set at the average or an above-average level among PRGF-eligible countries or near/above conventional policy “rule-of-thumb” (example: reserves equal to three months of imports).
- Variables averaged over five years where data permit to capture sustained performance; for inflation, both a maximum annual threshold and a five-year average threshold were used.
- Structural policies captured via an additional criterion: countries below the mid-point of the “medium institutional capacity” category in the World Bank’s CPIA index were excluded from comparator class.

### Comparator group and representativeness
- The comparator group, defined by the methodology, accounts for one quarter of PRGF-eligible members and encompasses all but one of the PSI users.
- Nigeria was the exception; it met four of the five criteria and “did not meet the institutional quality criterion.”
- Comparator group includes:
  - PSI users (month/year of PSI approval): Cape Verde (7/06); Mozambique (6/07); Nigeria (10/05)*; Senegal (11/07); Tanzania (2/07); Uganda (2/06, 12/06)
  - PRGF comparator countries (month/year of PRGF approval): Albania (2/06); Armenia (5/05); Honduras (2/04); Kenya (11/03); Kyrgyz Republic (2/05); Mali (6/04, 5/08); Moldova (5/06); Rwanda (6/06)
  - Other comparator countries: Azerbaijan; India; Lesotho; Pakistan; St. Lucia; Vietnam
- The evidence suggests the PSI has largely been used by its intended target group of mature stabilizers.
- The PSI has not fully displaced other forms of engagement among mature stabilizers:
  - Four comparator countries had new PRGF arrangements approved after October 2005.
  - Of the five countries with low-access PRGF arrangements approved after October 2005, two were among the comparator countries.

### Program design expectations
- Executive Board view: content of PSI-supported programs should closely follow that for the PRGF.
- PSI-supported programs expected to meet the standard of upper credit tranche conditionality (same standard as programs supported by Fund facilities such as the PRGF).
- The Standard Guidelines on Conditionality apply to PSIs.
- Documentation for PSI-supported programs was expected to be able to be more concise than for financial arrangements.

### Comparative findings on program design and implementation
- Methodology: PSI-supported programs compared with PRGF-supported programs for PRGF comparator countries and with previous PRGF-supported programs for PSI users to control for country-specific factors.
- Number of conditions:
  - PRGF-supported programs with both mature stabilizers and other LICs had roughly one quarter more conditions per review than PSI-supported programs.
  - The lower number of conditions in PSI-supported programs extended to both quantitative and structural conditions.
  - The number of conditions in PSI-supported programs was roughly similar to that in the previous PRGF-supported programs for the same PSI countries, suggesting country-specific factors influence conditionality.
- Implementation/adherence to structural conditionality:
  - PSI-supported programs have a somewhat higher level of adherence to structural conditionality than contemporaneous PRGF-supported programs.
  - Adherence in PSI-supported programs most closely resembled that of the previous PRGF-supported programs in PSI countries.
- Areas of structural conditionality (most common across groups): revenue mobilization, debt and expenditure management, and banking and financial sector conditions.
  - Debt and expenditure management measures were relatively more common for PSI-supported programs.
  - Revenue mobilization was relatively less important in PSI-supported programs than banking and financial sector conditions.
- Fixed review schedule:
  - All reviews under PSI-supported programs have been completed on schedule.
  - The fixed review schedule does not appear to weaken program implementation or design.
  - Adherence to conditionality is similar in PSI and PRGF-supported programs; PSI users have not required more waivers.
  - PSI users have similar numbers of conditions under the PSI and their previous PRGF arrangements.
  - The fixed review schedule appears effective in encouraging policy discipline.

### Conclusions and implications
- Preliminary conclusion: economic performance of PSI users has been at least as strong as that under PRGF-supported programs.
- Member countries deem the PSI a useful alternative to conventional instruments where there is no immediate need for Fund financing.
- The PSI has functioned as a voluntary, demand-driven tool expanding instruments for Fund engagement with low-income countries.
- Given small sample sizes and that many PSIs were still ongoing at the time of review, conclusions are tentative.
- The reform of LIC facilities under parallel work is not expected to alter the case for the PSI as a complement to financing instruments.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2009/_060409.pdf*

### Box 2. Senegal: Promoting Structural Reforms under the PSI

### Box 2. Senegal: Promoting Structural Reforms under the PSI

### Assessment under three PRGFs (since 1994)
- An assessment was critical of Senegal’s performance on structural reforms under its three PRGFs since 1994.
- Only about three-fifths of structural performance criteria were met on time.
- About half of the structural benchmarks were met on time.
- Instances of delays or noncompliance exceeded the observance of structural conditionality continuously since mid-2000.
- Some reforms succeeded only after several attempts.
- Reforms related to transparency in the financing of the new airport had been a major obstacle and delayed completion of past reviews under the PRGF.

### Performance under the PSI
- Since the start of the PSI program, Senegal has met all prior actions and all structural assessment criteria.
- Senegal has implemented two-thirds of the structural benchmarks on time.
- The remainder of structural benchmarks were implemented either partially or with a slight delay.

### Factors behind improved implementation
- Both the authorities and the staff team considered that the PSI’s predetermined review schedule was an important factor behind the improved implementation of structural reforms.
- The Minister of Finance reportedly expressed the view to management and staff that the schedule imposed significant discipline on decision-making within the government and led to more timely decisions.
- One cited instance: when budgetary slippages were uncovered in 2008, strong corrective actions were quickly taken, laying the foundation for a positive staff recommendation to complete the second PSI review.
- Prompt corrective action in this case helped put Senegal in a stronger position to face the impact of the global economic crisis that was breaking at that time.

*Source: Box 2. Senegal: Promoting Structural Reforms under the PSI (extracted from the provided IMF document).*

### 1. In the course of making your decision to use the PSI, please rank the following possible motivations in order of

### _060409 - 1. In the course of making your decision to use the PSI, please rank the following possible motivations in order of

### Motivations for using the PSI (responses and rank distributions)
- a. to intensify your policy dialogue with the IMF.
  - 16.7 16.7 − 16.7 50
- b. to reinforce your efforts to maintain fiscal and monetary discipline.
  - 50 − 33.3 − 16.7 −
- c. to provide a framework for policy reform, including through the requirement for a recent poverty reduction strategy paper.
  - 16.7 33.3 33.3 − 16.7 −
- d. to give confidence to the domestic private sector.
  - − − − 50 16.7 33.3
- e. to give confidence to donors, and thereby improve prospects for donor support.
  - 16.7 33.3 16.7 16.7 − 16.7
- f. to give confidence to foreign investors.
  - 16.7 16.7 − 33.3 33.3 −

### Whether experience with the PSI changed weighting of motivations
- Yes: 20
- No: 80

### Drawbacks of using the PSI (responses and rank distributions)
- a. the need for fixed reviews.
  - − 16.7 33.3 16.7 − 16.7 16.7
- b. the lack of financing.
  - − 16.7 − − 33.3 − 50
- c. the requirement for a recent poverty reduction strategy paper.
  - − − 50.0 − − 33.3 16.7
- d. donors regard signals from other programs as stronger and clearer.
  - − 16.7 − 16.7 50 − 16.7
- e. foreign investors regard signals from other programs as stronger and clearer.
  - 16.7 16.7 − 33.3 − 33.3 −
- f. debt concessionality requirements are too stringent.
  - 16.7 33.3 16.7 − 16.7 16.7 −
- g. too much structural criteria.
  - 50 − − 33.3 − − −
- h. other
  - 16.7 − − − − − −

### Whether experience with the PSI changed weighting of drawbacks
- Yes: 20
- No: 80

### PSI-using countries: views on PSI performance and design (response distributions)
- 5. IMF’s assessments delivered clear and timely signals about the strength of policies.
  - 20 80 − − − −
- 6. PSI-supported program promoted close policy dialogue with the IMF.
  - 60 40 − − − −
- 7. Fixed review schedule under the PSI improved the frequency of IMF signals.
  - 16.7 66.7 16.7 − − −
- 8. Performance under PSI has been an important input into donor aid decisions.
  - 16.7 66.7 − − − 16.7
- 9. Fixed review schedule helped facilitate donor coordination.
  - − 66.7 − 16.7 − 16.7
- 10. Absence of IMF financing in the PSI has not constrained implementation of economic reform strategy.
  - 20 60 − 20 − −
- 11. PSI signals have been useful in attracting private sector interest.
  - − 60 40 − − −
- 12. PSI more appropriate to your needs than a PRGF arrangement.
  - 20 40 40 − − −
- 13. Country ownership under PSI-supported program has been sufficiently emphasized.
  - 40 60 − − − −
- 14. PSI-supported program sufficiently aligned with poverty reduction strategies.
  - 20 60 20 − − −
- 15. PSI policy framework focused on consolidating macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability.
  - 60 40 − − − −
- 16. Structural measures focused on areas critical to maintenance of macroeconomic stability.
  - 40 60 − − − −
- 17. Modifications to the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) and the PSI making concurrent ESFs and PSIs possible make the PSI more attractive.
  - 33.3 33.3 16.7 16.7 − −
- 18. Non-concessional debt limits under PSI-supported programs are appropriate.
  - 20 60 20 − − −
- 19. Implementation of macroeconomic policies under the PSI-supported program has been [    ] than it would have been under a PRGF arrangement.
  - 20 60 − 20 − −
- 20. Implementation of structural measures under the PSI-supported program has been [    ] than it would have been under a PRGF arrangement.
  - 20 60 20 − − −

### Donors’ responses on PSI-supported programs (percent of total responses)
- 1. IMF assessments delivered clear and timely signals of the strength of policies.
  - 10.5 79.0 5.3 − − 5.3
- 2. Country performance under a PSI has been an important input into donor aid decisions.
  - 31.6 47.4 5.3 − − 15.8
- 3. PSI-supported programs promoted close policy dialogue between the IMF and user countries.
  - 47.4 47.4 − − − 5.3
- 4. Fixed review schedule improved frequency of IMF signals.
  - 15.8 47.4 26.3 5.3 − 5.3
- 5. Fixed review schedule helped coordination among donors and with country authorities.
  - 10.5 52.6 21.1 5.3 − 10.5
- 6. Absence of IMF financing in the PSI has not constrained implementation of the country's economic reform strategy.
  - 26.3 36.8 21.1 15.8 − −
- 7. PSI policy frameworks focused on consolidating macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability.
  - 15.8 79.0 5.3 − − −
- 8. Structural measures focused on areas critical to maintenance of macroeconomic stability.
  - 15.8 36.8 47.4 − − −
- 9. Country ownership under a PSI-supported program has been sufficiently emphasized.
  - 21.1 47.4 21.1 − − 10.5
- 10. PSI-supported programs sufficiently aligned with countries’ poverty reduction strategies.
  - 10.5 52.6 21.1 5.3 − 10.5
- 11. Non-concessional debt limits under PSI-supported programs are appropriate.
  - 17.7 52.9 11.8 5.9 − 11.8
- 12. PSI users have been “mature stabilizers.”
  - 5.3 79.0 15.8 − − −
- 13. Relative to surveillance, the PSI has been [   ] useful for making aid decisions.
  - 40.0 40.0 − 20.0
- 14. Relative to a PRGF arrangement, the PSI has been [    ] useful for making aid decisions.
  - − 64.7 11.8 24

- 15. Implementation of macroeconomic policies under PSIs has been [    ] than it would have been under a PRGF arrangement.
  - 5.6 11.1 61.1 − − 22.2
- 16. Implementation of structural measures under PSIs has been [    ] than it would have been under a PRGF arrangement.
  - − 5.6 72.2 5.6 − 16.7

### Other low-income countries: motivations and drawbacks if considering PSI in future (percent distributions)
- Motivations (rank distributions):
  - a) intensify policy dialogue with the IMF.
    - 6.3 6.3 18.8 25.0 18.8 25.0
  - b) reinforce efforts to maintain fiscal and monetary discipline.
    - 37.5 18.8 6.3 12.5 18.8 6.3
  - c) provide framework for policy reform, incl. PRSP requirement.
    - 12.5 25.0 6.3 18.8 18.8 18.8
  - d) give confidence to domestic private sector.
    - 0.0 18.8 31.3 12.5 25.0 12.5
  - e) give confidence to donors, improve prospects for donor support.
    - 31.3 18.8 12.5 6.3 12.5 18.8
  - f) give confidence to foreign investors.
    - 12.5 12.5 25.0 25.0 6.3 18.8
- Drawbacks (rank distributions):
  - a) need for fixed reviews.
    - 6.3 − 13.3 6.7 26.7 21.4 27.3
  - b) lack of financing.
    - 50 12.5 13.3 − 6.7 7.1 9.1
  - c) requirement for a recent poverty reduction strategy paper.
    - − − 13.3 26.7 26.7 7.1 27.3
  - d) donors regard signals from other programs as stronger and clearer.
    - 12.5 18.8 − 13.3 13.3 35.7 18.2
  - e) foreign investors regard signals from other programs as stronger and clearer.
    - − 18.8 26.7 6.7 13.3 21.4 18.2
  - f) debt concessionality requirements are too stringent.
    - 6.3 18.8 26.7 40.0 6.7 − −
  - g) too much structural criteria.
    - 25 31.3 6.7 6.7 6.7 7.1 −

### Other low-income countries: views on attractiveness and program effects
- If little or no need to borrow, PSI as attractive alternative:
  - a) surveillance-only relationship: 18.8 56.3 − 6.3 12.5 6.3
  - b) low-access PRGF arrangement: 14.3 35.7 28.6 14.3 7.1 −
- IMF-supported program as important input into donor funding decisions.
  - 50.0 43.8 6.3 − − −
- Fixed review schedule under a PSI would improve the frequency of IMF signals.
  - 18.8 62.5 12.5 6.3 − −
- Fixed review schedule would improve coordination among donors and authorities.
  - 18.8 56.3 12.5 12.5 − −
- Modifications to ESF and PSI allowing concurrent ESFs and PSIs make the PSI more attractive.
  - 25.0 43.8 18.8 6.3 − 6.3

### Private sector responses on PSI-supported program (percent distributions)
- 1. IMF assessments have delivered clear and timely signals of the strength of country policies.
  - 25 50 25 − − −
- 2. Country performance under PSI has been an important input into business decisions.
  - 25 50 25 − − −
- 3. Limits on non-concessional borrowing under PSI properly formulated.
  - 25 − 25 25 25 −
- 4. PSI users have been “mature stabilizers.”
  - 25 25 25 25 − −
- 5. Relative to a surveillance-only relationship, the PSI has been useful for making business decisions.
  - 100 − − −
- 6. Relative to a PRGF arrangement, the PSI has been useful for making business decisions.
  - 50 − 50 −
- 7. Implementation of macroeconomic policies under a PSI has been [    ] than under PRGF arrangements.
  - − 25 50 25 − −
- 8. Relative importance of IMF involvement (ranked):
  - a) signal of the strength of economic policies: − 100 − − −
  - b) financial support: 25 − 50 50 −
  - c) strengthening transparency: 75 − − − −
  - d) frequency of the assessment: − 50 50 −
  - e) others: − − − − 100

*Italic source: _060409 - 1. In the course of making your decision to use the PSI, please rank the following possible motivations in order of*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2009/_060409.pdf_
