## Annex 1: The Capacity Assessment Process (_121809)

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### I. Introduction and overview
- Executive Board approved new guidelines on external debt limits in Fund-supported programs in August 2009.
- Objective: prevent build-up of unsustainable debts while allowing adequate external financing; move from a single design for concessionality requirements to a more flexible, DSA-linked approach.
- Framework based on a menu of options to reflect diversity of member country situations, particularly PRGT-eligible countries (LICs).
- New guidelines entered into effect on December 1, 2009; changes to performance criteria under existing programs would normally be reflected at the time of the first program review initiated after December 1, 2009.
- Guidance note structure (high level): definitions of “debt vulnerabilities” and “capacity”; debt limits for lower-capacity countries and size of nonconcessional debt limits; operationalizing options for higher-capacity countries; debt limits for advanced LICs and non-LICs; residency or currency denomination criterion; setting and monitoring targets on total public debt; treatment of SOE debt.

### II. Concessionality Matrix (framework)
- Two assessment dimensions:
  - The extent of debt vulnerabilities (assessed via DSAs).
  - The country’s capacity to manage public resources (administrative capacity, PFM, project selection/implementation).
- Matrix summary of options:
  - Capacity = Lower, Debt vulnerabilities = Lower:
    - Minimum concessionality requirement based on previous debt-by-debt approach, with added flexibility on nonconcessional external debt (e.g., higher and untied nonzero limits, if consistent with maintenance of low debt vulnerabilities).
  - Capacity = Lower, Debt vulnerabilities = Higher:
    - Maintain minimum concessionality requirement based on previous debt-by-debt approach, likely higher than 35 percent, with limited or no room for nonconcessional borrowing.
  - Capacity = Higher, Debt vulnerabilities = Lower:
    - Minimum average concessionality requirement applied to external or total public borrowing; for most advanced LICs, no concessionality requirements and overall nominal debt limit if needed.
  - Capacity = Higher, Debt vulnerabilities = Higher:
    - Overall limit on the PV of external or total public debt; for most advanced LICs, ceilings on nominal external or total public debt.
- Authorities may opt for tighter debt limits than implied by the matrix.

### III. Assessing debt vulnerabilities and capacity
- Debt vulnerabilities classification:
  - Based on the most recent DSA.
  - Low or moderate DSA risk rating → generally lower vulnerability category.
  - High risk rating (or in debt distress) → higher vulnerability category.
  - Judgment may adjust classification where domestic public debt significantly increases vulnerabilities.
  - When no DSA rating (e.g., DSA using middle-income framework), use main conclusions of latest DSA.
- Capacity assessment process:
  - Initial classification conducted in November 2009 in coordination with the World Bank for program or near-program LICs.
  - Two-step approach:
    1. Preliminary classification using sub-CPIA and PEFA indices and associated thresholds:
       - Higher capacity required scoring above threshold for each indicator; both below → lower capacity; mixed → “grey zone”.
       - Thresholds defined as the average score of countries classified as “blend” by IDA; currently corresponds to the 75th percentile of each distribution.
    2. Roundtable simultaneous assessment across departments using four critical criteria:
       - (i) Track record of accessing market financing and managing nonconcessional borrowing.
       - (ii) Timely provision of debt data and ability of authorities to do their own DSA.
       - (iii) Existence and satisfactory implementation of an articulated Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy (MTDS).
       - (iv) Track record in selecting high-return public investment projects.
  - Information sources: ROSCs, World Bank DeMPA, HIPC CBP self-assessments, staff qualitative assessments.
- Ongoing monitoring:
  - Annual stock-taking exercises to determine whether developments warrant a change in classification (e.g., new sub-CPIA or PEFA assessments).
  - Authorities may petition for reclassification; individual changes can be considered intra-annually case-by-case.
  - Reclassification from higher to lower capacity possible if capacity deteriorates.

### IV. Debt limits in lower-capacity countries
- General approach: continue debt-by-debt concessionality requirements but apply more flexibility for countries with lower debt vulnerabilities; use DSAs actively.

- A. Countries with higher debt vulnerabilities
  - Debt limits expected to be tighter than for countries with lower debt vulnerabilities and higher capacity.
  - Minimum concessional requirement should be consistent with DSA results; a grant element higher than 35 percent may be required on a case-by-case basis.
  - Minimum concessionality requirement needs to reflect the projected average grant element in the DSA during the program period to mitigate debt vulnerabilities.
  - Nonconcessional borrowing should be exceptional.
    - Exceptions: concessional financing not available for a critical and highly profitable project included in authorities’ development strategy.
    - Projects financed by nonconcessional borrowing generally expected to be carefully evaluated by a reputable source (e.g., World Bank or Regional Development Bank).
    - Exceptional cases could allow financing with grant element below the concessionality requirement based on debt structure, borrowing costs, and debt management considerations, with consideration of market risks (including exchange rate risk).
  - DSA must confirm that nonconcessional borrowing will not result in a significantly and persistent increase in debt vulnerabilities.

- B. Countries with lower debt vulnerabilities
  - Space for nonconcessional borrowing can be considered more systematically.
  - A minimum concessionality requirement of 35 percent will be set.
  - A certain amount of nonconcessional borrowing could be exempt from this requirement (a “nonzero limit”).
    - General principle: the nonzero limit should not be so large that, if fully used, it would push a country into the higher debt vulnerability category.
    - Impact of such borrowing should be assessed interactively between the DSA and the fiscal framework.
    - Debt management considerations (e.g., substitution of external for domestic debt) can be taken into account.
    - Assessment should be based on realistic assumptions for nonconcessional financing beyond the period for which a nonzero limit is proposed.
    - A profile with very large upfront nonconcessional borrowing that then decreases rapidly is generally not considered realistic unless resources finance upfront very lumpy and critical infrastructure projects.

### Speed bump on debt accumulation
- Purpose: limit the maximum pace at which debt ratios can rise (in present value terms) in countries with large borrowing space or weak absorptive capacity.
- Suggested parameter: 5 percent of beginning-of-period GDP annually.
- Flexibility: the speed bump may be lower if country circumstances warrant it.
- DSA requirements if borrowing above the speed bump is contemplated:
  - Include a detailed explanation of the expected growth dividend.
  - Include an alternative “high borrowing-low growth dividend” scenario.

### Distinction by risk rating when setting nonzero limits
- Principle: treat low-risk and moderate-risk countries differently when setting nonzero limits.
- Implications:
  - The rule proposed in paragraph 13 (not reproduced here) rules out a downgrading of the risk rating for moderate-risk countries, but not for low-risk countries.
  - Countries just above and below the boundary between low risk and moderate risk should be accorded similar flexibility.
  - Rating downgrades for low-risk countries on account of a nonzero limit are expected to be rare.
  - For moderate-risk countries, nonzero limits should not bring baseline debt ratios to a level where a small shock would lead to a rating downgrade.

### Tied versus untied nonzero limits and capacity considerations
- Untied nonzero limits:
  - Allow borrowing nonconcessionally for uses not fully specified ex ante in program conditionality.
  - Are riskier from a debt sustainability perspective and should be considered only for countries with sufficient capacity.
- Expected evidence for permitting untied limits:
  - (i) Sub-CPIA and PEFA scores close to thresholds distinguishing lower and higher capacity.
  - (ii) Other evidence (e.g., country experience in choosing projects with high returns) confirming capacity to direct borrowing to high-return projects.
- Quantitative thresholds for qualification:
  - Sub-CPIA threshold: 3.67.
  - PEFA threshold: 2.64.
  - Countries could qualify for untied limits if both their sub-CPIA score and PEFA score are within the average of the blend countries minus one-half standard deviation.
- Procedural note:
  - Countries whose classification between lower and higher categories was debated in the second step of the capacity assessment process could also be considered.

### Disclosure and assumptions in the DSA for proposed limits
- Proposed tied or untied nonzero limits should be explicitly discussed in the DSA, including terms and purpose of the envisaged nonconcessional borrowing.
- If terms are unknown (more likely for untied limits), staff are strongly encouraged to use conservative assumptions:
  - Use market terms if known, or
  - Use a zero grant element.

### PV targets and average concessionality targets for higher-capacity countries
- Rationale: more sophisticated options for concessionality requirements in higher-capacity countries provide flexibility without debt-by-debt assessment.
- PV targets:
  - Intended for higher-capacity countries with higher vulnerabilities to limit overall debt accumulation while leaving structure choice to authorities.
  - Should be set as annual indicative targets and derived from the DSA.
  - Preferable frequency: annual; semi-annual or quarterly “guideposts” possible if reliable timing of external financing operations is available.
  - Transitional treatment: PV and average concessionality targets will generally be established as annual indicative targets (rather than performance criteria) under Fund arrangements for a transitional period of two years from the effective date of the decision (December 1, 2009).
  - Targets should be derived from the path of the PV of debt in the DSA’s baseline scenario, consistent with macro framework and debt sustainability.
- Monitoring requirements for PV targets:
  - Timely and comprehensive information on expected disbursements (existing and new loans).
  - Aggregate all disbursements to calculate a PV based on the DSF methodology.
  - TMUs should include reporting requirements on external debt to allow such calculations.
  - Close and regular monitoring of actual and projected disbursements (amounts and terms) is required; updated projections and calculations should be regularly shared with staff.
  - Country teams should actively monitor implementation and report to the Board in program reviews on whether targets are expected to be met.
  - Adjustments to targets can be proposed in program reviews if donors’ actual disbursements deviate significantly from projections.

### Average concessionality targets (countries with lower debt vulnerabilities)
- Nature: do not limit total borrowing; borrowing could be unlimited if sufficiently concessional on average.
- Practical constraint: limited availability of concessional resources makes unlimited borrowing highly hypothetical.
- If average concessionality requirements lead to excessive borrowing and jeopardize debt sustainability, a PV target could be used instead.
- Setting and monitoring follow the same steps and data requirements as PV targets:
  - DSA can provide the target by comparing projected PV of new disbursements with their nominal value.
  - Active monitoring requires regular updates of projections for new disbursements and associated terms.

### Contracting versus disbursement basis for targets
- Both bases are available for countries with higher capacity.
- Disbursement-based targets:
  - Closer link to the DSA (which is based on disbursements), making target setting relatively easy.
  - A loan can contribute to PV targets over several years through staggered disbursements.
- Contracting-based targets:
  - More complex at target-setting stage but simpler at monitoring stage (typically fewer contracts than disbursements).
  - Principle: calculate PV of new debt expected to be contracted over the period assuming full upfront disbursement at contracting.
  - For contracting-based PV targets, consistency with the DSA means:
    - (i) take into account all debts included in the DSA (and only those debts) projected to be contracted during the period; and
    - (ii) use DSA methodology to calculate the aggregate PV.
- Operational tool: the DSA/DSF worksheet described in Annex 2 allows for both options.

### Treatment of grants
- Grants are not explicitly taken into account when setting PV or average concessionality targets because their PV is equal to zero by definition.
- Monitoring considerations:
  - Grants may need to be taken into account in monitoring average concessionality targets to avoid perverse incentives (e.g., a projected grant becoming a concessional loan, or vice versa).
  - In practice, donor decisions between grants and loans are generally driven by donor policies, limiting scope for manipulation.
  - If substitutions between grants and concessional loans are significant and information is available, adjustments can be made at monitoring stage.
  - If substitutions are significant and information is insufficient, switching from average concessionality to a PV target would be desirable.

### Concessionality requirements for advanced LICs and non-LICs
- For the most advanced LICs:
  - Concessionality requirements could be dropped in Fund-supported programs.
  - These countries would be higher capacity, expected to have per capita income above the IDA operational cutoff, a strong macro and public resource management track record, and sustained past and prospective access to nonconcessional financing.
- For non-LICs:
  - Concessionality requirements are not expected to be included in Fund-supported programs because such countries generally have limited or no access to concessional financing.
- Even without concessionality requirements, debt limits may be considered if debt vulnerabilities remain high or fiscal coverage is narrow:
  - Options include debt ceilings on nominal external or total public debt, or sub-ceilings on specific types of debt, consistent with the fiscal framework.

### Criterion for defining “external” debt and treatment by country circumstances
- New guidelines move away from exclusive use of the residency criterion to define debt subject to concessionality requirements because:
  - Nonresidents’ role in domestic debt markets has blurred the external/domestic distinction.
  - Information on transactions involving nonresidents is often incomplete or delayed, complicating monitoring.
  - Such transactions are typically not under authorities’ control; concessionality requirements should not be designed to be met only through capital controls.
- For more advanced LICs and non-LICs with open capital accounts:
  - Focus of debt limits, if any, should be on total public debt; distinction between external and domestic debt is obviated.
  - Distinctions by characteristics (e.g., currency of denomination) may still be desirable from an external vulnerability standpoint even if not used for debt limits.
- For LICs with relatively closed capital accounts or very limited financial integration:
  - Use of the residency criterion remains appropriate; nonresident acquisition of domestically-issued debt in secondary markets is expected to be very limited and could be excluded from concessionality requirements to address monitoring issues.
- For LICs in an intermediate situation:
  - A currency of denomination criterion could be used: apply concessionality requirements to foreign-currency denominated debt regardless of creditor residency.
  - Teams should be mindful domestic debt could be foreign currency indexed or that repayment currency may differ from issue currency.

### Safeguards and program measures to address vulnerabilities from nonresident transactions
- Safeguards should be applied case-by-case, ensuring:
  - The program relies on an appropriately broad concept for the fiscal deficit performance criterion to close definitional loopholes.
  - All new domestic market borrowing should normally be in local currency.
  - Relevant program design changes (e.g., higher NIR targets) to mitigate vulnerabilities from significant nonresident holdings of domestic debt.
  - Such transactions are fully reflected in the external DSA, including explicit assessment of associated vulnerabilities (e.g., higher rollover risk, exchange rate or reserve pressures from sudden withdrawals).
  - Authorities report to the Fund the terms of new domestic borrowing, including currency composition, and take steps over time to improve monitoring of secondary market transactions.
  - Authorities are not signatories in transactions that involve immediate repackaging of domestic debt instruments for the sole purpose of reselling to nonresidents.

### Setting and monitoring targets on total public debt (higher-capacity countries)
- Recommendation: Try PV or nominal targets on total public debt on a case-by-case basis for countries with higher capacity (para 36–38).
- Definitions and mechanics:
  - Total public debt in the template is defined as the sum of PPG external debt and domestic debt of the government (para 38).
  - The template generates a PV for this aggregate by assuming that the PV of domestic debt is equal to its face value (para 38).
  - The process for setting and monitoring a PV target on total public debt is identical to that for PPG external debt; targets should be derived from a baseline scenario consistent with the macroeconomic framework and where public debt appears sustainable (para 38).
- Scope: Recommendation to apply only where potential problems are considered manageable by country teams and authorities (para 37).

### Limitations and operational issues of total public debt targets
- Coverage and data:
  - Fiscal accounts generally have limited coverage of total public debt and may not include all domestic public sector debt (para 39).
  - Moving to broader coverage would raise challenging monitoring issues (para 39).
- Policy interactions and objectives:
  - Domestic debt is often used for monetary policy, exchange rate management, or to support domestic financial market development; these objectives should be considered when setting targets (para 39).
- Comparative usefulness:
  - Where fiscal account coverage is broad, a nominal total debt target may offer no significant benefit relative to a target on the fiscal deficit (para 39).
  - Debt level changes may reflect large valuation changes or proceeds from net asset sales not covered in the fiscal balance.
- Composition and measurement concerns:
  - Total public debt targets do not address composition of debt; they may need to be complemented by separate targets on external or domestic debt/financing (para 39).
  - Measuring domestic debt on a gross basis can be less meaningful when governments hold large and variable deposits in the banking system; net domestic debt may be more relevant and controllable in such cases (para 39).

### Treatment of SOEs in debt limits
- General rule: Public enterprises and other official sector entities should be covered by external debt limits under Fund arrangements, unless an explicit selective exclusion is made in the TMU (para 40).
- Basis for selective exclusion:
  - Can be considered for SOEs able to borrow without a government guarantee and whose operations pose limited fiscal risk (para 40).
  - Objective: avoid inappropriately constraining operations and potentially hampering investment (para 40).
- Exclusions should be based on:
  - Managerial independence; relations with the government; periodicity of audits; publication of comprehensive annual reports and protection of shareholders’ rights; financial indices and sustainability; and other risk factors (para 41).
  - Two binding criteria for high fiscal risk where comprehensive information is lacking: i) the enterprise carries out uncompensated quasi-fiscal activities; and ii) it has negative operating balances (para 41).
  - SOEs requiring a sovereign guarantee to borrow externally are automatically covered under the debt-limits policy.

### Capacity assessment and classification process (Annual updates and ad hoc changes)
- Annual updates:
  - Annual capacity assessment updates are expected to be lighter than the initial 2009 assessment (para 42).
  - For most program countries previously classified, there is no need to follow the two-step 2009 process; main issue is whether developments warrant a change in classification (para 42).
  - Developments could be reflected in the most recent sub-CPIA or PEFA score, or other relevant sources (para 42).
  - Annual updates provide opportunity for authorities to argue for a different classification (para 42).
  - Annual updates expected to take place around midyear (para 43).
- Coordination with World Bank:
  - Assessment updates will be synchronized with the World Bank and classifications shared immediately after updates (para 43).
  - If discrepancies arise, a reconciliation meeting should be held within 5 working days following the exchange of classifications; managements will, within five working days, either resolve the dispute or decide the institutions will have different views (para 43).
- Ad hoc intra-annual assessments:
  - Two situations: (i) countries not previously assessed by the Fund that subsequently become program countries during the year; (ii) countries where a major development warrants reconsideration between annual updates (para 44).
  - Reclassification from a higher to the lower category cannot be ruled out if capacity deteriorates.

### Setting and monitoring PV and average concessionality targets on external debt (DSF template)
- New DSF template features:
  - A new sheet labeled “PV Targets” was added to the DSF template to set and monitor PV and average concessionality targets (para 45).
- Disbursement-based targets (Annex 2, A):
  - Step 1 (Setting): Assumptions on disbursement schedules and terms are taken from the DSA sheet ‘Inp_Outp_debt’ Section 3 NEW MLT DEBT and are used to calculate PV and average concessionality targets; critical to use terms and amounts reflecting staff’s best knowledge of authorities’ borrowing plans; record DSA exchange rates for consistency (para 46).
  - Step 2 (Monitoring): Specify terms/conditions of each actual disbursement; treat each disbursement as a separate loan with original loan terms applied; exchange rates used to convert disbursements into U.S. dollars must be identical to those used at the target setting stage; enter exchange rates via the “Change Exchange Rates” button; enter interest rates, maturity, grace period and number of principal payments per year in yellow shaded areas (para 47).
  - Step 3 (Comparing): Calculate PV and average grant element of each disbursement; aggregate PVs and average grant element for comparison with targets (para 49).
- Contracting-based targets (Annex 2, B):
  - Step 1 (Setting): Obtain information on new borrowing expected to be contracted over the period from authorities and enter face value, interest rate, maturity, grace period and number of principal payments per year for the first year of projection; enter DSA exchange rates to ensure consistent conversion (para 50).
  - Step 2 (Monitoring): Enter terms and amounts of contracted loans during the year; ensure exchange rates used are identical to target-setting rates; enter interest rates, maturity, grace period and number of principal payments per year in yellow shaded areas; calculate PV and average grant element and aggregate for comparison with targets (para 51).

### Indicators for exclusion of SOEs (Annex 3)
- Managerial independence:
  - Criteria include: i) cost-covering price setting for non-tradables; ii) average prices within 10 percent of the international benchmark for producers of tradables; iii) tariff setting regime compatible with long-term sustainability and comparable to private firms; employment policies should be independent of civil service laws and not subject to government intervention except when clearly justified (para 52, bullet 1).
- Relations with the government:
  - Consider existence of direct or indirect subsidies, on-lending, explicit or implicit loan guarantees beyond those to private enterprises; uncompensated quasi-fiscal activities; nature of regulatory and tax regimes; frequency of profit transfers to central budget (para 52, bullet 2).
- Periodic audits:
  - Periodic audits by reputable private accounting firms applying international standards; a major international firm should ideally audit large public enterprises (para 52, bullet 3).
- Publication of comprehensive annual reports and shareholders’ rights:
  - Annual reports should include audited balance sheets; profit and loss statements; off-balance sheet liabilities; levels/changes in activity; employment and investment; comparisons against other firms and international benchmarks; governance should protect minority shareholder rights (para 52, bullet 4).
- Financial conditions and sustainability:
  - Indicators include i) market access with borrowing rates comparable to private firms without a government guarantee; ii) less-than-full leveraging with debt-to-asset ratio comparable to industry average; iii) profitability measured as operating balance to assets ratio or positive and above average cost of debt where no comparator exists; iv) records of past investments demonstrating average rate of return at least equivalent to that required by cost-benefit analyses (para 52, bullet 5).
- Other risk factors:
  - Include contingent liabilities relative to operating balance; currency mismatches between revenue and debt; importance of the enterprise by size and/or function (para 52, bullet 6).

*Source: Annex 1 of the guidance note on debt limits in Fund-supported programs (excerpts).*

### Annex 1: The Capacity Assessment Process ...........................................................................17

### Annex 1: The Capacity Assessment Process

### I. Introduction and overview
- Executive Board approved new guidelines on external debt limits in Fund-supported programs in August 2009.
- Objective: prevent build-up of unsustainable debts while allowing adequate external financing; move from a single design for concessionality requirements to a more flexible, DSA-linked approach.
- Framework based on a menu of options to reflect diversity of member country situations, particularly PRGT-eligible countries (LICs).
- New guidelines entered into effect on December 1, 2009; changes to performance criteria under existing programs would normally be reflected at the time of the first program review initiated after December 1, 2009.
- Guidance note intended primarily for Fund staff; structure covers:
  - Definitions of “debt vulnerabilities” and “capacity.”
  - Debt limits for lower-capacity countries and size of nonconcessional debt limits.
  - Operationalizing options for higher-capacity countries.
  - Debt limits for advanced LICs and non-LICs.
  - Residency or currency denomination criterion.
  - Setting and monitoring targets on total public debt.
  - Treatment of SOE debt.

### II. Concessionality Matrix (framework)
- Two assessment dimensions:
  - The extent of debt vulnerabilities (assessed via DSAs).
  - The country’s capacity to manage public resources (administrative capacity, PFM, project selection/implementation).
- Table 1. Concessionality Matrix (summary of options)
  - Capacity = Lower, Debt vulnerabilities = Lower:
    - Minimum concessionality requirement based on previous debt-by-debt approach, with added flexibility on nonconcessional external debt (e.g., higher and untied nonzero limits, if consistent with maintenance of low debt vulnerabilities).
  - Capacity = Lower, Debt vulnerabilities = Higher:
    - Maintain minimum concessionality requirement based on previous debt-by-debt approach, likely higher than 35 percent, with limited or no room for nonconcessional borrowing.
  - Capacity = Higher, Debt vulnerabilities = Lower:
    - Minimum average concessionality requirement applied to external or total public borrowing; for most advanced LICs, no concessionality requirements and overall nominal debt limit if needed.
  - Capacity = Higher, Debt vulnerabilities = Higher:
    - Overall limit on the PV of external or total public debt; for most advanced LICs, ceilings on nominal external or total public debt.

- Authorities may opt for tighter debt limits than implied by the matrix.

### III. Assessing debt vulnerabilities and capacity
- Debt vulnerabilities classification:
  - Based on the most recent DSA.
  - Low or moderate DSA risk rating → generally lower vulnerability category.
  - High risk rating (or in debt distress) → higher vulnerability category.
  - Judgment may adjust classification where domestic public debt significantly increases vulnerabilities.
  - When no DSA rating (e.g., DSA using middle-income framework), use main conclusions of latest DSA.
- Capacity assessment process:
  - Initial classification conducted in November 2009 in coordination with the World Bank for program or near-program LICs.
  - Two-step approach:
    1. Preliminary classification using sub-CPIA and PEFA indices and associated thresholds (higher capacity required scoring above threshold for each indicator; both below → lower capacity; mixed → “grey zone”).
       - Thresholds defined as the average score of countries classified as “blend” by IDA; currently corresponds to the 75th percentile of each distribution.
    2. Roundtable simultaneous assessment across departments using four critical criteria:
       - (i) Track record of accessing market financing and managing nonconcessional borrowing.
       - (ii) Timely provision of debt data and ability of authorities to do their own DSA.
       - (iii) Existence and satisfactory implementation of an articulated Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy (MTDS).
       - (iv) Track record in selecting high-return public investment projects.
  - Information sources: ROSCs, World Bank DeMPA, HIPC CBP self-assessments, staff qualitative assessments.
- Ongoing monitoring:
  - Annual stock-taking exercises to determine whether developments warrant a change in classification (e.g., new sub-CPIA or PEFA assessments).
  - Authorities may petition for reclassification; individual changes can be considered intra-annually case-by-case.
  - Reclassification from higher to lower capacity possible if capacity deteriorates.

### IV. Debt limits in lower-capacity countries
- General approach: continue debt-by-debt concessionality requirements but apply more flexibility for countries with lower debt vulnerabilities; use DSAs actively.

- A. Countries with higher debt vulnerabilities
  - Debt limits expected to be tighter than for countries with lower debt vulnerabilities and higher capacity.
  - Minimum concessional requirement should be consistent with DSA results; a grant element higher than 35 percent may be required on a case-by-case basis.
  - Minimum concessionality requirement needs to reflect the projected average grant element in the DSA during the program period to mitigate debt vulnerabilities.
  - Nonconcessional borrowing should be exceptional.
    - Exceptions: concessional financing not available for a critical and highly profitable project included in authorities’ development strategy.
    - Projects financed by nonconcessional borrowing generally expected to be carefully evaluated by a reputable source (e.g., World Bank or Regional Development Bank).
    - Exceptional cases could allow financing with grant element below the concessionality requirement based on debt structure, borrowing costs, and debt management considerations, with consideration of market risks (including exchange rate risk).
  - DSA must confirm that nonconcessional borrowing will not result in a significantly and persistent increase in debt vulnerabilities.

- B. Countries with lower debt vulnerabilities
  - Space for nonconcessional borrowing can be considered more systematically.
  - A minimum concessionality requirement of 35 percent will be set.
  - A certain amount of nonconcessional borrowing could be exempt from this requirement (a “nonzero limit”).
    - General principle: the nonzero limit should not be so large that, if fully used, it would push a country into the higher debt vulnerability category.
    - Impact of such borrowing should be assessed interactively between the DSA and the fiscal framework.
    - Debt management considerations (e.g., substitution of external for domestic debt) can be taken into account.
    - Assessment should be based on realistic assumptions for nonconcessional financing beyond the period for which a nonzero limit is proposed.
    - A profile with very large upfront nonconcessional borrowing that then decreases rapidly is generally not considered realistic unless resources finance upfront very lumpy and critical infrastructure projects.

*Source: Annex 1 of the guidance note on debt limits in Fund-supported programs (excerpts).*

### 14.      This approach should be complemented by a “speed bump” in some cases. In

### _121809 - 14.      This approach should be complemented by a “speed bump” in some cases. In

### Speed bump on debt accumulation
- Purpose: limit the maximum pace at which debt ratios can rise (in present value terms) in countries with large borrowing space or weak absorptive capacity.
- Suggested parameter: 5 percent of beginning-of-period GDP annually.
- Flexibility: the speed bump may be lower if country circumstances warrant it.
- DSA requirements if borrowing above the speed bump is contemplated:
  - Include a detailed explanation of the expected growth dividend.
  - Include an alternative “high borrowing-low growth dividend” scenario.

### Distinction by risk rating when setting nonzero limits
- Principle: treat low-risk and moderate-risk countries differently when setting nonzero limits.
- Implications:
  - The rule proposed in paragraph 13 (not reproduced here) rules out a downgrading of the risk rating for moderate-risk countries, but not for low-risk countries.
  - Countries just above and below the boundary between low risk and moderate risk should be accorded similar flexibility.
  - Rating downgrades for low-risk countries on account of a nonzero limit are expected to be rare.
  - For moderate-risk countries, nonzero limits should not bring baseline debt ratios to a level where a small shock would lead to a rating downgrade.

### Tied versus untied nonzero limits and capacity considerations
- Untied nonzero limits:
  - Allow borrowing nonconcessionally for uses not fully specified ex ante in program conditionality.
  - Are riskier from a debt sustainability perspective and should be considered only for countries with sufficient capacity.
- Expected evidence for permitting untied limits:
  - (i) Sub-CPIA and PEFA scores close to thresholds distinguishing lower and higher capacity.
  - (ii) Other evidence (e.g., country experience in choosing projects with high returns) confirming capacity to direct borrowing to high-return projects.
- Quantitative thresholds for qualification:
  - Sub-CPIA threshold: 3.67.
  - PEFA threshold: 2.64.
  - Countries could qualify for untied limits if both their sub-CPIA score and PEFA score are within the average of the blend countries minus one-half standard deviation.
- Procedural note:
  - Countries whose classification between lower and higher categories was debated in the second step of the capacity assessment process could also be considered.

### Disclosure and assumptions in the DSA for proposed limits
- Proposed tied or untied nonzero limits should be explicitly discussed in the DSA, including terms and purpose of the envisaged nonconcessional borrowing.
- If terms are unknown (more likely for untied limits), staff are strongly encouraged to use conservative assumptions:
  - Use market terms if known, or
  - Use a zero grant element.

### PV targets and average concessionality targets for higher-capacity countries
- Rationale:
  - More sophisticated options for concessionality requirements in higher-capacity countries provide flexibility without debt-by-debt assessment.
- PV targets:
  - Intended for higher-capacity countries with higher vulnerabilities to limit overall debt accumulation while leaving structure choice to authorities.
  - Should be set as annual indicative targets and derived from the DSA.
  - Preferable frequency: annual; semi-annual or quarterly “guideposts” possible if reliable timing of external financing operations is available.
  - Transitional treatment: PV and average concessionality targets will generally be established as annual indicative targets (rather than performance criteria) under Fund arrangements for a transitional period of two years from the effective date of the decision (December 1, 2009).
  - Targets should be derived from the path of the PV of debt in the DSA’s baseline scenario, consistent with macro framework and debt sustainability.
- Monitoring requirements for PV targets:
  - Timely and comprehensive information on expected disbursements (existing and new loans).
  - Aggregate all disbursements to calculate a PV based on the DSF methodology.
  - TMUs should include reporting requirements on external debt to allow such calculations.
  - Close and regular monitoring of actual and projected disbursements (amounts and terms) is required; updated projections and calculations should be regularly shared with staff.
  - Country teams should actively monitor implementation and report to the Board in program reviews on whether targets are expected to be met.
  - Adjustments to targets can be proposed in program reviews if donors’ actual disbursements deviate significantly from projections.

### Average concessionality targets (countries with lower debt vulnerabilities)
- Nature: do not limit total borrowing; borrowing could be unlimited if sufficiently concessional on average.
- Practical constraint: limited availability of concessional resources makes unlimited borrowing highly hypothetical.
- If average concessionality requirements lead to excessive borrowing and jeopardize debt sustainability, a PV target could be used instead.
- Setting and monitoring follow the same steps and data requirements as PV targets:
  - DSA can provide the target by comparing projected PV of new disbursements with their nominal value.
  - Active monitoring requires regular updates of projections for new disbursements and associated terms.

### Contracting versus disbursement basis for targets
- Both bases are available for countries with higher capacity.
- Disbursement-based targets:
  - Closer link to the DSA (which is based on disbursements), making target setting relatively easy.
  - A loan can contribute to PV targets over several years through staggered disbursements.
- Contracting-based targets:
  - More complex at target-setting stage but simpler at monitoring stage (typically fewer contracts than disbursements).
  - Principle: calculate PV of new debt expected to be contracted over the period assuming full upfront disbursement at contracting.
  - For contracting-based PV targets, consistency with the DSA means:
    - (i) take into account all debts included in the DSA (and only those debts) projected to be contracted during the period; and
    - (ii) use DSA methodology to calculate the aggregate PV.
- Operational tool: the DSA/DSF worksheet described in Annex 2 allows for both options.

### Treatment of grants
- Grants are not explicitly taken into account when setting PV or average concessionality targets because their PV is equal to zero by definition.
- Monitoring considerations:
  - Grants may need to be taken into account in monitoring average concessionality targets to avoid perverse incentives (e.g., a projected grant becoming a concessional loan, or vice versa).
  - In practice, donor decisions between grants and loans are generally driven by donor policies, limiting scope for manipulation.
  - If substitutions between grants and concessional loans are significant and information is available, adjustments can be made at monitoring stage.
  - If substitutions are significant and information is insufficient, switching from average concessionality to a PV target would be desirable.

### Concessionality requirements for advanced LICs and non-LICs
- For the most advanced LICs:
  - Concessionality requirements could be dropped in Fund-supported programs.
  - These countries would be higher capacity, expected to have per capita income above the IDA operational cutoff, a strong macro and public resource management track record, and sustained past and prospective access to nonconcessional financing.
- For non-LICs:
  - Concessionality requirements are not expected to be included in Fund-supported programs because such countries generally have limited or no access to concessional financing.
  - This aligns with the concessionality matrix philosophy for LICs, providing a path towards graduation from concessionality requirements.
- Even without concessionality requirements, debt limits may be considered if debt vulnerabilities remain high or fiscal coverage is narrow:
  - Options include debt ceilings on nominal external or total public debt, or sub-ceilings on specific types of debt, consistent with the fiscal framework.

### Criterion for defining “external” debt and treatment by country circumstances
- New guidelines move away from exclusive use of the residency criterion to define debt subject to concessionality requirements because:
  - Nonresidents’ role in domestic debt markets has blurred the external/domestic distinction.
  - Information on transactions involving nonresidents is often incomplete or delayed, complicating monitoring.
  - Such transactions are typically not under authorities’ control; concessionality requirements should not be designed to be met only through capital controls.
- For more advanced LICs and non-LICs with open capital accounts:
  - Focus of debt limits, if any, should be on total public debt; distinction between external and domestic debt is obviated.
  - Distinctions by characteristics (e.g., currency of denomination) may still be desirable from an external vulnerability standpoint even if not used for debt limits.
- For LICs with relatively closed capital accounts or very limited financial integration:
  - Use of the residency criterion remains appropriate; nonresident acquisition of domestically-issued debt in secondary markets is expected to be very limited and could be excluded from concessionality requirements to address monitoring issues.
- For LICs in an intermediate situation:
  - A currency of denomination criterion could be used: apply concessionality requirements to foreign-currency denominated debt regardless of creditor residency.
  - Teams should be mindful domestic debt could be foreign currency indexed or that repayment currency may differ from issue currency.

### Safeguards and program measures to address vulnerabilities from nonresident transactions
- Safeguards should be applied case-by-case, ensuring:
  - The program relies on an appropriately broad concept for the fiscal deficit performance criterion to close definitional loopholes.
  - All new domestic market borrowing should normally be in local currency.
  - Relevant program design changes (e.g., higher NIR targets) to mitigate vulnerabilities from significant nonresident holdings of domestic debt.
  - Such transactions are fully reflected in the external DSA, including explicit assessment of associated vulnerabilities (e.g., higher rollover risk, exchange rate or reserve pressures from sudden withdrawals).
  - Authorities report to the Fund the terms of new domestic borrowing, including currency composition, and take steps over time to improve monitoring of secondary market transactions.
  - Authorities are not signatories in transactions that involve immediate repackaging of domestic debt instruments for the sole purpose of reselling to nonresidents.

*Source: IMF document excerpt (sections 14–34, IV–VII).*

### 36.      This section provides recommendations on how to set and monitor targets on total

### _121809 - 36.      This section provides recommendations on how to set and monitor targets on total

### Setting and monitoring targets on total public debt (higher-capacity countries)
- Recommendation: Try PV or nominal targets on total public debt on a case-by-case basis for countries with higher capacity (para 36–38).
- Definitions and mechanics:
  - Total public debt in the template is defined as the sum of PPG external debt and domestic debt of the government (para 38).
  - The template generates a PV for this aggregate by assuming that the PV of domestic debt is equal to its face value (para 38).
  - The process for setting and monitoring a PV target on total public debt is identical to that for PPG external debt; targets should be derived from a baseline scenario consistent with the macroeconomic framework and where public debt appears sustainable (para 38).
- Scope: Recommendation to apply only where potential problems are considered manageable by country teams and authorities (para 37).

### Limitations and operational issues of total public debt targets
- Coverage and data:
  - Fiscal accounts generally have limited coverage of total public debt and may not include all domestic public sector debt (para 39).
  - Moving to broader coverage would raise challenging monitoring issues (para 39).
- Policy interactions and objectives:
  - Domestic debt is often used for monetary policy, exchange rate management, or to support domestic financial market development; these objectives should be considered when setting targets (para 39).
- Comparative usefulness:
  - Where fiscal account coverage is broad, a nominal total debt target may offer no significant benefit relative to a target on the fiscal deficit (para 39; footnote 28).
  - Debt level changes may reflect large valuation changes or proceeds from net asset sales not covered in the fiscal balance (footnote 28).
- Composition and measurement concerns:
  - Total public debt targets do not address composition of debt; they may need to be complemented by separate targets on external or domestic debt/financing (para 39).
  - Measuring domestic debt on a gross basis can be less meaningful when governments hold large and variable deposits in the banking system; net domestic debt may be more relevant and controllable in such cases (para 39).

### Treatment of SOEs in debt limits
- General rule: Public enterprises and other official sector entities should be covered by external debt limits under Fund arrangements, unless an explicit selective exclusion is made in the TMU (para 40).
- Basis for selective exclusion:
  - Can be considered for SOEs able to borrow without a government guarantee and whose operations pose limited fiscal risk (para 40).
  - Objective: avoid inappropriately constraining operations and potentially hampering investment (para 40).
- Exclusions should be based on:
  - Managerial independence; relations with the government; periodicity of audits; publication of comprehensive annual reports and protection of shareholders’ rights; financial indices and sustainability; and other risk factors (para 41).
  - Two binding criteria for high fiscal risk where comprehensive information is lacking: i) the enterprise carries out uncompensated quasi-fiscal activities; and ii) it has negative operating balances (para 41).
  - SOEs requiring a sovereign guarantee to borrow externally are automatically covered under the debt-limits policy (footnote 30).
- Note: Treatment of SOEs is consistent with the DSF (footnote 29).

### Capacity assessment and classification process (Annual updates and ad hoc changes)
- Annual updates:
  - Annual capacity assessment updates are expected to be lighter than the initial 2009 assessment (para 42).
  - For most program countries previously classified, there is no need to follow the two-step 2009 process; main issue is whether developments warrant a change in classification (para 42).
  - Developments could be reflected in the most recent sub-CPIA or PEFA score, or other relevant sources (para 42).
  - Annual updates provide opportunity for authorities to argue for a different classification (para 42).
  - Annual updates expected to take place around midyear (para 43).
- Coordination with World Bank:
  - Assessment updates will be synchronized with the World Bank and classifications shared immediately after updates (para 43).
  - If discrepancies arise, a reconciliation meeting should be held within 5 working days following the exchange of classifications; managements will, within five working days, either resolve the dispute or decide the institutions will have different views (para 43).
- Ad hoc intra-annual assessments:
  - Two situations: (i) countries not previously assessed by the Fund that subsequently become program countries during the year; (ii) countries where a major development warrants reconsideration between annual updates (para 44).
  - Reclassification from a higher to the lower category cannot be ruled out if capacity deteriorates (footnote 31).

### Setting and monitoring PV and average concessionality targets on external debt (DSF template)
- New DSF template features:
  - A new sheet labeled “PV Targets” was added to the DSF template to set and monitor PV and average concessionality targets (para 45).
- Disbursement-based targets (Annex 2, A):
  - Step 1 (Setting): Assumptions on disbursement schedules and terms are taken from the DSA sheet ‘Inp_Outp_debt’ Section 3 NEW MLT DEBT and are used to calculate PV and average concessionality targets; critical to use terms and amounts reflecting staff’s best knowledge of authorities’ borrowing plans; record DSA exchange rates for consistency (para 46).
  - Step 2 (Monitoring): Specify terms/conditions of each actual disbursement; treat each disbursement as a separate loan with original loan terms applied; exchange rates used to convert disbursements into U.S. dollars must be identical to those used at the target setting stage; enter exchange rates via the “Change Exchange Rates” button; enter interest rates, maturity, grace period and number of principal payments per year in yellow shaded areas (para 47).
  - Step 3 (Comparing): Calculate PV and average grant element of each disbursement; aggregate PVs and average grant element for comparison with targets (para 49).
- Contracting-based targets (Annex 2, B):
  - Step 1 (Setting): Obtain information on new borrowing expected to be contracted over the period from authorities and enter face value, interest rate, maturity, grace period and number of principal payments per year for the first year of projection; enter DSA exchange rates to ensure consistent conversion (para 50).
  - Step 2 (Monitoring): Enter terms and amounts of contracted loans during the year; ensure exchange rates used are identical to target-setting rates; enter interest rates, maturity, grace period and number of principal payments per year in yellow shaded areas; calculate PV and average grant element and aggregate for comparison with targets (para 51).

### Indicators for exclusion of SOEs (Annex 3)
- Managerial independence:
  - Criteria include: i) cost-covering price setting for non-tradables; ii) average prices within 10 percent of the international benchmark for producers of tradables; iii) tariff setting regime compatible with long-term sustainability and comparable to private firms; employment policies should be independent of civil service laws and not subject to government intervention except when clearly justified (para 52, bullet 1).
- Relations with the government:
  - Consider existence of direct or indirect subsidies, on-lending, explicit or implicit loan guarantees beyond those to private enterprises; uncompensated quasi-fiscal activities; nature of regulatory and tax regimes; frequency of profit transfers to central budget (para 52, bullet 2).
- Periodic audits:
  - Periodic audits by reputable private accounting firms applying international standards; a major international firm should ideally audit large public enterprises (para 52, bullet 3).
- Publication of comprehensive annual reports and shareholders’ rights:
  - Annual reports should include audited balance sheets; profit and loss statements; off-balance sheet liabilities; levels/changes in activity; employment and investment; comparisons against other firms and international benchmarks; governance should protect minority shareholder rights (para 52, bullet 4).
- Financial conditions and sustainability:
  - Indicators include i) market access with borrowing rates comparable to private firms without a government guarantee; ii) less-than-full leveraging with debt-to-asset ratio comparable to industry average; iii) profitability measured as operating balance to assets ratio or positive and above average cost of debt where no comparator exists; iv) records of past investments demonstrating average rate of return at least equivalent to that required by cost-benefit analyses (para 52, bullet 5).
- Other risk factors:
  - Include contingent liabilities relative to operating balance; currency mismatches between revenue and debt; importance of the enterprise by size and/or function (para 52, bullet 6).

*Source: _121809 - 36.      This section provides recommendations on how to set and monitor targets on total (PDF chapter/section).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2009/_121809.pdf_
