## Distribution of Quotas and Calculated Quotas

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---

### I. Introduction — context and objectives
- Realigning quota shares central to reform; perceived misalignment undermines effectiveness and legitimacy.
- 2008 reform package included:
  - a new quota formula,
  - an aggregate shift in quota shares totaling almost 5 percentage points for 54 members (mainly EMDCs),
  - a 2.7 percent increase in voting share of EMDCs as a whole,
  - tripling of basic votes,
  - an additional Alternate Executive Director for the largest member constituencies (currently the two Sub-Saharan African chairs).
- 14th Review timing and implementation status:
  - Future general quota reviews, beginning with the 14th Review, aim at further adjustments.
  - As of early March 2010, 65 members representing about 70 percent of total voting power had implemented the 2008 reform steps (required three-fifths of members (112) having 85 percent of total voting power not met).
  - IMFC brought forward the 14th Review deadline to January 2011.

### II. Data and quota formula issues
- Data vintages and construction:
  - Current quota calculations initially covered period through 2007; staff updated through 2008 using a common cut-off date of end-January 2010 for data revisions.
  - Primary source for preliminary 2008-derived calculations: World Economic Outlook, October 2009 (WEO).
  - Two data sets constructed: periods through 2007 and through 2008; differences applied to current quota data set to derive 2008 CQS.
  - Data downloaded for 1994-2008 to capture revisions; where 2008 IFS elements were missing, previous period used.
- Methodological notes:
  - WEO-based projections approximate future IFS-based database at aggregate level but omit some balance of payments elements.
  - Exceptional financing transactions are excluded for quota purposes; WEO reports net income/transfers/capital account while quota data use both credit and debit sides.
  - For some 2008 elements, IFS data were used to avoid understating balance of payments components.
- Quota formula used for Calculated Quota Share (CQS):
  - CQS = (0.50*GDP + 0.30*Openness + 0.15*Variability + 0.05*Reserves)^K
  - GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates.
  - K is a compression factor of 0.95.
- Note on actual contributions:
  - Members’ financial contributions take many forms (voluntary bilateral/multilateral support for GRA liquidity, PRGT loan/subsidy contributions, debt relief contributions, voluntary SDR trading arrangements, support for technical assistance and training; mandated contributions via FTP participation, charges and fees, burden-shared contributions).
  - Actual contributions have been taken into account outside of the formula, mainly to recognize particularly generous contributions; systematic capture would require resolving difficult measurement and aggregation issues.

### III. Derived 2008 data implications — aggregate and regional shifts
- Aggregate implications (derived 2008 data):
  - Staff estimate EMDCs as a group could gain on the order of 1.7 percentage points in calculated quota share from the 2008 data update.
  - All major EMDC sub-regions gain calculated share, largest increases in Asia and transition countries.
  - Corresponding decline in aggregate share of major advanced economies indicated.
- Confirmation caveat: individual country changes require finalization of the 2008 IFS-based data set.

### IV. Key distribution figures (selected percentages preserved verbatim)
- Post Second Round Actual Quota Shares / Calculated Quota Shares (based on formula) / Projected (2008 WEO-derived) (In percent)
  - Advanced economies: 60.5 / 60.5 / 60.4 / 58.7
  - Major advanced economies: 45.2 / 45.3 / 45.0 / 43.3
    - Of which: US: 17.1 / 17.7 / 17.8 / 16.9
  - Other advanced economies: 15.3 / 15.3 / 15.4 / 15.5
  - Emerging Market and Developing Countries: 39.5 / 39.5 / 39.6 / 41.3
  - Developing countries: 32.1 / 32.4 / 32.6 / 33.7
    - Africa: 5.4 / 4.9 / 3.1 / 3.2
    - Asia (including Korea and Singapore): 11.5 / 12.6 / 17.2 / 18.0
    - Middle East, Malta & Turkey: 7.6 / 7.2 / 5.4 / 5.5
    - Western Hemisphere: 7.6 / 7.7 / 6.9 / 7.0
    - Transition economies: 7.4 / 7.1 / 7.0 / 7.5
  - Total: 100.0 / 100.0 / 100.0 / 100.0
- Memorandum items:
  - EU 27: 32.4 / 31.9 / 32.1 / 31.7
  - LICs (PRGT-eligible countries): 4.6 / 4.3 / 2.5 / 2.6

### V. IMFC guidance, interpretative issues and trade-offs
- IMFC (Istanbul, October 2009) guidance called for:
  - a shift in quota share to dynamic EMDCs of at least five percent from over-represented to under-represented countries using the current quota formula as a basis; and
  - protection of the voting share of the poorest members.
- Interpretative ambiguity:
  - Some members emphasize a shift of at least 5 percent to dynamic EMDCs.
  - Others emphasize a 5 percent shift from over- to under-represented countries.
  - These positions can be reconciled because EMDCs account for major part of aggregate shortfall of under-represented countries (using 2007 database and derived 2008 data), but they are not identical groups.
- Judgment required on relative emphasis between:
  - targeting dynamic EMDCs,
  - shifting from over- to under-represented countries,
  - protecting poorest members’ voting share.

### VI. Defining “dynamic” EMDCs — three alternative approaches (operational thresholds preserved)
- Approach A — Above-average growth:
  - Criteria example used in illustrations: average growth rates during 2004-08 above the average for EMDCs as a whole.
  - Growth window used in illustrations: 5 year period (2004-08).
  - Empirical outcome (derived 2008): captures 21 EMDCs; 15 are under-represented, 6 are at most moderately over-represented (over-represented by less than 25 percent): Belarus, Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Panama, and Uganda.
- Approach B — Contributions to global growth (PPP-weighted):
  - Inclusion rule example: contribution to global PPP growth in 2004-08 exceeded 0.5 percent.
  - Empirical outcome (derived 2008): covers 20 EMDCs, includes Brazil, China, India, Russia; among these 20, 3 are moderately over-represented: India, Pakistan, Romania.
- Approach C — PPP GDP out-of-lineness:
  - Measure: PPP-GDP share relative to post-second round quota share (PPP-GDP/AQS).
  - Thresholds illustrated (derived 2006-2008):
    - Cut-off ratio 1.0: includes 33 EMDCs (6 moderately over-represented: Belarus, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, India, Pakistan).
    - Cut-off ratio 1.5: captures 11 EMDCs: China, Turkey, India, Iran, Colombia, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Brazil, Egypt, Nepal, Mexico.
    - Cut-off ratio 1.75: yields 6 EMDCs: China, Turkey, India, Iran, Colombia, Vietnam.
- Operational constraint applied in illustrations:
  - Countries included only if they meet dynamism criteria and are not substantially over-represented using the quota formula (defined as over-representation of less than 25 percent, i.e., AQS/CQS<1.25).

### VII. Protecting the voting share of the poorest members — definitions and modalities (exact figures)
- Defining "poorest" members:
  - Option A: PRGT-eligible members — comprises 71 members with aggregate post second round quota share of 4.3 percent.
  - Option B: World Bank low income list (42 countries): post second round quota share of 2.8 percent.
  - World Bank low income criterion: yearly per-capita GNI $975 or less.
  - FY 2010 poverty line referenced: $1135 for FY 2010.
- Modalities to avoid loss of voting share:
  - Maintain share of basic votes as quotas increase (agreed in 2008): a member’s voting share remains unchanged as long as its quota share does not change.
  - Two options if using ad hoc increases:
    - Provide part of the ad hoc increase to the poorest countries to maintain their quota share.
    - Further increase the ratio of basic votes to total votes (would require amendment of the Fund’s Articles).
  - Simulations in the paper: poorest defined as PRGT-eligible countries with each individual country’s quota share protected (i.e., each maintains post second round quota share).

### VIII. Illustrative simulations — design, scenarios and allocation rules (preserved rules and sizes)
- Purpose: illustrate trade-offs; not staff proposals.
- Four sets of simulations:
  - (i) Selective increases only: increase distributed to all members according to calculated quota shares.
  - (ii) Selective increases combined with relatively large ad hoc increases allocated to countries meeting specific criteria.
  - (iii) Selective increases combined with relatively small ad hoc increases.
  - (iv) Combination of selective, ad hoc, and equiproportional increases (equiproportional increases allocated in proportion to actual quota shares to dampen realignment impacts).
- Aggregate increase magnitudes analyzed:
  - Purely selective: overall quota increases of 50-150 percent.
  - Other simulations: overall increases of 50 percent and 100 percent.
- Ad hoc allocation variants (examples):
  - (i) All under-represented countries.
  - (ii) All under-represented countries plus other dynamic EMDCs (dynamic EMDCs defined as those out-of-line with PPP GDP share).
  - (iii) Under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs (forgoing part of under-represented advanced countries).
- Allocation mechanics (preserved):
  - Uniform reduction factor (URF): increases distributed so each eligible country’s out-of-lineness is reduced proportionally by a URF (used in 2008 reform).
  - Over-represented dynamic EMDCs may receive a fixed "minimum ad hoc increase" shown in tables.
  - PRGT-eligible countries guaranteed at least their post second round actual quota share.

### IX. Key simulation findings and numeric outcomes (selected exact results and ranges)
- General findings:
  - Large selective increases can achieve a 5 percent shift from over- to under-represented countries with sufficiently large overall increase, but shifts between major country groups are small under purely selective increases.
  - Purely selective approach does not protect voting shares of poorest members; ad hoc component likely needed.
  - Combining selective increases with relatively large ad hoc increases can achieve sizable shifts in line with IMFC guidance; over-represented countries tend to lose larger shares.
  - Combining selective increases with relatively small ad hoc increases: close to a doubling of quotas would be needed to achieve a 5 percent shift to dynamic EMDCs.
  - Adding a modest equiproportional increase reduces overall shifts, but with a doubling of quotas it is still possible to achieve 5 percent shifts to groups benefiting from ad hoc increases (may require relaxing caps).
- Aggregate net effects reported:
  - Many simulations achieve a quota shift of at least 5 percentage points to dynamic EMDCs (particularly using derived 2008 data set) and a similar shift from over- to under-represented countries.
  - Net increase in share of EMDCs tends to be in the 1-3½ percentage point range.
  - Simulations lead to substantial realignment among largest quotas, with China moving in many cases from the sixth to the third largest quota.
- Selected numeric scenario outcomes (examples as presented):
  - Table 5 (Selective increases 50%, 100%, 150%) — Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.): 3.3 / 3.6 / 5.0 (for one variant) and 5.4 / 6.0 / 6.5 (for another variant).
  - Table 6 (Ad hoc to all under-represented) — Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.): 5.5 / 6.4 / 6.8 and variants 7.7 / 5.3 / 6.2.
  - Table 8 (Ad hoc to dynamic EMDCs) — Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 7/: 4.6 / 5.9 / 5.9 / variants up to 7.5.
  - Minimum ad hoc increases to dynamic EMDCs reported across tables in explicit percent values (examples): 20% / 25% / 35% / 40% / 25% / 35% / 45% / 55% (Table 8 variants), and other tables list minimum ad hoc increases such as 40% / 45% / 50% / 60% etc.
- Practical implications highlighted:
  - Ad hoc allocation appears necessary to achieve desired realignments; relative size of ad hoc component could vary.
  - If basic votes unchanged, part of ad hoc increases must be allocated to protect voting share of poorest (individually or as a group).
  - Further work required on size and qualification criteria for ad hoc increases, modalities for allocation, and whether any part should be distributed equiproportionally.

### X. Members’ financial contributions — forms, role, data and key figures (selected exact figures)
- Forms of contributions include:
  - bilateral loan/note purchase agreements and the NAB/GAB;
  - resources provided in context of specific facilities (e.g., oil facility);
  - loan and subsidy resources to PRGT and predecessors;
  - contributions to HIPC, MDRI and Liberia operation;
  - voluntary SDR trading arrangements;
  - financial support for technical assistance and training;
  - mandated contributions: quota subscriptions, FTP participation, charges and fees, burden-shared contributions.
- Role in quota determination:
  - Past ad hoc quota increases for contributors cited: Saudi Arabia (1981), Japan (9th Review), and ad hoc increases in general reviews.
  - Such adjustments made outside the quota formula.
- Measurement and aggregation challenges listed (preserved): choice of contribution types, aggregation across loan vs subsidy, time periods, discounting, and signaling effects.
- Indicators and selected numeric entries from tables:
  - Bilateral borrowing and note purchase agreements (selected amounts, in millions of SDRs; as of January 28, 2010):
    - Austria 2,026.70; Belgium 4,406.68; Canada 6,287.17; Cyprus 148.75; Czech Republic 957.57; Denmark 1,812.87; Finland 1,208.58; France 10,282.25; Germany 13,945.19; Greece 1,059.83; Ireland 1,208.58; Italy 7,539.70; Japan 62,871.73; Luxembourg 399.76; Malta 111.56; Netherlands 4,936.60; Norway 3,000.00; Poland 1,617.64; Portugal 985.46; Slovak Republic 409.06; Slovenia 260.31; Spain 3,848.87; Sweden 2,296.31; Switzerland 6,300.00; United Kingdom 9,920.00.
    - Note Purchase Agreements (selected): China 32,000.00; Brazil 6,287.17; India 6,287.17; Russia 6,287.17.
    - Total Bilateral Borrowing 198,702.69.
    - Exchange rates used (December 7, 2009): EUR/SDR 1.07564; USD/SDR 1.59054.
  - GAB/NAB components (as of April 30, 2009): selected components 6,344; 17,000; 34,000 (maximum resources available under NAB and GAB is SDR 34 billion).
  - PRGF-ESF / MDRI-II / ESF / PRGF-HIPC Trusts and Liberia Debt Relief (as of June 30, 2009) (in millions of SDRs):
    - PRGF-ESF Trust: 15,673.23 (loan commitments); amount disbursed 14,198.88.
    - MDRI-II Trust: 2,068.99 (commitments).
    - Liberia Debt Relief: 1,120.00 (transfers for Debt Relief).
    - ESF Subsidy Contributions: 220.07 (pledged).
    - PRGF-HIPC Trust: 87.49.
    - Other contributions/commitments: 1,562.31 and 508.53.
  - Voluntary SDR Designation Plan totals (as of February 1, 2010): Total Maximum Designation Plan Amounts: Total 1,500 (in millions of SDRs). Selected country maximums: Australia 61; Canada 63; France 157; India 162; Italy 158; Japan (listed "yes -"); United Kingdom 347; United States (listed "yes -"); Germany 57; Spain 70; Sweden 7.
  - Emergency Assistance — Subsidy Contributions (as of July 31, 2009) (in millions of SDRs): Total Contribution pledged 40.87; Contribution received 38.83. Sub-Account breakdowns preserved verbatim.
  - Technical Assistance (as of April 30, 2009) (US$ millions): Total 611.74. Selected contributors: Japan 480.50; United Kingdom 24.60; Switzerland 23.51; Canada 9.98; Netherlands 11.12; Australia 12.14; France 7.31; Germany 3.78; Spain 2.00; Sweden 5.84.

### XI. Directors’ questions and decision issues (preserved verbatim)
- How do Directors assess the broad objectives of the reform in light of IMFC direction? Viability of an approach seeking to achieve a shift in quota shares of at least 5 percent both to dynamic EMDCs and from over- to under-represented countries? What weight to net outcome for EMDCs as a whole?
- Do Directors agree the quota increase should include a combination of selective increases (based on the quota formula) and ad hoc increases? Views on including an equiproportional element?
- Views on approaches to capturing dynamic EMDCs? Agree that concept could include some moderately over-represented EMDCs if they meet criteria?
- Options for protecting voting share of poorest members? Should protection be through quota adjustments or increase in share of basic votes? If quota adjustments, protect individual members or group? Definition of "poorest" to use?

*Source: Finance Department, IMF staff paper excerpt — “Distribution of Quotas and Calculated Quotas.”*

### 1.   Distribution of Quotas and Calculated Quotas ....................................................................6

### 1.   Distribution of Quotas and Calculated Quotas

### I. Introduction — context and objectives
- Realigning quota shares is central to reform of Fund governance; perceived misalignment undermines effectiveness and legitimacy.
- The 2008 reform package included:
  - a new quota formula,
  - an aggregate shift in quota shares totaling almost 5 percentage points for 54 members (mainly EMDCs),
  - a 2.7 percent increase in voting share of EMDCs as a whole,
  - tripling of basic votes,
  - an additional Alternate Executive Director for the largest member constituencies (currently the two Sub-Saharan African chairs).
- The 2008 reform was a first step; future general quota reviews, beginning with the 14th Review, aim at further adjustments to reflect evolving economic weights.
- As of early March 2010, only 65 members representing about 70 percent of total voting power had implemented the 2008 reform steps, short of the required three-fifths of members (112) having 85 percent of total voting power.
- The 14th Review deadline was brought forward to January 2011 by the IMFC; an intensive work program was envisaged to narrow differences by the 2010 Annual Meetings.

### II. Data and quota formula issues
- Current quota calculations initially covered the period through 2007; staff initiated updating through 2008 using a common cut-off date of end-January 2010 for data revisions.
- For early assessment, staff derived calculated quota shares through 2008 using the October 2009 WEO as the primary source (with caution due to conceptual and coverage differences with IFS).
- Two data sets were constructed covering periods through 2007 and 2008; differences were applied to the current quota data set to obtain derived calculated quota shares through 2008.
- Key methodological notes:
  - WEO-based projections approximate future IFS-based database at aggregate level but omit some balance of payments elements (exceptional financing transactions excluded for quota purposes; WEO reports net income/transfers/capital account whereas quota data use both credit and debit sides).
  - For some 2008 elements, IFS data were used to avoid understating balance of payments components; where 2008 data were missing, the previous period was used.
  - Data were downloaded for 1994-2008 to capture revisions.
- The calculated quota shares in this paper are based on the new quota formula:
  - CQS = (0.50*GDP + 0.30*Openness + 0.15*Variability + 0.05*Reserves)^K
  - GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates.
  - K is a compression factor of 0.95.
- Members’ financial contributions to the Fund take many forms (voluntary bilateral/multilateral support for GRA liquidity, PRGT loan/subsidy contributions, debt relief contributions, voluntary SDR trading arrangements, support for technical assistance and training; mandated contributions via FTP participation, charges and fees, burden-shared contributions).
- Actual contributions have been taken into account outside of the formula, mainly to recognize particularly generous contributions; capturing actual contributions systematically would require addressing difficult measurement and aggregation issues.

### III. Derived 2008 data implications — aggregate and regional shifts
- The derived 2008 data set suggests EMDCs as a group can be expected to gain calculated quota share from the 2008 data update; staff estimate the increase could be on the order of 1.7 percentage points.
- All major EMDC sub-regions gain calculated share, with largest increases in Asia and transition countries.
- Corresponding decline in aggregate share of major advanced economies is indicated.
- Confirmation of individual country changes requires finalization of the 2008 IFS-based data set.

### IV. Key distribution figures (Table 1) — quota shares and calculated quota shares (In percent)
- Post Second Round Actual Quota Shares / Calculated Quota Shares (based on formula) / Projected (2008 WEO-derived)
  - Advanced economies: 60.5 / 60.5 / 60.4 / 58.7
  - Major advanced economies: 45.2 / 45.3 / 45.0 / 43.3
    - Of which: US: 17.1 / 17.7 / 17.8 / 16.9
  - Other advanced economies: 15.3 / 15.3 / 15.4 / 15.5
  - Emerging Market and Developing Countries: 39.5 / 39.5 / 39.6 / 41.3
  - Developing countries: 32.1 / 32.4 / 32.6 / 33.7
    - Africa: 5.4 / 4.9 / 3.1 / 3.2
    - Asia (including Korea and Singapore): 11.5 / 12.6 / 17.2 / 18.0
    - Middle East, Malta & Turkey: 7.6 / 7.2 / 5.4 / 5.5
    - Western Hemisphere: 7.6 / 7.7 / 6.9 / 7.0
    - Transition economies: 7.4 / 7.1 / 7.0 / 7.5
  - Total: 100.0 / 100.0 / 100.0 / 100.0
- Memorandum items:
  - EU 27: 32.4 / 31.9 / 32.1 / 31.7
  - LICs (PRGT-eligible countries): 4.6 / 4.3 / 2.5 / 2.6

### V. Realigning quota shares — IMFC guidance and interpretative issues
- IMFC guidance (Istanbul, October 2009) called for:
  - a shift in quota share to dynamic EMDCs of at least five percent from over-represented to under-represented countries using the current quota formula as a basis; and
  - protection of the voting share of the poorest members.
- Interpretative ambiguity exists:
  - Some members emphasize a shift of at least 5 percent to dynamic EMDCs.
  - Others emphasize a 5 percent shift from over- to under-represented countries.
  - These positions can be reconciled because EMDCs account for the major part of aggregate shortfall of under-represented countries (using 2007 database and derived 2008 data), but they are not identical groups.
- Judgments will be needed on the relative emphasis between:
  - targeting dynamic EMDCs,
  - shifting from over- to under-represented countries,
  - protecting poorest members’ voting share.

### VI. Shift to EMDCs as a group — feasibility and prior experience
- Targeting a specified shift for EMDCs as a whole lacked consensus pre-Istanbul; some argue the shift should be an outcome rather than a target.
- World Bank approach cited for comparison: targeting at least a 3 percent increase in voting share for developing and transition countries as a whole, on top of the 1.46 percent increase in the first phase of its reform.
- A sizable realignment can occur with little net increase in EMDC share if adjustments primarily redistribute within groups (selective distribution using the quota formula can shift share to many under-represented countries while EMDC aggregate share remains broadly in line with calculated share).
- The 2008 reform featured:
  - some under-represented advanced countries accepting smaller increases to facilitate agreement,
  - some countries moving from over- to under-represented; of 13 countries that became under-represented following ad hoc increases under the 2008 reform, 12 were EMDCs.

### VII. Under- and over-representation by major country groups (Table 2) — differences between calculated and post-second round actual quota shares (In percentage points)
- Data ending 2007 (IFS through 2007) / Data ending 2008 (preliminary WEO-based)
  - Advanced economies:
    - Post Second Round Quota Share: 60.5 / Calculated Quota Share: 60.4 / Difference: 0.0
    - Projected (2008): Quota Share 60.5 / Calculated 58.7 / Difference -1.7
    - Underrepresented: 32.9 / 35.2 / 2.3  — Projected: 17.1 / 19.0 / 1.9
    - Overrepresented: 27.5 / 25.2 / -2.3  — Projected: 43.4 / 39.8 / -3.6
  - Emerging Market and Developing Countries:
    - Post Second Round Quota Share: 39.5 / Calculated 39.6 / Difference 0.0
    - Projected (2008): Quota Share 39.5 / Calculated 41.3 / Difference 1.7
    - Underrepresented: 18.2 / 25.9 / 7.7  — Projected: 20.7 / 29.7 / 8.9
    - Overrepresented: 21.3 / 13.7 / -7.6  — Projected: 18.8 / 11.6 / -7.2
  - Total Underrepresented Countries:
    - Post Second Round: 51.1 / Calculated 61.1 / Difference 9.9  — Projected: 37.8 / 48.6 / Difference 10.8
  - Total Overrepresented Countries:
    - Post Second Round: 48.9 / Calculated 38.9 / Difference -9.9  — Projected: 62.2 / 51.4 / Difference -10.8
- Memorandum — LICs (PRGT-eligible countries):
  - Post Second Round (2007): Quota Share 4.3 / Calculated 2.5 / Difference -1.7
  - Projected (2008): Quota Share 4.3 / Calculated 2.6 / Difference -1.6
  - LICs underrepresented: 0.5 / 0.6 / 0.1  — Projected: 0.3 / 0.4 / 0.1
  - LICs overrepresented: 3.8 / 2.0 / -1.8  — Projected: 4.0 / 2.2 / -1.8

### VIII. Trade-offs and simulation aims
- Staff presents simulations to illustrate trade-offs between objectives (shifting quota share to dynamic EMDCs, shifting from over- to under-represented countries, protecting poorest members).
- No formal proposals are advanced; further guidance from Directors on objectives and finalization of the 2008 data set is required before concrete proposals.

*Source: Finance Department, IMF staff paper excerpt — “Distribution of Quotas and Calculated Quotas.”*

### 18.      Different approaches to capturing the concept of dynamic EMDCs are

### 18.      Different approaches to capturing the concept of dynamic EMDCs are

### Approaches to defining "dynamism"
- Above-average growth
  - Consider countries that have recorded above average growth, or exceeded the average by a certain margin, over a recent period of, say, 5 or 10 years.
  - The period must be long enough to exclude short bursts or temporary rebounds; choosing too long a period can distort results because several EMDCs experienced crises in the last decade.
  - Staff examined a range of possibilities (described in more detail in the Supplement). Results are sensitive to the chosen time period and the threshold for defining growth as above average.
  - Note: EMDCs generally grow faster than advanced countries; using EMDC average growth rather than global growth may be the more relevant threshold.

- Contributions to global growth
  - Consider EMDCs that made the strongest contribution to PPP-weighted real global GDP growth over a recent period.
  - This option was considered in the context of the 2008 reform but not pursued.
  - Generates a more stable list but primarily captures size and thus excludes very fast-growing smaller economies.

- Out-of-lineness in terms of PPP GDP
  - Consider countries whose share in global PPP GDP is larger than their quota share.
  - Used in the 2008 reform to bring forward expected growth for countries most out-of-line in PPP GDP.
  - In 2008 only countries with PPP GDP shares substantially larger than quota shares (ratio of more than 1.75) were considered to target a very small group.
  - Alternative thresholds could be considered for the 14th Review, including a longer list of countries with shares in global PPP GDP above their quota shares.

- Operational constraint applied in illustrations
  - Countries are included if they meet the defined dynamism criteria and are not substantially over-represented using the quota formula (defined here as over-representation of less than 25 percent).

### Empirical outcomes from the three approaches (based on derived database through 2008)
- The three approaches illustrated capture dynamism respectively as:
  - (i) EMDCs with average growth rates during 2004-08 above the average for EMDCs as a whole;
  - (ii) EMDCs whose contribution to global PPP growth in 2004-08 exceeded 0.5 percent;
  - (iii) EMDCs whose share in global PPP GDP exceeded their quota share.
- Counts and overlaps:
  - The different approaches capture between 20-33 countries.
  - 4 countries—China, India, Peru, and Vietnam—meet all three criteria.
  - 21 countries meet at least two of the three criteria.
- Most countries in these groups are already under-represented using the quota formula, but a small number of over-represented countries (between 3 and 6) would be added to the list under these criteria.

### Considerations for using the criteria
- One approach: focus primarily on under-represented countries but allow adding a small group of over-represented EMDCs that meet one or more dynamism criteria.
  - Advantage: all under-represented EMDCs qualify for ad hoc increases, making results less sensitive to the specific choice of criteria.
  - This approach is used in illustrative simulations in the following sections.
- Alternative approach: distribute part or all ad hoc increases exclusively to countries meeting one or more dynamism criteria.
  - Potential problem: fairness concerns regarding ad hoc increases to dynamic but over-represented countries relative to under-represented countries that do not meet the criteria.

### Thresholds and operational definitions referenced
- Over-representation threshold used in illustrations: over-represented by less than 25 percent (i.e., included if not over-represented by more than 25 percent).
- 2008 practice: considered countries with PPP GDP to quota share ratio of more than 1.75 for a very small group.
- Contribution threshold for one approach: contribution to global PPP growth above 0.5 percent over a recent 5 year period.
- Growth window used in illustrations: 5 year period (2004-08) for growth comparisons against EMDC average.

### Protecting the voting share of the poorest members
- Defining "poorest" members
  - Option A: use the list of PRGT-eligible members recently agreed by the Board — comprises 71 members with an aggregate post second round quota share of 4.3 percent.
  - Option B: a narrower list such as the 42 countries defined as low income in the IBRD’s World Development Indicators — these have a post second round quota share of 2.8 percent.
- Modalities for protection
  - Maintain share of basic votes as quotas increase (agreed in the 2008 reform): a member’s voting share remains unchanged as long as its quota share does not change.
  - Low income countries are over-represented on average and will tend to lose quota and voting share under formula-based realignment.
  - Two options to avoid loss of voting share:
    - Provide part of the ad hoc increase to the poorest countries to maintain their quota share.
    - Further increase the ratio of basic votes to total votes over and above the 2008 reform (would require further amendment of the Fund’s Articles).
- If ad hoc quota increases are used to protect voting share:
  - Issue: whether protection should be provided individually or for the poorest members as a group.
  - Group approach allows realignment within the poorest group but may result in a decline in share for many of those countries.
  - In the simulations that follow, poorest defined as PRGT-eligible countries with each individual country’s quota share protected.

- PRGT and World Bank income thresholds referenced
  - PRGT eligibility group comprises 71 members (aggregate post second round quota share 4.3 percent).
  - World Bank low income criterion: yearly per-capita GNI $975 or less.
  - FY 2010 poverty line referenced: $1135 for FY 2010 used in an operational PRGT-related definition.

### Illustrative simulations — design and scenarios
- Purpose: illustrate issues and trade-offs; simulations are not staff proposals and are based on simple allocation rules applied to all countries.
- Data sets: simulations provided for both the current data set and the derived data set through 2008 to show implications of the data update.
- Four sets of simulations presented:
  - (i) Selective increases only: increase distributed to all members according to calculated quota shares.
  - (ii) Selective increases combined with relatively large ad hoc increases allocated to countries meeting specific criteria.
  - (iii) Selective increases combined with relatively small ad hoc increases.
  - (iv) Combination of selective, ad hoc, and equiproportional increases (equiproportional increases allocated in proportion to actual quota shares to dampen realignment impacts).
- Aggregate increase magnitudes analyzed:
  - First set presented for overall quota increases of 50-150 percent.
  - Remaining simulations based on overall increases of 50 percent and 100 percent for simplicity.
- Allocation variants for ad hoc increases in second set:
  - (i) All under-represented countries (additional boost to those gaining from selective increases).
  - (ii) All under-represented countries plus other dynamic EMDCs (dynamic EMDCs defined as those out-of-line with PPP GDP share).
  - (iii) Under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs (implies foregoing on part of under-represented advanced countries).
  - In all three variants a portion of ad hoc increases allocated to PRGT-eligible countries to at least maintain their quota share and voting share.

### Key simulation findings (aggregate and distributional effects)
- Large selective increases can achieve a 5 percent shift from over- to under-represented countries with a sufficiently large overall increase, but:
  - Shifts in shares between major country groups would be small under purely selective increases.
  - Purely selective approach would not address protection of voting shares for the poorest members.
  - Therefore, some element of ad hoc increases is likely needed.
- Combining selective increases with relatively large ad hoc increases:
  - Can achieve sizable shifts in shares in line with IMFC guidance.
  - Over-represented countries tend to lose larger shares because they do not participate in ad hoc increases.
  - Increases the likelihood that some over-represented countries become under-represented; simulations impose limits to avoid such outcomes.
- Combining selective increases with relatively small ad hoc increases:
  - With a relatively small share allocated ad hoc (and part allocated to PRGT-eligible countries), close to a doubling of quotas would be needed to achieve a 5 percent shift to dynamic EMDCs.
- Adding an equiproportional increase of modest size:
  - Overall shifts in shares are somewhat smaller.
  - With a doubling of quotas, it is still possible to achieve 5 percent shifts to groups benefiting from ad hoc increases, though this may require relaxing caps to allow some over-represented countries to become moderately under-represented.
- Aggregate net effects reported across simulations:
  - Many simulations achieve a quota shift of at least 5 percentage points to dynamic EMDCs (particularly using the derived 2008 data set) and a similar shift from over- to under-represented countries.
  - The net increase in share of EMDCs tends to be in the 1-3½ percentage point range.
  - Simulations lead to substantial realignment among largest quotas, with China moving in many cases from the sixth to the third largest quota.
- Practical implications:
  - Allocating part of the increase on an ad hoc basis seems likely needed to achieve the desired realignments, though the relative size of the ad hoc component could vary.
  - If the share of basic votes is left unchanged, part of ad hoc increases would also need to be allocated to protect the voting share of the poorest, either individually or as a group.
  - Considerable further work required to narrow options: size and qualification criteria for ad hoc increases, modalities for allocation, and whether any part should be distributed equiproportionally.

*Source: Finance Department — based on preliminary data through 2008 and the text of the supplied content.*

### 34.      Directors may wish to comment on the following issues:

### 34.      Directors may wish to comment on the following issues:

### Questions for Directors
- How do Directors assess the broad objectives of the reform in light of the direction provided by the IMFC? Do they consider an approach that would seek to achieve a shift in quota shares of at least 5 percent both to dynamic EMDCs and from over- to under-represented countries, as a viable option? What weight should be given to the net outcome for EMDCs as a whole?  
- Do they agree that the quota increase should include a combination of selective increases (i.e., increases based on the quota formula) and ad hoc increases? What are their views on the merits of including an equiproportional element as part of the overall increase?  
- What are Directors’ views on possible approaches to capturing the concept of dynamic EMDCs? Do they agree that this concept could include some countries that are moderately over-represented under the formula, provided they meet certain criteria?  
- How do Directors assess the options for protecting the voting share of the poorest members? Should this be achieved through quota adjustments, or should a further increase in the share of basic votes be considered? If the former, should protection be provided for individual members within this group or for the group as a whole? What definition of the ―poorest‖ members should be used for this purpose?

### Illustrative Scenarios (Tables 5–12): Key numeric outcomes
- Table 5. Illustrative Scenarios: Selective Increases of 50%, 100% and 150% (In percent)
  - Round Quota Share (examples shown across post second round, 2007, 2008):
    - Advanced economies: 60.5 60.4 58.7 / 60.5 59.9 60.4 / 59.6 60.4 59.4
    - Major advanced economies: 45.3 45.0 43.3 / 45.2 44.6 45.2 / 44.3 45.0 44.1
    - United States (of which): 17.7 17.8 16.9 / 17.7 17.4 17.7 / 17.3 17.8 17.2
    - Other advanced economies: 15.1 15.4 15.5 / 15.2 15.3 15.3 / 15.3 15.3 15.3
    - Emerging Market and Developing Countries: 39.5 39.6 41.3 / 39.5 40.1 39.6 / 40.4 39.6 40.6
    - Developing countries: 32.4 32.6 33.7 / 32.5 32.8 32.5 / 33.1 32.5 33.2
  - Memorandum Items:
    - EU 27: 31.9 32.1 31.7 / 31.9 31.8 32.0 / 31.8 32.0 31.8
    - LICs (PRGT-eligible): 4.3 2.5 2.6 / 3.7 3.7 3.4 / 3.5 3.2 3.3
    - WB Low-Income countries: 2.8 1.5 1.6 / 2.4 2.4 2.1 / 2.2 2.0 2.1
    - Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.): 3.3 3.6 5.0 / 5.4 6.0 6.5
    - Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.): 2.6 3.0 3.8 / 4.5 4.6 5.4
    - Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 6/: 2.4 3.0 3.6 / 4.4 4.3 5.3

- Table 6. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to All Under-represented Countries (In percent)
  - Round Quota Share (examples):
    - Advanced economies: 60.5 60.4 58.7 / 59.6 58.2 59.7 / 58.2 59.6 58.2
    - Emerging Market and Developing Countries: 39.5 39.6 41.3 / 40.4 41.8 40.3 / 41.8 40.4 41.8
    - Developing countries: 32.4 32.6 33.7 / 33.4 34.5 33.3 / 34.4 33.4 34.4
  - Memorandum Items:
    - EU 27: 31.9 32.1 31.7 / 31.3 31.0 31.4 / 31.1 31.3 31.4
    - LICs (PRGT-eligible): 4.3 2.5 2.6 / 4.3 4.3 4.3 / 4.4 4.3 4.3
    - WB Low-Income countries: 2.8 1.5 1.6 / 2.8 2.8 2.8 / 2.8 2.8 2.8
    - Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.): 5.5 6.4 6.8 / 7.7 5.3 6.2 6.6 7.6
    - Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.): 4.2 5.3 5.2 / 6.4 4.1 5.1 5.1 6.3
    - Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 7/: 3.8 5.3 4.8 / 6.3 3.7 5.1 4.7 6.2

- Table 7. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to All Under-represented Countries and Other Dynamic EMDCs (In percent)
  - Round Quota Share (examples):
    - Advanced economies: 60.5 60.4 58.7 / 59.1 57.8 59.5 / 58.0 59.4 58.0
    - Emerging Market and Developing Countries: 39.5 39.6 41.3 / 40.9 42.2 40.5 / 42.0 40.6 42.1 40.5 42.0
    - Developing countries: 32.4 32.6 33.7 / 33.6 34.6 33.4 / 34.5 33.5 34.5
  - Memorandum Items:
    - Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.): 4.5 6.0 6.2 / 7.4 4.7 5.9 6.1 7.3
    - Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.): 3.7 5.3 4.8 / 6.3 3.7 5.1 4.7 6.2
    - Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 7/: 4.3 5.7 5.0 / 6.6 3.8 5.4 4.9 6.4
    - Minimum ad hoc increase to dynamic EMDCs: 40% 45% 50% 60% 25% 35% 40% 45%

- Table 8. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to Dynamic EMDCs (In percent)
  - Round Quota Share (examples):
    - Advanced economies: 60.5 60.4 58.7 / 58.5 57.2 58.3 / 57.0 58.4 57.1 58.2 56.9
    - Emerging Market and Developing Countries: 39.5 39.6 41.3 / 41.5 42.8 41.7 / 43.0 41.6 42.9 41.8 43.1
    - Developing countries: 32.4 32.6 33.7 / 34.3 35.3 34.4 / 35.3 34.4 35.3 34.5 35.3
  - Memorandum Items:
    - Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.): 4.5 5.8 5.7 / 7.1 4.7 5.9 5.9 7.2
    - Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.): 4.4 5.7 5.6 / 6.9 4.7 5.9 5.8 7.1
    - Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 7/: 4.6 5.9 5.9 / 7.2 4.8 6.2 6.2 7.5
    - Minimum ad hoc increase to dynamic EMDCs: 20% 25% 35% 40% 25% 35% 45% 55%

- Table 9. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to All Under-represented Countries and Other Dynamic EMDCs (In percent)
  - Round Quota Share (examples):
    - Advanced economies: 60.5 60.4 58.7 / 59.6 58.4 59.7 / 58.2 59.8 59.7 58.4
    - Emerging Market and Developing Countries: 39.5 39.6 41.3 / 40.4 41.6 40.3 / 41.8 40.3 41.2 40.3 41.6
    - Developing countries: 32.4 32.6 33.7 / 33.2 34.1 33.3 / 34.3 33.1 33.9 33.2 34.2
  - Memorandum Items:
    - Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.): 3.7 4.6 5.4 / 6.4 3.6 4.5 5.2 6.2
    - Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.): 2.9 4.0 4.1 / 5.3 2.8 3.7 4.0 5.1
    - Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 7/: 2.9 4.1 3.9 / 5.3 2.7 3.7 3.8 5.1
    - Minimum ad hoc increase to dynamic EMDCs: 7% 10% 5% 10% 5% 5% 5% 7%

- Table 10. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to Dynamic EMDCs (In percent)
  - Round Quota Share (examples):
    - Advanced economies: 60.5 60.4 58.7 / 59.2 58.1 59.0 / 57.7 59.3 58.4 59.1 57.8
    - Emerging Market and Developing Countries: 39.5 39.6 41.3 / 40.8 41.9 41.0 / 42.2 42.0 41.7 40.9 42.2
    - Developing countries: 32.4 32.6 33.7 / 33.6 34.4 33.8 / 34.8 33.5 34.2 33.7 34.6
  - Memorandum Items:
    - Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.): 3.6 4.6 5.1 / 6.3 3.5 4.4 5.0 6.1
    - Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.): 3.3 4.3 4.6 / 5.8 3.1 4.0 4.4 5.6
    - Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 7/: 3.4 4.4 4.6 / 5.9 3.1 4.1 4.4 5.7
    - Minimum ad hoc increase to dynamic EMDCs: 8% 10% 10% 12% 6% 8% 8% 10%

- Table 11. Illustrative Scenarios: Equiproportional, Selective and Ad hoc Increase (In percent)
  - Round Quota Share (examples):
    - Advanced economies: 60.5 60.4 58.7 / 59.7 58.9 59.3 / 58.0 59.9 59.1 59.6 58.5
    - Major advanced economies: 45.3 45.0 43.3 / 44.7 43.7 44.5 / 42.9 44.9 44.0 44.6 43.3
    - United States: 17.7 17.8 16.9 / 17.7 16.9 17.7 / 16.5 17.7 17.0 17.7 16.7
    - Emerging Market and Developing Countries: 39.5 39.6 41.3 / 40.3 41.1 40.7 / 42.0 40.1 40.9 40.4 41.5
  - Memorandum Items:
    - Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.): 3.1 3.9 4.7 / 5.8 2.9 3.5 4.4 5.4
    - Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.): 2.4 3.3 3.6 / 4.9 2.2 2.9 3.4 4.4
    - Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 7/: 2.4 3.3 3.6 / 5.0 2.2 3.0 3.3 4.4
    - Minimum ad hoc increase to dynamic EMDCs: 5% 5% 8% 10% 4% 5% 5% 5%

- Table 12. Illustrative Scenarios: Equiproportional, Selective and Ad hoc Increase (In percent)
  - Round Quota Share (examples):
    - Advanced economies: 60.5 60.4 58.7 / 59.3 58.4 58.7 / 57.4 59.5 58.8 57.9 58.0
    - Major advanced economies: 45.3 45.0 43.3 / 44.5 43.6 44.2 / 42.8 44.7 43.9 44.3 43.2
    - Emerging Market and Developing Countries: 39.5 39.6 41.3 / 40.7 41.6 41.3 / 42.6 40.5 41.2 40.9 42.0
  - Memorandum Items:
    - Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.): 3.0 3.9 4.6 / 5.8 2.8 3.5 4.2 5.3
    - Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.): 2.7 3.7 4.2 / 5.4 2.5 3.2 3.7 4.8
    - Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 7/: 2.8 3.7 4.3 / 5.5 2.5 3.3 3.8 4.9
    - Minimum ad hoc increase to dynamic EMDCs: 8% 5% 10% 10% 5% 5% 8% 8%

### Observations implied by the scenarios and tables
- Multiple allocation methods are illustrated: selective increases (based on quota formula), ad hoc increases targeted to under-represented countries, ad hoc increases targeted to dynamic EMDCs, and mixes including equiproportional, selective and ad hoc elements.  
- Scenarios present outcomes for Round Quota Share across groupings (Advanced economies; Major advanced economies; Other advanced economies; Emerging Market and Developing Countries; Developing countries; regional breakdowns including Africa, Asia, Middle East, Western Hemisphere, Transition economies). Exact percentage outcomes vary by scenario and by year/data vintage (2007, 2008, post second round calculated quota share).  
- Memorandum items consistently report EU 27 shares, LICs (PRGT-eligible), WB Low-Income countries, shifts for Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.), Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.), and Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.), with explicit numeric shifts shown for each scenario.  
- Scenarios specify rules/constraints used in simulations (preserved verbatim in table footnotes): e.g., inclusion of ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members not yet effective; Kosovo membership on June 29, 2009; caps where countries would become under-represented; PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share; definitions of dynamic EMDCs based on PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share being greater than 1 and not over-represented by more than 25%; simulations distributed on equiproportional/selective/ad hoc basis in specified x/y/z proportions.

*Source: Finance Department. (Content prepared for consideration in the Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares: Initial Considerations, Supplement, March 5, 2010.)*

### 1.      Members’ financial contributions to the Fund come in a wide variety of forms,

### 1.      Members’ financial contributions to the Fund come in a wide variety of forms,

### Overview
- Members’ financial contributions reflect the cooperative nature of Fund membership and take many forms, including:
  - commitments to support the Fund’s liquidity through bilateral loan/note purchase agreements and the NAB/GAB;
  - resources provided in the context of specific facilities (e.g., the oil facility);
  - loan and subsidy resources provided to the PRGT and its predecessors;
  - member contributions to debt relief operations in the context of HIPC, MDRI and the recent operation for Liberia;
  - voluntary SDR trading arrangements; and
  - financial support provided for other Fund activities, such as technical assistance and training.
- Members also make contributions mandated by Fund policies, such as:
  - quota subscriptions;
  - participation in the FTP;
  - charges and fees associated with borrowing from the Fund; and
  - burden shared contributions.
- Most of the membership contributes in one way or another to the financing of the Fund, but there have been important differences in the scale and form of these contributions between countries and over time.

### Role in Quota Determination
- Past and expected future financial contributions have played a role in determining individual members’ quotas.
- Members’ capacity and willingness to contribute financially to the Fund have long been recognized as relevant when determining quota increases.
  - Notable examples cited include:
    - the ad hoc quota increase for Saudi Arabia in 1981;
    - the ad hoc increase for Japan in the 9th Review; and
    - ad hoc increases agreed in the context of general reviews for other countries that had or were expected to contribute to the Fund’s liquidity.
- These adjustments have been made outside of the quota formula.
- Elements of the quota formula (notably GDP measured at market exchange rates and the reserve variable) capture important aspects of members’ potential to contribute financially to the Fund, but actual financial contributions have been taken into account outside of the formula, mainly in recognition of cases of particularly generous contributions.

### Measurement and Aggregation Challenges
- Difficult measurement and aggregation issues complicate capturing members’ actual financial contributions on a more systematic basis. Key issues include:
  - determining which types of contributions should be taken into account (e.g., whether to include only voluntary contributions, and which kinds of contributions);
  - how different types should be aggregated (e.g., how to combine loan versus subsidy resources, loan commitments to the GRA versus the PRGT, and how to adjust for other forms of contributions, such as voluntary SDR trading arrangements or financing for technical assistance and training);
  - what time period(s) should be considered and how to aggregate contributions over time; and
  - avoiding signaling that some forms of financing are more highly valued than others, which could discourage members from contributing in those areas in future.
- Practical discussions and references on these issues are noted (e.g., "Quotas and Voice—Further Considerations (9/2/05)", "Quotas—Further Thoughts on a New Quota Formula (11/22/06)", and "A New Quota Formula—Additional Considerations (3/14/07)"), reflecting ongoing consideration of practical implementation questions.

### Reliance on Larger Quota Holders and Emerging Market Developments
- The Fund’s financial structure relies on the ability and willingness of members with relatively larger quotas to make larger financial contributions.
- Data presented in the chapter indicate that advanced countries, which have the majority of Fund quotas, and at times major oil-exporting countries, have tended to provide the bulk of voluntary contributions in the past.
- As the quota share of EMDCs increases in line with their rising weight in the global economy, it can be expected that they will also play a more important role in contributing to the financing of the Fund.
- Notable recent developments indicating broader participation by EMDCs include:
  - note purchase agreements committed by several EMDCs to support the Fund’s liquidity;
  - on-going efforts to broaden the voluntary SDR trading arrangements;
  - the envisaged increase in EMDC participation in the reformed and expanded NAB.

### Indicators of Members’ Financial Contributions to the Fund
- Contributions reported in the attached tables are grouped into three main categories:
  1. resources provided by a member on a voluntary basis in support of the Fund’s general resources and the SDR department (Table I-1a; and Tables I-2–I-7);
  2. other voluntary resources provided by a member (Table I-1b; and Tables I-8–I-10); and
  3. contributions that are mandated by Fund policies (Table I-1c).
- The chapter focuses on members’ voluntary contributions but summarizes mandated contributions in Table I-1c.
- The data illustrate that contributions come in very different forms and are not easily comparable across categories and time periods.
  - The detailed tables report data in nominal values and often cover different time periods, depending on the particular contribution and data availability.
  - Aggregation of contributions across time would require a view on appropriate discount factors; where aggregate data is reported (such as for cumulative contributions to the Fund’s concessional lending facilities), nominal values are summed across different periods without discounting, in line with other published sources.

*Source: _030410a - 1.      Members’ financial contributions to the Fund come in a wide variety of forms,*

### 8.      While all members contribute resources to the Fund, there are substantial

### 8. While all members contribute resources to the Fund, there are substantial differences across the membership in terms of the level and areas of contributions

### Major findings on membership contributions
- Loan contributions to the PRGT (and its predecessors) have been limited so far to only 14 members, with a few providing particularly generous resources relative to their Fund quota.
- Advanced countries and at times oil-producing countries have tended to cover the bulk of voluntary contributions.
- Recent borrowing and note purchase agreements with several emerging market countries constituted an important expansion of the group of contributing members.
- Historical data illustrate substantial differences in support across the Fund’s membership in relation to quota shares.
- Data inventory and summary Tables I-1a–I-1c indicate member participation in multiple instruments and accounts across time periods (see member participation indicators reproduced below).

### Data issues and coverage
- Data sources and data gaps:
  - The data in this chapter are limited to those that are not confidential and the sources are published official documents, the external web, or online data bases.
  - Except for the summary tables (which indicate whether or not a member contributes in a particular area), data sources are listed in the footnotes to each attached table.
- Data periods and units:
  - Periods of coverage and units reflect standard reporting formats: some information reported for fiscal years rather than calendar years; some in US dollars rather than SDRs.
  - Periods covered vary across series—some limited to specific sub-periods due to instrument availability; others correspond to readily available data bases.

### Key statistics and participation indicators (preserved verbatim)
- Member Participation in % 16614121161427
- Member Participation in %8232064955 10017
- Member Participation in %100358766363646091

### Bilateral borrowing and note purchase agreements (Table I-2; as of January 28, 2010)
- Amounts Committed (selected members, in millions of SDRs):
  - Austria 2,026.70
  - Belgium 4,406.68
  - Canada 6,287.17
  - Cyprus 148.75
  - Czech Republic 957.57
  - Denmark 1,812.87
  - Finland 1,208.58
  - France 10,282.25
  - Germany 13,945.19
  - Greece 1,059.83
  - Ireland 1,208.58
  - Italy 7,539.70
  - Japan 62,871.73
  - Luxembourg 399.76
  - Malta 111.56
  - Netherlands 4,936.60
  - Norway 3,000.00
  - Poland 1,617.64
  - Portugal 985.46
  - Slovak Republic 409.06
  - Slovenia 260.31
  - Spain 3,848.87
  - Sweden 2,296.31
  - Switzerland 6,300.00
  - United Kingdom 9,920.00
- Note Purchase Agreements (selected members):
  - China 32,000.00
  - Brazil 6,287.17
  - India 6,287.17
  - Russia 6,287.17
- Total Bilateral Borrowing 198,702.69
- Exchange rates used (December 7, 2009): EUR/SDR 1.07564; USD/SDR 1.59054.

### GAB/NAB participants and credit amounts (Table I-3; as of April 30, 2009)
- Selected GAB/NAB credit components (in millions of SDRs):
  - Total components shown: 6,344; 17,000; 34,000
- Note: The maximum amount of resources available to the IMF under the NAB and GAB is SDR 34 billion.

### Supplementary Financing Facility (Table I-4; as of April 30, 1987)
- Total loans and related items (in millions of SDRs):
  - Total commitments and loan amounts shown in aggregate rows: Total 7,784.00 (total lending commitments), with amounts borrowed/disbursed and commitments listed by member in table.

### Enlarged Access Facility (Table I-5; as of April 30, 1987)
- Major entries (selected donors and years):
  - Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 8,000.00 — 1981
  - BIS and Central Banks 1,300.00 — 1981
  - SAMA, BIS and Other Official Institutions 6,000.00 — 1984
  - Japan 3,000.00 — 1986
- Total 18,300.00

### Oil Facilities (Table I-6; contributions and borrowing as of April 30, 1983)
- Oil Facility totals and related items (in millions of SDRs):
  - Total 6,902.43 (commitments) 160.55 (amount borrowed/received) 160.30 (contributions received)
- Selected member commitments/contributions (in millions of SDRs, as shown):
  - Saudi Arabia 2,250.00 (commitment); 40.00 (amount borrowed/received); 40.00 (contributions received)
  - Iran 990.00 (commitment); 6.00 (amount borrowed/received); 6.00 (contributions received)
  - Kuwait 685.00 (commitment)
  - Venezuela 650.00 (commitment); 6.00 (amount borrowed/received); 6.00 (contributions received)
  - Germany 600.00 (commitment); 13.70 (amount borrowed/received); 13.72 (contributions received)

### Voluntary SDR Trading Arrangements and Designation Plan (Table I-7; as of February 1, 2010)
- Total Maximum Designation Plan Amounts: Total 1,500 (in millions of SDRs)
- Selected country maximums (in millions of SDRs, as shown):
  - Australia yes 61
  - Canada yes 63
  - France yes 157
  - India 162
  - Italy 158
  - Japan yes -
  - United Kingdom yes 347
  - United States yes -
  - Germany 57
  - Spain yes 70
  - Sweden yes 7

### PRGF-ESF / MDRI-II / ESF / PRGF-HIPC Trusts and Liberia Debt Relief (Table I-8; as of June 30, 2009)
- Aggregate totals (in millions of SDRs):
  - PRGF-ESF Trust: 15,673.23 (loan commitments)
  - PRGF-ESF Trust: 14,198.88 (amount disbursed)
  - MDRI-II Trust: 2,068.99 (commitments)
  - Liberia Debt Relief: 1,120.00 (transfers for Debt Relief)
  - ESF Subsidy Contributions: 220.07 (pledged)
  - PRGF-HIPC Trust: 87.49 (subsidies and HIPC grant contributions "as needed")
  - Other contributions/commitments: 1,562.31 and 508.53 (various contribution received/commitment aggregates shown in table)
- Memorandum items (selected):
  - Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) 49.50
  - OPEC Fund for International Development 36.99
- Note: The PRGF-ESF Trust was renamed PRGT as of January 7, 2010; the table preserves historical nomenclature and amounts.

### Emergency Assistance and Technical Assistance (Tables I-9 and I-10; mid-2009)
- Emergency Assistance — Subsidy Contributions (as of July 31, 2009):
  - Total Contribution pledged 40.87; Contribution received 38.83 (in millions of SDRs)
  - Sub-Account 1: EPCA subsidization only — 9.74 pledged; 9.74 received
  - Sub-Account 2: ENDA subsidization only — 16.03 pledged; 13.99 received
  - Sub-Account 3: Subsidization of EPCA and ENDA — 15.10 pledged; 15.10 received
- Technical Assistance (Table I-10; amounts in millions of US dollars, contributions to Bilateral and Multidonor Administered Accounts as of April 30, 2009):
  - Total 611.74
  - Selected country contributions (US$ millions):
    - Japan 480.50
    - United Kingdom 24.60
    - Switzerland 23.51
    - Canada 9.98
    - Netherlands 11.12
    - Australia 12.14
    - France 7.31
    - Germany 3.78
    - Spain 2.00
    - Sweden 5.84

*Source: IMF internal chapter and tables as provided in the content unit.*

### 1.      Three alternative approaches to capturing dynamism are considered. The criteria

### Three alternative approaches to capturing dynamism are considered. The criteria

### Overview
- Three candidate criteria to identify "dynamic" EMDCs:
  - (i) above average GDP growth;
  - (ii) contribution to global economic growth (PPP-weighted);
  - (iii) PPP GDP out-of-lineness.
- Rationale: bring forward expected growth for countries whose dynamism is not fully reflected in calculated quota shares based on historical data.
- Illustrative limit applied in results: countries that are not over-represented by more than 25 percent (i.e., the ratio of post-second round quota share divided by calculated quota share is less than 1.25).
- Results presented for data through 2007 (current quota database) and data through 2008 (derived data set); real GDP series for 170 member countries taken from the World Economic Outlook database published in October 2009 (7 countries excluded for lack of WEO data).

### A. Above Average Real GDP Growth
- Concept:
  - Identify countries with relative real GDP growth above a chosen threshold, reflecting persistence in relative growth rates.
  - Threshold most relevant: average growth rate for EMDCs as a group (alternative: average world growth).
- Reference periods considered:
  - 10 years (long horizon to measure sustained growth).
  - 5 years (captures more recent dynamism).
- Sensitivity to period choice: examples
  - Albania, Bahrain, Cape Verde, Estonia, Lithuania, Maldives, and Russia had above average EMDC growth over the recent 10-year (but not the 5-year) period.
  - Panama, Peru, and Slovak Republic would drop out when a 10-year (rather than the 5-year) period is considered.
- Empirical findings (derived data set through 2008):
  - Applying above-EMDC-average growth over the past 5 years captures 21 EMDCs.
  - Of these 21 EMDCs:
    - 15 EMDCs are under-represented (as measured by their post-2008 reform quota shares relative to their calculated quota shares).
    - 6 EMDCs are at most moderately over-represented (i.e., over-represented by less than 25 percent): Belarus, Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Panama, and Uganda.
  - Shifting the period to 2003-2007 would cover 23 EMDCs.

### B. PPP-Weighted Contribution to Real Global GDP Growth
- Concept:
  - Contribution measure = average share of a country in PPP-based global GDP times its average annual real GDP growth over a period.
  - Inclusion rule: country included if its contribution to PPP-weighted real global GDP growth exceeds a threshold.
  - In 2008 reform discussions: 5-year interval and a threshold of 0.5 percent for contribution were considered.
- Properties and limitations:
  - Such measures tend to capture mainly the size of an economy and omit a number of fast-growing EMDCs with small world weights.
- Empirical findings (derived data set through 2008):
  - Using the 2008-discussed approach covers 20 EMDCs, including Brazil, China, India, and Russia.
  - Among these 20, 3 EMDCs are moderately over-represented as measured by the quota formula: India, Pakistan, and Romania.
  - This measure would not capture the eight fastest growing economies during this period, which have relatively small weight in the world economy.

### C. PPP GDP Out-of-Lineness
- Concept:
  - Measure follows the approach adopted in the 2008 reform: identify EMDCs whose shares in global PPP GDP are substantially larger than their actual pre-Singapore quota shares.
  - Under 2008 reform: under-represented EMDCs with PPP GDP shares more than 75 percent larger than pre-Singapore quota shares received a minimum nominal quota increase of 40 percent from pre-Singapore levels.
  - PPP-GDP out-of-lineness here is defined as the average value of PPP GDP over the past 3 years (as used in the formula) relative to its actual post-second round quota share.
- Threshold choices and illustrative results (derived data set for 2006-2008):
  - Cut-off ratio of 1.0 (PPP-GDP/AQS>1.0):
    - Includes 33 EMDCs.
    - Of these 33, 6 are moderately over-represented: Belarus, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, India, and Pakistan.
  - Cut-off ratio of 1.5:
    - Captures 11 EMDCs: China, Turkey, India, Iran, Colombia, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Brazil, Egypt, Nepal, and Mexico.
  - Cut-off ratio of 1.75:
    - Yields 6 EMDCs: China, Turkey, India, Iran, Colombia, and Vietnam.

### Key statistics and summary table excerpts (as presented)
- Average Real GDP Growth (group averages):
  - World 4.5%
  - Advanced Economies 2.2%
  - EMDC 7.2%
- PPP-weighted contribution to real global GDP growth (shares sum to):
  - World 100
  - Advanced Economies 26
  - EMDC 74
- Number of countries considered in tables:
  - No. of countries 38
  - No. of advanced economies 3
  - No. of EMDCs 35
- Criteria counts (for data through 2008, shaded if criteria met):
  - Average growth rate higher than EMDC: 21
  - Contribution to GDP growth above 0.5%: 20
  - With PPP-GDP/AQS>1: 33
- Selected country-level figures from Table II-1 (data through 2008; columns preserve original labels and values):
  - Average growth rate (2004-2008) / CQS (2008) / CQS/AQS:
    - Azerbaijan 20.0% / 1.293
    - Angola 16.8% / 1.586
    - Equatorial Guinea 16.3% / 2.363
    - Qatar 14.7% / 1.584
    - Turkmenistan 12.2% / 1.826
    - Armenia 11.6% / 0.643
    - Ethiopia 11.4% / 0.992
    - Myanmar 11.2% / 0.517
    - China 10.7% / 2.051
    - Venezuela 10.4% / 0.439
    - Cambodia 10.3% / 0.925
    - Belarus 9.9% / 0.866
    - Bhutan 9.7% / 1.491
    - Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of 9.7% / 0.618
    - Bangladesh 9.7% / 0.762
    - Mongolia 9.1% / 0.693
    - Kazakhstan 8.4% / 1.861
    - Argentina 8.4% / 0.674
    - Chad 8.3% / 1.154
    - Jordan 8.3% / 1.029
    - Uganda 8.3% / 0.963
    - United Arab Emirates 8.2% / 2.148
    - Peru 7.6% / 1.020
    - Slovak Republic 7.4% / 1.498
    - Latvia 7.4% / 1.498
    - Philippines 7.3% / 0.606
    - Lao, People's Dem. Republic 7.3% / 0.606
    - Tanzania 7.3% / 0.741
    - Estonia 7.3% / 1.801
  - PPP-weighted GDP contribution / CQS (2008):
    - China 25.216 / 2.051
    - United States 11.581 / 0.956
    - India 8.524 / 0.986
    - Russia 4.846 / 1.116
    - Brazil 2.972 / 1.161
    - Japan 2.486 / 1.014
    - Korea 1.831 / 1.451
    - Mexico 1.742 / 1.191
    - Germany 1.733 / 0.937
    - United Kingdom 1.690 / 1.030
    - Indonesia 1.616 / 1.024
    - Argentina 1.446 / 0.674
    - Canada 1.046 / 0.868
    - Australia 0.833 / 1.030
    - Saudi Arabia 0.827 / 0.280
  - PPP-GDP/AQS (2004-2008) / CQS (2008) (selected):
    - China 2.827 / 2.051
    - Turkey 2.210 / 1.892
    - India 1.886 / 0.986
    - Iran 1.853 / 1.027
    - Colombia 1.770 / 1.119
    - Vietnam 1.757 / 1.606
    - Ethiopia 1.717 / 0.992
    - Brazil 1.593 / 1.161
    - Mexico 1.505 / 1.191
    - Nepal 1.529 / 1.054
    - Azerbaijan 1.458 / 1.293
    - Poland 1.348 / 1.335
    - Equatorial Guinea 1.350 / 2.363
    - Bhutan 1.323 / 1.491
    - Thailand 1.319 / 1.338
    - Russia 1.286 / 1.116
    - Peru 1.267 / 1.020
    - Spain 1.224 / 1.324
    - Lithuania 1.186 / 1.436
    - Dominican Republic 1.185 / 1.102
    - Guatemala 1.095 / 0.982
    - Cambodia 1.085 / 0.925
    - Vietnam 0.569 / 1.606
    - India 0.986 / 0.986

*Source: IMF (content unit provided).*

### 3. Not over-represented by more than 25% (AQS/CQS<1.25) 1/

### _030410a - 3. Not over-represented by more than 25% (AQS/CQS<1.25) 1/

### Overview
- Table II-1 and Table II-2 present "Alternative Measures of 'Dynamic' EMDCs: Data through 2008" (continued) and "Data through 2007", reporting country-level indicators used to assess dynamic emerging market and developing countries (EMDCs).
- Key indicators shown for each country include: GDP growth (2004-2008 or 2003-2007), CQS (2008 or 2007), PPP-weighted CQS (2008 or 2007), PPP-GDP/AQS (CQS 2008 or 2007), and PPP-weighted GDP contribution/AQS (2006-2008 or 2005-2007).
- The criterion in the title: "Not over-represented by more than 25% (AQS/CQS<1.25) 1/" is one of three criteria used to identify EMDCs (see Criteria section below).

### Average real global GDP growth and group counts
- Average Real GDP Growth (World, PPP-weighted): 4.7%
- PPP-weighted contribution to real global GDP growth: World = 100
- With PPP-GDP/AQS>1:
  - No. of countries: 38
  - Advanced Economies: 2.5%
  - No. of advanced economies: 4
  - EMDC: 7.3%
  - No. of EMDCs: 34
- Criteria counts (columns labeled "Criteria"):
  - Criteria (first column): 23
  - Criteria (second column): 19
  - Criteria (third column): 32

### Selected country-level examples and exact indicator values (excerpted from tables)
- Maldives: GDP growth (2004-2008) 7.2%; CQS (2008) 1.178
- Montenegro: GDP growth (2004-2008) 7.1%; CQS (2008) 1.478
- Cape Verde: GDP growth (2004-2008) 7.1%; CQS (2008) 1.465
- Nigeria: GDP growth (2004-2008) 7.0%; CQS (2008) 0.689
- Japan: PPP-GDP/AQS (CQS 2008) 0.998; PPP-weighted CQS (2008) 1.014
- Singapore: GDP growth (2004-2008) 6.8%; PPP-weighted CQS (2008) 2.051
- Qatar: GDP growth (2004-2008) 6.9%; PPP-weighted CQS (2008) 1.584
- Kuwait: GDP growth (2004-2008) 7.0%; PPP-weighted CQS (2008) 0.539
- United Arab Emirates: PPP-GDP/AQS (CQS 2008) 0.827; PPP-weighted CQS (2008) 2.148
- Estonia: GDP growth (2004-2008) 6.0%; PPP-weighted CQS (2008) 1.801
- Turkey: PPP-GDP/AQS (CQS 2008) 0.829; PPP-weighted CQS (2008) 1.892
- China (Table II-2, 2003-2007): GDP growth 10.9%; CQS (2007) 1.870; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 23.646; PPP-GDP/AQS (CQS 2007) 2.668
- Azerbaijan (Table II-2, 2003-2007): GDP growth 19.8%; CQS (2007) 1.088
- Equatorial Guinea (Table II-2, 2003-2007): GDP growth 16.9%; CQS (2007) 2.246
- India (Table II-2, 2003-2007): GDP growth 8.6%; CQS (2007) 0.894
- United States (Table II-2, 2003-2007): PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 13.507; PPP-GDP/AQS (CQS 2007) 1.008

(Note: the tables contain many additional country rows with the exact numeric values reported in the source tables.)

### Data construction notes and definitions (as provided in the source)
- 1/ AQS refers to Actual Quota Share (post-second round quota share); CQS refers to Calculated Quota Share.
- 2/ Constructed using Gross Domestic Product, in constant price (local currency) from World Economic Outlook, October 2009 publication, for 179 member countries. Data are preliminary.
- 3/ Average share of a country in PPP-GDP during 2004-2008 times average real GDP growth during the same time period. The product is then normallized to sum up to 100. PPP-GDP share is constructed using PPP valuation of GDP from World Economic Outlook, October 2009 publication, for 179 member countries. Data are preliminary.
- 4/ PPP-GDP share is constructed using PPP valuation of GDP WEO October 2009 publication.
- 5/ Includes China, P.R. and Hong Kong SAR. Growth rate is calculated as a weighted average of real GDP growth, using PPP-GDP shares as weights.

### Criteria used to identify EMDCs (listed in source)
- 1. EMDC
- 2. Share of PPP GDP relative to AQS is at least 1
- 3. Average growth rate is higher than EMDC
- 4. Contribution to GDP growth is above 0.5%
- 5. Not over-represented by more than 25% (AQS/CQS<1.25) 1/

*Source: Table II-1 and Table II-2, "Alternative Measures of 'Dynamic' EMDCs: Data through 2008" and "Data through 2007" (as provided in the source PDF).*

### 3. Not over-represented by more than 25% (AQS/CQS<1.25) 1/

### 3. Not over-represented by more than 25% (AQS/CQS<1.25)

### Overview and criteria
- Criterion label: "3. Not over-represented by more than 25% (AQS/CQS<1.25) 1/"
- Number of EMDCs that meet criteria: 47

### Key statistics (aggregate)
- Average Real GDP Growth (first column): World 4.0%; Advanced Economies 2.3%; EMDC 6.1%.
- Average Real GDP Growth (second column): World 3.9%; Advanced Economies 2.6%; EMDC 5.7%.

### Selected country-level measures and indicators (preserve table values exactly)
- From the 2003–2007 / (AQS/CQS) listing (sample entries preserved exactly as in source):
  - Mozambique: 7.7%; CQS (2007) 0.643
  - Kazakhstan: CQS (2007) 0.492; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 1.773
  - Japan: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 1.035; GDP contribution /AQS 1.066
  - Sierra Leone: 7.6%; CQS (2007) 0.146
  - Greece: CQS (2007) 0.479; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 1.253
  - Angola: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 1.035; GDP contribution /AQS 1.332
  - Jordan: 7.5%; CQS (2007) 1.017
  - United Arab Emirates: CQS (2007) 0.475; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 1.779
  - Burkina Faso: CQS (2007) 1.018; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.751
  - Russia: 7.3%; CQS (2007) 0.976
  - Peru: CQS (2007) 0.446; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.944
  - Chile: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.992; GDP contribution /AQS 1.028
  - Singapore: 7.3%; CQS (2007) 2.101
  - Czech Republic: CQS (2007) 0.440; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 1.213
  - Paraguay: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.991; GDP contribution /AQS 0.988
  - Tanzania: 7.2%; CQS (2007) 0.557
  - Bangladesh: CQS (2007) 0.416; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.756
  - Latvia: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.979; GDP contribution /AQS 1.269
  - Uzbekistan: 7.1%; CQS (2007) 0.595
  - Kuwait: CQS (2007) 0.384; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.505
  - Tunisia: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.978; GDP contribution /AQS 0.941
  - Bahrain: 7.1%; CQS (2007) 1.310
  - Belarus: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.968; GDP contribution /AQS 0.835
  - Lao, People's Dem. Republic: 7.1%; CQS (2007) 0.601
  - Sweden: CQS (2007) 0.370; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.951
  - Turkmenistan: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.944; GDP contribution /AQS 1.559
  - Slovak Republic: 7.1%; CQS (2007) 1.391
  - Angola (again in PPP-GDP/AQS column): 0.359; GDP contribution /AQS 1.332
  - Oman: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.943; GDP contribution /AQS 1.279
  - Turkey: 6.9%; CQS (2007) 1.908
  - Algeria: CQS (2007) 0.333; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.770
  - Syrian Arab Republic: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.931; GDP contribution /AQS 1.275
  - Solomon Islands: 6.9%; CQS (2007) 0.545
  - Ireland: CQS (2007) 0.326; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 2.088
  - Macedonia, FYR: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.930; GDP contribution /AQS 1.053
  - Antigua and Barbuda: 6.9%; CQS (2007) 0.777
  - Azerbaijan: CQS (2007) 0.313; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 1.088
  - South Africa: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.917; GDP contribution /AQS 0.748
  - Cape Verde: 6.8%; CQS (2007) 1.249
  - Belgium: CQS (2007) 0.301; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.705
  - Chad: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.915; GDP contribution /AQS 1.174
  - Costa Rica: 6.6%; CQS (2007) 1.014
  - Belarus (again): CQS (2007) 0.297; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.835
  - Slovak Republic (again): PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.903; GDP contribution /AQS 1.391
  - Peru (again): 6.5%; CQS (2007) 0.944
  - Qatar: CQS (2007) 0.285; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 1.479
  - Czech Republic (again): PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.903; GDP contribution /AQS 1.213
  - Austria: CQS (2007) 0.277; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.955
  - El Salvador: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.898; GDP contribution /AQS 0.880
  - Sri Lanka: 6.4%; CQS (2007) 0.522
  - Israel: CQS (2007) 0.276; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.948
  - Sudan: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.894; GDP contribution /AQS 0.631
  - Romania: 6.4%; CQS (2007) 0.813
  - Switzerland: CQS (2007) 0.253; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.851
  - Tanzania: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.887; GDP contribution /AQS 0.557
  - Pakistan: 6.3%; CQS (2007) 0.821
  - Slovak Republic (CQS listing): CQS (2007) 0.240; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 1.391
  - Costa Rica (PPP-GDP/AQS listing): 0.881; GDP contribution /AQS 1.014
  - Namibia: 6.3%; CQS (2007) 0.390
  - Hungary: CQS (2007) 0.238; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.936
  - Argentina: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.881; GDP contribution /AQS 0.666
  - Bangladesh: 6.2%; CQS (2007) 0.756
  - Libya: CQS (2007) 0.223; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.525
  - Australia: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.876; GDP contribution /AQS 0.976
  - Madagascar: 6.2%; CQS (2007) 0.504
  - Norway: CQS (2007) 0.221; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 1.005
  - Romania (PPP-GDP/AQS listing): 0.864; GDP contribution /AQS 0.813
  - Iran: 6.1%; CQS (2007) 1.008
  - Finland: CQS (2007) 0.217; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.983
  - Bolivia: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.862; GDP contribution /AQS 0.622
  - Montenegro: 6.1%; CQS (2007) 1.484
  - Morocco: CQS (2007) 0.208; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.761
  - Italy: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.860; GDP contribution /AQS 0.937
  - Bulgaria: 6.1%; CQS (2007) 0.526
  - Sudan (PPP listing): CQS (2007) 0.197; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.631
  - Honduras: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.860; GDP contribution /AQS 1.005
  - Sao Tome and Principe: 6.1%; CQS (2007) 0.359
  - Sri Lanka (PPP listing): CQS (2007) 0.174; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.522
  - Lao, People's Dem. Republic (PPP listing): 0.853; GDP contribution /AQS 0.601
  - Malaysia: 6.0%; CQS (2007) 1.096
  - Bulgaria (PPP listing): CQS (2007) 0.169; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.526
  - Portugal: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.849; GDP contribution /AQS 1.079
  - Honduras (growth listing): 6.0%; CQS (2007) 1.005
  - Ecuador: CQS (2007) 0.159; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 1.025
  - Ukraine: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.842; GDP contribution /AQS 0.707
  - Malawi: 6.0%; CQS (2007) 0.985
  - Lithuania: CQS (2007) 0.158; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 1.401
  - Timor Leste: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.837; GDP contribution /AQS 1.101
  - Colombia: 5.9%; CQS (2007) 1.095
  - Ethiopia: CQS (2007) 0.151; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.965
  - Myanmar: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.832; GDP contribution /AQS 0.497
  - Dominican Republic: 5.9%; CQS (2007) 1.103
  - Uzbekistan (PPP listing): CQS (2007) 0.143; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.595
  - Uzbekistan (PPP-GDP/AQS listing): 0.827; GDP contribution /AQS 0.595
  - Vanuatu: 5.9%; CQS (2007) 0.341
  - Denmark: CQS (2007) 0.142; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.987
  - United Arab Emirates (PPP-GDP/AQS listing): 0.809; GDP contribution /AQS 1.779
  - Moldova: 5.9%; CQS (2007) 0.381
  - Tunisia (PPP listing): CQS (2007) 0.137; PPP-weighted CQS (2007) 0.941
  - Yemen, Republic of: PPP-GDP/AQS CQS (2007) 0.800; GDP contribution /AQS 1.025

- From the 10-year period (above-average real GDP growth) listings (selected top entries preserved exactly):
  - Equatorial Guinea: (1999–2008) 22.2%; CQS (2007)/AQS 2.363
  - Equatorial Guinea: (1998–2007) 23.5%; CQS (2007)/AQS 2.246
  - Turkmenistan: (1999–2008) 15.0%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.826
  - Turkmenistan: (1998–2007) 14.6%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.559
  - Azerbaijan: (1999–2008) 14.3%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.293
  - Azerbaijan: (1998–2007) 13.7%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.088
  - Myanmar: (1999–2008) 11.8%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.517
  - Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of: (1998–2007) 12.1%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.627
  - Angola: (1999–2008) 11.1%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.586
  - Myanmar: (1998–2007) 12.0%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.497
  - Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of: (1999–2008) 10.6%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.618
  - Armenia: (1999–2008) 10.5%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.567
  - Qatar: (1999–2008) 10.6%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.584
  - Qatar: (1998–2007) 9.9%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.479
  - Armenia: (1998–2007) 10.4%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.643
  - Angola: (1998–2007) 9.8%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.332
  - China 3/: (1999–2008) 9.6%; CQS (2007)/AQS 2.051
  - China 3/: (1998–2007) 9.4%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.870
  - Cambodia: (1999–2008) 9.5%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.925
  - Cambodia: (1998–2007) 9.3%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.892
  - Bhutan: (1999–2008) 8.9%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.491
  - Bhutan: (1998–2007) 8.7%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.451
  - Kazakhstan: (1999–2008) 8.7%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.861
  - Trinidad and Tobago: (1998–2007) 8.2%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.470
  - Sierra Leone: (1999–2008) 8.5%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.163
  - Chad: (1998–2007) 8.2%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.174
  - Tajikistan: (1999–2008) 8.1%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.455
  - Kazakhstan: (1998–2007) 8.2%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.773
  - Nigeria: (1999–2008) 8.1%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.689
  - Mozambique: (1998–2007) 8.2%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.643
  - Mozambique: (1999–2008) 7.7%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.510
  - Tajikistan: (1998–2007) 7.9%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.445
  - Trinidad and Tobago: (1999–2008) 7.6%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.484
  - Sierra Leone: (1998–2007) 7.8%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.146
  - Belarus: (1999–2008) 7.6%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.866
  - Latvia: (1998–2007) 7.8%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.269
  - Uganda: (1999–2008) 7.5%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.963
  - Nigeria: (1998–2007) 7.7%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.626
  - Chad: (1999–2008) 7.5%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.154
  - Belarus: (1998–2007) 7.4%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.835
  - Ethiopia: (1999–2008) 7.4%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.992
  - Estonia: (1998–2007) 7.3%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.767
  - United Arab Emirates: (1999–2008) 7.3%; CQS (2007)/AQS 2.148
  - Cape Verde: (1999–2008) 7.3%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.249
  - Rwanda: (1999–2008) 7.3%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.341
  - Vietnam: (1998–2007) 7.2%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.606
  - Vietnam: (1999–2008) 7.2%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.447
  - Maldives: (1999–2008) 7.0%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.156
  - India: (1998–2007) 7.2%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.986
  - Albania: (1998–2007) 7.0%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.254
  - Cape Verde: (1998–2007) 7.1%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.465
  - India: (1999–2008) 7.0%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.894
  - Sudan: (1999–2008) 7.0%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.684
  - Uganda: (1998–2007) 7.0%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.751
  - Latvia: (1999–2008) 6.9%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.498
  - Rwanda: (1998–2007) 7.0%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.325
  - Russia: (1999–2008) 6.8%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.116
  - Sudan: (1998–2007) 6.7%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.631
  - Lao, People's Dem. Republic: (1999–2008) 6.7%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.606
  - Ireland: (1998–2007) 6.7%; CQS (2007)/AQS 2.088
  - Maldives: (1998–2007) 6.6%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.178
  - Georgia: (1999–2008) 6.6%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.452
  - Georgia: (1998–2007) 6.5%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.472
  - Lithuania: (1999–2008) 6.6%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.401
  - Tanzania: (1998–2007) 6.5%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.741
  - United Arab Emirates: (1998–2007) 6.5%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.779
  - Mongolia: (1999–2008) 6.5%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.693
  - Lao, People's Dem. Republic: (1998–2007) 6.4%; CQS (2007)/AQS 0.601
  - Albania: (1999–2008) 6.4%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.234
  - Botswana: (1999–2008) 6.2%; CQS (2007)/AQS 1.428

### Footnotes and data construction notes (preserve wording exactly)
- 1/ AQS refers to Actual Quota Share (post-second round quota share); CQS refers to Calculated Quota Share.
- 2/ Constructed using Gross Domestic Product, in constant price (local currency) from World Economic Outlook, October 2009 publication, for 179 member countries. Data are preliminary.
- 3/ Average share of a country in PPP-GDP during 2003-2007 times average real GDP growth during the same time period. The product is then normallized to sum up to 100. PPP-GDP share is constructed using PPP valuation of GDP from World Economic Outlook, October 2009 publication, for 179 member countries. Data are preliminary.
- 4/ PPP-GDP share is constructed using PPP valuation of GDP from quota data updated to 2007.
- 5/ Includes China, P.R. and Hong Kong SAR. Growth rate is calculated as a weighted average of real GDP growth, using PPP-GDP shares as weights.

*Table II-2 and Table II-3. Alternative Measures of "Dynamic" EMDCs: Data through 2007 (selected entries and notes preserved from source).*

### 1. EMDCNumber of EMDCs that meet criteria

### 1. EMDCNumber of EMDCs that meet criteria

### Countries meeting the criteria (selected entries with exact figures)
- Jordan — 6.4% ; 1.029
- Estonia — 6.3% ; 1.801
- Ukraine — 6.2% ; 0.731
- Lithuania — 6.2% ; 1.436
- Uzbekistan — 6.1% ; 0.617
- Bahrain — 6.1% ; 1.361
- Russia — 5.8% ; 0.976
- Bangladesh — 5.8% ; 0.762
- Singapore — 5.7% ; 2.051
- Ireland — 5.6% ; 2.049
- Malaysia — 5.5% ; 1.083
- Botswana — 5.5% ; 1.384
- Luxembourg — 5.3% ; 2.768
- Korea — 5.3% ; 1.451
- Iran — 5.2% ; 1.008
- Egypt — 5.1% ; 1.015
- Peru — 5.1% ; 1.020
- Slovak Republic — 5.1% ; 1.498
- Montenegro — 5.1% ; 1.478
- Romania — 5.1% ; 0.874
- Philippines — 4.8% ; 1.013
- Namibia — 4.8% ; 0.390
- Tunisia — 5.0% ; 0.930
- Costa Rica — 5.0% ; 1.007
- Sri Lanka — 5.0% ; 0.522
- Indonesia — 4.8% ; 1.024
- Thailand — 4.8% ; 1.338
- Turkey — 4.2% ; 1.908
- Poland — 4.2% ; 1.285
- Zambia — 4.0% ; 0.176
- Iceland — 4.1% ; 1.668
- Greece — 4.1% ; 1.253
- Libya — 4.4% ; 0.545
- Peru — 4.1% ; 0.944
- Romania — 4.0% ; 0.813
- Mexico — 3.3% ; 1.226
- Brazil — 3.3% ; 1.161
- Canada — 3.3% ; 0.907
- Australia — 3.3% ; 1.030
- Sweden — 3.2% ; 0.951
- United States — 3.0% ; 1.008
- United Kingdom — 2.9% ; 1.018
- Netherlands — 2.6% ; 0.877
- France — 2.4% ; 0.935
- Germany — 1.6% ; 0.964
- Japan — 1.2% ; 1.066
- Zimbabwe — -6.3% ; 0.096
- Zimbabwe — -4.9% ; 0.109

(Note: list above is drawn from the table entries in the source and shows selected country rows with the two numeric columns as presented.)

### Table purpose and construction
- The table is titled "Alternative Measures of 'Dynamic' EMDCs—Above Average Real GDP Growth: a 10 Year Period".
- The two numeric columns per row reflect (as presented):
  - A growth rate (percent) for a 10-year period: either "(1999-2008) 2/" or "(1998-2007) 2/" depending on column.
  - A second numeric value (e.g., "1.029", "0.731") shown alongside the growth percent in the table.
- Shading in the original table indicates whether criteria are met.

### Notes and methodological points (as provided verbatim)
- 1/ AQS refers to Actual Quota Share (post-second round quota share); CQS refers to Calculated Quota Share.
- 2/ Constructed using Gross Domestic Product, in constant price (local currency) from World Economic Outlook, October 2009 publication, for 179 member countries.
- 3/ Includes China, P.R. and Hong Kong SAR. Growth rate is calculated as a weighted average of real GDP growth, using PPP-GDP shares as weights.

*Prepared by the Finance Department; Approved by Andrew Tweedie; March 5, 2010 — Table II-3 (concluded).*

### Section II of the main paper).

### Section II of the main paper

### Methodology and scenario design
- Quota increase—size:
  - Assumed quota increase sizes: "50 or 100 percent" (general simulations).
  - For the "purely selective simulation": "50, 100, 150 percent".
- Calculated Quota Share (CQS) formula used in simulations:
  - CQS = "(0.50*GDP + 0.30*Openness +0.15*Variability + 0.05*Reserves)^K."
  - "GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates."
  - "K is a compression factor of 0.95."
- Data vintages cited:
  - "Based on IFS data through 2007."
  - "Based on preliminary data through 2008 primarily from the World Economic Outlook, October 2009."

### Definitions and country groups
- Dynamic EMDCs:
  - "Dynamic EMDCs include all under-represented EMDCs plus other EMDCs whose share in global PPP GDP is greater than their post second round quota share under the 2008 reform, and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent (as measured by their calculated and post second round quota share)."
- Ad hoc increase—eligible groups (three variants):
  - (i) "all under-represented countries;"
  - (ii) "all under-represented countries plus other dynamic EMDCs;"
  - (iii) "all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs, which implies foregoing on the part of under-represented advanced countries."
- PRGT / poorest:
  - "The 'poorest' countries" are defined as "PRGT-eligible countries."

### Ad hoc increase—allocation and implementation rules
- When only under-represented countries are eligible:
  - Increases are distributed so that each eligible country’s out-of-lineness (difference between its calculated and post-selective/equiproportional quota share) is reduced proportionally by a uniform reduction factor (URF).
  - Note: "The uniform proportional reduction in out-of-lineness was also used in the 2008 reform for allocating ad hoc quota increases."
- When under-represented countries plus other dynamic EMDCs are eligible:
  - Over-represented dynamic EMDCs receive a fixed percentage increase over their post-selective/equiproportional nominal quotas (the "minimum ad hoc increase" shown in tables).
  - Eligible under-represented EMDCs receive either the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness or the minimum ad hoc increase, "whichever is greater."
  - Eligible under-represented advanced countries receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness.
- Common protections applied in scenarios:
  - Protection of the "poorest": "Each country in this group at least maintains its post second round quota and thus its voting share."
  - Protection from becoming under-represented: "Over-represented countries are protected from becoming under-represented as their final quota share is the maximum of their calculated quota share and the share they would otherwise receive based on the allocation mechanism." (This protection is "dropped in the simulations that include a small equiproportional element.")
  - Protection for under-represented advanced economies: "their final quota share cannot fall below their post second round quota share" in cases where they forego ad hoc increases.

### Illustrative scenarios and modalities
- Types of increases and distribution mixes used in simulations:
  - Purely selective: "50, 100, 150 percent" increases (selective-only simulations).
  - Ad hoc targeted to different eligible sets (Tables 4a–8a present country-by-country results across variants).
  - Equipropotional/selective/ad hoc mixes described; example proportions used in simulations include:
    - "x/y/z" proportions; specific mixes shown in tables include "0/40/60", "0/50/50", "0/60/40", "0/87.5/12.5", "0/90/10", "20/70/10", and "20/72.5/7.5".
- Numerical examples discussed in text (policy focus rather than exhaustive table replication):
  - Many Directors emphasized as an objective "a 5 percent shift in quota shares from over- to under-represented countries."
  - Others called for "a shift of at least 5 percent" to EMDCs.

### Key governance and policy considerations from the Chairman’s Concluding Remarks (March 25, 2010; Committee of the Whole on Review of Quotas Meeting 10/1, March 22, 2010)
- Timing and process:
  - Goal: reach agreement by "the January 2011 deadline."
  - Staff to "finalize the 2008 data set, with a view to issuing a paper with updated quota calculations as soon as possible after the Spring Meetings."
- Overarching messages from Directors and Chairman:
  - Realigning quota shares is "critical to enhancing the Fund’s legitimacy and effectiveness," but is only one element of broader governance and mandate reforms.
  - Importance of members taking steps "to allow the 2008 quota reforms to become effective as quickly as possible."
- DivergingDirector views summarized (selected):
  - Size vs distribution: "issues of the size and distribution of the quota increase under the 14th Review are closely inter-linked."
  - Objectives:
    - Some Directors: target "a 5 percent shift in quota shares from over- to under-represented countries," with "dynamic EMDCs" as predominant beneficiaries.
    - Others: emphasize "a substantial shift in quota share to EMDCs, calling for a shift of at least 5 percent."
  - Eligibility:
    - Differing views on whether "EMDCs that are over-represented using the quota formula should be eligible for an increase in quota share if they have met clear criteria for dynamism."
    - Some Directors favor capturing dynamism via the quota formula rather than ad hoc mechanisms.
  - Protections and modality preferences:
    - Broad support for protecting "the voting share of the poorest members," with many favoring extending protection to "all PRGT-eligible countries."
    - Many Directors open to setting aside part of any ad hoc increase for poorest members and "a number of Directors saw merit in considering a further increase in basic votes."
    - Modalities: initial preference by many Directors for a combination of "selective and ad hoc increases"; several Directors noted it is premature to rule out an equiproportional increase.
  - Quota formula:
    - Many Directors "maintained the view that the quota formula should not be reopened" given time constraints; others called for further work to address shortcomings before reuse.
  - Financial contributions discussion:
    - "Directors took note of the discussion in the staff papers on financial contributions to the Fund but generally did not see further work on this topic as warranted at this time."

*Source: Section II of the main paper (Finance Department simulations and Chairman’s Concluding Remarks, March 22–25, 2010).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2010/_030410a.pdf_