## _062910

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### Executive summary — motivation and reform approach
- The global crisis (2008−09) and subsequent contagion episodes highlighted the need to strengthen global financial safety nets to protect countries with sound policy frameworks.
- Reforms aim to complement the IMF’s traditional crisis resolution role and broaden availability of insurance instruments to address heterogeneity in countries’ policies and circumstances.
- The paper proposes evolutionary reforms to crisis prevention instruments and presents options for a framework to resolve systemic crises, drawing on prior reform work (GRA Toolkit paper, FFR paper) and feedback from policymakers and stakeholders.

### Key crisis prevention instrument proposals
- Flexible Credit Line (FCL) refinements:
  - Allow the FCL to be open for one or two years; where two years is chosen, an interim assessment of continued qualification is required after one year.
  - Remove the implicit access cap of 1000 percent of quota to allow more flexible access consistent with countries’ circumstances.
  - Clarify expectations on graduation: access in successor FCL arrangements would normally be expected to decline when sustained improvements in official and private financing prospects reduce BoP needs.
  - Transitional provision: eliminate the six-month review for all one-year FCL arrangements in place when the modification decision is adopted.
- Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) establishment:
  - Purpose: a new credit line for countries with sound policies but moderate vulnerabilities that disqualify them from the FCL.
  - Nature: a window in the credit tranches, carrying the same charges, surcharges and repurchase period as the SBA, but with streamlined ex post conditionality focused on remaining vulnerabilities.
  - Length: PCL arrangements could be approved for a period of between one to two years; semiannual assessments of continued qualification and performance would apply.
  - Access: would be capped at 1000 percent of quota for a period of between 12 and 24 months, subject to semiannual assessments; the PCL “would in most cases provide access above the normal limits” and would be subject to the Fund’s exceptional access criteria.
  - Qualification: approval only for members without an actual BoP need at request time and assessed to (i) have sound fundamentals and policy frameworks; (ii) be implementing and have a strong track record of implementing sound policies; and (iii) remain committed to maintaining these policies. PCL assessments would draw on the FCL qualification criteria but need not meet them as completely as required for the FCL.

### Systemic crisis resolution — Global Stabilization Mechanism (GSM) and related instruments
- Rationale: systemic events exhibit strong contagion and global public-good characteristics; predictability in handling such events can enhance global financial stability.
- GSM objective: activated only in systemic events to proactively channel financial assistance to help countries cope with large-scale liquidity withdrawals.
- Potential GSM elements and IMF actions under GSM activation:
  - Make unilateral offers to approve FCL arrangements for systemic qualifying countries.
  - Activate other liquidity instruments for countries with sound policies that do not qualify for the FCL.
  - Adopt additional measures as appropriate, such as activation of the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) to expand loanable resources and consideration of increasing global liquidity through general allocations of Special Drawing Rights (SDR).
- Design considerations and Board concerns: address “first-mover problem”; Directors expressed concerns about publicly identifying qualified countries, operational complexity, and uncertain resource requirements.

### Short-term Liquidity Line (SLL) and other GSM liquidity facilities
- Short-term Liquidity Line (SLL):
  - Activation: available only when GSM is activated; dormant in normal times.
  - Target: countries with sound fundamentals and policies sufficient to qualify for PCL; unlike PCL, SLL would not be subject to ex post conditionality.
  - Length: approved for a period of six months; could be renewed once by the Board.
  - Qualification: identical to PCL qualification criteria where relevant; reassessed for successor requests.
  - Access: normally up to 500 percent of quota; cap could be raised by the Board upon activation if warranted and resources exist.
  - Phasing: entire amount available upfront; multiple purchases allowed; drawings automatic and not subject to activation review.
  - Terms: repurchase period of 1¼−2 years; each purchase repaid in four quarterly installments starting 15 months after the date of purchase; other financial terms same as credit tranches.
  - Safeguards and approval: strong qualification criteria, short duration, capped access; establishment would require an 85 percent majority of total voting power for the instrument; activation within GSM would require a majority of votes cast.
- Alternative—new credit tranche window for systemic crisis:
  - Purpose: address non-precautionary/liquidity needs of PCL qualifiers hit by a systemic shock; allow immediate drawing on approval for actual BoP needs.
  - Duration: six months; could be renewed once subject to qualification and any prior actions.
  - Access: 500 percent of quota; Board could revise level under GSM if warranted.
  - Safeguarding: no review during six-month arrangement (no ex post conditionality); prior actions could still be used.

### Exceptional access substantive criteria (Box 1 summary)
- Four substantive criteria for exceptional access (exceeding annual/cumulative limits of 200 and 600 percent of quota respectively):
  - (a) Exceptional balance of payments pressures on current or capital account with financing needs that cannot be met within normal limits.
  - (b) Rigorous, forward-looking analysis indicates a high probability that public debt is sustainable in the medium term; where uncertainties exist, exceptional access justified if high risk of international systemic spillovers. Applies to public (domestic and external) debt and may incorporate contingent liabilities.
  - (c) Prospects of regaining access to private capital markets within the timeframe when Fund resources are outstanding.
  - (d) Policy program provides a reasonably strong prospect of success, including institutional and political capacity to deliver adjustment.

### PCL-specific operational features (from Box 1)
- Ex post conditionality and monitoring:
  - Members requesting PCL would commit to a focused set of policies addressing remaining vulnerabilities and submit a concise written request with a quantified macroeconomic framework and streamlined quantitative targets.
  - Mandatory semiannual reviews; reviews focus on adherence to qualification criteria and observance of relevant quantitative targets and measures.
  - New written communications restating policy plans generally not needed for semiannual reviews; semiannual reviews timed to avoid interrupting purchase rights.
  - Performance criteria and structural benchmarks generally not used except standard performance criteria on trade and exchange restrictions, discriminatory currency arrangements and multiple currency practices, and external arrears.
- Access, phasing, and terms:
  - Capped at 1000 percent of quota on a cumulative basis (assessed only against PCL-originated requests and purchases).
  - Frontloaded: up to 500 percent of quota available upon approval; for one-year arrangements no phasing; for arrangements >12 months up to additional 500 percent of quota normally available at start of second year upon completion of second semiannual review.
  - Crisis-resolution flexibility: ad hoc post-purchase Board review permitted to rephase additional access if actual BoP need materializes and qualification/performance maintained.
  - Exit: expires upon earlier of (i) purchase of full amount, (ii) expiration date, or (iii) cancellation by member.
  - Terms: same charges, surcharges, commitment fees and repurchase period (3¼ to 5 years) as FCL arrangements and SBAs.
- Safeguards and procedures:
  - Rapid approval possible under the Emergency Financing Mechanism.
  - Subject to safeguards assessments and post-program monitoring; initial mission to help design policy strategy expected but not required.
  - Management confidentiality for cases where PCL not judged suitable.
  - Board decision to establish PCL as instrument in credit tranches would require a majority of votes cast.
- Expected resource and moral hazard controls:
  - Safeguards include ex ante qualification, focused ex post conditionality, short duration of purchase rights (no more than six months), hard cap on access, phasing of access, safeguards assessments and post-program monitoring.
  - Modest additional net demand for Fund resources expected; PCL would largely absorb potential demand from HAPAs and could increase actual demand for precautionary resources.

### Board and stakeholder feedback highlights
- Executive Directors broadly supported core reforms:
  - Enhancing the FCL: general endorsement of doubling duration of purchase rights to one year and removing implicit access cap; most Directors preferred flexibility of a judgmental approach over a running list of qualifying countries.
  - Establishing the PCL: welcomed as broadening instruments; some Directors worried it could reduce attractiveness of HAPAs and increase toolkit complexity and tiering.
  - Introducing a systemic crisis mitigation mechanism: some Directors supported a dedicated instrument (including unilateral and multi-country mechanisms), while others had reservations about public identification of qualified countries and operational/resource uncertainties.
  - Strengthening synergies with regional safety nets: Directors saw scope for deeper engagement and welcomed coordination proposals.
- G20 leaders urged rapid progress in reviewing Fund lending instruments.

### Periodic review and trigger provisions
- Proposed joint Board review of revised FCL and PCL decisions no later than three years from adoption.
- An ad hoc review triggered whenever aggregate commitments outstanding under these two instruments reach SDR 100 billion to ensure sufficient resources (proposal to eliminate separate existing SDR 100 billion trigger in FCL commitments).
- Review to reassess design of crisis prevention instruments in light of usage and needs.

### Resource implications — current status and prospective capacity
- Forward Commitment Capacity (FCC) status:
  - Total lending resources: SDR 356 billion (noted elsewhere as 355.85 in table).
  - Bilateral loan and note purchase agreements: 19 agreements totaling SDR 174 billion made effective by late June 2010.
  - Record level of outstanding credit and undrawn commitments: SDR 125 billion.
  - FCC at record high level: SDR 162 billion ($239 billion).
- Table I.1 selected figures (as of June 24, 2010):
  - A. Total Lending Resources: 355.85 SDR billion / 525.54 US$ billion / 428.6 Euro billion.
  - Quota resources of FTP members: 179.72 SDR billion.
  - Effective Loan and Note Purchase Agreements: 173.32 SDR billion.
  - B. Credit outstanding and credit commitments: 125.31 SDR billion.
  - E. Current FCC (A-B+C-D): 161.72 SDR billion / 238.81 US$ billion / 194.8 Euro billion.
  - Activation of Existing NAB plus Pending Bilateral Borrowing scenario:
    - Total Lending Resources: 415.66 SDR billion / 613.95 US$ billion / 500.7 Euro billion.
    - FCC with Current Commitments and Repurchases: 209.63 SDR billion / 309.62 US$ billion / 252.5 Euro billion.
  - Full Activation of Expanded NAB plus 2008 Quota Increase scenario:
    - Total Lending Resources: 566.78 SDR billion / 837.06 US$ billion / 682.6 Euro billion.
    - FCC with Current Commitments and Repurchases: 330.44 SDR billion / 488.03 US$ billion / 398.0 Euro billion.
  - Exchange rate per SDR (Jun 24, 2010): 1.477141 US$ / 1.2046 Euro.
- Review of quotas (14th General Review of Quotas):
  - Illustrative quota increases of 100 to 150 percent (starting from quotas agreed in 2008) would raise quotas of FTP members by approximately SDR 200 to 300 billion.
  - If such increases agreed, Fund total financing capacity from quota resources would be about SDR 320 to 400 billion, increasing to SDR 610 to 690 billion if the expanded NAB were fully activated.
- Interim financing and NAB activation:
  - Additional pending bilateral agreements would boost resources by SDR 26 billion.
  - Activation of existing NAB: SDR 34 billion (until activated, not included in FCC).
  - Expanded NAB approved in April 2010 (of SDR 367 billion) in process of being made effective; folding bilateral borrowing into NAB expected to yield net increase in supplementary resources of about SDR 168 billion.
  - With ad hoc quota increases agreed in 2008 and activation of expanded NAB, total Fund lending resources could be SDR 567 billion ($837 billion), roughly doubling FCC to SDR 330 billion (about $480 billion) assuming current level of Fund credit and commitments.

### Potential impact of proposed facilities on demand for Fund resources
- Enhanced FCL:
  - Expect broader use of the FCL and potentially higher average access.
  - Shift to 12-month purchase rights could increase willingness of eligible members to request an FCL.
  - Removal of implicit cap on access could raise access levels where potential needs exceed 1000 percent of quota.
- Establishing the PCL:
  - Expect broader use relative to HAPAs; likely substitution from HAPA to PCL.
  - PCL front-loaded access and focused ex post conditionality; qualification signals may increase attractiveness.
  - Net impact on access unclear: (i) access may tend to rise toward the cap of 1000 percent of quota (exceeding average HAPA access to date of 300 percent of quota); (ii) early access to a PCL may avoid need for higher access SBA later.
- Introducing the GSM and SLL:
  - Expect a rise in demand for Fund resources in a systemic crisis.
  - Unilateral offers and SLL’s lack of ex post conditionality may bring forward requests for Fund resources and broaden range of members willing to consider Fund support.
- Overall:
  - Preventative nature of reforms likely to increase potential resource commitments early in a crisis while reducing need for commitments under traditional crisis management instruments.
  - Reforms tend to increase frontloading of demand and increase advantages of quota resources relative to borrowing; may affect liquidity management by creditor members.

### Tail risk scenarios and illustrative resource needs
- Advanced economies tail risk scenario:
  - Systemic banking crisis scenarios generated financing needs of about SDR 150 billion, or commitments of about SDR 290 billion assuming all affected countries received access of 1000 percent of quota.
- Emerging markets tail risk scenarios (57 countries included):
  - Under "original assumptions" combining low rollovers, capital outflows, reduced inflows: among group likely to use crisis prevention facilities, positive financing needs estimated in 18 countries.
  - Removing access cap on FCL:
    - If FCL-eligible countries have access equal to their estimated financing need if above 1000 percent of quota, or 1000 percent otherwise, total access would increase by about SDR 75 billion.
    - If burden shared with bilateral/regional sources (limiting access to Fund to 2000 percent of quota at most), overall commitments would increase by about SDR 50 billion.
- Crisis resolution commitments reduction with smaller outflows:
  - Group assumed to utilize crisis prevention instruments have overall financing needs of SDR 175 billion in original scenario (potential arrangements with 26 members; average access around 1200 percent of quota).
  - Reducing outflows by one-quarter reduces crisis resolution commitments by about SDR 40 billion.
  - Reducing outflows by one-half reduces crisis resolution commitments by about SDR 75 billion.
- Overall resource demand range for emerging markets in tail risk scenarios:
  - SDR 400 to 450 billion would cover most potential outcomes discussed, taking into account proposed reforms.
  - Focus on lower end reasonable to reflect contributions from other sources of exceptional financing (excluding recent commitments to Greece, other sources estimated to have committed just over SDR 30 billion in current crisis).
- Capacity under doubling of quotas plus expanded NAB:
  - A doubling of quotas together with expanded NAB would generate overall financing capacity of SDR 610 billion.

### Implications for composition of Fund resources and creditor liquidity management
- Composition shifts:
  - Proposed reforms expected to accelerate demand for commitments and increase share of quota resources relative to borrowing because quotas are more flexible.
  - Demand for FCLs and PCLs could arise outside systemic crisis when conditions for NAB activation may not be met.
- Liquidity management by creditor members:
  - Expansion of FCL usage requires expansion of quarterly FTP: most recent FTP totaled SDR 50 billion (SDR 25 billion quota resources and SDR 25 billion borrowed resources) relative to SDR 10 billion in scheduled purchases.
  - Larger volume of outstanding precautionary commitments would require further expansion of FTP; scale depends on potential for simultaneous drawings and regional concentration.
  - Table I.3 FTP doubled to SDR 100 billion scenario (1:1 ratio borrowed to quota) highlights transfers in FTP relative to FX reserves for key creditors (examples preserved as in source):
    - China: Quota 8.1 SDR bn; Borrowing 32.0 SDR bn; FX reserves 1,611.8 SDR bn; Transfers Current FTP in percent of FX Reserves 0.4; Transfers in FTP of SDR 100 billion in percent of FX Reserves 0.7.
    - Japan: Quota 13.3 SDR bn; Borrowing 65.9 SDR bn; FX reserves 652.7 SDR bn; Transfers Current FTP in percent of FX Reserves 1.8; Transfers in FTP of SDR 100 billion in percent of FX Reserves 3.5.
    - United States: Quota 37.1 SDR bn; Borrowing 31.9 SDR bn; Transfers Current FTP in percent of FX Reserves 15.9; Transfers in FTP of SDR 100 billion in percent of FX Reserves 32.4.
    - Euro area sub-total: Quota 49.6 SDR bn; Borrowing 37.8 SDR bn; FX reserves 97.6 SDR bn; Transfers Current FTP in percent of FX Reserves 11.7; Transfers in FTP of SDR 100 billion in percent of FX Reserves 25.3.
  - Implications: amounts under FTP become more significant relative to FX reserves for some members; adjustments in domestic liquidity and debt management may be required; potential need for temporary deviations in allocation of transfers in FTP to rely more on members with greater flexibility during extreme events.

### Issues for Directors and policy questions for consideration
- Is a predictable and coordinated response needed to deal with systemic crises and how can the Fund facilitate this?
- Do Directors agree a multi-pronged approach such as the GSM could address future systemic occurrences and what are views on its elements?
- How should the Fund balance the global public good of proactively channeling liquidity to contain a crisis against safeguards and moral hazard?
- Do Directors agree that the SLL or a new lending window in the PCL decision (¶44) is needed to provide Fund financing in a systemic crisis?

*Source: Executive Summary, Box 1, Sections I–II, and selected annexes of IMF paper _062910.*

### Executive Summary ......................................................................................................

### _062910 - Executive Summary ......................................................................................................

### Executive summary — motivation and reform approach
- The global crisis (2008−09) and subsequent contagion episodes highlighted the need to strengthen global financial safety nets to protect countries with sound policy frameworks.
- Reforms aim to complement the IMF’s traditional crisis resolution role and broaden availability of insurance instruments to address heterogeneity in countries’ policies and circumstances.
- The paper proposes evolutionary reforms to crisis prevention instruments and presents options for a framework to resolve systemic crises, drawing on prior reform work (GRA Toolkit paper, FFR paper) and feedback from policymakers and stakeholders.

### Key crisis prevention instrument proposals
- Flexible Credit Line (FCL) refinements:
  - Allow the FCL to be open for one or two years; where two years is chosen, an interim assessment of continued qualification is required after one year.
  - Remove the implicit access cap of 1000 percent of quota to allow more flexible access consistent with countries’ circumstances.
  - Clarify expectations on graduation: access in successor FCL arrangements would normally be expected to decline when sustained improvements in official and private financing prospects reduce BoP needs.
  - Transitional provision: eliminate the six-month review for all one-year FCL arrangements in place when the modification decision is adopted.
- Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) establishment:
  - Purpose: a new credit line for countries with sound policies but moderate vulnerabilities that disqualify them from the FCL.
  - Nature: a window in the credit tranches, carrying the same charges, surcharges and repurchase period as the SBA, but with streamlined ex post conditionality focused on remaining vulnerabilities.
  - Length: PCL arrangements could be approved for a period of between one to two years; semiannual assessments of continued qualification and performance would apply.
  - Access: would be capped at 1000 percent of quota for a period of between 12 and 24 months, subject to semiannual assessments (note: the PCL “would in most cases provide access above the normal limits” and would be subject to the Fund’s exceptional access criteria).
  - Qualification: PCL approval only for members without an actual BoP need at request time and assessed to (i) have sound fundamentals and policy frameworks; (ii) be implementing and have a strong track record of implementing sound policies; and (iii) remain committed to maintaining these policies. PCL assessments would draw on the FCL qualification criteria but need not meet them as completely as required for the FCL.

### Systemic crisis resolution — Global Stabilization Mechanism (GSM) and related options
- Rationale: systemic events exhibit strong contagion and global public-good characteristics; predictability in handling such events can enhance global financial stability.
- GSM objective: activated only in systemic events to proactively channel financial assistance to help countries cope with large-scale liquidity withdrawals.
- Potential GSM elements and actions the IMF could mount under GSM activation:
  - Make unilateral offers to approve FCL arrangements for systemic qualifying countries.
  - Activate other liquidity instruments for countries with sound policies that do not qualify for the FCL.
  - Adopt additional measures as appropriate, such as activation of the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) to expand loanable resources and consideration of increasing global liquidity through general allocations of Special Drawing Rights (SDR).
- Design considerations: the GSM would seek to address the “first-mover problem” where members hesitate to request support, but Directors expressed concerns about identifying qualified countries publicly, operational complexity, and uncertain resource requirements.

### Board and stakeholder feedback highlights
- Executive Directors broadly supported core reforms:
  - Enhancing the FCL: general endorsement of doubling duration of purchase rights to one year and removing the implicit access cap; most Directors preferred the flexibility of a judgmental approach over maintaining a running list of qualifying countries.
  - Establishing the PCL: welcomed as broadening instruments for members not meeting the FCL bar; some Directors worried it could reduce attractiveness of HAPAs and increase toolkit complexity and tiering.
  - Introducing a systemic crisis mitigation mechanism: some Directors supported a dedicated instrument (including unilateral and multi-country mechanisms), while others had reservations about public identification of qualified countries and operational/resource uncertainties.
  - Strengthening synergies with regional safety nets: Directors saw scope for deeper engagement and welcomed coordination proposals.
- G20 leaders urged rapid progress in reviewing Fund lending instruments, asking for proposals to strengthen global financial safety nets.

### Safeguards, resource implications, and process
- Safeguards to contain moral hazard: instruments tailored to fundamentals and policy track records; qualification and focused conditionality designed to limit moral hazard.
- Resource implications: Annex concludes that the total resource envelopes currently being discussed as part of the 14th General Review of Quotas, entailing a doubling of quotas or somewhat larger increases together with activation of the expanded NAB, would be sufficient to accommodate potential increase in commitments from the proposed reforms.
- Timing and decisions:
  - At this stage, only decisions setting forth the legal framework for FCL and PCL reforms are proposed for Board adoption; these will be covered in a forthcoming supplement.
  - Given complexity, GSM design options are presented for further Board consideration; a decision on such a framework could be proposed for approval by the Annual Meetings based on Director feedback.
  - Staff plans consultations with regional financing arrangements to explore synergies.

### Additional reform design details highlighted in the introduction and Section II
- The Fund’s crisis resolution framework has been robust—SBAs with ex-post conditionality were used flexibly for diverse BoP needs during the crisis.
- The FCL’s limited demand during the recent crisis may partly reflect positive externalities and perceived qualification of strong performers.
- Specific FCL design issues addressed: short duration of purchase rights and implicit cap on access.
  - Proposal: approve FCL arrangements for either one year with no interim reviews or two years with an interim review after twelve months; staff to keep the Board informed via Article IV consultations and informal briefings.
  - Proposal: eliminate the implicit 1000 percent of quota expectation for FCL access.
- PCL design borrows extensively from prior documents on a liquidity instrument for market access countries and resembles the Rapid Access Line considered pre-2008.

*Source: Executive Summary and Sections I–II of the IMF paper represented in the supplied content.*

### Box 1. Exceptional Access Policy: Substantive Criteria

### Box 1. Exceptional Access Policy: Substantive Criteria

### Substantive criteria for exceptional access
- The Fund may approve access in excess of the normal 200 and 600 percent of quota annual and cumulative limits, respectively, in exceptional circumstances, provided certain procedural requirements and the following four substantive criteria are met (PIN No. 09/40):
  - (a) The member is experiencing or has the potential to experience exceptional balance of payments pressures on the current account or the capital account, resulting in a need for Fund financing that cannot be met within the normal limits.
  - (b) A rigorous and systematic analysis indicates that there is a high probability that the member’s public debt is sustainable in the medium term. However, in cases where there are significant uncertainties that make it difficult to state categorically that there is a high probability that the debt is sustainable over this period, exceptional access would be justified if there is a high risk of international systemic spillovers.
    - In those cases, the Fund would need to come to the judgment—as in cases of normal access—that the debt is sustainable in the medium term.
    - In all cases, debt sustainability for these purposes will be evaluated on a forward-looking basis and may take into account, inter alia, the intended restructuring of debt to restore sustainability.
    - This criterion applies only to public (domestic and external) debt. However, the analysis of such public debt sustainability will incorporate any potential contingent liabilities of the government, including those potentially arising from private external indebtedness.
  - (c) The member has prospects of gaining or regaining access to private capital markets within the timeframe when Fund resources are outstanding.
  - (d) The policy program of the member provides a reasonably strong prospect of success, including not only the member’s adjustment plans but also its institutional and political capacity to deliver that adjustment.

### Ex post conditionality and monitoring (PCL context)
- Members requesting a PCL arrangement would:
  - Commit to implement a focused set of policies addressing the most pressing remaining vulnerabilities identified in the qualification process.
  - Summarize such policies together with a quantified macroeconomic framework underpinned by a streamlined set of quantitative targets in a concise written request for a PCL arrangement.
- Monitoring framework:
  - Mandatory semiannual reviews focusing on achievement of policy objectives supported by the arrangement and appropriate policy adjustments in response to economic changes.
  - A review will normally be completed when the member continues to adhere to the qualification criteria for approval of PCL arrangements and policy performance is in line with the overall objectives of the arrangement as demonstrated by observance of the relevant quantitative targets and measures specified in the authorities’ policy framework.
  - Unless required by changes in the member’s circumstances, new written communications restating policy plans would not be needed for completing semiannual reviews.
  - To avoid interrupting purchase rights, semiannual reviews should, to the extent possible, take place shortly before each six-month period lapses.
  - Prior actions could be established, but performance criteria and structural benchmarks would not be used, except for the standard performance criteria on trade and exchange restrictions, discriminatory currency arrangements and multiple currency practices, and external arrears.

### PCL access, phasing, and terms
- Access limits and drawing:
  - Access under PCL arrangements would be capped at 1000 percent of quota on a cumulative basis.
  - This cap would be assessed against the sum of requested access and outstanding purchases, but arising from PCL arrangements only.
  - The member could draw available amounts under an arrangement—with no separate activation review prior to drawing—in one purchase or make multiple purchases, but purchases may not exceed the member’s actual BoP need.
- Phasing:
  - Access would be frontloaded, with up to 500 percent of quota available upon approval of the arrangement.
  - For arrangements of one year, there would be no phasing—the full amount available upon approval would remain available throughout the arrangement subject to the completion of the semiannual review.
  - For arrangements longer than 12 months, additional access of up to 500 percent of quota would normally be made available at the start of the second year upon completion of the second semiannual review.
- Crisis-resolution flexibility:
  - If an actual BoP need materializes during the first year of a multi-year arrangement and the member purchases the entire amount available upon approval, it could request an ad hoc post-purchase Board review to bring forward (rephase) the additional access that would have become available at the start of the second year.
  - The Board would be expected to complete such a review if the member continues to adhere to the PCL qualification criteria and policy performance remains in line with overall objectives, as demonstrated by observance of the targets and measures specified in the authorities’ policy framework.
- Exit and sequencing:
  - A PCL arrangement would expire upon the earlier of (i) the purchase of the full amount of access under the arrangement, (ii) the expiration date of the arrangement, or (iii) the cancellation of the arrangement by the member.
  - Approval of new PCL arrangements would be permitted only for members whose outstanding purchases under the PCL are below the instrument’s 1000 percent of quota cumulative cap; additional financing needs beyond this cap could be met by requesting an SBA.
  - Graduation from a completed PCL arrangement to an FCL arrangement may be possible if the stricter qualification requirements of the FCL are met by that time.
- Terms:
  - As a window in the credit tranches, PCL arrangements would be subject to the same charges, surcharges, commitment fees and repurchase period (3¼ to 5 years) as FCL arrangements and SBAs.

### Safeguards, approval, and procedural aspects
- Policies and procedures:
  - Rapid approval of PCL arrangements would be possible under the Emergency Financing Mechanism.
  - The PCL would be subject to general Fund policies governing use of resources, including safeguards assessments and post-program monitoring.
  - An initial mission to help the member design its policy strategy under the PCL would be expected but not required.
  - Cases where a member expresses interest in a PCL arrangement but management decides the PCL is not suitable would be treated confidentially by management and staff.
- Board decision:
  - Establishing the PCL as an instrument in the credit tranches would require a Board decision adopted by a majority of the votes cast.

### Safeguards embedded in the PCL and expected resource impact
- Safeguards include:
  - Ex ante conditionality (qualification criteria).
  - Focused ex post conditionality to address remaining vulnerabilities.
  - Relatively short duration of purchase rights (no more than six months, compared to the twelve-month window under the FCL as proposed in this paper).
  - Adherence to the exceptional access policy (where relevant).
  - A hard cap on access (compared to no cap under the FCL modified as proposed in this paper, or under HAPAs).
  - Phasing of access such that any amounts above 500 percent of quota are available only after successful implementation of policy commitments in the first year (or subject to Board review if needed earlier).
  - Application of the Fund’s policy on safeguards assessments and post-program monitoring (unlike the FCL).
- Resource implications:
  - A modest additional net demand for Fund resources from establishment of the PCL is expected as the PCL would by and large absorb potential demand from HAPAs.
  - The design advantage of the PCL over the HAPA is expected to increase actual demand for precautionary resources.

### Systemic crises: incidence, Fund role, and response considerations
- Nature and incidence:
  - Systemic crises are virulent events where localized problems trigger panic responses by investors and set off chain reactions across asset markets and countries irrespective of their fundamentals.
  - Containing propagation beyond an epicenter requires coordinated responses to channel liquidity to countries suffering funding pressures.
- Key considerations for Fund response:
  - Country coverage: Target assistance quickly to countries that are systemic in the sense that they are impacted by the shock and have the ability to transmit it. Determination may depend on factors such as size of the economy, trade openness, sectoral dominance, and potential for a small country to be systemic.
  - Form of support: Use existing instruments (liquidity or solvency) or establish a new instrument aimed specifically at liquidity needs in a systemic crisis; adapt policies governing use of Fund resources (such as access policies) to the nature of systemic events.
  - First-mover problems: To reduce hesitation by countries to request assistance, the Fund could proactively invite impacted countries to make use of tailored financial assistance through a dedicated formal coordination mechanism to publicly offer simultaneous and rapid assistance to systemic countries that meet qualification requirements.
  - Moral hazard: Tailor form of assistance (choice of lending instrument and intensity of conditionality) to country performance and nature of BoP need to mitigate moral hazard risks.
    - Countries with sound fundamentals suffering exogenous liquidity shocks should be able to use short-term, quick-disbursing instruments based on ex ante conditionality only.
    - Countries with weaker track records and significant home-grown vulnerabilities would likely benefit from instruments with phased financing based on ex post policy conditionality.
  - Resource adequacy: Demonstrate that Fund resources are adequate; complement with coordination of monetary authorities, regional financing arrangements, multi-layered bilateral swaps, and voluntary private-sector initiatives to induce high private sector rollover rates.
  - Announcement effects: Coordinated public announcement of a global response can maximize impact on market confidence (example: April 2009 G20 announcement helped place emerging market spreads on a declining path after September 2008 widening).

### Periodic review and triggers
- The (revised) FCL and PCL decisions are proposed to be reviewed jointly by the Board no later than three years from the date of adoption of the reforms in this paper.
- An ad hoc review would be triggered whenever aggregate commitments outstanding under these two instruments reach SDR 100 billion to ensure sufficient resources for crisis resolution (with the separate existing trigger of SDR 100 billion in FCL commitments proposed to be eliminated).
- The review provides an opportunity to reassess design of crisis prevention instruments in light of their use and potential needs to support members’ adjustment programs with nonprecautionary arrangements.

*Source: _062910 - Box 1. Exceptional Access Policy: Substantive Criteria*

### 34.      A new policy establishing a Global Stabilization Mechanism (GSM) could

### A new policy establishing a Global Stabilization Mechanism (GSM) could

### Overview and purpose
- GSM would formalize a framework for responding to systemic events to:
  - enable the Fund to proactively provide financing to the membership;
  - expand its resource base; and
  - if needed, boost global liquidity.
- GSM could encompass:
  - procedures for identifying a systemic event that activates the mechanism;
  - a set of financing instruments to be offered or activated during a systemic event;
  - procedures for making offers to approve Fund arrangements;
  - guidelines about possible adaptations of policies governing Fund financing (such as access policy and conditionality);
  - modalities for ensuring adequacy of resources and global liquidity; and
  - where needed, modalities for coordinating the Fund’s response with relevant monetary authorities and regional financing arrangements, and for seeking voluntary private involvement.

### Board role and activation
- Board-centered decision-making:
  - Decision adopting a new GSM policy and a future decision activating the GSM during a systemic crisis could be adopted by a majority of the votes cast.
  - Broad consensus at the Board is noted as enhancing credibility.
- Activation:
  - GSM would be activated by a Board decision determining that a “systemic event” has occurred.
  - A triggering event could be a generalized global or regional shock, or a shock in a single country with high probability of spillovers.
  - Quantitative indicators (spreads, stock price volatility, reserves and exchange rates) could inform but not mechanically determine activation; a judgmental process based on enhanced global surveillance is preferred.

### Potential elements of the GSM (mobilizing/adapting lending and policies)
- Make a unilateral offer of financial assistance to a group of members to address first-mover problems.
- Activate short-term liquidity instruments available only in systemic events.
- Augment existing arrangements:
  - Board could signal willingness to approve expeditious augmentations of arrangements assessed to be insufficient to cope with BoP financing pressures due to the systemic shock, with appropriate policy adjustments.
- Modify access limits:
  - Temporary increase of access limits and caps could be used under the GSM, subject to assessment that resources are adequate.
- Increase access under the first credit tranche (FCT):
  - Proposal to temporarily double the FCT to 50 percent of quota—from the current first 25 percent of the Fund’s holdings of a member’s currency above its quota.
  - Historical precedent: in 1976 first credit tranche was temporarily increased from 25 percent to 36¼ percent of quota (pending the Second Amendment).
  - Purchases within the FCT require that the member is making reasonable efforts to solve its BoP problems, but are not subject to phasing and performance criteria (Decision No. 12865-(02/102), 9/25/02).
  - Raising the FCT provides more space for drawings without ex post policy conditionality; marginal impact for large liquidity needs but useful combined with other proposals and for smaller members.
- Coordination:
  - Close coordination with multilateral institutions, regional financing arrangements, and major central banks may be required.
  - Central bank swap lines could be complemented by GSM to ensure broader and even-handed country coverage consistent with the Fund’s global reach.
  - Avenues for co-financing by other multilaterals/regional institutions and concurrent discussions with home-country authorities to support voluntary private-sector rollovers could be pursued.
- Mobilizing resources:
  - GSM would trigger a rapid review of the adequacy of Fund resources and options to supplement resources if needed.
  - Board could recommend that the Managing Director propose establishment of an “activation period” to participants under the amended NAB if conditions warrant.
- Boosting global liquidity:
  - Board could request the Managing Director propose a general SDR allocation, subject to the Managing Director being satisfied that the allocation would meet a long-term global need to supplement existing reserve assets and that broad support exists across the membership.

### Policy for making a unilateral offer to approve financial assistance
- Motivation and approaches to encourage early use of assistance:
  - General invitation to all members risks signalling larger problems and may lack incentives.
  - Confidential bilateral discussions provide flexibility but may not generate broad participation.
  - Unilateral offer to approve Fund arrangements in clearly defined systemic circumstances could catalyze early interest and avoid ambiguous signals.
- Instrument choice and coverage:
  - Choosing the FCL as the underlying instrument balances stigma concerns but FCL’s strict qualification narrows coverage.
  - Simultaneous use of other dedicated instruments would be necessary to maximize contagion mitigation.
- Nature of the offer under GSM:
  - Board could make a unilateral offer to approve FCL arrangements for multiple qualifying countries that are systemic and meet the FCL’s qualification bar.
  - If a member accepts the offer and notifies the Fund, a separate Board decision would confirm continued satisfaction of qualification criteria and approve the arrangement on a lapse-of-time basis.
  - Offers would be for uniform access (in percent of quota); the Board would consider uncommitted resources relative to potential financing needs when determining the indicative access amount.
  - Any amount offered would be indicative; the amount eventually approved could vary according to specific BoP needs.
- Offer duration and disclosure:
  - Offer window generally three to six months (Board discretion), with a presumption—but not a requirement—that the offer will not be extended.
  - During the offer period, Board could expand the offer to additional members affected by the same systemic event or subsequently determined to qualify.
  - Publication of the group of qualifying members requires covered members’ consent under Article XII, Section 8; presumed voluntary publication is proposed but members could object to publication.
  - If a member objects, Fund could omit the member from publication or not publish any country names, stating only that offers had been made.
  - Fund would clarify that qualification assessment is definite only for members to whom an offer has been made and emphasize that composition of the group is not exclusively determined by FCL qualification.
  - Members not offered could still apply for any Fund lending instrument.

### A Short-term Liquidity Line (SLL)
- Motivation:
  - SLL would be a new, dedicated facility activated only at the onset of systemic crises (dormant in normal times).
  - Restricted to countries with sound fundamentals and policies sufficient to qualify for the PCL, but unlike PCL, SLL would not be subject to ex post conditionality.
  - Designed to encourage rapid use of liquidity support in systemic events given anticipated short-lasting nature of crisis-triggered liquidity needs.
- Key features:
  - Activation: SLL could be activated by activation of the GSM and would be available for the same period as the GSM offer mechanism.
  - Type of BoP problem addressed: temporary, short-term liquidity need resulting from global capital market developments not primarily under the member’s control; member expected to resolve liquidity difficulties before they become entrenched solvency problems.
  - Length: Approved for a period of six months; could be renewed once by the Board at the member’s request if qualification and special BoP need persist.
  - Qualification: Qualification criteria identical to those proposed for the PCL, including applicability of substantive criteria under the exceptional access policy where relevant; reassessed for successor requests.
  - Access: Normally approved for amounts up to 500 percent of quota; cap could be raised by the Board upon activation if warranted and sufficient resources exist.
  - Phasing: Entire amount approved under SLL would be made available upfront and remain available throughout the arrangement period; multiple purchases up to the approved amount allowed; drawings automatic and not subject to an activation review.
  - Terms: Repurchase period of 1¼−2 years; each purchase repaid in four quarterly installments starting 15 months after the date of purchase; other financial terms (periodic charges, surcharges and fees) same as financing in the credit tranches.
  - Safeguards: Strong qualification criteria, largely self-reversing nature of BoP need, adherence to exceptional access policy where applicable, relatively short duration, and capped access provide safeguards; a safeguards assessment of the external audit mechanism would be initiated at the time of a member's request and undertaken during the term of the arrangement.
  - Procedures: Procedural requirements similar to the PCL; approval may often be expedited under the Emergency Financing Mechanism.
  - Board voting requirement:
    - Establishment of the SLL would require a Board decision adopted by an 85 percent majority of the total voting power (Article V, Section 7(d) and Article XXX(c) implications).
    - Once established, activation of the SLL in the context of the GSM would require a Board decision adopted by a majority of votes cast.

*Source: IMF staff discussion of a proposed Global Stabilization Mechanism (GSM) and related instruments.*

### 44.      A new credit tranche window for systemic crisis. As an alternative to creating the

### _062910 - 44.      A new credit tranche window for systemic crisis. As an alternative to creating the

### Proposal details for a separate lending window under the GSM
- Purpose: Address non-precautionary/liquidity needs of PCL qualifiers hit by a systemic shock and to limit contagion.
- Availability: Would be available for both potential and actual BoP needs, to allow for immediate drawing on approval if needed.
- Duration: Six months, reflecting the short-term nature of the liquidity shock.
  - A six-month arrangement would not involve a review, obviating the need to negotiate ex post conditionality.
  - Prior actions could be established despite absence of ex post conditionality.
- Renewal: Could be renewed once, subject to again meeting qualification requirements, and any prior actions as needed.
- Access: 500 percent of quota, but the Board could consider revising this level under the GSM if warranted by circumstances and resource availability.
- Rationale for instrument design:
  - Short arrangement duration justified by anticipated short-lasting and self-correcting nature of the liquidity need.
  - Need for prompt and extraordinary measures to control the propagation of systemic crisis.

### Features relative to the PCL (Preservation of PCL elements and key differences)
- Unchanged elements: Other features of the PCL would apply to this separate lending window—notably, the qualification criteria would be unchanged.
- Key substantive differences from a safeguards perspective:
  - Possibility of using it for an actual, and not only potential, BoP need on approval.
  - Absence of a monitoring framework for assessing observance of ex post conditionality, given the duration of the arrangement would be the same as the periodicity of reviews.
- Balancing considerations: The possibility of using prior actions and the short-term, exogenous nature of the shock would be balancing considerations for safeguards and conditionality design.

### Conclusions and issues for discussion (drawn from the same section)
- Context: The 2008−09 global crisis and more recent events prompted rethinking of the Fund’s financing role; proposals build on nonconcessional lending toolkit reforms implemented in 2009.
- Objective: Ensure the Fund remains effective in meeting the needs of as broad a spectrum of members as possible under a variety of crisis circumstances.
- Organization principle: Lending windows organized according to the strength of members’ fundamentals and policies to allow tailoring conditionality to different member characteristics and to balance insurance provision with guarding against moral hazard.
- Specific expected outcomes:
  - The proposed enhancements to the FCL and the creation of the PCL would significantly strengthen the Fund’s crisis prevention capacity, complementing its demonstrated competence in crisis resolution.
  - Proposals to erect a firewall by providing liquidity support to countries that may become engulfed by systemic shocks.
  - Planned further work to build stronger synergies with regional financing arrangements.

### Resource implications and financing operations
- Potential need for larger overall resource commitments in many crises if all reforms are adopted.
- The total resource envelopes discussed in the initial Size of the Fund paper (EB/CQuota/10/2) appear to be broadly sufficient to accommodate such demand.
- Interim financing: Until the expanded NAB becomes effective, the proposed reforms could increase the likelihood that the Fund would need to bolster its resources temporarily, such as through expanded bilateral borrowing.
- Additional implication: Increased precautionary commitments may also have implications for the liquidity management of some creditor members.

*Source: _062910 - 44.      A new credit tranche window for systemic crisis. As an alternative to creating the*

### 47.      Directors may wish to consider the following issues for discussion:

### _062910 - 47.      Directors may wish to consider the following issues for discussion:

### Issues for Directors
- Do Directors agree that a predictable and coordinated response is needed to deal with systemic crises? How can the Fund facilitate this process?
- Given the recent experience with a large-scale crisis, do Directors agree that a multi-pronged approach—such as that embodied in the GSM—could address future such occurrences? What are Directors views on each the elements of the GSM?
- How do Directors see the balance between the global public good provided by proactively channeling liquidity to contain a crisis and safeguards?
- Do Directors agree that the SLL or a new lending window in the PCL decision (¶44) is needed to provide Fund financing in a systemic crisis?

### The Fund’s Nonconcessional Lending Instruments (Table 1: highlights)
- Instruments listed: Stand-By Arrangement (SBA, 1952); Extended Fund Facility (EFF, 1974); High Access Precautionary SBA (HAPA, clarified in 2009); Precautionary Credit Line (PCL); Short-term Liquidity Line (SLL); Flexible Credit Line (FCL, 2009).
- Availability:
  - Any time: SBA, EFF, HAPA, PCL, FCL
  - Only in systemic events: SLL
- Qualification:
  - SBA, EFF, HAPA: No
  - PCL, SLL: Yes, Sound policies
  - FCL: Yes, Very strong policies
- Balance of Payments (BoP) need described per instrument (preserve original wording for each).
- Access:
  - SBA, EFF, HAPA: No hard cap (normal limits may be exceeded under exceptional access policy or generally discouraged for high access)
  - PCL: Cap of 1000 percent of quota, with 500 percent cap on approval
  - SLL: Cap to be decided by Board on activation of facility in systemic event based on size of shock and available resources
  - FCL: Uncapped; Exceptional access policy 1/ (Triggered when annual or cumulative access is above, respectively, 200 and 600 percents of quota.)
- Ex post conditionality:
  - SBA, EFF, HAPA, PCL: Yes (reviews and PCs; structural focus for EFF; streamlined for HAPA; focused for PCL)
  - SLL, FCL: No
- Phasing and monitoring:
  - SBA, EFF, HAPA: Phased. Quarterly or semiannual reviews depending on circumstances
  - PCL: Frontloaded. Up to 500 percent of quota available on approval. Up to additional 500 percent of quota available at start of second year or earlier based on ad hoc review. Semiannual reviews
  - SLL: Frontloaded. Total amount available on approval. No reviews
  - FCL: Frontloaded. Total amount available on approval. Mid-term review to assess qualification only in 2 year arrangements
- Arrangement length:
  - SBA: Normal length 12-18 months, but up to 3 years if needed. Successor arrangements allowed
  - EFF: 3 years. Can be extended to 4 years. Successor arrangements allowed
  - HAPA: 12 months to up to 3 years. Successor arrangements allowed
  - PCL: Between 1 to 2 years. Successor arrangements allowed
  - SLL: 6 months. Up to 1 successor arrangement allowed
  - FCL: One- or two-year arrangements. Successor arrangements allowed
- Repayment period:
  - SBA, HAPA, PCL, FCL: 3¼-5 years
  - EFF: 4½-10 years
  - SLL: 1¼-2 years
- Charges, fees: Charges and Fees are as for the SBA for all instruments

### Annex: Fund Resources and Financing Operations — Current and Prospective Resources
- Forward Commitment Capacity (FCC) status:
  - Total lending resources: SDR 356 billion (noted elsewhere as 355.85 in table)
  - Bilateral loan and note purchase agreements: 19 agreements totaling SDR 174 billion made effective by late June 2010
  - Record level of outstanding credit and undrawn commitments: SDR 125 billion
  - FCC at record high level: SDR 162 billion ($239 billion)
- Further resource increases:
  - Additional pending bilateral agreements would boost resources by SDR 26 billion
  - Activation of existing NAB: SDR 34 billion (until activated, not included in FCC)
  - Expanded NAB approved in April 2010 (of SDR 367 billion) in process of being made effective
  - Folding bilateral borrowing into NAB expected to yield net increase in supplementary resources of about SDR 168 billion
  - With ad hoc quota increases agreed in 2008, activation of expanded NAB would bring total Fund lending resources to SDR 567 billion ($837 billion), roughly doubling FCC to SDR 330 billion (about $480 billion) assuming current level of Fund credit and commitments

- Table I.1 selected figures (as of June 24, 2010):
  - A. Total Lending Resources: 355.85 SDR billion / 525.54 US$ billion / 428.6 Euro billion
  - Quota resources of FTP members: 179.72 SDR billion
  - Effective Loan and Note Purchase Agreements: 173.32 SDR billion
  - B. Credit outstanding and credit commitments: 125.31 SDR billion
  - E. Current FCC (A-B+C-D): 161.72 SDR billion / 238.81 US$ billion / 194.8 Euro billion
  - Activation of Existing NAB plus Pending Bilateral Borrowing scenario:
    - Total Lending Resources: 415.66 SDR billion / 613.95 US$ billion / 500.7 Euro billion
    - FCC with Current Commitments and Repurchases: 209.63 SDR billion / 309.62 US$ billion / 252.5 Euro billion
  - Full Activation of Expanded NAB plus 2008 Quota Increase scenario:
    - Total Lending Resources: 566.78 SDR billion / 837.06 US$ billion / 682.6 Euro billion
    - FCC with Current Commitments and Repurchases: 330.44 SDR billion / 488.03 US$ billion / 398.0 Euro billion
  - Exchange rate per SDR (Jun 24, 2010): 1.477141 US$ / 1.2046 Euro

- Review of quotas (14th General Review of Quotas):
  - Preliminary analysis suggested need for substantial quota increase; illustrative quota increases of 100 to 150 percent (starting from quotas agreed in 2008) would raise quotas of FTP members by approximately SDR 200 to 300 billion
  - If such increases agreed, Fund total financing capacity from quota resources would be about SDR 320 to 400 billion, increasing to SDR 610 to 690 billion if the expanded NAB were fully activated
  - These figures are upper limits; activation of NAB in systemic circumstances may exclude some members from FTP reducing available NAB credit

### Potential Impact of the Proposed Facilities Reforms on Demand for Fund Resources
- Enhanced FCL:
  - Expect broader use of the FCL and potentially higher average access
  - Shift to 12-month purchase rights could increase willingness of eligible members to request an FCL
  - Removal of implicit cap on access could raise access levels where potential needs exceed 1000 percent of quota
- Establishing the PCL:
  - Expect broader use relative to HAPAs; substitution from HAPA to PCL likely
  - PCL provides substantial front-loaded access and focused ex post conditionality
  - Additional members may find PCL attractive as qualification signals positively to markets
  - Net impact on access levels unclear:
    - (i) access may tend to rise toward the cap of 1000 percent of quota (exceeding average HAPA access to date of 300 percent of quota)
    - (ii) early access to a PCL may avoid need for higher access SBA later
- Introducing the GSM and SLL:
  - Expect a rise in demand for Fund resources in a systemic crisis
  - Qualification criteria for liquidity instruments under GSM would be same as for PCL or FCL
  - Unilateral nature of the offer and country coverage could bring forward requests for Fund resources
  - Lack of ex post conditionality under SLL may broaden range of members willing to consider Fund support despite shorter repurchase obligations
- Overall:
  - Preventative nature of proposed reforms would likely increase potential resource commitments early in a crisis while reducing need for commitments under traditional crisis management instruments
  - Reforms tend to increase frontloading of demand for Fund resources and increase advantages of quota resources relative to borrowing
  - May have implications for liquidity management by creditor members

### Tail Risk Scenarios, Impact on Resource Needs, and Scenario Estimates
- Advanced economies tail risk scenario:
  - Scenarios representing a systemic banking crisis with some countries experiencing difficulties funding government debt generated financing needs of about SDR 150 billion, or commitments of about SDR 290 billion assuming all affected countries received access of 1000 percent of quota
- Emerging markets tail risk scenarios (57 countries included):
  - Under "original assumptions" scenarios combining low rollovers, capital outflows, reduced inflows:
    - Among group likely to use crisis prevention facilities, positive financing needs (after drawing on reserve buffers) estimated in 18 countries (about three-quarters of this group)
  - Removing access cap on FCL:
    - If FCL-eligible countries have access equal to their estimated financing need if above 1000 percent of quota, or 1000 percent otherwise, total access would increase by about SDR 75 billion
    - If burden shared with bilateral/regional sources (limiting access to Fund to 2000 percent of quota at most), overall commitments would increase by about SDR 50 billion
- Crisis resolution commitments reduction with smaller outflows:
  - Group assumed to utilize crisis prevention instruments have overall financing needs of SDR 175 billion in original scenario (potential arrangements with 26 members; average access around 1200 percent of quota)
  - Reducing outflows by one-quarter reduces crisis resolution commitments by about SDR 40 billion
  - Reducing outflows by one-half reduces crisis resolution commitments by about SDR 75 billion
- Overall resource demand range for emerging markets in tail risk scenarios:
  - SDR 400 to 450 billion would cover most potential outcomes discussed, taking into account proposed reforms
  - Focus on lower end reasonable to reflect contributions from other sources of exceptional financing (excluding recent commitments to Greece, other sources estimated to have committed just over SDR 30 billion in current crisis)
- Capacity under doubling of quotas plus expanded NAB:
  - A doubling of quotas together with expanded NAB would generate overall financing capacity of SDR 610 billion, leaving scope for commitments to advanced economies, though downside risks to availability exist
- Interim period risk and trigger:
  - Immediate reforms could increase likelihood Fund needs to bolster resources temporarily
  - SDR 100 billion trigger for review of FCL/PCL comes into effect with additional FCL/PCL commitments (on top of upcoming FCL for Poland) of SDR 52.5 billion
  - Based on current credit commitments (including upcoming FCL for Poland), remaining FCC would be reduced to SDR 96 billion when trigger reached
  - Until expanded NAB effective, likely avenue to generate temporary supplementary resources: expand amounts under existing bilateral loan and note purchase agreements and add new agreements

### Implications for Composition of Fund Resources and Liquidity Management by Creditor Members
- Composition:
  - Proposed reforms expected to accelerate demand for commitments and increase share of quota resources relative to borrowing because quotas are more flexible
  - Demand for FCLs and PCLs could arise outside systemic crisis when conditions for NAB activation may not be met
- Liquidity management by creditor members:
  - Introduction and expansion of FCL required expansion of quarterly FTP: most recent FTP totaled SDR 50 billion (SDR 25 billion quota resources and SDR 25 billion borrowed resources) relative to SDR 10 billion in scheduled purchases
  - A larger volume of outstanding precautionary commitments would require further expansion of FTP; scale depends on potential for simultaneous drawings and regional concentration
  - Table I.3 scenario (FTP doubled to SDR 100 billion, assuming current effective bilateral loan and note purchase agreements and current 1:1 ratio of quotas to borrowing) shows FTP amounts relative to reserves and FX reserves for a broad set of creditor members (selected highlights):
    - Total present quota (FTP members): 179.7 SDR billion; Present borrowing commitments: 173.3 SDR billion; FX reserves (sum): 4,550.2 SDR billion
    - Examples of country figures (Transfers, Current FTP SDR 50 bn / Transfers in FTP of SDR 100 billion — shown in table columns):
      - China: Quota 8.1 SDR bn; Borrowing 32.0 SDR bn; FX reserves 1,611.8 SDR bn; Transfers Current FTP in percent of FX Reserves 0.4; Transfers in FTP of SDR 100 billion in percent of FX Reserves 0.7
      - Japan: Quota 13.3 SDR bn; Borrowing 65.9 SDR bn; FX reserves 652.7 SDR bn; Transfers Current FTP in percent of FX Reserves 1.8; Transfers in FTP of SDR 100 billion in percent of FX Reserves 3.5
      - United States: Quota 37.1 SDR bn; Borrowing 31.9 SDR bn; Transfers Current FTP in percent of FX Reserves 15.9; Transfers in FTP of SDR 100 billion in percent of FX Reserves 32.4
      - Euro area sub-total: Quota 49.6 SDR bn; Borrowing 37.8 SDR bn; FX reserves 97.6 SDR bn; Transfers Current FTP in percent of FX Reserves 11.7; Transfers in FTP of SDR 100 billion in percent of FX Reserves 25.3
    - Total FTP scenario assumptions:
      - Current FTP (May-July 2010) comprises SDR 25 bn in quota resources and SDR 25 bn in borrowed resources
      - Table I.3 based on 1:1 ratio of borrowed to quota resources
  - Implications:
    - Amounts under FTP become more significant relative to foreign exchange reserves for some members; some adjustment in foreign exchange liquidity management may be required by members that do not issue a reserve currency
    - Some members finance Fund operations through public debt issuance; management of domestic debt and liquidity may require adjustment to meet larger potential use of these resources
    - Potential for very large drawings raises issues for Fund’s financial relationship with members: may need larger temporary deviations in allocation of transfers in the FTP to rely more on members with greater flexibility in extreme events while still achieving balanced positions among creditors over time

*Source: _062910 - 47.      Directors may wish to consider the following issues for discussion*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2010/_062910.pdf_
