## 1. Illustrative Quota Simulations

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### Introduction
- IMFC pledged to complete the 14th Quota Review before January 2011 in line with Istanbul parameters.
- Ratification status as of early October: 89 members (out of 113 required) accounting for 81.2 percent of the total voting power (85 percent required) have completed necessary ratification procedures.
- Purpose of simulations: help form basis for agreement by building on discussions to date and balancing diverse views.

### Size of the Increase
- Simulations are based on a doubling of quotas (100 percent increase).
- Rationale:
  - A doubling would broadly restore the ratio of quotas to global output prevailing at the time of the 11th Review in 1998.
  - Subsequent developments (notably the euro area crisis and progress on Fund lending facilities) strengthened the case for a doubling.
- Views among Directors:
  - Most Directors supported a substantial overall quota increase; most indicated they could support a doubling of quotas.
  - Some Directors viewed doubling as an upper bound; others saw it as a minimum.
  - A few Directors, pointing to the expanded New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB), were not convinced about the need for a substantial increase beyond targeted realignment.
  - Many Directors noted the size of the NAB should be reconsidered in light of a quota increase to maintain balance between quota and borrowed resources.

### Realignment of Quota Shares — Proposed Distribution Elements
- Overall approach:
  - Implement IMFC Istanbul objectives: shift quota share to dynamic EMDCs and from over- to under-represented countries, while protecting poorest members.
  - No equiproportional increase is proposed.
- Core distribution elements (as in Simulations 1 and 4 of Table 1):
  - A selective increase amounting to 60 percent of the total.
  - An ad hoc increase amounting to the remaining 40 percent of the total.
    - Major part of ad hoc distributed to members whose post-second round quota share is less than their share in the compressed GDP blend variable.
  - Eligibility and protection rules:
    - All members under-represented based on the GDP blend variable would be eligible for an ad hoc increase (change from previous paper).
    - Three under-represented advanced countries (Australia, Greece, and Spain) under the GDP blend would receive part of the ad hoc allocation but could receive a smaller reduction in out-of-lineness (suggested: one third of the size) compared with eligible EMDCs.
    - Major advanced countries under-represented under the GDP blend participate in ad hoc increase but are capped at their post-selective or post-second round quota share, whichever is greater.
    - Part of the ad hoc increase is used to protect over-represented countries from becoming under-represented (applies to advanced countries and EMDCs).
    - Countries under-represented under the formula only would participate in the ad hoc increase to ensure their increased share following the selective increase is not diluted.
    - A portion of the increase is used to protect the individual post-second round quota shares of the poorest members using two alternative eligibility criteria:
      - PCDR criterion: countries with annual per capita income below the prevailing operational IDA cut-off, or below twice the cut-off for small countries (47 members eligible).
      - PRGT criterion: includes many additional members (larger set than PCDR).
    - No further increase in basic votes is included in simulations.

- Additional proposed elements for consideration:
  - Limit on maximum percentage increase for any individual country (cap).
    - Example: cap at 200 percent would affect 6 countries (China, Equatorial Guinea, Luxembourg, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates).
    - Cap at 220 percent would affect 3 countries (China, Luxembourg, and Turkey).
  - Small “haircut” in quota share for all advanced countries using a common percentage reduction factor.
    - Illustrative simulation includes a 1 percent reduction factor (see Simulations 3 and 6).

### Outcomes — Key Findings from Simulations
- All simulations achieve shifts significantly in excess of 5 percent both to dynamic EMDCs and from over- to under-represented countries (meets IMFC Istanbul goals).
- Changes in ranking and shares:
  - China moves from 6th to 3rd in ranking of largest quotas.
  - Four EMDCs appear among the 10 largest shareholders, double the current number.
- Net shifts and distributional effects:
  - Net shift to EMDCs in Simulation 1: 2.3 percent.
  - Limiting the maximum increase in individual quotas mainly redistributes increases among EMDCs and has only a marginal effect on the net shift.
  - Introducing a small 1 percent haircut for advanced countries increases the net shift to 2.8 percent.
  - Limiting protection to the 47 members eligible for PCDR (versus PRGT) frees up more of the increase for dynamic EMDCs and leads to a larger overall shift to this group and to under-represented countries as a whole by about 0.3 percent.
    - PCDR protection also avoids anomalies where PRGT protection could result in lower calculated shares for some non-PRGT countries relative to PRGT-eligible peers (example cited: South Africa vs. Nigeria).
- Combined outcome scenarios (Simulations 3 and 6 illustrative):
  - Overall quota shift to dynamic EMDCs: about 6.4–6.7 percent.
  - Number of members seeing an increase in quota share: 64–65 members.
    - Of these, 54–55 are EMDCs.
  - After taking account of protection for the poorest members:
    - 97 EMDCs would either receive an increase or maintain their quota share under PCDR protection.
    - 116 EMDCs would either receive an increase or maintain their quota share under PRGT protection.
  - Largest nominal increases:
    - 14–16 EMDCs would receive nominal quota increases greater than 150 percent.
    - 8 of the 10 countries with the largest quota increase would be EMDCs.
- Distributional implications:
  - The proposed mixture of selective (60 percent) and ad hoc (40 percent) increases, with protection for the poorest and caps/haircuts as described, is designed to deliver sizable quota increases for most members while achieving a realignment based on the current quota formula and the GDP blend approach.
  - The combination of elements can be seen as a potential compromise between emphasizing the quota formula and increasing economic-weight-based adjustments.

### Summary of impact on quota and voting shares (combined with 2008 reform)
- Two reforms together would lead to an increase in quota share of dynamic EMDCs of over 9 percent (Table 5).
- Net shift in quota and voting share to EMDCs as a group under PCDR protection:
  - Quota: 3.9 percent.
  - Voting share: 5.3 percent.
- Excluding EMDCs that are oil exporters, the net shifts to EMDCs from the two reforms combined would be:
  - 6.6–6.8 percent for quota share.
  - 7.8–8.0 percent for voting share.

### Questions posed to Directors (policy choices under consideration)
- Can Directors support a doubling of quotas under the 14th Review, recognizing rebalancing between quotas and NAB resources may be necessary under forthcoming NAB review?
- Would Directors support distributing the increase using:
  - A combination of selective increases for all members based on the quota formula and ad hoc increases for a sub-set using the compressed GDP blend as the primary distribution key?
  - Limited participation of under-represented advanced countries in ad hoc increases?
- Views on additional flexibility to facilitate shifts to dynamic EMDCs:
  - Limiting the maximum percentage quota increase for individual members.
  - A small haircut for all advanced countries.
- Views on alternative eligibility lists for protecting the quota shares of the poorest members (PCDR vs PRGT lists).

### Key design parameters and constraints used in simulations
- All simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas which is distributed on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion 0/60/40, respectively.
- Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
- GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.
- The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent (where stated).
- All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares (in relevant simulations).
- Basic votes are calculated using the agreed percentage of total votes, 5.502 percent of total votes (provided there are no fractional votes) as in the Proposed Amendment to Enhance Voice and Participation (not yet in effect).

### Aggregate quota-share outcomes (selected illustrative values across simulations)
- Advanced economies: 60.5; 58.2; 60.0; 58.2; 58.2; 57.6; 58.2; 58.2; 57.7
- Major advanced economies: 45.3; 42.9; 48.0; 43.8; 43.8; 43.3; 43.8; 43.8; 43.3
  - United States: 17.7; 17.0; 21.6; 17.7; 17.7; 17.5; 17.7; 17.7; 17.5
- Emerging Market and Developing Countries: 39.5; 41.8; 40.0; 41.8; 41.8; 42.4; 41.8; 41.8; 42.3
- Developing countries: 32.4; 34.1; 33.2; 34.6; 34.5; 35.1; 34.6; 34.5; 35.1
- Regions (examples):
  - Africa: 4.9; 3.1; 2.9; 4.5; 4.5; 4.5; 4.2; 4.2; 4.2
  - Asia (including Korea and Singapore): 12.6; 17.7; 17.3; 16.0; 16.0; 16.2; 16.2; 16.1; 16.3
  - Western Hemisphere: 7.7; 7.0; 8.0; 7.6; 7.7; 7.9; 7.6; 7.8; 8.0
- Memorandum items (selected):
  - EU 27: 31.9; 31.3; 27.8; 30.4; 30.4; 30.1; 30.4; 30.4; 30.1
  - LICs (PRGT-eligible): 4.3; 2.6; 2.4; 4.3; 4.3; 4.3; 4.0; 4.0; 4.0
  - Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.): 6.4; 6.3; 6.7; 6.7; 6.6; 6.9

### Aggregate voting-share outcomes (selected illustrative values across simulations)
- Advanced economies voting share: 57.9; 55.8; 55.8; 55.2; 55.8; 55.8; 55.2
- Major advanced economies voting share: 43.0; 41.6; 41.6; 41.2; 41.6; 41.6; 41.2
  - United States voting share: 16.7; 16.7; 16.7; 16.6; 16.7; 16.7; 16.6
- Emerging Market and Developing Countries voting share: 42.1; 44.2; 44.2; 44.8; 44.2; 44.2; 44.8
- Developing countries voting share: 34.5; 36.5; 36.5; 37.0; 36.5; 36.5; 37.0
- Memorandum items (selected):
  - EU 27 voting share: 30.9; 29.5; 29.5; 29.2; 29.5; 29.5; 29.3
  - LICs (PRGT-eligible) voting share: 6.1; 6.2; 6.2; 6.2; 5.8; 5.8; 5.8
  - Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.): 6.0; 6.0; 6.3; 6.3; 6.2; 6.6

### Illustrative quota-share outcomes for largest members (selected figures)
- United States quota share (various simulations): 17.67; 17.67; 17.67; 17.49; 17.67; 17.67; 17.49
- Japan / China (varies by simulation): Japan 6.56; Japan 6.56; Japan 6.56; Japan 6.49; China 6.68; Japan 6.56; Japan 6.49
- Germany / China (varies): Germany 6.11; China 6.53; China 6.39; China 6.39; Japan 6.56; China 6.39; China 6.39
- India quota shares across simulations: 2.44; 2.40; 2.70; 2.82; 2.70; 2.77; 2.88 (selected entries)

### Summary shifts in voting and quota shares (selected Table 5 values)
- Shift of voting shares (ppts) — examples:
  - to under-represented countries: 8.6; 6.3; 8.9; 6.6
  - to dynamic EMDCs: 9.1; 6.0; 9.4; 6.3
  - to EMDCs: 5.4; 2.7; 5.3; 2.7
  - to non-oil EMDCs: 7.8; 4.1; 8.0; 4.3
- Shift of quota shares (ppts) — examples:
  - to under-represented countries: 9.0; 6.7; 9.3; 6.9
  - to dynamic EMDCs: 9.3; 6.4; 9.6; 6.7
  - to EMDCs: 4.0; 2.8; 3.9; 2.8
  - to non-oil EMDCs: 6.6; 4.3; 6.8; 4.5
- Number of countries that increase quota share:
  - total: 57; 64; 58; 65
  - Advanced Countries: 10; 10; 10; 10
  - EMDCs: 47; 54; 48; 55
- Number of countries that increase or maintain quota share:
  - total: 57; 126; 58; 107
  - Advanced Countries: 10; 10; 10; 10
  - EMDCs: 47; 116; 48; 97
- Number of countries with nominal quota increases greater than 150%:
  - total: 40; 17; 42; 19
  - Advanced Countries: 6; 3; 6; 3
  - EMDCs: 34; 14; 36; 16
- Adjustment coefficient (reduction in deviations): 67.6; 58.1; 67.5; 57.9 (Simulation 3 (PRGT protection) and Simulation 6 (PCDR protection) comparisons)

### Largest increases and decreases in quota shares (selected winners and losers)
- Largest increases (examples across simulations):
  - China: 2.54; 2.40; 2.40; 2.69; 2.40; 2.40
  - Brazil: 0.43; 0.47; 0.61; 0.47; 0.55; 0.69
  - Turkey / Korea / Mexico / India in various simulations: 0.40; 0.37; 0.41; 0.45; 0.44 (selected entries)
- Largest decreases (examples across simulations):
  - Saudi Arabia: -1.06 (consistent across listed simulations)
  - France: -0.72; -0.72; -0.75; -0.72; -0.72; -0.75
  - Belgium: -0.57; -0.57; -0.58
  - Germany: -0.43; -0.49
  - Venezuela: -0.41

### Alternative eligibility criteria for protection of the poorest (two lists)
- PRGT list: includes 71 economy entries (selected start: Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of; Armenia; Bangladesh; Benin; Bhutan; ... through 71 Zambia).
- PCDR list: includes 47 economy entries (selected start: Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of; Bangladesh; Benin; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Central African Republic; Chad; Comoros; Congo, Democratic Republic of; ... through 47 Zambia).
- Notes:
  - See Eligibility to Use the Fund’s Facilities for Concessional Financing (January 11, 2010).
  - Zimbabwe has overdue obligations to the PRGT and is currently not PRGT eligible.
  - PCDR cutoffs based on income (Atlas method; IDA cutoff currently US$1,135 per year) and "small states" provision (below 200% of the IDA cutoff).

### Member-level illustrative outcomes (selected entries from Tables A1 and A2)
- United States quota shares (selected sims): 17.670; 16.987; 21.645; 17.670; 17.670; 17.493; 17.670; 17.670; 17.493
- Japan quota shares (selected sims): 6.556; 6.493; 7.282; 6.556; 6.556; 6.490; 6.556; 6.556; 6.490
- China quota shares (selected sims): 3.996; 7.917; 8.128; 6.533; 6.394; 6.394; 6.681; 6.394; 6.394
- India quota shares (selected sims): 2.442; 2.403; 3.027; 2.668; 2.700; 2.816; 2.701; 2.766; 2.882
- Voting share examples (selected sims):
  - United States voting shares: 16.727; 16.727; 16.727; 16.560; 16.727; 16.727; 16.560
  - China voting shares: 3.806; 6.203; 6.071; 6.071; 6.343; 6.071; 6.071
  - India voting shares: 2.337; 2.550; 2.581; 2.691; 2.582; 2.643; 2.753
  - Brazil voting shares: 1.714; 2.122; 2.160; 2.294; 2.161; 2.235; 2.370

### Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, Protection (supplemental simulations 7–12)
- Simulation 7 (baseline modification):
  - Adds Lesotho, Solomon Islands, and Zimbabwe to list qualifying for protection based on IDA per capita income threshold (US$1,135 in 2008 and small-country provision).
  - Rationale: Lesotho and Solomon Islands met respective cutoffs; Zimbabwe included for prudence despite current PRGT ineligibility due to arrears.
- Simulation 8: Full participation of advanced countries in the ad hoc increase (would make Australia, Greece, and Spain eligible for larger increases relative to Simulation 1).
- Simulation 9: Dual protection at the higher of calculated quota share or GDP blend share (would cover five countries: Canada, France, Argentina, Morocco, and South Africa).
- Simulation 10: Floor on maximum decline in quota share — a country's quota share cannot fall below 70 percent of its post second round quota share (benefits 35 countries, all EMDCs).
- Simulation 11: Combination of Simulations 8–10.
- Simulation 12: Simulation 11 plus voluntary foregoing by all advanced countries at 1.64 percent (would broadly cover protection cost using IDA cutoff but fall short for PRGT list; would leave US quota share unchanged from pre-Singapore level).
- Trade-offs:
  - Combinations can be calibrated to increase scope for EMDC gains (via cap at 220 percent and voluntary foregoing), protect poorest members (PCDR or PRGT lists), mitigate large declines for some EMDCs (70 percent floor), and adjust advanced-country participation (one third reduction factor vs full participation).

### Scenarios and simulation variants (labels used in tables)
- Variants include:
  - Full CQS protection; partial ad hoc participation for advanced countries; maximum individual increase.
  - Full ad hoc participation for advanced countries.
  - Dual (CQS and GDP blend share) protection.
  - Limit on maximum decrease (quota share floor at 70 percent of post second round).
  - Full ad hoc participation + dual protection + limit on maximum decrease.
  - Voluntary foregoing scenarios (e.g., voluntary 1.64 percent reduction by advanced countries).

### Summary of simulation outcomes and constraints
- Most simulations meet IMFC objective of at least 5 percent shift to dynamic EMDCs and from over- to under-represented countries; exception: Simulation 17 (combines all elements except voluntary foregoing and uses PRGT list for poorest protection).
- Shifts from over- to under-represented countries range: 5.6–6.6 percent.
- Shifts to dynamic EMDCs range: 4.9–6.1 percent.
- Net shifts to EMDCs as a group range: 1.8–2.8 percent.
- Cost/protection metrics (examples):
  - Aggregate cost of protection for poorest: about 0.91 percentage points (IDA cutoff) and 1.29 percentage points (PRGT list) of total quota share.
  - Voluntary foregoing could free up about 0.96 percentage points.
- Technical notes:
  - GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using 0.95.
  - Uniform proportional reduction factor reduces gaps between GDP blend and post-selective quota share.

### Chairman’s concluding remarks (Committee of the Whole on Review of Quotas Meeting 10/5 — October 6, 2010)
- Directors’ initial reactions were highly preliminary given limited time for consultation.
- Further reflection is needed from all sides; remaining time to reach an agreement within the agreed deadline is very short.
- Other elements of the broader Fund governance reform also need to be decided.
- Directors are urged to use the period over the Annual Meetings to consider options for reaching an agreement that can command broad support.
- Maintain the spirit of compromise, be realistic and pragmatic in expectations.
- Suggestion to revisit how best to take the process forward in light of forthcoming discussions.

*Source: IMF staff paper "1. Illustrative Quota Simulations" (Fourteenth General Review of Quotas); Finance Department. Prepared by the Finance Department; Approved by Andrew Tweedie; October 19, 2010.*

### 1. Illustrative Quota Simulations ......................................................................................

### 1. Illustrative Quota Simulations

### Introduction
- The IMFC pledged to complete the 14th Quota Review before January 2011 in line with the parameters agreed in Istanbul.
- Ratification status as of early October: 89 members (out of 113 required) accounting for 81.2 percent of the total voting power (85 percent required) have completed necessary ratification procedures.
- The simulations in this paper are intended to help form the basis for an agreement by building on discussions to date and balancing diverse views.

### Size of the Increase
- Simulations are based on a doubling of quotas.
- Rationale:
  - A doubling would broadly restore the ratio of quotas to global output prevailing at the time of the 11th Review in 1998.
  - Subsequent developments (notably the euro area crisis and progress on Fund lending facilities) strengthened the case for a doubling.
- Views among Directors:
  - Most Directors supported a substantial overall quota increase; most indicated they could support a doubling of quotas.
  - Some Directors viewed doubling as an upper bound; others saw it as a minimum.
  - A few Directors, pointing to the expanded New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB), were not convinced about the need for a substantial increase beyond targeted realignment.
  - Many Directors noted the size of the NAB should be reconsidered in light of a quota increase to maintain balance between quota and borrowed resources.

### Realignment of Quota Shares — Proposed Distribution Elements
- Overall approach:
  - Simulations seek to implement IMFC Istanbul objectives: shift quota share to dynamic EMDCs and from over- to under-represented countries, while protecting poorest members.
  - No equiproportional increase is proposed.
- Core distribution elements (as in Simulations 1 and 4 of Table 1):
  - A selective increase amounting to 60 percent of the total.
  - An ad hoc increase amounting to the remaining 40 percent of the total.
    - Major part of ad hoc distributed to members whose post-second round quota share is less than their share in the compressed GDP blend variable.
  - All members under-represented based on the GDP blend variable would be eligible for an ad hoc increase (change from previous paper).
    - Three under-represented advanced countries (Australia, Greece, and Spain) that are under-represented using the GDP blend would receive part of the ad hoc allocation but could receive a smaller reduction in out-of-lineness (suggested: one third of the size) compared with eligible EMDCs.
    - Major advanced countries that are under-represented under the GDP blend participate in ad hoc increase but are capped at their post-selective or post-second round quota share, whichever is greater.
  - Part of the ad hoc increase is used to protect over-represented countries from becoming under-represented (applies to advanced countries and EMDCs).
  - Countries under-represented under the formula only would participate in the ad hoc increase to ensure their increased share following the selective increase is not diluted.
  - A portion of the increase is used to protect the individual post-second round quota shares of the poorest members using two alternative eligibility criteria:
    - PCDR criterion: countries with annual per capita income below the prevailing operational IDA cut-off, or below twice the cut-off for small countries (47 members eligible).
    - PRGT criterion: includes many additional members, reflecting asymmetry of PRGT entry and graduation criteria (larger set than PCDR).
  - No further increase in basic votes is included in simulations.

- Additional proposed elements for consideration:
  - Limiting the size of the maximum percentage increase for any individual country (cap).
    - Example: cap set at 200 percent would affect 6 countries (China, Equatorial Guinea, Luxembourg, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates).
    - Alternatively, cap set at 220 percent would affect 3 countries (China, Luxembourg, and Turkey).
  - A small “haircut” in quota share for all advanced countries using a common percentage reduction factor.
    - Illustrative simulation includes a 1 percent reduction factor (see Simulations 3 and 6).

### Outcomes — Key Findings from Simulations
- All simulations achieve shifts significantly in excess of 5 percent both to dynamic EMDCs and from over- to under-represented countries (meets IMFC Istanbul goals).
- Changes in ranking and shares:
  - China moves from 6th to 3rd in ranking of largest quotas.
  - Four EMDCs appear among the 10 largest shareholders, double the current number.
- Net shifts and distributional effects:
  - Net shift to EMDCs in Simulation 1: 2.3 percent.
  - Limiting the maximum increase in individual quotas mainly redistributes increases among EMDCs and has only a marginal effect on the net shift.
  - Introducing a small 1 percent haircut for advanced countries increases the net shift to 2.8 percent.
  - Limiting protection to the 47 members eligible for PCDR (versus PRGT) frees up more of the increase for dynamic EMDCs and leads to a larger overall shift to this group and to under-represented countries as a whole by about 0.3 percent.
    - PCDR protection also avoids anomalies where PRGT protection could result in lower calculated shares for some non-PRGT countries relative to PRGT-eligible peers (example cited: South Africa vs. Nigeria).
- Combined outcome scenarios (Simulations 3 and 6 illustrative):
  - Overall quota shift to dynamic EMDCs: about 6.4–6.7 percent (more than double the shift to this group under the 2008 reform).
  - Number of members seeing an increase in quota share: 64–65 members.
    - Of these, 54–55 are EMDCs.
  - After taking account of protection for the poorest members:
    - 97 EMDCs would either receive an increase or maintain their quota share under PCDR protection.
    - 116 EMDCs would either receive an increase or maintain their quota share under PRGT protection.
  - In terms of largest nominal increases:
    - 14–16 EMDCs would receive nominal quota increases greater than 150 percent.
    - 8 of the 10 countries with the largest quota increase would be EMDCs.
- Distributional implications:
  - The proposed mixture of selective (60 percent) and ad hoc (40 percent) increases, with protection for the poorest and caps/haircuts as described, is designed to deliver sizable quota increases for most members while achieving a realignment based on the current quota formula and the GDP blend approach.
  - The combination of elements can be seen as a potential compromise between emphasizing the quota formula and increasing economic-weight-based adjustments.

*Source: IMF staff paper "1. Illustrative Quota Simulations" (Fourteenth General Review of Quotas) from the supplied content.*

### 17.      The elements discussed in this paper would also build upon the shifts achieved

### 17.      The elements discussed in this paper would also build upon the shifts achieved

### Summary of impact on quota and voting shares
- The elements discussed would build upon the shifts achieved under the 2008 reform.
- Taken together, the two reforms would lead to an increase in quota share of dynamic EMDCs of over 9 percent (Table 5).
- The net shift in quota and voting share to EMDCs as a group would be 3.9 and 5.3 percent, respectively, under PCDR protection.
- Excluding EMDCs that are oil exporters, whose quota shares generally decline, the net shifts to EMDCs from the two reforms combined would be:
  - 6.6–6.8 percent for quota share.
  - 7.8–8.0 percent for voting share.

### Context for discussion
- These quantitative shifts are presented as issues for further discussion in the following section: V.   ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION.

*Source: _100510b - 17.      The elements discussed in this paper would also build upon the shifts achieved*

### 18.      This paper seeks to lay out several elements that could help provide a basis for a

### 18.      This paper seeks to lay out several elements that could help provide a basis for a possible compromise on the 14th Review within the timetable laid out by the IMFC.

### Questions posed to Directors
- Can Directors support a doubling of quotas under the 14th Review, recognizing that some rebalancing between quotas and NAB resources may be necessary under the forthcoming NAB review?
- Would Directors support an approach to distributing the increase along the lines discussed in this paper?
  - Using a combination of selective increases for all members based on the quota formula and ad hoc increases for a sub-set of members using the compressed GDP blend variable as the primary distribution key?
  - Do they agree that under-represented advanced countries could participate in the latter to a limited degree?
- Views on additional elements of flexibility to facilitate shifts to dynamic EMDCs:
  - Limiting the maximum percentage quota increase for individual members.
  - A small haircut for all advanced countries.
- Views on alternative eligibility lists for protecting the quota shares of the poorest members.

### Key design parameters and constraints used in simulations
- All simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas which is distributed on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion 0/60/40, respectively.
- Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
- GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.
- The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent (where stated).
- All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares (in relevant simulations).
- Basic votes are calculated using the agreed percentage of total votes, 5.502 percent of total votes (provided there are no fractional votes) as in the Proposed Amendment to Enhance Voice and Participation (not yet in effect).

### Aggregate quota-share outcomes (Table 1 — illustrative values across simulations)
- Advanced economies: 60.5; 58.2; 60.0; 58.2; 58.2; 57.6; 58.2; 58.2; 57.7 (as presented across simulations columns)
- Major advanced economies: 45.3; 42.9; 48.0; 43.8; 43.8; 43.3; 43.8; 43.8; 43.3
  - Of which: United States: 17.7; 17.0; 21.6; 17.7; 17.7; 17.5; 17.7; 17.7; 17.5
- Emerging Market and Developing Countries: 39.5; 41.8; 40.0; 41.8; 41.8; 42.4; 41.8; 41.8; 42.3
- Developing countries: 32.4; 34.1; 33.2; 34.6; 34.5; 35.1; 34.6; 34.5; 35.1
- Region examples:
  - Africa: 4.9; 3.1; 2.9; 4.5; 4.5; 4.5; 4.2; 4.2; 4.2
  - Asia (including Korea and Singapore): 12.6; 17.7; 17.3; 16.0; 16.0; 16.2; 16.2; 16.1; 16.3
  - Western Hemisphere: 7.7; 7.0; 8.0; 7.6; 7.7; 7.9; 7.6; 7.8; 8.0
- Memorandum items (selected):
  - EU 27: 31.9; 31.3; 27.8; 30.4; 30.4; 30.1; 30.4; 30.4; 30.1
  - LICs (PRGT-eligible): 4.3; 2.6; 2.4; 4.3; 4.3; 4.3; 4.0; 4.0; 4.0
  - Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.): 6.4; 6.3; 6.7; 6.7; 6.6; 6.9
  - Uniform reduction factor 11/: 40.1; 45.5; 64.8; 45.6; 56.4; 75.8 (as shown across simulations)

### Aggregate voting-share outcomes (Table 2 — illustrative values across simulations)
- Advanced economies voting share: 57.9; 55.8; 55.8; 55.2; 55.8; 55.8; 55.2
- Major advanced economies voting share: 43.0; 41.6; 41.6; 41.2; 41.6; 41.6; 41.2
  - Of which: United States voting share: 16.7; 16.7; 16.7; 16.6; 16.7; 16.7; 16.6
- Emerging Market and Developing Countries voting share: 42.1; 44.2; 44.2; 44.8; 44.2; 44.2; 44.8
- Developing countries voting share: 34.5; 36.5; 36.5; 37.0; 36.5; 36.5; 37.0
- Memorandum items (selected):
  - EU 27 voting share: 30.9; 29.5; 29.5; 29.2; 29.5; 29.5; 29.3
  - LICs (PRGT-eligible) voting share: 6.1; 6.2; 6.2; 6.2; 5.8; 5.8; 5.8
  - Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.): 6.0; 6.0; 6.3; 6.3; 6.2; 6.6
  - Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.): 5.3; 5.2; 5.7; 5.6; 5.5; 5.9

### Illustrative quota-share outcomes for largest members (Table 3 — selected ranks and figures)
- Rank 1 United States quota share (various simulations): 17.67; 17.67; 17.67; 17.49; 17.67; 17.67; 17.49
- Rank 2 Japan / China (varies by simulation): Japan 6.56; Japan 6.56; Japan 6.56; Japan 6.49; China 6.68; Japan 6.56; Japan 6.49
- Rank 3 Germany / China: Germany 6.11; China 6.53; China 6.39; China 6.39; Japan 6.56; China 6.39; China 6.39
- Other illustrative entries (selected):
  - Saudi Arabia appears at rank 8 with 2.93 in Post Second Round in one column.
  - India appears in ranks with quota shares such as 2.44; 2.40; 2.70; 2.82; 2.70; 2.77; 2.88 across simulations.

### Summary shifts in voting and quota shares (Table 5 — comparisons and shifts)
- Shift of voting shares (ppts):
  - to under-represented countries: 8.6; 6.3; 8.9; 6.6 (corresponding to simulations 3 and 6)
  - to dynamic EMDCs: 9.1; 6.0; 9.4; 6.3
  - to EMDCs: 5.4; 2.7; 5.3; 2.7
  - to non-oil EMDCs: 7.8; 4.1; 8.0; 4.3
- Shift of quota shares (ppts):
  - to under-represented countries: 9.0; 6.7; 9.3; 6.9
  - to dynamic EMDCs: 9.3; 6.4; 9.6; 6.7
  - to EMDCs: 4.0; 2.8; 3.9; 2.8
  - to non-oil EMDCs: 6.6; 4.3; 6.8; 4.5
- Number of countries that increase quota share:
  - total: 57; 64; 58; 65
  - Advanced Countries: 10; 10; 10; 10
  - EMDCs: 47; 54; 48; 55
- Number of countries that increase or maintain quota share:
  - total: 57; 126; 58; 107
  - Advanced Countries: 10; 10; 10; 10
  - EMDCs: 47; 116; 48; 97
- Number of countries with nominal quota increases greater than 150%:
  - total: 40; 17; 42; 19
  - Advanced Countries: 6; 3; 6; 3
  - EMDCs: 34; 14; 36; 16
- Adjustment coefficient (measures reduction in deviations between actual and calculated quota shares):
  - 67.6; 58.1; 67.5; 57.9 (Simulation 3 (PRGT protection) and Simulation 6 (PCDR protection) comparisons)

### Largest increases and decreases in quota shares (Table 6 — illustrative winners and losers)
- Largest increases (top ranks across simulations):
  - China 2.54; China 2.40; China 2.40; China 2.69; China 2.40; China 2.40 (China consistently top)
  - Brazil 0.43; Brazil 0.47; Brazil 0.61; Brazil 0.47; Brazil 0.55; Brazil 0.69
  - Turkey 0.40; Korea 0.37; Korea 0.41; Turkey 0.42; Korea 0.39; Mexico 0.45
  - Korea 0.36; Turkey 0.37; Mexico 0.40; Korea 0.37; Turkey 0.37; India 0.44
- Largest decreases (top negative changes across simulations):
  - Saudi Arabia -1.06; -1.06; -1.06; -1.06; -1.06; -1.06 (consistent largest decrease)
  - France -0.72; -0.72; -0.75; -0.72; -0.72; -0.75
  - Belgium -0.57; -0.57; -0.58; -0.57; -0.57; -0.58
  - Germany -0.43; -0.43; -0.49; -0.43; -0.43; -0.49
  - Venezuela -0.41 across simulations

### Alternative eligibility criteria for protection of the poorest (Table 4 — two lists presented)
- PRGT list (selected entries, ordered as in table):
  - 1 Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of
  - 2 Armenia
  - 3 Bangladesh
  - 4 Benin
  - 5 Bhutan
  - 6 Bolivia
  - 7 Burkina Faso
  - 8 Burundi
  - 9 Cambodia
  - 10 Cameroon
  - ... (table continues through 71 Zambia)
- PCDR list (selected entries, ordered as in table):
  - 1 Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of
  - 2 Bangladesh
  - 3 Benin
  - 4 Burkina Faso
  - 5 Burundi
  - 6 Cambodia
  - 7 Central African Republic
  - 8 Chad
  - 9 Comoros
  - 10 Congo, Democratic Republic of
  - ... (table continues through 47 Zambia)
- Notes:
  - See Eligibility to Use the Fund’s Facilities for Concessional Financing (January 11, 2010).
  - Shaded countries in source are PCDR eligible countries (see Footnote 2).
  - Zimbabwe has overdue obligations to the PRGT and is currently not PRGT eligible.
  - PCDR cutoffs based on income (Atlas method; countries with income per capita below the IDA cutoff (currently US$1,135 per year) plus "small states" with income per-capita below 200% of the IDA cutoff).

### Member-level illustrative outcomes (Table A1 and Table A2 — selected member examples)
- Post Second Round and simulation quota shares (selected members, values taken directly):
  - United States quota shares: 17.670; 16.987; 21.645; 17.670; 17.670; 17.493; 17.670; 17.670; 17.493
  - Japan quota shares: 6.556; 6.493; 7.282; 6.556; 6.556; 6.490; 6.556; 6.556; 6.490
  - China quota shares: 3.996; 7.917; 8.128; 6.533; 6.394; 6.394; 6.681; 6.394; 6.394 (note includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR where indicated)
  - India quota shares (selected sims): 2.442; 2.403; 3.027; 2.668; 2.700; 2.816; 2.701; 2.766; 2.882
- Voting share examples (Table A2, selected values):
  - United States voting shares: 16.727; 16.727; 16.727; 16.560; 16.727; 16.727; 16.560
  - China voting shares: 3.806; 6.203; 6.071; 6.071; 6.343; 6.071; 6.071
  - India voting shares: 2.337; 2.550; 2.581; 2.691; 2.582; 2.643; 2.753
  - Brazil voting shares: 1.714; 2.122; 2.160; 2.294; 2.161; 2.235; 2.370

*Source: Finance Department. Prepared by the Finance Department; Approved by Andrew Tweedie; October 19, 2010.*

### 1.  Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, Protection

### 1.  Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, Protection of the Poorest Based on IDA Thresholds

### Introduction
- Purpose: present additional illustrative simulations to help garner wider support for the 14th Quota Review, building on Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Possible Elements of a Compromise (10/5/10).
- Context: Directors’ views at the Committee of the Whole meeting on October 6 were highly preliminary; simulations focus on suggested modifications that broadly maintain the approach in the October 5, 2010 paper.

### Basis and common design elements (starting point)
- Starting simulation: Simulation 5 from Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Possible Elements of a Compromise (10/5/10).
- Core features of the starting approach:
  - A doubling of quotas, with 60 percent distributed to all members on a selective basis using the quota formula, and 40 percent distributed on an ad hoc basis to a sub-set of members, primarily those under-represented using the compressed GDP blend variable.
  - Under-represented advanced countries that are also under-represented using the GDP blend variable were included in the ad hoc increase but received a smaller reduction in out-of-lineness (one third of the size) than eligible EMDCs.
  - Over-represented advanced countries that are under-represented under the GDP blend also participated in the ad hoc increase but were capped at their post-second round quota share.
  - Part of the ad hoc increase was allocated to protect:
    - (i) all countries that are under-represented using the formula but not under the GDP blend variable at their post selective quota share;
    - (ii) all over-represented countries from becoming under-represented; and
    - (iii) all PCDR-eligible members at their post-second round quota share.
  - A maximum of 220 percent was set on the largest individual quota increase. This maximum could be considered in the context of voluntary foregoing by eligible members.
- Technical method note: ad hoc increases are allocated on the basis of a uniform reduction factor so that each eligible member’s out-of-lineness—relative to their share in the compressed GDP blend variable—is reduced proportionately the same amount. Eligible advanced countries would receive one third of the uniform reduction factor applying to eligible EMDCs.

### Simulation 7 (baseline modification)
- Change relative to Simulation 5: inclusion of three additional countries in the list that could qualify for protection based on the IDA per capita income threshold:
  - Lesotho
  - Solomon Islands
  - Zimbabwe
- Rationale and eligibility notes:
  - PCDR-eligibility is limited to PRGT-eligible countries with annual per capita income below the prevailing operational IDA cut-off (US$1,135 in 2008) or below twice IDA’s cut-off for countries meeting the definition of a "small country" under the PRGT eligibility criteria.
  - Lesotho: 2008 per capita income was below the US$1,135 cut-off.
  - Solomon Islands: per capita income was below the higher cut-off applying to small countries.
  - Zimbabwe: not PRGT-eligible due to removal from the PRGT-eligibility list in connection with arrears, but estimated per capita income was below US$1,135 in 2008 and it lacked market access; likely to become PRGT-eligible once arrears are cleared and remedial measures lifted. Included in illustrative simulations for prudence and symmetry (also added to list receiving individual quota share protection using the longer PRGT-eligible list).

### Additional illustrative simulations (8–12)
- Simulation 8 — Full participation of advanced countries in the ad hoc increase:
  - Proposal: all eligible countries participate fully in the ad hoc increases if they are under-represented using both the formula and the GDP blend.
  - Effect: relative to Simulation 1, three advanced countries (Australia, Greece, and Spain) would be eligible for larger increases.

- Simulation 9 — Dual protection at the higher of calculated quota share or GDP blend share:
  - Proposal: protection for over-represented members provided at the higher of their share in the GDP blend or their calculated quota share (rather than solely the latter), to be consistent with giving greater weight to the GDP blend in ad hoc increases.
  - Effect: relative to Simulation 1, five countries would be covered by the double backstop, including two advanced countries (Canada and France) and three EMDCs (Argentina, Morocco, and South Africa).

- Simulation 10 — Floor on the maximum decline in quota share:
  - Proposal: introduce a floor of 30 percent on the maximum decline in an individual country’s quota share relative to its post second round quota share.
  - Effect: the protection would benefit 35 countries, all EMDCs.
  - Additional note: when protection for the poorest is applied to all PRGT-eligible countries (Simulations 13–18 referenced), 23 countries would benefit from the floor (again, all EMDCs).

- Simulation 11 — Combination of Simulations 8–10:
  - Proposal: combine full participation of eligible advanced countries in the ad hoc increase, protection at the higher of calculated quota or GDP blend share, and the 30 percent floor on maximum decline in quota share.

- Simulation 12 — Combination with voluntary foregoing by advanced countries:
  - Base: Simulation 11.
  - Voluntary foregoing: slightly higher level of voluntary foregoing by all advanced countries at 1.64 percent.
  - Purpose and effects:
    - Would broadly cover the cost of protection for the poorest based on the IDA income cutoff (would fall short of the cost of protection using the PRGT list).
    - Would leave the US quota share unchanged from its pre-Singapore level.
  - Context: earlier illustrative simulation in the October 5 paper presented a 1 percent haircut in the quota shares of all advanced countries; views were mixed and any foregoing is to be voluntary.

### Combinations and policy considerations
- Different combinations of the above elements can be considered to balance objectives:
  - Increase scope for sizable increases for EMDCs (via maximum individual quota increase cap of 220 percent and voluntary foregoing).
  - Provide targeted protection for poorest members using IDA thresholds (US$1,135 in 2008) or the longer PRGT list.
  - Mitigate large declines in quota shares for over-represented EMDCs through a 30 percent floor.
  - Adjust participation rules for advanced countries in ad hoc increases (one third reduction factor vs full participation).
- Trade-offs highlighted:
  - Protection mechanics (post-selective quota share vs higher of GDP blend or calculated quota share) affect which countries receive backstops (e.g., five countries under dual protection in Simulation 9).
  - Level of voluntary foregoing by advanced countries (e.g., 1.64 percent in Simulation 12) can be calibrated to cover protection costs under certain eligibility criteria.

*Source: IMF—Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, Protection of the Poorest Based on IDA Thresholds (supplement to Fourteenth General Review of Quotas).*

### 7.      The results of the above simulations are summarized in Table 1.

### _100510b - 7.      The results of the above simulations are summarized in Table 1.

### Summary of simulation outcomes
- All these simulations meet the IMFC objectives of a shift of at least 5 percent in quota shares to dynamic EMDCs and from over- to under-represented countries, except for Simulation 17 (which combines all the above elements except voluntary foregoing by advanced countries, with use of the PRGT-eligible list for protection of the poorest).
- The shifts from over- to under-represented countries range from 5.6–6.6 percent.
- The shifts to dynamic EMDCs range from 4.9–6.1 percent.
- The net shifts to EMDCs as a group range from 1.8–2.8 percent.

### Selected aggregate metrics and memorandum items (from Tables 1 and 2)
- Advanced economies: 60.5 58.2 60.0 58.2 58.5 58.5 58.2 58.6 57.7 (values shown across simulations)
- Major advanced economies: 45.3 42.9 48.0 43.8 43.8 44.1 43.8 44.1 43.4 (values shown across simulations)
- Emerging Market and Developing Countries: 39.5 41.8 40.0 41.8 41.5 41.5 41.8 41.4 42.3 (values shown across simulations)
- Developing countries: 32.4 34.1 33.2 34.6 34.3 34.3 34.6 34.2 35.1 (values shown across simulations)
- Africa: 4.9 3.1 2.9 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.4 4.4 (values shown across simulations)
- Asia 9/: 12.6 17.7 17.3 16.0 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.7 16.1 (values shown across simulations)
- Transition economies: 7.1 7.7 6.8 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 (values shown across simulations)
- Total: 100.0 across all simulations
- EU 27 (memorandum): 31.9 31.3 27.8 30.4 30.6 30.6 30.3 30.7 30.3 (values shown across simulations)
- LICs (PRGT-eligible) 10/: 4.4 2.6 2.4 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 (Table 1) and 4.4 2.6 2.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 (Table 2)
- LICs (IDA threshold) 1/: 3.2 1.8 1.7 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 (values shown)
- Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.): 6.5 6.6 6.2 6.2 5.9 6.5 (Table 1) and 6.3 6.3 5.9 6.0 5.6 6.2 (Table 2)
- Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.): 5.7 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.0 5.8 (Table 1) and 5.5 5.3 5.2 5.2 4.7 5.6 (Table 2)
- Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 11/: 6.0 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.1 6.1 (Table 1) and 5.7 5.5 5.4 5.4 4.9 5.8 (Table 2)
- EMDCs (shift in p.p.): 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.3 1.8 2.8 (Table 1) and 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.3 1.9 2.8 (Table 2)
- Uniform reduction factor 12/: 54.1 45.4 42.3 42.3 29.6 55.8 (Table 1) and 43.5 36.5 33.2 33.5 24.9 46.0 (Table 2)

### Cost, foregoing, and protection details (footnote information preserved)
- Under one simulation, the aggregate ―cost‖ of protection for the poorest countries is about 0.91 percentage points in terms of total quota share (1.29 percentage points for the PRGT list).
- The voluntary foregoing would free up about 0.96 percentage points.
- Footnote clarifications (selected):
  - 1/ Eligibility is limited to PRGT-eligible countries with annual per capita income below the prevailing operational IDA cut-off (US$1,135 in 2008) or below twice IDA's cut-off for countries meeting the definition of a "small country" under the PRGT eligibility criteria. Zimbabwe is included (see text for details).
  - 2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.
  - 3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.
  - 4/ Equivalent to simulation 5 in Table 1 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Possible Elements of a Compromise (10/5/10) except for the addition of Lesotho, Solomon Islands, and Zimbabwe to the list of the poorest members (see text for details).
  - 5/ Eligible advanced countries that are under-represented under both the formula and the GDP blend receive the same reduction in out-of-lineness as EMDCs.
  - 6/ Countries that are over-represented with respect to the formula or the GDP blend share that would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are protected at their calculated quota share or their GDP blend share, whichever is greater.
  - 7/ A country's quota share cannot fall below 70 percent of its post second round quota share.
  - 8/ All advanced countries are assumed to accept a voluntary 1.64 percent reduction in their final quota shares.
  - 9/ Including Korea and Singapore.
  - 10/ PRGT-eligible countries with annual per capita income below the prevailing operational IDA cut-off (US$1,135 in 2008) or below twice IDA's cut-off for countries meeting the definition of a "small country" under the PRGT eligibility criteria. Zimbabwe is included (see text for details).
  - 11/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.
  - 12/ Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between GDP blend (see footnote 3) and post-selective quota share.

### Member-level highlights (selected entries from Tables A1 and A2)
- United States: 17.7 16.9 21.6 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.4 (values shown across simulations)
- China 9/: 3.99 6.7 7.9 8.12 6.39 4.6 3.50 6.357 6.130 6.394 (values appear across different table columns and rows; China entry is denoted with footnote 9/)
- Japan: 6.55 6.49 6 7.28 6.55 6.55 6.55 6.55 6.44 (values shown across simulations)
- Germany: 6.11 6.10 5.67 8 5.20 5.67 5.67 5.67 5.67 5.58 (values shown across simulations)
- India: 2.44 2.40 2.40 3.02 2.75 2.70 2.68 2.68 2.60 2.76 (values shown across simulations)
- Russia: 2.49 2.94 2.74 2.70 2.69 2.69 2.69 2.68 2.70 (values shown across simulations)
- Brazil: 1.78 2.15 2.65 2.31 2.25 2.23 2.23 2.13 2.33 (values shown across simulations)
- Many other member-level quota share values are reported across Tables A1 and A2 for Simulations 7–18 (individual country rows list values for Post Second Round Quota Share, Calculated Quota Share, GDP Blend Share, and simulation variants such as full CQS protection; dual protection; limits on maximum decreases; and voluntary foregoing scenarios).

### Scenarios and simulation variants (as labeled in tables)
- Simulation variants include:
  - Full CQS protection; partial ad hoc participation for advanced countries; maximum individual increase.
  - Simulation with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries.
  - Simulation with dual (CQS and GDP blend share) protection.
  - Simulation with a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share (a country's quota share cannot fall below 70 percent of its post second round quota share).
  - Simulation with full ad hoc participation, dual protection, and a limit on the maximum decrease.
  - Simulation with foregoing based on a common percentage reduction for advanced countries (assumed voluntary 1.64 percent reduction).

### Chairman’s concluding remarks (Committee of the Whole on Review of Quotas Meeting 10/5 — October 6, 2010)
- Directors’ initial reactions were highly preliminary given limited time for consultation.
- Further reflection is needed from all sides; remaining time to reach an agreement within the agreed deadline is very short.
- Other elements of the broader Fund governance reform also need to be decided.
- Directors are urged to use the period over the Annual Meetings to consider options for reaching an agreement that can command broad support.
- Maintain the spirit of compromise, be realistic and pragmatic in expectations.
- Suggestion to revisit how best to take the process forward in light of forthcoming discussions.

*Source: Finance Department. October 7, 2010. The Chairman’s Concluding Remarks — Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Possible Elements of a Compromise — Committee of the Whole on Review of Quotas Meeting 10/5 (October 6, 2010).*

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