## _122810a

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### Canada — Overview, trends, reforms, and lessons
- Health care system:
  - Public contract model — publicly financed with private provision (Medicare); decentralized to the provinces; gatekeeping by primary care physicians; universal coverage.
- 2008 indicators and comparisons:
  - Total health spending to GDP: 10.4 percent (Canada) vs. OECD advanced economies average of 9.3.
  - Public health spending: 7.3 percent of GDP (Canada) vs. OECD average of 6.9.
  - Private spending: made up 30 percent of total health expenditure in 2008; roughly doubled since 1980.
  - Public health spending per capita (US$): 1,387.
  - Formal health care coverage (share of population): 100.0.
  - Life expectancy (years at birth): 79.0.
  - Physicians (per 1,000 population): 3.1.
  - Hospital beds (per 1,000 population): 5.6.
- Spending trends:
  - 1970–1992: public health spending rose to 6.9 percent of GDP from 4.8 percent; real per capita public health care expenditure increased at an average annual rate of 3–4 percent.
  - 1992–1999: public health expenditure to GDP declined to 6.2 by 1999; between 1993 and 1998 real growth rate of per capita public health spending averaged -1.2 percent.
  - 2000s: public health expenditure increased by 3.5 percent per year.
  - Recession dynamics: public health expenditure increased as a share of GDP during recessions and often followed by cost containment.
  - Specific figures: per capita public spending US$1,299 in 1996 vs. US$1,516 in 1991; public in-patient expenditure US$743 in 1991 to US$563 in 1995; growth rate per capita declined from 15.7 percent in 1975 to 1.2 percent in 1977.
- Cost-containment instruments:
  - Budget caps, supply constraints, and price controls; federal-provincial fiscal program (1977) with prospective per capita “escalator” transfers; per capita transfers frozen in early 1990s and resumed late 1990s below GDP growth.
  - 1992 measures: hospital and physician budgets capped; physician funding mostly fee-for-service with controlled fee-for-service rates; medical school enrolment limited starting in 1991.
  - Pharmaceutical policies: province-specific; reimbursement price freezes since 1994 in Ontario and Québec; British Columbia used internal/therapeutic price referencing.
- Impact and durability:
  - After 1977 reform: average excess cost growth in five years following reform was 2.9 percent vs. 0.6 percent in five preceding years — short-lived containment.
  - 1990s consolidation: annual excess cost growth averaged -2.3 over the rest of the 1990s; reductions in hospital spending and capacity; potential increases in waiting times for breast cancer treatment noted.
  - Structural change: share of public spending in total health spending declined from 74 percent in 1990 to 70 percent in 2008.
- Lessons and policy implications:
  - Budget caps and supply constraints can limit spending increases.
  - Single-payer system can facilitate cost-cutting and reduce administrative costs.
  - Canada attains strong health indicators with lower inputs (e.g., fewer hospital beds per thousand).
  - Private insurance allowed only for services not covered publicly; expanding private insurance could reduce waiting lists but would likely increase total health spending.

### Finland — Historical trends, 1990s reforms, impacts, and lessons
- Historical spending and indicators:
  - Public health care spending rose from 3.2 percent of GDP in 1965 to 6.3 percent in 1990 and to 7.2 percent by 1992 during recession.
  - Central government fiscal balance shifted from surpluses pre-1991 to a deficit of over 10 percent of GDP by 1994.
  - Public health expenditure to GDP dropped to 5.1 percent in 2000; public health spending per capita (US$): 3,179 in 2008.
  - Selected OECD figures in table context preserved as reported.
- 1990s cost-containment package:
  - Macro- and micro-level measures: supply constraints, budget caps, price controls, public management and coordination reforms.
  - Management reforms: municipal hospitals brought under 21 health care districts; Hospital Act (1990); Specialized Medical Care Act (1991).
  - Payment and pricing: DRG pricing adopted by some districts in 1997 and broadly by 2000; DRGs cap reimbursement to specified prices.
  - Decentralization: central subsidies to local governments reduced; municipalities became main purchasers; subsidies prospectively calculated by weighted capitation; out-of-pocket payments increased.
  - Pharmaceuticals: fixed drug deductibles increased in 1990, 1992, 1994; pharmacists allowed generic substitution in 1993; late-1990s focus on price controls.
- Impacts:
  - Per capita public spending: US$1,752 in 1990 → US$1,203 in 2000 → US$3,179 in 2008.
  - In-patient per capita expenditure decreased from US$743 to US$563 in 1991–95; rose to US$792 by 2008.
  - Hospital beds per 1,000: 8.3 in 1990 → 6.5 in 2008.
  - Average excess cost growth: five years after 1993 subsidy reforms was -3.3 vs. 4.4 in five preceding years; DRG introduction (1997–2000) associated with average excess cost growth of -2.9.
  - Pharmaceutical public expenditure grew (5.5 percent to 8.4 percent of health expenditure during 1991–95; 10 percent by 2000).
- Lessons and unintended consequences:
  - Cost control more effective when macro-level reforms are combined with micro-efficiency measures.
  - Decentralization produced regional inequalities (difference in municipal expenditure levels €1,000 per capita in 2005), differing waiting times, small municipalities lacked economies of scale, and two-tier financing encouraged cost shifting between in-patient and out-patient drug coverage.

### Italy — System, 1990s consolidation, instruments, and outcomes
- System overview:
  - Universal coverage; public integrated model financed through payroll and general taxation; strong regional decentralization since 1992; state sets “essential levels of care” uniformly provided by regions; ASLs deliver care via capitated budgets.
- 2008 financing:
  - Public expenditure on health services: 7.0 percent of GDP vs. OECD advanced economies average 6.9.
  - Private sector role: just over 2 percent of GDP.
- 1990s fiscal consolidation and spending trends:
  - General government primary balance swung to a surplus exceeding 4 percent of GDP between 1992 and 1995.
  - Public spending on health declined from 6.3 percent in 1991 to 5.5 percent in 1999.
  - Real per capita growth of public spending declined by 4.6 percent on average over 1993–95.
  - Total expenditure on health declined by 7.2 percent (early 1990s period); excess cost growth of public health spending: 3.7 percent during 1992–96.
- Cost-containment instruments:
  - Salary controls for doctors (salaried NHS doctors; GPs/pediatricians on capitation); postponement of contract renewals; bonuses and overtime cuts — salary growth curbed to less than 8 percent over 1991–95.
  - Pharmaceutical policies: 1994 positive list re-defined and fixed charges for prescriptions; 1994 pharmaceutical budget ceiling set 2.4 percent lower than 1993 nominally; 1995 generalized price cut; 1996 reference pricing; delisting of over 400 drugs in mid-1990s.
  - Public management/quasi-market: 1992 administrative/financial independence for ASLs and hospitals; quasi-markets introduced but separation of purchasing/provision uneven.
  - Hospitals: DRGs introduced 1994, operational in 1996; 1996 national bed-closure program; capital expenditure cut in 1995 to 0.3 percent of current expenditure.
- Impacts and reversals:
  - Delisting increased private spending on drugs: private share of total drug spending rose from 20 percent in 1990 to over 35 percent in 1995.
  - 2001 abolition of drug copayments and reduced prescribing restrictions reversed earlier reductions; subsequent measures included price cuts, reference prices, prescribing restrictions, and spending ceilings.
  - Salary restraint postponed contracts and deferred compensation obligations; control of variable pay may have weakened incentives and shifted services to private sector.
- Lessons:
  - Price controls and cost-sharing effective short-term but durability is limited.
  - Salary restraint can reduce costs but may reduce output and shift services private.
  - Shared commitment that central government would not bail out regional deficits was critical to containment; expectation of EMU accession coincided with renewed spending growth.

### Sweden and United Kingdom — Summary of reforms, impacts, and lessons
- Sweden (1980s–early 1990s):
  - Public spending peaked in 1980s; reforms emphasized budget caps, decentralization, payment-system changes, price controls, and market mechanisms.
  - Key outcomes: average excess cost growth in five years after 1982 reforms was -2.4 vs. 3.5 preceding; hospital beds fell >40 percent between 1993 and 2003; staff per 1,000 fell from 46.7 in 1992 to 31.9 in 2002.
  - Lessons: budget caps and strengthened accountability under decentralization effective; some adverse supply-side consequences; market mechanisms later introduced to improve efficiency.
- United Kingdom (late 1970s–1980s):
  - Public-integrated NHS; reforms included cash limits, managerial reforms (Griffiths), internal market and purchaser-provider split (1989), and pharmaceutical profitability regulation.
  - Outcomes: excess cost growth after cash limits 1.2 percent in five years vs. four times higher before; after Griffiths reforms excess cost growth -1.3 percent vs. 1.1 before.
  - Lessons: cash limits can temporarily reduce growth but are renegotiable; managerial reforms associated with more durable control; internal market had criticisms (transaction costs, equity concerns).

### NHS waiting times and enforcement (UK)
- Long waiting times for elective inpatient care persistent since 1948 and worsened during containment periods.
- Since 2001 there has been effort to reduce long waiting times via strictly enforced waiting–time targets for individual hospital trusts.

### United States — System, 1990s managed care, and outcomes
- System features:
  - Mainly private insurance and provider system; Medicare and Medicaid each cover about 15 percent of population.
- 2008 spending:
  - Total health spending to GDP: 16 percent vs. OECD average 9.3.
  - Public health spending: 7.4 percent of GDP vs. OECD average 6.9.
- 1990s reforms and impacts:
  - Managed care expansion in 1990s, introduction of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale (1992) for physician fees; Medicare+Choice and State Children’s Health Insurance Program introduced.
  - Managed care associated with reduced cost growth; excess cost growth dropped by -0.7 percent over second half of 1990s.
  - Lessons: managed care/gatekeeping and negotiated prices slowed spending growth in the 1990s; backlash and regulatory responses later reduced tight managed care controls.

### Estonia — Transition reforms, performance, and lessons
- System and financing:
  - Compulsory social health insurance introduced in 1992 with 13 percent payroll tax (employer-paid); reorganized to single independent public agency in 2001 legally obliged to balance yearly revenues and expenditures.
- Reforms:
  - Primary care: family medicine specialty, list system, partial gatekeeping, mixed payment (age-adjusted capitation, fee-for-service, allowances, quality bonus).
  - Hospital sector: acute-care bed reduction by two-thirds; hospitals incorporated under private law; DRG-based payments introduced in 2004.
  - Patient cost-sharing: 1993 prescription reimbursement with cost-sharing; flat co-payments for select services.
- Outcomes and challenges:
  - Life expectancy 73.9 years in 2008 (5.6 years below OECD average 79.8).
  - Public health spending per capita rose from US$398 in 2000 to US$836 in 2008.
  - Main challenges: workforce shortages and retention, rapid real per capita spending growth (average 8.8 percent per year between 2000 and 2008), demographic and lifestyle health risks.
- Lessons:
  - Dedicated payroll tax and phased reforms aided transition.
  - Single health insurance fund enabled risk pooling, redistribution, lower administrative costs, and global budget discipline.

### Hungary — System, reforms, challenges, and policy implications
- System:
  - Compulsory social insurance financing most spending (71 percent in 2008 by contributions); municipalities manage primary care; national government owns hospitals.
  - 2008 life expectancy: 73.8 years; infant mortality: 5.6 per 1,000.
- Reforms:
  - Family physician system in early 1990s with capitation payments and referral requirement; DRGs for inpatient care in 1993.
  - Copayments introduced for pharmaceuticals and chronic care; 2006/07 copayments and hospital daily fee reduced demand but were repealed by referendum in 2008.
- Challenges:
  - Rising pressure on public spending; poor population health status; high lifestyle risks (alcohol, tobacco, obesity); uneven workforce distribution; inefficient use of hospital-based care.
  - 2007 per capita physician-patient contacts 10.8 (~50 percent higher than OECD average).
- Policy implications:
  - Need long-term strategy, provider payment and incentive reform, better incentives for primary care, monitoring of global budgets, and flexibility in budget distribution; difficulty of rolling back generous benefit packages highlighted by referendum reversal.

### China — Coverage expansion, payment distortions, challenges, and implications
- System evolution:
  - Moving toward social health insurance via stepwise expansion: 1998 formal sector scheme; 2003 rural cooperative scheme and medical assistance; 2007 urban resident scheme.
- Payment and provider incentives:
  - Fee-for-service common; prices historically set below cost for basic services and above cost for drugs/high-tech tests encouraging provider shifts to high-margin services.
  - Payment pilots with global budgets, capitation, and DRGs show lower expenditures vs. FFS in pilots; broader effects on quality and selection unclear.
- Key indicators and gaps:
  - Life expectancy 74.0 years in 2008; infant mortality 18 per 1,000.
  - 2007 total health spending ~4½ percent of GDP (less than half public); out-of-pocket >50 percent of spending.
- Challenges:
  - High out-of-pocket spending, wide urban–rural and regional inequalities, inefficient resource use (bed occupancy 60 percent vs. ~80 percent OECD), overuse of high-tech and drugs, underprovision of primary/preventive care, rapid aging (share aged 60+ projected to reach 30 percent by 2050).
- Lessons:
  - Economic growth alone insufficient to deliver health progress.
  - Incremental coverage expansion workable; expanding depth and breadth requires more resources.
  - Need to re-emphasize preventive public health spending and scale up payment reforms beyond pilots.

### Thailand — Universal coverage reform, financing, outcomes, challenges, and lessons
- Universal coverage (since 2001):
  - Tax-financed policy; by 2007 estimated 98 percent coverage; standard package includes curative, promotion, and prevention.
- Insurance schemes:
  - UCS covers 3/4 of population; CSMBS ~8 percent; SSS ~11 percent; private insurance ~2 percent.
  - SSS financed by compulsory 1.5 percent payroll contributions by employers, employees and government each.
- 2007 spending and indicators:
  - Total health spending: 3.7 percent of GDP; public health spending: 2.7 percent of GDP (increase of 1.1 percent since 1995).
  - Out-of-pocket: fell from 43 percent in 1995 to 19 percent in 2007.
  - Public health spending per capita (US$): 209 (table context preserved).
  - Life expectancy: 70 years in 2008; infant mortality: 13 per 1,000 in 2008.
- UCS design and evolution:
  - Gatekeeper primary care units, capitation grant initially 1,202 baht → 1,899 baht in 2007; 30 baht copayment abolished in 2006.
  - ARVs included in 2003; renal replacement therapy in 2008.
  - Capitation grants increased since 2006; supply constraints and cost-containment keep utilization low for high-cost services.
- Challenges:
  - Supply constraints: utilization rose ~20 percent between 2002–2007 straining primary care workforce.
  - Initial capitation grants too low, causing financial stress in some provinces; salaries excluded from capitation in 2003.
  - Quality pressures under tight budgets; rising costs from aging and income growth may require reintroduction of copayments.
- Lessons:
  - Political consensus and public engagement key to enact reforms.
  - Ensure adequate supply before rapid coverage expansion.
  - Careful calibration of financing and resource transfers necessary to maintain quality and retain health workers.

### Institutions, universal coverage rationale, and Mexico case study (paras. 163–178)
- Institutional principles:
  - Credible, independent institutions are critical due to market imperfections in health care.
  - Public mandatory insurance is critical to ensure near-universal coverage, include low-income/high-risk individuals, reduce adverse selection, and pool risk to contain public costs.
- Mexico — structure and performance:
  - Segmented social health insurance system with multiple institutions operating providers; federal MoH finances and controls some third-level providers; delivery decentralized to State Health Services.
  - 2008 life expectancy: 75.1 years; public health spending: 2.7 percent of GDP (well below OECD average 6.8).
  - Out-of-pocket ≈ half of total health spending; doctor supply ~2.0 per 1,000 (below OECD 3.2).
- SPSS (Seguro Popular) reforms (2003/2004):
  - Objectives: universal access via social insurance with per-family contributions on sliding scale and waivers; define essential package financed at state level; more equitable federal resource distribution via per-enrolled family fee + solidarity supplement; increase provider competition via accreditation; protect public health interventions via separate fund; finance catastrophic interventions via national fund.
- Challenges for Mexico:
  - Fragmentation, inefficiency, and inequality due to vertically integrated providers and weak regulation.
  - Voluntary enrollment risks adverse selection; capacity constraints from doctor shortages; additional public funding required for universal coverage and chronic disease care.
  - Integration and separation of financing and provision recommended to foster competition; provider payment reform and workforce mix adjustments (more nurses vs. doctors) advised.
- Policy implications:
  - Break institutional barriers to enable contracting and purchasing flexibility; consider moving toward unified public health insurance given package and quality differences across insurers.
  - Reform provider payment from capped budgets/salaries toward incentives for productivity and efficiency.

*Italic: Source — IMF staff country case studies and chapter excerpts from PDF content unit _122810a.*

### 1. Canada: Key Health Indicators .......................................................................................

### 1. Canada: Key Health Indicators

### Overview of the health care system
- Health care system: public contract model — publicly financed with private provision (Medicare).
- Decentralization: system decentralized to the provinces; gatekeeping by primary care physicians is a central element.
- Coverage: universal coverage.
- 2008 totals and comparisons:
  - Total health spending to GDP: 10.4 percent (Canada) vs. OECD advanced economies average of 9.3.
  - Public health spending: 7.3 percent of GDP (Canada) vs. OECD average of 6.9.
  - Private spending (percent of GDP): roughly doubled since 1980 and made up 30 percent of total health expenditure in 2008.
- Other indicators (as reported):
  - Public health spending per capita (US$): 1,387 (Canada entry in table context).
  - Formal health care coverage (share of population): 100.0.
  - Life expectancy (years at birth): 79.0 (Canada entry in table context).
  - Physicians (per 1,000 population): 3.1 (table entry).
  - Hospital beds (per 1,000 population): 5.6 (table entry).

### Spending trends (late 1970s and 1990s episodes)
- Long-term trend:
  - Between 1970 and 1992 public health expenditure increased despite brief stabilization in the late 1970s.
  - Real per capita public health care expenditure increased at an average annual rate of 3–4 percent over this period.
  - Public health spending rose to 6.9 percent of GDP from 4.8 percent in 1970.
- 1990s consolidation:
  - From 1992 onwards the ratio of public health expenditure to GDP declined to 6.2 by 1999.
  - Between 1993 and 1998, the real growth rate of per capita public health spending averaged -1.2 percent.
  - Public health expenditure increased by 3.5 percent per year in the 2000s.
- Recession dynamics:
  - Public health expenditure in Canada increased rapidly as a share of GDP during recessions and was generally followed by periods of cost containment.
- Specific figures:
  - Per capita public spending on health: US$1,299 in 1996 compared with US$1,516 in 1991.
  - Public expenditure on in-patient care: US$743 in 1991 to US$563 in 1995.
  - Growth rate of health care expenditure per capita declined from 15.7 percent in 1975 to 1.2 percent in 1977.

### Cost-containment reforms (late 1970s and 1990s)
- Reform instruments used:
  - Budget caps, supply constraints, and price controls were central to reform efforts.
  - Budget caps and price controls were part of a broader fiscal consolidation in the mid-1990s.
- 1977 federal-provincial fiscal program:
  - Reformed funding arrangements for hospitalization, medical care, and extended health care.
  - Federal transfers established prospectively using an “escalator” that considered per capita growth and inflation; transfers were no longer based on actual provincial expenditures.
  - Initially each province received an equal per capita transfer; provinces had flexibility in spending transfers.
  - Per capita transfers were frozen in the early 1990s, then resumed in the late 1990s at a rate below GDP growth.
- 1992 measures:
  - Budgets for hospitals and physicians were capped.
  - Physician funding: mostly fee-for-service reimbursed by the public system; fee-for-service rates were controlled and set to decline once a certain level of service was reached.
  - Medical school enrolment was limited starting in 1991, imposing supply constraints with a significant time lag.
- Price controls:
  - Pharmaceutical policies differ by province.
  - Since 1994 reimbursement price freezes used in at least two provinces (Ontario and Québec).
  - British Columbia used internal or therapeutic price referencing.

### Impact and durability of reforms
- Short-lived 1977 effects:
  - Average excess cost growth in the five years following the 1977 reform was 2.9 percent compared with 0.6 percent in the five preceding years — cost-containment effects were short lived and excess cost growth increased after two years.
- Durable 1990s effects:
  - Annual excess cost growth averaged -2.3 over the rest of the 1990s following the cost-containment efforts.
  - Reductions in hospital spending and capacity: hospitals reduced number of beds; hospitals closed or merged leading to a decline in number of hospitals and beds over the 1990s.
  - Potential adverse outcome: reductions in spending during the 1990s may have resulted in increases in waiting times for treatment of breast cancer (Mayo and others, 2001).
- Structural financing change:
  - Share of public spending in total health spending declined from 74 percent in 1990 to 70 percent in 2008.
  - Canada’s per capita spending has been higher than the average of OECD countries through the last four decades; example noted that Australia with similar health outcomes spent on average less on health care services.

### Lessons and policy implications
- Budget caps and supply constraints can be successful in limiting increases in health care spending.
- A single-payer system can facilitate implementation of cost-cutting reforms and help control administrative costs.
- Canada achieves strong health indicators with a lower level of health sector inputs (e.g., hospital beds per thousand).
- Role of private insurance:
  - In Canada private insurance is allowed only for services not covered by the public sector (pharmaceuticals and dental services).
  - Expanding private insurance could potentially reduce waiting lists for services but would likely increase total health spending.

*Source: IMF staff country case study — “Canada: Key Health Indicators.”*

### 16.      From the mid-1960s through the 1980s, public health care spending in Finland grew

### 16.      From the mid-1960s through the 1980s, public health care spending in Finland grew

### Historical spending trends and key indicators
- Public health care spending rose from 3.2 percent of GDP in 1965 to 6.3 percent in 1990 and surged to 7.2 percent by 1992 during a deep recession.
- The central government fiscal balance deteriorated from surpluses before the 1991 crisis to a deficit of over 10 percent of GDP by 1994.
- Public health expenditure to GDP dropped to 5.1 percent in 2000; by 2008 the share of public spending on health to GDP remained roughly at the same level as in 1990.
- Public health spending per capita was US$3,179 in 2008, above the OECD advanced economies average.
- Selected OECD table figures (1970/1980/1990/2000/2008 context as presented):
  - Total health spending (percent of GDP): 5.5, 6.3, 7.7, 7.2, 8.4, 9.3
  - Public (percent of GDP): 3.3, 4.1, 5.1, 5.1, 6.1, 6.9
  - Private (percent of GDP): 1.5, 1.3, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 2.5
  - Public health spending per capita (US$): 995, 491, 1,752, 1,203, 3,179, 2,028
  - Out-of-pocket spending (share of total health spending): 23.8, 18.4, 15.5, 22.3, 19.4, 16.8
  - Formal health care coverage (share of population): 100.0, 100.0, 100.0, 100.0, 100.0, 99.0
  - Life expectancy (years at birth): 70.8, 73.6, 75.0, 77.7, 79.5, 79.9
  - Measles immunization (share of children 12-23 months): ... , 70.0, 87.0, 96.0, 98.7, 89.6
  - Physicians (per 1,000 population): ......, 2.2, 2.5, 2.7, 3.1
  - Hospital beds (per 1,000 population): ......, 8.3, 7.5, 6.5, 5.6
- Per capita public spending on health: US$1,752 in 1990, US$1,203 in 2000; life expectancy in 2008 was 79.5 years (OECD advanced economies average 79.9 years).

### Cost containment reforms (1990s)
- Overview: Reforms combined macro- and micro-level measures including supply constraints, budget caps, price controls, and public management and coordination reforms.
- Public management and coordination:
  - All municipal hospitals brought under ownership and management of 21 health care districts to improve coordination and reduce duplication.
  - In 1991 multi-purpose hospital districts were created with each municipality required to be a member of a hospital district.
  - Legal bases: The Hospital Act (1990); the Specialized Medical Care Act (1991).
- Supply constraints and price controls:
  - Reduction in number of hospital beds and shift from integrated system to public contract model.
  - In 1997 two hospital districts adopted case-based Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) pricing; by 2000 most hospital districts followed suit.
  - DRGs specify treatment protocols and medical conditions and provide an associated price schedule; where reimbursement is based on DRGs, providers are not compensated for costs above the DRG price.
- Budget caps and decentralization:
  - Central subsidies to local governments were reduced; municipalities became main purchasers of health care services.
  - Hospital revenues became dependent on types and numbers of services purchased by municipalities.
  - Subsidies calculated prospectively according to weighted capitation based on expected population of patients.
  - Local governments gained greater freedom over administration, user charges, and arrangement of services; share of municipal taxes in financing increased.
  - Out-of-pocket payment increased during 1990s with abolition of tax deduction for medical expenses and increased user charges.
- Pharmaceutical cost sharing and controls:
  - Fixed deductible for drugs increased three times in 1990, 1992, and 1994.
  - In 1993 pharmacists allowed to substitute prescribed drugs with cheaper generic options.
  - Late-1990s focus shifted toward controlling drug prices.

### Impact and durability of reforms
- Expenditure outcomes:
  - Per capita public spending on health: US$1,203 in 2000 (down from US$1,752 in 1990); rose to US$3,179 by 2008.
  - In-patient care: per capita expenditure decreased from US$743 to US$563 during 1991–95; by 2008 it rose to US$792.
  - Hospital beds per 1,000 people decreased from 8.3 in 1990 to 6.5 in 2008.
  - Average excess cost growth in five years following state subsidy reforms of 1993 was -3.3, compared with 4.4 in the five preceding years.
  - Introduction of DRG pricing (1997–2000): average excess cost growth for total public health expenditure during this period was -2.9, although growth increased again after 2000—possibly due to earmarked funding in 2001 to eliminate waiting times.
- Pharmaceuticals:
  - Public expenditure on pharmaceuticals grew from 5.5 percent to 8.4 percent of health expenditure during 1991–95; by 2000 it increased to 10 percent.
  - Substitution of in-patient care with pharmaceutical care may have contributed to pharmaceutical expenditure growth in the 1990s.

### Lessons and unintended consequences
- Key lesson:
  - Costs are better controlled when spending growth is addressed through a combination of measures acting at various levels—macro-level reforms supplemented with micro-level, efficiency-enhancing measures.
  - The 1993 subsidy reform was implemented during a severe crisis and under a generalized fiscal consolidation effort, contributing to significant expenditure containment.
- Unintended consequences of decentralization:
  - Inequality between regions: in 2005, the difference in expenditure levels between municipalities was €1,000 per capita.
  - Municipalities have different coverage; hospital districts have different waiting times.
  - Small municipalities cannot benefit from economies of scale for specialized services.
  - No nationally set guideline to determine prices for hospital services.
  - Two-tier financing (state subsidies and municipal financing) encourages cost shifting—for example, municipalities and the state cover drugs used in in-patient care and out-patient care, respectively, creating incentives for hospitals to use out-patient drug therapy.

*Source: IMF staff chapter on Finland health sector reforms (excerpts).*

### 41.      The National Health Care System coverage is universal, covering citizens and

### _122810a - 41.      The National Health Care System coverage is universal, covering citizens and

### Overview of the National Health Care System (Italy)
- Coverage: universal, covering citizens and permanent residents.
- Model: public integrated model, financed through payroll and general taxation, with both private and public provision of services.
- Decentralization: since reforms initiated in 1992 the system has been highly decentralized, with regions and local health units bearing strong administrative and financial independence.
- State role: the state sets “essential levels of care,” namely a positive list of services that must be uniformly provided by all regions.
- Delivery: rests with the local public enterprises (Aziende Sanitarie Locali—ASL), vertically integrated and funded by the region through capitated budgets.
- 2008 financing indicators:
  - Public expenditure on health services: 7.0 percent of GDP.
  - OECD advanced economies average (public health expenditure): 6.9 (percent of GDP).
  - Role of the private sector: broadly stable over the last decade at just over 2 percent of GDP, below the OECD average.

### Spending trends and fiscal consolidation (1990s)
- Fiscal context (1992–95):
  - General government primary balance: swung into a surplus exceeding 4 percent of GDP between 1992 and 1995.
  - Shift in consolidation: from revenue-based adjustment up to 1993 to expenditure-based adjustment in 1994–95.
- Public health spending:
  - Public spending on health declined from 6.3 percent in 1991 to 5.5 percent of GDP in 1999.
  - Real per capita growth of public spending: negative, declining by 4.6 percent on average over 1993–95.
  - For most of the period real growth of public spending was below the OECD average.
  - Private spending continued to grow, albeit at a slower pace than earlier.
- Aggregate figures and growth:
  - Total expenditure on health declined by 7.2 percent (period context: early 1990s reforms).
  - Excess cost growth of public health spending: 3.7 percent during 1992–96.

### Cost-containment reforms and instruments (1990s)
- Focus areas: control of doctors’ salaries and pharmaceutical expenditure as part of broader fiscal consolidation.
- Doctors’ salaries:
  - All doctors employed by the NHS are salaried and have civil servant status; GPs and pediatricians are paid on capitation.
  - Salary control measures during 1991–95:
    - Renewal of national contracts postponed several times.
    - Increases in salaries were less generous and in line with inflation.
    - Bonuses and compensation for overtime were cut.
  - Outcome: measures curbed salary growth to less than 8 percent over the entire 1991–95 period.
- Pharmaceutical sector measures:
  - 1994: positive list re-defined and fixed charges introduced for all prescriptions.
  - 1994: ceiling on the pharmaceutical budget set 2.4 percent lower than in 1993 in nominal terms.
  - Government funding for several hundreds of active ingredients suspended.
  - Prices constrained to not exceed average European prices; 1995: generalized price cut; 1996: reference pricing introduced.
  - Effects: delisting of over 400 drugs in the mid-1990s; in 1997 pharmacists forced to sell at discount to the NHS with smallest margins for highest priced drugs.
  - Outcome: between 1991 and 1995, pharmaceutical expenditure declined by 35 percent in nominal terms.
- Public management and quasi-market reforms:
  - 1992 reforms granted administrative and financial independence to ASLs (and to hospitals) and reduced their number.
  - Introduced quasi-markets where providers competed for contracts; separation of purchasing and provision was left to regions and did not fully materialize.
- Hospitals and supply-side reforms:
  - DRGs introduced in 1994 and made operational in 1996.
  - 1996 national program for bed closure.
  - Capital expenditure cut in 1995 to 0.3 percent of current expenditure.

### Impacts, unintended consequences, and reversals
- Pharmaceuticals:
  - Delisting increased private spending on drugs: private share of total drug spending rose from 20 percent in 1990 to over 35 percent in 1995.
  - 2001: drug copayments were abolished and restrictions on prescribing were reduced, leading doctors to prescribe more expensive and newer drugs and reversing early reductions in drug expenditure.
  - Subsequent policy responses included price cuts to drug industry sales to the NHS, introduction of reference prices for drugs no longer covered, reintroduction of prescribing restrictions, and imposition of a ceiling on drug spending by the NHS.
- Hospital activity and tariffs:
  - New payment system incentivized regions to cut hospital tariffs or individual DRG tariffs when expenditure exceeded predetermined levels, discouraging provision of certain services.
  - Tighter limits on number of beds led to declines in hospitalization rates and length of stay.
- Salaries and service provision:
  - Salary restraint reduced growth but postponement of contracts created deferred compensation obligations; control of variable salary components may have weakened incentives and decreased health sector output, shifting some services to the private sector.

### Key quantitative outcomes (preserved as reported)
- Public expenditure on health services in 2008: 7.0 percent of GDP.
- OECD advanced economies average (public health spending): 6.9 (percent of GDP).
- Private sector role: just over 2 percent of GDP.
- Public spending on health: declined from 6.3 percent in 1991 to 5.5 percent in 1999.
- Real per capita growth of public spending: declined by 4.6 percent on average over 1993–95.
- Total expenditure on health declined by 7.2 percent (early 1990s period).
- Excess cost growth of public health spending: 3.7 percent during 1992–96.
- Pharmaceutical expenditure decline: 35 percent in nominal terms between 1991 and 1995.
- Private share in total spending on drugs: increased from 20 percent in 1990 to over 35 percent in 1995.
- Growth of NHS salaries curbed to less than 8 percent over 1991–95.
- Capital expenditure in 1995 equaled 0.3 percent of current expenditure.

### Lessons and policy implications drawn in the source
- Price controls and cost-sharing can be very effective short-term cost-containment measures, but their durability is questionable.
- Salary restraint can contain costs but may reduce incentives, decrease output, and shift services to the private sector; postponed contract renewals defer rather than eliminate expenditure.
- Increases in co-payments beyond a certain level risk undermining equity objectives and may be subsequently reversed.
- A critical success factor for Italy’s cost containment was the shared recognition that the central government would not bail out regional health systems with large deficits—enabled by the preceding severe financial crisis and Maastricht constraints for joining the EMU.
- Once it became clear that Italy would join the EMU, health spending accelerated again.

*Italicized source: IMF staff chapter content from the provided PDF content unit.*

### 0.7 to 1.7 percent of GDP in the last three decades.

### _122810a - 0.7 to 1.7 percent of GDP in the last three decades.

### Sweden — Experience with health reforms: 1980s and early 1990s

- Spending trends
  - Public spending on health as a share of GDP was the highest in OECD in the 1980s and 1990s; since then, near zero excess cost growth has seen it fall to around seventh.
  - Health expenditures expanded considerably in the 1960s and 1970s—growing at an average real rate of about 4.5 percent between 1970 and 1982, and increasing by over 2 percentage points of GDP.
  - Between 1982 and 1994, expenditure growth slowed dramatically with a mildly negative average annual growth rate; public health spending declined from 8.5 percent of GDP to 7.2 percent of GDP.
  - Figures include two definitional changes: in 1985 care for the mentally handicapped was excluded from health and classified under education and social services; in 1992 care for the elderly was transferred to social services.
  - Public health care spending picked up after 1995, but by 2007 was still below the levels seen in 1982.

- Cost containment reforms
  - Main reform themes: budget caps, public management and coordination (including greater decentralization), price controls; market mechanisms introduced in the early 1990s.
  - Decentralization and budgetary responsibility
    - 1982: power over health care activities of county councils consolidated; county councils used global budgets for recurrent and capital expenses connected to formal and informal rules on activity execution.
    - 1985: regulatory and planning capacity of county councils strengthened by transferring responsibility for costs of both publicly and privately owned ambulatory health care from the Swedish Social Insurance Agency to county councils; grants disbursed to county councils based on weighted capitation; private practitioners still paid fee-for-service but negotiated volumes with councils.
    - 1988/1990: parliament prohibited county councils and municipalities from raising income taxes starting in 1990.
    - 1991: decisions on copayment levels for outpatient devolved to county councils; copayments increasingly used to steer patients toward primary care.
  - Price controls and payment system changes
    - Late 1980s: reimbursement shifted toward prospective per-case payments instead of activity budgets.
    - 1993: reference prices for generic drugs introduced.
    - 1990s: DRG pricing introduced, particularly in Stockholm County.
  - Public management and market mechanisms
    - 1992: transfer of responsibility for providing long-term care to the elderly and disabled from county councils to local municipalities to integrate care with municipal social services and improve efficiency; fees levied on municipalities if not ready to receive hospital discharges.
    - 1990s: greater use of planned markets and purchaser-provider splits; by 1994, 14 out of 26 councils had separate purchasing organizations.

- Impact and durability of reforms
  - Global budgets introduced by county councils appeared to slow health expenditure expansion:
    - Average excess cost growth in the five years following the 1982 reforms was -2.4 compared with 3.5 in the five preceding years.
  - Five years following the 1985 payment-system reform: excess cost growth was -0.8.
  - Fiscal squeeze from limits to taxation in 1990 led to accumulation of debt and hospital closures; long waiting lists, especially for elective care.
    - 1992: a three-month guarantee issued for 12 selected treatments offering treatment at another county hospital or private facility after three months.
  - Changes in inputs and structure
    - Number of hospital beds decreased substantially—falling by more than 40 percent between 1993 and 2003, partly due to decline in non-acute-care beds resulting from the 1992 reform.
    - Health care staff employed per 1,000 people dropped from 46.7 in 1992 to 31.9 in 2002; exceptions were physicians, nurses, and midwives.
    - Shift from hospital-based care toward primary care contributed to staff reductions.
  - Overall, health expenditure avoided the wider surge in total public expenditure in 1989–93.

- Lessons
  - Budget caps and public management and coordination reforms, especially those strengthening accountability under decentralization, were successful in reigning in spending.
  - Some negative supply-side consequences occurred; market mechanisms were introduced subsequently to improve efficiency.
  - Other 1990s reforms focused on performance; evidence of productivity increases exists but attribution to specific reforms is difficult.

---

### United Kingdom — Overview and experience with health reforms: late 1970s and 1980s

- System overview and 2008 snapshot
  - Public-integrated healthcare system—heavily regulated, strict gatekeeping, little decentralization, central government budget financing; hospital providers part of government sector.
  - 2008: total health spending to GDP was 8.7 percent, compared with the OECD average of 9.3.
  - 2008: public health spending was 7.2 percent of GDP, compared with the OECD advanced economies average of 6.9 percent.
  - Private spending more than doubled since 1980 as a percent of GDP, but remained small.

- Spending trends
  - 1960s through mid-1970s: health care spending grew at an average real rate of 4.8 percent per year; health expenditure climbed as a percent of GDP from 3.3 to almost 5 percent.
  - Expenditure rose particularly fast during the recession following the 1973 oil shock and the 1973–74 stock market crash.
  - Late 1970s: short period of negative or low real growth rates and a three-year period of declining expenditure as a percent of GDP.
  - Public health spending to GDP ratio rose during the early 1980s recession before falling from 4.9 percent in 1981 to 4.5 percent in 1989.
  - Real growth rates of health spending during the first two Thatcher governments averaged 2.2 percent, compared with 4.2 percent in the preceding decade.

- Cost containment reforms
  - Budget caps
    - Early 1970s: cash limits introduced on departmental budgets; NHS budget set centrally and subject to cash limits determined by weighted capitation.
  - Public management and coordination
    - 1982: abolishment of 90 area health authorities to reduce bureaucracy.
    - 1983: Griffiths Report introduced “new public management”—hierarchical general management, managerial accountability for service levels, quality, and resource use.
  - Market mechanisms and competition
    - 1989: Working for Patients reform proposed an internal market with purchaser-provider split; created district health authorities and GP fund-holders; NHS Trusts (semi-independent hospitals) competed for contracts.
    - 1989 reforms also restricted access to certain outputs (e.g., eye tests and equipment) to reduce costs.
  - Pharmaceutical reforms
    - Since 1957: U.K. regulated pharmaceutical profitability rather than product prices.
    - Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (1993–98) limited return on capital from sales to the NHS.
    - Cost-control efforts: delisting products from NHS coverage (1985 and 1993); prescribing schemes in 1992 and 1994 to compare prescription costs with targets and reduce over-prescription.
  - Other reforms
    - 1998: fund-holding scheme replaced by Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) financed by weighted capitation; pharmaceutical spending included in PCT budgets.
    - 1990s: focus on performance—Health of the Nation Green Paper set quantified targets; Patient’s Charter specified patients’ rights and service standards (e.g., reduced waiting times).

- Impact and durability of reforms
  - Cash limits effect
    - Excess cost growth in the five years following the cash limits was 1.2 percent—one-fourth the growth rate in the five preceding years.
  - Griffiths reforms effect
    - Excess cost growth in the five years after the Griffiths Reforms was -1.3 percent, compared with 1.1 in the five years before.
    - However, the Conservative government held total public spending broadly flat in real terms over most of the 1980s, complicating attribution of outcomes to reforms versus budget limits.
  - Internal market and fund-holding
    - Impact on health expenditure is hard to determine because implementation coincided with other reforms focused on performance and later structural changes to primary care arrangements.

- Lessons
  - 1976 cash limits appear to have temporarily reduced health expenditure growth, but limits could be renegotiated annually and expenditure resumed rising later.
  - Abolishment of area health authorities and introduction of new management practices associated with more durable control of expenditure growth, including effects observed five years after implementation.
  - Criticisms of 1989 reforms include increased transaction costs from the internal market, potential emphasis on costs over quality, and increased inequity.
  - Evidence on fund-holding GPs suggests less growth in prescription costs for fund-holders than non-fund-holders; a 1996 Audit Commission report was inconclusive.

*Italic: Source — OECD; WHO; WDI; and IMF staff estimates (years as indicated or latest available).*

### 90.      Long waiting times for elective inpatient care have been a feature of the NHS since

### _122810a - 90.      Long waiting times for elective inpatient care have been a feature of the NHS since

### NHS waiting times and policy context
- Long waiting times for elective inpatient care have been a feature of the NHS since its formation in 1948 and have worsened during the cost-containment period.
- Since 2001 there has been a considerable effort to reduce long waiting times, driven by a strictly enforced system of waiting–time targets for individual hospital trusts. (Smith and Goddard, 2009).

### United States — overview of health care system
- System structure and coverage
  - The United States has a mainly private insurance and provider healthcare system.
  - Private insurance is largely tied to employment; individuals can purchase policies in the non-group market.
  - Two large public insurance programs—Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid for the poor—each one covers about 15 percent of the population.
  - Medicare and Medicaid were incorporated in the Social Security Act of 1965.
  - There is some gatekeeping through managed care.

- Spending levels and comparisons (2008)
  - Total health spending to GDP: 16 percent.
  - OECD average for advanced economies total health spending: 9.3 percent.
  - Public health spending: 7.4 percent of GDP.
  - OECD average public health spending: 6.9 percent of GDP.
  - Private spending has grown rapidly in recent decades, but less than public spending.

- Key indicators (as presented)
  - GDP per capita (US$, PPP): 4,998 12,180 23,054 35,078 47,193 35,617
  - Primary balance (percent of GDP): ............-3.9 1.5
  - General government primary expenditure (percent of GDP): .........31.3 33.6 40.4
  - Total health spending (percent of GDP): 7.1 9.0 12.2 13.4 16.0 9.3
  - public (percent of GDP): 2.6 3.7 4.8 5.8 7.4 6.9
  - private (percent of GDP): 4.5 5.3 7.4 7.6 8.5 2.5
  - Public health spending per capita (US$): 129 445 1,102 2,032 3,507 2,028
  - Out-of-pocket spending (share of total health spending): 34.2 23.4 19.4 14.5 12.1 16.8
  - Formal health care coverage (share of population): .........85.0 85.2 99.0
  - Life expectancy (years at birth): 70.9 73.7 75.3 76.7 77.9 79.9
  - Measles immunization (share of children 12-23 months): .........90.5 92.1 89.6
  - Physicians (per 1,000 population): .........2.3 2.4 3.1
  - Hospital beds (per 1,000 population): 7.9 6.0 4.9 3.5 3.1 5.6

### United States — experience with health reforms: mid- to late 1990s
- Spending trends
  - Growth in U.S. public health expenditure accelerated in the mid-1960s with creation of Medicare and Medicaid.
  - From 1970 through to 1990 public health care spending in the United States grew at an average real rate of around 5.3 percent per year.
  - Health expenditure rose from 1.2 percent of GDP in 1960 to 6.1 percent in 1995.
  - By 1999 public health expenditure had dropped to 5.7 percent of GDP.
  - Expenditure growth resumed strongly in 2001 and public health spending to GDP rose by over 1½ percentage points by 2008.

- Cost containment reforms
  - Public management and coordination reforms, including the use of managed care.
  - 1992: Medicare established the Resource-Based Relative Value Scale physician fee schedule—prices based on three producer factors: physician work, practice expense, and malpractice expense; conversion factor adjusted annually.
  - Rapid expansion of managed care in the 1990s; enrollment in Medicare managed care increased from 1 million in 1991 to more than 6 million in 1999 (Lagoe, and others, 2005).
  - States expanded managed care for Medicaid to constrain cost growth.
  - 1997–98: attempt to reduce Medicare spending by reducing payments to providers; payments were raised in subsequent legislation a year later.
  - Introduction of Medicare+Choice program (monthly capitation fee based on local Medicare spending per beneficiary).
  - Introduction of State Children’s Health Insurance Program to expand coverage of uninsured children with higher matching funding than Medicaid.

- Impact and durability
  - Studies find managed care arrangements—particularly HMOs—can reduce health care costs, at least in the short term, by transferring purchasing power toward price-sensitive insurers and employers.
  - Presence of managed care is associated with reduced cost growth in areas with higher managed care penetration (Docteur and Oxley, 2003).
  - Managed care expansion associated with excess cost growth dropping by -0.7 percent over the second half of the 1990s as use expanded.
  - Backlash due to limits on patient choice, intervention in physician decisions, and selective contracting led to moves away from tight plan management and increased emphasis on patients’ rights (Congressional debate, state-level laws, purchaser-imposed patient rights).

- Lessons
  - Major slowdown in health spending in the United States in the 1990s was attributable to widespread adoption of managed care, which introduced gatekeeping and utilization reviews and enabled negotiated prices between managed care plans and providers.

### Estonia — overview of health care system
- System structure and funding
  - Predominately publicly funded through mandatory health insurance contributions, with a mix of public and private provision.
  - The earmarked social payroll tax accounts for almost two-thirds of total health spending.
  - Private spending comprises a quarter of total health spending, mostly in the form of copayments for pharmaceuticals and dental care.
  - Most specialists and hospitals are public, owned by local governments.
  - Private provision is largely restricted to primary care, ambulatory services, and pharmacies.

- Health status and spending (2008 and trends)
  - Life expectancy: 73.9 years in 2008, 5.6 years below the OECD average of 79.8 years.
  - Infant mortality rate: 5.0 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2008, above the OECD average of 3.9.
  - In 2008 total health spending was 5.4 percent of GDP, below the OECD average of 9.2 percent.
  - Public health expenditures as a share of GDP decreased during the 1990s and remained relatively stable since the early 2000s.
  - Public health spending per capita rose from US$398 in 2000 to US$836 in 2008.

- Key indicators (selected)
  - GDP per capita (US$, PPP): 6,318 9,876 20,640 34,549 37,899
  - Total health spending (percent of GDP): 6.2 5.3 5.4 5.1 9.2
  - public (percent of GDP): 5.6 4.1 4.1 3.4 6.8
  - private (percent of GDP): 0.6 1.2 1.3 2.6 2.4
  - Public health spending per capita (US$): 365 398 836 1,189 2,541
  - Out-of-pocket spending (share of total health spending): 10.2 19.9 22.1 25.2 17.0
  - Formal health care coverage (share of population): ......100.0 ...97.8
  - Life expectancy (years at birth): 67.7 70.6 73.9 75.5 79.8
  - Infant mortality (per 1,000 life births): 14.9 8.4 5.0 12.2 3.9
  - Measles immunization (share of children 12-23 months): ...93.4 95.4 90.5 93.6
  - Physicians (per 1,000 population): 3.2 3.3 3.4 2.3 3.2
  - Hospital beds (per 1,000 population): 8.3 7.2 5.7 3.8 5.7

### Estonia — experience with health reforms
- Major reforms since early 1990s
  - 1992: Introduced a compulsory social health insurance system; an earmarked health insurance fund independent of the state budget established and financed by a 13 percent payroll tax on salaries, paid fully by employers. Initially 22 non-competing district-based funds; reorganized in 2001 into a single independent public agency legally obliged to balance yearly revenues and expenditures.
  - Primary care reform:
    - Introduction of family medicine as a specialty.
    - Creation of a list system for population registration with a primary care doctor.
    - Introduction of a partial gatekeeping system controlling most access to specialist care.
    - Mixed payment system for primary care: age-adjusted capitation, fee-for-service payments, basic allowances, and a quality bonus system.
    - Doctors granted status of independent contractors.
  - Hospital sector rationalization:
    - Reduction in number of acute-care hospital beds by two-thirds and decrease in number of acute-care hospitals in 2003.
    - All public hospitals incorporated under private law as foundations or joint-stock companies, giving managerial rights and access to financial markets.
    - DRG-based payment methods introduced in 2004, used in combination with other payment methods for hospital reimbursement.
  - Other public health system reforms included creation of institutional structure, establishment of a financial mechanism, and defining responsibilities of different shareholders.
  - Patient cost-sharing:
    - 1993: Prescription pharmaceutical reimbursement system with cost-sharing introduced.
    - Significant cost-sharing for dental care; about 23 percent of out-of-pocket spending goes toward dental services.
    - Flat co-payments charged for certain services (primary care physician home visits, outpatient visits, hospital bed-days).

### Estonia — main challenges and lessons
- Main challenges
  - Growing lack of medical professionals: number of doctors and nurses per 1,000 people has been declining; shortage of nursing personnel and uneven distribution of specialist services.
  - EU accession in 2004 led to temporary spike in migration of doctors and nurses to neighboring EU countries; migration has decreased recently, main challenge is retention.
  - Rising health care costs: health spending per capita grew in real terms by an average of 8.8 percent per year between 2000 and 2008 (more than double the OECD average of 4.2 percent).
  - Demographic factors, technology improvements, and need to raise relatively low salaries of medical professionals likely to put upward pressure on public health spending.
  - High lifestyle-related risks: high smoking rate; high HIV incidence rates; alcohol consumption at 14 liters per year per adult (above OECD average of 9.3).

- Lessons
  - Careful planning is crucial for transition from tax-based to compulsory social insurance system; Estonia used a dedicated 13 percent payroll tax and phased delivery and regulatory changes.
  - Development and successful implementation of a long-term strategy were key to successful hospital sector reform, including target setting and capacity assessment (1990 baseline: about 120 hospitals with 14,000 acute-care beds).
  - Global budgets, if well enforced, can effectively contain public health spending; the independent health insurance fund is legally obliged to balance yearly revenues and expenditures and has achieved this requirement almost every year.
  - A single health insurance fund allows more extensive risk pooling, redistribution of revenues between regions, lower administrative costs, and more economic use of resources.

### Hungary — overview of health care system
- System structure and health status
  - Hungary has a compulsory social insurance system with mostly public provision.
  - In 2008, most spending (71 percent) was financed by compulsory health insurance contributions paid by employees and employers.
  - Municipalities are responsible for primary care (doctor services, family physician services, dental care, mother and child health nursing services).
  - Provision of secondary care is shared among municipalities, the national government, and private providers.
  - The national government owns hospitals that provide acute and chronic care.
  - Life expectancy in 2008: 73.8 years (OECD average: 79.8 years).
  - Infant mortality in 2008: 5.6 per 1,000 live births (OECD average: 3.9).

*Source: Excerpt from IMF PDF chapter/section _122810a - 90.      Long waiting times for elective inpatient care have been a feature of the NHS since*

### 112.     Public health spending as a share of GDP is well below the OECD average. Public

### 112.     Public health spending as a share of GDP is well below the OECD average. Public

### Key indicators (excerpted table figures)
- Sources: WDI, WHO, and OECD. All spending data uses 2007 for 2008.
- Hungary (table excerpt):
  - GDP per capita (US$, PPP): 8,535 11,211 18,989 37,899 37,899
  - Total health spending (percent of GDP): 7.3 6.9 7.4 9.2 9.2
  - public (percent of GDP): 6.1 4.9 5.2 6.8 6.8
  - private (percent of GDP): 1.2 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.4
  - Public health spending per capita (US$): 554 602 980 2,541 2,541
  - Out-of-pocket spending (share of total health spending): 16.0 26.3 24.9 17.3 17.0
  - Formal health care coverage (share of population): ... 100.0 ...... 97.8
  - Life expectancy (years at birth): 69.9 71.7 73.8 79.8 79.8
  - Infant mortality (per 1,000 life births): 10.7 9.2 5.6 3.9 3.9
  - Measles immunization (share of children 12-23 months): 99.8 99.8 99.9 93.6 93.6
  - Physicians (per 1,000 population): 3.0 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.2
  - Hospital beds (per 1,000 population): 8.8 8.1 7.0 5.7 5.7

- China (table excerpt):
  - GDP per capita (US$, PPP): 1,351 2,163 5,389 5,894 37,899
  - Total health spending (percent of GDP): 3.5 4.6 4.3 6.0 9.2
  - public (percent of GDP): 1.8 1.8 1.9 3.6 6.8
  - private (percent of GDP): 1.7 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.4
  - Public health spending per capita (US$): 46 70 104 177 2,541
  - Out-of-pocket spending (share of total health spending): 46.4 59.0 50.8 35.4 17.0
  - Formal health care coverage (share of population): ...... 85.0 ... 97.8
  - Life expectancy (years at birth): 70.8 71.0 74.0 65.6 79.8
  - Infant mortality (per 1,000 life births): 37 30 18 39.9 3.9
  - Measles immunization (share of children 12-23 months): 98 85 94 85.7 93.6
  - Physicians (per 1,000 population): 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.0 3.2
  - Hospital beds (per 1,000 population): ... 2.3 2.2 2.2 5.7

### Hungary — Experience with health reform
- Compulsory social health insurance system:
  - Health Insurance Fund (HIF) collects premium contributions from formal sector workers and the self-employed.
  - Provisions for non-contributing groups are shared between the HIF and the government.
  - HIF is separated from the government budget; government cannot use HIF surpluses for other purposes but is obligated to cover its deficit.
  - HIF responsible only for recurrent costs; fixed costs and investments are responsibilities of owners of health facilities (local governments and the state).
  - HIF has been effective in imposing discipline on aggregate health spending.
- Primary care system:
  - System of family physicians established in the early 1990s to deliver continuous, personal, and comprehensive health care, emphasizing prevention, rehabilitation, and home nursing services.
  - Patients required to seek referral from a GP of their choice to limit access to specialist services.
  - Payments for GPs are based on a capitation fee and the number of patients registered.
- Hospital system:
  - Pre-transition hospital system was excessively costly with too many overall hospital beds and too few beds in intensive care, chronic care, and rehabilitation.
  - Reform efforts aimed to fit distribution of medical services to regional needs.
  - DRGs introduced for inpatient care in 1993; outpatient specialty services paid fee-for-service.
- Patient cost-sharing:
  - Copayments for pharmaceuticals and long-term chronic care introduced; copayments in primary and outpatient care and a hospital daily fee for inpatient care introduced during 2006/07 reform, which reduced demand.
  - These measures were repealed by national referendum in 2008.
  - Dental coverage excluded from national health insurance, effectively increasing cost sharing.

### Hungary — Main challenges
- Rising pressure on public health spending:
  - Population health status among the worst in the EU region two decades after reform.
  - Cost pressures likely to increase due to demographic factors, technology improvements, and low salaries of medical professionals.
  - Fiscal consolidation limits financial resources for health care; improving efficiency is essential.
- High lifestyle-related risks:
  - Alcohol consumption about one third higher than the OECD average (OECD, 2010b).
  - Hungarian men have one of the highest lung cancer mortality rates in the world.
  - Two-thirds of men and one-half of women are overweight or obese.
- Imbalance of health services professionals:
  - Overall health workforce/population ratio comparable to OECD average but geographic and inter-specialty distribution is unbalanced and biased towards high-skilled specialists.
  - Some areas lack doctors and nurses; shortages in primary care, public health, and diagnostic specialties.
- Inefficient use of health care resources:
  - Excess use of hospital-based care and specialty care despite reforms.
  - Rate of hospitalization has increased; share of primary care in spending decreased.
  - High utilization suggests inefficiencies and need for copayments to rationalize demand.
  - In 2007, per capita physician-patient contacts was 10.8, about 50 percent higher than the OECD average (Utca, 2009).

### Hungary — Lessons and policy implications
- Need for a consistent long-term strategy:
  - Reforms should promote cooperation between agencies and avoid contradictory measures.
- Provider payment and incentive reform required:
  - Current payment system insufficiently incentivizes GPs to treat patients within primary care (capitation + registered patients).
  - Hospitals incentivized toward in-patient treatment due to higher reimbursements.
  - Health institutions lack incentives to use medical equipment economically because provider payments do not cover depreciation; capital funding rests with governments.
- Difficulty of rolling back generous benefit packages:
  - Under communism, coverage was comprehensive and free; benefit package remained generous and hard to roll back (e.g., repeal of copayments).
- Global budgets effective but need monitoring and flexibility:
  - HIF sets sub-budgets for in-patient, out-patient, chronic care, and primary care.
  - No spending cap for pharmaceuticals may have contributed to pharmaceutical spending growth.
  - Lack of flexibility in budget distribution (based on historical patterns) creates perverse incentives; needs medium- to long-term needs analysis.

### China — Overview and key facts
- System evolution:
  - Moving toward a social health insurance system with dominant public provision.
  - Consists of basic insurance for urban formal-sector workers, an urban resident scheme, and the cooperative scheme for rural residents.
  - Medical assistance program provides financial assistance for the poorest and most vulnerable.
  - Public hospitals provide most health care services; private hospitals and clinics play a complementary role (Huang and others, 2009).
- Health status improvements:
  - Life expectancy reached 74.0 years in 2008.
  - Infant mortality decreased to 18 deaths per 1,000 live births.
- Health spending lag:
  - In 2007, total health spending equaled 4½ percent of GDP (with less than half public), substantially less than countries at comparable income levels.
  - Out-of-pocket spending accounts for more than 50 percent of health care spending (OECD, 2010d).
  - Note: CEIC data indicate public health spending increased by 0.8 percentage point of GDP since 2007; CEIC estimated public health spending at 0.8 percent of GDP in 2007 while WHO data indicate 1.9 percent of GDP.

### China — Experience with health reform
- Coverage expansion (step-by-step approach):
  - 1998: basic insurance scheme for formal sector urban workers introduced; financed by employer-funded collective fund (approximately 6 percent of wages) and beneficiary-funded personal account (about 2 percent of wages); pooled fund for inpatient stays and individual medical savings accounts for outpatient visits.
  - 2003: rural residents’ scheme financed largely by government premium subsidies and enrollee contributions; typical package includes modest household medical savings account for outpatient and social pooling account for inpatient with high deductibles; as funding increased, coverage became more generous (Wagstaff and others, 2009a).
  - 2003: medical assistance safety net program introduced for the poorest and most vulnerable; jointly funded by central and provincial governments; early evidence suggests good targeting (Wagstaff and others, 2009b).
  - 2007: urban resident scheme introduced targeting children, the elderly, the disabled and other non-working urban residents; financed largely by government premium subsidies and enrollee contributions; enrollment at household level to reduce administrative costs and adverse selection.
- Payment reform:
  - Fee-for-service remains most common; government sets prices for most services.
  - Historical policy set prices below cost for preventive and basic services and above cost for drugs and high-tech tests, inducing provider incentives to shift toward high-margin services, high-tech equipment, drugs, and medically unnecessary care.
  - 2000 reforms sought to reduce price distortions by increasing prices of professional services and reducing prices of high-tech care.
  - Government experimented with global budgets, capitation payments, and DRGs.
  - Payment reform pilots at provincial and city levels; evidence shows payment reforms associated with lower expenditures compared with FFS but effects on quality, risk selection, and cost shifting not yet available (Eggleston and others, 2008).

### China — Main challenges
- High out-of-pocket expenditures:
  - Rapidly rising costs and limited insurance benefits make care increasingly unaffordable.
  - Even with planned universal coverage, many families may face high out-of-pocket expenditures and limited financial protection for catastrophic events.
  - Addressing shortcomings requires further government subsidies, especially for rural residents, residents of less developed regions, and low-income families.
- Wide inequalities:
  - Health resources concentrated in urban areas; urban insurance benefits richer than cooperative insurance.
  - Government subsidies to big urban hospitals and urban resident coverage favor higher-income groups.
  - Wide regional disparities in public health spending across local governments at provincial or county levels reflecting differing financing constraints (Wagstaff and others, 2009a).
- Inefficient use of resources and services:
  - Bed occupancy rates low at 60 percent compared with nearly 80 percent in OECD countries.
  - Large hospitals expanding rapidly; small community hospitals and health centers underutilized.
  - Overuse of high-tech services and prescription drugs; underprovision of preventive and primary care.
  - Preventive and primary services often provided by large hospitals; some patients hospitalized who could be treated outpatient.
  - Need to shift from hospital-based care to primary physician services and from large hospitals to small facilities.
- Rapid aging and disease burden:
  - Share of population aged 60 or above projected to reach 30 percent by 2050.
  - Smoking rate remains high; obesity rising.
  - Incidence of cancer, cerebrovascular disease, and heart disease increased and are now leading causes of death.

### China — Lessons and policy implications
- Economic growth alone insufficient:
  - Rapid growth did not ensure commensurate progress on health indicators; health spending lagged growth and system design flaws slowed improvements.
- Incremental coverage expansion can work:
  - Stepwise approach initially limited packages to basic services and catastrophic events, expanding coverage from formal sector urban workers to rural population and then other urban residents.
  - Increasing depth and breadth of packages and ensuring universal coverage will require additional resources.
- Re-emphasize preventive care and public health:
  - Preventive care and public health services were overlooked despite increases in public health spending; much spending went to invasive care, high-tech tests, and expensive drugs.
  - Need to expand public health and preventive spending, especially in less developed regions and rural areas, possibly via more generous earmarked transfers for public health programs (Wagstaff and others, 2009a).
- Reform provider payment to improve efficiency:
  - Over the medium term, move beyond fee-for-service to more efficient price schedules or payment methods.
  - Implement payment reforms shown effective in pilots at the national level.

*Italic: Source — Excerpts from the IMF PDF chapter/section with table figures and narrative as provided.*

### 136.     Thailand has a mixed health care system with public and private financing and

### 136.     Thailand has a mixed health care system with public and private financing and provision.

### Overview and coverage
- Since 2001, Thailand has a tax-financed universal health care coverage policy aiming to ensure access to quality health care and a single standard benefits package for all.
- By 2007, 98 percent of the population was estimated to be covered by formal insurance (Wibulpolprasert and Thaiprayoon, 2008), and any uninsured citizen has the right to register and receive free care.
- The standard care package includes curative care, as well as health promotion and prevention.

### Insurance schemes and financing
- Four main insurance options (mostly public):
  - Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS): 3/4 of the population.
  - Civil Servants Medical Benefits Scheme (CSMBS): about 8 percent.
  - Social Security Scheme (SSS): about 11 percent.
  - Private insurance: about 2 percent.
- Financing modalities:
  - UCS and CSMBS are mainly tax-financed.
  - SSS is financed through compulsory 1.5 percent payroll contributions by employers, employees and the government each.
  - Limited copayments apply in the case of CSMBS and SSS.
  - Private insurance is voluntary and entirely financed through private and employer contributions.
- Provider choice:
  - Under all schemes, patients can choose between public and private providers.
  - Public facilities provide most of the care under the UCS and CSMBS; provision under SSS is split in about equal parts (Wibulpolprasert and Thaiprayoon, 2008).

### Health sector structure and human resources
- Public sector provides about three fourths of all hospital beds; private sector mainly provides high-quality care in and around Bangkok and other urban centers, including care for medical tourists.
- Hospital beds and physician distribution:
  - 4.5 hospital beds per 1,000 people in Bangkok, vis-à-vis 2.1 per 1,000 in all provinces.
  - Number of physicians per 1,000 people is only 0.3, but ranges between 1.2 for Bangkok and 0.1 for the Northeastern region (Ministry of Public Health, 2009).
- Since the 1970s, village health volunteers have been trained to provide primary care services in rural areas and play an important role in health promotion and prevention.

### Health outcomes and disease burden
- Health indicators:
  - In 2008, life expectancy stood at 70 years.
  - Infant mortality in 2008: 13 deaths per 1,000 live births, down from 26 in 1995.
- Thailand performs considerably better than countries with a similar level of income but there remain gaps relative to OECD countries.
- HIV/AIDS continues to cause the highest disease burden overall.

### Expenditures and fiscal context
- Total health spending and composition (2007):
  - Total health spending: 3.7 percent of GDP.
  - Public health spending: 2.7 percent of GDP (almost three-fourths of total health spending), an increase of 1.1 percent since 1995.
  - Private spending almost halved as a share of GDP over the same period.
  - Out-of-pocket payments fell from 43 percent of total spending in 1995 to 19 percent in 2007.
- Macroeconomic context:
  - Average annual GDP growth at 4.8 percent during 2000–08.
  - Projected to grow by more than 5 percent in 2010.
  - Public debt was around 45 percent of GDP in 2009.
- Key indicators excerpt (as reported):
  - GDP per capita (US$, PPP): 4,226 4,684 7,942 5,894 37,899 (table format preserved from source).
  - Total health spending (percent of GDP): 3.5 3.4 3.7 6.0 9.2.
  - public (percent of GDP): 1.6 1.9 2.7 3.6 6.8.
  - private (percent of GDP): 1.9 1.5 1.0 2.4 2.4.
  - Public health spending per capita (US$): 105 127 209 177 2,541.
  - Out-of-pocket spending (share of total health spending): 42.6 33.8 19.2 35.4 17.0.
  - Formal health care coverage (share of population): 45.5 71.0 97.7 ... 97.8.
  - Life expectancy (years at birth): 68.0 68.0 70.0 65.6 79.8.
  - Infant mortality (per 1,000 life births): 26 17 13 39.9 3.9.
  - Measles immunization (share of children 12-23 months): 80 94 98 85.7 93.6.
  - Physicians (per 1,000 population): ... 0.3 ... 1.0 3.2.
  - Hospital beds (per 1,000 population): ... 2.2 ... 2.2 5.7.

### Experience with health reforms
- Reforms since the 1970s culminated in universal coverage in 2001.
- Main reforms (1970s–1990s):
  - Expansion of primary health care to rural areas through district hospitals and health centers, training of village health volunteers, and community-financing schemes.
  - Share of health service delivery through regional hospitals dropped from almost half in 1977 to just over a sixth in 2003 (Wibulpolprasert and Thaiprayoon, 2008).
  - Key schemes established:
    - Medical Welfare Scheme (MWS) in 1975 for the poor and selected groups.
    - Health Card Scheme (HCS) in 1990 for the near-poor (voluntary).
    - Social Security Scheme (SSS) in 1992 covering private-sector employees (compulsory).
    - Civil Servants Medical Benefits Scheme (CSMBS) covering public servants since 1963 (payments under CSMBS are fee-for-service).
  - Gatekeeper systems and global budgets (MWS, HCS) or capitation payments (SSS) were implemented.

- Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) (launched 2001), slogan “30 baht (about $1) treats all diseases”:
  - Aim: establish universal access to essential care and reduce catastrophic illnesses and out-of-pocket costs.
  - Pilots in six provinces; scaled nationwide within one year.
  - Primary care provider units function as gatekeepers; capitation rates based on utilization and cost estimates.
  - Capitation grant: set at 1,202 baht initially, increased to 1,899 baht in 2007.
  - Provinces receive budgets according to population and workload, with specific support introduced for hospitals in more remote areas.
  - Initially, 30 baht copayments required; standard care package initially excluded antiretroviral drugs (ARVs), renal replacement therapy, cosmetic surgery, and fertility treatments.
  - For high-cost care, a package similar to SSS was adopted to reduce inequities.
  - Changes over time:
    - Copayment of 30 baht abolished in 2006; out-of-pocket charges now apply only in case of nonemergency services from nonregistered facilities.
    - ARVs included in the standard care package in 2003; renal replacement therapy included in 2008.
    - Capitation grants increased rapidly since 2006; additional benefits managed separately.
  - Despite a wide health package, supply constraints and cost containment incentives keep utilization low, especially for high-cost services, consistent with low public spending to GDP.

### Main challenges
- Supply constraints:
  - Rapid scale-up of UCS and increased demand led to a sharp increase in utilization rates of outpatient and inpatient care by about 20 percent between 2002 to 2007, straining a relatively small number of primary health care doctors and nurses.
- Financing scheme:
  - Initial capitation grants were too low to cover facility costs, causing severe financial stress, especially in affluent but small provinces with high concentrations of health personnel.
  - Salaries were excluded from capitation grants in 2003.
  - Since 2005, resource allocation based on capitation and facility workload, with additional support for hospitals in remote and hardship areas.
- Quality:
  - Financing scheme and supply constraints posed challenges to maintaining quality standards within tightly set budget limits (Ministry of Public Health, 2009).
- Rising costs:
  - With rising incomes, greater demand for more expensive care packages, and population aging, cost pressures are likely to increase and could require re-introduction of copayments to supplement tax financing.
  - Subsidies could be reduced for those opting to stay in private rooms.

### Lessons
- Political consensus building is important for enacting successful health reforms:
  - Universal coverage was possible due to an overwhelming political consensus to subsidize quality care for all through tax revenues, created through collaboration of policymakers and civil society and an effective public relations campaign.
- Ensure adequate supply before expanding coverage:
  - Rapid expansion without expanding supply can lead to undesirable reductions in quality.
- Calibrate financing models and resource transfers carefully:
  - Initial capitation grants were too low and led to financial stress; transfers and payment mechanisms need careful design to ensure quality of care and to attract and retain health care workers in remote areas.

*Source: Excerpt on Thailand health care system from _122810a - Thailand chapter, IMF PDF.*

### 163.     The delivery of cost-effective high-quality health care depends on efficient

### _122810a - 163.     The delivery of cost-effective high-quality health care depends on efficient

### Institutions and universal coverage (paras. 163–164)
- Delivery of cost-effective, high-quality health care depends on credible and independent institutions because health care is fraught with market imperfections (para. 163).
- Public mandatory insurance is critical to ensure near-universal coverage by including low-income and high-risk individuals, reducing adverse selection, and containing public sector costs through some degree of risk pooling (para. 164).
- In Chile, concerns include cream-skimming by the private sector and the prospect that FONASA may remain the only affordable option for the elderly and chronically ill as the population ages and costs rise with technology (para. 164).

### Mexico — system structure and performance (paras. 165–167)
- Structure:
  - Mexico has a segmented social health insurance system covering private-sector formal salaried workers, government employees, oil company workers, and Popular Health Insurance (PHI) for the rest (para. 165).
  - Institutions operate their own facilities and employ their own staff; federal Ministry of Health (MoH) still finances and controls a series of third-level providers; delivery of most services decentralized to State Health Services (SHS) (para. 165).
  - Private sector is heterogeneous and weakly regulated (para. 165).
- Health outcomes and inputs (2008 and comparisons):
  - Life expectancy in Mexico was 75.1 years, below the OECD average of 79.8 years, but higher than the 71.8 years for countries with a similar income level (para. 165).
  - Infant mortality per 1,000 live births was well above the OECD average of 3.9, but comparable to countries with a similar income level (para. 165).
  - Supply of inputs: around 2.0 doctors per 1,000 people in Mexico, compared with the OECD average of 3.2 (para. 166).
- Financing:
  - In 2008, public health spending was 2.7 percent of GDP, well below the OECD average of 6.8 percent and 4.0 percent among countries with a similar income level (para. 166).
  - Out-of-pocket spending accounted for nearly half of total health spending (para. 166).
- Coverage:
  - Various social security institutes cover about 40 percent of the population, while PHI run by the MoH accounts for another 25 percent (para. 167).
  - Some uninsured access free services in remote areas; most uninsured use state health facilities and pay out-of-pocket for services and pharmaceuticals in the private sector (para. 167).

### Mexico — reforms (paras. 168–169)
- Pre-2003: decentralization of services for the uninsured to states, but federal fund allocations remained based on historical budgets, causing persistent and increasing funding disparities (para. 168).
- System of Social Protection in Health (SPSS; passed 2003, effective 2004) objectives and measures (para. 169):
  - Establish a system of universal access based on social insurance; PHI (Seguro Popular) ensures access to affordable insurance with family contributions on a sliding fee scale and waivers for low-income families (para. 169 bullets).
  - Define a package of essential services financed by a fund administered at the state level covering ambulatory primary care and outpatient consultation and hospitalization for basic specialties at the secondary level (para. 169 bullets).
  - Make federal resource distribution to states more equitable via per-enrolled family fee plus a solidarity supplement for poorer states (para. 169 bullets).
  - Increase competition among service providers by accrediting public or private clinics and hospitals to provide PHI-covered services (para. 169 bullets).
  - Protect funding of public health interventions via a separate fund for community health services (para. 169 bullets).
  - Protect families from excessive health expenditures by financing catastrophic interventions in a national-level fund to aggregate risk (para. 169 bullets).

### Main challenges for Mexico (paras. 170–174)
- Fragmentation, inequality of access, and inefficiencies:
  - Multiple public purchasers vertically integrated with providers serving different population segments with little connection; large mostly unregulated private sector; wide inequality in access, financing, and health status (para. 170).
  - Mexico identified as one of the least efficient health care systems in the OECD in a cross-country study (Schwellnus, 2009) (para. 170).
- Voluntary enrollment and adverse selection:
  - PHI’s voluntary enrollment risks low take-up by healthy individuals and deterioration of the risk pool; mandatory enrollment may be considered to reduce adverse selection (para. 171).
  - Expansion of PHI enrollment depends on improvements in quality of provision and access in SHS facilities (para. 171).
- Capacity constraints from higher demand:
  - Coverage expansion will create extra demand for services; Mexico’s doctor density (around 2.0 per 1,000) is lower than OECD average, raising concerns about meeting increased demand especially in poorer states and rural areas (para. 172).
- Financing needs:
  - Additional public funding required to reduce out-of-pocket spending and meet costly demands from chronic diseases; while efficiency gains can yield resources, the absolute amount and public share of GDP spent on health will have to increase to achieve universal coverage and expand access to new interventions (para. 173).
- Integration of insurance system:
  - Institutional barriers at the provider level must be broken to enable states to set up contracts and purchasing arrangements with diverse providers; moving toward a unified public health insurance system may be necessary given differences in benefit packages and provider quality between social security and PHI (para. 174).

### Lessons and policy implications (paras. 175–178)
- Fragmentation and lack of competition drive inefficiency:
  - Vertically integrated providers across multiple public and private insurers cause duplication of administration and infrastructure, limit patient choice, and suppress provider competition (para. 175).
- Separation of financing and provision:
  - Necessary to allow competition and foster efficiency; insurers should be allowed to contract with any provider to reduce provision costs and incentivize provider efficiency (para. 176).
- Provider payment reform:
  - Current capped budgets and salary-based worker pay provide few incentives for productivity and efficiency; payment system weaknesses have impeded optimal use of health resources (para. 177).
- Workforce mix:
  - Mexico has a relatively high ratio of doctors to nurses compared with other OECD countries; increasing the number of nurses per doctor and expanding nurse responsibilities could yield a more cost-effective input mix since nurses are generally paid less than doctors (para. 178).

*Source: Excerpt from IMF chapter on health care reforms (paras. 163–178).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2010/_122810a.pdf_
