## _082611b

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### Overview and methodology
- Purpose:
  - (a) provides a snapshot of the overall value added of Fund's surveillance perceived by stakeholders;
  - (b) details where the Fund stands in terms of four operational priorities set out in the 2008 TSR;
  - (c) examines key issues identified in the recent IEO paper on the IMF performance in the run up to the global crisis;
  - (d) discusses stakeholders' perception on the communication aspects of surveillance.
- Methodology:
  - Relies on stakeholder surveys: country authorities; Executive Directors; IMF mission chiefs; financial market participants; media; and civil society organizations.
  - Includes interviews by former senior Fund staff of country authorities (mainly at the time of the 2011 Spring Meetings).
  - Staff review of 50 Article IV staff reports issued from January 2010 through April 2011.

### Overall value-added of surveillance, traction, and areas for progress
- Crisis policy advice:
  - About 80 percent of respondents to the country authority and Executive Director surveys thought that the Fund's advice during the global crisis has taken into account changing economic conditions.
  - Around 70 percent thought Fund's advice has been timely.
    - Asia: only 36 percent of respondents agreed that it was timely.
    - G-20 countries: only 50 percent of respondents agreed that it was timely.
- Coverage in Article IV staff reports (50-sample review):
  - All basic macro policy areas were covered.
  - Virtually all reports provided rationale and justification for recommended fiscal and monetary policy adjustments and stance.
  - Virtually all reports covered core financial sector issues.
  - Virtually all reports provided a clear assessment of the exchange rate level.
  - All sample staff reports clearly identified the baseline scenario and discussed key medium-term challenges.
  - Progress vs 2008 TSR: 2008 TSR found about a quarter of sample reports did not clearly describe the baseline medium-term scenario.
- Follow up of past policy advice:
  - Fund advice was not followed in 64 percent of the cases.
  - Among countries where past Fund advice was not followed, around 56 percent did not provide reasons why.
- Perceived value-added (by user group):
  - Country authorities:
    - WEO: 85 percent found most helpful.
    - GFSR: 69 percent.
    - REO: 57 percent.
    - Fiscal Monitor, Early Warning/Vulnerability Exercises, cross-country thematic reports: less than 30 percent reported as most helpful.
  - Executive Directors:
    - Almost all reported WEO and GFSR most helpful.
    - Fiscal Monitor: 61 percent.
    - Early Warning/Vulnerability Exercises: 61 percent.
    - REOs: 50 percent.
    - Cross-country thematic reports: less than 40 percent.
  - Financial market participants:
    - 85 percent rely on Article IV reports at least to some extent.
    - 81 percent rely on WEO.
    - 65 percent rely on GFSR.
    - Over 90 percent considered comprehensiveness and analytical depth main strengths.
  - Media: almost all respondents reported credibility of Article IV reports satisfactory or very good.
  - CSOs:
    - 80 percent found analysis of developments and outlook most valuable.
    - Almost 70 percent perceived cross-country thematic aspects as valuable.
    - 40 percent considered Fund's communications on surveillance somewhat or much better than other comparable institutions.
- Perceived value-added across policy areas (country authorities):
  - Fiscal analysis ranked highest.
  - Macro-financial and financial sector policy issues ranked next.
  - Monetary policy: 38 percent reported strong contribution overall; 58 percent outside Europe.
  - Exchange rate issues: 27 percent reported strong contribution overall; 38 percent for non-European members.
  - Cross-country analysis and spillovers ranked lower.
- Variation across membership and traction:
  - Higher perceived value-added among African and Middle East country authorities vs European and Asian.
  - Non-G-20 vs G-20: higher perceived value-added among non-G-20.
  - Program countries perceived more value-added than non-program.
  - LIC authorities saw greatest value added, followed by emerging markets, then advanced countries.
  - Traction:
    - More than 70 percent of country authority survey respondents thought recent Article IV consultations generated policy debate at least to some extent.
    - More than 60 percent thought they fostered appropriate policy changes at least to some extent.
    - Traction highest among LICs and African countries; lowest among advanced economies and Asia Pacific.
    - 2009 IEO Report: least traction with advanced and large emerging market economies, most traction with PRGT-eligible countries.
  - Around 70 percent thought Fund's policy advice during the crisis was appropriately informed by political and social context.
  - More than 60 percent saw the need for policy advice to be more tailored to country circumstances.
  - Around 40 percent ranked better consistency of advice as high-priority improvement.
  - Almost 50 percent wanted greater use of cross-country comparisons.
  - Around 45 percent desired better quality of analysis.
  - Larger countries emphasized quality of analysis and consistency (around 60 percent).

### Where we stand on the four operational priorities — Risk assessment (selected findings)
- Four operational priorities (2008 TSR): risk assessment; multilateral perspective; financial sector surveillance and real-financial linkages; analysis of exchange rate and external stability risks.
- Tools and exercises:
  - Since 2008 the Fund and FSB have initiated regular Early Warning Exercises (EWEs).
  - EWE examines tail risks that would result in policy recommendations different from baseline WEO/GFSR/Fiscal Monitor.
  - Scope of vulnerability exercises expanded to include advanced economies; starting 2011, a Vulnerability Exercise for LICs introduced.
- Improvements in attention to risks:
  - More than 70 percent of country authority survey respondents noticed improvement in risk assessment at least to some extent vs pre-crisis.
  - Article IV staff report reviews: bottom-line messages took account of major risks to baseline in 78 percent of the sample reports.
    - Comparable ratio in 2008 TSR was 54 percent.
- Limitations and gaps:
  - Signaling risks for other countries seen as weaker; G-20, Asian, and Western Hemisphere authorities particularly critical.
  - Asian respondents: slightly over 50 percent reported no progress or little progress in risk assessment.
  - Transmission channels of risks:
    - 50 percent of Executive Director survey respondents indicated discussion of transmission channels in Article IV reports was insufficient.
    - More than 30 percent of financial market survey respondents shared this view.
  - Coverage of two-way macro-financial transmission channels in Article IV reports remained uneven despite some progress since 2008.

### Tail risks
- Authorities welcomed increased focus on systemic risks but called for further progress in identifying tail risks and tracing effects.
- More than a quarter of respondents to Executive Director and financial market surveys indicated discussion of tail risks in Article IV reports was insufficient.
- Review of 50 Article IV reports: tail risks discussed only in 16 percent of the sample.
- Mission chief survey: more than 90 percent reported authorities were open at least to some extent to discussing high probability risks; openness dropped below 70 percent for discussing tail risks.

### Multilateral perspective (spillovers and cross-country analysis)
- 2008 TSR recommendations reiterated: better integration of WEO/GFSR into Article IVs; more explicit discussion on inward spillovers; more discussion of outward spillovers for systemic members; better knowledge sharing within the Fund.
- Processes introduced since 2008:
  - Weekly cross-departmental surveillance meetings.
  - Changed briefing process for Article IV missions to enhance inter-departmental discussions.
  - Regional units set up in all area departments.
  - Spillover reports for five systemic economies prepared (surveys conducted before their release).
- Coverage and policy orientation remain uneven:
  - Around 20 percent of country authority survey respondents mentioned inward spillovers among areas they gained most insights from.
  - Perceived value added for outward spillovers: 6 percent (lowest).
  - Around three quarters of 50-sample Article IV reports explicitly covered inward spillover issues, but only 20 percent provided extensive analysis (scenarios and transmission mechanisms).
  - Only a third of sample reports drew lessons from other countries, though about 80 percent used some form of cross-country comparisons.
  - Majority of cross-country analyses were comparisons of indicators over a peer group.
- Constraints:
  - Resource and data limitations cited as constraints to routinely conducting spillover and cross-country analyses.

### Financial Sector Surveillance and Real-Financial Linkages
- Progress perceived greatest in financial sector analysis and advice since 2008, opinions vary by country group:
  - Advanced country authorities rated progress less favorably than emerging market countries and LICs.
  - G-20 authorities rated it less favorably than non-G-20.
  - Asian countries least convinced of progress.
- Article IV staff report review findings:
  - About 70 percent of sample reports provided rationale for prioritization and composition of proposed financial sector reforms.
  - No prioritization or reform proposals too general in about a quarter of the sample.
  - Coverage of macro-financial issues improved but uneven:
    - Less than half of sample reports discussed possible transmission of risks from financial to macro.
    - Just half discussed transmission from macro to financial channels.
- Mission chief survey: data limitations and cross-departmental coordination were key constraints.

### Analysis of Exchange Rate and External Stability Risks
- Technical quality:
  - Training and use of CGER methods improved consistency of exchange rate analysis.
  - Staff found more comprehensive use of CGER-based methods vs 2008.
  - 60 percent of mission chief survey respondents reported applicability of standard CGER-based methods to a country posed a challenge in writing a staff report.
- Perceptions:
  - Country authorities reported limited improvement in exchange rate analysis since 2008.
  - 40 percent of Executive Director survey respondents representing advanced countries indicated government agencies they liaise with did not rely on Article IV staff report at all on exchange rate issues.
  - Almost 60 percent of financial market participants saw no contribution to exchange rate issues in Article IV reports for advanced countries.
  - Executive Directors' perception of exchange rate aspects quality became less favorable: less than 40 percent noted aspects met expectations in many/most/all reports in 2011 versus more than 50 percent in 2008.
- Reasons for perception gap:
  - Article IV reports sometimes do not discuss details of exchange rate assessments.
  - No multilateral publication allows for comprehensive vision; analysis often focuses on exchange rate levels and insufficiently on capital/financial account risks.
  - Some interviewees dissatisfied with 2007 Decision implementation; perceived focus too much on exchange rates at expense of broader external stability.

### Other issues: capital flows and reserve adequacy
- Capital flows:
  - Staff increased efforts and expanded framework, but little progress perceived.
  - More than half of country authority survey respondents saw either no progress or only to a little extent in capital flows analysis vs pre-crisis.
  - More than 40 percent of Executive Director survey respondents reported coverage of capital flows in Article IV reports was insufficient.
- Reserve adequacy:
  - Article IV staff report reviews found discussions on reserve adequacy levels limited or unclear in about 60 percent of sample reports for countries with national currency.
  - Almost 40 percent of Executive Director survey respondents reported coverage of this issue in Article IV reports was insufficient.

### Candor, “silo” mentality, and evenhandedness
- Candor / diversity of views:
  - Almost all country authority survey respondents reported degree of candor in Article IV reports was adequate.
  - Almost half of financial market survey respondents regarded candor as a strength.
  - Media professionals rated candor less favorably compared with timeliness, evenhandedness, clarity, and credibility.
  - Mission chiefs:
    - About 60 percent reported authorities were largely/completely candid in dialogue.
    - More than 80 percent reported pressure from authorities constrained the mission’s work “not at all” or “to a little extent.”
    - Almost 20 percent reported pressures to “some/large/very large” extent.
  - Challenging authorities:
    - About 80 percent of mission chiefs reported they felt no, or little, difficulties in challenging authorities because of their better knowledge; remainder viewed it as a problem “to some/large” extent.
    - Article IV staff report reviews: 70 percent of sample reports clearly identified and explained dissenting views by the authorities.
  - Internal expression of views:
    - Almost a quarter of mission chiefs saw self-censorship as a factor inside the Fund making surveillance difficult at least some extent.
    - Almost 40 percent thought pressure not to express a dissenting view was a constraining factor at least some extent; higher among mission chiefs for G-20 and program countries.
- “Silo” mentality:
  - More than 50 percent of mission chief survey respondents reported difficulties working across departments and lack of knowledge sharing make surveillance work difficult at least to some extent.
  - Internal factors perceived among most serious constraints, next to data limitations.
  - Country authority interviews indicated perception that integration of multilateral and bilateral surveillance stymied by a still existing “silo” mentality.

### Evenhandedness and communication/readability
- Evenhandedness:
  - Country authority survey: only 38 percent agreed or strongly agreed “the IMF is evenhanded in its policy advice.”
  - Almost 30 percent of respondents from advanced and emerging market countries and almost 60 percent from G-20 countries disagreed.
  - Much lower disagreement among LICs (4 percent) and non-G-20 countries (12 percent).
  - Media survey: 85 percent rated evenhandedness of Article IV reports as very good or satisfactory (Satisfactory 52%; Very Good 33%; Poor 11%; Never use 4%).
- Communication and readability:
  - Media: around 70 percent saw Fund's communication much or somewhat better than other institutions.
  - CSO: 40 percent shared this view.
  - Article IV staff report readability (50-sample review):
    - Reports generally written in an accessible manner for a wide audience (Gunning Fog Index approximate range 9.8 to 11.4; Overall Average shown on chart).
    - Gunning Fog scores listed for main body (Table 7 extract): 10.70 10.70 11.26 10.51 10.44 10.63 10.31 11.09 10.39 10.83 10.66.
  - Consistency of messages:
    - Executive Directors and country authorities saw room for improvement in consistency across products.
    - Almost 90 percent of financial market survey respondents thought Fund’s messages from various products were clear and coherent to a large or very large extent.
    - TSR External Study noted review process prevents serious consistency problems but identified room for a consolidated overarching product with top-line messages.

### Article IV staff report review — sample and method
- Sample universe: 148 Article IV staff reports discussed by the Board between January 1, 2010 and April 30, 2011; 50 reports reviewed.
- Sample composition: includes 12 program countries.
- Review team: SPR economists; pairs reviewed each country with third reviewer resolving conflicts.
- Readability assessment: 2011 TSR used Gunning Fog index (computer); 2008 used Research Assistants assessing readability for college-educated reader.

### Appendix I — Selected tabulated results (extracts)
- Appendix I, Table 2 (Financial Sector Issues) — aggregate sample header: 28; multiple tabulated numeric strings preserved as presented (e.g., 2633050033679281729; "Yes" responses line: 66677842100563378678361; techniques and indicators tallies: a. 82751007575896787838382; b. 148228132211922816; etc.).
- Appendix I, Table 3 (Exchange Rate and External Stability Issues) — question header indicator: 23; answer counts presented as numeric strings (e.g., 16171182522224283311; "No" 8483899275787896726789); "Yes" for clear assessment of exchange rate level: 7875788388677878788376.
- Appendix I, Table 4 (Risk Assessment) — tail risk discussion tallies:
  - Passing reference: 4642671750671157505842.
  - More than passing reference with some analysis: 1417025022221311816.
  - Extensive substantive analysis: 2081150131156176026.
  - No: 20332283801113333316.
- Appendix I, Table 6 (Statistical Issues) — N/A line: 4417448306710043173347; data deficiencies discussed and remedial action proposed: 32424483833022614229.
- Appendix I, Table 7 (Candor and Communication) — sample tallies preserved (e.g., Other IFIs: 1433111700229172511; Private sector analysts: 1417112501133136816; "None": 76508967100895678836779; "Yes" self-contained statement assessing past surveillance: 4458563325441139678332; "No reason(s) provided" where past advice not followed: 3667113325333326504234).

### Appendix II — Stakeholder surveys: methodology, sample statistics, and key survey results
- Surveys conducted: country authorities; Executive Directors; mission chiefs; financial markets; media; CSOs; think tanks (think tanks had 241 contacted, 5 percent response rate; not incorporated).
- Response rates and counts:
  - Country Authorities: Number of Respondents: 121; surveys sent: 368; Participation Rate: 32.9%
  - Executive Directors: Number of Respondents: 18; surveys sent: 24; Participation Rate: 75.0%
  - Mission Chiefs: Number of Respondents: 95; surveys sent: 154; Participation Rate: 61.7%
  - Financial Markets respondents: 41 out of 300; Participation Rate: 13.7%
  - Media: 28 out of 88; Participation Rate: 32.2%
  - CSOs: 17 out of 45; Participation Rate: 37.8%
  - Think Tanks: 12 out of 24; Participation Rate: 15.0%
- Country Authorities survey selected metrics:
  - Aggregate responses: 121 (Advanced 48; Emerging 44; Low-income 27).
  - Thematic coverage percentages (Country Authorities' view of Fund staff policy advice coverage — "During the aftermath of the global financial crisis Fund staff has provided policy advice that has ..."):
    - Monetary developments and policy issues: 38
    - Fiscal developments and policy issues: 62
    - Exchange rate regime and exchange rate policy: 24
    - Exchange rate level and competitiveness: 27
    - Financial sector vulnerabilities: 49
    - Regulatory and supervisory issues: 40
    - Potential macroeconomic/external stability implications of financial sector developments: 42
    - Impact on economy of developments elsewhere (inward spillovers): 21
    - Impact of domestic developments on other economies (outward spillovers): 6
    - Lessons from experience in other countries: 40
- Selected survey results — Country Authorities (Question 2 scope of surveillance insights):
  - Overall distribution: Not at all 35; To a little extent 17; To some extent 39; To a great extent 8; To a very great extent 1. Weighted average score 2.23.
  - LIC weighted average score: 2.96.
  - G-20 weighted average score: 1.88; Non-G-20 2.31.
- Improvements since pre-global crisis (Question 3) — selected weighted averages:
  - Exchange rate analysis and advice overall weighted average score 3.15.
  - Financial sector analysis and advice overall weighted average score 3.01.
  - Analysis related to management of capital flows overall weighted average score 3.03.
- Risk discussion and incorporation (Questions 4–5):
  - As presented in latest Article IV staff report: Appropriate 91; Excessive 5; Insufficient 3. Overall appropriateness weighted average 4.73.
  - As discussed with the mission: Appropriate 94; Excessive 3; Insufficient 3. Overall weighted average 4.81.
  - "The Article IV staff report appropriately weighted and incorporated various risks": Strongly agree 7; Agree 67; Neutral 22; Disagree 4. Weighted average score 3.76.
  - Risk assessment signaled by Fund advice: For your country Yes 65; No 35. For other countries Yes 61; No 39.
- Frequency, timing, quality of engagement:
  - Frequency of Article IV missions: Too infrequently 9; Adequate 86; Too frequently 5. Weighted average 2.92.
  - Did recent Article IV consultations generate policy debate: Not at all 6; To a little extent 21; To some extent 45; To a great extent 27; To a very great extent 1. Weighted average 2.96.
  - Foster appropriate policy change: Not at all 12; To a little extent 27; To some extent 43; To a great extent 16; To a very great extent 3. Weighted average 2.72.
- Candor and evenhandedness:
  - Degree of candor in most recent Article IV staff report: Excessive 2; Insufficient 2; Appropriate 97. Weighted average 4.90.
  - Delivery of more candid messages separately rather than in staff report: No 49; Yes 51.
  - "The IMF is evenhanded in its policy advice": Strongly disagree 2; Disagree 21; Neutral 39; Agree 35; Strongly agree 3. Weighted average 3.15.
- Use of multilateral products:
  - WEO: 85 overall.
  - GFSR: 69 overall.
  - Fiscal Monitor: 29 overall.
  - Early Warning/Vulnerabilities Exercises: 27 overall.
  - REO: 57 overall.
- Executive Directors survey (selected weighted averages and distributions):
  - Example weighted average scores: Fund staff policy advice aftermath weighted average 3.39 overall.
  - Reliance on Article IV staff reports by topic (weighted averages): Exchange rate policy 3.50; Financial sector policies 3.28; Macro-financial issues 3.33; Fiscal policy 2.22.

### Mission chiefs, financial markets, media, CSO survey highlights (selected)
- Mission Chiefs (95 respondents):
  - Scope to focus greater attention on inward spillovers: 95 percent overall signaled scope (table-level context).
  - Data needs reported: More frequent national account data 42; More frequent general government fiscal data 29; Quarterly sector balance sheet data 27; More detailed IIP data 24; More detailed FDI data 24; Real estate property prices 23.
  - Analytical inputs used in consultations: Financial soundness indicators (FSIs) 85 percent; Support from functional departments 44 percent; Recent FSAP or FSAP update 42 percent; Stress test and scenario analysis 57 percent; Network analysis 3 percent.
- Financial Markets survey (41 respondents):
  - Reliance on IMF tools — Article IV staff reports weighted average score 3.85; WEO 3.76; GFSR 3.00; Fiscal Monitor 3.03.
  - Main strengths of IMF country reports: Evenhandedness mean/score 4.88; Comprehensiveness 4.82; Analytical depth 4.48.
- Media survey (28 respondents):
  - Around 70 percent saw Fund communication much or somewhat better than comparable institutions.
  - Readability and ratings: Article IV reports rated Satisfactory/Very Good by majority; weighted average example 3.86.
  - Suggestions: fewer reports, clearer abstracts, more direct language, faster release, more local engagement.
- CSO survey (17 respondents):
  - 80 percent found analysis of developments and outlook most valuable.
  - Comparative assessment of IMF communications vs others: Much better 2; Somewhat better 4; About the same 6; Somewhat worse 2; Much worse 1. Weighted average score 2.88.

### Common reform and improvement themes from stakeholders (synthesis of comments)
- Improve tailoring of policy advice to country circumstances; increase use of cross-country comparisons.
- Improve quality and specificity of analysis and policy recommendations; greater functional department participation on missions.
- Strengthen risk assessment, especially transmission channels and tail risks; expand vulnerability and EWE analyses to advanced economies and LICs.
- Enhance coverage and quantified analysis of inward and outward spillovers; improve multilateral-bilateral integration.
- Strengthen financial sector surveillance and two-way macro-financial linkage analysis; address data limitations and ensure mission access to supervisory/bank-by-bank data.
- Improve exchange rate analysis applicability and transparency; refine CGER application and implementation of 2007 Decision.
- Address candor, evenhandedness, and internal “silo” constraints; reduce pressures leading to self-censorship and promote knowledge sharing across departments.
- Increase transparency and timeliness of publication and of underlying assumptions; consider mandatory publication and boxes on follow-up of past advice.
- Streamline multilateral products to reduce duplication (WEO, GFSR, Fiscal Monitor, REOs); produce concise, consistent top-line messages.
- Operational suggestions: stabilize mission teams, provide more country-level experts, improve data infrastructure, and consider governance/mandate reforms to strengthen surveillance on systemic stability and capital flows.

*Italic: Source: 2011 TSR — section "1. Overview", Article IV staff report reviews, mission chief and other surveys, Appendix I and Appendix II extracts as provided in _082611b.*

### 1. Overview. This paper (a) provides a snapshot of the overall value added of Fund‘s

### 1. Overview

### Methodology
- Relies on various stakeholders' surveys: country authorities; Executive Directors; IMF mission chiefs; financial market participants; media; and civil society organizations.  
- Includes interviews by former senior Fund staff of country authorities (mainly at the time of the 2011 Spring Meetings) to analyze stakeholders' perception (TSR External Report on Interviews with Country Authorities).  
- Relies on a review by staff of 50 Article IV staff reports issued from January 2010 through April 2011.  

### Purpose of the paper
- (a) provides a snapshot of the overall value added of Fund's surveillance perceived by stakeholders;  
- (b) details where the Fund stands in terms of four operational priorities set out in the 2008 TSR;  
- (c) examines key issues identified in the recent IEO paper on the IMF performance in the run up to the global crisis; and  
- (d) discusses stakeholders' perception on the communication aspects of surveillance.  

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### Overall value-added of surveillance, traction, and areas for progress

- Scope: snapshot of perceptions related to effectiveness, value added, and areas for future progress in Fund surveillance; coverage of basic macro issues and follow up on past policy advice in Article IV staff reports.

Findings on crisis policy advice
- About 80 percent of respondents to the country authority and Executive Director surveys thought that the Fund's advice during the global crisis has taken into account changing economic conditions in the global economy and their own country.  
- Around 70 percent thought that Fund's advice has been timely, but views varied across country groups:  
  - Asia: only 36 percent of respondents agreed that it was timely.  
  - G-20 countries: only 50 percent of respondents agreed that it was timely.

Coverage in Article IV staff reports
- Article IV staff report reviews of the 50 sample reports found:  
  - All basic macro policy areas were covered.  
  - Virtually all reports provided a rationale and justification for recommended fiscal and monetary policy adjustments and stance.  
  - Virtually all reports covered core financial sector issues.  
  - Virtually all reports provided a clear assessment of the exchange rate level.  
  - All sample staff reports clearly identified the baseline scenario and discussed key medium-term challenges.  
- This represents progress compared with the 2008 TSR when about a quarter of the sample reports did not clearly describe the baseline medium-term scenario.

Follow up of past policy advice
- Fund advice was not followed in 64 percent of the cases.  
- Among countries where past Fund advice was not followed, around 56 percent did not provide reasons why, despite the Bilateral Surveillance Guidance Note stipulating follow up on previous policy recommendations.  
- The lack of follow up may be an impediment to the traction of surveillance.

Perceived value-added: country authorities' general perception
- Main value-added of bilateral surveillance seen as provision of an integrated view of the main economic and financial challenges facing the country and new insights to policy interactions.  
- Small emerging markets and LICs highlighted valuable specific technical inputs that helped domestic policy making and supported internal policy coordination.  
- Larger countries valued multilateral surveillance more than smaller ones.

Perceived value-added across Fund products
- Country authorities:  
  - 85 percent noted WEO was most helpful in sharpening their views.  
  - 69 percent noted GFSR.  
  - 57 percent noted REO.  
  - Less than 30 percent reported Fiscal Monitor, Early Warning/Vulnerability Exercises, and cross-country thematic reports as most helpful.  
- Executive Directors:  
  - Almost all reported WEO and GFSR most helpful for understanding global stability risks.  
  - Fiscal Monitor: 61 percent.  
  - Early Warning/Vulnerability Exercises: 61 percent.  
  - REOs: 50 percent.  
  - Less than 40 percent for cross-country thematic reports.  
- Financial market participants:  
  - 85 percent rely on Article IV reports at least to some extent.  
  - 81 percent rely on WEO.  
  - 65 percent rely on GFSR.  
  - Over 90 percent considered comprehensiveness and analytical depth of surveillance reports as their main strength.  
- Media: almost all respondents reported that the credibility of Article IV reports was satisfactory or very good.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)
- 80 percent of CSO survey respondents found analysis of developments and outlook the most valuable aspects of the Fund's surveillance products.  
- Almost 70 percent perceived cross-country thematic aspects as valuable.  
- 40 percent considered the Fund's communications on surveillance as somewhat or much better than other comparable international financial institutions, government agencies and think tanks.

Perceived relative value-added across policy areas
- Country authorities ranked contribution of Fund surveillance highest for fiscal analysis, followed by macro-financial and financial sector policy issues.  
- Monetary policy contribution ranked lower overall; 38 percent of country authority respondents reported Fund's analysis of monetary policy contributed strongly, with this figure rising to 58 percent outside of Europe.  
- For exchange rate issues, overall 27 percent of country authority respondents reported Fund's analysis contributed strongly, with this figure rising to 38 percent for non-European members.  
- Cross-country analysis and spillovers (inward and outward) were ranked lower.

Variation across membership
- Higher perceived value-added among African and Middle East country authorities compared to European and Asian counterparts.  
- Higher perceived value-added among non-G-20 compared to G-20 authorities.  
- Program countries perceived more value-added than non-program countries.  
- LIC authorities saw the greatest value added in Fund's surveillance across policy areas, followed by emerging markets, with lower value-added perceived for advanced countries.  
- Executive Directors perceived surveillance most valuable for LICs; financial market participants echoed these results.

Traction of bilateral surveillance
- More than 70 percent of respondents to the country authority survey thought recent Article IV consultations generated policy debate at least to some extent.  
- More than 60 percent thought they fostered appropriate policy changes at least to some extent.  
- Perceived traction varied across country groups: highest among LICs and African countries; lowest among advanced economies and Asia Pacific; less traction perceived by G-20 compared to non-G-20 and by non-program versus program cases.  
- The 2009 IEO Report on IMF Interactions with Member Countries found least traction with advanced and large emerging market economies, and most traction with PRGT-eligible countries.  
- Some authorities noted staff sometimes lacked the political savvy needed to gain traction among policy makers, parliaments, unions, civil society, and public opinion.

Areas for future progress (country authority views)
- Almost 70 percent thought the Fund's policy advice during the crisis has been appropriately informed by the political and social context.  
- More than 60 percent saw the need for policy advice to be more tailored to country circumstances to strengthen Fund surveillance.  
- Around 40 percent ranked better consistency of advice as a high-priority improvement.  
- Almost 50 percent indicated they would like to see greater use of cross-country comparisons in the future.  
- Around 45 percent indicated a desire for better quality of analysis.  
- Larger countries emphasized improvements in quality of analysis and the need for more consistency of advice (around 60 percent).

---

### Where we stand on the four operational priorities — Risk assessment (selected findings)

- The four operational priorities identified in the 2008 TSR: risk assessment; multilateral perspective; financial sector surveillance and real-financial linkages; and analysis of exchange rate and external stability risks.  
- The 2008 TSR called for: (i) greater attention to risks around the baseline; (ii) an improved toolkit to quantify high probability risk assessment; and (iii) a more systemic approach to tail risks in Article IV consultations.

Toolkit and exercises
- Since 2008 the Fund and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) have initiated regular Early Warning Exercises (EWEs).  
- The EWE examines tail risks to the global economy that would result in policy recommendations different from those generated by the baseline scenario in the WEO, GFSR, and the Fiscal Monitor.  
- The EWE seeks to identify vulnerabilities and triggers that could precipitate systemic crises and identifies risk-mitigating policies including those requiring international cooperation.  
- As part of the EWE, the scope of the vulnerability exercises was expanded to include advanced economies.  
- Starting 2011, a Vulnerability Exercise for LICs has been introduced.

Improvements in attention to risks
- More than 70 percent of respondents to the country authority survey noticed an improvement in the quality of risk assessment at least to some extent compared with pre-global crisis Article IV consultations.  
- Article IV staff report reviews found bottom-line messages took account of the major risks to the baseline scenario in 78 percent of the sample reports.  
- Comparable ratio in the 2008 TSR was 54 percent.

Limitations and gaps
- While a large majority thought the discussion of risks was appropriate for their own country, this ratio dropped significantly for signaling risks for other countries; G-20, Asian, and Western Hemisphere country authorities were particularly critical of the Fund's ability to adequately signal risks for other countries.  
- Respondents from Asian countries were less convinced of progress in risk assessment: slightly over 50 percent of them reported no progress or progress only to a little extent.  
- There is scope for improvement on transmission channels of risks:  
  - 50 percent of Executive Director survey respondents indicated that the discussion of transmission channels of risks in the Article IV reports was insufficient.  
  - More than 30 percent of respondents to the financial market survey shared this view.  
- Coverage of two-way macro-financial possible transmission channels in Article IV staff reports remained uneven despite some progress since 2008.

*Source: 2011 TSR — section "1. Overview" and associated analysis.*

### 19. There is also scope for

### 19. There is also scope for

### Tail risks
- Authorities welcomed increased focus on analysis of systemic risks but identified a need for further progress in identifying tail risks and tracing the effects of their possible realization (i.e., connecting the dots).
- More than a quarter of respondents to the Executive Director and financial market surveys indicated that the discussion of tail risks in the Article IV reports was insufficient.
- Review of 50 Article IV reports found that tail risks were discussed only in 16 percent of the sample (Chart 8, Statistical Appendix I, Table 4).
- More than 90 percent of respondents to the mission chief survey reported that authorities were open at least to some extent to discussing high probability risks; this ratio dropped below 70 percent for discussion of tail risks (Statistical Appendix II, Table 3).

### Multilateral perspective (spillover and cross-country analysis)
- 2008 TSR recommendations reiterated: (i) better integration of the WEO/GFSR into Article IV staff reports; (ii) more explicit discussion on inward spillover effects; (iii) more discussion of outward spillovers for systemic members; and (iv) better knowledge and information sharing within the Fund.
- Since 2008, new processes introduced to enhance integration and knowledge sharing:
  - Weekly cross-departmental surveillance meetings to improve knowledge and information sharing between functional and area departments.
  - Briefing process for Article IV consultation missions changed to enhance inter-departmental discussions and knowledge sharing.
  - Regional units set up in all area departments to improve coverage of regional inter linkages.
  - Spillover reports of five systemic economies prepared (surveys and analysis in this paper were conducted before their release).
- Coverage and policy orientation of spillover and cross-country analyses remain uneven.
- Authorities view spillover analysis less favorably than other areas of Fund surveillance:
  - Only about 20 percent of country authority survey respondents mentioned inward spillovers among the areas from which they gained the most contribution to their insights from Fund surveillance (see Chart 2).
  - Respondents from advanced economies and LICs viewed the value added less favorably than emerging market countries.
  - Perceived value added for outward spillovers was 6 percent of overall respondents—the lowest relative to other policy areas.
- Uneven coverage of spillovers:
  - Around three quarters of the 50-sample Article IV reports explicitly covered inward spillover issues—a result similar to the 2008 TSR—but only 20 percent provided extensive analysis (possible scenarios and transmission mechanisms) to document implications and policy recommendations (Chart 9).
  - Country authorities requested more detailed discussion, based on quantified scenarios, of risks posed by international developments (inward spillovers) and more analysis of transmission of financial disturbances across borders.
- Cross-country analysis:
  - Current cross-country analysis receives higher marks in contribution than spillovers—40 percent of country authority survey respondents viewed Fund surveillance in this area as contributing most to their insights (see Chart 2).
  - Review of 50 Article IV reports found that only a third of sample reports drew lessons from other countries‘ experiences, though about 80 percent used some form of cross-country comparisons or analyses (Chart 10).
  - Majority of cross-country analyses were comparisons of indicators over a peer group.
  - Authorities want greater emphasis on presenting and discussing international comparisons and experiences relevant to their countries.
- Challenges to enhanced analyses:
  - About a third of respondents to the mission chief survey saw scope to focus greater attention on inward spillovers in future Article IV consultations to a large or very large extent.
  - Almost half of mission chiefs saw scope to focus greater attention on cross-country analyses to a large or very large extent.
  - Resource and data limitations were cited as constraints to routinely conducting spillover and cross-country analyses (Chart 11); these were also major constraints in the 2008 TSR.

### Financial Sector Surveillance and Real-Financial Linkages
- 2008 TSR called for (i) greater integration of financial risks to real sector and vice versa; and (ii) more specificity of policy advice.
- Progress since 2008 perceived greatest in financial sector analysis and advice (see Chart 6), though opinions vary across country groups:
  - Advanced country authorities rated progress less favorably than emerging market countries and LICs.
  - G-20 authorities rated it less favorably than non-G-20 authorities.
  - Across regions, Asian countries are the least convinced of progress.
- Article IV staff report reviews found:
  - About 70 percent of sample reports provided rationale for prioritization and composition of proposed financial sector reforms.
  - No prioritization provided or reform proposals were too general in about a quarter of the sample.
  - Coverage of macro-financial issues improved since 2008 but remains uneven:
    - Less than half of the sample reports discussed possible transmission of risks from financial to macro.
    - Just half discussed transmission from macro to financial channels (see Chart 8).
- Mission chief survey indicated that data limitations and cross-departmental coordination were key constraints to progress on financial sector analysis and recommendations (Chart 12).

### Analysis of Exchange Rate and External Stability Risks
- 2008 TSR called for (i) better integration of ER assessment and macro analysis; and (ii) greater transparency in ER assessment.
- Progress in technical quality:
  - Review of Article IV reports suggests training and use of CGER methods have improved consistency of Fund‘s exchange rate analysis.
  - Compared with 2008, staff found more comprehensive use of CGER-based methods and more robust exchange rate analysis (Chart 13).
  - However, 60 percent of respondents to the mission chief survey reported that applicability of standard CGER-based methods to a country posed a challenge in writing a staff report.
- Perception on exchange rate analysis:
  - Country authorities reported limited improvement in exchange rate analysis since 2008 (see Chart 6).
  - 40 percent of Executive Director survey respondents representing advanced countries indicated government agencies they liaise with did not rely on the Article IV staff report at all on exchange rate issues.
  - Almost 60 percent of financial market participants saw no contribution to this issue in the Article IV reports for advanced countries.
  - Executive Directors‘ perception of quality of exchange rate aspects in staff reports became less favorable compared with 2008 TSR: less than 40 percent noted aspects met expectations in many/most/all reports in 2011 versus more than 50 percent in 2008.
- Perception versus technical progress:
  - Technical quality improved, but stakeholder perceptions of exchange rate policy advice are somewhat unfavorable.
  - Contributing factors: Article IV reports sometimes do not discuss details of exchange rate assessments; no multilateral publication allows for a comprehensive vision; analysis often focuses primarily on exchange rate levels and insufficiently on risks from capital and financial account.
  - Some interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with the implementation of the 2007 Decision, noting it focused too much on exchange rates at the expense of broader external stability issues.
  - Authorities argued Fund advice on exchange rate policies was sometimes too generic and insufficiently focused on policy implementation.

### Other issues
- Capital flows:
  - Fund staff has recently increased efforts and expanded analytical framework, but work is still in progress and little progress is perceived.
  - More than half of country authority survey respondents saw either no progress at all or only to a little extent in analysis related to management of capital flows compared with the pre-crisis period.
  - More than 40 percent of respondents to the Executive Director survey reported coverage of capital flows in Article IV reports was insufficient.
- Reserve adequacy:
  - Article IV staff report reviews found discussions on reserve adequacy levels were either limited or unclear in about 60 percent of sample reports for countries with their own national currency.
  - Almost 40 percent of respondents to the Executive Director survey reported coverage of this issue in Article IV reports was insufficient.

### Candor, “silo” mentality, and evenhandedness
- Scope: examines candor/encouraging diversity of views; a “silo” mentality; and evenhandedness, in light of recent IEO report recommendations on IMF performance in the run up to the crisis.
- Candor / Encouraging a diversity of views:
  - Mixed perceptions about degree of candor in surveillance reports:
    - Almost all country authority survey respondents reported degree of candor in Article IV reports was adequate.
    - Almost half of financial market survey respondents regarded candor as a strength of Article IV reports.
    - Media professionals rated candor less favorably compared with timeliness, evenhandedness, clarity, and credibility.
  - Mission chiefs‘ perception:
    - About 60 percent of mission chief survey respondents reported authorities were largely/completely candid in dialogue with the mission.
    - More than 80 percent reported pressure from authorities constrained the mission‘s work “not at all” or “to a little extent.”
    - Almost 20 percent reported pressures to “some/large/very large” extent (Chart 14).
  - Challenging the authorities‘ view:
    - 2011 IEO Report noted IMF staff felt uncomfortable challenging authorities in advanced economies on monetary and regulatory issues.
    - About 80 percent of mission chief survey respondents reported they felt no, or little, difficulties in challenging authorities because of their better knowledge; the remainder viewed this as a problem “to some/large” extent (Chart 15).
    - Article IV staff report reviews found 70 percent of sample reports clearly identified and explained dissenting views by the authorities (Statistical Appendix I, Table 7).
    - Differences between mission chief and economist perceptions may exist due to differing survey samples.
  - Expressing diversity of views among staff:
    - Almost a quarter of mission chief survey respondents saw self-censorship as a factor inside the Fund that makes surveillance difficult at least some extent (Chart 16).
    - Almost 40 percent thought pressure not to express a dissenting view (group-think) was a constraining factor at least some extent; ratio higher among mission chiefs for G-20 and program countries.
- “Silo” mentality:
  - More than 50 percent of mission chief survey respondents reported difficulties working across departments and lack of knowledge sharing make surveillance work difficult at least to some extent (Chart 16).
  - These internal factors perceived as among the most serious constraints on surveillance, next to data limitations.
  - Country authority interviews indicated a perception that efforts to integrate multilateral and bilateral surveillance were stymied by a still existing “silo” mentality.

*Source: _082611b - 19. There is also scope for (Article IV staff report reviews, mission chief and other surveys, and 2011 TSR analysis).*

### 40. There are differences of

### _082611b - 40. There are differences of

### Evenhandedness
- Survey finding (country authority survey): only 38 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the sentence “the IMF is evenhanded in its policy advice.”
- Disagreement by group: almost 30 percent of respondents from advanced and emerging market countries and almost 60 percent from G-20 countries disagreed.
- Footnote qualifiers: this ratio was much lower among respondents from LICs (4 percent) and non-G-20 countries (12 percent).
- Qualitative feedback: many written comments by country authorities indicated concern on evenhandedness, mostly of the “too soft on large systemic countries” variety; country authorities echoed this perception in interviews.
- Historical note: in the 2008 TSR, a similar concern was voiced by some Executive Directors in their written comments.
- Media survey perception: 85 percent of respondents to the media survey rated evenhandedness of Article IV reports as very good or satisfactory.
- Chart 18 breakdown (media survey rating of evenhandedness of AIV reports):
  - Satisfactory, 52%
  - Very Good, 33%
  - Poor, 11%
  - Never use, 4%

### Communication and readability
- Media and CSO perceptions:
  - Around 70 percent of respondents to the media survey saw that the Fund‘s communication was much or somewhat better than that of other comparable international institutions or government agencies.
  - 40 percent of respondents to the CSO Survey shared this view.
- Article IV staff report readability:
  - Review of 50 Article IV staff reports found that reports were generally written in an accessible manner for readability by a wide audience (typically high school level) (Chart 19).
  - Gunning Fog index context: the Gunning Fog Index measures the readability of English writing; the index ranges from 6 to 20 and estimates the years of formal education needed to understand the text on a first reading. Texts for a wide audience generally require an index less than 12.
  - Chart 19 (Article IV Health Check - Gunning Fog Index) shows values in the approximate range 9.8 to 11.4 across regions and categories with an Overall Average indicated on the chart.

- Consistency of messages:
  - Executive Directors and country authorities saw room for improvement in terms of the consistency of messages across various products; some Executive Directors pointed to the need to reduce overlaps and improve consistency and coherence of messages among various products.
  - By contrast, almost 90 percent of respondents to the financial market survey thought that the Fund‘s messages from various products were clear and coherent to a large or very large extent.
  - TSR External Study — IMF Surveillance: Coverage, Consistency, and Coherence found that the review process seemed to prevent serious consistency problems among various products, but identified room for a consolidated overarching product with top-line messages across policy areas.

### Article IV staff report review — Methodology and sample
- Review purpose: a representative sample of Article IV reports was internally reviewed to collect standardized qualitative information across main diagnostic questions.
- Review team and process:
  - Review conducted by SPR economists.
  - A sample of 50 reports/countries was reviewed to allow for more qualitative and in-depth review.
  - Pairs of economists reviewed each country and met to compare responses; conflicting views were resolved by a third reviewer.
  - The team member responsible for the Health Check Chapter checked results across the 50-country sample for accuracy and consistency.
  - Countries were divided among reviewers to ensure diversity in area departments, income level, and Fund program status.
- Readability assessment change from 2008 to 2011:
  - 2011 TSR used the Gunning Fog index to automatically measure readability by computer software.
  - In 2008, Research Assistants in SPR reviewed staff reports to assess readability and clarity from the perspective of “an average college-educated reader.”
- Sample selection details:
  - The sample universe includes 148 Article IV consultation staff reports discussed by the Board between January 1, 2010 and April 30, 2011. In case a country had two Article IV consultations completed during this period, only the latest one is included in the sample universe.
  - Membership was stratified by income group (advanced, emerging, and developing/low-income) and by region (5 regions according to area department); percentages of the membership within each strata were calculated and a target number of countries was specified (based on a total of 50 staff reports) to match the percentage of the membership within each strata.
  - In each strata, a random number ranging from 0 to 1 was assigned to each country, and then countries with the highest score within each strata were drawn to match the target number as closely as possible.
  - Definition of income group classification:
    - Advanced: advanced economies according to the WEO classification in October 2010;
    - Emerging markets: countries that fall into neither advanced nor developing/low-income;
    - Developing/low-income: all PRGT-eligible countries (listed in Appendix I of the Board paper Emerging from the Global Crisis: Macroeconomic Challenges Facing Low-Income Countries).
- Sample composition: the sample includes 12 program countries.

### Statistical Appendix I — Results overview (as summarized)
- Results are summarized in Tables 1 through 7 of Statistical Appendix I.
- Appendix I, Table 1 (Summary of Article IV Staff Report Review - Basic Macro Issues) covers items including:
  - Whether baseline scenario is clearly identified and medium-term challenges discussed.
  - Consistency of description of baseline with numerical presentation.
  - Clarity and detail of recommended medium-term and short-term fiscal policy objectives and whether short-term fiscal measures are put in a clear medium-term fiscal road map.
  - Justification for magnitude, pace, and composition of recommended fiscal change where adjustment is recommended.
  - Adequacy and clarity of assessment of the monetary policy stance and justification/risks for recommended monetary policy adjustments.
  - Discussion of reserve adequacy/level and metrics used to assess reserve adequacy (e.g., reserve in months of imports of goods and services; reserve to short-term external debt ratio; reserve to monetary aggregates).
  - Treatment of scenario analysis (country-specific scenario analysis, comparison to peers, model based).
  - Whether fiscal/monetary exit strategies are elaborated and implications discussed when loosening occurred in 2009 or 2010.

- Appendix I, Table 2 (Summary of Article IV Staff Report Review - Financial Sector Issues) covers items including:
  - Coverage of sectors (banks, non-banks, markets).
  - Identification of key risks/vulnerabilities and contagion risks and cross-border spillovers.
  - Coverage of regulation and supervision framework.
  - Use of quantitative analysis (Financial soundness indicators (FSIs); other market indicators; stress tests/scenario analysis/network analysis) and qualitative analysis (weaknesses in financial structure/infrastructure; contagion analysis).
  - Information sources used (SIP/previous staff analysis; discussions with market participants/credit rating agencies; reference to FSAP or FSAP update; WEO/GFSR/EWE/VEA/VEE).
  - Whether reports provide clearly justified policy recommendations on monitoring, strengthening supervision, crisis management (including capital injections and deposit insurance guarantees)/exit from extraordinary measures, supporting macroeconomic policy measures, and how to address financial sector development concerns.
  - Integration of FSAP findings where applicable and follow-up on FSAP findings within the last 5 years.

*Source: _082611b - 40. There are differences of (2011 TSR content provided in the supplied PDF).*

### Appendix I, Table 2. Summary of Article IV Staff Report Review - Financial Sector Issues

### Appendix I, Table 2. Summary of Article IV Staff Report Review - Financial Sector Issues

### Coverage and Overall Responses
- Aggregate sample size indicators in table header: 28
- Tabulated answer counts (as presented): 2633050033679281729
- "Yes" responses line: 66677842100563378678361
- "No because the report does not describe policies that relate to the exchange rate clearly.": 201100000603
- "No because the report describes policies that relate to the exchange rate but does not give a view on their appropriateness for the member.": 200001104003
- "No because the depth of analysis is too shallow.": 401180009005
- Additional "Yes" line: 92100788310010089919410089
- Additional "No" line: 802217001196011
- Another "Yes" line: 821006775100677883839279
- "No because no analysis presented": 4008011114005
- "No because sophistication/ depth of analysis is limited.": 802280111196011
- "No because critical features of methodologies and/or key assumptions are not disclosed or, presented in a "black box" way.": 60118011041185
- "No because analysis/conclusions appear to be either not taking into account all important factors or internally inconsistent (at odds with other facts presented in the report).": 00000000000

### Techniques and Indicators Used (as listed)
- a. Basic indicators (e.g. REER, market shares, export growth, unit labor costs, etc): 82751007575896787838382
- b. PPP approaches (e.g. weighted average relative prices, WARP): 148228132211922816
- c. Macro economic balance approach: 8092788363788974837582
- d. External sustainability approach: 7492678363568983566776
- e. Equilibrium real exchange rate approach: 7892567575898978727579
- f. External vulnerabilities (discussion of effects of capital inflows, capital restrictions, FX intervention or changes in reserves): 282533333811043221732
- g. Other (please specify): 2084483811022285011

### Adjustments for Member-Specific Circumstances
- "No clear adjustments for member specific circumstances": 5250676713566757395850
- "Allowances made for member circumstances and are clearly justified": 4033332588333339443342
- "Allowances made for member circumstances and are unclear": 81708011041788

*Italic: Source: _082611b - Appendix I, Table 2. Summary of Article IV Staff Report Review - Financial Sector Issues (extracts as provided)*

---

### Appendix I, Table 3. Summary of Article IV Staff Report Review - Exchange Rate and External Stability Issues

### Questions 23–27: Exchange Rate Appraisal and Techniques
- Table header indicator: 23.
- "For countries with exchange rate policies (i.e. not pure floaters), does the report provide a reasoned appraisal of the member’s policies with respect to the exchange rate?"
  - Answer counts (by category): 16171182522224283311
  - "No": 8483899275787896726789
- "Does the report provide a clear assessment of the exchange rate level?"
  - "Yes": 7875788388677878788376
  - "No because only some of the major risks to baseline MT/LT scenario appear to be appropriately incorporated in the bottom-line messages.": 202522813332217221721
  - "No because no policy advice stemming from identified risks appear to have been incorporated in the bottom-line messages of the SR.": 20080004003

*Italic: Source: Appendix I, Table 3 (extracts as provided)*

---

### Appendix I, Table 4. Summary of Article IV Staff Report Review - Risk Assessment

### Questions 28–29: Tail Risks and Major Risks in Policy Messages
- Table header indicator: 28.–29.
- "Does the staff report discuss tail risks?"
  - "Yes. Passing reference (acknowledging effects and risks in general terms).": 4642671750671157505842
  - "Yes. More than passing reference, with some analysis.": 1417025022221311816
  - "Yes. Extensive substantive analysis (e.g. possible scenarios and transmission mechanisms to show size of problem and policy implications).": 2081150131156176026
  - "No": 20332283801113333316
- "Are the major risks to baseline MT/LT scenario taken into account in the policy messages of the SR?"
  - "No use of cross-country analysis.": 2217111750222226174216
  - "Some use of cross-country analysis": 445844253856039725839
  - "Extensive use of cross-country analysis": 342544581322783511045
  - "Comparison of indicators over a peer group": 7683897550786774835882
  - "Narrative illustrating experience of one or several other countries": 2625334213115622171729
  - "Econometric analysis seeking to assess appropriateness of policy": 60017130224008
  - "Other": 6002500330008
  - "Regional trends": 5850448338677848614263
  - "Global trends": 26331142033333511832
  - "Drawing relevant policy lessons from similarly-placed economies": 3242562513223335281737
  - "Other": 201100000603

*Italic: Source: Appendix I, Table 4 (extracts as provided)*

---

### Appendix I, Table 5. Summary of Article IV Staff Report Review - Multilateral Perspective

### Questions 30–33: Multilateral Impacts and Cross-Country Analysis
- Table header indicator: 30.–33.
- "Are the impacts of global economic and financial developments or policies of other countries (systemic countries or trading partners) discussed in the report?"
  - Aggregate indicator in header: 31
- "How extensive is the use of cross-country analysis in the Staff Report?"
  - "Yes. Passing reference (acknowledging effects and risks in general terms)." (see Appendix I, Table 4 entries above for cross-country categories used)
- "If cross-country analysis is used in the Staff Report, what type of analysis is it? (check all that apply.)"
  - Types reported (see Appendix I, Table 4 list above): comparison of indicators over a peer group; narrative illustrating experience of other countries; econometric analysis; regional trends; global trends; drawing relevant policy lessons; other.
- "If cross-country analysis is used in the Staff Report, what topics are covered? (check all that apply)"
  - Topics covered (as categorized): regional trends; global trends; policy lessons; others (numeric tallies referenced in Appendix I, Table 4).

*Italic: Source: Appendix I, Table 5 (extracts as provided)*

---

### Appendix I, Table 6. Summary of Article IV Staff Report Review - Statistical Issues

### Questions 34–35: Statistical Appendix and Financial Sector Data Adequacy
- Table header indicator: 34.–35.
- "Where the Statistical Appendix highlights significant data weaknesses are these discussed adequately in the Article IV staff report?"
  - N/A count line: 4417448306710043173347
  - "Yes. Data deficiencies are discussed but no remedial actions or TA proposed.": 100085000176811
  - "Yes. Data deficiencies are discussed and remedial action/TA is proposed.": 32424483833022614229
  - "No": 1442110130017171713
- "Does the Staff Report explain whether financial sector data are adequate or inadequate to make an assessment of key financial sector risks/vulnerabilities?"
  - "Yes": 10022013220176013
  - "No": 90100781008878100839410087

*Italic: Source: Appendix I, Table 6 (extracts as provided)*

---

### Appendix I, Table 7. Summary of Article IV Staff Report Review - Candor and Communication

### Questions 36–41 and Readability
- Table header indicator: 36.–41.
- "Did the advice on key policy issues in Article IV reports discuss the views of others outside the Fund such as (Check all that apply):"
  - "Other IFIs": 1433111700229172511
  - "Private sector analysts": 1417112501133136816
  - "Academia/ think tanks/ media/ other": 480800114005
  - "None": 76508967100895678836779
- "Does the staff report include a self-contained comprehensive statement assessing the effectiveness of past surveillance in the country?"
  - "Yes": 4458563325441139678332
  - "No": 5642446775568961331768
  - "N/A - IMF advice was followed": 368226750335643171742
- "What reasons were provided where past IMF advice was not followed?"
  - "Broadly agree with advice, but want to proceed at a slower pace (e.g. because of political issues)": 20173302533026223316
  - "Agree in general, but needed TA or other assistance to help implement, so not yet implemented": 481100004683
  - "Disagree with advice": 4022000110605
  - "No reason(s) provided": 3667113325333326504234
- "Are dissenting views by the authorities clearly identified and explained?"
  - "Yes": 70587892387810070565076
  - "No": 30422286322030445024
- "Is the political and social context of the country explained (Check all that apply)?"
  - "The report contains an overview of the political context of the country.": 4842674250442243675047
  - "Pressing social problems (such as structural unemployment, lack of opportunities in the labor market, inequality and poverty) are flagged.": 5050673363445643565050
  - "No discussion": 3033114225333335223329
- "Is the language used in the report appropriate:"
  - "Yes": 901001001006378898310010087
  - "No because it is too deferential (e.g. frequent use of terms like commend the authorities, served the country well).": 10000382211170013
  - "No because it is excessively blunt or overly emotive language is used.": 00000000000
- Gunning Fog readability index for the main body of the Staff Report:
  - Score: 10.7010.7011.2610.5110.4410.6310.3111.0910.3910.8310.66

*Italic: Source: Appendix I, Table 7 (extracts as provided)*

---

### Appendix II: Stakeholder Surveys — Methodology and Key Sample Statistics

### Survey design and audiences (paragraph summaries and numeric indicators)
- Multiple anonymous surveys conducted for the 2011 TSR covering: member country authorities; IMF Executive Directors; Article IV IMF mission chiefs; the public including financial market participants, media, civil society organizations, and think tanks.
- Paragraph 47–49 describe purpose and approach; paragraph 48 lists thematic areas.
- Note on methodology differences vs 2008 TSR: paragraph 48 footnote clarifies (i) and (ii).

### Problems encountered and response rates
- Response rate note: survey of think tanks had 241 think tanks contacted and a 5 percent response rate; feedback from think tanks not incorporated in 2011 TSR. (paragraph 50)
- Stakeholder Survey Sample Universe and Response Rates (table excerpts):
  - Country Authorities: Number of Respondents: 121; Number of surveys sent: 368; Participation Rate in %: 32.9%
  - Regional shares (Country Authorities): Africa 10 (6.15%), Asia Pacific 19 (15.7%), Europe 56 (46.3%), Middle East 14 (11.6%), Americas 18 (14.9%) — as presented in the table block.
  - Executive Directors: Number of Respondents: 18; Number of surveys sent: 24; Participation Rate: 75.0%
  - Mission Chiefs: Number of Respondents: 95; Number of surveys sent: 154; Participation Rate: 61.7%
  - Financial Markets respondents: 41 (Number of respondents) out of 300 surveys sent, Participation Rate 13.7%
  - Media: 28 respondents out of 88 sent, Participation Rate 32.2%
  - CSOs: 17 respondents out of 45 sent, Participation Rate 37.8% (noted as insufficient for some analyses)
  - Think Tanks: 12 respondents out of 24 sent, Participation Rate 15.0% (noted as insufficient)
- Footnote clarifications:
  - 3/ As some country authorities and mission chiefs did not identify their regional classifications, the sum of total respondents by region is less than the total number of respondents for the country authorities' and mission chiefs' surveys.
  - 1/ In 2011, Country Authority surveys were sent to both the central bank/financial supervision agency and the ministry of finance/treasury of each member country. There were 121 respondents out of 368 survey recipients.
  - 2/ In addition to the online survey, surveys were also distributed to CSOs during an informational session at the IMF-World Bank Spring Meetings in April 2011.

### Selected survey result snapshots (Country Authorities' Survey Results table excerpts)
- Aggregate number of responses: 121 (breakdowns: Overall 121; Advanced 48; Emerging 44; Low-income 27; Africa 10; Asia Pacific 23; Europe 56; Middle East 14; Americas 18; G-20 28; Non-G-20 84; Yes 29; No 90) — as presented in the table block.
- Participation Rate (in Percentage) line: 32.9 15.2 39.7 49.1 26.4 23.4
- Weighted average score examples (five-point scale conversions shown in table):
  - Example weighted average score line: 3.68 3.62 3.79 3.58 3.78 3.32 3.80 3.85 3.56 3.42 3.76 3.86 3.61
  - Other weighted average score lines: 3.94 3.93 3.93 3.96 4.00 3.76 4.02 4.00 3.83 3.73 4.00 4.17 3.86; and 3.71 3.63 3.74 3.81 4.00 3.48 3.80 3.69 3.56 3.54 3.78 4.00 3.62
- Selected thematic coverage percentages (Country Authorities' view of Fund staff policy advice coverage — "During the aftermath of the global financial crisis Fund staff has provided policy advice that has ..."):
  - "Monetary developments and policy issues": 38 (Overall)
  - "Fiscal developments and policy issues": 62
  - "Exchange rate regime and exchange rate policy": 24
  - "Exchange rate level and competitiveness": 27
  - "Financial sector vulnerabilities": 49
  - "Regulatory and supervisory issues": 40
  - "Potential macroeconomic/ external stability implications of financial sector developments": 42
  - "Impact on economy of developments elsewhere (i.e., inward spillovers)": 21
  - "Impact of domestic developments on other economies (i.e., outward spillovers)": 6
  - "Lessons from experience in other countries": 40
  - "Other areas": 3

*Italic: Source: Appendix II, Tables and narrative (extracts as provided)*

### 2. Please indicate the

### _082611b - 2. Please indicate the

### Scope of surveillance insights (Question 2)
- Distribution of responses to "Please indicate the areas in which surveillance in your country contributed the most to your understanding of the issues, or provided you with new insights":
  - Overall: Not at all 35; To a little extent 17; To some extent 39; To a great extent 8; To a very great extent 1. Weighted average score 2.23.
  - Advanced: Not at all 60; To a little extent 9; To some extent 28; To a great extent 2; To a very great extent - . Weighted average score 1.72.
  - Emerging: Not at all 22; To a little extent 29; To some extent 41; To a great extent 5; To a very great extent 2. Weighted average score 2.37.
  - Low-income: Not at all 9; To a little extent 13; To some extent 52; To a great extent 26; To a very great extent - . Weighted average score 2.96.
  - By region examples: Africa weighted average score 2.70; Asia Pacific 2.14; Europe 1.96; Middle East 3.09; Americas 2.28.
  - G-20: Weighted average score 1.88; Non-G-20 2.31; IMF Program? Yes 2.64; No 2.07.

### Improvements since pre-global crisis (Question 3)
- Exchange rate analysis and advice: Not at all 9; To a little extent 11; To some extent 44; To a great extent 28; To a very great extent 8. Weighted average score 3.15 (Overall).
  - Advanced score 3.00; Emerging 3.09; Low-income 3.55; Africa 3.30; Asia Pacific 2.38; Europe 3.36; Middle East 3.64; Americas 3.00; G-20 2.89; Non-G-20 3.26; IMF Program? Yes 3.63; No 2.99.
- Financial sector analysis and advice: Not at all 12; To a little extent 10; To some extent 47; To a great extent 26; To a very great extent 5. Weighted average score 3.01 (Overall).
  - Advanced 2.80; Emerging 2.95; Low-income 3.52; Africa 3.40; Asia Pacific 2.29; Europe 3.22; Middle East 3.55; Americas 2.67; G-20 2.73; Non-G-20 3.12; IMF Program? Yes 3.42; No 2.85.
- Financial sector/banking crisis prevention/management advice: Not at all 29; To a little extent 26; To some extent 30; To a great extent 14; To a very great extent 1. Weighted average score 2.31 (Overall).
  - Advanced 1.98; Emerging 2.44; Low-income 2.77; Africa 2.50; Asia Pacific 2.33; Europe 2.20; Middle East 2.64; Americas 2.29; G-20 2.40; Non-G-20 2.27; IMF Program? Yes 2.64; No 2.21.
- Analysis related to the management of capital flows: Not at all 7; To a little extent 21; To some extent 39; To a great extent 29; To a very great extent 5. Weighted average score 3.03 (Overall).
  - Advanced 2.89; Emerging 2.91; Low-income 3.52; Africa 3.40; Asia Pacific 2.52; Europe 3.21; Middle East 3.09; Americas 2.81; G-20 2.74; Non-G-20 3.18; IMF Program? Yes 3.38; No 2.90.

### Risk discussion and incorporation (Questions 4–5)
- "The discussion of risks surrounding the macro-economic outlook was: As presented in the latest Article IV Staff Report":
  - Excessive 5; Insufficient 3; Appropriate 91. Overall appropriateness weighted average 4.73.
  - Advanced 4.65; Emerging 4.73; Low-income 5.00; Africa 4.80; Asia Pacific 5.00; Europe 4.53; Middle East 5.00; Americas 4.78; G-20 5.00; Non-G-20 4.63; IMF Program? Yes 4.71; No 4.72.
- "As discussed with the mission":
  - Excessive 3; Insufficient 3; Appropriate 94. Overall appropriateness weighted average 4.81.
  - Advanced 4.74; Emerging 4.86; Low-income 4.85; Africa 5.00; Asia Pacific 5.00; Europe 4.67; Middle East 5.00; Americas 4.75; G-20 4.69; Non-G-20 4.85; IMF Program? Yes 4.56; No 4.89.
- "The Article IV staff report appropriately weighted and incorporated various risks to the medium/long-term outlook in the bottom-line assessment." Responses:
  - Strongly disagree - ; Disagree 4; Neutral 22; Agree 67; Strongly agree 7. Weighted average score 3.76 (Overall).
  - Advanced 3.57; Emerging 3.93; Low-income 3.81; Africa 3.56; Asia Pacific 3.68; Europe 3.73; Middle East 4.14; Americas 3.78; G-20 3.81; Non-G-20 3.77; IMF Program? Yes 3.85; No 3.74.
- Risk assessment (as signaled by Fund advice):
  - For your country: No 35; Yes 65.
  - For other countries: No 39; Yes 61.

### Frequency, timing, and quality of engagement (Questions 6–9)
- Frequency of Article IV missions:
  - Overall: Too infrequently 9; With adequate frequency 86; Too frequently 5. Weighted average 2.92.
  - Advanced 3.00; Emerging 2.77; Low-income 3.00; Africa 2.80; Asia Pacific 2.64; Europe 2.96; Middle East 3.31; Americas 2.89; G-20 3.00; Non-G-20 2.93; IMF Program? Yes 2.78; No 2.96.
- Frequency of missions for bilateral surveillance topics (example):
  - Too infrequently 38; With adequate frequency 59; Too frequently 4. Weighted average 2.32.
- Aspects improved compared with pre-crisis (selected items and percent selecting greater use/improvement):
  - Quality of analysis: 42 (Overall).
  - Greater use of cross-country comparisons: 48 (Overall).
  - Consistency of policy advice across countries: 40 (Overall).
  - Tailoring policy advice to country circumstances: 62 (Overall).
  - Timing of missions: 16 (Overall).
  - Staff's interaction with the authorities: 23 (Overall).
  - Clarity of messages in surveillance products: 31 (Overall).
- Did recent Article IV consultations generate debate or foster change:
  - Generate policy debate: Not at all 6; To a little extent 21; To some extent 45; To a great extent 27; To a very great extent 1. Weighted average score 2.96.
  - Foster appropriate policy change: Not at all 12; To a little extent 27; To some extent 43; To a great extent 16; To a very great extent 3. Weighted average score 2.72.
- Press conference at end of most recent Article IV consultation:
  - Was a press conference held? No 66; Yes 34.
  - When held: Orally 74; Concluding statement 18; Other 9.

### Candor, precision, and evenhandedness (Questions 10–15)
- Degree of candor in the most recent Article IV staff report for my country:
  - Excessive 2; Insufficient 2; Appropriate 97. Weighted average 4.90 (Overall).
  - Advanced 4.73; Emerging 5.00; Low-income 5.00; Africa 5.00; Asia Pacific 5.00; Europe 4.78; Middle East 5.00; Americas 5.00; G-20 4.85; Non-G-20 4.93; IMF Program? Yes 4.79; No 4.93.
- More candid messages delivered separately rather than in the staff report:
  - No 49; Yes 51.
- Degree to which messages were delivered separately (formats and precision):
  - More candid orally: Orally 74 overall when press conference held.
  - Precision of policy advice across membership: Too precise 5; Adequately precise 88; Insufficiently precise 7 (Overall).
  - Differences across membership in precision of policy advice: Yes/No split not explicitly provided in single-line numeric form in this excerpt; question 15 present.
- "The IMF is evenhanded in its policy advice." Responses:
  - Strongly disagree 2; Disagree 21; Neutral 39; Agree 35; Strongly agree 3. Weighted average score 3.15 (Overall).
  - Advanced 3.02; Emerging 3.07; Low-income 3.54; Africa 3.33; Asia Pacific 3.09; Europe 3.06; Middle East 3.64; Americas 3.06; G-20 2.58; Non-G-20 3.35; IMF Program? Yes 3.46; No 3.05.

### Use of IMF multilateral and other products (selected uptake percentages)
- Multilateral Surveillance products used/recognized (percent selecting):
  - World Economic Outlook (WEO): 85 overall; Advanced 69; Emerging 98; Low-income 96; Africa 100; Asia Pacific 87; Europe 80; Middle East 86; Americas 89; G-20 82; Non-G-20 87; IMF Program? Yes 90; No 83.
  - Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR): 69 overall.
  - Fiscal Monitor: 29 overall.
  - Early Warning Exercise/Vulnerabilities Exercises: 27 overall.
- Other IMF products:
  - Regional Economic Outlook (REO): 57 overall.
  - Financial System Stability Assessment (FSSA): 50 overall.
  - Cross-country Thematic Reports: 26 overall.
- Inputs for other fora:
  - G-20 Surveillance Notes: 41 overall.
  - Analytical input for the G-20 (e.g., G-20 Mutual Assessment Process): 32 overall.

*Appendix II, Table 1. TSR Country Authorities' Survey Results — Distribution of answer in percentage (excerpts provided).*

### 16. Among the following

### 16. Among the following products, which ones have been the most helpful in sharpening your views (Check all that apply)?

### Appendix II, Table 1 — TSR Country Authorities' Survey Results (selected metrics)
- Participation Rate (In Percentage): 75
- Agreement levels (example item):
  - Neutral: 28 (Overall); 25 (G-20); 33 (Non G-20); 27 (Advanced); 38 (Emerging); 14 (Low-income)
  - Agree: 72 (Overall); 75 (G-20); 67 (Non G-20); 73 (Advanced); 63 (Emerging); 86 (Low-income)
  - Weighted average score2/: 3.72 (Overall); 3.75 (G-20); 3.67 (Non G-20); 3.73 (Advanced); 3.63 (Emerging); 3.86 (Low-income)
- Additional item (example):
  - Disagree: 6 (Overall); 8 (G-20); - (Non G-20); - (Advanced); 13 (Emerging); -
  - Neutral: 17 (Overall); 8 (G-20); 33 (Non G-20); 9 (Advanced); 13 (Emerging); 14 (Low-income)
  - Agree: 72 (Overall); 75 (G-20); 67 (Non G-20); 82 (Advanced); 63 (Emerging); 71 (Low-income)
  - Strongly Agree: 6 (Overall); 8 (G-20); - (Non G-20); 9 (Advanced); 13 (Emerging); 14 (Low-income)
  - Weighted average score: 3.78 (Overall); 3.83 (G-20); 3.67 (Non G-20); 4.00 (Advanced); 3.75 (Emerging); 4.00 (Low-income)
- Third example item:
  - Disagree: 6 (Overall); 8 (G-20); - (Non G-20); - (Advanced); 13 (Emerging); -
  - Neutral: 28 (Overall); 17 (G-20); 50 (Non G-20); 18 (Advanced); 25 (Emerging); 43 (Low-income)
  - Agree: 61 (Overall); 75 (G-20); 33 (Non G-20); 73 (Advanced); 50 (Emerging); 43 (Low-income)
  - Strongly Agree: 6 (Overall); - (G-20); 17 (Non G-20); 9 (Advanced); 13 (Emerging); 14 (Low-income)
  - Weighted average score: 3.67 (Overall); 3.67 (G-20); 3.67 (Non G-20); 3.91 (Advanced); 3.63 (Emerging); 3.71 (Low-income)

Notes:
- 1/ Number of respondents classified by income level add up to more than the number of overall respondents. This is because when a respondent's constituency includes more than two type of income levels (e.g., advanced and emerging market), the respondent is classified into both income level groups.
- 2/ A weighted average was used to convert the responses to questions to select one from four or five answer choices to a 5-point scale to make the responses more comparable across questions. The higher the score, the more positive the response was.

### Appendix II, Table 2 — TSR Executive Directors' Survey Results (selected metrics)
- Question 1 (Fund staff policy advice during aftermath of global financial crisis):
  - Example item responses (Distribution of answer in percent):
    - To a little extent: 11 (Overall); 8 (G-20); 17 (Non G-20); 18 (Advanced); - (Emerging); - (Low-income)
    - To some extent: 50 (Overall); 67 (G-20); 17 (Non G-20); 55 (Advanced); 50 (Emerging); 14 (Low-income)
    - To a great extent: 28 (Overall); 17 (G-20); 50 (Non G-20); 18 (Advanced); 25 (Emerging); 57 (Low-income)
    - To a very great extent: 11 (Overall); 8 (G-20); 17 (Non G-20); 9 (Advanced); 25 (Emerging); 29 (Low-income)
    - Weighted average score: 3.39 (Overall); 3.25 (G-20); 3.67 (Non G-20); 3.18 (Advanced); 3.75 (Emerging); 4.14 (Low-income)
  - Other example items present similar distributions with weighted average scores such as: 2.94; 3.11; 3.17; 2.94; 2.83; 3.17 (values given in table for different aspects).

- Question 2 (Reliance on Article IV staff reports for analysis — selected topics and weighted averages):
  - Analysis of macro-economic developments and outlook:
    - Weighted average score: 3.06 (Overall); 3.33 (G-20); 2.50 (Non G-20); 3.09 (Advanced); 3.25 (Emerging); 2.86 (Low-income)
  - Monetary policy:
    - Weighted average score: 3.06 (Overall); 3.33 (G-20); 2.50 (Non G-20); 3.09 (Advanced); 3.25 (Emerging); 2.86 (Low-income)
  - Exchange rate policy:
    - Weighted average score: 3.50 (Overall); 3.83 (G-20); 2.83 (Non G-20); 3.82 (Advanced); 3.63 (Emerging); 3.43 (Low-income)
  - Fiscal policy:
    - Weighted average score: 2.22 (Overall); 2.42 (G-20); 1.83 (Non G-20); 2.09 (Advanced); 2.50 (Emerging); 2.29 (Low-income)
  - Financial sector policies:
    - Weighted average score: 3.28 (Overall); 3.25 (G-20); 3.33 (Non G-20); 3.27 (Advanced); 3.25 (Emerging); 3.29 (Low-income)
  - Macro-financial issues:
    - Weighted average score: 3.33 (Overall); 3.25 (G-20); 3.50 (Non G-20); 3.27 (Advanced); 3.25 (Emerging); 3.43 (Low-income)
  - Spillovers across countries:
    - Weighted average score: 2.83 (Overall); 3.00 (G-20); 2.50 (Non G-20); 3.00 (Advanced); 3.00 (Emerging); 2.86 (Low-income)
  - Cross-country analysis:
    - Weighted average score: 2.89 (Overall); 2.92 (G-20); 2.83 (Non G-20); 2.91 (Advanced); 3.13 (Emerging); 2.71 (Low-income)

- Question 3 (Reliance on Article IV staff reports for analysis relating to Advanced economies and Emerging markets — distributions provided in table)
- Question 4 (Compared to the pre-crisis period, improvement in quality of Exchange rate analysis and advice — distributions provided in table)

### Question 5 — Most helpful surveillance and other products in strengthening understanding of global stability risks (distribution of selections)
- Bilateral Surveillance: Article IV staff reports: 56 (Overall); 58 (G-20); 50 (Non G-20); 45 (Advanced); 63 (Emerging); 57 (Low-income)
- Multilateral Surveillance: World Economic Outlook (WEO): 89 (Overall); 83 (G-20); 100 (Non G-20); 82 (Advanced); 100 (Emerging); 86 (Low-income)
- Multilateral Surveillance: Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR): 100 across all categories
- Multilateral Surveillance: Fiscal Monitor: 61 (Overall); 58 (G-20); 67 (Non G-20); 55 (Advanced); 75 (Emerging); 57 (Low-income)
- Multilateral Surveillance: Early Warning Exercise/Vulnerabilities Exercise: 61 (Overall); 75 (G-20); 33 (Non G-20); 64 (Advanced); 63 (Emerging); 57 (Low-income)
- Other IMF Products: Regional Economic Outlook (REO): 50 (Overall); 58 (G-20); 33 (Non G-20); 27 (Advanced); 75 (Emerging); 43 (Low-income)
- Other IMF Products: Financial System Stability Assessment (FSSA): 39 (Overall); 25 (G-20); 67 (Non G-20); 36 (Advanced); 38 (Emerging); 43 (Low-income)
- Other IMF Products: Cross-country Thematic Reports: 33 (Overall); 33 (G-20); 33 (Non G-20); 36 (Advanced); 25 (Emerging); 43 (Low-income)
- Input for other Fora: G-20 Surveillance Notes: 56 (Overall); 75 (G-20); 17 (Non G-20); 73 (Advanced); 38 (Emerging); 29 (Low-income)
- Input for other Fora: Analytical input for the G-20 (e.g. G-10 Mutual Assessment Process): 61 (Overall); 75 (G-20); 33 (Non G-20); 73 (Advanced); 50 (Emerging); 57 (Low-income)

### Question 6 — Extent of discussion in recent Article IV reports (High probability risks, Tail risk, Transmission channels)
- High probability risks around the outlook (distribution):
  - Insufficient: 33 (Overall); 33 (G-20); 33 (Non G-20); 36 (Advanced); 25 (Emerging); 43 (Low-income)
  - Appropriate: 67 (Overall); 67 (G-20); 67 (Non G-20); 64 (Advanced); 75 (Emerging); 57 (Low-income)
- Tail risk (frequency/extent qualification):
  - Too unfrequent: 22 (Overall); 17 (G-20); 33 (Non G-20); 18 (Advanced); 13 (Emerging); 14 (Low-income)
  - With adaquate frequency: 78 (Overall); 83 (G-20); 67 (Non G-20); 82 (Advanced); 88 (Emerging); 86 (Low-income)
- Transmission channels of risk (frequency/extent qualification):
  - With adaquate frequency: 94 (Overall); 92 (G-20); 100 (Non G-20); 91 (Advanced); 100 (Emerging); 100 (Low-income)
  - Too frequently: 6 (Overall); 8 (G-20); - (Non G-20); 9 (Advanced); - (Emerging); - (Low-income)

### Question 7 — Do you think the Fund signals risks:
- For your constituency (responses and weighted averages in table):
  - Example overall agreement pattern: Agree to Some Extent: 88; Weighted average score: 3.67 (Overall); 3.79 (G-20); 3.40 (Non G-20); 3.67 (Advanced); 3.67 (Emerging); 3.67 (Low-income)
- For other countries (responses and weighted averages in table):
  - Example overall pattern: Agree to Some Extent: 65; Weighted average score: 3.20 (Overall); 3.18 (G-20); 3.22 (Non G-20); 3.40 (Advanced); 3.17 (Emerging); 3.48 (Low-income)

### Question 8 — "Article IV staff reports appropriately weight and incorporate various risks to the medium/long-term outlook in the bottom-line assessment:" (by economy type)
- Overall weighted average score: 3.17
- Advanced economies weighted average score: 3.25
- Emerging Markets weighted average score: 3.00
- Low-income economies weighted average score: 3.14

*Appendix II, Tables 1 and 2 — TSR Country Authorities' and Executive Directors' Survey Results (selected items and exact percentages and weighted average scores as presented in the source).*

### Appendix II, Table 2. TSR Executive Directors' Survey Results

### Appendix II, Table 2. TSR Executive Directors' Survey Results

### Financial sector and macro-financial analysis (Q9–Q10)
- Q9: In the analysis of financial sector and macro-financial issues, please indicate whether Article IV reports discussed in the past year have met your expectations in describing how financial sector developments could potentially impact domestic or external stability:
  - Overall distribution (In some cases / In many cases / In most cases / Weighted average score):
    - In some cases: 33
    - In many cases: 28
    - In most cases: 39
    - Weighted average score: 3.06
  - G-20:
    - In some cases: 25
    - In many cases: 42
    - In most cases: 33
    - Weighted average score: 3.08
  - Non G-20:
    - In some cases: 50
    - In many cases: -
    - In most cases: 50
    - Weighted average score: 3.00
  - Advanced:
    - In some cases: 45
    - In many cases: 36
    - In most cases: 18
    - Weighted average score: 2.73
  - Emerging:
    - In some cases: 13
    - In many cases: 25
    - In most cases: 63
    - Weighted average score: 3.50
  - Low-income:
    - In some cases: 29
    - In many cases: 29
    - In most cases: 43
    - Weighted average score: 3.14

- Q10: In the analysis of financial sector and macro-financial issues, please indicate whether Article IV reports discussed in the past year have met your expectations in describing how macroeconomic developments could potentially affect the financial sector:
  - Overall distribution (In some cases / In many cases / In most cases / Weighted average score):
    - In some cases: 33
    - In many cases: 44
    - In most cases: 22
    - Weighted average score: 2.89
  - G-20:
    - In some cases: 42
    - In many cases: 42
    - In most cases: 17
    - Weighted average score: 2.75
  - Non G-20:
    - In some cases: 17
    - In many cases: 50
    - In most cases: 33
    - Weighted average score: 3.17
  - Advanced:
    - In some cases: 55
    - In many cases: 45
    - In most cases: -
    - Weighted average score: 2.45
  - Emerging:
    - In some cases: 13
    - In many cases: 50
    - In most cases: 38
    - Weighted average score: 3.25
  - Low-income:
    - In some cases: 29
    - In many cases: 43
    - In most cases: 29
    - Weighted average score: 3.00

- Additional breakdowns (other rows for Q9/Q10 appear):
  - Example row with weighted average score 2.61 overall (In very few cases: 17; In some cases: 33; In many cases: 22; In most cases: 28).
  - Example row with weighted average score 2.22 overall (In very few cases: 17; In some cases: 56; In many cases: 22; Always: 6).
  - Example row with weighted average score 2.22 overall (In very few cases: 22; In some cases: 39; In many cases: 33; In most cases: 6).
  - Example row with weighted average score 2.12 overall (In very few cases: 24; In some cases: 41; In many cases: 35).

### Exchange rate analysis (Q11)
- Please indicate whether the quality of analysis of exchange rate issues in staff reports discussed in the past year has met your expectations in the areas specified below:
  - Assessment of exchange rate level:
    - Insufficient: 44
    - Appropriate: 56
    - Excessive: -
  - Assessment of exchange rate regime:
    - Insufficient: 39
    - Appropriate: 56
    - Excessive: 6
  - Integration of the discussion of exchange rate issues with the overall policy mix:
    - In very few cases: 6
    - In some cases: 17
    - In many cases: 33
    - In most cases: 44
    - Weighted average score: 3.17
    - (G-20 weighted average score: 3.25; Non G-20: 3.00; Advanced: 2.91; Emerging: 3.38; Low-income: 3.43)
  - Other related rows:
    - Weighted average score 3.56 overall for a row where distribution includes Always: 11, In most cases: 39, In many cases: 44.
    - Weighted average score 3.22 overall for a row with In many cases: 50, In most cases: 28, Always: 6.
    - Weighted average score 3.43 overall for a row where Agree to Some Extent: 88, Disagree categories: -.
    - Weighted average score 3.59 overall for another row (Agree to Some Extent: 94).
    - Weighted average score 3.82 overall for a row where Agree to Some Extent: 88 and Strongly Agree: 12 (G-20: 3.79; Non G-20: 3.89; Advanced: 3.80; Emerging: 4.00; Low-income: 4.05).

### Coverage and quality of Article IV reports (Q12–Q14)
- Q12: Coverage of the following issues in Article IV reports:
  - Capital flows:
    - Insufficient: 44
    - Appropriate: 56
    - Excessive: -
  - Reserves adequacy:
    - Insufficient: 39
    - Appropriate: 56
    - Excessive: 6
- Q13: Please indicate whether Article IV reports are:
  - Timely:
    - In very few cases: 6
    - In some cases: 17
    - In many cases: 33
    - In most cases: 44
    - Weighted average score: 3.17
  - Comprehensible, clear:
    - In some cases: 17
    - In many cases: 50
    - In most cases: 39
    - Always: 11
    - Weighted average score: 3.56
- Q14: Are the Fund's messages appropriately consistent among various surveillance and related IMF products?
  - No: 28
  - Yes: 72
  - Agree to Some Extent: 100
  - Weighted average score: 3.67 (overall and across groups)

### Candid discussion of differences and evenhandedness (Q15–Q16)
- Q15: Article IV staff reports candidly discuss differences of view between the authorities and staff:
  - Distribution:
    - Not at all: 6
    - To a little extent: 17
    - To some extent: 44
    - To a great extent: 28
    - To a very great extent: 6
    - Weighted average score: 3.06 overall (G-20: 3.08; Non G-20: 3.00; Advanced: 3.64; Emerging: *2.63; Low-income: *3.00)
- Q16: To what extent is the policy advice in IMF Article IV staff reports evenhanded across countries?
  - Distribution:
    - To a little extent: 17
    - To some extent: 61
    - To a great extent: 22
    - Weighted average score: 3.06 overall (G-20: 3.08; Non G-20: 3.00; Advanced: 3.09; Emerging: 3.38; Low-income: 3.43)

### Policy advice impact (Q17)
- To what extent did Fund policy advice given in the context of recent Article IV consultations in your constituency help:
  - Generate policy debate:
    - Overall weighted average score: 3.22
    - Distribution example (Overall): Not at all: 3; To a little extent: 17; To some extent: 46; To a large extent: 22; To a very large extent: 12
    - By region and group: Africa 2.95; Asia Pacific 3.42; Europe 3.19; Middle East 3.50; Americas 3.21; Advanced 3.47; Emerging 3.00; Low-income 3.21; G-20 3.22; Non G-20 3.27; Yes 3.19; No 3.22
  - Foster appropriate policy change:
    - Overall weighted average score examples: 1.88 and 3.41 appear for different rows:
      - Row with weighted average score 1.88 (Overall): Not at all: 42; To a little extent: 40; To some extent: 10; To a large extent: 7; To a very large extent: 2
      - Row with weighted average score 3.41 (Overall): Not at all: 2; To a little extent: 10; To some extent: 42; To a large extent: 38; To a very large extent: 9

### Mission Chiefs' Survey (Appendix II, Table 3) — selected highlights
- Q1: Scope for teams to focus greater attention in future Article IV consultations (Distribution of answers in percent by region, income level, G-20 membership, IMF program):
  - Spillover effects from other economies onto the country you work on:
    - Overall: 95
    - Africa: 22
    - Asia Pacific: 19
    - Europe: 27
    - Middle East: 12
    - Americas: 14
    - Advanced: 21
    - Emerging: 36
    - Low-income: 38
    - G-20: 15
    - Non G-20: 80
    - Yes (IMF Program?): 34
    - No: 59
  - Spillover effects from the country you work on to others:
    - Overall participation rate or related figure: 62 (other regional and group breakdowns listed)
- Q2: Among surveillance and related products helpful in strengthening understanding of global stability risks (Check all that apply):
  - Examples of products and percent selecting them:
    - World Economic Outlook (WEO): Overall 81; Africa 82; Asia Pacific 89; Europe 74; Middle East 75; Americas 93; Advanced 86; Emerging 75; Low-income 87; G-20 80; Non G-20 81; Yes 76; No 85
    - Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR): Overall 55; Africa 27; Asia Pacific 74; Europe 56; Middle East 58; Americas 71; Advanced 57; Emerging 61; Low-income 47; G-20 53; Non G-20 41; Yes 64; No 53
    - Other items listed include Fiscal Monitor, Early Warning Exercise/Vulnerabilities Exercises, Regional Economic Outlook (REO), Financial System Stability Assessment (FSSA), Cross-country Thematic Reports, G-20 Surveillance Notes, Analytical input for the G-20.
- Additional mission chiefs responses (selected weighted average scores from subsequent question blocks):
  - Weighted average score 3.27 overall for a question with distribution Not at all 7, To a little extent 16, To some extent 34, To a large extent 30, To a very large extent 13.
  - Weighted average score 2.40 overall for a question with higher Not at all/To a little extent shares.
  - Weighted average score 2.60 overall and 2.72, 3.26 for other question items with regional and group breakdowns provided.

*Appendix II, Table 2 and Appendix II, Table 3. TSR Executive Directors' Survey Results and TSR Mission Chiefs' Survey Results (distribution of answers in percent, by groupings as presented in the source).*

### 3. To what extent do you consider

### _082611b - 3. To what extent do you consider

### Impediments to routinely analyzing spillovers and conducting cross-country analysis
- Data limitations/cost of acquiring relevant data from authorities
  - Not at all: 30
  - To a little extent: 44
  - To some extent: 16
  - To a large extent: 9
  - To a very large extent: 1
  - Weighted average score: 2.08
- Limited data sharing within the Fund
  - Not at all: 34
  - To a little extent: 27
  - To some extent: 26
  - To a large extent: 10
  - To a very large extent: 2
  - Weighted average score: 2.19
- Limited knowledge sharing within the Fund
  - Not at all: 4
  - To a little extent: 8
  - To some extent: 22
  - To a large extent: 32
  - To a very large extent: 35
  - Weighted average score: 3.85

### Additional impediments reported
- Lack of familiarity with analytical tools
  - Not at all: 16
  - To a little extent: 33
  - To some extent: 25
  - To a large extent: 18
  - To a very large extent: 8
  - Weighted average score: 2.67
- Lack of interest from the authorities
  - Not at all: 1
  - To a little extent: 4
  - To some extent: 17
  - To a large extent: 54
  - To a very large extent: 24
  - Weighted average score: 3.95
- Resource constraints
  - Not at all: 11
  - To a little extent: 17
  - To some extent: 27
  - To a large extent: 32
  - To a very large extent: 13
  - Weighted average score: 3.19
- Word count ceilings
  - Not at all: 1
  - To a little extent: 8
  - To some extent: 19
  - To a large extent: 55
  - To a very large extent: 17
  - Weighted average score: 3.80

### Frequency of covering risks in mission discussions and staff reports (high-probability vs tail risks)
- For mission discussions: relative frequency compared with prior
  - Less frequently: -
  - About the same: 88
  - More frequently: 12
- To what extent did the latest Article IV mission discussions you conducted cover high probability risks
  - Not at all: 3
  - To a little extent: 4
  - To some extent: 31
  - To a large extent: 49
  - To a very large extent: 12
  - Weighted average score: 3.62
- To what extent did the latest Article IV mission discussions you conducted cover tail risks
  - Not at all: 12
  - To a little extent: 19
  - To some extent: 37
  - To a large extent: 28
  - To a very large extent: 4
  - Weighted average score: 2.94
- To what extent did the latest Article IV staff reports you produced cover high probability risks
  - Not at all: 4
  - To a little extent: 18
  - To some extent: 52
  - To a large extent: 20
  - To a very large extent: 6
  - Weighted average score: 3.04
- To what extent did the latest Article IV staff reports you produced cover tail risks
  - Not at all: 4
  - To a little extent: 18
  - To some extent: 52
  - To a large extent: 20
  - To a very large extent: 6
  - Weighted average score: 3.04

### Signaling risks tradeoff (future Article IV consultations)
- Would you signal risks:
  - Not at all: 3
  - To a little extent: 4
  - To some extent: 31
  - To a large extent: 49
  - To a very large extent: 12
  - Weighted average score: 3.62

### Authorities' receptiveness to discussions on risk assessments
- Openness and receptivity to high probability risks
  - Not at all: 12
  - To a little extent: 29
  - To some extent: 35
  - To a large extent: 21
  - To a very large extent: 3
  - Weighted average score: 2.75
- Openness and receptivity to tail risks
  - Not at all: 13
  - To a little extent: 38
  - To some extent: 32
  - To a large extent: 13
  - To a very large extent: 3
  - Weighted average score: 2.55

### Scope to focus more on financial sector and macro-financial issues in future Article IV consultations
- To what extent do you see scope to focus more attention to analyzing financial sector and macro-financial issues
  - Not at all: 30
  - To a little extent: 29
  - To some extent: 24
  - To a large extent: 15
  - To a very large extent: 2
  - Weighted average score: 2.32

### Challenges in the latest Article IV consultation (selected items)
- Identifying the key financial sector vulnerabilities/risks
  - Not at all: 13
  - To a little extent: 38
  - To some extent: 32
  - To a large extent: 13
  - To a very large extent: 3
  - Weighted average score: 2.55
- Assessing the potential macroeconomic implications of financial sector developments
  - Not at all: 18
  - To a little extent: 31
  - To some extent: 29
  - To a large extent: 20
  - To a very large extent: 3
  - Weighted average score: 2.60
- Assessing cross-border financial sector risks stemming from other economies
  - Not at all: 12
  - To a little extent: 24
  - To some extent: 43
  - To a large extent: 13
  - To a very large extent: 4
  - Weighted average score: 2.67
- Assessing the key domestic financial sector vulnerabilities which may have cross-border implications
  - Not at all: 12
  - To a little extent: 29
  - To some extent: 35
  - To a large extent: 21
  - To a very large extent: 3
  - Weighted average score: 2.75
- Drawing out clear policy recommendations
  - Not at all: 13
  - To a little extent: 38
  - To some extent: 32
  - To a large extent: 13
  - To a very large extent: 3
  - Weighted average score: 2.55

### Analytical and informational inputs used in Article IV consultations (percent reporting use)
- Cross-departmental surveillance discussions: 22
- Financial Sector Surveillance Guidance Note: 21
- Analytical tools from EWE, vulnerability exercises, or GFSR: 15
- Recent Article IV analysis on macro-financial linkages: 32
- WEO, GFSR, REOs: 36
- Recent FSAP or FSAP update: 42
- Support from functional departments: 44
- Market-based indicators and related models: 37
- Financial soundness indicators (FSIs): 85
- Balance sheet risk approach/CCA: 23
- Moody's KMV (EDF): 12
- Stress test and scenario analysis: 57
- Network analysis: 3

*Appendix II, Table 3. TSR Mission Chiefs' Survey Results — Distribution of answers in percent*

### 10. Among the following sources,

### _082611b - 10. Among the following sources,

### Q10 — Among the following sources, please indicate those that have helped the most in strengthening the discussion of macro financial linkages in the latest Article IV consultation
- Distribution of answers in percent (Overall):
  - Not at all: 9
  - To a little extent: 24
  - To some extent: 37
  - To a large extent: 24
  - To a very large extent: 6
  - Weighted average score: 2.93

### Q11 — Over the last three years, what quantitative/analytical tools for financial sector surveillance have you used in the Article IV consultations?
- Block 1 (Distribution of answers in percent — Overall):
  - Not at all: 26
  - To a little extent: 16
  - To some extent: 22
  - To a large extent: 23
  - To a very large extent: 13
  - Weighted average score: 2.83
- Block 2 (Distribution of answers in percent — Overall):
  - Not at all: 10
  - To a little extent: 17
  - To some extent: 26
  - To a large extent: 26
  - To a very large extent: 21
  - Weighted average score: 3.31
- Block 3 (Distribution of answers in percent — Overall):
  - Not at all: 30
  - To a little extent: 26
  - To some extent: 21
  - To a large extent: 17
  - To a very large extent: 6
  - Weighted average score: 2.43
- Block 4 (Distribution of answers in percent — Overall):
  - Not at all: 13
  - To a little extent: 22
  - To some extent: 28
  - To a large extent: 22
  - To a very large extent: 16
  - Weighted average score: 3.07
- Block 5 (Distribution of answers in percent — Overall):
  - Not at all: 26
  - To a little extent: 39
  - To some extent: 20
  - To a large extent: 8
  - To a very large extent: 7
  - Weighted average score: 2.31

### Q12 — To what extent do you see the following issues as impediments to analyzing financial sector and macro-financial issues in the context of Article IV consultations?
- Shortage of accessible analytical tools to investigate macro-financial linkages (Overall distribution):
  - Not at all: 28
  - To a little extent: 36
  - To some extent: 24
  - To a large extent: 7
  - To a very large extent: 6
  - Weighted average score: 2.27
- Lack of a recent FSAP (Overall distribution):
  - Not at all: 28
  - To a little extent: 30
  - To some extent: 27
  - To a large extent: 12
  - To a very large extent: 3
  - Weighted average score: 2.33
- Limitations in data/access to information (Overall distribution):
  - Not at all: 20
  - To a little extent: 30
  - To some extent: 27
  - To a large extent: 18
  - To a very large extent: 6
  - Weighted average score: 2.59
- Insufficient feedback from the review process (Overall distribution):
  - Not at all: 14
  - To a little extent: 27
  - To some extent: 31
  - To a large extent: 23
  - To a very large extent: 4
  - Weighted average score: 2.76
- Lack of mission support from the relevant functional departments (Overall distribution):
  - Not at all: 13
  - To a little extent: 22
  - To some extent: 28
  - To a large extent: 22
  - To a very large extent: 16
  - Weighted average score: 3.07
- Unwillingness of the authorities to discuss the implication of tail risks (Overall distribution):
  - Not at all: 26
  - To a little extent: 20
  - To some extent: 28
  - To a large extent: 16
  - To a very large extent: 10
  - Weighted average score: 2.59

### Q13 — To what extent do you see scope to pay more attention to following exchange rate issues in future Article IV consultations?
- Exchange rate regime (Overall distribution):
  - Not at all: 29
  - To a little extent: 26
  - To some extent: 21
  - To a large extent: 19
  - To a very large extent: 5
  - Weighted average score: 2.46
- Intervention policies or other exchange rate policies (Overall distribution):
  - Not at all: 52
  - To a little extent: 22
  - To some extent: 14
  - To a large extent: 7
  - To a very large extent: 4
  - Weighted average score: 1.89
- Reserve adequacy (Overall distribution):
  - Not at all: 21
  - To a little extent: 19
  - To some extent: 23
  - To a large extent: 15
  - To a very large extent: 22
  - Weighted average score: 2.99
- Exchange rate levels and/or external competitiveness (Overall distribution):
  - Not at all: 24
  - To a little extent: 17
  - To some extent: 26
  - To a large extent: 20
  - To a very large extent: 13
  - Weighted average score: 2.83
- Additional exchange-rate related item (Overall distribution):
  - Not at all: 47
  - To a little extent: 28
  - To some extent: 16
  - To a large extent: 3
  - To a very large extent: 7
  - Weighted average score: 1.96
- Additional exchange-rate related item (Overall distribution):
  - Not at all: 30
  - To a little extent: 17
  - To some extent: 28
  - To a large extent: 16
  - To a very large extent: 10
  - Weighted average score: 2.59

### Q14 — Please indicate the extent to which the following factors posed a challenge for the full treatment of the discussions of exchange rate issues in your latest staff report
- Time and resource constraints (Overall distribution):
  - Not at all: 16
  - To a little extent: 19
  - To some extent: 42
  - To a large extent: 18
  - To a very large extent: 5
  - Weighted average score: 2.77
- The need to preserve quality relationships with the authorities (Overall distribution):
  - Not at all: 25
  - To a little extent: 19
  - To some extent: 25
  - To a large extent: 20
  - To a very large extent: 11
  - Weighted average score: 2.73
- Applicability of the standard CGER-based methodologies to your country (Overall distribution):
  - Not at all: (marked as candidness section header in source; no numeric distribution for this item in the same layout)
- Consistency of the results of CGER-based methodologies with other evidence (Overall distribution):
  - Not at all candid / Hardly candid / Somewhat candid / Largely candid / Completely candid — distributions provided in the source for candidness of discussions:
    - Somewhat candid: 1
    - Largely candid: 65
    - Completely candid: 34
    - Weighted average score: 4.33
  - Another candidness block (distribution):
    - Not at all candid: 2
    - Hardly candid: 7
    - Somewhat candid: 31
    - Largely candid: 48
    - Completely candid: 12
    - Weighted average score: 3.62
- The expectation of publication of staff reports (Overall distribution):
  - Not at all candid: 2
  - Hardly candid: 7
  - Somewhat candid: 31
  - Largely candid: 48
  - Completely candid: 12
  - Weighted average score: 3.62
- Data limitations (Overall distribution):
  - Not at all candid: 2
  - Hardly candid: 7
  - Somewhat candid: 31
  - Largely candid: 48
  - Completely candid: 12
  - Weighted average score: 3.62

*Appendix II, Table 3. TSR Mission Chiefs' Survey Results — Distribution of answers in percent (excerpts as presented in the source).*

### 16. How would you evaluate the

### 16. How would you evaluate the degree of candor, on the part of the team and of the authorities, in the dialogue with the authorities?

### On the part of the team — coverage of issues (distribution and weighted averages)
- Response categories shown: Not at all; To a little extent; To some extent; To a large extent; To a very large extent.
- Overall distribution (first block shown):
  - Not at all: 21
  - To a little extent: 37
  - To some extent: 27
  - To a large extent: 11
  - To a very large extent: 3
  - Weighted average score: 2.38
- Subsequent blocks (other issues) — overall distributions and weighted average scores:
  - Block 2 overall:
    - Not at all: 49
    - To a little extent: 24
    - To some extent: 14
    - To a large extent: 9
    - To a very large extent: 3
    - Weighted average score: 1.92
  - Block 3 overall:
    - Not at all: 53
    - To a little extent: 27
    - To some extent: 11
    - To a large extent: 7
    - To a very large extent: 2
    - Weighted average score: 1.78
  - Block 4 overall:
    - Not at all: 51
    - To a little extent: 27
    - To some extent: 13
    - To a large extent: 4
    - To a very large extent: 4
    - Weighted average score: 1.85
  - Block 5 overall:
    - Not at all: 80
    - To a little extent: 4
    - To some extent: 12
    - To a large extent: 2
    - To a very large extent: 2
    - Weighted average score: 1.42

### On the part of the authorities — modes of communication and candor constraints
- Modes of delivering candid messages (overall distributions shown):
  - Concluding Statement: 11
  - Orally: 21
  - Other: 1
  - Not delivered: 3
- Extent to which respondents felt constrained in delivering candid messages (overall distributions and weighted averages shown):
  - Not at all: 54
  - To a little extent: 29
  - To some extent: 12
  - To a large extent: 2
  - To a very large extent: 3
  - Weighted average score: 1.73
- Additional overall constraint distributions (other factor blocks):
  - Block A:
    - Not at all: 37
    - To a little extent: 44
    - To some extent: 14
    - To a large extent: 4
    - To a very large extent: 0
    - Weighted average score: 1.86
  - Block B:
    - Not at all: 34
    - To a little extent: 42
    - To some extent: 13
    - To a large extent: 8
    - To a very large extent: 3
    - Weighted average score: 2.06

### Delivery channels when constrained
- If constrained "To a large extent" or "To a very large extent", respondents indicated delivering more candid messages via:
  - Concluding Statement: 11
  - Orally: 21
  - Other: 1
  - Not delivered: 3

### Extent of pressures from members constraining surveillance (Q19)
- Overall distribution:
  - Not at all: 18
  - To a little extent: 32
  - To some extent: 40
  - To a large extent: 9
  - To a very large extent: 2
  - Weighted average score: 2.46

### Difficulties challenging authorities because of their expertise/access (Q20)
- Overall distribution:
  - Not at all: 34
  - To a little extent: 42
  - To some extent: 13
  - To a large extent: 8
  - To a very large extent: 3
  - Weighted average score: 2.06

### Internal pressures and constraints inside the Fund (Q21)
- Factors inside the Fund making surveillance work difficult — overall distributions and weighted averages:
  - Difficulties working across departments:
    - Not at all: 29
    - To a little extent: 31
    - To some extent: 21
    - To a large extent: 12
    - To a very large extent: 6
    - Weighted average score: 2.34
  - Pressure to self censor your view in discussion with senior management:
    - Not at all: 18
    - To a little extent: 31
    - To some extent: 32
    - To a large extent: 17
    - To a very large extent: 2
    - Weighted average score: 2.54
  - Pressure not to express a dissenting view:
    - Not at all: 17
    - To a little extent: 18
    - To some extent: 26
    - To a large extent: 28
    - To a very large extent: 12
    - Weighted average score: 3.01
  - Lack of data:
    - Not at all: 18
    - To a little extent: 31
    - To some extent: 32
    - To a large extent: 17
    - To a very large extent: 2
    - Weighted average score: 2.54
  - Lack of knowledge sharing across and/or within departments:
    - Not at all: 18
    - To a little extent: 32
    - To some extent: 32
    - To a large extent: 17
    - To a very large extent: 2
    - Weighted average score: 2.54

### Report publication and consent considerations (from Q17 summary)
- Factors that constrained presentation of a candid staff report (distribution highlights):
  - The need to preserve quality relationships with authorities — weighted average score: 3.52 (overall)
    - To a very large extent: 10
    - To a large extent: 42
    - To some extent: 40
  - Concerns about risk of leaks — weighted average score: 3.11 (overall)
    - To a very large extent: 7
    - To a large extent: 22
    - To some extent: 48
- Publication expectation (staff report publication with limited scope for deletions) and concerns that authorities might not consent or delay publication are reflected in distributions under the Q17 matrix (see above categories for overall shares).

### Data needs reported by missions (selected overall percentages)
- Quarterly sector balance sheet data: 27
- Quarterly data on cross-border exposures: 23
- More frequent CPIS data: 8
- More detailed IIP data: 24
- More detailed FDI data: 24
- Quarterly external debt by remaining maturity: 7
- More frequent general government fiscal data: 29
- General government debt data: 14
- Real estate property prices: 23
- More frequent national account data: 42

*Appendix II, Table 3. TSR Mission Chiefs' Survey Results — Distribution of answers in percent*

### 23. To what extent did Fund policy

### 23. To what extent did Fund policy advice given in the context of recent Article IV consultations you conducted help

### Generate policy debate?
- Participation Rate (In Percentage): 41
- Distribution of answers (Overall):
  - Not at all: 14
  - Hardly: 5
  - To some extent: 10
  - To a large extent: 51
- By region (weighted average score 2/): 3.86
  - US/Canada: 3.60
  - Europe: 3.96
  - Asia: 3.71
  - EMEA: 3.98
  - Latin America: 3.72

### Foster appropriate policy change?
- Distribution of answers (Overall):
  - Not at all: 3
  - Hardly: 18
  - To some extent: 58
  - To a large extent: 23
- By region (weighted average score): 3.67
  - US/Canada: 3.79
  - Europe: 3.74
  - Asia: 3.67
  - EMEA: 3.58
  - Latin America: 3.56

### Additional related indicators from Appendix II, Table 3 (selected)
- [Question unspecified row — distribution and weighted averages follow exactly as in source]
  - Distribution (Overall): Not at all 8; Hardly 28; To some extent 40; To a large extent 25
  - Weighted average score: 3.43
  - Regional weighted averages: US/Canada 3.73; Europe 3.44; Asia 3.53; EMEA 3.31; Latin America 3.50
- Distribution (Overall): Not at all 15; Hardly 22; To some extent 46; To a large extent 17
  - Weighted average score: 3.21
  - Regional weighted averages: US/Canada 3.35; Europe 3.22; Asia 3.27; EMEA 3.04; Latin America 3.17
- Distribution (Overall): Not at all 21; Hardly 33; To some extent 41; To a large extent 5
  - Weighted average score: 2.74
  - Regional weighted averages: US/Canada 2.67; Europe 2.73; Asia 2.57; EMEA 2.65; Latin America 2.51
- Distribution (Overall): Not at all 26; Hardly 41; To some extent 26; To a large extent 8
  - Weighted average score: 2.54
  - Regional weighted averages: US/Canada 2.60; Europe 2.65; Asia 2.43; EMEA 2.47; Latin America 2.22
- Distribution (Overall): Not at all 10; Hardly 43; To some extent 40; To a large extent 8
  - Weighted average score: 2.93
  - Regional weighted averages: US/Canada 3.09; Europe 3.00; Asia 2.84; EMEA 2.79; Latin America 2.72
- Distribution (Overall): Not at all 35; Hardly 38; To some extent 25; To a large extent 3
  - Weighted average score: 2.27
  - Regional weighted averages: US/Canada 2.47; Europe 2.25; Asia 2.42; EMEA 2.16; Latin America 2.33
- Distribution (Overall): Not at all 33; Hardly 43; To some extent 20; To a large extent 5
  - Weighted average score: 2.30
  - Regional weighted averages: US/Canada 2.60; Europe 2.49; Asia 2.47; EMEA 2.16; Latin America 2.28

*Italic: Appendix II, Table 3. TSR Mission Chiefs' Survey Results — Distribution of answers in percent*

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### Appendix II, Table 4. TSR Financial Markets Survey Results — reliance on IMF analytical tools and perceived roles

### 1. To what extent do you rely on the following IMF analytical tools?
- Bilateral Surveillance: Article IV staff reports
  - The least important: 3
  - (other intermediate categories preserved in table)
  - The most important: 44
  - Weighted average score: 3.85
  - Regional weighted averages: US/Canada 3.78; Europe 4.20; Asia 3.84; EMEA 4.00; Latin America 3.75
- Multilateral Surveillance: World Economic Outlook (WEO)
  - The least important: 3
  - The most important: 26
  - Weighted average score: 3.76
  - Regional weighted averages: US/Canada 3.67; Europe 3.87; Asia 3.80; EMEA 3.81; Latin America 3.80
- Multilateral Surveillance: Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR)
  - The least important: 3
  - The most important: 18
  - Weighted average score: 3.00
  - Regional weighted averages: US/Canada 3.17; Europe 3.13; Asia 3.08; EMEA 2.92; Latin America 3.15
- Multilateral Surveillance: Fiscal Monitor
  - The least important: (table entries)
  - The most important: 3
  - Weighted average score: 3.03
  - Regional weighted averages: US/Canada 2.94; Europe 2.80; Asia 2.96; EMEA 2.96; Latin America 2.90
- Other IMF Products: Regional Economic Outlook (REO)
  - The least important: 91
  - The most important: 9
  - Weighted average score: 1.35
  - Regional weighted averages: US/Canada 1.44; Europe 1.00; Asia 1.32; EMEA 1.31; Latin America 1.40

### 2. What do you see as the role of the IMF's country-specific analytical products? (ranked 1 to 5; summary of perceived roles)
- Providing objective assessments to the official community (including policy makers in other countries): The most important role (Overall weighted average score reflected in table)
- Providing input to decision making by the authorities
- Informing the private sector (including financial market participants)
- Shaping public debate on the key policy issues
- Other
- Note: exact percentage distributions for each role are provided in the table and regional breakdowns are preserved there.

*Italic: Appendix II, Table 4. TSR Financial Markets Survey Results — Distribution of answers in percent*

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### Appendix II, Table 4. Features, contributions, and added value of IMF country reports (Article IV)

### 3. What features of IMF country reports do you consider as their main strengths/weaknesses? (selected features and summary)
- New insights
  - Weakness: 67
  - Neither: 27
  - Strength: 6
  - Mean/score: 1.79
  - Regional means: US/Canada 1.71; Europe 1.53; Asia 1.80; EMEA 1.85; Latin America 1.70
- Timeliness
  - Weakness: 24
  - Neither: 30
  - Strength: 45
  - Mean/score: 3.42
  - Regional means: US/Canada 3.00; Europe 2.73; Asia 3.48; EMEA 3.38; Latin America 3.10
- Candor
  - Weakness: 16
  - Neither: 38
  - Strength: 47
  - Mean/score: 3.63
  - Regional means: US/Canada 3.50; Europe 3.43; Asia 3.67; EMEA 3.56; Latin America 3.74
- Evenhandedness
  - Neither: 6
  - Strength: 94
  - Mean/score: 4.88
  - Regional means: US/Canada 4.88; Europe 5.00; Asia 4.84; EMEA 4.85; Latin America 4.80
- Comprehensiveness
  - Neither: 9
  - Strength: 91
  - Mean/score: 4.82
  - Regional means: US/Canada 5.00; Europe 4.87; Asia 4.84; EMEA 4.77; Latin America 4.90
- Analytical depth
  - Weakness: 3
  - Neither: 19
  - Strength: 77
  - Mean/score: 4.48
  - Regional means: US/Canada 4.60; Europe 4.69; Asia 4.57; EMEA 4.52; Latin America 4.56

### 4. With recent Article IV reports in mind, how would you qualify the extent of the discussion of the following issues? (selected issues and contributions)
- High probability risks around the outlook
  - No contribution: 15
  - Some contribution: 81
  - Significant contribution: 4
  - Mean/score: 2.78
  - Regional mean examples: US/Canada 3.00; Europe 3.00; Asia 2.90; EMEA 2.71; Latin America 2.88
- Tail risk
  - Some contribution: 56
  - Significant contribution: 44
  - Mean/score: 3.88
  - Regional mean examples: US/Canada 4.00; Europe 3.86; Asia 4.00; EMEA 3.88; Latin America 3.74
- Transmission channels of risk
  - Some contribution: 5
  - Significant contribution: 95
  - Mean/score: 4.91
  - Regional mean examples: US/Canada 4.83; Europe 5.00; Asia 4.88; EMEA 5.00; Latin America 4.83
- Policy orientation
  - No contribution: 26
  - Some contribution: 44
  - Significant contribution: 30
  - Mean/score: 3.07
  - Regional mean examples: US/Canada 3.53; Europe 3.62; Asia 3.00; EMEA 3.19; Latin America 3.50
- Objectivity
  - Some contribution: 28
  - Significant contribution: 69
  - Mean/score: 4.31
  - Regional mean examples: US/Canada 4.63; Europe 4.71; Asia 4.33; EMEA 4.44; Latin America 4.37
- Innovative techniques
  - Some contribution: 9
  - Significant contribution: 91
  - Mean/score: 4.82
  - Regional mean examples: US/Canada 4.83; Europe 5.00; Asia 4.76; EMEA 4.88; Latin America 4.67

### 5. In your view, what are the areas in which the analysis in IMF country reports add value compared to analytical products by other institutions? (selected areas with distributions)
- Economic developments and outlook: Advanced economies
  - No contribution: 59
  - Some contribution: 37
  - Significant contribution: 4
  - Mean/score: 1.89
  - Regional mean examples: US/Canada 1.80; Europe 1.77; Asia 1.80; EMEA 2.05; Latin America 1.88
- Economic developments and outlook: Emerging Market countries
  - No contribution: 25
  - Some contribution: 59
  - Significant contribution: 16
  - Mean/score: 2.81
  - Regional mean examples: US/Canada 3.00; Europe 2.71; Asia 2.83; EMEA 2.92; Latin America 2.79
- Economic developments and outlook: Low-income countries
  - No contribution: 14
  - Some contribution: 68
  - Significant contribution: 18
  - Mean/score: 3.09
  - Regional mean examples: US/Canada 2.83; Europe 3.00; Asia 3.24; EMEA 3.25; Latin America 3.00
- Macroeconomic policies: Advanced economies
  - No contribution: 22
  - Some contribution: 67
  - Significant contribution: 11
  - Mean/score: 2.78
  - Regional mean examples: US/Canada 3.00; Europe 3.31; Asia 2.70; EMEA 2.81; Latin America 2.88
- Macroeconomic policies: Emerging Market countries
  - No contribution: 3
  - Some contribution: 63
  - Significant contribution: 34
  - Mean/score: 3.63
  - Regional mean examples: US/Canada 3.50; Europe 3.57; Asia 3.50; EMEA 3.64; Latin America 3.42
- Exchange rates: Emerging Market countries
  - No contribution: 19
  - Some contribution: 67
  - Significant contribution: 15
  - Mean/score: 2.93
  - Regional mean examples: US/Canada 3.13; Europe 3.31; Asia 2.90; EMEA 3.10; Latin America 3.00
- External vulnerabilities and risks: Emerging Market countries
  - No contribution: 9
  - Some contribution: 56
  - Significant contribution: 34
  - Mean/score: 3.50
  - Regional mean examples: US/Canada 3.13; Europe 3.43; Asia 3.42; EMEA 3.48; Latin America 3.21
- Financial sector vulnerabilities and risks: Emerging Market countries
  - No contribution: 14
  - Some contribution: 50
  - Significant contribution: 36
  - Mean/score: 3.45
  - Regional mean examples: US/Canada 3.00; Europe 3.25; Asia 3.59; EMEA 3.25; Latin America 3.33
- Risk transmission between financial sector and real economy: Advanced economies
  - (table continues with regional distributions preserved in source)

*Italic: Appendix II, Table 4. TSR Financial Markets Survey Results — Distribution of answers in percent*

### 5. In your view, what are the areas in which

### 5. In your view, what are the areas in which

### Areas in which the analysis in IMF country reports (Art. IV consultations) add value
- Listed analytical areas (as presented):
  - Cross-border risk transmission: Low-income countries
  - Risk transmission between the financial sector and the real economy: Emerging Market countries
  - Risk transmission between the financial sector and the real economy: Low-income countries
  - Cross-border risk transmission: Advanced economies
  - Cross-border risk transmission: Emerging Market countries
  - Structural issues and policies (labor/product market reforms): Low-income countries
  - Cross-country analysis (i.e., that brings in experience of other countries): Advanced economies
  - Cross-country analysis (i.e., that brings in experience of other countries): Low-income countries
  - Other: Emerging Market countries
  - Other: Low-income countries
  - Structural issues and policies (labor/product market reforms): Advanced economies
  - Structural issues and policies (labor/product market reforms): Emerging Market countries
  - Cross-country analysis (i.e., that brings in experience of other countries): Emerging Market countries
  - Other: Advanced economies

### Appendix II, Table 4 — TSR Financial Markets Survey Results: Distribution of answers in percent (By region header order: Overall US/Canada Europe Asia EMEA Latin America)
- For the first listed area (table block with three response categories and mean scores):
  - No contribution: 30 27 23 30 29 25
  - Some contribution: 41 33 46 40 48 38
  - Significant contribution: 30 40 31 30 24 38
  - Mean scores line: 3.00 3.27 3.15 3.00 2.90 3.25
- Next block:
  - No contribution: 3 6 - 4 - 5
  - Some contribution: 47 31 50 50 52 42
  - Significant contribution: 50 63 50 46 48 53
  - Mean scores line: 3.94 4.13 4.00 3.83 3.96 3.95
- Next block:
  - No contribution: 5 - - 6 6 8
  - Some contribution: 41 42 63 41 44 33
  - Significant contribution: 55 58 38 53 50 58
  - Mean scores line: 4.00 4.17 3.75 3.94 3.88 4.00
- Next block:
  - No contribution: 19 13 8 10 19 19
  - Some contribution: 59 67 77 65 67 63
  - Significant contribution: 22 20 15 25 14 19
  - Mean scores line: 3.07 3.13 3.15 3.30 2.90 3.00
- Next block:
  - No contribution: 6 6 7 - 4 5
  - Some contribution: 53 50 50 54 56 47
  - Significant contribution: 41 44 43 46 40 47
  - Mean scores line: 3.69 3.75 3.71 3.92 3.72 3.84
- Next block:
  - No contribution: 5 8 - - - 8
  - Some contribution: 41 50 38 29 50 33
  - Significant contribution: 55 42 63 71 50 58
  - Mean scores line: 4.00 3.67 4.25 4.41 4.00 4.00
- Next block (three-category block with different labels):
  - No contribution: 50 50 50 43 50 40
  - Some contribution: 50 50 50 57 50 60
  - Significant contribution: - - - - - -
  - Mean scores line: 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.14 2.00 2.20
- Next block:
  - No contribution: 42 60 67 40 40 38
  - Some contribution: 58 40 33 60 60 63
  - Significant contribution: - - - - - -
  - Mean scores line: 2.17 1.80 1.67 2.20 2.20 2.25
- Next block:
  - No contribution: 38 50 50 29 33 20
  - Some contribution: 50 50 50 57 50 60
  - Significant contribution: 13 - - 14 17 20
  - Mean scores line: 2.50 2.00 2.00 2.71 2.67 3.00

### Assessment of overall quality in IMF country reports vs. similar analyses (Appendix II, Table 4 — distribution and weighted averages)
- Question: "Compared to an average quality of similar type of analyses produced by other public and private institutions, how would you assess the overall quality in the IMF's country reports (Art. IV consultations) of: Cross-country analysis; Analysis of cross-border risk transmission; Analysis of financial sector risks and vulnerabilities"
- Example distribution for one assessment block (Much worse / Worse / Average / Better / Much better):
  - Much worse than average: - - - - - -
  - Worse than average: 12 18 - 8 12 16
  - Average: 18 12 14 21 20 16
  - Better than average: 52 47 64 54 48 53
  - Much better than average: 18 24 21 17 20 16
  - Weighted average score: 3.76 3.76 4.07 3.79 3.76 3.68
- Additional assessment block:
  - Worse than average: 6 6 - 4 8 6
  - Average: 31 25 29 33 36 33
  - Better than average: 50 44 50 46 44 44
  - Much better than average: 13 25 21 17 12 17
  - Weighted average score: 3.69 3.88 3.93 3.75 3.60 3.72
- Another block:
  - Average: 27 29 21 33 24 37
  - Better than average: 48 47 50 42 48 37
  - Much better than average: 24 24 29 25 28 26
  - Weighted average score: 3.97 3.94 4.07 3.92 4.04 3.89
- Example block with high "Better than average":
  - Worse than average: 3 - - 4 4 5
  - Average: 22 19 21 29 16 26
  - Better than average: 66 63 64 54 68 53
  - Much better than average: 9 19 14 13 12 16
  - Weighted average score: 3.81 4.00 3.93 3.75 3.88 3.79
- Example block with concentrated "Average" responses:
  - Worse than average: 3 6 7 4 - 5
  - Average: 53 50 57 50 56 58
  - Better than average: 41 44 36 46 40 37
  - Much better than average: 3 - - - 4 -
  - Weighted average score: 3.44 3.38 3.29 3.42 3.48 3.32
- Example block with strong positive skew:
  - Average: 15 6 7 17 12 11
  - Better than average: 52 47 57 58 64 63
  - Much better than average: 33 47 36 25 24 26
  - Weighted average score: 4.18 4.41 4.29 4.08 4.12 4.16

### Two-way analysis and specific analytical themes (listed)
- Two way analysis of risk transmission between the financial sector and the real economy
- Analysis of exchange rate issues
- Analysis of external stability/vulnerability

### Appendix II, Table 4 — Which IMF/global products have been most helpful (selected items and distributions)
- Multilateral Surveillance: World Economic Outlook (WEO)
  - Example block: The least useful: 23 24 29 23 26 24
  - The most useful: 10 6 7 9 9 6
  - Weighted average score: 2.42 2.47 2.21 2.36 2.35 2.41
- Multilateral Surveillance: Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR)
  - The least useful entries: 3 6 - 5 4 6
  - The most useful: 35 29 36 27 30 29
  - Weighted average score: 4.10 4.00 4.21 3.91 4.04 4.00
- Multilateral Surveillance: Fiscal Monitor
  - The least useful entries: 3 6 - 5 4 6
  - The most useful: 42 47 64 45 48 53
  - Weighted average score: 4.10 4.29 4.57 4.00 4.17 4.29
- Other IMF Products: Regional Economic Outlook (REO)
  - The least useful entries: 3 6 - 5 4 6
  - The most useful: 16 24 36 18 22 24
  - Weighted average score: 3.68 3.65 4.00 3.73 3.61 3.71
- Other IMF Products: Cross-country Thematic Reports
  - The least useful: 16 12 7 18 13 6
  - The most useful: 10 6 7 14 4 12
  - Weighted average score: 2.97 3.06 3.21 3.05 2.87 3.24

### Features of IMF global/regional reports: ranking results (question 8 — features ranked 1 to 5; selected aggregated weighted average scores)
- Timeliness: Weighted average score: 4.73 4.00 4.83 5.00 (Overall Asia Europe USA and Canada)
- Comprehensiveness: Weighted average score: 4.36 4.00 4.25 5.00
- Analytical depth: Weighted average score: 3.35 2.33 3.25 4.47
- New insights: Weighted average score: 3.12 3.67 2.73 3.93
- Access to privileged information: Weighted average score: 3.61 3.00 3.59 4.00
- Additional items with weighted scores:
  - 3.29 3.33 3.17 3.67
  - 3.81 4.33 3.43 5.00
  - 3.67 4.33 3.12 5.00

### Appendix II, Table 5 — TSR Media Survey Results: usage/coverage and instrument familiarity (selected results)
- Question 1: Number of Respondents: 28 4 18 5; Participation Rate (In Percentage): 32
- Use/coverage frequency examples (distribution labels: Rarely / Sometimes / Frequently)
  - Example: Rarely 4 - 6 - ; Sometimes 14 50 6 20 ; Frequently 82 50 89 80 ; Weighted average: 4.57 4.00 4.67 4.60
- Instrument familiarity and frequency (selected weighted average scores):
  - Other IMF products: Financial System Stability Assessments (FSSA): 3.62 3.33 3.74 3.67
  - Other IMF products: Regional Economic Outlooks: 4.06 3.67 4.22 3.93
  - Other IMF products: Cross-country Thematic Reports: 3.67 3.33 3.74 3.93
  - Input for other fora: G-20 Surveillance Briefing Notes: 3.12 3.00 2.96 3.93
  - Input for other fora: Analytical input for the G-20 (e.g., G-20 Mutual Assessment Process): 3.67 3.67 3.50 4.33
  - Additional instrument scores (selected): 3.43 3.33 3.40 3.67; 3.15 2.67 3.20 4.00; 2.64 2.33 2.14 5.00

*Appendix II, Table 4 and Table 5. TSR Financial Markets Survey Results / TSR Media Survey Results (distribution of answers in percent; regional breakdowns and weighted average scores as presented).*

### 3. How often do you use or

### _082611b - 3. How often do you use or

### Appendix II, Table 5. TSR Media Survey Results — Use and ratings of IMF communications instruments (by region)
- Instruments listed: Press briefings at IMF Headquarters; Press briefings in the field; Conference calls; Press Events: Other; Mission concluding statements; Country Article IV reports; Public Information Notices/Press; Selected Issues Papers (SIP).
- Response categories and examples of distribution (percent):
  - Example instrument block (Overall / Asia / Europe / USA and Canada):
    - Never use: 4 / 25 / - / -
    - Poor: 11 / 25 / 6 / 20
    - Satisfactory: 52 / 25 / 59 / 40
    - Very good: 33 / 25 / 35 / 40
    - Weighted average score: 3.86 / 3.00 / 4.06 / 3.93
  - Repeated instrument block with identical distribution and weighted average:
    - Never use: 4 / 25 / - / -
    - Poor: 11 / 25 / 6 / 20
    - Satisfactory: 52 / 25 / 59 / 40
    - Very good: 33 / 25 / 35 / 40
    - Weighted average score: 3.86 / 3.00 / 4.06 / 3.93
  - Additional instrument examples (selected blocks from the table):
    - Never use: 4 / 25 / - / -
      - Poor: 16 / - / 20 / 20
      - Satisfactory: 56 / 50 / 60 / 60
      - Very good: 24 / 25 / 20 / 20
      - Weighted average score: 3.67 / 3.33 / 3.67 / 3.67
    - Never use: 4 / 25 / - / -
      - Poor: - / - / - / -
      - Satisfactory: 58 / 50 / 50 / 100
      - Very good: 38 / 25 / 50 / -
      - Weighted average score: 4.08 / 3.33 / 4.33 / 3.67
    - Never use: 4 / 25 / - / -
      - Poor: 31 / 25 / 19 / 80
      - Satisfactory: 54 / 25 / 69 / 20
      - Very good: 12 / 25 / 13 / -
      - Weighted average score: 3.31 / 3.00 / 3.58 / 2.60
    - Never use: 4 / 25 / - / -
      - Poor: 8 / 25 / 6 / -
      - Satisfactory: 64 / 50 / 69 / 50
      - Very good: 24 / - / 25 / 50
      - Weighted average score: 3.77 / 2.67 / 3.92 / 4.33
    - Never use: 4 / 25 / - / -
      - Poor: 8 / 25 / - / 25
      - Satisfactory: 68 / 25 / 81 / 50
      - Very good: 20 / 25 / 19 / 25
      - Weighted average score: 3.72 / 3.00 / 3.92 / 3.67
    - Never use: 4 / 25 / - / -
      - Poor: 12 / 25 / 6 / 25
      - Satisfactory: 72 / 50 / 75 / 75
      - Very good: 12 / - / 19 / -
      - Weighted average score: 3.56 / 2.67 / 3.83 / 3.33
    - Never use: 4 / 25 / - / -
      - Poor: 17 / 25 / 7 / 50
      - Satisfactory: 75 / 50 / 87 / 50
      - Very good: 4 / - / 7 / -
      - Weighted average score: 3.39 / 2.67 / 3.67 / 3.00
    - Never use: 4 / 25 / - / -
      - Poor: 4 / - / - / 25
      - Satisfactory: 72 / 75 / 69 / 75
      - Very good: 20 / - / 31 / -
      - Weighted average score: 3.77 / 3.00 / 4.08 / 3.33
- Comparative assessment of IMF communications on surveillance versus other institutions (by region; distribution in percent):
  - Much Worse: - / - / - / -
  - Somewhat Worse: 4 / 25 / - / -
  - About the Same: 26 / - / 38 / 20
  - Somewhat Better: 35 / - / 46 / 40
  - Much Better: 35 / 75 / 15 / 40

### Attributes rated for Article IV reports (question 4)
- Attributes listed: Clarity; Credibility; Candor; Timeliness; Evenhandedness.
- (No discrete numeric breakdown provided in the excerpt beyond the attribute list.)

### Attributes rated for global/regional surveillance (question 5)
- Attributes listed: Timeliness; Conciseness; Clarity; Candor; Evenhandedness.
- (No discrete numeric breakdown provided in the excerpt beyond the attribute list.)

---

### Appendix II, Table 6. TSR CSO Survey Results — Respondent characteristics, familiarity, and value judgments
- Overall statistics:
  - Number of Responses: Number of Responses17
  - Participation Rate (in Percentage)38
- Regional distribution (number of respondents by region):
  - Sub-Saharan Africa: 6
  - Asia: 7
  - Latin America or Caribbean: 6
  - Europe: 5
  - Middle East/North Africa: 4
  - USA and Canada: 0
  - USA or Canada based only: 1
  - USA or Canada based, with branches in other countries: 1
  - Western Europe based only: 2
  - Western Europe, with branches in other countries: 2
  - In a Latin American or Caribbean / Middle Eastern or African / Asian country, but with a regional scope of work: 6
  - In a Latin American or Caribbean / Middle Eastern or African / Asian country, that operates only in that country: 3
- Familiarity with IMF surveillance products (response categories converted to a 5-point scaled weighted average where used):
  - Example weighted average scores (by unspecified product/context):
    - Weighted average score: 2.35
    - Weighted average score: 2.53
    - Weighted average score: 2.06
    - Weighted average score: 1.65
    - Weighted average score: 2.24
    - Weighted average score: 1.88
    - Weighted average score: 1.59
- Perceived value of specific IMF surveillance products (counts and weighted averages):
  - Individual country staff reports: Find valuable 12 / Do not find valuable 2 / Not applicable 1 / Weighted average score 1.53
  - World Economic Outlook (WEO): Find valuable 8 / Do not find valuable 4 / Not applicable 1 / Weighted average score 1.18
  - Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR): Find valuable 8 / Do not find valuable 3 / Not applicable 2 / Weighted average score 1.12
  - Fiscal Monitor: Find valuable 9 / Do not find valuable 3 / Not applicable 2 / Weighted average score 1.24
  - Regional Economic Outlook: Find valuable 10 / Do not find valuable 2 / Not applicable 3 / Weighted average score 1.29
  - Financial Sector Stability Assessment (FSSA): Find valuable 7 / Do not find valuable 3 / Not applicable 2 / Weighted average score 1.00
  - G-20 Surveillance Notes: Find valuable 9 / Do not find valuable 2 / Not applicable 2 / Weighted average score 1.18
  - (One item with: Find valuable 2 / Do not find valuable 0 / Not applicable 3 / Weighted average score 0.24)
- Comparative assessment of IMF communications on surveillance versus other institutions (CSO responses):
  - Much better: 2
  - Somewhat better: 4
  - About the same: 6
  - Somewhat worse: 2
  - Much worse: 1
  - Weighted average score: 2.88

### CSO-stated most valuable aspects of IMF surveillance products (question 4 — checklist)
- Analysis of developments and outlook
- Monetary policy
- Exchange rate policy
- Fiscal policy
- Financial sector issues
- Economic contagion across countries
- Cross-country thematic analysis
- Other

---

### Appendix II, Table 7. TSR Country Authorities Survey Comments — Key themes from open-ended responses
- Need for transparency and timeliness in projections:
  - "When projections are presented, their underlying assumptions and data (sources) should be provided to the authority in a timely manner."
- Quality of analysis:
  - High quality in areas such as monetary/fiscal policy; improvement needed in macroprudential policy.
  - Concern that recent Article IV missions sometimes lacked macroprudential policy experts.
  - Quality varies with mission team composition; frequent changes in mission chiefs and team members reduce in-depth country knowledge.
  - New surveillance formats should not negatively impact quality; in-depth selected issues papers are "no longer the norm."
- Timing and coordination of missions:
  - Overlap of Article IV, FSAP, and spillover reports can create "IMF fatigue" and duplicate questions.
  - Suggestion to schedule visits after March to allow year-end data and Central Bank March statements to be available.
- Interaction with authorities and consultation process:
  - Authorities should be allowed to comment earlier in drafting to correct factual errors; current "at the last minute" comments often too late.
  - Increase staff consultations with other stakeholders' groups; more interaction on the ground to foster ownership.
- Use of cross-country comparisons and spillovers:
  - Fund's comparative advantage is cross-country comparisons and spillover analysis—encouraged greater focus on these areas.
  - Calls for more regional and cross-border surveillance and better use of externalities/spillovers in Article IVs.
  - A gap remains in impact analysis of domestic developments on other economies and inward spillovers.
- Tailoring advice to country circumstances:
  - Need for more country-specific approaches, accounting for membership in arrangements like EMU and balance of payments specifics of small open economies.
  - Concern that "top-down approach" or consistency pressures (e.g., "euro area advice") can make policy messages non-applicable to some countries.
  - Policy advice should consider broader legal, regulatory and institutional environments; avoid over-reliance on standard templates.
- Staffing and expertise:
  - Need for functional department experts (e.g., FAD) rather than generalists for specialized surveillance areas.
  - Fuller contribution from entire mission team would add weight to policy interactions.
- Suggestions for surveillance periodicity and scope:
  - Support for mandatory FSAPs for systemic countries; suggestion that periodicity should be increased to 3 years (comment incomplete).
  - All systemically important economies should be appropriately covered with due follow-up monitoring.
- Communication style and candor:
  - Calls for more definitive and candid views from the Fund.
  - Some respondents perceive inconsistency or lack of evenhandedness across countries; perception that small countries may be subject to stricter surveillance.
- Specific policy and sectoral comments:
  - Greater emphasis needed on financial sector vulnerabilities, bank recapitalization needs, and restructuring where relevant.
  - Requests for more impact analysis and for Fund to consider recommending institutional changes where appropriate.
- Miscellaneous suggestions:
  - Improve succinctness and accessibility of staff papers.
  - Use peer performance comparisons to incentivize better country performance.
  - Recognize distinct country circumstances; avoid "one-size-fits-all" policy prescriptions.

*Source: Appendix II, Tables 5–7, _082611b - 3. How often do you use or*

### 3. In reference to Question 9 on whether or not a press conference was held at the end of the most recent

### _082611b - 3. In reference to Question 9 on whether or not a press conference was held at the end of the most recent

### Press conference at end of Article IV missions (Question 9)
- Reasons given for not holding a press conference:
  - "It was felt that the release to the media of the Mission‘s concluding statement was sufficient, particularly as there were no major issues of contention in it."
  - "This is the staff‘s report and we do not want to show any interference."
  - "Ample press coverage is undertaken when the Report of the Article IV Consultation is published."
  - "Relatively low level of general public interest in article IV consultations in our country."
  - "A formal press conference has never been carried out in our country. The mission chief did, however, conduct a media briefing."
  - "Normally a press release is issued at the end of negotiations."
  - "A press release was issued as discussed with the authorities."
  - "There was no Press Release but the newspapers reported on the recent Article IV Mission."
  - "A press release sufficed. There were no issues of divergence of views."
  - "In the past, no need was seen to hold a press conference."
  - "Ministry of Finance chose to keep the findings internal."

### Delivery of more candid messages (Question 11)
- Modes cited for delivering more candid messages outside the staff report:
  - "In Selected Issues."
  - "Yes but could have been even stronger."
  - "Closed door meeting between authorities and staff team."

### Perceptions of evenhandedness in IMF policy advice (Question 13)
- Reasons and examples given for perceptions of uneven treatment:
  - "Because treatment of evenhandedness in peer group countries differs to wide extent."
  - "Clearly IMF advice to advanced economies policy makers was not at the appropriate strength and frequency needed to put pressure on them to correct their wrong policy path before the 2008 crises."
  - "Are more critical when relating to small countries, the IMF should not shy away from giving appropriate advice to large members."
  - "Bigger countries get  ̳better‘ treatment, in particular G7/G20."
  - "More prescriptive for developing and program countries and less so for advanced countries."
  - "Candor and topic/country coverage is not evenhanded."
  - Governance and independence concerns:
    - "The nature of the Fund‘s corporate governance structure is such that the Board and the Staff do not have clearly delineated lines of responsibility. This means that Fund surveillance is always perceived to be somewhat influenced by political considerations. Truly evenhanded and credible surveillance would need to be carried out by a Staff with greater operational independence from Executive Directors. The Board should assume a more hands-off supervisory role in surveillance."
  - Examples of uneven financial-sector scrutiny and systemic-country candor:
    - "Financial sector analysis is not evenhanded; countries with large financial sectors with potential spillover effects are not sufficiently overseen."
    - "Fund‘s advice on US fiscal development is relatively less sharp than for other advanced systemic countries."
    - "Larger countries (esp. US) get a free ride."
    - "Surveillance of largest members appears partly less rigorous."
    - "IMF is not candid enough on assessment of systemic countries."

### Differences in precision of policy advice across membership (Question 15)
- Observations about drivers of precision differences:
  - "Risk assessment and policy advice in peer group countries in particular large advanced countries differ to wide extent."
  - "Our sense is that Mission teams are evenhanded in their direct interactions with policymakers across the membership, but this may not necessarily be reflected in the final published surveillance product. Overall, the published policy advice for systemic countries tends to be less precise than for non-systemic economies."
  - "These differences may reflect tailoring policy advice to local circumstances."
  - Country-size, resources, and staffing factors:
    - "Largely, I suspect, a reflection of the research resource the Fund can/does throw at big country issues, compared with what is realistic for a small country."
    - "It all depends on the quality and expertise of the staff working on your country."
    - "The Fund often hints at large members - but names small."
  - Thematic gaps in implementation of surveillance frameworks:
    - "There is clearly a large difference with respect to exchange rate analysis. The 2007 Surveillance Decision is not being fully implemented, especially with respect to large reserve accumulators. The Fund need to be more forceful in its analysis of currency manipulation and exchange rate misalignment - it must call out when countries are not respecting the Articles and the Decision."
  - Comparative precision patterns:
    - "Policy advice is more detailed for emerging and developing economies, while for advanced economies policy advice is more general in nature."
    - "Less advanced economies are given more precise advice, which makes sense."
    - "We have noticed differences of precision of countries with similar characteristics (advanced/ emerging)."
    - "If more thorough analyses of developments in major economies had been made, much of the difficulties that spilled over to other countries could have been avoided."
  - Other determinants:
    - "Contingent on depth and coverage of data availability."
    - "This has mainly to do with the quality of statistics available."
    - "This difference is explained by different attitude of the authorities."
    - "Precision of policy advise relates in large measure to country circumstances."
    - "Depending on team members of the mission."

### Gaps in coverage and duplication across IMF surveillance products (Question 7)
- Notable gaps and duplication examples:
  - Duplication highlighted between WEO and GFSR, especially in financial market analysis: "WEO and GFSR are duplicated especially in a financial market area. They should be integrated to a single report."
  - "There continue to be analytical inconsistencies between the WEO and the GFSR (notwithstanding the fact that the GFSR is intended to focus more on tail risks)."
  - Calls for clearer, more concise key messages across flagship publications: "The key messages from many of the surveillance products (including the WEO and the GFSR) need to be brought out more clearly, through more concise summaries."
  - Cross-sector and macro-financial gaps:
    - "IMF surveillance could recognize/further enhance cross-sectoral as well as risk based approach;"
    - "Gaps: Linkages between financial sector risk and the real economy (second round effects)."
    - "Cross country operational issues related to capital flows."
    - "Gaps in coverage: - cross-border capital flows (multilateral and bilateral perspective)/both for recipient and source countries; - Global liquidity analysis and surveillance; - Systemic stability perspective/analysis of spillovers."
  - Internal inconsistencies and overlap with other institutions:
    - "The discussion of surveillance related to capital flows is a perfect example of duplication. While SPR worked on that paper, MCM worked on a different one regarding macro prudential policies. The overlap is totally evident..."
    - "Duplications with other international bodies could be addressed."
    - "High risk for future duplication of surveillance, in particular in Europe (IMF/EBA/ESRB/FSB/BCBS...)."
  - Calls to sharpen flagship reports (length and coherence):
    - "The WEO and especially the GFSR are too long. They could be considerably sharpened and shortened. The emphasis should be on multilateral dimensions (e.g. spillovers)..."
    - "We welcome the MDs statement with key messages on the WEO and the GFSR..."
    - "Going forward, we see little need to introduce new multilateral surveillance products. Actually, the Fund needs to be careful not to confuse readers by establishing too many publications dealing with multilateral surveillance issues."

### Recommendations to enhance effectiveness of surveillance (Question 8)
- General strategic recommendations:
  - "In order to enhance the effectiveness of surveillance, Articles of Agreement of IMF should be amended to include financial stability in the formal purpose of IMF."
  - "The Fund should focus its surveillance on its areas of comparative advantage, in particular, on macrofinancial and cross-country linkages. An important element of this is ensuring that multilateral and bilateral surveillance products are linked up."
  - "We think the Fund is in the best position to carry out surveillance of cross-border capital flows, but that its ability to do so is hampered by inadequate data."
  - "For systemic economies, the effectiveness of surveillance could be enhanced by ensuring that national policymakers are able to engage with IMF Staff/external consultants with a commensurate degree of seniority."
  - "Follow IEO recommendations."
  - "Follow a policy of more evenhandedness."
- Operational and analytic improvements:
  - "The GFSR contains useful analysis, but is an unwieldy document. It could be improved by increasing the focus on the key risks, and ensuring consistent messaging with the WEO."
  - "The FSSA is too long. We would suggest producing a summary containing key charts and tables."
  - "To enhance the overall effectiveness of surveillance, the IMF should improve the quality of analysis, provide detailed but appropriate policy prescriptions and follow up by conducting implementation reviews and assessing their impact on the economy."
  - "We encourage the IMF to prepare general guidelines or principles for managing capital inflows/outflows, further elaboration of metrics for reserve adequacy and inclusion of these metrics to IMF surveillance."
  - "We support increased transparency of surveillance products, including mandatory publication of Article IV reports and publication of CGER analysis."
  - "Stronger discussion of capital flows and stronger analysis of reserve adequacy, incorporating the Fund‘s new metric, is also needed in bilateral surveillance."
  - "Reforms to the IMF organizational structure may be required to help promote greater consistency and candor of surveillance across countries. Staff should move forward in incorporating the recommendations of the recent IEO report on surveillance."
- Practical and procedural suggestions:
  - "Personnel changes of the IMF staff members should be kept to a minimum. There might be room for further involvement of the OAP during the IMF mission."
  - "Organize regional consultations with national authorities."
  - "Make presentation of surveillance documents after the Board discussion."
  - "Have closer interaction with the authorities before the Article IV mission."
  - "Greater transparency on assumptions used for macroeconomic forecasts."
  - "Greater transparency on country specific models for macroeconomic forecasts."
  - "Greater reactivity on current economic developments, at least for small advanced countries."
  - "The Fund teams really need to know the country, and the ethos of its bureaucracy and policymakers."
  - "We see a role for the IMFC as a medium through which members apply peer review and pressure and address cross border spillovers of domestic policies."
  - "IMF shall adjust its focus of surveillance, paying more attention to the macroeconomic policies of major reserve currency issuing economies, the financial sector and the cross-border capital flows."
  - "We encourage staff to ensure that the focus remains on drawing out key lessons from these exercises."
  - "We support increased transparency of surveillance products, including mandatory publication of Article IV reports and publication of CGER analysis."
  - "More generally, the Fund should reflect on its value added in surveillance of advanced economies and emerging markets given the large amount of academic and investment bank analysis and surveillance."

*Source: _082611b - 3. In reference to Question 9 on whether or not a press conference was held at the end of the most recent*

### Appendix II, Table 7. TSR Country Authorities Survey Comments

### _082611b - Appendix II, Table 7. TSR Country Authorities Survey Comments

### Governance, Institutional Reform, and Accountability
- Full implementation of the IEO recommendations on corporate governance reforms to:
  - enhance accountability,
  - delineate lines of responsibility,
  - enhance ministerial involvement,
  - augment the Board‘s role in terms of Staff supervision (rather than direct Board involvement) and in setting the strategic direction of the Fund (and its surveillance).
- Provide the Staff with greater operational independence (though still accountable to the Board periodically) to improve credibility and traction of Fund advice.
- More work in terms of pushing ahead with the IMFB.
- A greater role of independent evaluation in the TSR (less staff self-assessment).
- Stricter implementation of the 2007 surveillance Decision.
- Completion of governance reform seen as critical for providing emerging markets with a greater sense of ownership and for fostering global policy coordination.
- Reforms to the IMF organizational structure may be required to help promote greater consistency and candor of surveillance across countries.
- Staff should move forward in incorporating the recommendations of the recent IEO report on surveillance.

### Legal Framework, Mandate, and Scope of Surveillance
- The legal framework of IMF surveillance should be reviewed to ensure the IMF is equipped to deal with today‘s economic and financial realities: systemic stability and spillovers, capital account management, macro-financial stability.
- Consideration of all possible options for reform (such as a review of the 2007 Decision and multilateral surveillance decision or amendment of the Articles of Agreement).
- Proposal to amend Articles of Agreement to include financial stability in the formal purpose of IMF.
- The Fund‘s potential role in monitoring capital flows should be enhanced.

### Transparency, Publication, and Information Access
- Greater transparency on assumptions used for macroeconomic forecasts.
- Greater transparency on country specific models for macroeconomic forecasts.
- The staff reviews should be made public and not depend upon the approval of authorities; withholding creates inequality of access to information.
- Access to information like BOP, Debt database and monthly and annual bulletin be enhanced.
- Support increased transparency of surveillance products, including mandatory publication of Article IV reports and publication of CGER analysis.

### Country-Specific Tailoring, Capacity Building, and Knowledge Transfer
- IMF should tailor policy recommendations according to a country‘s specific circumstances.
- The IMF should do more to share with local authorities the techniques IMF staff adopt on assessment missions to facilitate understanding and ownership of IMF recommendations.
- More country specific research, possibly joint with authorities.
- Transfer of knowledge between persons coming to work on a country and the one leaving—reduce time spent re-covering the same issues with personnel changes.
- Teams working on a given country should be stable for at least 2 years to improve understanding and dialogue with authorities.
- Surveillance should be backed by experts (e.g., fiscal expert and BOP statistics expert included in missions).
- Staff quality needs improvement with recruitment of experienced personnel from Central Bank Supervision departments and Government Treasury departments.

### Financial Stability, Macro-Financial Analysis, and Capital Flows
- Encourage continued enhancement of analytical underpinnings on financial stability issues (e.g., work on capital flows).
- FSAPs on a more formal and regular basis, interlinked with the Article IV process.
- Early Warning Exercise is welcome.
- IMF should adjust its focus of surveillance, paying more attention to the macroeconomic policies of major reserve currency issuing economies, the financial sector and the cross-border capital flows.
- Encourage preparation of general guidelines/principles for managing capital inflows/outflows, further elaboration of metrics for reserve adequacy and inclusion of these metrics to IMF surveillance.
- Stronger discussion of capital flows and stronger analysis of reserve adequacy, incorporating the Fund‘s new metric, is also needed in bilateral surveillance.

### Multilateral vs. Bilateral Surveillance and Product Consistency
- Bilateral surveillance should continue as a cornerstone role; it remains the most direct way to communicate policy advice and allows candid and confidential discussions.
- Multilateral surveillance development is useful but should not come at the expense of bilateral surveillance.
- Concern about overlaps and duplication among WEO, GFSR, Fiscal Monitor, REOs, Article IVs, and cross-country thematic reports.
- The consistency of key messages in the WEO and the GFSR has improved, but differences in emphasis remain and flagship publications can appear reconciled late in production.
- A single short and succinct multilateral product that is more than a synthesis could accompany various products to avoid blunting key messages.
- Area department products can differ from functional/multilateral products (example: differing views on FX reserve accumulation).

### Candor, Evenhandedness, and Risk Assessment
- Calls for more independent analysis and candid policy assessments, particularly of systemically important countries.
- Staff policy advice on addressing medium and long term risks in advanced economies has been described as vague and sometimes self-censored.
- Article IV reports tend to be more candid and critical of emerging market and developing countries than of advanced economies, especially major shareholders.
- Perception that risks are generally incorporated, but less so for advanced economies (e.g., U.S.).
- Recommendations to point out clearly emerging risks, provide comprehensive explanation of policy options, and prepare response plans if risks materialize.
- Some Article IV reports for advanced economies were criticized as not candid about sectoral weaknesses (examples cited in text: Greece, Ireland).

### Analytical Tools and Methodologies
- Refinement of the CGER methodology to better assess exchange rate situations, especially for small open economies.
- Greater use and expansion of the Statement of Surveillance Priorities to get countries to re-affirm their Article IV commitments.
- Continue development of tools and databases relative to multilateral surveillance.
- More rigorous assessment of likelihood and severity of identified vulnerabilities to improve usefulness for decision makers.

### Operational and Staffing Recommendations
- Greater role of independent evaluation in TSR and less reliance on staff self-assessment.
- Provide experts from functional departments on missions to small non-operational members.
- Modify incentives for Fund staff to speak truth and overcome hurdles leading to lack of evenhandedness.
- Diversify Art. IV mission teams to incorporate staff with policymaking experience beyond academic backgrounds.
- Turnaround of staff work in-country has an impact on dialogue; stability of teams recommended.

*Source: Appendix II, Table 7. TSR Country Authorities Survey Comments*

### 5. In reference to Question 16 on, in your view, to what extent the policy advice in IMF Article IV

### _082611b - 5. In reference to Question 16 on, in your view, to what extent the policy advice in IMF Article IV

### Evenhandedness of IMF Article IV policy advice
- Observation: On low income countries, the reports do not hesitate to criticize policies and measures taken, but we do not see the same approach when it comes to advanced economies and some emerging countries whose policies many times have spillover effects.
- Example: Little criticism of protectionist agricultural policies in advanced and emerging economies, while protectionist policies in low income countries are always criticized.
- Recommendation implicit in comments: Greater candor and even-handedness, less political influence on the mission teams.

### Differences in traction of surveillance across countries
- Finding: Fund advice has more traction in small countries with limited domestic policy development capacity.
- Distinction: Traction is not surprisingly highest in program countries.
- Specific notes:
  - Traction is relatively high in countries which want to maintain a good track record and which are vulnerable to changes in market sentiment.
  - Program countries tend to follow Fund advice more closely.
  - Non-program countries are remote and in some cases see Article IV consultation as a process to tick a box and wait for the next consultation.
  - LICs and small middle income countries are more likely to follow Fund recommendations and policy advice.
- Summary statements from respondents: "There is not much difference among the countries in my constituency." and "Yes, stronger in program countries."

### Steps proposed to improve traction of Fund surveillance
- Address issues from the authorities’ perspective with policy options and pros and cons.
- Better use of cross-country relevant experiences across the Fund’s membership.
- Increase significantly share of staff with practical policy experience.
- Focus more on diversity of thinking.
- Ensure Article IV reports explain why recommendations are not followed.
- Clearer public messaging.
- Gain the trust of the authorities; convincing authorities of the merits of Fund advice is paramount.
- Systematically improve the Fund’s policy advising skills (non-technical) and think more strategically about how to engage authorities on sensitive issues.
- Appropriate candor in assessments and advice, and the responsibility of membership to publish.
- Mission chiefs should be familiar with issues and take into account political and social implications.
- More consistent monitoring of what happened to past Fund advice; more specificity in Fund advice.
- Identify more effective ways of engaging authorities through products that appeal to all membership as countries exit Fund programs.
- More clear and concise messages on multilateral surveillance.
- Elevate some surveillance discussions at the ministerial level.
- Incorporate in Article IV reports a Box on how the authorities did or did not follow-up on past recommendations.
- Strengthen the multilateral dimension of surveillance.
- Staff could give conferences or seminars on important economic policies at end of missions.
- Greater ministerial involvement, guidance, and review.
- Demonstrate genuine value added to authorities based on real expertise and experience of how other countries approached similar issues.
- Rethink surveillance model: consider more consistent and frequent but shorter engagement instead of current one/two week mission a year.
- Avoid relying on media engagement to improve traction; it can undermine the confidential advisor role.

### General comments on enhancing overall effectiveness of surveillance
- The Fund must be viewed by the authorities as an independent and trusted advisor to enhance acceptance of Fund’s advice.
- The Fund should be seen as evenhanded across countries and groups of countries.
- Increase regional diversity of Fund staff to strengthen surveillance quality.
- More adverse scenario testing of baseline projections in every Article IV.
- Obligatory reserve adequacy assessment and exchange rate assessments in every Article IV report.
- Overhaul surveillance framework to capture changed dynamics of global risks; assign equal attention to monetary, fiscal, financial sector policies and macro-critical structural policies as to exchange rate.
- Greater involvement of ministers in IMFC meetings on surveillance issues.
- Maintain a clear, memorable key message regardless of number of surveillance products.
- Some higher degree of standardization could be useful (e.g., inclusion of a Box on follow-up on past advice, more consistency in exchange rate analysis, rigorous implementation of guidelines on capital flows).
- Enhance ministerial discussion and multilateral dimension (spillover analysis) beyond systemic economies.
- Better articulate surveillance and lending; use surveillance to qualify countries for different types of lending facilities.
- Legal framework of surveillance is outdated; jurisdiction over the capital account seems necessary in some form.
- Critique: The so-called "innovative format" for Article IV is not an improvement; such reports tend to provide less substantive analysis and argumentation.
- Suggestion: Give more prominence to the views of authorities, especially when they differ from staff.
- Keep improving financial sector expertise within staff.
- Rethink the bilateral model of annual missions and little other engagement.
- Multilateral surveillance should highlight inter-relationships and spillovers; flagship multilateral products need reform/consolidation.
- Internal coordination issue: Evidence of Departments failing to work together and working in parallel; tackling this is a major Management challenge.

### Mission chiefs’ operational and analytical challenges (selected)
- Use of G-20 analytical inputs:
  - Regular surveillance work and its analytical component are broadly aligned with G20 priorities; analytical surveillance drives G20 contributions.
  - For some, G-20 process has been "a cost" with no benefit; G20-related work may add workload without much added value for bilateral surveillance.
  - Use inputs on financial sector stability, lessons from the crisis, and addressing global imbalances.
- Authorities’ receptivity to risk assessments:
  - Authorities are very sensitive to discussions of imperfect policies or institutions for domestic political reasons; candid risk assessments can become onerous and combative up to Board discussion.
  - Some authorities perceive extensive low-probability risk discussions as "speculative" and not worth their time; tail risks often dismissed as "irrelevant doom saying."
  - Authorities often focused on domestic political issues that distract from macro-financial priorities.
  - Capacity constraints make discussion of standard risks a luxury in some cases.
  - Example: Authorities unwilling to discuss spillover risks from a European country in crisis due to limited control and liquidity support constraints.
- Challenges in Article IV consultations on financial sector issues:
  - Capacity of regulatory authorities to collect and analyze data is very limited.
  - Cross-border financial institution issues require broader analysis than bilateral surveillance.
  - Difficulty distinguishing idiosyncratic vs. systemic/regulatory weaknesses in institutions.
  - Information on risks from other countries often not available in easily digested format.
  - Authorities' unwillingness to provide non-public banking and financial data constrains risk identification.
  - Lack of relevant data on cross-border exposures.
  - Fluid and complex situations (e.g., Europe) complicate cross-border risk assessments.
  - Need for resource-intensive on-site examinations to identify vulnerabilities in individual institutions.
  - Macroeconomic implications of financial sector developments are difficult to predict due to behavioral responses.
  - Political resistance: authorities may resist discussion of tail risks (e.g., fall in house prices).
  - In LIC/non-systemic cases, reliance on other IFIs due to limited support from MCM.
  - Data limitations, weak central bank capacity, poor quality of financial sector data, and lack of bank-by-bank supervisory data hinder stress testing and analysis.
  - Time constraints, lack of resources, and lack of staff training exacerbate challenges.
  - Recommendation: Conduct FSAP or FSAP Update before Article IV where financial sector issues are significant.
- Analytical tools used:
  - Use of CDS and spreads cited.
  - Use of market-based indicators in SIP chapters to assess linkages between banks domestically and internationally.

*Source: _082611b - 5. In reference to Question 16 on, in your view, to what extent the policy advice in IMF Article IV*

### 5. Please indicate what you would find most helpful to enable you to improve the integration of macro-

### _082611b - 5. Please indicate what you would find most helpful to enable you to improve the integration of macro-

### Integration of macro-financial linkages (responses to Question 5)
- Need for timely feedback from the Fund work in the area of macro-financial linkages.
- Concern that "The focus and priorities of the institution keep shifting, and the integration of macro-financial linkages into the Article IV report is almost seen as anachronistic, because there is excessive focus on the current flavor of the day (e.g., dealing with capital inflows, food and commodity prices etc). So it is up to the mission chief to lead the agenda, and there seems to be less interest from review departments and others as priorities are always on shorter term issues that are being talked about (as above) and not on the underpinnings of appropriate surveillance. Recognition of good reports that integrate macro-financial linkages may help clarify institutional priorities."
- Availability of suitable, ready-to-use analytical tools/models.
- "Models/frameworks for linking financial to the macro"
- "An economic framework for better analysis of macro-financial issues."
- "Development of methodologies that capture these linkages. It is still a work in progress."
- Centralized off-site model/indicator analysis: "Many of the model/indicator-based analysis can be conducted off-site (i.e., in DC), and there are clear gains from scope (i.e., no need to decentralize the work to individual country desks; what is needed is simply data to be put into the model). If any approach listed under the survey question on ―What quantitative/analytical tools for financial sector surveillance have you used in the Article IV?‖ is known to be useful, MCM should carry out analysis regularly for AEs and major EMs, and offer the findings for the use of country teams. If area departments find such products useful, they will be forthcoming to help MCM in terms of data provision. That this is not happening is rather surprising."
- Staffing and reliable data availability.
- Need for bank-specific data.
- "A well-established analytical framework (or frameworks) to study the linkages."
- Access to MCM and SPR analytical tools and data: "We need access to MCM and SPR‘s analytical tools and data for our countries. They should not treat these as proprietary. They need to be  ̳open source‘ on the intranet. The EWE and EWA are far too nontransparent.*"
- Request for FSAP update: "The FSAP update scheduled for 2012 should be sufficient."
- Greater support from MCM (including "Support from MCM" and "A more effective MCM department.")
- Resource constraints: "Resources--we are a program case, we spent half the year at half-requisite staff level, and we subsequently hired outside the Fund with no particular experience in macro-financial issues. We have no resources from MCM beyond TA coordination, and relying on the Bank and other IFIs has proven difficult, time-consuming, and sometimes less useful for Fund-related work."
- Use of systematic templates.
- More cross-country financial-macro linkage studies to base country analysis on.
- Better data, MCM mission participation, readily accessible analytical tools.
- Consistent coverage/input from MCM; consistent set of tools/models; better data.
- Better access to some data (notably, stress tests).
- Financial sector analysis (development module) needs:
  - "bank by bank supervisory data from the authorities"
  - "Effective MCM input- a banking sector specialist (e.g. a former supervisor) and someone with time to devote to country work"
  - "comprehensive data base with high frequency data on external debt by cou [NOTE: respondent did not finish comment]"
  - "Data availability"
  - "Candid and more technical discussion with the authorities"
  - "More support from functional department"
- Miscellaneous: "More training. More time in the field." and "Macro-financial linkages are very limited due to the low level of financial development in the country."

### Exchange rate discussion constraints (responses to Question 6)
- Authorities' sensitivity and publication threats: "The authorities threatened to withhold publication of the staff report due to the discussion of exchange rate issues. Needed a lot of maneuvering and massaging the text to get their approval."
- Mission team size issues and CGER limitations: "Mission team size an issue, as well as standard CGER not informative for a number of countries."
- CGER applicability concerns:
  - "The CGER-based methodologies do not take into account all relevant country-specific factors; moreover, they do not seem applicable to small open economies."
  - "CGER by itself is not much use - it needs to be put in context, e.g. it is not enough to stabilize NFA if NFA is very negative."
  - "CGER might be the best we can hope for at this point, but the best is not good enough to trust."
  - "The CGER process has become a major challenge with very little informational content or policy guidance, but a huge bureaucratic drag.*"
  - "CGER doesn‘t work well, but the real problem is that the 2007 decision is not implementable in practice."
  - "The CGER is more than obsolete, it is dead!*"
- Data quality and timeliness constraints: "The authorities do not provide the timely data on the international reserves, and there is a small doubt about the data accuracy."
- WEO convention conflict: "One issue is that WEO convention requires major economy country teams to assume constant real exchange rates. However, if the exchange rate is under or overvalued, this convention forces country teams to choose between (i) either making current account forecasts that are consistent with a constant real exchange rate but that they don‘t really believe in (because they think the exchange rate will eventually adjust), resulting in broader growth and macro scenarios that may not be their central scenario or (ii) projecting current account adjustment in the absence of exchange rate adjustment, which results in the CGER showing the exchange rate as being at its equilibrium value, when in fact that is not the case."
- Suitability issues in resource-rich, dollarized, or fixed exchange rate regimes: "I work in resource rich fixed exchange rate regimes where the results of the models are highly sensitive to commodity prices and resources under the ground." and "Highly dollarized economy, unreliable macroeconomic data"
- Other practical constraints: "The expectation of publication and the desire to maintain good relations with the authorities act as powerful brakes on the presentation of issues in the staff report." and "Authorities have very opposite view of the exchange rate regime as of IMF, we agreed to disagree" and "CPI based REER provides only partial picture"
- Need for alternative approaches: "We have built our own set of models to analyze real exchange rate levels, closely inspired by the underlying models in CGER. Data sometimes were not so great, though."

### Duplication and gaps across IMF surveillance products (responses to Question 7)
- Perceived overlap and proliferation: "I think there is considerable scope for streamlining the proliferation of cross-country surveillance products without losing (or even enhancing) content. EWEs, GFSR, G20 analysis, Fiscal Monitor, WEO, REO-- too many different initiatives involving considerable overlap and repetition!"
- Specific duplication concerns:
  - "the monitor and the GFSR are now overlapping"
  - "Yes. There are too many functional department products. We should stick to the WEO and the GFSR. If a particular fiscal issue has cross-country implications, it should show up as a chapter in the WEO (certainly with co-authorship of FAD economists.) I do not see the need of a  ̳Fiscal Monitor.‘"
  - "The WEO and GFSR should be integrated. The Fiscal Monitor should be a chapter in the WEO."
  - "REOs provide little value added over the WEO and the GFSR."
  - "Huge overlap and clash with Fiscal Monitor. Fiscal Monitor authors make huge demands on country desks and give nothing in return. Worse, we spend a lot of time fixing their mistakes (or apologizing to the authorities for them) and the concepts they publish are foreign to the authorities--they don‘t recognize their own numbers in"
  - "The EWE simply reflects risks that are mentioned in the WEO/GFSR and does not address tail risks at all."
  - "The GFSR has become far too long and unwieldy."
  - "WEO, GFSR and regional surveys continue to significantly and unnecessarily overlap."
  - "REOs and Chapter II of the WEO."
- Suggestion for consolidation: "It would be more efficient to combine these into one streamlined document that is something akin to an A4 staff report and Selected Issues paper for the whole world. RES could be in charge of the real sector part, MCM the financial sector part, and FAD the fiscal sector part. This would eliminate duplication, promote a more consistent and unified message, and make the Fund‘s messages more focused and prominent (rather than being lost in a sea of many publications)."
- Audience and relevance issues: "Focus of most of these products is mainly on advanced economies and major emerging markets." and "Although I work on a low-income country, I don‘t find the vulnerability exercise to be useful. Our own assessment is more meaningful to me."
- Desire to reorient coverage toward issues like inclusive growth: "The question of inclusive growth should feature more prominently in teams‘ analyses. ... Let‘s have some courage and allow teams to focus on what they consider important for their respective country and do not follow cookie-cutter approaches. Then questions of employment generation and social protection will automatically gain more traction in the Fund‘s analysis.*"

### Constraints on candid reporting and challenging authorities (responses to Questions 8–10 and Q21)
- Fear of career consequences and management support concerns:
  - "The  ̳need to preserve relationship with authorities‘ should be understood as a management issue in the Fund. I am not afraid to have disagreement with the authorities. But if the authorities were to complain to management I have very low expectation that management would back me up--even if the mission‘s view is exactly as laid out and agreed in the policy consultation note"
  - "the main problem is that if the authorities complain about me to my supervisor my career will suffer"
- Top-down message control and constrained candor: "If  ̳candor‘ means one‘s ability to speak his mind, it is often seriously, and these days increasingly, constrained from above, through EXR‘s instruction not to speak a word, or to say only certain things, on particular issues. And the reasons for such restrictions are usually not explained, except that one can vaguely feel that there must be some sensitivity."
- Corrections/deletions policy and SPR implementation concerns: "The corrections and deletions policy needs to be amended. It focuses too much on the details and not sufficiently on fact that the image of the Fund can be damaged by such an inflexible policy. The constraints of the policy, alongside the ultra-strict implementation of SPR without regard to the broader context, will inherently make mission chiefs more conservative and unwilling to take risks in the staff report. This is not in the best interest of the institution."
- Review process and external interference: "Review process within the Fund, and a few attempted interferences from the ED‘s office."
- Practical barriers to candor: "Lack of hard evidence (e.g. data) to substantiate warning on risks without looking unduly alarming or undermining the relationship with authorities." and "Concern about market reaction on discussion of exchange rate and devaluation. Concern about triggering bank runs if weak banks are named or can be easily identified (possible in smaller banking systems in smaller countries)"
- Difficulty challenging authorities' technical edge and suggested remedies:
  - "Better quality staff and  resources."
  - "the authorities could take a less defensive attitude"
  - "Lower teams‘ rotation"
  - Need for stronger technical credentials: "Technical preparation/background. You cannot argue on technical ground if you have a master taken 20 years ago from an obscure university and the counterpart has 3 PhDs from top universities. This is the reason why it is so key to keep an outstanding level of economists. The access to data is a secondary issue."
  - Data and information sharing: "- sharing bank-by-bank supervisory data" and "-more in house expertise and resources to compile published financial sector data (quarterly balance sheets of banks)"
  - "More resources. Stronger local economists or stronger role for them."

*Source: Appendix II, Table 9. Mission Chiefs' Survey Comments*

### Appendix II, Table 9. Mission Chiefs‟ Survey Comments

### Appendix II, Table 9. Mission Chiefs‟ Survey Comments

### 10. Factors inside the Fund making surveillance work difficult
- MCM speaks with many voices.
- See above on MCM, SPR, Fiscal Monitor. Functional departments do not adequately help the country teams-- they are a burden, making huge data demands, and producing absurd analyses that show a complete lack of knowledge of the country institutional framework, which we then have to try to fix (against their resistance). I remember fondly the days when the functional departments were helpful. Those days are over.*
- Our software systems for data sharing (SharePoint, DM5, Country Exchange, TAIMS, etc) are terrible.
- Smaller mission teams, infrequent contact with the authorities, and lack of other resources.
- Ever-growing mandates, combined with nonsensical time constraints, without sufficient staff resources.
- Limited resources.
- Lack of RAs;
- Staffing issues: difficulties attracting high quality staff to positions on non-program smaller countries. Poor personnel management- senior management unwilling to authorize recruitment, forcing temporary solutions by taking team members away to fill gaps on other countries. High turnover on assignments so country detail and knowledge is lost and no relationship is built with counterparts where team members change too frequently
- MCM staffing and resource constraints, especially following the G-20 FSAP mandate are being born by the LIC countries, most regrettably on  ̳development‘ FSAPs. This is unfair to these members and pose unwelcome challenges for staff working on these countries
- There is clearly a resource constraint on work from other department (especially functional departments) on smaller, less systemic countries. Collaboration in principle is good but the resource rationing makes it almost impossible in some cases. E.g., it is very difficult to have resources to work on the financial sector of a low income countries as they seem to be all devoted to G20/systemic countries.
- Resource constraints are always underestimated. While macro challenges and requirements have risen, resources have remained stagnant or were even reduced. This leads to a more superficial analysis, with risks to the Fund‘s reputation.
- An ever increasing amount of non-desk related work is piling up on desks - reviews, requests for inputs to various cross-country products and papers, response to journalist questions, etc. At the end, very little time is left to focus on the core bilateral surveillance.
- Management‘s unwillingness to back staff in their message.
- *Edited for language.

### 11. Reasons for not holding a press conference at the end of the Article IV mission
- There was no accessible media presence in the country.
- Authorities requested that we not hold a press conference.
- the authorities refuse
- Our preliminary conclusions were covered in the press. In later and earlier visits, I gave interviews to the press.
- We had a press release and then met with selected journalists for more in-depth discussion, and the res rep followed up with other media.
- Published the concluding statement.
- The authorities do not allow us to have one.
- The authorities do not encourage it.
- We issued a press statement instead, in this occasion.
- The authorities forbid us to have one.
- Authorities did not agree to it.
- A press conference was planned by the mission ended early because and election was called. Instead, we held a conference call after the publication of the staff report 2 days after the board meeting.
- Because of the recent unrest in the Middle East and Management decision to remain low key in the media.
- However, I had bilateral interviews with international and local press.
- Authorities not keen; we had a separate event on the REO which was very well received. Concluding statement was published however for first time.
- difficult to organize, security issues
- The authorities did not see the need and there was very limited interest by a politically polarized media for may IMF stand-alone event.
- authorities did not want a press conference
- the authorities objected
- The authorities published the concluding statement instead.
- No tradition for holding one.
- The authorities do not allow it.
- Article IV was combined with program negotiations. Press briefing followed Board consideration.
- The authorities are not keen on post A4 press conferences.
- There is no independent press in my country of assignment. In addition we were under tight time constraints (Article IV plus two reviews). We will do it in the future.
- Press statement issued, but organizational difficulties for organizing a press conference.
- Press statement was released.
- Authorities not in favor.
- At the authorities‘ request due to the sensitivity of the issues. However, Resident Representative conducts more low-key outreach.
- Authorities did not want one.
- We did issue a press statement.
- Authorities do not approve.
- Issued a press release and did a press interview, but did not hold a formal press conference. No particular reason.
- Not the tradition

### 12. What could be done to improve the traction of Fund‟s surveillance?
- To encourage the authorities to share the staff report more actively with the private sector.
- Management needs to reinforce messages from Article IV candidly with authorities during high level meetings with authorities so that it is not dismissed as the view of the mission team alone and not supported by the Fund‘s overall staff and management.
- be more candid and frank about problems/risks
- Make the views of staff independent from those of the Board; allow for production and publication of staff reports without the need for Board approval, and hold Board discussion as an entirely separate process, with a different output (the summing up).
- We got a lot of traction with the authorities enacting a set of measures that mirrored the team‘s suggestions (and they did not need to do so, as this was not a program mission.) This positive result was due to respectful, deep debates with the authorities.
- The Fund should not worry so much about traction, and focus more on doing the best analysis and policy recommendations and then leave the rest to the authorities. Focus on traction should not lead to a situation where we give up on first-best recommendations in favor of second-best solutions  ̳given the real world‘. The Fund of course needs to be mindful of political realities, but it should stay technocratic.
- Additional work on the pros and cons of fiscal rules.
- This question should best be asked to the authorities.
- Not much, but continue to produce as good economics as possible
- For the big countries--not much. They will chart their own courses. We need to continue with outreach though.
- Importantly, if the functional departments were more of a help and less of a burden, we could do more of the analytical work that actually has some traction with countries.
- Have a resident representative in the country.
- Focus on the most important problems facing the country in a manner that fits in the local public debate on economic issues.
- We were in basic agreement with the authorities.
- Staff reports should be geared toward the public, not the Board. To make them punchier, readable, and succinct, the staff appraisal, which typically just repeats conclusions made in the main body of the report, should be dropped. The authorities‘ views should be drafted by the authorities themselves in an attached statement/BUFF rather than having to be detailed in the report. All reports should start with an Executive Summary, with key policy recommendations in bullets. This would result in much more streamlined reports.
- Higher quality analysis -- which can only come from dedicated country work. In the current environment, with multiple departmental and extra-departmental initiatives to which we must respond, simply finding the time to do fundamental research and country-analysis is difficult -- this is one of the major corners we have cut as part of the downsizing process.
- Improve the image of the Fund.
- Allow more frequent staff visits and contacts with authorities. The most effective policy impact we have is when we give advice in a low-key and behind the scenes way, i.e., in a more advisory capacity.
- Surveillance will always be an uphill battle, but more innovative and creative framing of a country‘s policy issues is needed and staff reports that look more modern as print products would also help.
- A civilian and elected government with a broader mandate than the current military junta.
- =openness and buy-in by the authorities to seek fund advice.
- More and better trained human resources devoted to country teams. We are beginning to be too short-staffed to be able to offer in depth and convincing analysis, especially vis-à-vis emerging markets or advanced economies.
- Allow for more in-between staff visits. We need to move away from the once-per-year visit to a member to maintain more direct and more frequent contact with member authorities. Especially in the current environment (where countries are seeking for policy responses to the many challenges they are facing), the Fund could provide more value-added. But the resource envelope is too tight for this.
- Less rigidity. Provide more analysis and tools to authorities to help them deliver on their objectives rather than ours.
- Article IV discussions should be separated from program reviews. And there may be scope to alter the composition of the team a little with functional specialists replacing area department generalists.
- Improve the consistency of the policy message among key development partners.
- Focus less on bureaucratic issues and more on substance.

### 13. Other data priorities for filling data gaps
- Some of the more basic data are missing, such as unemployment, capacity utilization, and reliable nation-wide CPI.
- International reserves
- The authorities publish external debt by remaining maturity, but more granular data by sector is needed to better understand the risks.
- Better data on real estate property prices for the whole economy are needed to better inform judgments on risks.
- real sector indicators (labor market, wages, prices, economic activity, capacity utilization)
- The move to GFSM 2001 for all countries take us in the opposite direction by forcing teams to use less-frequent (annual) data rather than more frequent (monthly) cash data. What are our priorities as an institution in terms of data--frequency or something different?
- More reliable BOP data.
- Financial sector data.
- Bank balance sheet data, especially for the state-owned banks is highly suspect.
- Employment and labor market data.
- better BOP reporting of off-balance sheet transactions

### 14. General comments on enhancing overall effectiveness of surveillance
- It is interesting that nowhere in the questionnaire were we asked to give our views on the adequacy of surveillance or our coverage of macrofinancial issues, only on our  ̳scope for increasing‘.  ̳Scope for increasing‘ is very different from desirability of increasing. In my country, there is certainly scope for increasing, but I would not do it, as we already give ample coverage to these issues. Seems like a design flaw in the survey questions to me.
- We need to set a higher standard of independence from authorities to promote more candid surveillance. We should be more willing to speak out in public even if it means annoying the authorities.
- We need to shift the focus back to bilateral surveillance, with functional departments supporting area departments in this effort.
- Surveillance--bilateral for sure, but also multilateral--depends on the work by country teams. But country teams have been squeezed at the same time as the demands on country teams from multilateral surveillance products have increased. A rebalancing is needed. The various multilateral surveillance products--which have become the way for functional departments to brandish their name--should be streamlined. And more functional departments‘ resources should be devoted to support country teams.
- Get the functional departments to support the area departments.
- Management discipline the process--let‘s get everyone on the same page, not producing contradictory analyses that country teams have to scramble to fix.
- Kill the Fiscal Monitor. Put the GFSR and WEO in one publication.
- Get all the MCM and SPR data and analytical tools up on their website where country teams can use them (data and tools are not proprietary!!)
- Management support of staff signaling risks is very important.
- Fund needs more frequent presence in LICs and middle income where capacity is weak to develop policy responses. For many, Fund presence is the only opportunity to focus on macroeconomic issues at all.
- The SPR papers providing cross-country comparisons of economic and policy reaction to the crisis provide useful in raising questions about relevant comparisons. More such studies (for instance from MCM on financial sector issues / monetary policy) would be helpful.
- The culture of the institution must change and staff must be supported in providing views or analysis that the authorities may not agreed with or like. Until this is done, surveillance will remain muted and veiled in diplomatic language.
- The 2007 decision doesn‘t work as a surveillance framework neither in theory nor in practice and needs to go back to the (drawing) Board.
- It is a very welcome development that the Fund is now beginning to be able to have an impact on the policy of its largest members through the G-20 platform. This progress also raises the legitimacy of our work with other members.
- The Fund has to decide whether it wants to be equipped to do high-level economic work on all its member countries or only a selected number. Universal high quality economic work requires much more human resources, or a quite different prioritization of work, than currently. The recent wave of programs in advanced countries is accelerating a process of decreasing competitiveness of the Fund in the field of economic surveillance which was already underway. The focus on cross-country analysis can only go so far without sound single-country analysis.
- My concern is that soon we will no longer be looked at as a reference for economic analysis of EM and advanced country economic developments.
- Find the right balance between mandatory work (exchange rate assessments, DSAs, standard Art. IV checklists etc) and empowering country teams or departments to determine priorities. The resource envelope is finite, so let‘s use those resources to the benefit of the member and not to satisfy institutional requirements.
- In a low income post conflict country the main challenges that the authorities face are developmental in nature and they are less interested in analysis of prospective macroeconomic risks, spillovers and macro-financial linkages. In this context the main objective of Fund surveillance is not greatly appreciated by the authorities.
- Country teams should be encouraged to be candid and reassured about strong management support.
- Ensure greater evenhandedness and uniformity of treatment in our diagnosis of economic issues and policy recommendations across countries with different political clout. This applies to macroeconomic surveillance (were differences across departments are stark) and to FSAPs.
- More training for mission chiefs on surveillance.
- Get rid of the CGER

*Source: Appendix II, Table 9. Mission Chiefs‟ Survey Comments (selected entries).*

### Appendix II, Table 10. Financial Markets Survey Comments

### Appendix II, Table 10. Financial Markets Survey Comments

### Gaps in coverage and unnecessary duplication
- "I think your exchange rate analysis is inevitably poor since you get in to trouble with authorities for being opinionated and wrong. I wouldn‘t bother if I were you!"
- "The cross-country spillovers focus is worth a try though you have much further to go. It comes over as being a bit formulaic."
- "There is an inherent overlap in WEO and the GFSR when financial dislocation is at the heart of economic developments as it has been in the past few years"
- "The access to privileged information, and new insights are IMF‘s best strengths from our perspective. The current IMF country representative does a great job of disseminating IMF‘s point of view personally, and his standing in the local markets is very high. However, I do think IMF should be doing more to disseminate their reports in a more institutional manner."
- "More timely, perhaps shorter Article IV-style updates"
- "WEO, GFSR and Fiscal Monitor belong in one publication."
- "Regional Economic Outlook could be covered by WEO."
- "There‘s too much of the same thing at times. For instance on the capital flow/capital controls issue, there were and are too many reports from different departments."
- "As already indicated there are simply way too many reports put out by the IMF. It has become very time consuming to distinguish new and valuable material from sheer repetition. Particularly irritating are the updates in between the regular reports."
- "The inconsistencies are one way to see divisions within the IMF on subjects such as capital controls. So I find them useful too."
- "Some macroeconomic figures, at national level, are out-of-date."
- "Breaking embargo in WEO often troubles me."
- "My main complaint is that the IMF does not flag its important communications. Input for the G20 is especially bad."

### Analyses found particularly useful and desired expansions
- "I particularly like the data on banking health in GFSR, and I like the increased emphasis on vulnerability indicators in country reports. I think you should make more emphasis to bring all reports up to best standards."
- "WEO/GFSF are great in depth think pieces (candor has greatly improved in recent years)."
- "I find the new IMF staff position notes incredibly helpful."
- "There is enormous value in cross-country analysis/statistics. The fiscal monitor in this respect is one of the most important recent innovations."
- "The IMF should be more transparent in informing the public its implicit foreign exchange forecasts and reasoning behind."
- "The issue with IMF analysis is not its quality but the inherent constraints on discussing risks (due to the risk of sparking contagion) as well as the balance between maintaining access to policy makers/information and providing unwelcome advice"
- "Personal meetings with the local IMF country rep always leave one with new insights- I have always taken international investors to meet IMF here, as that probably gives them the most balance picture of the country."
- "The table in the Fiscal Monitor that shows a cross-country comparison of the IMF‘s estimate of the debt-stabilizing primary has been particularly useful for our work (first published as Appendix Table 5 in the July 2009 Fiscal Monitor). This is still the best comparison of fiscal risks available, and the IMF‘s analysis has had a strong impact on the pricing of sovereign risks in the market, as shown in Figure 1.6 of the April 2010 GFSR"
- Concerns and suggestions about that Fiscal Monitor table:
  - "However, the IMF has frequently changed the format and methodology of this analysis."
  - "Instead of coming up with new and innovative ways of telling the story, it would be preferable to get the data in exactly the same format every six months. This would allow us to check progress over time."
  - "Also, it would be more useful to just compare the structural PB and the debt-stabilizing PB, instead of deriving a  ̳needed‘ fiscal adjustment based on arbitrarily chosen targets (60% for advanced economies and 40% for EM)."
- "Analysis of public policy inc. fiscal policy, in particular e.g. analysis of impacts of policy vs. no-change counterfactuals. No other source provides this kind of analysis with the same comprehensiveness."
- "Given the analytical reach and the amount of data on hand, what would probably be most useful to me would be to expand things like the cross country fiscal monitor into cross country comparisons that include private sector debt, Net International Investment Positions, etc."
- "I like the working papers."
- "I think the overall suite of products is excellent, and superior to just about anything from the private sector. As a longtime user, I am also very heartened by the increased candor over time (e.g., recent European Article IVs are much more grounded in reality than comparable surveillance or MOUs of large clients like Argentina or Russia in the late 1990s)."

### How to enhance the overall effectiveness of IMF surveillance
- Timeliness and frequency
  - "Staff updates in between GFSR rounds. In many cases your staff will be right on top of new developments a month after AIV is published, but the world doesn‘t know about it for a year. You should allow staff updates that are light on views but include forecast for more variables than the WEO, and that don‘t require board approval."
  - "1) reports need to be published; (2) would be great if there was a vehicle to have publication more than 1x per year (e.g. publish the macro-tables every quarter)."
  - "Timeliness. Some Article IVs are so late they lose usefulness."
  - "Improve timeliness on smaller emerging markets and convince more governments to publish Article IV reports."
  - "More timely updates on public policy impact."
- Institutional and political constraints
  - "The biggest benefit would come from a greater willingness among major economies to surrender to sovereignty over questions of global policy coordination. Without that greater willingness, the effectiveness of the analysis is handicapped by the lack of country follow-through."
  - "By changing the review policy for Article 4 reports to make them less diplomatic."
- Preserve and expand comprehensiveness
  - "Article IV reports play a particularly valuable role in providing a definitive review of a large range of countries. In terms of quickly getting up to speed on a country, there are few better sources. They also provide a useful historical record. As such, I hope they remain (a) frequent (annual); and (b) comprehensive in their coverage of macroeconomic issues (not too much streamlining)."
  - "Provide more data that is comparable across countries. The publication of fiscal data for EM countries in the WEO database was a very useful improvement. Why not publish more series? e.g. ToT for individual countries?"
- Accountability and public pressure
  - "Find more ways to shame the G7, especially the US."

### Media perspectives on IMF communications, coverage, and impact
- What journalists and media users value
  - "I‘m mainly interested in insights from the IMF management and staff, on various economic and financial issues, whether national or international."
  - "Everything that may grasp people‘s attention is relevant."
  - "Policy recommendations, economic forecasts, currency valuation, debt levels."
  - "The economic outlook plays a key role in my coverage, e.g. the future trajectory of GDP, Inflation and employment, but also the IMF‘s policy recommendations are of interest"
  - "Current statistics and commentary."
  - "I‘m mainly interested in WEO and the country report."
  - "Data and detailed narrative...less interested in prescriptive advice and more interested in what has happened and why."
  - "Prefer to go to the direct report where possible. The press reports are often lacking, and would be improved by fact box of leading facts and figures. PINs are also not very reader friendly on the whole."
  - "I find the summaries of economic conditions in the Article IV PINs useful, particularly when I am trying to learn something about a country in a hurry."
  - "We are mainly interested in growth rates, fiscal policy data and inflation."
- Coverage focus and geography (selected respondent replies)
  - "All regions and virtually all countries."
  - "GREECE"
  - "US, EU, China"
  - "Turkey"
  - "Poland"
  - "ECA"
  - "Japan, East Asia"
  - "Brazil, China, India, United States, EU countries, African countries"
  - "Ireland, euro area, EU"
  - "USA, Europe (in particular Germany)"
- Perceived problems and suggestions from media respondents
  - Volume and redundancy: "The general problem is the sheer volume of IMF publications... It has got more and more difficult to understand what is really new information or simply a repetition of already well known material."
  - Jargon and candor: "I find there‘s too much jargon, in reports but also in press releases." / "I find there‘s too much jargon in IMF reports and it‘s not candid enough."
  - Timeliness and access: "I would like to get these reports faster after they are completed (even though I know it‘s up to the countries, not the IMF)." / "The IMF is good at making a lot of documents accessible. It still lags other organizations in giving us access to the staff that wrote these reports."
  - Searchability and web usability: "More visibility could be given for G-20 process; search engine on the website is a mess!!!"
  - PR and press office interaction:
    - Positive: "Pros: timeliness, responsiveness, thoroughness, accessibility on deadline has all been good."
    - Negative: "Cons: Too much caution about speaking for the record; top officials often seem a bit scripted." / "The press office distrusts the press."
    - "The IMF does not have as much impact as it should because in spite of a supposed new openness, the press office tries to guard its secrets."
- Impact on public debate
  - Mixed views on impact:
    - "It‘s very difficult to assess from my point of view. The impact in the financial press seems higher than in the policies of member countries, though."
    - "Particularly in my country the messages which are sent by the IMF announcements or executive‘s statements have an unprecedented impact on the domestic public debate."
    - "Impact and presence is obviously higher during times of crises. But overall, the IMF‘s surveillance products present in my view an important and respected voice of expertise and guidance to the international economic debate."
    - "Highly relevant; impact seems contingent on the circumstances -- higher in cases of smaller countries or ones over which the fund has leverage due to events; less so for larger countries or when the fund speaks on broader or more generic policy matters (i.e. the financial tax debate)."
    - "I would say that the impact on public debate has been decreasing in the last years."
  - Relative impact by product: "WEO has high impact, GSFR much less and fiscal monitor even more less. Financial system stability assessment is important. Regional reports (except euro-zone) are not. G20 input is not important as process driven by G20 and not by IMF."
  - Influence conditional on accuracy and clarity: "IMF‘s messages are very relevant as long as they are accurate (and this quality is verified in time). Also, the public expects a candor and objective message regarding the economic perspectives, even if this message is not in line with those communicated by the public authorities."
- Comparative strengths and weaknesses versus other institutions
  - Strengths: "Clarity, methodology, authority, empirical database." / "I cannot think of another institution that are so open on the data and analysis it produces."
  - Weaknesses: "Less clear and more  ̳technical‘ than e.g. what I‘ve seen from the OECD‘s communications; more precise,  ̳to the point‘ and tangible than e.g. the World Bank." / "Again, if I compare the IMF with think tanks and from the perspective of a reporter working on deadline its worse. It takes too long to get answers and the answers are often very diplomatic."
  - Operational/practical notes: "Timely notice pre-release."

*Source: _082611b - Appendix II, Table 10. Financial Markets Survey Comments*

### Appendix II, Table 11. TSR Media Survey Comments

### Appendix II, Table 11. TSR Media Survey Comments

### How could the IMF improve communications on surveillance in order to have a greater impact on the public debate?
- "The IMF is putting out way too many reports and updates - and so risks irrelevance of its information."
- "I believe that sometimes the IMF has to be more external. With this I mean not to be afraid to organize more interviews with the IMF executives because these interviews are a very important communication tool for the IMF messages transmission to any local country."
- "Increase transparency even more, release more information on the Mutual Assessment Process and currencies."
- "To give more opened local information on IMF views on what is going in particular country, and using that country‘s native languages."
- "- More information for the local media actors should be provided."
- "- IMF‘s Country Representatives should contact media actors more frequently."
- "Language and angles could be less technical and more  ̳journalistic‘ in order to make topics and findings more accessible to a broad audience which could in turn result in greater impact on the public debate."
- "Reach out more, even on background."
- "Trying to make articles easy to understand for public is important."
- "Not sure this is a communications issue as much as the structure of the institution..."
- "IF you are to release something and judge that it is important/relevant, then flag it in advance and make people available for comment and interview outside the confines of a press conference organized by the press office."
- "Faster reaction to the messages of public figures, if those messages contradict the frame of measures stated in an agreement. Also, a quicker and more solid communication with the national media."
- "Do a press conference in the respective country."
- "Make staff more available, through conference calls and meetings in person with the core IMF reporters."
- "Release the documents closer to their discussion date by the board. Write in a more direct and dynamic way."
- "Fewer reports, clearer abstracts that are better readable, indicating clearer if something is a new observation, more illustrations of the often very theoretical reports with examples."
- "Be bolder in your choice of wording on surveillance. It‘s getting better."
- "More regional press conferences in the field?"
- "It should think of having more local conferences, having local economists discussing your analyses and data."
- "Stronger worded criticism of named country policies."

*Appendix II, Table 11. TSR Media Survey Comments*

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### Appendix II, Table 12. TSR CSO Survey Comments

### 2. What do you see as the main strength(s) of Fund surveillance?
- "Very strong on depth of analysis."
- "The strengths and weaknesses of the country‘s policies and programs."
- "Knowledge generation."
- "The fact that there is an independent voice overlooking some of the Fund‘s most powerful members."
- "Providing data."
- "It provides checks and balances and can provide early warning systems."
- "The process wants to find the opinion of external independent experts."
- "I think main Fund surveillance is economic outlook and cross-country analysis."
- "Its country-specificity and financial-depth analysis."
- "It‘s precautionary and serves to alert officials of pending problems and/or provide assurances of outlook and performance."
- "Resource tabbing and also in strategic mobilization of the funds."
- "Monitoring policies."
- "Most independent and professional."

### 1. The reasons why the communications of the IMF compared to other institutions are better or worse are:
- "Media Notifications."
- "The communications are data-based and well analyzed."
- "Openness and willingness to incorporate views of new actors."
- "The IMF fails to take into account the views of many external stakeholders. Thus the views and communications of the IMF are often one-sided. Additionally the failure to address the spillovers of economic and international policy of systemically important countries means communication is ineffective because it misses some of the most important issues."
- "It reaches me now better than before; more easily obtainable."
- "The IMF is only recently opening up to wider society. It was always perceived as secretive and unaccountable for its work, perhaps accountable to its Board."
- "The people do not know the products."
- "We don‘t have an IMF office so I don‘t know about it so much. After coming here, communication is good but there is room for improvement."
- "The only time the IMF and its publications are mentioned is when related to the MD. Compared with the OECD and similar publications such as ―Economic Outlook,‖ the general belief--even inside IMF staff--is that the OECD‘s studies are much more reliable. In this sense, their communication strategy is also more extensive and more often quoted by governments and academia."
- "More in-depth and professional approach to analysis of issues and assessment of policies and their impact on the economy."
- "I think IMF has been the global entity and also has influence to the member states. It also enjoys and mobilizes the gigantic resources in the globe."
- "Need to more details or information sharing at the national level; Need for more reporting."
- "IMF and IMF‘s work is not visible at all in the media and society."

### 3. What do you see as the main weakness(es) of Fund surveillance?
- "Sometimes the language can be vague."
- "It is technically written and cannot be understood by ordinary layman."
- "Somewhat lack of local capacity building"
- "(1) The lack of evenhandedness in the Fund‘s work;"
- "(2) Ideological biases in favor of policies which favor certain segments of the population or certain economic interests;"
- "(3) The inability of the Fund to exert influence over systemically important economies when they adopt policies that damage developing countries;"
- "(4) Failure to adequately consult with external stakeholders AND failure to incorporate external views adequately into the surveillance work;"
- "(5) Failure to consider development trajectories, policy space needed for developing countries to experiment with ideas that fit their economies, and overly rigid application of neoclassical economic doctrines that have proven unreliable and empirically false."
- "It doesn‘t take into account social indicators. I suggest also looking at the gross national happiness index."
- "Surveillance coupled with programs."
- "Lack of broader engagement with various sectors of society."
- "The people don‘t know the products."
- "The lack of country resident representative offices and the ignorance on its existence and the IMF‘s work beyond a ―high-interest lender‖ that imposes strict conditionality from the ―outside.‖"
- "It may not reflect the actual performance as authorities often attempt to conceal outcomes and impact of policies. Missions may not investigate proper size of outcomes and quality of policies."
- "1) lack of transparency - countries not allowing publishing of Article IV reports"
- "2) the unwillingness of the Fund to speak clearly about countries entering crisis."
- "Until now IMF has not been improve their internal bureaucratic process.  I think time has come to look into it seriously.  Paper works should be drastically reduced and set the example for others."
- "Linking with people on the ground."
- "The institution is seen as too much dedicated to the superstructure."
- "Not understandable for the broader public."

### 4. Please use this space to offer any comments on how the IMF can make its surveillance more effective:
- "Enhance dissemination of surveillance through presentation/discussion with CSOs."
- "The language can be simpler and shorter—like how Prof. Richard Bird writes."
- "Please read and incorporate the ideas in this briefing: http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-566307"
- "It needs to use technology like mobile internet and television to get more feedback from the masses."
- "Build expert think tanks in all member countries, exchange with them. Decouple from programs."
- "Communicate better and beyond its traditional audiences."
- "The IMF needs to do a campaign to help people know their products."
- "More consultation with diverse groups and make sure consultation ideas are put into action."
- "Associate with CSOs, not only governments. Also monitor and measure the efficiency and representativeness of the IMF‘s own work. Would welcome students--especially economists--to participate in the review."
- "The IMF needs to deepen its analysis and become more doubtful of positive outlooks often displayed by authorities. Authorities often overrate and praise their performance by concealing actual performance or facts or by playing down the negatives. Authorities also may blame performance on external shocks or elements beyond their control while the reality is the opposite. Missions/economists need to assess quality of policies and variables such as investment and current spending."
- "Maybe in improving more communication of local offices with partners; regional approaches in reporting are also required."
- "Make reports that are understandable and user-friendly and advertise them among the people and media. CSOs can help doing this."

*Appendix II, Table 12. TSR CSO Survey Comments*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2011/_082611b.pdf_