## _031813

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---

### Background and scope
- Purpose: Advance concrete proposals to conclude the Review of Low-Income Countries (LICs) Facilities and improve tailoring and flexibility of Fund facilities and instruments for LICs while avoiding undue operational complexity.
- Consistency: Proposals intended to be consistent with the self-sustainability of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) and with the parallel 2013 PRGT Eligibility Review proposals (including graduation of Armenia and Georgia; entry of Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Tuvalu; higher GNI per capita entry and graduation thresholds for microstates).

### Key proposals and policy recommendations
- Enhance existing blending policy to conserve PRGT subsidy resources for poorer members and yield greater differentiation in financing terms.
- Access policy change: adopt now a decision to halve access norms and limits in relation to quota when the quota increase under the Fourteenth General Review of Quotas comes into effect.
- Modify instruments to enhance precautionary support and permit more rapid responses to additional financing needs (contingent tranches and streamlined augmentations).
- Operational streamlining: increase flexibility of the LIC toolkit (PSI modalities, PRS procedural easing, longer initial ECF durations, automatic termination of defunct ECF arrangements).

### Blending policy — objectives and options
- Objective: Use blending of PRGT and General Resources Account (GRA) resources to conserve PRGT resources for the poorest members and differentiate financing terms.
- Projected numerical impact: On average the changes are projected to shift demand of some SDR 100 million per year from the PRGT to the GRA over the period 2013–35.
- Current blending presumption (summary of criteria):
  - Presumed to blend if: (i) per capita GNI exceeds 100 percent of the IDA operational cutoff; or (ii) per capita GNI exceeds 80 percent of the IDA operational cutoff and the member has market access; and (iii) not at high risk of debt distress or in debt distress.
  - Market access (current practice): access to international financial markets in at least three of the last five years; total access over the last five years amounting to at least 100 percent of quota.
  - Blending rules currently require total access equally divided between PRGT and GRA, subject to a floor of 25 percent of quota and a ceiling of 50 percent of quota on average annual concessional access.
  - Exceptional circumstances: blending may be used even when criteria not satisfied if financing needs exceed applicable access limits.
- Two enhancement approaches considered:
  - Approach 1 (staff recommendation): incrementally enhance blending while maintaining broadly current rules for determining presumed blenders, but relax market-access criterion and eliminate the 25/50 percent floor/ceiling in favor of a 50:50 mix with caps tied to norms.
  - Approach 2 (more ambitious): includes Approach 1 features and lowers income and market-access thresholds to broaden the pool of presumed blenders.

### Blending policy — Proposed specifics (first approach)
- Market-access criterion revision:
  - Presumed market access if tapped international financial markets during at least two of the last five years, and total access over the five years amounting to a minimum of 50 percent of quota.
  - Immediate impact limited—affecting only one additional member (Senegal)—but impact could increase over time.
- Concessional resource mix and caps:
  - Eliminate floor of 25 percent of quota and ceiling of 50 percent of quota on average annual use of concessional resources in blended financing.
  - Stipulate a 50:50 mix of PRGT and GRA resources, with access to concessional resources capped at the norm applicable to unblended arrangements; all access above the norm must be met from the GRA.
  - For RCFs (no norm), the cap on concessional resources is the annual limit; for SCF treated as precautionary the cap is the average annual access limit.
- Modality for members with first credit tranche resources available:
  - 50:50 blend of PRGT and credit tranche resources applies; phasing and performance criteria for GRA resources apply only to purchases above the first credit tranche.

### Blending policy — More ambitious option (second approach)
- Income thresholds lowered:
  - For members with market access, income threshold for blending lowered from 80 percent to 60 percent of the IDA operational cutoff.
  - For all other LICs, threshold lowered from 100 percent to 80 percent of the IDA operational cutoff.
  - Could bring some seven additional members into presumed blenders.

### Staff recommendation on blending and expected fiscal effect
- Recommend adopting the first blending approach.
  - Expected reduction in annual demand for PRGT resources: about SDR 0.1 billion annually in the near term under the first approach.
  - The second approach could lower demand by up to a further SDR 0.1 billion on average.
  - First approach keeps broadly unchanged the existing set of blenders while expanding presumption of blending to lower levels of access.

### Access policy — proposal and timing
- Proposal: keep access norms and limits unchanged now and adopt a decision now to reduce the norms and limits by half when the quota increase under the Fourteenth General Review of Quotas becomes effective (assumed to happen in 2013).
  - Decision would be effective immediately upon completion of general effectiveness conditions for the quota increase.
  - Decision would not affect commitments under PRGT arrangements approved prior to its effectiveness.
- Rationale:
  - Norms and limits were doubled in 2009 and are broadly appropriate in nominal terms for most LICs.
  - Within the self-sustained framework, any modest nominal access increase now would compress size of future access increases PRGT could accommodate; access as a share of GDP would decline for future users.

### Scenarios and tradeoffs for nominal access increases (selected specifics)
- Baseline scenario: reduce access norms and limits (in percent of quota) by 50 percent when quota increase becomes effective in 2013.
  - Earliest date when lower-end of average annual PRGT access returns to baseline: 2020
  - Number of times future nominal access increases need to be forgone to return lower-end to baseline (three-year intervals starting 2016): Two (2016 and 2019)
  - Notes: baseline assumes access in nominal SDR terms increases by 24.2 percent at three-year intervals, starting in 2016.
- Reduce norms by 40 percent (increases average nominal access in 2013 by 15 percent):
  - Earliest date return to baseline: 2020
  - Number of times future increases forgone: Two (2016 and 2019)
- Reduce norms by 28 percent (no member worse off in nominal SDR access; implies average increase of 38 percent in 2013):
  - Earliest date return to baseline: 2026
  - Number of times future increases forgone: Four (2016, 2019, 2022, and 2025)
- Keep norms unchanged:
  - Earliest date return to baseline: Not until after 2035
  - Number of times future increases forgone: All
- Illustrative impacts of specific nominal increases:
  - Average increase of 15 percent relative to baseline:
    - Cumulative lending would not return to baseline-projected levels before 2020 at the earliest.
    - A further nominal access increase could not realistically be considered before 2022.
    - An increase of 15 percent would still leave 14 countries with lowered nominal access at the new norms.
  - Average increase of 38 percent (to ensure no member faced a decline in SDR terms):
    - Further nominal access increase may only be expected by 2026.
  - If quota increase passed in full to higher access with no future increases:
    - Cumulative lending would still exceed baseline-projected levels by 2035.

### PRGT sustainability strategy (three pillars)
- Pillar 1: A base envelope of about SDR 1¼ billion in annual lending capacity to cover concessional lending needs over normal periods, allowing buildup in low-lending years and drawdown in higher-demand years.
- Pillar 2: Contingent measures activated when average financing needs exceed the base envelope substantially for an extended period. Possible contingent measures include:
  - (i) additional understandings on bilateral fundraising efforts supported by a broad range of membership;
  - (ii) suspension for a limited period of the reimbursement of the GRA for PRGT administrative expenses; and
  - (iii) modifications of access, blending, and interest rate and eligibility policies to reduce need for subsidy resources.
- Pillar 3: Principle of self-sustainability under which future modifications to LIC facilities are expected to ensure demand can be met with resources under the first and second pillars under plausible scenarios.

### Projections and key numeric ranges (baseline and with blending)
- Baseline average annual demand for PRGT resources: in the range of SDR 1.2–2.1 billion for 2013–35.
  - Slightly higher than IMF (2012b) estimate of SDR 1.1–1.9 billion.
- Estimated self-sustained average annual lending capacity: about SDR 1¼ billion.
- PRGT commitments expected in 2013 and 2014: about SDR 1 billion.
- Sensitivity assumptions:
  - High case: assumes 50 percent of LICs have some form of Fund financial support in any given year.
  - Low case: assumes about 30 percent of PRGT-eligible countries resort to Fund financing in any given year.
- Projected impact of enhanced blending (staff’s recommended first option):
  - Projected average demand for PRGT resources: SDR 1.1–1.7 billion for 2013–35.
  - SDR 1.0–1.5 billion for the period through 2023.
- Selected figures from projection table (average annual demand for access to PRGT resources, SDR; 2013–23 / 2013–35):
  - Baseline at time of gold windfall distribution decision: 1.1 / 1.8
  - Updated baseline: 1.1 / 2.2
  - Moderate expansion of blending rules: 1.0 / 1.7
  - More aggressive expansion of blending rules: 0.9 / 1.6
- Average annual savings (+) or dissavings (−) relative to updated baseline:
  - Moderate expansion of blending rules: 0.1 / 0.3 (2013–23 / 2013–35)
  - More aggressive expansion of blending rules: 0.1 / 0.3 (2013–23 / 2013–35)

### Access metrics and proposed limits (selected exact figures)
- Proposed global access limits to concessional resources (until 14th General Review effective):
  - Global access limits: 50% of quota annual access; 150% of quota cumulative access (net of scheduled repayments)
  - Limit on exceptional access: 75% of quota annually; 225% of quota cumulatively (net of scheduled repayments)
- Specific proposed metrics (ECF/SCF):
  - Annual access limit (ECF/SCF): 75% of quota; Average annual access limit: 50% of quota
  - Once 14th Review effective: Annual access limit of 37.5% of quota; Average annual access limit of 25% of quota
- RCF proposed limits:
  - Annual access: 25% of quota (shocks window: 50% of quota)
  - Cumulative access, net of repayments: 75% of quota (shocks window: 100% of quota)
  - Once 14th Review effective: Annual access: 12.5% of quota (shocks window: 25% of quota); Cumulative access: 50% of quota (shocks window: 62.5% of quota)
- Access limits on SCF treated as precautionary (proposed):
  - 60% of quota if outstanding credit < 50% of quota and 37.5% of quota if it is >= 50% of quota
  - Once 14th Review effective: 120% of quota if outstanding credit < 100% of quota and 75% of quota if it is >= 100% of quota
  - Annual access limit of 50% of quota (noted)
- Exceptional access criteria (preserved):
  - Access above normal limits available to LICs that (i) experience an exceptionally large balance of payments need; (ii) have a comparatively strong adjustment program and ability to repay the Fund; and (iii) do not have sustained past and prospective access to capital markets, and have income at or below the prevailing IDA operational cutoff.

### RCF cumulative access limit proposal and expected effects
- Proposal: increase cumulative limit (net of scheduled repayments) from 75 percent to 100 percent of quota.
  - When used to address an urgent balance of payments need resulting primarily from a sudden and exogenous shock, increase from 100 to 125 percent of quota.
- Rationale and expected impact:
  - Primary beneficiaries likely members in fragile situations and natural disaster-prone small economies.
  - Staff believes net additional demands on PRGT resources and risks to the Fund would be minimal.
  - Moral hazard contained by keeping annual limits unchanged (annual limits set at 25 percent of quota and, for urgent shocks, at 50 percent of quota).

### Enhancing precautionary support — contingent tranches and augmentations
- Contingent tranche considerations:
  - Envisaged: contingent tranche available at arrangement approval; draw when member represents an urgent balance of payments need caused by a sudden and exogenous shock.
  - Risks: member self-assessment may lead to activation where augmentation would not have been approved; ex-post Board challenges after disbursement problematic.
- Alternative recommended: augmentations at ad hoc reviews between scheduled reviews for on-track ECF/SCF arrangements:
  - Advantages: timely, tailored support; available for a wide range of balance of payments problems; Board approval provides safeguards; avoids tying up concessional resources unnecessarily.
  - Requirements/safeguards:
    - Board assessment that program was on track at time of augmentation (continuous performance criteria observed).
    - Program documents must establish basis for augmentation; requests supported by short staff report and member’s letter of intent.
    - Augmentations available in a single disbursement following Board approval; no limit on amount subject to PRGT access limits and norms; subject to blending rules and may be supplemented by corresponding GRA augmentation.
    - Disbursement amount limited to what is immediately needed; additional amounts considered in context of regular program review.
    - New disbursement subject to observance of continuous PCs; not subject to periodic performance criteria linked to remaining disbursements.
    - Augmentation requests that do not exceed 25 percent of quota eligible for approval on a lapse-of-time (LOT) basis.
    - Scheduled review following an ad hoc review must undertake a comprehensive review and cannot be completed on a LOT basis.

### SCF proposed modifications to facilitate precautionary use
- Exclude certain precautionary SCF arrangements from counting toward the "two and a half out of five year" limit when treated entirely as precautionary by authorities or when Fund assesses no actual balance of payments need.
- Require explicit documentation when SCF use exceeds the standard limit: staff reports and Letters of Intent to make explicit case that member does not have a protracted balance of payments problem.
- Establish access limits for precautionary SCF approvals:
  - At approval: annual access limit of 75 percent of quota for SCF arrangements approved in absence of an actual need.
  - At approval: limit on member’s average annual access under such SCF arrangements of 50 percent of quota.
  - Guidance to explicitly recognize frontloading: e.g., for a two-year SCF approved in absence of an actual need, total access could not exceed 100 percent of quota; if first-year access was 75 percent of quota, second-year access could not exceed 25 percent of quota.

### Operational streamlining and modalities
- PSI refinements:
  - Make PRS documentation requirements more flexible; link qualification standards more to sustainability of macroeconomic policies.
  - Permit initial PSI duration up to four years and overall duration up to five years.
  - Clarify PSI is available to any member meeting policy criteria, maintain high standards for qualification.
- PRS procedural easing:
  - Permit PRS documentation requirement for second or subsequent review to be met by describing in LOI/MEFP how fiscal budgets and planned structural reforms advance PRS implementation, where PRSP covers a period of twelve months from review date.
  - Permit submission of JSANs to the Board for information rather than discussion.
- ECF arrangements:
  - Permit initial durations ranging from three to up to four years; overall maximum duration of five years.
  - Access for fourth year of ECF set in line with average annual access corresponding to the norm that would otherwise have applied to the successor of a three-year ECF arrangement.
- Automatic termination of defunct ECF arrangements:
  - Amend PRGT Instrument so ECF arrangements approved after amendment automatically terminate when eighteen months have elapsed since most recent completion date of a program review under the arrangement.
  - Executive Board may, at authorities’ request, extend the eighteen month period for three additional months if understanding on targets and measures appears imminent.

### Operational modalities and transitional timing
- Enhanced blending approach, if approved, would take effect starting three months after adoption of Board decision for all new ECF and SCF arrangements, and RCF disbursement requests; current policy continues for existing arrangements until they expire and for any new arrangements and RCF requests approved within three months after adoption.
- Automatic termination of defunct ECF arrangements, if approved, would apply only to new arrangements approved after adoption of decision.
- Operational guidance clarifying PSI qualification standards to be issued within four months after completion of the review.
- Access norms and limits reduced by half once quota increase under Fourteenth General Review becomes effective; then apply to all new ECF and SCF arrangements and RCF disbursement requests; current policy continues for arrangements approved prior to quota increase effectiveness.

### LIC Quota increases under Fourteenth General Review (selected highlights)
- Quotas would double for 49 out of 73 PRGT-eligible members; for other members the increase would vary from 40 percent to some 150 percent.
- Distribution (Number of countries):
  - Less than 50%: 14
  - At least 50% but less than 100%: 2
  - 100%: 49
  - More than 100%: 8
- Representative entries from Annex III (Quota as of Sept. 18, 2012 / Proposed under 14th General Review / Increase):
  - Afghanistan — 161.9 / 323.8 / 100%
  - Bangladesh — 533.3 / 1,066.6 / 100%
  - Armenia — 92.0 / 128.8 / 40%
  - Marshall Islands, Rep. of — 3.5 / 4.9 / 40.0%
  - Tuvalu — 1.8 / 2.5 / 39%
  - Vietnam — 460.7 / 3/1,153.1 / 150%

### Governance questions for Directors (policy judgments)
- Do Directors agree that:
  - The proposed reforms would help maintain the self-sustainability of the PRGT?
  - Blending should be enhanced in line with the first approach?
  - Access norms and limits in terms of quota should remain unchanged now and be halved when the quota increase under the Fourteenth General Review of Quotas becomes effective?
  - Augmenting access for on-track ECF and SCF arrangements between scheduled reviews with streamlined procedures is pragmatic for timely support?
  - Proposals to increase cumulative limit under RCF and ease SCF rules would enhance Fund toolkit flexibility for PRGT-eligible countries?
  - Focusing more on substance of linkages between Fund-supported programs and PRS implementation while easing PRS documentation would benefit PRGT-eligible members?
  - Staff proposals to make other modalities more flexible are helpful?

*Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY and excerpts from "REVIEW OF FACILITIES FOR LICs—PROPOSALS FOR IMPLEMENTATION," March 15, 2013 (IMF staff paper; _031813)._

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Background and scope
- Purpose: Advance a set of concrete proposals to conclude the Review of Low-Income Countries (LICs) Facilities and improve tailoring and flexibility of Fund facilities and instruments for LICs while avoiding undue operational complexity.
- Consistency: Proposals are intended to be consistent with the self-sustainability of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) and with the parallel 2013 PRGT Eligibility Review proposals (including graduation of Armenia and Georgia; entry of Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Tuvalu; higher GNI per capita entry and graduation thresholds for microstates).

### Key proposals
- Enhancement of the existing blending policy to conserve PRGT subsidy resources for poorer members and to yield greater differentiation in financing terms.
- Access policy change: adopt now a decision to halve access norms and limits in relation to quota when the quota increase under the Fourteenth General Review of Quotas comes into effect.
- Modifications to enhance precautionary support and permit more rapid responses to additional financing needs.
- Operational streamlining to enhance flexibility of the LIC toolkit and to make more efficient use of PRGT resources.

### Blending policy (enhancement)
- Objective: Make greater use of blending of PRGT and General Resources Account (GRA) resources so PRGT resources are conserved for the poorest members and financing terms are more differentiated.
- Projected numerical impact: On average the changes are projected to shift demand of some SDR 100 million per year from the PRGT to the GRA over the period 2013–35.
- Current blending policy (presumed blenders and criteria):
  - PRGT-eligible members are presumed to blend if:
    - (i) their per capita GNI exceeds 100 percent of the IDA operational cutoff; or
    - (ii) their per capita GNI exceeds 80 percent of the IDA operational cutoff and they also have market access as defined below; and
    - (iii) they are not at high risk of debt distress or in debt distress.
  - Market access for blending purposes is deemed to exist if the member has sustained past and prospective access to non-concessional lending from capital markets and official lenders. In practice, this has been understood to mean:
    - (i) access to international financial markets in at least three of the last five years; and
    - (ii) total access over the last five years amounting to at least 100 percent of quota.
  - Blending rules require total access to be equally divided between the PRGT and the GRA, subject to a floor of 25 percent of quota and a ceiling of 50 percent of quota on average annual concessional access.
  - When financing is blended under a PRGT arrangement and an arrangement under the GRA, total access is determined based on the standard criteria (balance of payments need; program strength and capacity to repay; amount of outstanding Fund credit and record of past use).
  - Exceptional circumstances: blending can be used even when blending criteria are not satisfied if financing needs exceed applicable access limits.
- Staff considered two enhancement approaches:
  - Approach 1: Incrementally enhance blending while maintaining broadly current rules for determining presumed blenders.
  - Approach 2: Include features of Approach 1 and also lower income and market-access thresholds to broaden the pool of presumed blenders.
- Supplementary materials: Table 1 summarizes features; Annex I contains proposals for enhanced blending (staff proposal and more ambitious option); Annex II addresses application of blending rules.

### Access policy
- Decision proposed now: halve access norms and limits in relation to quota when the quota increase under the Fourteenth General Review of Quotas comes into effect.
- Rationale and expected outcome:
  - The norms and limits were doubled in 2009 and appear broadly appropriate to meet LICs’ needs.
  - Staff’s proposal would imply unchanged access in SDR terms for most LICs after the new quotas come into effect.
  - Within the self-sustained framework, even a modest nominal access increase now would compress significantly the size of access increases that the PRGT could accommodate in the future, meaning that access as a share of GDP would decline for future users.

### Modifications to enhance precautionary support and respond more quickly to additional financing needs
- Proposals include:
  - For Stand-by Credit Facility (SCF) arrangements treated as precautionary:
    - Easing time limitations on use, and
    - Allowing more frontloading of access, to make the instrument more helpful to members.
  - Streamlined Board approval of augmentation requests between scheduled reviews to provide more timely support to members experiencing shocks.

### Operational streamlining to enhance LIC toolkit flexibility
- Proposals include:
  - Changing modalities for the Policy Support Instrument (PSI), and clarifying qualification standards for the PSI to increase its usefulness.
  - Easing procedural requirements related to Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS).
  - Permitting approval of longer initial durations of Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangements, and allowing greater flexibility in the timing of reviews.
  - Requiring the timely termination of defunct ECF arrangements to avoid PRGT resources being locked up longer than necessary, thereby releasing them for other eligible users.

### PRGT sustainability strategy (Box 1)
- Three-pillar strategy to ensure the PRGT has the resources to meet projected demand for IMF concessional lending over 2013–35:
  1. A base envelope of about SDR 1¼ billion in annual lending capacity to cover concessional lending needs over normal periods, allowing buildup in low-lending years and drawdown in higher-demand years.
  2. Contingent measures to be activated when average financing needs exceed the base envelope by a substantial margin for an extended period. Possible contingent measures include:
     - (i) reaching additional understandings on bilateral fundraising efforts supported by a broad range of the membership;
     - (ii) suspension for a limited period of the reimbursement of the GRA for PRGT administrative expenses; and
     - (iii) modifications of access, blending, and interest rate and eligibility policies to reduce the need for subsidy resources.
  3. A principle of self-sustainability under which future modifications to LIC facilities are expected to ensure demand for IMF concessional lending can be met with resources available under the first and second pillars under a plausible range of scenarios.

### Additional context and governance
- The paper reflects Board guidance from the first stage of the Review and the discussion on distribution of remaining windfall gold sales profits.
- Items not pursued further (due to lack of broad support in the first stage) include:
  - A new insurance-type instrument with ex ante qualification criteria along the lines of the Flexible Credit Line and Precautionary and Liquidity Line;
  - Differentiated interest rates across users (greater use of blending was preferred instead);
  - Initiatives implying further debt or debt service relief, for example by broadening the scope for eligibility to relief from the Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief Trust Fund.
- Organizational attribution:
  - Approved By: Siddharth Tiwari, Andrew Tweedie, and Sean Hagan.
  - Prepared by: Strategy, Policy, and Review Department; the Finance Department; and the Legal Department.

*Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Review of Facilities for LICs—Proposals for Implementation), March 15, 2013.*

### 9.      Under the first approach, presumed blenders would have somewhat lower access to

### _031813 - 9.      Under the first approach, presumed blenders would have somewhat lower access to

### Proposed changes to the blending policy (first approach)
- Market-access criterion revision:
  - A member would be presumed to have market access if it had tapped international financial markets during at least two of the last five years, and with the total access over the five years amounting to a minimum of 50 percent of quota.
  - This aligns the definition of market access for blending more closely with that for entry into PRGT-eligibility as proposed in the 2013 PRGT Eligibility Review.
  - Immediate impact relative to current practice would be limited—affecting only one additional member (Senegal)—but impact could increase over time.
- Concessional resource mix and caps:
  - Eliminate both the floor of 25 percent of quota and the ceiling of 50 percent of quota on the average annual use of concessional resources in blended financing that applies under current policy.
  - Stipulate instead a 50:50 mix of PRGT and GRA resources, with the access to concessional resources capped at the norm applicable to unblended arrangements.
  - All access above the norm would need to be met from the GRA.
  - For RCFs (which have no norm), the cap on the access to concessional resources would be the annual limit; for the SCF treated as precautionary this cap would be at the average annual access limit.
- Modality for members with first credit tranche resources available:
  - The 50:50 blend of PRGT and credit tranche resources would apply, but phasing and performance criteria for GRA resources would only apply to purchases above the first credit tranche.

### More ambitious option (second approach)
- Lowers income thresholds for blending in addition to the first approach's relaxed market-access thresholds:
  - For members with market access, the income threshold for blending would be lowered from 80 percent to 60 percent of the IDA operational cutoff.
  - For all other LICs, it would be lowered from 100 percent to 80 percent of the IDA operational cutoff.
  - This change could bring some seven additional members into the group of presumed blenders.

### Staff recommendation and rationale
- Staff recommends adopting the first blending approach.
  - Expected reduction in annual demand for PRGT resources: about SDR 0.1 billion annually in the near term under the first approach.
  - The second approach could lower demand by up to a further SDR 0.1 billion on average.
  - The first approach would keep broadly unchanged the existing set of blenders while expanding the presumption of blending to lower levels of access than presently applies.
  - High likelihood that presumed blenders under the first approach could manage GRA access levels smoothly.
  - The second approach would bring into the blending presumption some countries far removed from PRGT-graduation with compromised creditworthiness or low debt-management capacity, inconsistent with the original intent of the blending policy.

### Baseline projections and key assumptions for PRGT demand
- Main assumptions:
  - Access norms and limits in terms of quota are reduced by half when the quota increase under the Fourteenth General Review of Quotas becomes effective, assumed to happen in 2013.
  - In 2013, Armenia and Georgia graduate from PRGT eligibility; Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Tuvalu become PRGT-eligible.
  - Thereafter, members are assumed to graduate from PRGT-eligibility at two-year intervals based on reaching the required income threshold for graduation.
  - PRGT demand projections use a bottom-up approach for 2013–14; for 2015–35 projections follow the framework presented in the first stage of the Review (IMF, 2012a) and assume access in SDR terms to increase broadly in line with PRGT-eligible countries’ GDP after 2015.
- Updated projections:
  - Baseline average annual demand for PRGT resources: in the range of SDR 1.2–2.1 billion for 2013–35.
  - This is slightly higher than the IMF (2012b) estimate of SDR 1.1–1.9 billion.
  - Estimated self-sustained average annual lending capacity: about SDR 1¼ billion.
- Sensitivity and scenario assumptions:
  - High case assumes 50 percent of LICs have some form of Fund financial support in place in any given year.
  - Low case assumes about 30 percent of PRGT-eligible countries resort to Fund financing in any given year.
  - PRGT commitments in 2013 and 2014 are expected to be about SDR 1 billion.

### Projected impact of enhanced blending on PRGT demand
- Staff’s recommended blending proposal (first option) could bring projected average demand for PRGT resources to:
  - SDR 1.1–1.7 billion for 2013–35.
  - SDR 1.0–1.5 billion for the period through 2023.
- Table summary (selected figures from projections table):
  - Average annual demand for access to PRGT resources (2013–23 / 2013–35):
    - Baseline at time of gold windfall distribution decision: 1.1 / 1.8
    - Updated baseline: 1.1 / 2.2
    - Moderate expansion of blending rules: 1.0 / 1.7
    - More aggressive expansion of blending rules: 0.9 / 1.6
  - Average annual savings (+) or dissavings (-) relative to updated baseline:
    - Moderate expansion of blending rules: 0.1 / 0.3 (2013–23 / 2013–35)
    - More aggressive expansion of blending rules: 0.1 / 0.3 (2013–23 / 2013–35)
- Notes on projection inputs:
  - Updated baseline assumes 50 percent reduction in access norms and limits (in percent of quota) when the quota increase under the Fourteenth General Review of Quotas goes into effect in 2013, followed by increases in access in nominal SDR terms of 24.2 percent at three-year intervals starting in 2016.
  - Updated baseline reflects methodological refinements: applying vulnerability and debt vulnerability criteria to graduation and blending assumptions and aligning graduation assumptions with the two-year PRGT-eligibility review cycle.

### Tradeoffs and timing scenarios for increases in nominal access
- General point:
  - An upfront increase in nominal access now would reduce potential for future increases in PRGT access; current beneficiaries would gain at the expense of future users, disproportionately affecting poorer and more vulnerable PRGT-eligible members.
- Illustrative scenarios:
  - An average increase of 15 percent relative to the baseline:
    - Cumulative lending would not return to baseline-projected levels before 2020 at the earliest.
    - A further nominal access increase could not realistically be considered before 2022.
    - An increase of 15 percent would still leave 14 countries with lowered nominal access at the new norms.
  - An average increase of 38 percent (required to ensure no member faced a decline in SDR terms):
    - A further nominal access increase may only be expected by 2026.
  - If the increase under the Fourteenth General Review of Quotas were passed on in full to higher access, with no further future increases:
    - Cumulative lending would still exceed baseline-projected levels by 2035.

_Review of Facilities for LICs—Proposals for Implementation, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND_

### 18.      In light of these observations, staff proposes that access norms and limits be kept

### _031813 - 18.      In light of these observations, staff proposes that access norms and limits be kept

### Proposal on access norms and timing
- Staff proposes that access norms and limits be kept unchanged now, and that a decision be adopted by the Board at this time to reduce the norms and limits by half at the time that the quota increase under the Fourteenth General Review of Quotas becomes effective.
- The decision to reduce norms and limits by half would be taken now but become effective immediately upon completion of the general effectiveness conditions for the quota increase under the Fourteenth General Review of Quotas.
- The decision would not affect commitments under PRGT arrangements approved prior to its effectiveness.
- Rationale for proposal:
  - Access norms and limits were doubled in 2009 and, as noted by most Directors at the first stage of the Review, access levels in nominal terms are broadly appropriate on average.
  - Higher projected demand for PRGT resources in the new baseline implies weaker assurances that the Trust’s finances will remain self-sustaining (the self-sustained lending capacity would be close to the bottom of the new range of projected demand).
  - Prudence requires that savings from blending be used to re-establish a cushion relative to the self-sustaining PRGT resource envelope to safeguard against uncertainties in projected demand.
  - Keeping access unchanged in SDR terms now helps safeguard availability of PRGT resources for relatively poorer PRGT-eligible members whose share in total demand would increase over time as wealthier members graduate from eligibility.
  - While some 16 PRGT-eligible members would face reduced access in SDR terms at the new norms and limits once the quota increase becomes effective, most of these countries are presumed blenders with access to GRA resources to supplement financing needs; for remaining members access could exceed the norm if warranted by balance of payments need.

### Scenarios: changes to access norms and limits (in percent of quota) when quota increase becomes effective in 2013
- Baseline: reduce access norms and limits (in percent of quota) by 50 percent.
  - Earliest date when lower-end of average annual PRGT access returns to baseline: 2020
  - Number of times that future increases in nominal access need to be forgone to return lower-end of average annual PRGT access to baseline (assuming nominal access increases are considered at three-year intervals, starting in 2016): Two (2016 and 2019)
  - Notes: The baseline assumes that the quota increase under the Fourteenth General Review of Quotas goes into effect in 2013 and that access norms and limits (in percent of quota) are reduced by 50 percent, which leaves access norms and limits unchanged in nominal SDR for most PRGT-eligible members. Thereafter, the baseline assumes that access in nominal SDR terms increases by 24.2 percent at three-year intervals, starting in 2016.
- Reduce access norms and limits (in percent of quota) by 40 percent — increasing average access in 2013 by 15 percent.
  - Earliest date when lower-end of average annual PRGT access returns to baseline: 2020
  - Number of times future increases need to be forgone: Two (2016 and 2019)
  - Notes: A reduction by 40 percent results in an increase in nominal access of 15 percent, on average, in 2013. It is equivalent to first halving access norms and limits (in percent of quota) to account for the impact of the quota increase and then increasing those new norms and limits by 20 percent.
- Reduce access norms and limits (in percent of quota) by 28 percent — just enough to leave no PRGT-eligible member worse off in terms of nominal SDR access.
  - Earliest date when lower-end of average annual PRGT access returns to baseline: 2026
  - Number of times future increases need to be forgone: Four (2016, 2019, 2022, and 2025)
  - Notes: A reduction by 28 percent results in an increase in nominal access of 38 percent, on average, in 2013. It is equivalent to first halving access norms and limits and then increasing those new norms and limits by 44 percent.
- Keep access norms and limits (in percent of quota) unchanged.
  - Earliest date when lower-end of average annual PRGT access returns to baseline: Not until after 2035
  - Number of times future increases need to be forgone: All
  - Notes: For the median PRGT-eligible member, this scenario implies a doubling of access norms and limits in nominal SDRs.
- Baseline projection range: average annual access to PRGT resources of SDR 1.1–1.7 billion over 2013–35 (the baseline incorporates staff's proposal for a moderate expansion in blending).

### LIC Quota increases under Fourteenth General Review of Quotas (summary)
- Quotas would double for 49 out of 73 PRGT-eligible members; for other members the increase would vary from 40 percent to some 150 percent.
- Distribution shown (Number of countries):
  - Less than 50%: 14
  - At least 50% but less than 100%: 2
  - 100%: 49
  - More than 100%: 8

### RCF cumulative access limit proposal and expected effects
- Staff proposes raising the cumulative access limit under the RCF:
  - Increase cumulative limit (net of scheduled repayments) from 75 percent to 100 percent of quota.
  - When used to address an urgent balance of payments need resulting primarily from a sudden and exogenous shock, increase from 100 to 125 percent of quota.
- Rationale and expected impact:
  - Broad support at Board discussion for such increase; primary beneficiaries likely members in fragile situations and natural disaster-prone small economies.
  - Staff believes net additional demands on PRGT resources and risks to the Fund would be minimal.
  - Risk of moral hazard would be contained by keeping the annual limits unchanged (annual limits are set at 25 percent of quota and, when used to meet an urgent balance of payments need arising primarily from a sudden and exogenous shock, at 50 percent of quota).
  - For members in fragile situations facing urgent balance of payments need, the intent is to allow a more extended period of support under the RCF as a substitute for early recourse to ECF support; for any given period of Fund support it is likely there would be no net additional demand on the PRGT.
  - Higher cumulative limit could be partial compensation for members that will face reduced nominal access at the new norms after quota increases, since some of those members are natural disaster-prone small states likely to use RCF.

### Enhancing precautionary support — contingent tranches and augmentations
- Contingent tranche design considerations:
  - Broad support for cost-neutral approaches to contingent tranches.
  - Main challenge: balance automaticity of access with associated resource implications; more automatic access increases precautionary support but raises risk of frequent activation.
  - Envisaged design: contingent tranche becomes available at arrangement approval and could be drawn by the member upon its representation of an urgent balance of payments need caused by a sudden and exogenous shock.
  - Risks: Member self-assessment of qualifying shock and financing gap could lead to use where a conventional augmentation would not have been approved or would have been smaller; ex-post challenges by the Board after disbursement create practical problems.
- Alternative: augmentations between scheduled program reviews for on-track ECF/SCF arrangements
  - Augmentations would be considered by the Board in ad hoc reviews between scheduled reviews and could provide timely, tailored support for acute increases in balance of payments problems.
  - Advantages:
    - Available to address increases in underlying balance of payments problems from a wide range of sources, not limited to sudden and exogenous shocks (though streamlined procedures likely most appropriate for exogenous shocks).
    - Board approval provides more effective safeguards on appropriate use of Trust resources and addresses incentives to draw on precautionary facilities irrespective of need.
    - Avoids drawbacks and risks of contingent tranches and meets test of simplicity.
    - Does not tie up concessional resources unnecessarily.
  - Requirements and safeguards:
    - Approval of augmentations at an ad hoc review would require Board assessment that the program was on track at the time of augmentation (assess observance of continuous performance criteria and that policies are suitable and consistent with program objectives).
    - Program documents must establish basis for augmentation and support on-track assessment; requests typically supported by a short staff report and member’s letter of intent describing nature and size of problem and policies being undertaken.
    - Augmentations would be available in a single disbursement following Board approval; no limit on amount subject to PRGT access limits and norms; subject to rules on blending and may be supplemented by corresponding augmentation under the GRA.
    - Disbursement amount limited to what is immediately needed; additional amounts considered in context of regular program review.
    - New disbursement subject to observance of continuous PCs including accuracy of information on implementation and any prior actions; not subject to periodic performance criteria and other conditions linked to remaining disbursements.
    - A member may request an undrawn disbursement made available upon Board approval until the availability date of the next scheduled disbursement under the arrangement.
    - Augmentation requests at ad hoc reviews that do not exceed 25 percent of quota would be eligible for approval on a lapse-of-time (LOT) basis.
    - A scheduled review following an ad hoc review to consider an augmentation request would undertake a comprehensive review of policies and could not be completed on a LOT basis.

*Source: IMF staff projections and calculations, extracted from the chapter titled "REVIEW OF FACILITIES FOR LICs—PROPOSALS FOR IMPLEMENTATION."*

### 27.      Three proposed modifications could facilitate greater use of SCF arrangements

### 27.      Three proposed modifications could facilitate greater use of SCF arrangements

### Proposed modifications to SCF use (summary)
- Exclude certain SCF arrangements from counting toward the "two and a half out of five year" limit:
  - Staff proposes that the period of past SCF arrangements that were treated in their entirety as precautionary by the authorities, and prospective SCF arrangements for which the Fund assesses the member does not have an actual balance of payments need, not be counted towards the two and a half out of five year limit that normally applies on the use of SCFs.
  - Rationale: closes a gap where members treating SCF arrangements as precautionary for two and a half out of five years currently resort to a low-access ECF arrangement.

- Require explicit documentation when SCF use exceeds the standard limit:
  - Repeated requests for SCF arrangements could signal a protracted balance of payments problem; for requests to use the SCF for more than two and a half out of five years (where permitted by past precautionary use or staff assessment of no actual need), staff reports and Letters of Intent would be required to make an explicit case that the member does not have a protracted balance of payments problem.

- Establish access limits for precautionary SCF approvals:
  - At approval, impose an annual access limit of 75 percent of quota for SCF arrangements that are approved in the absence of an actual balance of payments need.
  - At approval, impose a limit on a member’s average annual access under such SCF arrangements of 50 percent of quota.
  - Guidance would more explicitly recognize the possibility to frontload access: e.g., for a two-year SCF approved in absence of an actual need, total access could not exceed 100 percent of quota; if first-year access was 75 percent of quota, second-year access could not exceed 25 percent of quota.

### Guidance on frontloading and LIC needs
- Justification:
  - The possibility to frontload more access in SCFs that at approval a member intends to treat as precautionary, without raising overall access, would better meet the needs of LICs which are more integrated with the world economy and could face significant potential short-term balance of payment needs.

### PSI (Policy Support Instrument) refinements
- Objective: explore refinements to make the PSI more flexible while preserving its signaling function; link qualification standards more to sustainability of macroeconomic policies and less to broader institutional capacity measures.
- Proposed changes to PSI modalities:
  - Make PRS documentation requirements more flexible, focusing PRS implementation on substance rather than process.
  - Allow more flexibility in setting review dates; permit initial duration of a PSI to extend up to four years and overall duration up to five years.
  - Permit a one-month extension of the deadline for issuance of the staff report for a review (LOI and MEFP would normally still need to be signed and circulated before the test date of periodic assessment criteria linked to the next scheduled review).
- Clarify PSI qualification guidance:
  - Operational guidance would make clear a PSI is available to any member that meets the criteria set out in the policy, including those with a good track record of macroeconomic management and institutions of sufficient quality to support continued good performance, including in responding to shocks.
  - Maintain high standards for qualification and completing a review (including having a UCT-quality program and ability to keep up with fixed review schedules) to preserve the quality of the PSI signal.

### PRS-related procedural changes (ECF/PSI/JSANs)
- Easing PRS-related procedural requirements while focusing more on substance:
  - Permit members to meet the PRS documentation requirement for the second or any subsequent review under an ECF arrangement or a PSI by describing in the LOI/MEFP how the current fiscal budget, the upcoming fiscal budget (if available), and planned structural reforms advance PRS implementation — available only where a PRSP issued to the Board covers a period of twelve months from the date of the review.
  - Permit submission of JSANs to the Board for information rather than for discussion, eliminating the need for a standalone Board meeting to discuss a JSAN when related country papers are considered on a LOT basis or when no Fund-supported program papers are scheduled.

### Termination of defunct ECF arrangements
- Automatic termination to free PRGT resources:
  - Amend the PRGT Instrument so that ECF arrangements approved after the amendment will automatically terminate when eighteen months have elapsed since the most recent completion date of a program review under the arrangement.
  - Executive Board may, at the authorities’ request, extend the eighteen month period for three additional months—provided the extension does not fall outside the existing period of the arrangement—if an understanding on targets and measures appears imminent.
  - The arrangement would automatically expire at the end of that period unless a program review is completed.

### Initial durations and access for ECF arrangements and PSIs
- ECF arrangements:
  - Permit initial durations ranging from three to up to four years; overall maximum duration of five years.
  - Access for the fourth year of an ECF be set in line with the average annual access corresponding to the norm that would otherwise have applied to the successor of a three-year ECF arrangement.
  - Staff expects three years to remain the default at approval, but flexibility to align with PRSP cycles or blending with EFF arrangements is available.
- PSIs:
  - Permit PSIs an initial duration of one to four years, with an overall maximum period of five years.

### Flexible timing of reviews, phasing, and performance criteria
- Proposal: allow more flexibility in scheduling program reviews for ECF, SCF, and PSI, subject only to the sole proviso that reviews be scheduled at most six months apart; eliminate other limitations on periodicity of reviews.
- Note: Each review continues to be associated with its own set of performance (assessment) criteria and disbursements; members with higher frequency reviews must have capacity to provide accurate data at required frequency.

### Implications for PRGT self-sustainability and operational modalities
- Resource implications:
  - Proposals are consistent with the self-sustaining financing framework for the PRGT.
  - Access and blending proposals together with PRGT eligibility/graduation proposals were designed to keep expected average demand within the range consistent with a self-sustained PRGT.
  - Staff calculations indicate minor resource costs (and savings); estimates are subject to significant uncertainty but overall impact is expected to be very limited.
- Operational modalities and transitional arrangements:
  - Enhanced blending approach, if approved, would take effect starting three months after the adoption of the Board decision for all new ECF and SCF arrangements, and RCF disbursement requests; current policy continues for existing arrangements until they expire and for any new arrangements and RCF requests approved within three months after adoption.
  - Automatic termination of defunct ECF arrangements, if approved, would apply only to new arrangements approved after the adoption of the decision.
  - Operational guidance clarifying PSI qualification standards would be issued within four months after completion of the review.
  - Access norms and limits would be reduced by half once the quota increase under the Fourteenth General Review of Quotas becomes effective; at that time they will apply to all new ECF and SCF arrangements and requests for RCF disbursements; current policy continues to apply for arrangements approved prior to the quota increase becoming effective.

*Source: REVIEW OF FACILITIES FOR LICs—PROPOSALS FOR IMPLEMENTATION (excerpt).*

### 39.      Do Directors agree that:

### _031813 - 39.      Do Directors agree that:

### Summary of Director-level Questions (policy judgments)
- The proposed reforms would help maintain the self-sustainability of the PRGT?
- Blending should be enhanced in line with the first approach in the paper?
- Access norms and limits in terms of quota should remain unchanged now and be halved when the quota increase under the Fourteenth General Review of Quota becomes effective?
- Augmenting access for on-track ECF and SCF arrangements in between scheduled program reviews, and permitting the use of streamlined procedures, is a pragmatic solution to provide members with timely support to meet unexpected balance of payments needs?
- The proposals for increasing the cumulative limit under the RCF and easing SCF rules would help enhance the flexibility of the Fund’s toolkit for PRGT-eligible countries?
- The staff proposal to focus more on the substance of linkages between Fund-supported programs and PRS implementation while easing PRS documentation requirements would benefit PRGT-eligible members?
- Staff proposals to make other modalities more flexible are helpful?

### Table 4 — Global access limits to concessional resources (proposed regime)
- Until 14th General Review of Quota is in effect:
  - Global access limits: 50% of quota annual access; 150% of quota cumulative access (net of scheduled repayments)
  - Limit on exceptional access: 75% of quota annually; 225% of quota cumulatively (net of scheduled repayments)
- Once 14th General Review of Quota is in effect:
  - Global access limits: (No explicit new totals listed in table header beyond contextual changes to norms and halves elsewhere)
- Procedural safeguards (high-level):
  - (1) Similar but (ii) applies if total access would be brought to more than 40% of quota, based on past scheduled (not necessarily drawn) and future scheduled disbursements, in any 24-month period. (Guidelines (this paper))
  - (2) Similar but (ii) applies if the concessional financing request would bring total access to more than 90% of quota, based on past scheduled (not necessarily drawn) and future scheduled disbursements, in any 36-month period. (Guidelines (this paper))
  - (3) A similar exception would apply for financing requests of 5% of quota or less. (Guidelines (this paper))

### ECF and SCF norms and limits (proposals vs current)
- Proposed guidance:
  - The norms do not apply for outstanding concessional credit above 100% of quota and access will then be guided by consideration of the access limit of 150 percent of quota, expectation of future need for Fund support, and the repayment schedule. (Guidelines (this paper))
- Specific access metrics proposed:
  - Annual access limit (ECF/SCF): 75% of quota; Average annual access limit: 50% of quota
  - Once 14th Review effective: Annual access limit of 37.5% of quota; Average annual access limit of 25% of quota
- RCF limits (proposed):
  - Annual access: 25% of quota (shocks window: 50% of quota)
  - Cumulative access, net of repayments: 75% of quota (shocks window: 100% of quota)
- RCF limits (once 14th Review effective):
  - Annual access: 12.5% of quota (shocks window: 25% of quota)
  - Cumulative access, net of repayments: 50% of quota (shocks window: 62.5% of quota)
- Access limits on the SCF treated as precautionary (proposed):
  - 60% of quota if outstanding credit < 50% of quota and 37.5% of quota if it is >= 50% of quota
  - Once 14th Review effective: 120% of quota if outstanding credit < 100% of quota and 75% of quota if it is >= 100% of quota
  - Annual access limit of 50% of quota (noted)

- Notes on exceptional access (footnotes preserved):
  - Access above the normal limits is available to a LICs that (i) experiences an exceptionally large balance of payments need; (ii) has a comparatively strong adjustment program and ability to repay the Fund; and (iii) does not have sustained past and prospective access to capital markets, and has income at or below the prevailing IDA operational cutoff.
  - The annual access limit refers to any 12-month period, including past scheduled disbursements (not necessarily drawn upon in the case of an arrangement treated as precautionary and delayed disbursements) and future scheduled disbursements. Total outstanding Fund concessional credit (including disbursements that were approved but not drawn upon in the context of a precautionary arrangement) cannot exceed the cumulative limit at any given time.

### Current LIC architecture (for comparison)
- Current LIC architecture (pre-reform):
  - 100% of quota annual access; 300% of quota cumulative access (net of scheduled repayments)
  - 150% of quota annually; 450% of quota cumulatively (net of scheduled repayments) (appears as alternative current metrics)
- Current procedural requirements (existing):
  - (1) A DSA update is required for requests for concessional financing that would: (i) involve exceptional access; and/or (ii) bring total access to more than 80% of quota, based on past scheduled (not necessarily drawn) and future scheduled disbursements, in any 24-month period; and/or (iii) involve a member with a high risk of debt distress or in debt distress.
  - (2) An early informal Board meeting is required if a request for concessional financing would (i) involve exceptional access and/or (ii) bring total access to more than 180% percent of quota, based on past scheduled (not necessarily drawn) and future scheduled disbursements, in any 36-month period.
  - (3) Exception: neither a DSA update nor an early informal Board meeting is required for financing requests of 10% of quota or less.
  - The norms do not apply for outstanding concessional credit above 200% of quota and access will then be guided by consideration of the access limit of 300 percent of quota, expectation of future need for Fund support, and the repayment schedule.

### Blending of PRGT and GRA resources (proposals)
- Staff proposal (enhanced blending — first approach):
  - 50:50 PRGT-GRA blend, with average annual concessional floor and ceiling of 25% and 50% of quota, respectively, for the use of concessional resources. (Guidelines (this paper))
- Operational clarifications:
  - For members who have resources in their first credit tranche available, implementing a blend of credit tranche and PRGT resources would entail the following modalities. The 50:50 blend of PRGT and credit tranche resources would still apply, but for the GRA resources phasing and performance criteria would only apply to purchases above the first credit tranche.
  - Clarify in operational guidance a PSI is available to any member that meets the criteria set out in the policy, including those that have established a good track record of macroeconomic management and where institutions are of sufficient quality to support continued good performance, including in responding to shocks.

### Definition and criteria for market access (blending and eligibility)
- Current policy criteria (2013 PRGT Eligibility Review):
  - Market access is described in the 2013 PRGT Eligibility Review; previously classified as having market access if cumulative PPG external bonds and commercial loans over 2007–11 are above 100 percent of quota and if the country had issues in at least three of those years.
- Staff proposed criteria (more specific):
  - Under the staff proposal, a country would be classified as having market access if the cumulative PPG external bonds and commercial loans over 2007–11 are above 50 percent of quota and if the country had issues for two years out of the last five years. (See the 2013 PRGT Eligibility Review for details.)
- Additional operational definition proposals:
  - Add specific criteria to define past market access: a member would have market access if it tapped international financial markets during at least two of the last five years, and with the total access over the five years amounting to a minimum of 50 percent of quota.
  - Add specific criteria to define past market access once 14th Review effective: a member would have market access if it tapped international financial markets during at least two of the last five years, and with the total access over the five years amounting to a minimum of 25 percent of quota.

### Augmentations, procedural timing, and reviews
- Augmentations at ad hoc reviews for on-track ECF/SCF arrangements:
  - The amount of resources committed under an ECF/SCF arrangement may be increased at the time of a review. (No formal change needed; guidance in this paper clarifies.)
  - Augmentations of access cannot be considered on lapse-of-time (LOT) basis. (Decision A-13207 (08/28/09))
  - Single-disbursement requests for augmentation requests at ad hoc reviews between scheduled program reviews could be considered by the Board for on-track ECF/SCF arrangements. The information in program documents would need to establish the basis for the augmentation and support the assessment that the program is on-track.
  - The new disbursement approved at an ad hoc review will be subject to the observance of the continuous PCs under the arrangement, including the accuracy of information on the implementation of such PCs and of any prior actions established for that disbursement.
  - An undrawn disbursement made available upon the Board's approval of the requested augmentation would remain available until the availability date of the next scheduled review under the arrangement.
  - Augmentation requests at ad hoc reviews that do not exceed 25 percent of quota would be eligible for approval on a LOT basis. A scheduled review following ad hoc review to consider an augmentation request would be expected to undertake a comprehensive review of policies under the program, and therefore could not be completed on a LOT basis.

- Board documentation timing for scheduled reviews:
  - Documentation supporting Board discussion of a review should be issued no later than the test date for the periodic assessment criteria relevant for the next review. (PSI—Framework: Para. 8)
  - The staff report supporting Board discussion of a review may be issued up to one month after the test date for the periodic assessment criteria relevant for the next scheduled review. Nonetheless, the LOI and MEFP would normally have to be signed and circulated to the Board before the test date of the periodic assessment criteria linked to the next scheduled review.

### PRS documentation and linking PRS to programs (flexibility proposals)
- Current rule:
  - The second and any subsequent ECF/PSI review can only be completed if a PRS document has been issued to the Board, normally within the previous 18 months, and has been the subject of a staff analysis (incl. in the staff report on a new ECF/PSI request or on a review). (PRGT Trust: Section II Para. 1(b)(3); and PSI—Framework: Para. 8)
- Proposed flexibility:
  - It would be permissible for members to meet the PRS documentation requirement for the second or any subsequent review under an ECF arrangement or a PSI by describing in the LOI/MEFP how the current fiscal budget, the upcoming fiscal budget (if available), and planned structural reforms advance PRS implementation.
  - This flexibility would only be available to members that, at the time of the Board meeting considering the review, have in place a PRSP which has been issued to the Board, and which covers a period of twelve months from the date of the review.
  - The requirement of a staff analysis would be met by discussing in the staff report how the fiscal budgets and planned structural reforms help advance PRS implementation.
  - Any new ECF/PSI request or program review must be accompanied by a statement, normally in the LOI/MEFP, of how the program advances the country's poverty reduction and growth objectives.

- JSANs:
  - Allow JSANs to be circulated to the Board for information. (Decision 14253-(09/8), January 27, 2009 referenced for circulation practice.)

### Duration and frequency of ECF arrangements and PSIs (proposed changes)
- Proposed changes to initial duration and maximums:
  - ECF arrangements:
    - Initial duration may be permitted ranging from three to four years; members have the option to request further extensions, with an overall maximum duration of the ECF arrangement of five years.
    - The initial duration of ECF arrangements is three years and can be extended to a maximum duration of five years. (PRGT Instrument: Section II Paras. 1(b)(1) and Para. 3(b))
  - PSIs:
    - PSIs may be permitted for an initial duration of one to four years, and may be extended further, with an overall maximum duration of the PSI of five years. (PSI—Framework: Para. 2)
- Flexible timing of reviews:
  - Beyond the sole proviso that reviews be scheduled at most six months apart, the periodicity of program reviews can be timed flexibly. Each review would need to be associated with its own set of performance (assessment) criteria and disbursements; hence, ECF/SCF arrangements or PSIs with a higher frequency of reviews would also need to have performance (assessment) criteria and disbursements of a similar frequency. (PRGT Instrument: Section II Paras. 1(b)(1) and 1(c)(1); and PSI—Framework: Paras. 8 and 9(a)(i))

### Treatment of defunct ECF arrangements and other instrument rules
- Defunct ECF arrangements:
  - No such provision. (PRGT Instrument: new provision proposed)
- Other notes:
  - The second and any subsequent ECF/PSI review continuation rule (automatic termination after 18 months since most recent completion date) with Board discretion to grant a three-month extension if an understanding on targets and measures appears imminent; arrangement automatically expires at end of period unless a program review is completed.

### Annex I — Proposals for Enhanced Blending (staff proposal and more ambitious option)
- Annex lists country classifications by risk of debt distress and market access status (table preserved as presented; specific country lists and categories are in the source).
- IDA cutoff and related metrics:
  - IDA cutoff is set at US$1,195 based on 2011 GNI per capita calculated by the Atlas method.
  - GNI per capita < 80 percent of IDA cutoff (US$956) 5/
  - 80 percent IDA cutoff < GNI per capita < 100 percent of IDA cutoff
  - GNI per capita > 100 percent of IDA cutoff
- Risk of debt distress classification date:
  - Risk of debt distress based on the latest available DSA as of December 6, 2012.

### Annex II — Application of Blending Rules (schematic outcomes)
- Blending outcomes by total access and outstanding PRGT access (preserved table logic):
  - For SCF Arrangements, RCF Disbursements, ECF Arrangements across ranges of Access (0 < Access < 150; 150 < Access < 240; 240 < Access < 300; Access > 300; and annual/three-year/average distinctions), the table specifies whether 50:50 split between PRGT and GRA applies and where PRGT provides specific quota percentages (e.g., 75 percent of quota from the PRGT, 120 percent of quota from the PRGT, 150 percent of quota from the PRGT), and whether resource savings occur ("Yes"/"No") depending on the reform proposal versus current policy.
  - Specific preserved entries (examples from table):
    - 0 < Access < 150: 75 percent of quota from the PRGT, and the rest from the GRA; 50:50 split between PRGT and GRA; Resource Savings: Yes
    - 150 < Access < 240: 50:50 split between PRGT and GRA; Resource Savings: No
    - 240 < Access < 300: 50:50 split between PRGT and GRA; 120 percent of quota from the PRGT, and the rest from the GRA; Resource Savings: Yes
    - Access > 300: 150 percent of quota from the PRGT, and the rest from the GRA; 120 percent of quota from the PRGT, and the rest from the GRA; Resource Savings: Yes
    - For annual/three-year and average access interpretations, analogous rules are listed, including cases with 25 percent of quota from the PRGT for low-access ranges and the conditions under which 50:50 split applies.

*Source: _031813 - 39.      Do Directors agree that: (IMF PDF).*

### Annex III. Quota of PRGT-Eligible Members: Current and Proposed Under the Fourteenth

### Annex III. Quota of PRGT-Eligible Members: Current and Proposed Under the Fourteenth General Review of Quotas

### Quota table (entries 1–75)
- 1 Afghanistan, Islamic Rep. of — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 161.9 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 323.8 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 161.9 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 2 Armenia, Rep. of — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 92.0 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 128.8 — Increase (in percent): 40% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 92.0 — Increase (in percent): 40%
- 3 Bangladesh — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 533.3 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 1,066.6 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 533.3 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 4 Benin — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 61.9 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 123.8 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 61.9 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 5 Bhutan — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 6.3 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 2/20.4 — Increase (in percent): 224% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 8.5 — Increase (in percent): 140%
- 6 Bolivia — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 171.5 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 240.1 — Increase (in percent): 40% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 171.5 — Increase (in percent): 40%
- 7 Burkina Faso — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 60.2 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 120.4 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 60.2 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 8 Burundi — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 77.0 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 154.0 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 77.0 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 9 Cambodia — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 87.5 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 175.0 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 87.5 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 10 Cameroon — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 185.7 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 276.0 — Increase (in percent): 49% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 185.7 — Increase (in percent): 49%
- 11 Cape Verde — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 9.6 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 2/23.7 — Increase (in percent): 147% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 11.2 — Increase (in percent): 112%
- 12 Central African Republic — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 55.7 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 111.4 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 55.7 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 13 Chad — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 66.6 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 3/140.2 — Increase (in percent): 111% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 66.6 — Increase (in percent): 111%
- 14 Comoros — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 8.9 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 17.8 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 8.9 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 15 Congo, Dem. Rep. of — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 533.0 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 1,066.0 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 533.0 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 16 Congo, Rep. of — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 84.6 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 162.0 — Increase (in percent): 91% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 84.6 — Increase (in percent): 91%
- 17 Côte d'Ivoire — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 325.2 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 650.4 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 325.2 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 18 Djibouti — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 15.9 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 31.8 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 15.9 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 19 Dominica — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 8.2 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 11.5 — Increase (in percent): 40% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 8.2 — Increase (in percent): 40%
- 20 Eritrea — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 15.9 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 2/36.6 — Increase (in percent): 130% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 18.3 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 21 Ethiopia — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 133.7 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 300.7 — Increase (in percent): 125% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 133.7 — Increase (in percent): 125%
- 22 Gambia, The — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 31.1 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 62.2 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 31.1 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 23 Georgia — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 150.3 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 210.4 — Increase (in percent): 40% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 150.3 — Increase (in percent): 40%
- 24 Ghana — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 369.0 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 738.0 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 369.0 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 25 Grenada — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 11.7 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 16.4 — Increase (in percent): 40% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 11.7 — Increase (in percent): 40%
- 26 Guinea — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 107.1 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 214.2 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 107.1 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 27 Guinea-Bissau — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 14.2 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 28.4 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 14.2 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 28 Guyana — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 90.9 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 181.8 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 90.9 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 29 Haiti — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 81.9 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 163.8 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 81.9 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 30 Honduras — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 129.5 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 249.8 — Increase (in percent): 93% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 129.5 — Increase (in percent): 93%
- 31 Kenya — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 271.4 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 542.8 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 271.4 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 32 Kiribati — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 5.6 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 11.2 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 5.6 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 33 Kyrgyz Republic — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 88.8 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 177.6 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 88.8 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 34 Lao PDR — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 52.9 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 105.8 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 52.9 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 35 Lesotho — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 34.9 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 69.8 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 34.9 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 36 Liberia — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 129.2 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 258.4 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 129.2 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 37 Madagascar — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 122.2 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 244.4 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 122.2 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 38 Malawi — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 69.4 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 138.8 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 69.4 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 39 Maldives — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 10.0 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 3/21.2 — Increase (in percent): 112% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 10.0 — Increase (in percent): 112%
- 40 Mali — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 93.3 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 186.6 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 93.3 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 41 Marshall Islands, Rep. of the — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 3.5 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 4.9 — Increase (in percent): 40.0% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 3.5 — Increase (in percent): 40%
- 42 Mauritania — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 64.4 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 128.8 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 64.4 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 43 Micronesia, Fed. States of — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 5.1 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 7.2 — Increase (in percent): 41% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 5.1 — Increase (in percent): 41%
- 44 Moldova, Rep. of — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 123.2 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 172.5 — Increase (in percent): 40% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 123.2 — Increase (in percent): 40%
- 45 Mongolia — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 51.1 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 72.3 — Increase (in percent): 41% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 51.1 — Increase (in percent): 41%
- 46 Mozambique — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 113.6 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 227.2 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 113.6 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 47 Myanmar — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 258.4 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 516.8 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 258.4 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 48 Nepal — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 71.3 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 156.9 — Increase (in percent): 120% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 71.3 — Increase (in percent): 120%
- 49 Nicaragua — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 130.0 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 260.0 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 130.0 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 50 Niger — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 65.8 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 131.6 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 65.8 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 51 Nigeria — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 1,753.2 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 2,454.5 — Increase (in percent): 40% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 1,753.2 — Increase (in percent): 40%
- 52 Papua New Guinea — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 131.6 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 263.2 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 131.6 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 53 Rwanda — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 80.1 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 160.2 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 80.1 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 54 Samoa — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 11.6 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 16.2 — Increase (in percent): 40% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 11.6 — Increase (in percent): 40%
- 55 São Tomé & Príncipe — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 7.4 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 14.8 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 7.4 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 56 Senegal — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 161.8 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 323.6 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 161.8 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 57 Sierra Leone — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 103.7 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 207.4 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 103.7 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 58 Solomon Islands — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 10.4 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 20.8 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 10.4 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 59 Somalia — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 44.2 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 4/163.4 — Increase (in percent): 270% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 81.7 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 60 South Sudan — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 123.0 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 246.0 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 123.0 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 61 St. Lucia — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 15.3 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 21.4 — Increase (in percent): 40% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 15.3 — Increase (in percent): 40%
- 62 St. Vincent and the Grenadines — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 8.3 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 11.7 — Increase (in percent): 41% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 8.3 — Increase (in percent): 41%
- 63 Sudan — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 169.7 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 4/630.2 — Increase (in percent): 271% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 315.1 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 64 Tajikistan, Republic of — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 87.0 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 174.0 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 87.0 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 65 Tanzania — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 198.9 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 397.8 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 198.9 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 66 Timor-Leste, The Dem. Rep. of — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 8.2 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 2/25.6 — Increase (in percent): 212% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 10.8 — Increase (in percent): 137%
- 67 Togo — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 73.4 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 146.8 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 73.4 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 68 Tonga — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 6.9 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 13.8 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 6.9 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 69 Tuvalu — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 1.8 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 2.5 — Increase (in percent): 39% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 1.8 — Increase (in percent): 39%
- 70 Uganda — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 180.5 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 361.0 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 180.5 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 71 Uzbekistan, Rep. of — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 275.6 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 551.2 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 275.6 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 72 Vanuatu — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 17.0 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 23.8 — Increase (in percent): 40% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 17.0 — Increase (in percent): 40%
- 73 Vietnam — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 460.7 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 3/1,153.1 — Increase (in percent): 150% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 460.7 — Increase (in percent): 150%
- 74 Yemen, Rep. of — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 243.5 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 487.0 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 243.5 — Increase (in percent): 100%
- 75 Zambia — PRGT-eligible country — Quota (as of Sept. 18, 2012): 489.1 — Proposed under 14th General Review: 978.2 — Increase (in percent): 100% — Post second-round quota (agreed as part of 2008 quota and voice reform): 489.1 — Increase (in percent): 100%

### Notes and footnotes
- 1/ In the 2013 PRGT Eligibility Review, staff proposes graduation from PRGT-eligibility for Armenia and Georgia, and entry into PRGT-eligiblity for Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Tuvalu.
- 2/ The country is eligible for an ad-hoc increase under the 2008 Reform, but has not yet consented to and/or paid for its quota increase.
- 3/ Reflects ad-hoc increase under the 2008 Reform for those countries that have already consented to and paid for their increase.
- 4/ Sudan and Somalia are in arrears. The quota share reflects the increase they would be eligible for under the 12th quota review.

*Annex III. Quota of PRGT-Eligible Members: Current and Proposed Under the Fourteenth General Review of Quotas (excerpt).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2013/_031813.pdf_