## Assessing Reserve Adequacy—Further Considerations (content unit: _111313d)

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### Executive summary and scope
- Two primary aims:
  - (i) to explore the role reserves play in preventing and mitigating crises; and
  - (ii) to consider in what ways current guidance on adequacy may need to be augmented, in particular to account for country-specific factors.
- Focus: reserves held for precautionary motives.
- Follow-up: a guidance note will distill the operational implications of this paper.
- Date: November 13, 2013.

### Conceptual approach and organization
- Reserve needs assessed by maturity, depth and underlying liquidity of markets and by economic flexibility rather than by AM/EM/LIC classification.
- Builds on the 2011 Assessing Reserve Adequacy (ARA) policy paper; responds to outstanding Board issues following the 2012 IEO evaluation.
- Paper organization (select parts):
  - Part I: Reserves and buffers — role and use.
  - Part II: Assessing the adequacy and the cost of reserves.
  - Conclusions and Issues for Discussion follow.

### Key high-level findings
- Reserves remain a critical liquidity buffer for most countries:
  - Associated with lower crisis risks (crisis prevention).
  - Provide space for authorities to respond to shocks (crisis mitigation).
- Other external instruments (official credit lines and bilateral swap lines) principally act as complements to official reserves for most countries.
- The effectiveness of reserves depends on fundamentals and policy settings; adequate reserves alone do not eliminate market pressure risk.
- Advanced market economies (AMs) with flexible exchange rates have used reserves to address market dysfunction and funding pressures (examples include Australia and Sweden).

### Findings by country-market characteristics
- Mature markets and advanced economies (AMs):
  - May need precautionary reserves to stem severe market dysfunction and ease short-term foreign currency funding pressures despite more liquid markets.
  - Median ratio of reserves to GDP at end-2012:
    - Mature market economies with rigid exchange rate regimes: 53 percent.
    - Floaters: 3 percent.
- Emerging and less-mature market economies (EMs):
  - The ARA metric generally performed well.
  - Suggested refinements: higher weight on portfolio equity and longer-term debt liabilities; account for commodity intensity and dollarization.
- Low income countries (LICs) with limited market access:
  - Need more specific guidance on the marginal cost of reserves.
  - LIC reserve accumulation has tended to track traditional metrics (e.g., three months of import coverage) but often lags desirable prudential levels.

### Evidence on reserve behavior and motivations
- No single explanation covers reserve behavior across all countries and periods; motives shifted over time:
  - 1980–97: insurance against current account shocks.
  - Post-1997/Asian crisis onwards: insurance against capital account shocks gained importance.
- 2013 staff survey:
  - Around three-quarters saw precautionary liquidity needs as the critical reason for building reserves.
  - Around 40 percent held reserves to manage either exchange rate volatility or levels.
- Peer comparisons informative but not sufficient for adequacy assessments.

### Costs of holding reserves
- Opportunity and quasi-fiscal costs grow as reserves increase.
- For countries with market access:
  - Net financial cost approach supplemented by evidence on sterilization opportunity cost.
  - Sterilization opportunity-cost measure applicable where foreign-currency debt is limited; large sterilization needs can impose significant quasi-fiscal costs.
- For LICs:
  - More granular benchmarking of reserve cost by LIC type (frontier markets, resource-rich LICs).
  - Sterilization costs matter most for LICs with net capital inflows.

### Aggregate and numeric implications (ARA metric and global effects)
- ARA EM metric:
  - Purpose: cover a broad range of potential balance of payments pressures via a composite of short-term debt, medium- and long-term debt and equity liabilities, broad money, and exports.
  - Reserves in the range of 100–150 percent of the composite metric are considered adequate for precautionary purposes.
  - At end-2012, around 20 EMs had reserves below 100 percent of the metric.
  - Bringing those to 100 percent would add around $700 billion (6 percent) in demand to global reserve assets (around 2 percent of core-advanced economy bonds outstanding).
  - Amendments to the metric (e.g., raising weight on other liabilities or exports) would modestly increase implied reserve needs; for countries below 100 percent of the revised metric, reserves would rise by less than $100 billion.
- Empirical outflows and shocks:
  - Portfolio equity liabilities experienced a 26 percent decline on average in 2008.
  - Some export falls during the global financial crisis exceeded historical EM EMP episodes; pooled 10th percentile export loss: 4.7 percent; commodity exporters: 6.1 percent; non-commodity exporters: 2.5 percent.

### Intervention: objectives, modalities, and empirical findings
- Objectives and motives:
  - Reserves held primarily as precautionary liquidity buffer or to smooth excessive exchange rate volatility; about 40 percent of EM respondents hold reserves to manage exchange rate level.
  - Intervention works via portfolio-balance and signaling channels; unsterilized intervention generally effective, sterilized intervention effectiveness varies.
  - Intervention can be effective to limit temporary shocks or address market dysfunction but is ineffective or risky when used to defend an exchange rate inconsistent with other macro policies.
- Forms and instruments:
  - Spot market FX purchases/sales remain primary.
  - Derivatives (options, swaps, forwards) used increasingly; swaps/forwards used by around one-third of EM respondents.
  - About half of respondents restrict intervention to spot market only.
- Empirical results (EM sample, 49 countries; country-specific actual intervention data for Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Turkey):
  - Central banks’ intervention reaction functions vary with structural characteristics:
    - (i) Less flexible regimes intervene more aggressively (coefficient on stock of reserves twice that when purchasing FX); no relationship for flexible regimes.
    - (ii) Less open capital accounts (Chinn-Ito Index) tend to intervene less.
    - (iii) Selling intervention slows depreciation pace over a short period but does not prevent it.
  - Quantitative implication: for the median post-Lehman intervention (0.6 percent of GDP), the pace of depreciation would have been temporarily slowed by about 5 percentage points.
  - Impact stronger for countries with capital controls.
- Recent patterns:
  - EMs tend to intervene asymmetrically—some only during heightened volatility, others more frequently.
  - Table 1 monthly data (2004–13 for EMs):
    - Appreciations: 76% (Reserves rise).
    - Depreciations: 24% (Reserves fall).

### Near-reserves: swap lines and IFI contingent facilities
- Alternative buffers: credit lines, central bank swap lines, commodity hedges.
- USD swap lines during GFC were prompt and important for many economies; core central banks (ECB, SNB, BOJ, BOE, BOC) maintain swap lines more permanently; others faced smaller and temporary access.
- IFI credit lines (e.g., FCL and PLL) complement reserves and provide a “stamp of approval” but are time-limited (last at most two years and subject to reviews).
- Pre-committed coordinated swap lines could substitute self-insurance if predictable, but issues include issuer credit risk, domestic mandates, recipient predictability concerns, and activation-trigger ambiguity.

### Market dysfunction in FX swap markets and implications
- Market dysfunction defined as implied US dollar FX swap spreads exceeding their 99th percentile; 85 episodes identified from January 1989 to August 2013.
- Around 80 percent of dysfunction episodes historically lasted no more than two weeks; during the global financial crisis average duration rose to more than three weeks.
- In the GFC, implied US dollar FX swap rates reached record highs and spreads against U.S. dollar Libor widened sharply as transactions froze.
- Policy implication: FX liquidity buffers should be sufficient to meet bank FX liquidity needs and to help stem market dysfunction; consider sectoral coverage beyond banks.

### Mature market economies: reserve needs and prudential tools
- Reserve currency issuers or those with predictable access to reserve currency less likely to need sizable precautionary reserves due to ability to create assets swapped into other currencies.
- Many central banks rely on prudential requirements over reserve buffers to limit financial stability risks; first-best: use macro- and micro-prudential tools to reduce FX liquidity risks.
- Duration of dislocation matters for buffer sizing; central banks may maintain FX liquidity operations longer than typical dysfunction durations.

### Box examples: Sweden and Australia during the GFC
- Sweden:
  - Riksbank increased reserves to support a dollar lending facility reflecting banks’ FX liquidity needs; Fund and Riksbank used Basel liquidity ratios to estimate FX liquidity needs.
  - Fund estimated reserve needs using stable funding necessary for a 100 percent net stable funding ratio (NSFR), capturing possible one-year funding needs under extended stress.
- Australia:
  - RBA intervened (selling US dollars) during episodes of market dysfunction; intervention criterion centers on market conditions and dysfunction, not solely on funding needs.
- BCBS liquidity rules (LCR and NSFR):
  - LCR aims to ensure survival for up to 30 days; phased in from 2015, reaching 100 percent in 2019.
  - NSFR covers a 1 year stress scenario; implementation modalities and timing are ongoing.
  - Central banks could hold FX assets sufficient to meet LCR shortfalls in significant currencies as a complement to prudential tools.

### EM ARA metric: construction, performance, and proposed refinements
- Components: short-term debt (remaining maturity); medium- and long-term debt and equity liabilities; broad money; export earnings.
- Risk weights based on observed tenth percentile outflows during EMP events; separate distributions for fixed and floating regimes.
- Adequacy threshold: 100–150 percent of the composite metric.
- Out-of-sample performance: ARA EM metric outperformed traditional metrics (months of imports; percent of short-term debt; percent of broad money) in predicting EMP and crisis events; an alternative that separates portfolio equity liabilities (ARA2) improved signal-to-noise ratio to 2.7 from 2.4.
- Proposed refinements:
  - Raise weight on other liabilities by 5 percentage points (preferred simple approach).
  - Consider an export weight uplift for commodity exporters (commodity exporters 10th percentile export loss: 6.1 percent versus pooled 4.7 percent).
  - For highly volatile liability histories, introduce persistence (e.g., moving average) in desired reserve holdings.
  - For commodity importers, add a component reflecting the gap between current high commodity import bills and expected long-run prices when current prices are below long-run levels.

### Reserve demand, time variation, and distributional differences
- Ghosh, Ostry & Tsangarides (2012) findings:
  - 1980–97: current account shock insurance dominant.
  - 1998–2004: capital account shock insurance gained importance.
  - 2005–2010: capital-account and undervaluation coefficients larger and significant.
  - Quantile regressions: capital account insurance more important for countries in higher reserve quantiles; current account shocks matter more for lower-reserve holders.
- Empirical model: dependent variable log(gross international reserves/GDP); observations and significance indicators reported in source tables.

### Cost of reserves: public-sector and alternative measures
- Public-sector opportunity cost measures:
  - Spread between return on reserves and interest on domestic-currency government bonds/bills (sterilization cost).
  - Spread between return on reserves and interest paid on external debt (external debt servicing cost).
  - Social opportunity cost: return on reserves less social return on capital (proxied by local government bond rate).
- Net financial cost approach (2011 ARA): EMBI spread less endogenous impact of higher reserves on spreads.
- Sterilization and changing debt structure:
  - Median EM domestic debt share rose to near 70 percent in recent years.
  - Quasi-fiscal sterilization cost proxied by difference between long-term US Treasury returns and domestic yields.
  - Beyond a domestic public debt-to-GDP threshold (around 30-40 percent), issuing more domestic debt via sterilization raises financing costs at an increasing rate.

### Quantitative cost observations
- AMs (non-reserve currency issuers): opportunity costs modest relative to EMs.
- Ten-year average total return on US and advanced economy equities (2003-12): around 7-9 percent.
- EMs’ opportunity cost stands around 6 percent; AMs like Australia, Sweden, New Zealand depicted around 2 percent.
- Increasing marginal cost of reserves supports an ARA-style upper bound on reserve levels.

### LICs: cost proxies, marginal cost, and adequacy framework
- Analytical agenda: provide organizing framework for cost proxy selection, quantify country-specific return on reserves, and refine benefit estimation for resource-rich LICs (RRs).
- Three approaches to gauge LIC cost (select by market liquidity):
  - Yield on sovereign borrowing for LICs accessing capital markets.
  - Sterilization cost (government securities return adjusted for exchange rate risk) where domestic markets exist.
  - Marginal productivity of capital (MPK) as opportunity cost where markets are thin.
- Empirical medians:
  - Marginal cost of holding reserves ranges from around 4 to 6 percent.
  - LICs that accessed sovereign bond markets: marginal cost about 4 percent.
  - LICs without liquid government securities markets (MPK approach): marginal cost about 6.2 percent.
- Return on reserve assets:
  - Method: highest interest among holding government debt security or foreign bank deposits per currency; use one-year U.S. Libor for dollar claims; deflate nominal returns by inflation to obtain real returns.
  - Observations: real returns negative in recent years, largely driven by dollar claims.
    - Dollar claims averages during 2010–12: inflation about 2.3 percent and nominal returns about 0.9 percent.
    - Real returns on euro claims declined from 3.1 percent in 2009 but remain positive.
- Sensitivity: a 2.2 percent difference in the marginal cost of holding reserves translates into a 2 months of imports difference in adequate reserve level.

### Resource-rich LICs and marginal benefits
- RRs face higher absorption losses from commodity-price shocks; regression results indicate larger absorption drops in RRs, implying higher desired reserve buffers for RRs.

### Dollarized economies and currency unions
- Fully dollarized economies:
  - Still face BOP shocks needing FX liquidity buffers; LIC metric can be a conservative benchmark and a lower bound.
  - Experience: Panama and Ecuador have maintained reserves significantly below the metric’s lower bound; El Salvador’s reserves fluctuated near the 100 percent bound since full dollarization in 2001.
  - Fiscal reserve-like buffers may be appropriate on top of central-bank reserves given institutional constraints.
- Partially dollarized economies:
  - Reserve adequacy needs and volatility broadly similar to non-dollarized economies; ARA EM metric generally appropriate.
- Currency unions:
  - Union-level pooling can be efficient if shocks are not fully common, but pooling limited by financial architecture, lack of banking union, synchronization of cycles, and member coordination constraints.
  - Reserve adequacy for unions should reflect member types (reserve-currency issuers versus EMs/LICs).

### Market dysfunction statistics and episodes
- FX swap market dysfunction episodes (implied USD FX swap spreads > 99th percentile): 85 episodes from Jan-1989 to Aug-2013.
- Historically about 80 percent of dysfunction episodes lasted no more than two weeks; during GFC average duration exceeded three weeks.
- Typical dysfunction measured lasted two to three weeks in most cases.

### Case study: Brazil (May 2013)
- Announced cumulative intervention program: US$55billion.
- Program components:
  - Daily auctions of foreign-exchange swaps up to US$0.5 billion per day Monday–Thursday until year-end.
  - Auctions up to US$1 billion in repos on Fridays during same period.
- Purpose: respond to hedging-demand pressures rather than a desire to sell exposure to Brazil.

### Conclusions, policy implications, and next steps
- Reserves provide significant crisis prevention and mitigation benefits; marginal benefits decline at high reserve levels and are offset by rising costs.
- Intervention can be effective to meet bank FX funding needs and address market dysfunction but should not defend misaligned exchange rates.
- ARA advice for less-mature markets generally conservative; proposed augmentations improve country specificity (portfolio liabilities, commodity intensity, persistence).
- For LICs, framework provides more granular guidance on measuring marginal cost of reserves and tailoring adequacy.
- Planned follow-up: a guidance note to operationalize allocation of countries by type (mature, less-mature, frontier, credit-constrained LICs), to better operationalize three conceptual approaches for mature markets and to outline augmentations of standard metrics for less-mature and low-income economies.
- Issues for Director discussion include: usefulness of ARA metrics, assessing reserve needs by market maturity/liquidity vs. AM/EM/LIC, reserves’ crisis role, scope for reserve use to limit outflow pressure, data gaps (bank FX funding, trading liquidity), and granularity of LIC cost measures.

*International Monetary Fund. Assessing Reserve Adequacy—Further Considerations. November 13, 2013.*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Aims and scope
- Two primary aims:
  - (i) to explore the role reserves play in preventing and mitigating crises; and
  - (ii) to consider in what ways current guidance on adequacy may need to be augmented, in particular to account for country-specific factors.
- Focus: reserves held for precautionary motives.
- Follow-up: a guidance note will distill the operational implications of this paper.
- Date: November 13, 2013.

### Conceptual approach
- Reserve needs are approached by the maturity, depth and underlying liquidity of markets and by economic flexibility, rather than by standard classifications (AM, EM, and LIC).
- The paper responds to outstanding issues identified by the IMF Board following the 2012 IEO evaluation International Reserves—IMF Concerns and Country Perspectives.
- The work builds on the 2011 Assessing Reserve Adequacy (ARA) policy paper and supplements it with further analysis and refinements.

### Key findings on the role of reserves
- Reserves remain a critical liquidity buffer for most countries:
  - Associated with lower crisis risks (crisis prevention).
  - Provide space for authorities to respond to shocks (crisis mitigation).
- Other external instruments (official credit lines and bilateral swap lines) principally act as complements to official reserves for most countries.
- The effectiveness of reserves in preventing or mitigating crises depends on underlying fundamentals and policy settings; the existence of adequate reserves does not by itself eliminate market pressure risk.
- Experience since the global financial crisis shows advanced market economies (AMs) with flexible exchange rates have used reserves (e.g., Australia and Sweden) to address market dysfunction and funding pressures.

### Findings by country-market characteristics
- Mature markets and advanced economies:
  - Despite more liquid markets and higher tolerance for foreign exchange volatility, many mature market economies may need to hold precautionary reserves to stem severe market dysfunction and ease short-term foreign currency funding pressures.
- Emerging and less-mature market economies:
  - The general guidance provided in the ARA metric seems to have worked relatively well.
  - Important refinements suggested to better capture risks for some specific economy types (e.g., commodity intensive and dollarized economies).
  - The metric could place higher weight on risks associated with longer-term debt and portfolio equity liabilities.
- Low income countries (LICs) with limited market access:
  - Need for more specific guidance on the marginal cost of reserves.
  - LIC reserves accumulation has moved more closely with traditional metrics (like three-months of import coverage), although it generally continues to lag behind desirable prudential levels.

### Evidence on reserve behavior and motivations
- No single explanation accounts for reserve behavior across all countries and periods; motives have shifted over time (e.g., pre-1997 insurance against current account shocks; post-Asian crisis insurance against capital account shocks).
- Peer comparisons can be informative but should not be the sole basis for adequacy assessments as they can delink adequacy from fundamental vulnerabilities.
- A 2013 staff survey of membership on reserves found:
  - around three-quarters saw precautionary liquidity needs as the critical reason for building reserves;
  - around 40 percent held reserves to manage either exchange rate volatility or levels.

### Costs of holding reserves
- Large reserve holdings can be costly; opportunity costs increase as reserves reach high levels.
- For countries with market access:
  - The paper supplements the net financial cost approach from ARA with evidence on the opportunity cost associated with sterilization.
  - The sterilization opportunity-cost measure is applicable to countries with relatively little foreign currency debt and suggests large sterilization needs can impose a significant quasi-fiscal cost.
- For LICs the paper provides more granular guidance on benchmarking the cost of reserves:
  - Frontier markets with minimal credit constraints face a different opportunity cost of reserves compared with resource-rich LICs, which face the choice between investing windfalls at home or abroad.
  - LICs with net capital inflows face sterilization costs that matter most.

### Implications for reserve guidance and assessment
- Reserve needs ultimately reflect market maturity, depth, underlying liquidity, and economic flexibility; these dimensions do not always map to AM/EM/LIC classifications.
- Prudent ranges of reserve buffers should be tailored to country characteristics:
  - Higher for countries with fixed exchange rates.
  - For mature, liquid markets, focus on stemming market dysfunction and short-term foreign currency bank funding needs.
  - For less-mature markets, refine ARA to account for commodity intensity, dollarization, and longer-term external liabilities.
  - For LICs, operational guidance on the marginal cost of reserves is required.
- Actual reserve holdings are challenging to model; analysis of reserve behavior complements adequacy assessment by illuminating underlying motives for reserve accumulation.

### Paper organization (by part and major sections)
- Part I: Reserves and buffers — role and use
  - I.I What Role Do Reserves Play?
  - I.II Intervention: Effectiveness and Modalities
- Part II: Assessing the adequacy and the cost of reserves
  - II.I Do Mature Markets and Flexible Economies Need Reserves?
  - II.II Refining Advice for Economies with Less-Mature Markets
  - II.III Cost of Reserves—Considerations for Market Access Countries
  - II.IV Revisiting Reserve Adequacy for Credit Constrained and Low Income Economies
  - II.V Dollarized Economies and Currency Unions
- Conclusions and Issues for Discussion follow.

*International Monetary Fund. Assessing Reserve Adequacy—Further Considerations. November 13, 2013.*

### 12.      Reserve buffers seem to play different roles in advanced and emerging economies.

### 12.      Reserve buffers seem to play different roles in advanced and emerging economies.

### Role of reserves in emerging markets (EMs) and advanced markets (AMs)
- In EMs reserves significantly reduce the risks of a currency crisis, as well as the number of episodes of shortage of foreign exchange market liquidity (Figure 2.a), although these benefits decline at high levels of reserves.
- Reserve buffers are associated with a lower assessment of country risk, and lower interest rates in EMs.
- Marginal benefits to reserves decline at high levels as the marginal reduction in the likelihood of exchange market pressure and marginal reduction in yields decline.
- For AMs, the empirical evidence on reserves’ effect on currency crises is less clear, possibly reflecting the limited number of currency crises in advanced economies.
- In AMs, reserve buffers are associated with a lower risk of banking crises, possibly reflecting the ability of higher reserves to allow central banks to extend foreign exchange liquidity to banks.
- Reserves are primarily a liquidity buffer and can ameliorate the impact of other weaknesses but may not offset high vulnerabilities or policy choices that diminish policy space.

### Reserves versus other vulnerabilities and policy factors
- Figure 2.b shows that for emerging markets high external leverage, overvaluation, and large fiscal gaps significantly raise the risk of a currency crisis.
- Around half of respondent AM and EM central banks said that prudential requirements played a role in limiting the risks from banks’ foreign exchange liquidity needs, more than those who said reserve buffers played this role.
- Reserves lower crisis risk only partially; other fundamental and policy factors play a critical role.
- Events in May 2013 illustrated that some countries holding high levels of reserves still came under market pressure.

### Near-reserves: alternative external buffers
- Alternative forms of external buffers include (public and private) credit lines, central bank swap lines, and commodity hedges.
- Surveys of country authorities (in 2011 and for this paper) found almost all respondents thought swap lines and contingent credit lines provided by IFIs had reserve-like features, but private credit lines and commodity hedges were not so close.

### Central bank swap lines and IFI contingent facilities: features and limitations
- Swap lines and contingent IFI facilities can perform the role of reserves when activated but:
  - They do not constitute an asset for the authorities.
  - Their availability in times of stress is not certain.
- USD swap lines:
  - During the global financial crisis temporary USD swap lines were put in place promptly by the US Federal Reserve and provided an important external liquidity backstop for a number of emerging and advanced economies (Chapter 4 of the supplement).
  - While these lines have remained a relatively constant part of the tool kit for some major central banks—ECB, SNB, BOJ, BOE, and BOC—for other central banks in mature and emerging market economies the lines were both smaller and ultimately temporary (see Figure 3).
  - Some core central banks may find swap lines a close substitute for reserves, but others, particularly during idiosyncratic stress, may not be able to rely on these facilities.
- Non-USD swap lines:
  - In addition to USD swap lines, non-USD swap lines were also put in place among central banks, providing core central banks with another form of reserves.
- IFI credit lines (e.g., FCL and PLL):
  - Are an important complement to reserves during times of heightened stress and bring the advantage of a “stamp of approval” over a member’s policies.
  - Are designed to provide access to insurance for periods of heightened risk and, if necessary, be tapped during stress.
  - Do not have the same permanence as reserves: they last for at most two years at a time and are subject to periodic reviews, limiting certainty of availability.

### Pre-committed swap lines: pros and cons
- Coordinated and pre-committed swap lines could be a useful alternative precautionary buffer to self-insurance if sufficiently predictable and can be created at little direct cost by reserve-issuing central banks.
- Issues limiting greater use:
  - Issuer perspective:
    - Issuing to a broad set of countries could be seen as inconsistent with domestically focused central bank mandates (price and financial stability).
    - Originating central banks would face credit risk that may be difficult to price and may be hesitant to take such risk if used to defend a misaligned currency without necessary adjustment.
  - Recipient perspective:
    - Predictability is a primary concern; many swap lines created post-Lehman were not permanent.
    - In some cases (e.g., Fed swap lines) there was an expectation for the country to use their own reserves before resorting to the swap line.
    - Activation linked to triggers can produce uncertainty due to interpretation differences about whether an event has triggered activation.

### Intervention: objectives, theoretical context, and central bank motivations
- Survey responses:
  - Reserves are primarily held as a precautionary liquidity buffer or to smooth excessive exchange rate volatility.
  - About 40 percent of EM respondents also said they hold reserves to manage the level of the exchange rate.
- Theoretical literature:
  - Unsterilized intervention is generally seen as effective; sterilized intervention’s effectiveness is less clear.
  - Intervention works through:
    - A portfolio balance channel (changes in composition of domestic and foreign assets held by residents).
    - A signaling channel (intervention signals future stance of monetary policy; “official intervention does not represent an instrument independent of monetary policy”).
  - Currency crisis models highlight the ineffectiveness of intervention when the exchange rate is inconsistent with other macroeconomic policies and can even increase the risk of speculative attack if policies are inconsistent.
  - While policies are adjusted, intervention can limit crisis risk or mitigate pressure effects by smoothing temporary shocks and addressing transitory market dysfunction, including providing foreign currency liquidity to financial intermediaries if necessary.

### Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of sterilized intervention
- Literature findings summarized:
  - Sarno and Taylor (2001): intervention in advanced economies seems particularly effective during “periods of high reputation and heavy sterilized intervention,” and “if it is publicly announced and concerted.”
  - Dominguez (2003): FX interventions influence FX returns and volatility; efficacy depends on FX market characteristics.
  - Kearnes and Rigobon (2005): for Australia, significant contemporaneous impact on currency level from intervention policy change.
  - Adler and Tovar (2011): for EMs, during episodes of appreciation pressure intervention can significantly affect the pace of appreciation but not the level of the exchange rate.
  - Kohlscheen and Andrade (2013): public currency swap auctions in Brazil have an economically and statistically significant effect on FX rate.
  - Ostry and others (2012, p. 12): evidence on sterilized intervention in EMEs is mixed, but generally more favorable than in advanced economy context; many EME central banks undertake sterilized intervention, suggesting they believe it to be effective in their markets.

### New empirical findings from the paper (broad sample and country-specific data)
- Sample and method:
  - The sample covers 49 emerging markets, with separate estimation using actual intervention data from Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Turkey.
  - Two-stage estimation procedure accounts for endogeneity.
  - Intervention policy decisions modeled as depending on recent exchange rate moves and volatility, the level of reserves held by the central bank, the extent of exchange rate misalignment, and the level of international reserves.
  - Each EM’s exchange rate modeled as a function of short-term interest rates and longer-term sovereign spreads, commodity price fluctuations, market volatility (VIX), and central bank intervention.
- Key empirical results:
  - Central banks’ intervention policy reaction functions vary considerably depending on structural characteristics:
    - (i) Countries with less flexible exchange rate regimes tend to intervene more aggressively (as a function of their reserves) on both sides, but especially when defending against depreciation pressure—the coefficient on the stock of reserves is twice that when purchasing foreign exchange. (There is no relationship for countries with flexible exchange rates.)
    - (ii) Countries with less open capital accounts (as measured by the Chinn-Ito Index) tend to intervene less, reflecting lower near-term outflow risks even when they have rigid currencies (Figure 4, left).
    - (iii) While selling intervention does not prevent depreciation, it can slow the rate of depreciation over a relatively short period.
  - Quantitative implication:
    - For the median intervention seen post-Lehman (0.6 percent of GDP), the pace of depreciation would have been temporarily slowed by about 5 percentage points.
  - The impact of intervention seems stronger for countries with capital controls.
  - Central banks with relatively flexible currencies seem to trade off maintaining or supplementing reserves versus addressing misalignment (Figure 4, right).

### Recent intervention patterns and modalities in emerging markets
- Emerging markets have tended to intervene in an asymmetric manner; some maintain considerable exchange rate flexibility and intervene only during heightened volatility, others intervene more frequently.
- Decomposition of the exchange market pressure (EMP) index across EMs shows that the exchange rate is the primary defense in all but the most severe events (Figure 5).
- Table 1 (monthly data from 2004-13 for EMs) summary:
  - Share of appreciation / depreciation episodes:
    - Appreciates: 76% (Reserves rise)
    - Depreciates: 24% (Reserves fall)
  - When depreciating episodes occur, reserves contributed to the EMP alongside exchange rate movements (Figure 5a, 5b).
- The paper documents country examples (Brazil, China, India, Russia) in Figure 5b and related panels showing reserves contribution, exchange rate contribution, and EMP over Jan-04 to Jan-13.

*Source: ASSESSING RESERVE ADEQUACY—FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

### 25.      Intervention can take different forms.

### 25.      Intervention can take different forms.

### Forms of intervention and instruments
- Spot market foreign exchange purchases or sales remain a major form of intervention.
- Some central banks also intervene in derivatives markets.
- Survey result: about half of respondents reported restricting intervention to only the spot market.
- Derivatives instruments used:
  - Exchange rate options: allow rules-based intervention depending on strike price chosen.
  - Swap and forward transactions: reportedly used by around one-third of EM respondents; play an increasing role in reserve management, sterilization, and allowing private counterparties to hedge exposure without withdrawing from a market.
- Operational implications:
  - Countries holding long positions augment their forward-looking liquidity position.
  - Engaging in forward and swap arrangements allows central banks to manage domestic liquidity and intervene in the spot market without impacting headline official reserve figures.
  - During the crisis, some countries reduced net long positions by increasing their short position, enabling intervention while limiting impact on headline reserves.
  - Few countries report net short positions.

### Choice of intervention strategy and rules
- Survey result: almost half of EMs (51 percent) reported that their reserve usage (in the face of outflow pressures) is fully discretionary and not rules based.
- A similar number report some form of rules-based intervention (with varying degrees of discretion).
- Absence of a rule may reflect idiosyncratic nature of stress episodes requiring alternative intervention strategies.
- Key parameters in deciding scope and size of intervention:
  - Extent of currency misalignment.
  - State of the economy.
  - Adequacy of reserves.
- Risks:
  - Intervention without clearly adequate reserves or a sense of equilibrium parity can be risky when defending a misaligned currency.
  - Other economic policies need to be supportive to ensure success of intervention.
  - Intervention is not appropriate in all cases; a weaker currency may be beneficial when the economy is underperforming (negative output gap) or if sovereign and private balance sheets are less exposed to FX risk.

### Case example: Brazil (May 2013 episode)
- Trigger: Prospects of early tapering of the US Federal Reserve’s asset purchase program prompted large nominal depreciations in emerging markets’ currencies starting May 2013.
- Brazil response:
  - Announced a large intervention program with a cumulative amount equivalent to US$55billion.
  - Program components:
    - Daily auctions of foreign-exchange swaps amounting up to US$0.5 billion per day from Monday thru Thursday of each week until year-end.
    - Auctions up to US$1 billion in repos on Fridays during the same period.
  - Rationale: Responded to perceived nature of pressures—principally demand for hedging operations rather than a desire to sell exposure to Brazil.

### Assessing reserve adequacy and when to intervene
- Paper’s view (aligned with IMF institutional view on capital flows (IMF, 2012)):
  - Intervention could be a useful instrument when pressures are expected to be temporary, economic fundamentals are sound, and if intervention is coordinated carefully with other policies.
- Policy mix:
  - Reserve usage often combined with policy adjustment and exchange rate flexibility during episodes of outflows.
  - Scope of intervention is a live issue among policy makers.

### Mature market economies and reserve needs
- Reserve currency issuers and those with predictable access to reserve currency:
  - Are unlikely to need sizable reserves for precautionary purposes since they can create assets swapped into other currencies.
  - Central importance of reserve currencies, especially the US dollar, underscored during the global financial crisis.
  - Several central banks used liquidity swap lines provided by reserve issuers (especially USD swap lines) to meet short-term dollar funding needs and stem market dysfunction.
  - Temporary USD swap lines were put in place promptly for core countries; size, timing, and duration were less flexible for central banks outside the core.
- Reserve levels by exchange rate regime (median at end-2012):
  - Mature market economies with rigid exchange rate regimes: median ratio of reserves to GDP of 53 percent.
  - Floaters: median ratio of reserves to GDP of 3 percent.
- Interpretation:
  - High reserves for pegs could reflect accumulation under inflows or buffers needed to maintain the peg.
  - Maintaining a fixed exchange rate with full capital mobility and deep financial markets may require a very large war chest to defend the peg or risk a costly exit.

### Market dysfunction in FX swap markets and implications for reserves
- Definition used in paper:
  - FX market dysfunction episodes are extreme multi-day deviations from covered interest parity (CIP), where implied US dollar FX swap spreads exceed their 99th percentile value.
  - From January 1989 to August 2013, 85 such episodes were identified.
- Historical patterns:
  - Dysfunction episodes divided into four periods: Nordic banking crises (early 1990s), Asia crisis (pre-2007), global financial crisis (GFC), and post-GFC (euro area, Singapore, Switzerland).
  - Historically, about 80 percent of dysfunction episodes lasted no more than two weeks; during the GFC frequency and duration increased, with average duration of more than three weeks.
- Observations during the global financial crisis:
  - Implied US dollar FX swap rate shot up to record high levels in a wide range of advanced economies.
  - Spread against U.S. dollar Libor widened sharply as market transactions froze.
  - Market dysfunction measured this way typically lasted two to three weeks in most cases.

### Policy implications for mature markets, liquidity buffers, and prudential tools
- Rationale for foreign currency liquidity buffers:
  - To provide foreign currency liquidity to the financial system or to stem market dysfunction.
  - Start by ensuring sufficient FX liquidity buffers for banks since funding and exchange market disruption have historically coincided with financial system stress.
  - Consider sectoral coverage since non-bank entities (investment banks, insurance companies, mutual funds) can be systemic and face short-term funding stress.
- Survey and experience-based findings:
  - Many central banks rely on price-based indicators (e.g., swap rates) to signal market dysfunction.
  - Authorities in mature markets viewed prudential requirements as playing a more important role than reserve buffers in guarding against financial stability risks.
- Prudential and other policy tools:
  - First-best approach: deploy macro- and micro-prudential tools to reduce financial stability risks arising from banks’ foreign currency liquidity needs.
  - Adequate foreign exchange reserves help alleviate pressures but come at a cost (self-insurance).
  - Duration of market dislocation is a key consideration for setting buffer bounds; policymakers may maintain FX liquidity support operations longer than typical dysfunction durations (example: Riksbank terminated its U.S. dollar lending facility at end-2009).
- Objective for reserves:
  - Mitigate economic and financial shocks while minimizing opportunity costs and risk exposures that reserve assets generate.

*Source: _111313d - 25.      Intervention can take different forms.*

### Box 2. Reserve Use During the Global Financial Crisis: Sweden and Australia

### Box 2. Reserve Use During the Global Financial Crisis: Sweden and Australia

### Sweden — reserve use, banking system characteristics, and reserve need estimation
- Financial system is large relative to the economy; the system’s four major banks have sizeable foreign currencies activities, especially in Euros and US dollars.
- Major banks rely on wholesale funding markets to finance some foreign currency activities.
- A currency breakdown of the aggregate balance sheet of the major banks indicates a sizeable gap between U.S. dollar assets and liabilities.
- The Riksbank increased its reserves during the global financial crisis to support a dollar lending facility intended to reflect banks’ potential foreign exchange liquidity needs, which have increased in nominal terms.
- Both the Fund and the Riksbank have estimated foreign reserve needs using proposed Basel liquidity ratios as a guide:
  - The Riksbank applied scenario analysis to banks’ euro and dollar funding needs, estimating the system’s need for FX liquidity on top of net cashflow needs that coincides with banks’ combined liquidity coverage ratios (LCRs).
    - Under the baseline scenario, banks have already started using their liquidity buffers before the central bank intervenes.
    - The banks are then unable to convert half of their most liquid assets but are unable to issue government-guaranteed debt.
  - The Fund’s estimated reserve needs are based on an estimate of the required stable funding necessary to meet the 100 percent net stable funding ratio, and so capture possible funding need over a one year time horizon in a period of extended stress.

### Australia — intervention motive, market dysfunction, and RBA actions
- The Australian authorities view the need for intervention, and hence reserves, to be centered on market conditions.
  - Initially after the Australian dollar floated in 1983 the aim was mitigating volatility “to lessen its effect on the economy” in light of some market participants’ limited capacity to cope with volatility.
  - This motivation migrated to addressing market dysfunction; the RBA retains discretion to intervene to address gross misalignments of the exchange rate even where market conditions are orderly.
- During the global financial crisis:
  - The AUD market came under stress with poor liquidity and the AUD losing value in a manner of one-way price movement.
  - To address dysfunction, the RBA intervened by selling US dollars, on some occasions continuously for a few days.
- Although the intervention criterion is less clear than funding needs, addressing market dysfunction is a critical stability motivation for holding precautionary reserves.

### Link between liquidity regulation (Basel standards) and reserve buffers
- The BCBS liquidity rules can guide the amount of buffers needed by aiming to ensure banks have sufficient high quality liquid assets (HQLA) to survive stress scenarios lasting up to 30 days, which roughly coincides with the duration of past events of funding stress.
- When foreign currency mismatches are important, BCBS recommends monitoring the LCR for significant currencies; some countries are considering adopting a foreign exchange LCR as a standard.
- Implication: central banks could hold a buffer of highly liquid foreign currency assets sufficient to meet any LCR shortfalls in the banking system over some duration of a stress scenario in significant currencies, provided FX funding risks outside the reach of LCR are not significant.
- The LCR will be phased in from 2015, but will only reach 100 percent in 2019.
  - The net stable funding ratio (NSFR) is also recommended by BCBS as a standard for covering a stress scenario for 1 year; discussions on implementation modalities and timing are still on-going.

### Role of reserves as a backstop and data gaps
- Reserves could provide an important buffer:
  - In the transition period to full adoption of new liquidity standards, where gaps may emerge in compliance.
  - During periods of stress when banks may need to hold less than the 100 percent LCR standard.
- Because the LCR is new and untested, it is difficult to be definitive about sufficiency; additional empirical work is needed as data on bank (and non-bank) liquidity positions become available.
- Beyond banking liquidity, central banks may need to assess market functioning via:
  - Trading liquidity (size, bid-ask spread, speed of execution).
  - Behavior and positioning of market participants (market maker position limits, order flow and option positioning, currency needs of important economic actors).
  - Detailed balance of payments analysis to distinguish core transactions versus interdealer and speculative trading.
- Significant data gaps hinder computation and comparison:
  - Standards for public disclosure on the LCR are still being developed.
  - High-frequency data on foreign exchange trading volumes and bid-ask spreads are limited due to confidentiality and proprietary concerns.
  - Position limits and information on important market actors may be legally accessible only to authorities.

### Proposal and operational guidance
- International reserves can serve as an important buffer for mature market countries that are not reserve currency issuers.
- Bank foreign exchange funding needs may provide a basis for reserve assessment, but should be augmented to reflect:
  - Measures of trading liquidity.
  - Market participants’ behavior.
  - Possibly foreign exchange liquidity needs of some non-banks.
- Due to data gaps, the three approaches (banking liquidity, trading liquidity, market behavior) should be monitored by central banks as a basis for assessing reserve needs, with efforts to fill data gaps and provide aggregate data to aid comparability.

*Source: Box 2. Reserve Use During the Global Financial Crisis: Sweden and Australia — _111313d*

### Box 4. The EM ARA Metric

### Box 4. The EM ARA Metric

### Overview and components
- Purpose: broaden analytic basis for determining level of reserves needed for precautionary purposes, covering a broader range of potential balance of payments pressures than traditional measures.
- Components covered:
  - Short-term debt (remaining maturity).
  - Medium- and long-term debt and equity liabilities (external liability stocks; debt liabilities include both bank and portfolio liabilities).
  - Broad money to represent resident capital flight risk.
  - Export earnings to reflect potential loss from a drop in external demand or a terms of trade shock.

### Risk weights and methodology
- Relative risk weights are based on observed outflows from EMs during exchange market pressure (EMP) events; potential outflows are computed from the distribution of the annual percentage loss of export income, short-term debt, other longer-term liabilities, and broad money observed during such EMP events.
- Separate distributions estimated for fixed and floating exchange rate regimes; final weights based on observed tenth percentile outflows.
- Little correlation found between the broad elements of the metric (Table): specific correlations reported in the source text (e.g., other liabilities vs short-term debt -0.21; broad money vs other liabilities 0.10; exports vs broad money 0.11).

### Adequacy threshold and out-of-sample performance
- Reserves in the range of 100–150 percent of the composite metric are considered adequate for precautionary purposes.
- Tested against actual crisis and EMP experience (including through the most recent crisis), the ARA EM metric outperformed traditional metrics.
- Empirical observations:
  - Outflows from short-term debt during recent crises were not large relative to previous crises.
  - Exports were an exception: some countries experienced falls in export earnings much larger than suggested by historical EM EMP episodes (reflecting an almost unique shock to global trade during the global financial crisis).
  - Portfolio equity liabilities experienced large declines in 2008, averaging a 26 percent decline.

### Refinements proposed and rationale
- Portfolio liabilities
  - Finding: tenth percentile outflows for portfolio liabilities (by exchange rate regime) in the updated sample are above the weights recommended in ARA.
  - Table excerpts (10th percentile of loss in ARA metric component, by exchange rate regime; sample: 1980-2008 and 1980-2012):
    - ARA1: Fixed 27.6 n.a. n.a.; Floating 9.2 n.a. n.a.
    - ARA2: Fixed 23.1 15.1 23.8; Floating 11.6 21.5 11.8
    - (ARA2 decomposes other liabilities into portfolio equities (PEL) and medium and long term debt (MLTD))
  - Proposals:
    - Raise the weight applied to other liabilities by 5 percentage points (preferred: maintains simple, transparent structure).
    - Alternative: separate equity and debt liabilities (but may overstate equity risk since pressure from equity outflows falls as prices decline and exchange rate depreciates).
- Commodity importers and exporters
  - Commodity importers:
    - Evidence: commodity importers have much smaller price elasticity of demand (regression results for real oil imports 1980–2013).
    - Proposal: for countries highly dependent on commodity imports, add a component to the ARA metric reflecting the gap between the annual commodity import bill under current prices and under expected long-run prices (e.g., WEO or country-specific projections) when current prices are below long-run levels.
  - Commodity exporters:
    - Finding: using WEO list of fuel/primary commodity–based exporters, the tenth percentile for export losses is:
      - Commodity exporters: 6.1 percent
      - Pooled sample: 4.7 percent
      - Non-commodity exporters: 2.5 percent
    - Proposal: adjust upward the weight applied to exports in the ARA EM metric specifically for countries heavily reliant on commodity exports.
- Volatility and persistence
  - Finding: recent rise in volatility of financial flows (portfolio and bank-related) has led to greater liability flow volatility for some economies; liability flow volatility for some economies is well below the ARA EM metric average level (i.e., higher capital flow volatility for specific economies).
  - Proposal: for countries with a history of highly volatile flows, introduce persistence in desired reserve holdings—for example, maintain reserves relative to a moving average of the country’s metric level—to reflect rapid reversals and enhance country-specificity.

### Implications, aggregate effects, and comparative performance
- Aggregate reserve implications:
  - At end-2012, around 20 EMs had reserves below 100 percent of the ARA metric.
  - Bringing those reserves to 100 percent of the metric would add around $700 billion (6 percent) in demand to global reserve assets (around 2 percent of core-advanced economy bonds outstanding).
  - Amendments (e.g., raising weight on other liabilities or exports) would modestly increase implied reserve needs; for countries below 100 percent of the revised metric, reserves would rise by less than $100 billion.
  - The commodity-importer suggestion does not imply additional need currently because medium-term prices (as projected by the WEO) are below current levels.
- Comparative predictive performance:
  - Logit regressions of EMP and crisis events show ARA EM metrics are statistically significant predictors of crisis events and generally outperform traditional indicators such as:
    - Reserves in months of imports,
    - Reserves in percent of short-term debt,
    - Reserves in percent of broad money.
  - Alternative ARA EM metric that separates portfolio equity liabilities (ARA2) is somewhat more significant and has a slightly higher signal-to-noise ratio: 2.7 compared with 2.4 for the original metric.
- Notes on reserve demand:
  - Observed reserve accumulation can be used to infer motives for holding reserves and to assess adequacy via peer comparisons.
  - Precautionary needs for EMs cover both current and capital accounts; beyond backing fixed exchange rate regimes and precautionary motives, reserves may accumulate due to exchange rate policies or longer-term savings motives.

*International Monetary Fund — Box 4. The EM ARA Metric (excerpt).*

### 54.      Recent Fund research extends the analysis of reserve demand presented in the 2011

### 54. Recent Fund research extends the analysis of reserve demand presented in the 2011 Assessing Reserve Adequacy paper

### Reserve demand: motives, time variation, and distributional differences
- Recent work (Ghosh and others, 2012) considers both precautionary (country insurance) and non-precautionary (mercantilist) motives and expands proxies to capture:
  - current and capital account shocks,
  - the exchange rate regime,
  - new proxies for mercantilism/currency undervaluation, including publicly-available information on IMF exchange rate assessment methodologies.
- Key empirical findings:
  - No single explanation accounts for reserve behavior for all countries at all times.
  - Time variation (full sample 1980-2010 and sub-periods):
    - 1980-97 (pre-Asian crisis): when reserve holdings and financial integration were low, insurance against current account shocks was the most important determinant.
    - 1998-2004 (post-Asian crisis): insurance against capital account shocks gained greater importance; reserves accumulation not obviously related to insurance and accumulation associated with undervalued exchange rates became more relevant.
    - 2005-2010 (global imbalances): coefficients on capital account variables and exchange rate undervaluation become larger and remain statistically significant.
  - Distributional variation (quantile regressions):
    - Insurance against capital account shocks is more important for countries holding higher reserves relative to GDP (higher quantiles).
    - Countries with relatively lower levels of reserves center motivations on current account shocks.
    - Currency undervaluation is relevant across the reserves distribution, though for some low-reserve holders it may reflect currency crises and collapsed real exchange rates rather than undervaluation by policy choice.

- Empirical model details (as reported):
  - Dependent variable: log(gross international reserves/GDP).
  - Sub-sample periods: 1980-1997; 1998-2004; 2005-2010; full period 1980-2010 used for quantiles.
  - Observations reported: 449, 289, 258, 996, 996, 996, 996 (as presented in Table 5).
  - Robust standard errors; significance indicators: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
  - Source for regression table: Ghosh, Ostry & Tsangarides, 2012, Tables 1 and 2.
  - Notes: Other independent variables include per capita income, population, volatility of neer and opportunity cost.

### III. Cost of Reserves — Considerations for Market Access Countries
- Public-sector opportunity cost measures (three types identified):
  - Spread between return on reserves and interest paid on domestic-currency government bonds/bills (sterilization cost).
  - Spread between return on reserves and interest paid on external debt (external debt servicing cost).
  - Social opportunity cost of public capital: difference between yield on reserves and social return on capital (often proxied by local currency government bond rate).
- Alternative measures and considerations:
  - Rodrik proposes a measure of external debt servicing cost incorporating private sector net open foreign currency positions (Rodrik, 2006).
  - Empirical implementation involves "heroic assumptions" given methodological difficulties (e.g., using return on domestic government bonds as proxy).
  - Around 40 percent of surveyed respondents reported not using any quantified cost measure in reserves analysis; around a fifth reported using several alternative methods.

- Net financial cost approach (2011 ARA):
  - For countries with external debt denominated in foreign currency, the net financial cost measure equals the EMBI spread less the endogenous impact of higher marginal reserves on spreads (Levy Yeyati, 2008).
  - Assessing Reserve Adequacy showed that for the median EM, the rise in reserve holdings has been associated with a general convergence of this cost measure and the EMBI spread.

- Sterilization costs and changing debt structure:
  - Several countries with large reserves have limited externally issued debt; debt issuance increasingly in local currency.
  - For the median EM, the share of domestic debt in total public debt has risen since the early 2000s, reaching near 70 percent in the last few years.
  - Central banks have increasingly sterilized rapid reserves accumulation (IMF WEO 2007; Aizenman and Glick 2009), incurring quasi-fiscal costs (Calvo, 1991).
  - An appropriate proxy for quasi-fiscal sterilization cost is the difference between the return on longer term US Treasury bonds and domestic yields.

- Comparative magnitude of costs:
  - Opportunity cost measures relevant for mature market (AM) economies not issuing reserve currency are modest relative to EMs.
  - Over a longer ten year period (2003-12), the average total return on US and advanced economy equities was around 7-9 percent (the higher number reflects a world AM MSCI index).
  - On this basis, marginal opportunity cost of reserves could be higher than suggested by EM bond yields by up to 2 percentage points.
  - Reported illustrative levels: EMs’ opportunity cost stands at around 6 percent; AMs depicted (Australia, Sweden, and New Zealand) having a considerably lower cost (around 2 percent).

- Sterilization and non-linear costs:
  - Increasing domestic public debt, including that associated with sterilization, raises the spread between yields on domestic long-term sovereign bonds and yields on US bonds.
  - Beyond a threshold of domestic public debt to GDP (around 30-40 percent of GDP), issuing more government bonds domestically via sterilization raises the government’s financing costs at an increasing rate.
  - The increasing marginal quasi-fiscal costs help explain why sterilization efforts are often temporary during episodes of capital inflows.
  - This convex relationship between domestic public debt and yields holds even after controlling for global risk aversion (VIX index).

- Policy implication:
  - The increasing marginal cost of reserves reinforces the ARA approach that proposes an upper bound on reserve levels: net benefits decline at higher reserve levels due to rising domestic opportunity costs.

### IV. Revisiting Reserve Adequacy for Credit Constrained and Low Income Economies (LICs)
- Background and objectives:
  - The 2011 IMF approach for LICs complements traditional indicators (e.g., three months of import coverage) by focusing on the precautionary motive and a cost-benefit analysis balancing crisis prevention/mitigation benefits against opportunity costs.
  - Survey responses from country teams indicate the cost-benefit approach is being used and that more operational guidance would be useful given LIC heterogeneity.
  - Teams requested greater clarity on quantifying the opportunity cost of reserves and customizing benefit estimates to country circumstances; benefits vary across resource-rich LICs (RRs), dollarized economies, small states, and monetary union members.

- Analytical agenda for LICs:
  - Focus on cost of holding reserves in LICs, including:
    - Providing an organizing framework for selecting appropriate cost proxies by LIC type.
    - Presenting an approach to quantify country-specific return on reserves.
    - Refining estimation of benefits for resource-rich LICs, where high dependence on commodity revenues implies higher absorption losses from severe/prolonged commodity price declines—re-estimation yields a greater weight on shock effects for RRs.
  - Three-step illustrative estimation for adequate reserves in LICs:
    1. Estimate the cost of reserves (equated to the appropriate country group cost proxy).
    2. Quantify the country-specific return on reserves.
    3. Derive adequate reserve levels using the estimated marginal cost of reserves (return on reserve assets less cost) and marginal benefits.

### B. The Cost of Holding Reserves in LICs — Framework and measurement
- Conceptual considerations:
  - LIC heterogeneity—financial development, capital market access, capital account openness, commodity export dependence—affects both benefits and costs of reserves.
  - Cost of holding reserves can be viewed narrowly (central bank financial costs) or broadly (economy-wide opportunity cost).

- Three approaches for gauging cost in LICs (not all relevant for every LIC):
  - External funding cost for LICs that access capital markets, net of estimated return on foreign assets held as reserves.
  - Sterilization cost for LICs with liquid government securities markets, net of return on foreign reserve assets; when comparing domestic interest cost with foreign return, adjust for exchange rate risk.
  - Opportunity cost to the economy as a whole: marginal productivity of capital (MPK) as the foregone return from shifting resources from physical investment to holding reserve assets. For resource-rich states with substantial foreign-currency resources at the central bank, opportunity cost can be proxied by marginal productivity of public investment.

- Measurement guidance and proxy selection:
  - Three suggested proxies tailored to financial market liquidity:
    - Yield on sovereign borrowing for LICs accessing capital markets.
    - Sterilization cost adjusted for an exchange rate risk premium for LICs with liquid government securities markets—estimated as the exchange rate risk-adjusted return on the most liquid longer-term government bonds.
    - Marginal product of capital where financial markets are thin and underdeveloped.
  - Choosing and quantifying an appropriate proxy can be difficult when markets are distorted or segmented, which undermines interest rates' informational value as economic cost measures.

*Source: Ghosh, Ostry & Tsangarides, 2012; IMF staff estimates.*

### 71.      For LICs with market access, the external cost

### 71. For LICs with market access, the external cost of borrowing can be approximated by the yield on the sovereign bond

### External funding cost: sovereign bond yield as proxy
- The yield on sovereign bonds is proposed as a market-based indicator that captures sovereign risk.
- Potential biases:
  - Downwards if sovereign borrowing is collateralized or securitized by future commodity-revenues.
  - Upwards if government debt and probability of default are high.
- Empirical observation: lack of a significant relationship between spread and the size of the bond-to-reserve ratio in LICs and EMs (chart referenced).
- Where sovereign bond markets are illiquid or frictions persist, a cross-country currency interest rate swap could be used to estimate an external funding cost.
- Summary statistic: The average yield on LIC sovereign bonds, issued within the last ten years, is about 7 percent.

### Sterilization cost proxy for LICs with developed financial markets
- Use return on government securities adjusted for an exchange rate risk premium.
- Where forward exchange markets do not exist, compute the risk premium using an average of historical real effective exchange rate depreciation.
- Choice of government security maturity: base on market depth with a bias toward longer-term securities.
- If government bond and central bank securities markets are illiquid or distorted, judgment is required to select appropriate interest rates as sterilization-cost proxies.

### Opportunity cost proxy (MPK) for LICs without market access
- For LICs lacking external market access or developed domestic financial markets, the evolution of the output-to-capital ratio (Marginal Productivity of Capital, MPK) is used to proxy the opportunity cost of foregone fixed investment.
- MPK depends on: investment as percent of GDP, output, depreciation rate, and capital share (see Box 5 for formal model).
- Data and measurement issues limit country-specific MPK estimates; MPK used as a cross-country proxy.

### Box 5 — MPK modeling and calibration (theoretical summary and empirical scenarios)
- Capital accumulation law of motion: K̇ = I − δK (equation structure shown in source).
- Cobb-Douglas production and competitive markets imply MPK formula (equations (1)–(5) in source).
- Empirical calibration:
  - Depreciation rate δ set to 0.04.
  - Share of capital stock α (capital share) set to 0.3.
- Two scenarios to estimate MPK:
  - Scenario I: steady state (use sample averages during 1990-2018 for steady-state investment and nominal GDP).
  - Scenario II: dynamic transition path (compound equation (1) recursively to determine current capital stock and then calculate MPK).
- Robustness: alternative δ and α values considered; scenarios valid if capital adjustment costs are negligible.

### Marginal cost of holding reserves: empirical findings
- Using alternative cost proxies, the marginal cost of holding reserves ranges from around 4 to 6 percent.
- Specific group medians:
  - LICs that have accessed sovereign bond markets: marginal cost about 4 percent.
  - LICs without liquid government securities markets (MPK approach applied): marginal cost about 6.2 percent.
- Marginal cost definition used: cost proxy minus the return on assets (all financial proxies converted into real terms).

### Return on reserve assets (recent trends and methodology)
- Reserve management objectives in LICs: invest in liquid and safe assets; cost minimization is second order.
- Typical instruments: short-term bank deposits and government securities; search for yield has increased in recent years.
- Method to estimate return on foreign exchange claims:
  - Highest interest among holding government debt security or foreign bank deposits for each constituent currency.
  - One-year U.S. Libor used for dollar claims; government bond yield for other currencies.
  - Real returns obtained by deflating nominal returns using the constituent currency’s inflation.
  - Composite real return on foreign exchange holdings uses currency-claim shares as weights.
- Empirical points:
  - Real returns have been negative in recent years, largely driven by dollar claims.
  - Dollar claims have been negative since 2010 with averages during 2010–12: inflation about 2.3 percent and nominal returns about 0.9 percent.
  - Real returns on euro claims declined from a peak of 3.1 percent in 2009 but remain positive.
  - Gold and reserve tranches at the IMF have no returns; SDRs earn the SDR interest rate.
  - Negative real returns on reserve assets since 2011 attributed to declining nominal returns and rising inflation.

### Reserve adequacy in Resource-Rich (RR) economies: marginal benefits
- Marginal benefits adjusted upward for RRs to reflect higher absorption losses from commodity-price shocks.
- Regression results indicate absorption drops magnitude is much higher in RRs compared with other countries (table referenced).
- Implication: RRs may need to hold higher reserves to withstand external shocks.

### Determining adequate reserve levels and sensitivity to cost proxies
- Illustrative calibration for a typical LIC uses estimated marginal benefits with median fundamentals and shocks.
- Higher marginal costs of holding reserves => lower adequate reserve levels (marginal benefits held constant).
- Quantified sensitivity: A 2.2 percent difference in the marginal cost of holding reserves translates into a 2 months of imports difference in the adequate level of reserves.
- Empirical context:
  - In the last five years, reserve coverage has been above three months of imports for both flexible and fixed regimes.
  - Assessment suggests fixed regimes could benefit from more reserve accumulation.
  - Adequate reserve levels are higher for fixed regimes and for RR subgroups.
  - Frontier markets have relatively lower adequate reserves due to lower cost proxies (external funding) and stronger institutions/exposure profiles.
- Calibration notes:
  - Cost proxy for frontier markets: average sovereign borrowing rate.
  - Cost proxy for RRs: average of sovereign borrowing rate and MPK, weighted by number of LICs falling under each proxy.
  - Calculation assumes access to Fund-support following a shock.

### Application to LICs and operational guidance
- Framework refines cost measurement to reflect LIC heterogeneity but cannot capture all factors affecting cost of holding reserves.
- Close examination of balance of payments and foreign exchange markets recommended to inform choice of cost proxy.
- Sensitivity analysis on MPK recommended because rapid investment and capacity issues can affect transition to steady state.
- LIC country team survey findings:
  - Need for structured approach to adjust parameters and for further operational guidance on metric use.
  - LICs with market access should consider supplementing the LIC metric with the EM-type metric to capture capital flight risks.
  - Future work should explore heterogeneity (e.g., high vulnerability of small states and mono-export economies).

### Dollarized economies and currency unions (brief proposal on metric applicability)
- Fully dollarized economies still face BOP shocks requiring FX liquidity buffers that cannot be domestically generated.
- Case analysis for Ecuador, El Salvador, and Panama suggests the LIC metric may be a relevant, conservative benchmark for fully dollarized economies.
- Recommendation: treat the metric as a lower bound for reserve adequacy in fully dollarized economies.
- Practical considerations: ex ante frictions in usability of reserves (e.g., limits on usability for liquidity support in El Salvador) should be considered; any fiscal reserve buffers should be held on top of metric-proposed reserve buffers, especially if a large share of fiscal financing is from residents.

*Source: IMF staff analysis from “Assessing Reserve Adequacy—Further Considerations” (content unit: 71. For LICs with market access, the external cost).*

### 85.      Overall, Panama and Ecuador have maintained reserves significantly below the

### _111313d - 85.      Overall, Panama and Ecuador have maintained reserves significantly below the

### Dollarized economies: empirical patterns and observed behaviors
- Panama and Ecuador have maintained reserves significantly below the metric’s lower bound.
- El Salvador’s reserves have fluctuated near the 100 percent bound since its full dollarization in 2001.
- In Panama and Ecuador, import compression played a role in years of BOP drains when reserves were either partially used or not used at all.
- In El Salvador, import compression never played a large role.
- The results cited are based on an analysis of annual BOP data over 1980-2008, examining seven components of BOP flows, all expressed in percent of GDP: current account, capital flight (assets plus net errors and omissions), direct investment liability, portfolio liability, deposit and currency liability, other liability flows and reserve assets.
- Periods of BOP drains were identified as periods of large capital outflows or non-resident deposit flight, along with corresponding behavior of the current account (import compression for instance) or reserves use or both.

### Partially dollarized economies: reserve adequacy and volatility
- For partially dollarized economies where currency depreciation is an option, reserve adequacy needs, and its volatility, does not seem to differ substantially from in non-dollarized economies.
- Aside from the potential loss of export income, countries with the most extreme partial dollarization—Bulgaria, Peru, and Uruguay—do not particularly stand out against other EMs based on the risk factors included in the EM ARA metric.
- Figure 18 shows that partially dollarized economies accumulated slightly more reserves (relative to metric) and experienced higher excess reserves volatility relative to other EMs; excluding the highly dollarized Uruguay eliminates any pattern.
- There seems little relationship between the extent of foreign bank participation in the economy and the extent of reserves held, or the volatility of adequacy.
- Foreign banks often revert to their parents for funding during times of funding stress rather than rely on the host central bank; this is particularly true for foreign branches which are legally entitled to support from parent banks during times of funding stress. Parent banks are not legally obliged to provide support to troubled subsidiaries, introducing uncertainty to parent-subsidiary burden sharing and potentially suggesting higher need for reserve accumulation in host country central banks.
- Proposal: The basic framework of the ARA EM metric seems to generally suit partially dollarized economies well given the high level of external (and externally denominated) liabilities.

### Dollarized low-income countries (Box 6)
- Dollarized LICs may need to hold reserves, though their sources of external drains and ways of smoothing shocks differ from non-dollarized economies and depend on the nature and degree of dollarization.
- Fully-dollarized LICs:
  - Do not require reserves to smooth excessive exchange rate fluctuations but may need them to stem a liquidity crisis.
  - Could acquire reserve buffers to provide liquidity in the face of a bank run, though credibility of liquidity support may be limited due to small size, capacity and credit constraints.
  - A deposit insurance scheme could provide stronger confidence to help stem a liquidity crisis since banking systems tend to be primarily financed by deposits.
  - These economies tend to have a single deposit-taking institution that is owned by the government or foreign parent bank and could benefit from an implicit government guarantee or “imported” regulation and supervision, respectively.
- Dual legal tender and other heavily dollarized economies:
  - Generally need to hold more reserves than non-dollarized countries due to high exposure to exchange rate risk.
  - May need relatively lower reserves to cover imports as residents already use foreign currency for transactions, but face high exchange rate risk particularly if there is no de jure fixed exchange rate.
  - If one of the dual currencies is a non-reserve currency, the risk of capital flight could be elevated (example noted: concerns about the rand could have implications in Lesotho).
  - The lender of last resort role needs to be carefully managed to limit elevated risks of capital flight, which may warrant holding higher reserves.
  - Moving from a de facto to de jure dollarization could help remove currency mismatch in the economy.
  - Reserves cannot substitute for sound economic policies; heavily dollarized economies also need to focus on reducing macroeconomic vulnerabilities.
- Notes on reserve-like fiscal buffers in fully dollarized LICs:
  - Large external shocks could have significant income effects reducing the capacity to finance imports; buffers could be held by the government since it is better placed to provide income support during a crisis and may be included as reserves depending on the institutional framework.
  - Tuvalu: does not have a central bank, has reserves in the form of government deposits and investment funds obtained from fiscal surpluses.
  - Kiribati: has no central bank and no reserve assets but has a sovereign wealth fund used for fiscal financing in case of shocks.
  - East Timor: has a central bank and holds some reserve assets, as well as a separate sovereign wealth fund.

### Currency unions: reserve needs, pooling, and limitations
- Individual economies within a currency union can be subject to balance of payments shocks and require external buffers even if they have no currency to “defend.”
- With a common central bank holding adequate reserves and ensuring adequate liquidity within the union, individual members may have less need to cover reserve needs through their own reserves.
- Pooling reserves at the union level is likely efficient to the extent shocks are not entirely common; reserve assets should be invested externally in foreign currency.
- Costs of maintaining reserves could be charged differentially across members based on contribution to overall vulnerabilities; the common central bank could provide foreign currency liquidity against pressure arising from particular members.
- Reserve adequacy considerations should reflect the underlying structure of the type of members:
  - Currency unions able to issue a reserve currency: adequacy should align with reserve currency issuers.
  - Unions comprising EMs and LICs: adequacy should be in line with those types of economies.
  - Examples: West African and Central African CFA francs pegged to the euro and backed by the French Treasury; Eastern Caribbean dollar pegged to the US dollar and supported by a quasi-currency board with the monetary base backed by international reserves.
- Limitations to heavy reliance on reserve pooling:
  - Financial architecture: interconnected banking systems can transmit deposit outflow shocks; absence of a banking union and the possibility that one member can block pooled resource use (example: ECCU) limits pooling.
  - Synchronization: lack of sufficient economic diversification and high synchronicity of business cycles increase exposure to correlated shocks (surges in food and fuel prices, plunges in FDI and terms of trade, drops in external demand), limiting pooling value.
- Additional supportive policies needed in currency unions:
  - Fiscal and banking unions to provide a backstop to stem deposit flight.
  - A central bank able to provide domestic liquidity within the region.
  - Without sufficient fiscal integration and given limits on fiscal space due to currency board arrangements, adjustment to asymmetric shocks can be especially difficult.
  - Empirical note: After the global financial crisis, some ECCU members faced balance of payments pressures and resorted to external assistance (including sovereign debt restructuring) and IMF support.

### Conclusions: benefits, costs, and next steps
- This paper succeeds the Fund’s 2011 Assessing Reserve Adequacy paper, examining factors affecting adequacy in specific country cases and providing considerations for mature market economies, constrained by data availability.
- The paper finds that the ARA advice for less-mature markets has been generally conservative, but suggests possible modifications relating to portfolio liabilities and commodity intensive economies.
- For LICs, the paper provides more advanced and granular guidance on establishing a benchmark for the cost of reserves.
- General findings:
  - Reserves bring significant benefits, although these decline at the margin and are countered by their cost.
  - For all types of economies, reserves provide important liquidity buffers and reduce the risk of a crisis; this effect can be offset by weak fundamentals including currency misalignment.
  - Intervention can be effective when used to meet bank funding needs in foreign exchange, provided it is not aimed at defending an exchange rate out of line with fundamentals.
  - Measures of opportunity cost of reserves suggest reserves become expensive at high levels.
- Planned use of the work:
  - Basis for a subsequent guidance note focused on operational issues.
  - Guidance note will more clearly specify guiding lines for allocating countries by types of economy—mature, less-mature, frontier and credit constrained low income.
  - Will seek, subject to informational constraints, to better operationalize the three conceptual approaches proposed to underpin mature markets reserve adequacy needs.
  - For less-mature and low income economies, the guidance note will outline approaches to augment standard metrics to capture country specific characteristics consistently.
  - Overarching objective: maintain guidance that can be applied in a relatively simple and transparent way, as advocated in ARA.

### Issues for discussion (questions for Directors)
- Do Directors agree that the ARA metrics provide useful guidance to EM and LIC country authorities on reserve holdings relative to traditional reserve metrics?
- Do Directors see the desirability of assessing a country’s reserve needs by the maturity, depth and underlying liquidity of its markets as well as its economic flexibility, rather than by standard classifications (AM, EM, and LIC)?
- Do Directors view reserves as playing important crisis prevention and mitigation roles both in mature and less-mature economies?
- Do Directors agree that there is scope for the use of reserves to limit the pressure of outflows, although this scope depends on the adequacy of reserves, nature of external pressures, the extent of country-specific vulnerabilities, and the consistency of the domestic macroeconomic policy framework?
- Do Directors agree that many mature market economies may need precautionary external buffers, and that bank foreign exchange funding needs, measures of trading liquidity, and market participants’ behavior may provide useful indicators of these needs? Should gaps in the availability of aggregated data needed to compile these indicators be filled quickly?
- Are the proposed augmentations to the work on the ARA EM metric worthwhile steps towards providing additional country specificity in reserve adequacy assessments? Does the metric provide a useful guide to the appropriate level of reserves, including for dollarized economies?
- Do Directors agree that the marginal benefits of reserves decline at high levels of holdings, and the marginal cost of reserves increases with reserve holdings?
- Do Directors see the benefit of the additional granularity provided on the cost of LIC reserve holdings?

*Source: _111313d - 85.      Overall, Panama and Ecuador have maintained reserves significantly below the (IMF staff paper text excerpts).*

### References

### _111313d - References

### Foreign exchange intervention, sterilization, and market microstructure
- Adler, Gustavo and Camilo Tovar, “Foreign Exchange Intervention: A Shield Against Appreciation Winds?,” IMF Working Paper 11/165 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Aizenman, Joshua and Reuven Glick, 2009, “Sterilization, Monetary Policy, and Global Financial Integration,” Review of International Economies, 17 (4), pp. 777-801.
- Aizenman, Joshua and Yi Sun, 2012, “The financial crisis and sizable international reserves depletion: From ‘fear of floating’ to the ‘fear of losing international reserves’?” International Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 24, 250-269.
- Calvo, Guillermo, 1991,” The Perils of Sterilization,” Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund, 38, Issue 4 (December), pp. 921-926.
- Dominguez, Kathryn, 2003, “The Market Microstructure of Central Bank Intervention,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 59, 25-45.
- Kearnes, Jonathan and Roberto Rigobon, 2005, Identifying the Efficacy of Central Bank Intervention: Evidence From Australia and Japan,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 66, pp. 31-48.
- Sarno, Lucio, and Mark Taylor, 2001, “Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market: Is it Effective and, If So, How Does It Work?,” Journal of Economic Literature Vol XXXIX, pp. 839-68.
- Newman, Vicki, Chris Potter, and Michelle Wright, 2011, “Foreign Exchange Market Intervention,” December Quarter, pp. 67-76 (Reserve Bank of Australia).
- Vallence, Christian, 2012, “Foreign Exchange Reserves and the Reserve Bank’s Balance Sheet Bulletin– December Quarter 2012” (Reserve Bank of Australia).
- Kohlscheen, Emanuel and Sandro C. Andrade, 2013, “Official Interventions through Derivatives: Affecting the Demand for Foreign Exchange,” Banco Central Do Brazil Working Paper 317.
- Basu, Kaushik and Aristomene Varoudakis, 2013, “How to Move the Exchange Rate If You Must: The Diverse Practice of Foreign Exchange Intervention by Central Banks and a Proposal for Doing it Better,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6460.
- Kearnes, Jonathan and Roberto Rigobon, 2005, Identifying the Efficacy of Central Bank Intervention: Evidence From Australia and Japan,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 66, pp. 31-48.

### FX swaps, dollar funding, and central bank balance sheets
- Ando M., 2012, Recent Developments in U.S. Dollar Funding Costs through FX Swaps, Bank of Japan Review Series)
- Baba, N. and F. Packer (2009), From turmoil to crisis: dislocations in the FX swap market before and after the failure of Lehman Brothers, BIS Working Paper No. 285 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Barkbu B. and L. Ong, 2010, “FX Swaps: Implications for Financial and Economic Stability”, IMF Working Paper 10/55 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Cook, David, and James Yetman, 2012, “Expanding Central Bank Balance Sheets in Emerging Asia: a Compendium of Risks and Some Evidence, BIS Papers chapters, in Bank of International Settlements (ed.), Are Central Bank Balance Sheets in Asia too large?, Vol. 66, pp. 30-75.
- Fiechter, Jonathan, Inci Otker-Robe, Anna Ilyina, Michael Hsu,  Andre Santos, and Jay Surti, 2011,l “Subsidiaries or Branches: Does One Size Fit All?” IMF Staff Discussion Note 11/04 (March).

### Reserve adequacy, optimal reserves, and the cost of reserves
- Bird, Graham and Ramkishen Bird (2002), “Too Much of a Good Thing?: The Adequacy of International Reserves in the Aftermath of Crises,” Centre of International Economic Studies, Discussion Paper No. 0210.
- Jeane, O., and R. Rancière, 2006, “The Optimal Level of Reserves For Emerging Markets: Formulas and Applications,” IMF Working Paper 06/229 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Jeanne, O., and R. Rancière, 2006, “The Optimal Level of Reserves For Emerging Markets: Formulas and Applications,” IMF Working Paper 06/229 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Goncalves, F.M., 2007, "The Optimal Level of Foreign Reserves in Financially Dollarized Economies: The Case of Uruguay," IMF working paper No. 07/265 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Dehesa, Pineda, and Samuel, 2009, “Optimal Reserves in the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union,” IMF Working Paper 09/77 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Delèchat and Martijn, 2007, “Reserve Adequacy in the CFA Franc Zone,” in A. M. Gulde and C. Tsangarides (eds), The CFA Franc Zone: Common Currency, Uncommon Challenges (International Monetary Fund: Washington, DC).
- Hauner, David, 2005, “A Fiscal Price Tag for International Reserves,” IMF Working Paper 05/81 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Levy Yeyati, E., 2008, “The Cost of Reserves,” Economics Letters, Vol. 100, No. 1, pp. 39–42.
- Rodrik, Dani, 2006, “The social cost of foreign exchange reserves,” NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 11952.
- Rodriguez, C.S. and K. Funk, 2012," Estimation of Optimal International Reserves for Costa Rica: A Micro-Founded Approach," Banco Central de Costa Rica research paper No. 1-2012.
- Ghosh, Atish R., Jonathan D. Ostry, and Charalambos Tsangarides, 2012, “Shifting Motives: Explaining the Buildup in Official Reserves in Emerging Markets since the 1980s,” IMF Working Paper (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Bird, Graham and Ramkishen Bird (2002), “Too Much of a Good Thing?: The Adequacy of International Reserves in the Aftermath of Crises,” Centre of International Economic Studies, Discussion Paper No. 0210.

### Financial stability, banking structure, and crises
- Cerutti, Eugenio, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, and Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, 2007, “How Banks Go Abroad: Branches or Subsidiaries?”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 31, pp. 1669–1692.
- Laeven, Luc, and Fabian Valencia, 2012, “Systemic Banking Crises Database: An Update,” IMF Working Paper 12/163 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Goyal et al., 2013, “A Banking Union for the Euro Area,” IMF Staff Discussion Note 13/01 (February)
- Dehesa and Druck, 2008, “The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank: Challenges to An Effective Lender of Last Resort,” IMF Working Paper 08/214 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Arslanalp S., F. Bonhorst, S. Gupta, and E. Sze, 2010, “Public Capital and Growth,” IMF Working Paper 10/175 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Fiechter, Jonathan, Inci Otker-Robe, Anna Ilyina, Michael Hsu,  Andre Santos, and Jay Surti, 2011,l “Subsidiaries or Branches: Does One Size Fit All?” IMF Staff Discussion Note 11/04 (March).

### Growth, public debt, and fiscal implications
- Aghion, P., and P. Howitt, 2007, “Capital, Innovation, and Growth Accounting,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp.79–93.
- Ardagna, Silvia, Francesco Caselli, and Timothy Lane, 2007, “Fiscal Discipline and the Cost of Public Debt Service: Some Estimates for OECD Countries,” The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 7 (1), pp. 1-33.
- Bosworth, B., and S. M. Collins, 2003, “The Empirics of Growth: An Update,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 113–206.
- Hauner, David, 2005, “A Fiscal Price Tag for International Reserves,” IMF Working Paper 05/81 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- International Monetary Fund, 2007, World Economic Outlook October 2007: Managing Large Capital Inflows (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- International Monetary Fund, 2011, “Assessing Reserve Adequacy,” IMF Policy Paper, February  (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

### Regional studies and country-specific analyses
- Dehesa, Pineda, and Samuel, 2009, “Optimal Reserves in the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union,” IMF Working Paper 09/77 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Delèchat and Martijn, 2007, “Reserve Adequacy in the CFA Franc Zone,” in A. M. Gulde and C. Tsangarides (eds), The CFA Franc Zone: Common Currency, Uncommon Challenges (International Monetary Fund: Washington, DC).
- Rodriguez, C.S. and K. Funk, 2012," Estimation of Optimal International Reserves for Costa Rica: A Micro-Founded Approach," Banco Central de Costa Rica research paper No. 1-2012.
- Goncalves, F.M., 2007, "The Optimal Level of Foreign Reserves in Financially Dollarized Economies: The Case of Uruguay," IMF working paper No. 07/265 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- International Monetary Fund, 2012, Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, April 2012: Sub-Saharan Africa’s Natural Resource Exporters: Recent Performance and Policy Challenges, Regional Economic Outlook (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

*Source: _111313d - References (PDF chapter/section).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2013/_111313d.pdf_
