## _073014a — EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ## Source details **Canonical URL:** [_073014a — EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2014/_073014a.pdf) ## Other formats - [Markdown version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2014/_073014a.pdf.md) - [Structured JSON version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2014/_073014a.pdf.json) --- ### Overall assessment of IMF surveillance - Fund surveillance is seen as having improved since 2011. - Stakeholder groups surveyed: country authorities (CAs), IMF Executive Directors (EDs), IMF mission chiefs (MCs), and civil society organizations (CSOs). - Key findings: - 14 percent of CAs—mainly from EMs and LICs—report a great improvement and a further three-quarters see some improvement. - Mission chiefs (MCs) working on advanced markets (AMs): over 40 percent see no change. ### Value added and priority areas - Country-specific policy advice is seen as the most valuable feature of Fund surveillance. - Top areas of value added: - Work on financial vulnerabilities. - Fiscal policy. - Risk assessments. - Additional points: - EDs emphasize analysis of external developments and actual/potential spillovers. - The Fund’s medium-term approach is generally valued; CAs believe the Fund takes medium-term sustainability implications adequately into account. - Analysis of macro-financial linkages offers more value added than spillover analysis and represents an improvement since 2011. - Work on external sector assessments receives recognition especially from EMs and LICs. - Nearly half of CAs see limited or no value added from work on capital flow management. - Views on monetary policy differ: - EDs rate monetary policy among the top three areas of Fund surveillance in value added. - AMs, particularly some European countries in the euro area, attach less weight to the Fund’s work on monetary policy. ### Integration of bilateral and multilateral surveillance; analytical gaps - The Fund is making progress toward integrating surveillance but scope for further improvements remains. - Required advances: - Spillover work should offer deeper analysis of the impact of systemic countries’ policies on the rest of the world. - Risk assessments should focus more on transmission channels and be quantified where feasible. - Timely integration requires a reversal of the recent decline in support from functional departments to country teams (notably for EMs and LICs), and increased delivery of financial sector expertise. - Practical barriers identified by MCs: - Data gaps. - Insufficient information sharing internally. - Gaps in specialty knowledge. - MCs’ recommendations: - Expand cross-country analytical studies. - Greater availability of cross-country data. - Establish a database with cross-country policy experience. ### Changes in the Fund’s policy stance and perceptions ("Policy Compass") - Stakeholders detect major changes in the Fund’s “policy compass.” - The Fund is seen as more likely to recommend gradual fiscal adjustments and more accommodative monetary policy for the wider membership, and to some degree larger deficits. - Stakeholders do not support higher inflation targets. - Many stakeholders view shifts in policy advice as appropriate responses to changing circumstances rather than inconsistency over time. - MCs are generally more comfortable with the new, more accommodative stance than EDs. - Selected exact survey indicators (preserved verbatim from source): - Likelihood for accommodative monetary policy (membership as a whole) is seen as likely by 80 percent of CAs, EDs, and MCs. - For respondents’ own country, the ratio drops to about 60 percent of CAs and EDs, and only 35 percent of MCs. - Around three-quarters of MCs believe the Fund is increasingly likely to recommend larger fiscal deficits for the membership as a whole. - For respondents’ own country: half of the CAs (and 90 percent in Africa) indicate the Fund is recommending larger fiscal deficits than in the past; over 60 percent of MCs have seen no change. ### Evenhandedness and candor - Concerns: - A significant minority of CAs have concerns about evenhandedness; CAs see surveillance as biased in favor of large advanced markets, with concerns greatest in the Americas and, to a lesser extent, Asia. - Some 40 percent of EDs—mainly representing Africa, Asia Pacific, and the Americas—do not believe the Fund is evenhanded with respect to G20 AMs (32 percent see the Fund as evenhanded—mainly from Europe—and 27 percent neutral). - MCs generally believe the Fund is evenhanded in substance: around 70 percent see overall assessments as evenhanded "to some or a great extent." - Candor and pressure: - Staff generally feel able to write candid documents, but indicate pressure in a significant minority of cases. - 20 percent of MCs report pressure "to some extent" and 9 percent "to a great extent" to restrict coverage of sensitive issues. ### How stakeholders want surveillance strengthened (traction and practicality) - Country authorities and EDs call for advice that is implementable—specific, practical, and attentive to CAs’ views. - Specific suggestions: - Provide concrete, actionable advice and leverage cross-country knowledge; may require changing incentive structures and greater expert participation. - Strengthen staff expertise in financial sector issues, particularly at the micro level. - Take into account country specificities (prepare HQ staff better, ensure awareness of institutional features). - Engage earlier with CAs on mission scope and issues of interest. - Introduce critical self-evaluation: follow up on implementation, 360º assessments, acknowledge when outcomes differ from past advice. - Strengthen communications: streamline key points for policymakers, use less technical language, involve management for large advanced countries. ### Findings from interviews with long-standing policymakers - Interviews conducted with officials from ten countries: Burkina Faso, Germany, Lebanon, New Zealand, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sweden. - Key interview takeaways: - The Fund has become less dogmatic, more collaborative, and more responsive to country needs. - Seminars during missions and outreach have helped build trust. - Traction of bilateral surveillance more challenging: Fund is one of many analysis sources in AMs; countries increasingly seek expert rather than generalist advice. - Participation of experts in bilateral surveillance has diminished; mission teams more tilted toward macroeconomists with limited specialty knowledge. - Multilateral products are highly appreciated but large volumes limit senior policymakers’ absorption. --- ### Box 1 — Country Authorities’ Responses by Region (selected highlights) - Regional differences in authorities’ responses: - Africa: most comfortable with the change in the Fund’s “policy compass”; calls on the Fund to work harder to listen to and understand the authorities’ views. - Americas: strongest concerns about evenhandedness. - Asia: wants more focused and detailed advice. - Europe: most familiar with the Integrated Surveillance Decision; most likely to see Fund surveillance improving “to some extent” but least likely to respond “to a great extent”. - Middle East and Central Asia: most likely to find the Fund’s advice on country-specific issues of value; strongly favors expansion of the Fund’s work on structural issues. - Usefulness and priorities: - Almost all CAs want the Fund to focus on fiscal and monetary developments and policy issues, financial sector vulnerabilities, and risk assessments. - Nearly 90 percent of LIC respondents and 60 percent of EM respondents have approached the Fund outside the Article IV consultation cycle versus 40 percent of AMs. - Some 90 percent of CAs see their policies as consistent with Fund advice. - Integration and functional support: - Over 40 percent of MCs detect progress integrating bilateral and multilateral surveillance. - Nearly half of MCs working on EMs and LICs report a marginal or substantial decline in support from functional departments; AM MCs report no change (60 percent) or marginal improvement (33 percent). - Financial sector expertise on teams: 70 percent of EUR country teams have financial sector experts, ratio drops to around 30 percent in AFR and MCD. ### Selected exact weighted average score lines (preserved verbatim from source) - Weighted average score (Assessment of the exchange rate level): 2.0 1.4 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.1 1.8 2.4 2.0 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.0 - World Economic Outlook (use/read): 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.4 3.7 3.3 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.9 3.5 3.5 3.6 - Global Financial Stability Report (use/read): 3.3 3.6 3.3 3.0 3.3 3.0 3.6 3.4 3.1 3.7 3.2 3.1 3.4 - Spillover Report (use/read): 2.5 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.9 2.5 2.3 3.2 2.7 2.8 2.6 - Example priority weights for forward focus areas: 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.7 3.8 4.0 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.7 3.8 3.8 --- ### Risk assessments and financial sector surveillance (selected exact findings) - Risk assessments: - Around 70 percent of CAs agree with the Fund’s risk assessments of their country. - A large share of CAs, particularly EMs and LICs, call for a major focus on risk assessment in the Fund’s future work. - Steps requested: greater focus on transmission channels of shocks and quantification of risks and impacts. - Financial sector surveillance: - CAs: 57 percent assess the Fund’s work on real-financial linkages as very good. - EDs: some 70 percent indicate that Fund work on macro-financial linkages has contributed only to some extent to their understanding. - MCs: 56 percent assess analysis of real-financial linkages as only satisfactory. - Progress under the Financial Surveillance Strategy (FSS) pillars is uneven: progress in cross-border linkages, macroprudential analysis, capital flows, and policies to contain sovereign-bank feedback loops; less improvement on exit from extraordinary macrofinancial policies, global regulatory reforms, and financial deepening. ### External sector and capital flows (selected exact findings) - Nearly 80 percent of EDs believe the Fund should focus on external sector analysis "to a great extent" in the future. - Pilot External Sector Report readership: - Over 60 percent of G20 CAs use this report "to a great extent". - Only 11 percent of non-G20 CAs indicate the same. - 25 percent of non-G20 CAs respond that they do not read this report at all. - Fund contribution to understanding capital flow management is rated less favorably than external sector assessment; EDs’ rating of the Fund’s contribution in management of capital inflows is somewhat lower than in other policy areas. --- ### Consultation with Civil Society Organizations (Box 3) - Consultation design: - Public survey open from February 24 to April 30, 2014, in English, French, and Spanish; meeting with ten CSOs on April 9, 2014. - CSO takeaways: - Welcomed increased focus on inclusive growth, macro-critical social issues, and income distribution. - Fund documents remain difficult to understand; suggested non-expert executive summaries. - Suggested ongoing consultations with civil society during surveillance, not only every three years. - Felt Fund should make stronger effort to reach a wide variety of stakeholders during country visits. --- ### Mission chiefs’ and Executive Directors’ survey highlights (selected exact token lines preserved) - MCs report practical constraints and recommend: - Greater availability of cross-country (departmental) analytical studies: 91 92 90 91 90 94 80 91 10 01 0 90 96 89 - Greater availability of comparable cross-country economic and financial data: 85 10 08 08 99 89 08 88 09 17 58 06 92 83 - Staffing and expertise: - Mission chiefs who needed a financial sector expert during the past year: Yes 68 64 70 66 62 53 80 77 60 78 67 92 59 - Had a financial sector expert on their team during the past year: Yes 43 75 39 37 29 41 70 32 44 60 41 46 42 - Barriers inside the Fund cited most frequently: - Lack of data; Lack of specialty knowledge; Lack of knowledge sharing across/within departments. --- *Italic: Source — _073014a - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2014 TSR: STAKEHOLDERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON IMF SURVEILLANCE) — https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2014/_073014a.pdf* ### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ### _073014a - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ### Overall assessment of IMF surveillance - Fund surveillance is seen as having improved since 2011. - Country authorities (CAs) in emerging markets (EMs) and low-income countries (LICs) are the most positive about developments. - All stakeholder groups judge that Fund surveillance has improved since the 2011 TSR, although the strength of views varies. - 14 percent of CAs—mainly from EMs and LICs—report a great improvement and a further three-quarters see some improvement. - Mission chiefs (MCs) working on advanced markets (AMs): over 40 percent see no change. - Stakeholder groups surveyed: country authorities (CAs), IMF Executive Directors (EDs), IMF mission chiefs (MCs), and civil society organizations (CSOs). ### Value added and priority areas - Country-specific policy advice is seen as the most valuable feature of Fund surveillance. - Top areas where stakeholders see greatest value added: - Work on financial vulnerabilities. - Fiscal policy. - Risk assessments. - Additional observations: - EDs emphasize analysis of external developments and actual/potential spillovers as high value added. - The Fund’s medium-term approach is generally valued; CAs believe the Fund takes medium-term sustainability implications adequately into account. - Analysis of macro-financial linkages is seen as offering more value added than spillover analysis, and represents an improvement since 2011. - Work on external sector assessments receives recognition especially from EMs and LICs. - Work on capital flow management has gained less traction; nearly half of CAs see limited or no value added. - Views on monetary policy differ: - EDs rate monetary policy among the top three areas of Fund surveillance in value added. - AMs, particularly some European countries in the euro area, attach less weight to the Fund’s work on monetary policy. ### Integration of surveillance and analytical gaps - The Fund is making progress toward integrating surveillance but scope for further improvements remains. - To advance integration: - Spillover work should offer deeper analysis of the impact of systemic countries’ policies on the rest of the world. - Risk assessments should focus more on transmission channels and be quantified where feasible. - Staff believes timely integration requires a reversal of the recent decline in support from functional departments to country teams (notably for EMs and LICs), and increased delivery of financial sector expertise. - MCs identify practical barriers to effective surveillance: - Data gaps. - Insufficient information sharing internally. - Gaps in specialty knowledge. - MCs recommend expanding cross-country analytical studies, greater availability of cross-country data, and establishing a database with cross-country policy experience. ### Changes in the Fund’s policy stance and perceptions - Stakeholders detect major changes in the Fund’s “policy compass.” - The Fund is seen as more likely to recommend gradual fiscal adjustments and more accommodative monetary policy for the wider membership, and to some degree larger deficits. - Stakeholders do not support higher inflation targets. - Many stakeholders view shifts in policy advice as appropriate responses to changing circumstances rather than inconsistency over time. - MCs are generally more comfortable with the new, more accommodative stance than EDs. ### Evenhandedness and candor - A significant minority of CAs have concerns about the evenhandedness of Fund surveillance. - CAs see surveillance as biased in favor of large advanced markets, with concerns greatest in the Americas and, to a lesser extent, Asia. - Staff generally feel able to write candid documents, but indicate pressure in a significant minority of cases; the composition of this minority is largely invariant to region or income group. ### How stakeholders want surveillance strengthened (traction and practicality) - Country authorities and EDs call on Fund staff to provide advice that can be implemented readily—specific, practical, and taking into account CAs’ views. - Specific suggestions for enhancing traction in bilateral surveillance: - Provide concrete advice and leverage cross-country knowledge. - Precise and actionable advice, backed by more in-depth analysis and cross-country policy experiences, would raise the value added of Fund surveillance. - This may require a change in the incentive structure facing Fund staff and greater expert participation in bilateral surveillance. - Strengthen staff’s expertise in financial sector issues, particularly at the micro level. - Take into account country specificities. - Better preparation of staff at headquarters, particularly when new staff join a team. - Ensure staff are aware of country characteristics and institutional features, including institutional set-ups in currency unions. - Staff should signal a willingness to learn about country-specific features. - Take into account country authorities’ interests and views. - Ask CAs sufficiently ahead of time which issues they are particularly interested in and address these issues. - Engage in genuine dialogue about authorities’ overall goals and views and discuss these in staff reports. - Introduce critical self-evaluation. - Follow up on implementation of past Fund advice, evaluate the quality of past advice (360º assessment), be open about changes in advice, and acknowledge authorities’ successes even if they result from policies different from past Fund advice. - Strengthen communications. - Streamline communication of key points from multilateral surveillance products for high-level policymakers. - Provide more targeted communications on specific multilateral issues to senior country technical staff. - Increase candor, involve management in surveillance on large advanced countries, conduct outreach in less technical language, and train staff to act as sales persons for Fund surveillance. ### Findings from interviews with long-standing policymakers - Staff interviewed officials from ten countries with long familiarity with Fund surveillance. - Interviews: eight countries in person (margins of 2014 Spring Meetings) and two countries provided views in writing. - Countries interviewed: Burkina Faso, Germany, Lebanon, New Zealand, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sweden. - Key points from these interviews: - The Fund has become less dogmatic, more collaborative, and more responsive to country needs. - Seminars during missions on issues chosen by country authorities and outreach have helped build trust and relevance. - Traction of bilateral surveillance has become more challenging: - In advanced markets, the Fund is one of many sources of analysis. - Stronger institutional capacity in some countries reduces need for traditional advice; countries increasingly seek expert rather than generalist advice. - Participation of experts in bilateral surveillance has diminished; mission teams are more tilted toward macroeconomists with limited specialty knowledge. - Countries value the Fund’s hands-on cross-country experience but believe it has not been leveraged effectively in policy advice. - Multilateral surveillance products are highly appreciated but senior policymakers have difficulty absorbing large volumes of material; nuances are often only clear to authors. *Prepared by Zsofia Arvai, Mame Astou Diouf, Gavin Gray, Nicolas Million, David Moore, Perry Perone, Di Wang, and Hans Weisfeld (all SPR); Approved by Siddharth Tiwari — July 30, 2014.* ### Box 1. Country Authorities’ Responses by Region ### Box 1. Country Authorities’ Responses by Region ### Regional differences in authorities’ responses - Africa: is the most comfortable with the change in the Fund’s “policy compass”; calls on the Fund to work harder to listen to and understand the authorities’ views. - Americas: has the strongest concerns about evenhandedness. - Asia: thinks the Fund could best improve its policy advice by providing more focused and detailed advice. - Europe: most familiar with the Integrated Surveillance Decision; most likely to see Fund surveillance improving “to some extent” but least likely to respond “to a great extent”. - Middle East and Central Asia: most likely to find the Fund’s advice on country-specific issues of value; and strongly favors an expansion of the Fund’s work on structural issues. ### Areas where IMF surveillance adds value and where CAs want the Fund to focus (paragraph 15; Figures 1–2) - Almost all CAs want the Fund to focus on fiscal and monetary developments and policy issues, financial sector vulnerabilities, and risk assessments. - Relative emphases by income group: - AMs: put greater emphasis on macro-financial linkages and external sector assessments; of the three groups they are the most interested in work on outward spillovers. - EMs: are the most interested in risk assessments and financial sector vulnerabilities. - LICs: are the most interested in the Fund doing work on fiscal and monetary policy, and for surveillance to address country-specific needs; LICs (particularly in the Middle East) are also the most interested of the three income groups in macro-social issues. - CAs with Fund-supported programs: - especially keen for surveillance to focus on macro-social issues, - somewhat less enthusiastic than others about the Fund’s work on external sector issues. ### Traction of Fund surveillance and steps to strengthen it (paras 16–22) - Traction depends on receptiveness to Fund advice, which depends on the quality of advice and members’ trust in the Fund; trust is influenced by perceptions of transparency, evenhandedness and willingness to enter into genuine dialogue. - Role of the Fund as external advisor: - A large share of CAs, particularly in EMs and LICs, see the Fund as their key external advisor on macro-policy decisions. - Nearly 90 percent of LIC respondents and 60 percent of EM respondents have approached the Fund outside the Article IV consultation cycle versus 40 percent of AMs. - Consistency of policies with Fund advice: - Some 90 percent of CAs see their policies as consistent with Fund advice, with relatively little difference across income and geographical groups. - MCs are somewhat less convinced, especially those working on EMs. - Reasons for differences between policies and Fund advice: - CAs (and MCs) generally attribute differences more to differing views or political constraints (more pronounced in countries with Fund arrangements) than to lack of detail in Fund advice or implementation capacity constraints. - Capacity constraints emerge as an issue for some LICs. - Trust and disclosure of confidential information: - Around a quarter of members provide no information beyond Article IV requirements and publicly available information, with a higher ratio in the Middle East (around 40 percent). - LICs, countries in AFR or those with Fund arrangements show the greatest trust—proxied by early disclosure of policy intentions or full disclosure—while AMs and G20 countries in general are less prepared to trust Fund staff with confidential information. - Stakeholder requests to improve Fund engagement and advice: - CAs and EDs encourage the Fund to work harder to listen to and understand the authorities’ views, and take greater account of political constraints, notably EMs and LICs. - CAs call for more focused and detailed advice; especially in Asia, CAs suggest that teams undertake more analysis requested by the authorities. - CAs believe value added of surveillance missions would be strengthened by earlier engagement on mission scope, more fact-checking from headquarters, and missions fielded with greater in-depth specialist knowledge. - MCs suggest strengthening engagement through more frequent missions, but this has little support from either CAs or EDs. - Engagement with nongovernmental sector and domestic stakeholders: - CAs (30 percent overall and 55 percent of LICs) are more likely than MCs (10 percent) to see scope for greater engagement with local academics. - Countries with Fund-supported programs: 50 percent call for more work with local academics, and 45 percent favor more engagement with parliamentarians. - CSOs consider the Fund should make a stronger effort to reach out to stakeholders during country visits. - Coordination with IMF technical assistance (TA): - Most CAs who have used Fund TA report that subsequent advice from the IMF in the context of Article IV consultations has been more persuasive, especially strong for LICs. - EDs generally see surveillance discussions with Fund teams adequately reflecting and being consistent with findings of Fund-provided TA. ### Progress in integrating bilateral and multilateral surveillance (paras 23–27) - Overall view: All stakeholders acknowledge the Fund has begun to integrate bilateral and multilateral surveillance, but see further room for progress. - Executive Directors: - More than 25 percent view bilateral and multilateral surveillance as still fragmented. - A further 25 percent point to the need for more progress to incorporate global and regional issues into bilateral surveillance. - Mission Chiefs and MCs: - Over 40 percent of MCs detect progress at integrating bilateral and multilateral surveillance. - Around a quarter of MCs—especially those working on EMs and LICs—believe that things may have gone too far and emphasize the need for a renewed focus on country-specific issues. - Resource allocation and functional department support: - MCs—particularly those working on EMs and LICs—call for greater support from functional departments either on Article IV missions or on a continuous basis. - Nearly half of MCs working on EMs and LICs (particularly in MCD and AFR) report a marginal or substantial decline in support from functional departments, whereas AM MCs report no change (60 percent) or a marginal improvement (33 percent). - Financial sector expertise on teams: - While 70 percent of EUR country teams have financial sector experts, the ratio drops to around 30 percent in AFR and MCD. - A significant share of mission teams in AMs (mainly in EUR and WHD) have a permanent MCM economist, whereas EM and LIC teams rely on economists from their departments. ### Spillovers and the Integrated Surveillance Decision (ISD) (paras 26–28; Box 2) - Spillover analysis: - Seen as improving compared with the 2011 TSR, especially relative to outward spillovers, but still among the areas where the Fund’s contribution to countries’ understanding is among the lowest. - Familiarity with the ISD: - The Integrated Surveillance Decision (ISD) only came into force in early 2013 and much of the membership remains unfamiliar with its implications. - Awareness remains uneven over a year since its adoption: while all G20 respondents are familiar with the ISD, awareness levels are much lower amongst non-G20 CAs, and fall below 30 percent amongst LICs. - Perceived impact of ISD among CAs familiar with it: - CAs familiar with the ISD are generally positive about its impact and believe the Fund has made progress in integrating bilateral and multilateral surveillance. - AMs and EMs believe the IMF should make more progress on incorporating global and regional issues in bilateral surveillance, whereas LIC authorities emphasize the need to restore some focus on country-specific issues. - Sources of spillover analysis: - WEO and GFSR are ranked as the best sources of spillover analysis. - WEO is ranked highest by non-European CAs; GFSR is ranked highest by EDs and European CAs. - Newer reports—the Spillover Report, the pilot External Sector Report, and Cluster Reports—are rated higher by authorities from AMs than from EMs and LICs, reflecting the Spillover Report’s focus on systemically important countries and notably lower readership among other countries. - Strengthening spillover work (Figure 4): - The need for a more in-depth discussion of the impact of systemically important countries’ policies on the rest of the world is widely seen as a priority. - Some 30 percent of EDs representing EMs favor strengthening the Fund’s mandate so it can respond more effectively to cross-border spillovers affecting global economic and financial stability. ### Risk assessments (paras 29–31) - Overall ratings: - The Fund’s work on risks is highly rated by both CAs and EDs. - CAs in AMs (EUR) particularly appreciate assessment of external risks, whereas EMs and LICs (AFR and MCD) put more emphasis on domestic risks. - WEO and GFSR risk analysis receive the strongest ratings; FSSAs, Article IV reports and REOs are also well appreciated. - Nearly half of all EDs favor continuing to strengthen work in this area. - A large share of CAs, particularly EMs and LICs, call for a major focus on risk assessment in the Fund’s future work. - Agreement with Fund’s risk assessments: - Around 70 percent of CAs agree with the Fund’s risk assessments of their country, although EDs are more critical. - CAs in Africa and Europe are particularly supportive of the Fund’s risk assessments. - In the Middle East and the Americas, about 20 percent see the Fund’s assessments as too sanguine, but around 30 percent see them as too alarmist. - Around a quarter of EDs see the Fund’s risk assessments as overly alarmist; the ratio rose to 40 percent for EDs representing LICs. - Steps to strengthen risk assessments: - Stakeholders want greater focus on the transmission channels of shocks and quantification of risks and their likely impacts. - CAs and EDs call for greater efforts to quantify assessments of risks and impacts. - MCs, particularly those working on LICs (AFR and MCD) and EMs, see greater emphasis on countries’ domestic political issues as important. ### Financial sector surveillance (paras 32–34; Figure 5) - Priority and added value: - Respondents view financial sector surveillance as a high priority area that has added value to Fund surveillance and should receive greater focus in the future. - CAs and EDs agree the Fund promotes understanding and new insights in financial sector vulnerabilities and regulatory and supervisory issues. - EMs and LICs are the most positive; CAs in WHD are the most critical. - Macro-financial linkages: - CAs: 57 percent assess the Fund’s work on real-financial linkages as very good. - EDs: some 70 percent indicate that Fund work on macro-financial linkages has contributed only to some extent to their understanding of issues. - MCs: 56 percent assess analysis of real-financial linkages as only satisfactory; those working on AMs are the most critical. - Progress under the Financial Surveillance Strategy (FSS) pillars: - Risk identification and macrofinancial policy analysis: - EDs find most progress in cross-border linkages, macroprudential analysis, capital flows and policies to contain sovereign-bank feedback loops. - Less improvement in assessing implications of exit from extraordinary macrofinancial policies, global regulatory reforms, and work on financial deepening. - Instruments and products: - EDs identify progress in FSAP follow-up and the overall quality of financial sector analysis in Article IVs, with around a third of EDs detecting significant improvements. - Much less progress in frequency of FSAPs, with a third of EDs reporting no change. - Engaging effectively with stakeholders: - Fund’s work on assessing systematic risks receives recognition, but contributions to the global regulatory reform agenda and data provision for surveillance receive fewer plaudits. - There has been no material improvement in collaboration with the World Bank. *Source: _073014a - Box 1. Country Authorities’ Responses by Region — https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2014/_073014a.pdf* ### 35. Looking forward, there is broad support to strengthen further work on financial and ### 35–56: Looking forward — financial/macro-financial issues; external sector; consistency and focus of policy advice ### Financial and macro-financial issues - Broad support to strengthen further work on financial and macro-financial issues, including structural financial issues. - Most EDs believe the Fund should be more proactive in assessing the macroeconomic effects of regulatory reforms (taking as given the existing division of responsibility between the Financial Stability Board and the Fund). - EDs also believe the Fund should improve work on financial deepening and exit from extraordinary macrofinancial policies. ### External sector and capital flows - CAs and EDs agree the Fund has contributed to their understanding of a broad range of external sector issues, but there is room for improvement. - The Fund’s contribution and analysis in this area received somewhat less favorable ratings than some other core areas of expertise (as in the 2011 TSR). - Regional differences in perceived value: - EM and LIC authorities, particularly from AFR and EUR, find the Fund’s contribution most valuable. - WHD authorities are significantly more critical. - Nearly 80 percent of EDs believe the Fund should focus on external sector analysis "to a great extent" in the future. - Quality of analysis and discussions falls short of expectations: - Surveillance has focused more on reserve adequacy, foreign exchange intervention, and capital flow issues. - EDs are skeptical about improvement in the quality of exchange rate assessment (particularly those representing EMs and LICs). - CAs are not entirely convinced the Fund bases external sector assessments on a sufficiently wide range of indicators. - MCs report exchange rate assessments only marginally influence authorities’ policies, though assessments are candid and contribute to dialogue and staff views on the overall policy mix. - Pilot External Sector Report readership: - Over 60 percent of G20 CAs use this report "to a great extent". - Only 11 percent of non-G20 CAs indicate the same. - 25 percent of non-G20 CAs respond that they do not read this report at all. - Fund contribution to understanding capital flow management is rated less favorably than external sector assessment, particularly by AMs. - EDs’ rating of the Fund’s contribution in management of capital inflows is somewhat lower than in other policy areas. - EDs put less emphasis on capital flow management for the Fund’s future work. - EDs from EMs generally find Fund advice on managing capital flows more effective than do those representing LICs or AMs. ### Consistency and focus of policy advice — "Policy Compass" - Stakeholders asked whether the Fund changed advice on key policy questions for the membership as a whole and for their country. - Fiscal policy: - Stakeholders agree the Fund is more likely to recommend more gradual fiscal adjustments. - Near consensus the Fund now recommends more gradual fiscal adjustments for the membership as a whole; EDs and MCs strongly support this. - For respondents’ own country/constituency: around 75 percent of CAs, 60 percent of EDs, and 65 percent of MCs see the Fund as more likely now to recommend more gradual fiscal adjustment. - About three-quarters of EDs believe this advice is appropriate for their constituency. - The Fund is viewed as somewhat more likely to recommend larger fiscal deficits than in the past, though support is more fitful: - Around three-quarters of MCs believe the Fund is increasingly likely to recommend larger fiscal deficits for the membership as a whole. - Half of EDs and one third of CAs detect such a change (around 25 and 40 percent see no change, respectively). - Around two-thirds of MCs are supportive of larger deficits; EDs are more skeptical, with around 35 percent in favor. - For respondents’ own country: half of the CAs (and 90 percent in Africa) indicate the Fund is recommending larger fiscal deficits than in the past; over 60 percent of MCs have seen no change. - Around 40 percent of EDs think the Fund is no more likely to recommend larger fiscal deficits for their constituencies, versus a quarter who detect some change. - Just under 30 percent of EDs believe larger fiscal deficits would be appropriate for countries in their constituency. - Inflation and monetary policy: - The Fund is seen as more likely than before to recommend more accommodative monetary policy; this position commands some support. - Likelihood for the membership as a whole is seen as likely by 80 percent of CAs, EDs, and MCs. - For respondents’ own country, the ratio drops to about 60 percent of CAs and EDs, and only 35 percent of MCs. - Around 80 percent of MCs consider more accommodative monetary policy appropriate for the membership as a whole; only a slim majority of EDs are in favor for the membership as a whole and their constituencies. - Higher inflation targets: - Around half of MCs, and a third of EDs, see the Fund as more likely to recommend higher inflation targets for the membership as a whole. - Around three-quarters of MCs and EDs believe there has been no change in the likelihood of the Fund advocating higher inflation targets for their countries. - A majority of EDs are against the Fund recommending higher inflation targets; a slim majority of MCs are supportive at the membership level, but most see no change for their own country team. - Capital controls: - Reflecting the new institutional view on capital flows, there is broad agreement the Fund is now more likely to recommend capital controls to the Fund membership as a whole. - Around 80 percent of MCs and 60 percent of EDs agree that the Fund’s recommendations on capital flow management measures (CFMs) are appropriate for the wider membership. - Views more mixed for respondents’ own country: - Only a quarter of MCs think their own teams are more likely to recommend CFMs (three-quarters see no change). - Less than 10 percent of EDs detect any increase in likelihood of Fund recommending capital controls for countries in their constituency (three-quarters see no change). ### Consistency, evenhandedness, and candor - Consistency: - Shifts in Fund policy advice raise questions whether advice is consistent or reflects changing circumstances. - Around two-thirds of MCs interpret Fund advice since the crisis as being based on the same analytical framework as in the past but taking into account changed circumstances. - Only 17 percent see the Fund’s advice as being based on a new analytical framework; 15 percent see the Fund’s advice as ad hoc. - CAs believe the Fund should do more to take changing circumstances into account; majority view is that Fund policy advice took changing economic circumstances into account "to some extent." - Respondents tend to see Fund advice as somewhat more consistent over time than across countries; roughly half see advice in both dimensions as consistent "to some extent." - On advice over time: those not answering "to some extent" are fairly evenly split between "to a great extent" and "to a limited extent." - Across countries: more answer "to a limited extent" (about one-third). EDs and MCs for G20 countries more likely to see Fund advice as consistent than those representing or working on non-G20 countries. - Evenhandedness: - A significant minority of CAs and EDs perceive the Fund not to be evenhanded, especially regarding large AMs. - Around 20 percent of CAs feel they are not being treated evenhandedly by the Fund in comparison to AMs; concerns strongest in the Americas and to a lesser extent Asia Pacific. - Some concerns arise in Europe and the Middle East prompted by perceived differential treatment of members with Fund-supported programs. - Some 40 percent of EDs—mainly representing Africa, Asia Pacific, and the Americas—do not believe the Fund is evenhanded with respect to G20 AMs (32 percent see the Fund as evenhanded—mainly from Europe—and 27 percent neutral). - Some 40 percent of EDs also think the Fund’s risk assessments for G20 AMs are too sanguine. - EDs citing evenhandedness concerns point to tone and substance of recommendations, treatment of authorities’ views, and degree of intrusiveness: - Tone of recommendations concerns just under half of all EDs; a quarter pinpoint biases in favor of other groups. Three-quarters of EDs representing EMs detect biases in favor of other countries. - Around 45 percent of EDs have concerns about evenhandedness of the substance of policy recommendations; particular concern for EDs representing LICs and EMs. - Treatment of authorities’ views is an issue for 40 percent of EDs; EDs representing LICs strongest, with two-thirds seeing some bias. - Degree of intrusiveness is an issue for EDs representing LICs (three-quarters see this as an issue) and to a lesser extent EMs. - MCs generally believe the Fund is evenhanded in substance of surveillance: - Around 70 percent see overall assessments as evenhanded "to some or a great extent." - MCs more concerned about intrusiveness and tone of reports; only 40 percent replying "to some extent" or "to a great extent" on intrusiveness, with stronger concerns in LICs and the Americas. - Objectivity/candor: 50 percent concern (particularly in the Americas). - Tone of reports: concerns in the Middle East and the Americas (45 percent). - Candor and pressure to restrict coverage: - A significant minority of MCs report pressure by the authorities to restrict coverage of sensitive issues in staff reports. - Majority report little or no pressure, but 20 percent of MCs report pressure "to some extent" and 9 percent "to a great extent." - CAs most often attempt to restrict discussion of "negative assessment(s) of sensitive issues by staff", followed by "risks to the financial sector." - Pressure exerted directly during missions or indirectly through modification requests outside the scope of the Transparency Policy. ### Supporting sustainability through structural reforms - Stakeholders generally see the Fund as taking medium-term issues into account, but some question whether it gives sufficient emphasis to policies supporting growth. - CAs generally appreciate the Fund’s advice on structural issues: - Around three-quarters believe it is focused and well integrated into the Fund’s other advice on macroeconomic policies. - It is seen to a somewhat lesser extent as high quality, anchored on cross-country characteristics, and addressing implementation issues as well as choice of reforms. - Major weakness: lack of coordination with other agencies. - LICs appreciate the Fund’s advice most, with higher assessments for quality, focus on implementation issues, and integration. - MCs are positive overall but a third to half raise concerns about: - Limited focus on country circumstances and implementation (Asia). - Quality (the Americas). - Use of cross-country experience (Africa). - CSOs welcome increased focus on issues relating to inclusive growth, macro-critical social issues, and income distribution. *Source: 2014 TSR—STAKEHOLDERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON IMF SURVEILLANCE (excerpts, paragraphs 35–56).* ### Box 3. Consultation with Civil Society Organizations ### Box 3. Consultation with Civil Society Organizations ### Consultation design and timing - A public consultation comprising: - A survey on the IMF’s external website, open from February 24 to April 30, 2014, in English, French, and Spanish. - A meeting between representatives of ten CSOs and IMF staff on April 9, 2014 in the context of the Civil Society Policy Forum that took place in the margins of the 2014 IMF/World Bank Spring Meetings. ### Outreach and promotion - Information about the public consultation, which was translated into Spanish and French, was sent to over 3,000 members of civil society. - Social media was used to promote the consultation. - Feedback received through the online survey can be found at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/consult/2014/tsr/. ### CSO participation at the April 9 forum - All CSOs attending the Spring Meetings were invited to the forum. - CSOs represented: Anticorruption Action Center; ATD Fourth World; Kosovar Foundation for Civil Society; CRES/Tunisia; FUSADES; International Centre for Development Initiatives; Jubilee USA; New Rules for Global Finance; Youth Diplomats of Canada; Institute for Liberty and Democracy. - UNICEF also attended. ### Four main takeaways from CSOs - CSOs welcomed the increased focus of Fund surveillance on issues related to inclusive growth, macro-critical social issues, and income distribution. - CSOs stated that Fund documents remain difficult to understand and believed that more accessibility of key Fund documents could help strengthen the dialog between CSOs and the Fund. Some CSOs suggested publishing executive summaries written for non-expert audiences to accompany the release of Fund documents. - CSOs suggested ongoing consultations with civil society on surveillance—not only every three years—especially in countries with resident representatives. - CSOs felt that the Fund should make a stronger effort to reach a wide variety of stakeholders during country visits. *Box 3. Consultation with Civil Society Organizations, 2014 TSR.* ### 4. Looking forward, to ### _073014a - 4. Looking forward, to ### Country-specific needs and lessons from other countries - Distribution categories shown: Overall, Advanced, Emerging, Low-income, Africa, Asia Pacific, Europe, Middle East, Americas, G-20, Non-G-20, IMF Program (Yes/No). - Selected weighted average scores reported for assessments of external sector issues (Assessment of the exchange rate level; Usage of a broad set of indicators; Integration of external sector assessment with overall policy mix): - Weighted average score (Assessment of the exchange rate level): 2.0 1.4 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.1 1.8 2.4 2.0 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.0 - Weighted average score (Usage of a broad set of indicators): 2.5 2.2 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.4 - Weighted average score (Integration of the external sector assessment with overall policy mix): 2.4 2.2 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.4 ### IMF advice on managing capital inflows and outflows (Q6) - For your own country / For advanced economies / For emerging markets / For low-income countries: distribution and weighted averages shown. - Example weighted average scores presented: - For your own country: 1.9 0.9 2.1 2.6 2.5 2.3 1.5 2.1 1.3 1.3 2.0 2.4 1.7 - For advanced economies: 2.1 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.5 1.9 - For emerging markets: 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.7 2.3 2.4 2.3 ### Use of IMF surveillance products (Q7) - Frequency/extent of reading and use of specific products (percent distribution): Pilot External Sector Report; Vulnerability Exercise for Low-Income Countries (VE-LIC); Regional Economic Outlooks; G-20 Surveillance Notes; World Economic Outlook; Global Financial Stability Report; Fiscal Monitor; Spillover Report. - Selected weighted average scores for products: - World Economic Outlook: 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.4 3.7 3.3 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.9 3.5 3.5 3.6 - Global Financial Stability Report: 3.3 3.6 3.3 3.0 3.3 3.0 3.6 3.4 3.1 3.7 3.2 3.1 3.4 - Fiscal Monitor: 2.8 3.2 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.4 3.2 3.0 2.6 3.3 2.7 2.8 2.8 - Spillover Report: 2.5 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.9 2.5 2.3 3.2 2.7 2.8 2.6 - Familiarity and views on the Integrated Surveillance Decision (ISD): - Are you familiar with the IMF’s Integrated Surveillance Decision?: Yes 58865528385373645010048446464; No 4214457262472736500525636 - Do you believe ISD has helped integration?: “Yes, relative to 2011, the Fund has made significant progress at integrating bilateral and multilateral products.” 15191213250231100231416; “Partly. The IMF should make more progress on incorporating global and regional issues in bilateral surveillance.” 62656538256363786786505065; “Partly. But the IMF should restore some of its focus on country-specific issues.” 22132350503813112210273618; “No. Bilateral and multilateral surveillance remain fragmented.” 23000000115002 ### Linkages and spillovers (Q10–Q13) - Ratings requested on: analysis of linkages between real economy and financial sector; cross-border linkages across financial sectors; Fund’s analysis of spillovers across several products (WEO, GFSR, Fiscal Monitor, Spillover Report, Pilot External Sector Report, VE-LIC, REOs). - Selected weighted average scores for linkages and spillovers: - Linkages and Spillovers overall: 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.4 - Analysis of cross-border linkages across financial sectors (overall assessment examples): 2.5 2.1 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.3 3.2 2.1 2.0 2.7 2.9 2.4 - Priorities to strengthen spillover work (check at most two): - Strengthen quantitative analysis: 27312231242729402136251831 - Expand the coverage of the Spillover Report beyond the five most systemically important countries (S5): 41424731524737532641414241 - More in-depth discussion of the impact of systemically important countries’ policies on the rest of the world: 66785766716078405373647662 - More timely analysis: 1882224242012271627162416 - More reliable and timely data: 171718141013171326021920 - Other (please explain): 586000502118207 ### Risks (Q14–Q16) - Ratings requested on the Fund’s analysis of risks in surveillance products (identifying particular risks and likely impact). - Selected weighted average scores for risk analysis across products: - World Economic Outlook (risks): 1.8 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.5 2.0 2.6 1.4 2.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 - Global Financial Stability Report (risks): 2.7 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.6 3.2 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.7 - Fiscal Monitor (risks): 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.5 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.4 - Spillover Report (risks): 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.6 3.0 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.5 - Views on IMF’s risk assessments of your country (Q15): - About right: 71836369956783474764737669 - Too sanguine: 80147070202101097 - Do not cover the right risks: 1517102152715131623131814 - Too alarmist: 1361814020527322311915 - Steps that could improve IMF risk assessment (Q16): - IMF’s present approach is appropriate: 23331424242724271627221825 - More efforts to quantify assessments of risks and impacts: 54475366573354735345577048 - More analysis of transmission channels of shocks: 61536366815351675855627057 - More focus on analyzing your country’s domestic political issues: 33193941242029534223363931 - More sensitive handling of confidential information: 103141051352011511910 - Other (please explain): 6116001370115737 ### Changes in IMF policy advice since the crisis (Q17) - Respondents asked whether IMF is more/less likely to recommend specific policy options since the crisis; distributions reported as More likely / No change / Less Likely and weighted average scores. - Selected weighted average score lines (examples for policy options): - Larger fiscal deficits: 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 - Accommodative monetary policy: 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.8 - Capital controls: 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.6 - Policies that have spillover effects on other economies: 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 - Policy advice: consistency and evenhandedness — sample summary weighted average: - Weighted average score: 3.1 3.2 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.2 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.1 *Source: 2014 TSR — Table 1: 2014 TSR Country Authorities' Survey Results (cont.), _073014a - 4. Looking forward, to* ### 19. Has the IMF’s policy ### 19. Has the IMF’s policy advice taken appropriate account of changing economic circumstances in your country over the past five years? ### Survey question and context - Question theme: Whether IMF policy advice over the past five years took appropriate account of changing economic circumstances in respondents' countries (e.g., larger fiscal deficits, more gradual fiscal adjustment, accommodative monetary policy, higher inflation targets, capital controls, non-market solutions in the financial sector, policies with spillover effects). - Respondent groups reported by: Overall, Advanced, Emerging, Low-income, Africa, Asia Pacific, Europe, Middle East, Americas, G-20, Non-G-20, IMF Program (Yes/No). ### Aggregate response patterns (selected reported metrics) - Distribution categories used in the tables: Strongly disagree; Disagree; Neutral; Agree; Strongly agree. - Example weighted average score lines as reported in the source: - Weighted average score 3.63.63.63.83.93.53.73.43.63.63.63.73.6 - Weighted average score 3.63.53.63.83.93.53.73.43.33.53.63.63.6 - Weighted average score 3.03.32.2.92.83.13.13.23.32.23.03.02.93.0 - Weighted average score 3.13.53.02.83.13.13.43.32.43.23.12.93.2 - Weighted average score 3.23.43.23.03.33.23.43.52.93.53.23.13.3 - Weighted average score 3.43.53.43.23.43.33.53.63.13.53.33.33.4 - Weighted average score 3.33.23.23.63.73.23.23.53.03.13.43.53.3 (Note: these weighted average score lines are recorded exactly as they appear in the source tables.) ### Key tabulated findings (selected items preserved verbatim) - Tone of reports: 11614141475726239614 - Description of the authorities’ views: 11016172472026912912 - Differing policy advice for countries in similar circumstances: 131410171401004223112110 - Degree of intrusiveness: 1114127107107262391510 - Objectivity: 917475710021187610 - For the question "Do you think the IMF is evenhanded in its policy advice for your country compared with others?" response categories and an example of reported weighted average: - To some extent 47534446384754573343484847 - To a great extent 36333539482734215038353635 - Weighted average score 3.13.13.03.33.23.03.22.73.23.23.13.23.1 - For the question on whether IMF policy advice has taken into account medium-term sustainability and growth linkages: - Weighted average score 2.72.62.73.02.92.32.82.72.62.72.73.12.6 - Example categorical responses (overall): Not at all 1020000065001; To some extent 55604762634763553340586152; To a great extent 1711201921715182820162912 ### Structural reform priorities (question 23 — check all that apply) - Items and example percentage lines as reported: - Taxation: 53424776625344605336577344 - Public expenditure management: 74617390868054808959778868 - Safety nets and other social policies: 53365569578041604236576747 - Labor market policies: 56645155626061603755575557 - Product market policies: 32332741332041332627344228 - Financial sector policies (e.g., to enhance access to finance): 615055861006051475336678253 - Other (please specify below): 8887577716147126 ### Assessment of IMF advice on structural issues (question 24) - Response categories used in the table: The advice was focused; The advice on how to implement reforms adequately complemented advice on what reforms to pursue; The advice was of high quality; The advice was adequately tailored to our circumstances; The advice was built on cross-country experience; The advice reflected coordination with other relevant multilateral agencies; The advice was well integrated into the IMF’s advice on macroeconomic policies. - Example overall tallies: - Yes 756969939053671007265779069 - No 253131710473302835231031 - Example weighted average score line for assessment: 3.23.13.23.43.33.33.13.13.33.23.23.13.2 ### Reasons for divergence between country policies and IMF advice (question 28 — main reasons) - Most frequent checklist items (example tallies): - Different views/don’t agree with the IMF: 46474745297349275873403651 - Lack of detail in IMF advice: 1419121010715271123121215 - Lack of capacity to implement IMF advice: 19818342447720160243314 - Lack of relevant data or other information: 171118211971520169182115 - Political constraints: 51565145486051474250515848 - Other (please specify below): 30600007115204 ### Suggestions to strengthen IMF surveillance missions (question 29 — check all that apply) - Prominent items and example tallies: - Earlier engagement on the aims and scope of the mission: 43334355336037534745424841 - IMF teams should have more in-depth specialist knowledge: 48445148574056472632524549 - Carry out more basic fact checking at HQ to create additional time on mission for policy discussions: 45423566525337474245454246 - Create room for “off the record” discussions of confidential issues that are important for the authorities: 41283962575324275818474540 - More frequent missions: 13314241913527115151811 - Other (please specify): 71180013701614539 ### Traction, engagement and information sharing (selected items) - On whether countries give confidential information to IMF staff: - Yes 62436286906049676143678851 - No 38573814104051333957331349 - On whether IMF takes greater account of political constraints or listens more to authorities: - Take greater account of political constraints: 52316359674039676336555849 - Work harder to listen to, and understand, the authorities’ views: 54445169814046475350546449 - Provide more focused and detailed advice: 50504755526056472650505548 - On perceived evolution of Fund surveillance since 2011 (question 36): - It is improved to a great extent 15315292420823119162510 - It has improved to some extent 75916964677385627291706977 - It has not changed 7313457315170968 - It has deteriorated to some extent 2304003000203 - It has deteriorated to a great extent 0000000000000 ### Engagement with non-governmental players and technical assistance (questions 30–32) - Preferred steps to strengthen engagement with non-governmental players (selected items and reported tallies): - The present level of engagement is appropriate: 61785352436768675368593969 - Greater engagement with academic researchers in your country: 30172455483320273218335221 - Devote more time to discussions with parliamentarians: 22620453327177215264512 - Devote more time to discussions with civil society and report their views in staff reports: 2014163424271713165243315 - On whether technical assistance and/or training made IMF Article IV advice more persuasive (question 31): - IMF 82728493958783876368869478 - Private consultants 17327171940520169181816 - World Bank 3984372674024404214467326 - Other international or regional financial institutions 2725223843402213269323325 ### Bilateral surveillance (Table 2 highlights) - Topics and example weighted average score lines (advice usefulness to constituencies): - Advice on country-specific policy issues: Weighted average score 3.43.63.33.23.23.33.63.43.23.43.43.43.33.53.3 - Assessment of domestic risks: Weighted average score 3.03.33.02.62.53.13.33.02.63.13.03.32.73.12.8 - External sector assessment: Weighted average score 2.82.82.82.93.03.02.82.72.82.82.92.93.02.82.8 - Financial sector vulnerabilities / regulatory and supervisory issues: weighted averages and categorical distributions appear throughout Table 2. *Source: Table 1 and Table 2, 2014 TSR — STAKEHOLDERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON IMF SURVEILLANCE (country authorities’ and Executive Directors’ survey results) — data and numeric values reproduced exactly as in the source tables.* ### 2. Do you find Fund ### 2. Do you find Fund policy advice in the following areas to be useful to countries in your constituency? (continued) ### Focus of IMF Surveillance — contribution to understanding / new insights - Survey question: "To what extent has Fund surveillance contributed to your understanding (and that of government agencies with which you liaise) of issues, or provided new insights, in the following areas?" - Areas listed in source: Macro-financial linkages; Risk assessment; Analysis of inward spillovers (impact on your economy of developments elsewhere); Analysis of outward spillovers, if applicable (impact of your country’s developments and policies on other economies); Monetary developments and policy issues; Fiscal developments and policy issues; Macro-social issues; Country-specific needs; Lessons from experience in other countries. - Distribution of answer in percentage: rows of categorical responses (Not at all; To a limited extent; To some extent; To a great extent; N/A) are reported in the source. - Example weighted average scores as reported in the source (preserve exact formatting and sequence): - Weighted average score 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.9 3.0 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.5 3.0 2.4 3.0 - Weighted average score 2.9 2.6 3.0 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.7 3.1 2.6 2.7 3.1 2.6 3.0 3.0 3.0 - Weighted average score 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.8 1.8 2.7 2.9 2.0 2.3 2.8 2.1 3.0 2.8 2.3 - Weighted average score 2.1 2.4 2.1 1.5 1.6 2.4 2.3 1.7 2.4 2.5 1.7 2.5 1.0 2.1 2.3 - Weighted average score 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.6 2.4 2.2 1.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.0 - Weighted average score 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.9 2.7 3.1 3.0 2.5 2.7 - Weighted average score 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.7 - Weighted average score 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.3 3.9 3.8 - Weighted average score 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.8 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.8 - Distribution categories and subgroup breakdowns are presented by: Overall; Advanced; Emerging; Low-income; Africa; Asia Pacific; Europe; Middle East; Americas; G-20; Non-G-20; Single-country constituency, without a program; Multiple-country constituency; all or most of the countries have programs; Multiple-country constituency; some of the countries have programs; Multiple-country constituency; none of the countries have programs. *Source: Table 2: 2014 TSR Executive Directors' Survey Results (cont.) — Focus of IMF Surveillance (pages with weighted average scores and distribution of answers in percentage).* --- ### 4. Looking forward, to what extent should the Fund focus on the following areas? (continued) ### Forward-looking priorities reported - Areas listed in source: External sector assessment, including exchange rate regime and policy, and external competitiveness; Management of capital flows; Financial sector vulnerabilities; Regulatory and supervisory issues, including macroprudential policies; Macro-financial linkages; Risk assessment; Analysis of inward spillovers; Analysis of outward spillovers, if applicable; Macro-social issues. - Example weighted average scores and distributions as reported in the source: - Weighted average score 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.7 3.8 4.0 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.7 3.8 3.8 - Weighted average score 3.6 3.3 3.8 3.5 3.2 3.7 3.4 3.7 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.3 3.5 3.8 - Weighted average score 3.3 3.5 3.3 2.9 2.7 3.6 3.4 3.2 3.0 3.4 3.1 3.5 2.7 3.4 3.3 - Weighted average score 3.3 3.5 3.2 2.9 2.2 3.6 3.2 3.3 3.6 3.4 3.0 3.5 2.7 3.1 3.5 - Weighted average score 3.0 3.1 3.2 2.4 2.0 2.9 3.4 3.0 2.8 3.1 2.9 3.1 2.0 3.4 2.8 - Weighted average score 2.8 3.1 2.6 2.7 2.2 3.0 2.9 2.5 3.2 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.0 2.9 3.5 - Weighted average score 2.5 2.9 2.3 2.3 1.7 2.3 2.9 2.2 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.6 1.7 2.6 2.8 - Weighted average score 2.5 2.7 2.3 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.7 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.1 3.0 - Weighted average score 2.6 2.2 2.8 2.8 3.2 3.0 2.3 2.5 2.1 2.5 2.6 2.3 3.3 2.5 2.8 - Distribution categories and subgroup breakdowns are presented by the same subgroup lines as above. *Source: Table 2: 2014 TSR Executive Directors' Survey Results (cont.) — Looking forward focus areas (pages with weighted average scores and distribution of answers in percentage).* --- ### 5. Integration of Bilateral and Multilateral Surveillance ### How effectively does multilateral surveillance inform and deepen bilateral surveillance? - Multilateral surveillance products listed: Regional Economic Outlooks; Fiscal Monitor; Spillover Report; Pilot External Sector Report; Vulnerability Exercise for Low Income Countries (VE-LIC); World Economic Outlook; Global Financial Stability Report. - Respondents were asked: "Please indicate, with respect to each of the multilateral surveillance products below, the extent to which it supports and is consistent with bilateral surveillance." - Example weighted average scores and distributions as reported: - Weighted average score 2.4 2.9 1.9 2.4 2.1 2.9 2.3 1.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.0 2.6 2.3 1.8 3.3 - Weighted average score 2.4 2.9 1.9 2.4 2.1 2.7 2.4 1.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.0 2.6 2.3 1.8 3.3 - Weighted average score 3.0 3.1 3.1 2.7 2.5 3.0 3.3 2.9 2.6 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.7 3.0 3.3 - Weighted average score 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.4 3.1 2.7 2.9 2.4 2.7 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.0 ### Perceptions of progress on integrating bilateral and multilateral products - Response categories included: - "Yes, relative to 2011, the Fund has made significant progress at integrating bilateral and multilateral products." - Example response count line: 914480017021414001325 - "Yes, relative to 2011, the Fund has made progress at integrating bilateral and multilateral products, but progress is still limited." - Example response count line: 26203619235822120282425332525 - "Yes, but more progress is required to incorporate global and regional issues in bilateral surveillance." - Example response count line: 26271646626283514203325671325 - "Yes, but renewed focus on country-specific issues is required." - Example response count line: 132548156171901610130250 - "No, bilateral and multilateral surveillance continue to be fragmented." - Example response count line: 2614411902917356432193802525 - "No change" - Example response count line: 17113200101135432410380130 - Further outcome categories for integration over time: - "Improved marginally" and "Improved significantly" appear with subgroup breakdowns and example count lines in the source. *Source: Table 2: 2014 TSR Executive Directors' Survey Results (cont.) — Integration of Bilateral and Multilateral Surveillance.* --- ### 6–7. Overall integration and the Integrated Surveillance Decision (ISD) ### Overall effectiveness and ISD assessment - Question 6: "How effectively does multilateral surveillance inform and deepen bilateral surveillance, overall?" - Distribution of answers reported by subgroup; numeric lines and categorical responses are provided in the source. - Question 7: "Do you believe that the Integrated Surveillance Decision (ISD) has helped to better integrate bilateral and multilateral surveillance so that they increasingly draw on each other?" - Response categories in the source include: "Too soon to say"; "No change"; "Improved marginally"; "Improved significantly"; with subgroup breakdowns. - Example categorical distribution lines include: 13111123461911001610253300; 40110010012001000130; 5248545838456158365252503338100; 30412519152628316432292533500; etc. *Source: Table 2: 2014 TSR Executive Directors' Survey Results (cont.) — Questions on overall integration and ISD (pages with categorical distributions by subgroup).* --- ### 8–10. New multilateral products and Financial Sector Surveillance ### Assessment of new multilateral surveillance products - New products listed in the source: Spillover Report; Pilot External Sector Report; Vulnerability Exercise for Low Income Countries (VE-LIC); G-20 Surveillance Notes; Analytical inputs for the G-20 (including Mutual Assessment Process); Cross-country papers. - Respondents were asked to "Please rate their contribution to the effectiveness of Fund surveillance." - Distribution of categorical responses and subgroup breakdowns are presented in the source (numerical distribution lines and weighted averages where applicable). ### Financial Sector Surveillance — implementation of the IMF’s Financial Surveillance Strategy (FSS) - Questions include evaluation of: - Progress in strengthening instruments and products: Macroprudential policy; Financial sector analysis in Article IV consultations; FSAP follow-up in Article IVs; Frequency of FSAPs; Risk analysis in Article IVs; Cluster reports; Managing capital flows; Policies to contain sovereign-bank feedback loops; Cross-border linkages; Implications of global regulatory reforms. - Progress in strengthening risk identification and policy analysis. - Response categories include: "Too soon to say"; "No change"; "Improved marginally"; "Improved significantly"; "N/A", with subgroup breakdowns in percentage-distribution tables. - Example categorical distribution lines and summary indicators from the source: - Too soon to say 944314606021414033025 - No change 179308019114601619250250 - Improved marginally 576650505452831936644850336375 - Improved significantly 1321512019023431610253300 - Additional subgroup lines and distributions are provided throughout the source pages. *Source: Table 2: 2014 TSR Executive Directors' Survey Results (cont.) — New multilateral products and Financial Sector Surveillance (pages with categorical distributions by subgroup).* --- *Source: Table 2: 2014 TSR Executive Directors' Survey Results (cont.), 2014 TSR — STAKEHOLDERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON IMF SURVEILLANCE (International Monetary Fund).* ### 10. In the context of ### _073014a - 10. In the context of ### Strengthening risk identification and policy analysis (FSS implementation) - Survey areas evaluated: - Monetary policy in current economic downturn - Financial deepening - Exit from extraordinary macrofinancial policies - Engagement/coverage categories used in the survey: - In very few cases; In some cases; In many cases; In most cases; Always - Not at all; To a limited extent; To some extent; To a great extent; N/A - Representative weighted average scores reported for progress in strengthening risk identification and policy analysis (as presented in the source): - 2.4 - 2.4 - 2.7 - 1.8 - 1.6 - 2.9 - 2.5 - 2.1 - 2.6 - 2.6 - 2.2 - 2.5 - 1.0 - 2.9 - 2.5 ### Strengthening engagement with stakeholders (FSS implementation) - Areas of stakeholder engagement evaluated: - Facilitator on macroprudential policy - Contribution to the global regulatory reform agenda - Collaboration with the World Bank - Data provision for surveillance - Assessment of systemic risks - Responses were collected by constituency type and region (e.g., Overall, Advanced, Emerging, Low‑income, Africa, Asia Pacific, Europe, Middle East, Americas, G‑20, Non‑G‑20, Single‑country constituency, Multiple‑country constituency with varying program coverage). - Representative weighted average scores reported for stakeholder engagement items (as presented in the source): - 1.6 - 1.0 - 1.9 - 2.2 - 2.4 - 2.1 - 1.3 - 1.8 - 0.5 - 1.2 - 2.1 - 0.8 - 2.7 - 1.8 - 2.3 ### External Sector Surveillance — quality of analysis and discussion - External sector areas evaluated in staff reports discussed by the Executive Board: - Usage of a broad set of indicators (exchange rate, current account, capital account, reserves, competitiveness) - Assessment of the external position integrated with overall policy mix (fiscal, monetary, financial sector policies) - Assessment of the exchange rate level - Response categories included qualitative judgments: Poor; Satisfactory; Very good; Excellent; N/A; Yes; No - Representative weighted average scores presented for external sector items (as shown in the source): - 2.4 - 2.5 - 2.5 - 2.2 - 2.7 - 2.4 - 2.6 - 2.4 - 1.9 - 2.4 - 2.5 - 2.4 - 2.7 - 2.6 - 2.0 ### Macroprudential policy tailoring and capital flow advice - Question: Where the Fund has provided advice on macro‑prudential policies, has this been adequately tailored to country circumstances? - Separate evaluations for: For your own country/constituency; For advanced economies; For emerging markets; For low‑income countries - Question: Is the Fund giving effective advice on managing capital inflows and outflows? - Representative weighted average scores and response patterns are reported across constituencies (examples captured in the source): - Weighted average scores: 1.9; 1.9; 2.0; 1.6; 2.1; 1.5; 2.2; 1.6; 1.5; 2.0; 1.7; 1.9; 1.7; 1.8; 2.3 ### Analysis of spillovers across surveillance products - Products rated for spillover analysis included: - World Economic Outlook - Global Financial Stability Report - Fiscal Monitor - Spillover Report - Pilot External Sector Report - Vulnerability Exercise for Low Income Countries (VE‑LIC) - Regional Economic Outlooks - Article IV Reports - Financial Sector Stability Assessments (FSSAs) - Cluster Reports (e.g., Nordic Regional Report) - G20 Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) - Question: Should the Fund be more proactive in assessing the macroeconomic effects of regulatory reforms (given agreed division of responsibility between FSB and Fund)? - Available responses include Yes / No; and priorities for strengthening work on spillovers. - Priorities for strengthening spillover work (respondents could choose up to two): - Strengthen quantitative analysis - Expand the coverage of the Spillover Report beyond the five most systemically important countries (S5) - More in‑depth discussion of the impact of systemically important countries’ policies on the rest of the world - More timely analysis - More reliable and timely data - Other (explain) - Representative weighted average scores for spillover analysis across products (as presented in the source): - 2.1 - 2.1 - 2.2 - 2.1 - 2.3 - 2.2 - 2.2 - 2.0 - 1.9 - 2.0 - 2.3 - 1.8 - 2.0 - 2.4 - 2.5 ### Analysis of risks in surveillance products and assessment quality - Products rated for risk analysis (identifying risks and likely impacts) included: - World Economic Outlook - Global Financial Stability Report - Fiscal Monitor - Spillover Report - Pilot External Sector Report - Vulnerability Exercise for Low Income Countries (VE‑LIC) - Regional Economic Outlooks - Financial Sector Stability Assessments (FSSAs) - Cluster Reports - Article IV Staff Reports - Respondents judged whether risk coverage was "About right", "Too sanguine", "Do not cover the right risks", or "Too alarmist". - Representative weighted average scores for risk analysis across products (as provided in the source): - 2.1 - 2.0 - 2.2 - 2.2 - 2.2 - 2.2 - 2.1 - 2.5 - 2.0 - 2.0 - 2.3 - 1.9 - 2.7 - 1.9 - 2.8 ### Views on the Fund’s risk assessments and possible changes - Questions asked of Executive Directors included: - What is your view of the Fund’s risk assessments of countries in your constituency? - What is your view of the Fund’s risk assessments, as presented to the Executive Board, of other countries outside your constituency? (categories: Other advanced economies; G‑20 emerging markets; Other emerging markets; Low‑income countries; G‑20 advanced economies) - Options regarding changes to risk assessment approach: - The present approach is appropriate - Systematic inclusion of Risk Assessment Matrices (RAMs) - Replace RAMs with deeper analysis of risks - More efforts to identify additional risks and impacts - More efforts to quantify assessments of risks and impacts - More analysis of the transmission channels of shocks - More focus on analyzing domestic political issues - More sensitive handling of confidential information - Other - Responses on whether executive directors expected the Fund to be "More likely", "No change", or "Less Likely" to take certain actions were summarized, with representative weighted average scores shown (examples from the source): - -0.1 - 0.1 - -0.1 - -0.5 - -0.5 - -0.4 - 0.2 - 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 - -0.1 - 0.0 - -1.0 - 0.4 - -0.5 ### Steps suggested to improve the Fund’s risk assessments - Options offered to respondents to check all that apply (as presented in the source): - Larger fiscal deficits - More gradual fiscal adjustment - Accommodative monetary policy - Higher inflation targets - Capital controls - Non‑market solutions in the financial sector - Policies that have spillover effects on other economies - More proactive policies to prevent risks from materializing - Other *Source: Table 2: 2014 TSR Executive Directors' Survey Results (cont.), 2014 TSR — STAKEHOLDERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON IMF SURVEILLANCE (excerpts as provided in the source content).* ### 25. In your own ### 25. In your own country/constituency’s interactions with the Fund, do you feel that the institution’s approach to policy advice has changed in response to the global economic crisis? ### Change in policy advice (Q25–Q27) - Question labels included: Larger fiscal deficits; More gradual fiscal adjustment; Accommodative monetary policy; Higher inflation targets; Capital controls; Non-market solutions in the financial sector; Policies that have spillover effects on other economies; More proactive policies to prevent risks from materializing; Other. - Distribution of answers (selected summary items from the table): - Overall "Yes"/"No" tallies (distribution of answer in percentage) for whether approach changed: entries include sequences such as - Yes: 27 14 23 56 21 62 83 01 41 73 81 43 33 82 5 - No: 73 89 58 65 38 84 72 70 86 83 62 86 67 63 75 - Responses on likelihood (More likely / No change / Less Likely) and weighted averages appear, for example: - More likely: 91 88 99 100 85 94 89 92 100 84 100 88 100 88 100 88 100 - No change: 9 11 10 15 6 11 6 11 6 10 10 12 16 11 12 13 0 - Less Likely: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - Weighted average score: 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 - Other question-specific weighted average score examples (Q25 variants): - Weighted average score: 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 -0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.5 ### Appropriateness of advice (Q26 and Q28) - Q26 asks: Is this advice broadly appropriate? (for listed policy responses). - Responses by extent (Not at all / To a limited extent / To some extent / To a great extent / N/A) and a weighted average score example: - Weighted average score: 2.8 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.9 2.9 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.8 - Q28 repeats appropriateness across broader membership. Example weighted average scores: - Weighted average score: 2.5 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.3 2.5 2.3 ### Consistency and evenhandedness (Q29–Q31) - Q29: Has the Fund’s policy advice been consistent over time throughout the crisis? - Example distribution (Strongly disagree / Disagree / Neutral / Agree / Strongly agree) with weighted averages: - Weighted average score: 3.4 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.3 3.0 3.6 3.2 3.9 3.0 3.3 3.0 - Q30: Has the Fund’s policy advice been consistent across countries throughout the crisis? - Example weighted average score: 2.8 3.2 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.0 3.5 3.1 2.0 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.5 - Q31: Do you think the Fund is evenhanded in its policy advice for your country/constituency compared with other country groups? - Example distribution and weighted average score: - Weighted average score: 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.1 2.9 3.7 2.9 2.9 3.4 3.0 3.7 3.0 3.3 ### Report tone, treatment of authorities’ views, and sources of perceived inconsistency (Q32–Q33) - Items respondents could identify as problems (if they answered “strongly disagree” or “disagree”): - Tone of reports; Description of the authorities’ views; Differing policy advice for countries in similar circumstances; Degree of intrusiveness; Objectivity; Other. - Distribution examples (percentages shown across respondent groups for selected items): - Tone of reports: 27 31 27 25 13 32 31 20 32 25 28 17 17 31 33 - Description of authorities’ views: 16 23 12 22 23 8 12 13 15 24 11 20 03 31 32 - Degree of intrusiveness: 22 15 22 24 38 21 13 25 24 25 20 33 33 19 11 ### Evenhandedness of surveillance products (Q33–Q35) - Q33: Contributors to evenhandedness (Fund staff efforts / Executive Board review / Independent Evaluation Office / Request corrections / Bilateral surveillance / WEO / GFSR / Fiscal Monitor / Spillover Report). - Q34: Are surveillance products evenhanded? (Bilateral surveillance reports; World Economic Outlook; Global Financial Stability Report; Fiscal Monitor; Spillover Report; Pilot External Sector Report; Vulnerability Exercise for Low-Income Countries (VE-LIC)) - Example weighted average scores for evenhandedness of products: - Bilateral surveillance reports weighted average score: 2.6 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.4 1.9 3.2 2.2 3.0 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.3 2.5 2.8 - World Economic Outlook weighted average score: 2.6 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 3.0 2.2 2.8 3.0 2.2 3.3 2.3 2.2 2.8 - Perceived biases (sample distributions for “No concerns” / “Biased in favor of my country” / “Biased against my country” / “Biased in favor of other groups/regions” / “Biased against other groups/regions”): - Example for one product: No concerns 56 10 02 51 22 04 47 34 07 56 23 47 63 07 50 - Biased in favor of other groups/regions: 28 04 17 18 03 22 70 25 19 40 13 50 33 50 ### Evenhandedness in surveillance substance and tone (Q35) - Respondents assessed: Substance of policy recommendations; Tone of policy recommendations; Treatment of authorities’ views; Degree of intrusiveness. - Example weighted average scores (selected): - Substance of policy recommendations: 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.7 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.6 3.3 - Tone of policy recommendations: 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.4 2.3 2.7 3.3 2.4 2.1 2.8 2.7 3.0 2.3 2.8 2.8 ### Medium-term sustainability and growth (Q36–Q38) - Q36: Has IMF policy advice since the onset of the global crisis: - Taken into account the implications of its advice on medium-term sustainability? - Appropriately considered policies to maintain or raise growth? - Taken into account linkages across sectors (e.g between the financial and fiscal sectors)? - Example weighted average scores: 3.1 3.0 3.2 2.7 2.6 3.3 2.5 3.3 2.3 2.9 3.4 3.3 3.0 - Q37: Would you like to see the Fund undertake much more work on structural issues? - Responses (Yes/No) example: Yes 32 36 28 31 46 12 39 12 39 12 62 39 33 32 25 - No 68 64 72 69 54 88 61 88 61 88 38 61 67 68 75 - Q38: Specific areas that should be priorities (up to three options). Example distributions for selected priorities: - Taxation: 24 22 19 33 33 33 20 33 31 42 32 42 03 31 73 3 - Public expenditure management: 12 6 19 80 02 00 14 81 40 01 73 3 - Safety nets and other social policies: 12 17 14 00 33 03 30 33 29 15 10 20 01 70 - Financial sector policies (e.g., to enhance access to finance): 35 39 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 38 33 34 03 33 33 ### Engagement, mission conduct and outreach - Respondents indicated ways IMF engagement could change (examples and distributions): - Do more to take into account the country’s political economy constraints: 57 48 54 81 10 06 13 97 73 64 07 62 51 00 63 75 - Work harder to listen to, and understand the views of country authorities: 65 64 70 58 54 81 50 10 03 66 07 15 06 75 - Be readier to undertake analysis requested by the authorities: 43 34 55 38 46 19 56 23 86 52 33 63 36 33 38 25 - IMF teams should have more in-depth specialist knowledge: 48 34 55 62 62 26 56 58 36 44 52 50 67 25 75 - Carry out more basic fact checking at HQ to create additional time on mission for policy discussions: 61 57 68 54 46 39 78 57 86 64 60 62 75 67 63 25 - Create room for “off the record” discussions of confidential issues that are important for the authorities: 57 50 61 62 69 48 56 36 43 52 62 63 10 03 85 0 - The present level of engagement is appropriate: 74 84 68 65 54 90 78 65 57 80 67 75 33 37 51 00 *Italic source attribution: Table 2: 2014 TSR Executive Directors' Survey Results (cont.), 2014 TSR — STAKEHOLDERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON IMF SURVEILLANCE* ### 41. How should Fund staff ### 41. How should Fund staff strengthen their engagement with non-governmental players during surveillance missions? ### Engagement channels and perceived effectiveness - Weighted average score (engagement extent across constituencies): 3.2; 3.0; 3.2; 3.2; 3.4; 3.1; 2.9; 3.5; 3.0; 3.3; 3.1; 3.5; 3.7; 3.4; 2.3 - Response distribution (extent of engagement): - Not at all: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - To a limited extent: 18 38 81 50 24 30 03 81 51 90 00 75 - To some extent: 47 23 60 46 62 44 50 46 25 38 52 50 33 63 25 - To a great extent: 35 38 32 38 38 32 20 54 38 46 29 50 67 38 0 - N/A: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ### Factors mission chiefs highlighted for improving traction of IMF policy advice (Q39) - Weighted average score (how much the factor would help traction): 3.2; 2.7; 3.4; 3.2; 3.4; 3.0; 2.9; 3.7; 3.0; 3.2; 3.1; 3.0; 3.7; 3.6; 2.0 - Response distribution (extent to which each factor would help): - Not at all: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - To a limited extent: 68 48 02 40 00 08 50 00 02 5 - To some extent: 47 27 50 62 62 56 30 35 10 06 23 81 00 33 38 50 - To a great extent: 41 42 46 31 38 20 50 60 50 31 48 06 76 30 - N/A: 62 30 00 02 00 01 00 0 0 02 5 ### Suggested changes to strengthen the value added of IMF surveillance missions (Q40) - Weighted average score (across categories): 2.8; 2.6; 3.0; 2.7; 2.9; 3.1; 2.5; 3.0; 2.5; 3.0; 2.7; 3.5; 3.0; 2.8; 2.5 - Response distribution examples (extent to which options should be done differently): - Not at all: 68 48 00 10 03 88 50 00 02 5 - To a limited extent: 24 27 14 38 46 24 30 12 01 52 90 33 25 - To some extent: 53 65 58 31 15 44 60 77 38 46 57 50 33 75 25 - To a great extent: 18 02 42 33 83 32 01 22 53 11 05 03 30 25 ### Specific mission changes (selected items reported by mission chiefs) - Increase participation of area department (AD) staff in flagships: responses include 41 33 37 49 48 29 40 55 25 30 42 50 38 - More participation of functional department staff in Article IV missions: 61 50 59 69 76 65 30 59 81 70 60 80 83 54 - More support from functional departments during preparation of Article IV staff reports (aside from mission participation): 51 58 53 46 38 59 50 50 63 90 47 42 54 - More continuous support from functional departments (advice as needed): 56 50 59 54 48 47 70 64 50 30 59 50 58 - Inclusion of spillover analysis/cross-country work in the accountability framework of ADs: 11 81 01 41 41 85 51 91 01 28 13 ### How to strengthen timely integration of bilateral and multilateral surveillance (Q6/Q7 highlights) - Priorities ranked by mission chiefs to increase use of cross-country analysis and integration: - Greater availability of cross-country (departmental) analytical studies: 91 92 90 91 90 94 80 91 10 01 0 90 96 89 - Greater availability of comparable cross-country economic and financial data: 85 10 08 08 99 89 08 88 09 17 58 06 92 83 - Broadening/deepening cross-country samples and databases: 35 33 41 29 29 35 40 36 38 40 35 25 39 ### Perceived changes since 2011 in integration of bilateral and multilateral surveillance (ISD adoption) - Yes, significant progress integrating bilateral and multilateral products: 13 81 69 52 55 18 13 20 12 13 13 - Yes, some progress but still limited: 43 33 41 48 65 38 40 27 44 40 43 39 44 - Yes, but more progress required to incorporate global and regional issues: 13 33 12 65 13 20 14 13 - Yes, but renewed focus on country-specific issues required: 23 82 42 71 52 51 54 11 90 26 22 24 - No, bilateral and multilateral surveillance continue to be fragmented: 9 17 69 10 02 00 13 10 08 13 7 ### Staffing, team composition, and experience (selected mission chiefs' findings) - Number of mission chief responses: 96 (Overall); 12 (Advanced); 49 (Emerging); 35 (Low-income); regional breakdowns listed. - Change in staff numbers vs. 2011 (responses checked all that apply): - More area department staff: 71 33 22 11 11 16 - More functional department staff: 10 42 31 42 11 36 27 - No change in staff numbers: 52 52 12 61 49 91 47 34 91 73 5 - Change in team experience vs. 2011: - Overall, team is less experienced than in 2011: 48 58 55 34 33 41 53 55 60 30 50 43 49 - No change: 36 25 32 46 57 41 21 32 27 40 36 48 32 - Overall, team is more experienced than in 2011: 16 17 13 20 10 18 26 14 13 30 14 91 8 ### Financial sector expertise on teams - Mission chiefs asked whether they needed a financial sector expert during the past year: Yes 68 64 70 66 62 53 80 77 60 78 67 92 59 - Had a financial sector expert on their team during the past year: Yes 43 75 39 37 29 41 70 32 44 60 41 46 42 - Type of financial expert on team (distribution): - A permanent staff member of your department: 26 13 37 17 40 14 23 29 29 02 91 03 1 - An MCM economist who is a permanent member of your team: 36 50 47 80 14 54 29 57 60 32 40 34 - An MCM economist who joined on a one-off basis: 36 38 16 67 60 71 23 29 14 40 34 - An external consultant who joins during missions: 30 08 00 14 00 03 10 00 31 00 ### Quality assessments of IMF analysis (cross-border and real economy–financial sector linkages) - Please rate the IMF’s analysis of cross-border linkages across financial sectors (weighted average score): 1.9; 1.8; 2.1; 1.7; 1.7; 1.8; 2.0; 2.0; 2.3; 2.0; 1.9; 1.6; 2.1 - Please rate the IMF’s analysis of linkages between the real economy and the financial sector (weighted average score): 2.0; 1.9; 2.2; 1.8; 1.8; 2.0; 2.1; 2.3; 1.9; 2.4; 2.0; 1.8; 2.1 ### Spillovers and the contribution of multilateral products to bilateral surveillance - Overall assessment of the extent to which analysis of spillovers in multilateral surveillance products contributes to respondents' surveillance efforts (selected weighted averages): 2.5; 2.6; 2.7; 2.2; 2.4; 2.4; 2.5; 2.6; 2.6; 2.5; 2.5; 2.5 - Product-level weighted averages (examples): - World Economic Outlook: 2.6; 2.9; 3.1; 2.6; 2.7; 2.6; 2.9; 3.2; 2.9; 2.8; 2.5 - Global Financial Stability Report: 2.6; 1.4; 2.8; 2.6; 3.0; 2.5; 1.8; 2.8; 2.9; 2.7; 2.5 - Spillover Report: 2.4; 2.6; 2.4; 2.4; 2.3; 2.6; 2.3; 2.5; 2.2; 2.5; 2.3 ### Evolution of surveillance since 2011 (concluding perceptions) - Relative to 2011, respondents reported a mix of outcomes for the Fund’s surveillance: - Improved marginally: 18 33 19 11 14 18 25 23 74 01 52 11 17 - Improved significantly: 20 06 06 00 70 20 30 20 3 - No change / Deteriorated responses also reported across constituencies *Source: 2014 TSR — Stakeholders’ Perspectives on IMF Surveillance (Mission Chiefs’ and Executive Directors’ survey results excerpt).* ### 16. Please assess, overall ### _073014a - 16. Please assess, overall ### Contribution of multilateral and other Fund products to bilateral surveillance (spillovers) - Survey asks: "Please assess, overall and by product, the extent to which the analysis of spillovers in the Fund’s multilateral surveillance products and other products contributes to your own surveillance efforts." - Selected product-level weighted average scores (as reported): - Overall (multilateral surveillance products, overall): weighted average score 2.6 - Cross-country papers: weighted average score 2.6 - Other countries’ Article IV reports and Financial Sector Stability Assessments (FSSAs): weighted average score 3.0 - Vulnerability Exercise for Advanced Economies (VEA): weighted average score 2.4 - Global Risk Assessment Matrix (G-RAM): weighted average score 2.3 - Regional Economic Outlooks: weighted average score 1.7 - G-20 Surveillance Notes: weighted average score 1.4 - Analytical inputs for the G-20 (including Mutual Assessment Process): weighted average score 1.4 ### Priorities to strengthen the Fund’s work on spillovers (question 17) - Top priority options presented to respondents included: - Strengthen quantitative analysis - Expand coverage of the Spillover Report beyond the S5 - More in-depth discussion of the impact of systemically important countries’ policies on the rest of the world - More timely analysis - More reliable and timely data - More focused training to staff on spillover analysis - Example reported preferences (selected lines from table): - "Strengthen quantitative analysis" row includes values and a weighted average score 2.6 - "Expand coverage of the Spillover Report beyond the S5" weighted average score 2.6 - "More in-depth discussion of the impact of systemically important countries’ policies on the rest of the World" weighted average score 3.0 ### Contribution of discussions of risk in surveillance products (question 18) - Respondents rated how the risk discussions in various Fund products contribute to their surveillance: - Fiscal Monitor: weighted average score 1.4 - Spillover Report: weighted average score 1.8 - Pilot External Sector Report: weighted average score 1.4 - World Economic Outlook: weighted average score 2.7 - Global Financial Stability Report: weighted average score 2.6 - Vulnerability Exercise for Advanced Economies (VEA): weighted average score 2.4 - Global Risk Assessment Matrix (G-RAM): weighted average score 1.3 - Regional Economic Outlooks: weighted average score 2.2 - Analytical inputs for the G-20 (including Mutual Assessment Process): weighted average score 2.4 - G-20 Surveillance Notes: weighted average score 1.3 - Vulnerability Exercise for Low-income Countries (VE-LIC) and for Emerging Markets (VEE): weighted average score 1.3 - Perceptions of global risk assessments (question 19) — selected summary items: - Responses on whether IMF’s risk assessments are "About right", "Too sanguine", "Does not cover the right risks", or "Too alarmist" are reported for multiple products; examples from the table: - For one product: "About right" 70; "Too sanguine" 11; "Does not cover the right risks" 80; "Too alarmist" 12 (row-level distributions preserved in table) ### Steps to improve IMF’s risk assessments (question 20) - Options and some reported response frequencies include: - More efforts to quantify assessments of risks and impacts — reported as option checked (e.g., values shown: 70, 106, 10, 12, 59, 0, 107, 87 in the table) - More analysis of the transmission channels of shocks — option checked with responses shown in the table (e.g., 110, 169, 101, 25, 23, 61, 0, 128, 13) - More focus on accounting for countries domestic political issues — responses shown (e.g., 100, 101, 45, 12, 0, 2, 76, 0, 128, 11) - More sensitive handling of confidential information — indicated as option with zeroes in some rows - Other (please explain below) — shown as option with numeric counts in the table ### How authorities view IMF country risk assessments and steps to increase usefulness (questions 21–22) - How authorities find IMF’s risk assessments of their country (question 21) — example aggregated responses: - "More likely" to take action in response to assessments: weighted average score 0.7 (overall) - For some product categories, weighted average scores reported as 1.0, 0.9, 0.5, 0.8, 0.6, 0.1, 0.7, 0.1 in the table - Steps to make risk assessments more useful to authorities (question 22) — options included: - Quantified assessment of risks and impact - Better account for domestic political issues - More analysis of transmission channels - More sensitive handling of confidential information - Better communication - Other - Example reported choice frequencies (selected): - "Quantified assessment of risks and impact" shows counts in the table including 48, 42, 51, 34, 33, 35, 45, 41, 69, 60, 42, 29, 49 - "More analysis of transmission channels" shows counts including 57, 50, 59, 43, 48, 41, 50, 59, 63, 90, 48, 38, 57 ### Perceived change in the Fund’s approach to policy advice since the crisis (questions 23–26) - Question 23: "Do you feel that the institution’s approach to policy advice has changed in response to the global economic crisis?" — selected example responses: - For recommending "Larger fiscal deficits": "Yes" 65; "No" 35 (row entries preserved) - For recommending "More proactive policies to prevent risks from materializing": "Yes" 79; "No" 21 - Weighted average score examples: "Larger fiscal deficits" weighted average score 0.2; "More gradual fiscal adjustment" weighted average score 0.6; "Accommodative monetary policy" weighted average score 0.3 - Question 24: "Is this advice broadly appropriate?" — responses include: - For "Larger fiscal deficits": "More likely" 66; "No change" 32; "Less Likely" 2; weighted average score 0.6 - For "Capital controls": "More likely" 11; "No change" 89; weighted average score 0.1 - Question 25: "In your own surveillance work, do you feel that your team’s overall approach to policy advice has changed?" — selected summary: - "More likely" to recommend "Larger fiscal deficits": 66; "No change" 32; "Less Likely" 2; weighted average score 0.6 - For "Capital controls": "More likely" 11; "No change" 89; weighted average score 0.1 - Question 26: "Since the crisis do you think the Fund’s policy advice has been:" — responses include: - "Based on a new analytical framework": counts include 17, 25, 16, 14, 19, 12, 20, 27, 0, 19, 17, 17 - "Based on the same analytical framework as in the past, but taking into account changed conditions": counts include 64, 58, 69, 57, 62, 59, 65, 58, 18, 60, 26, 63 - "Ad hoc": counts include 15, 8, 12, 20, 14, 24, 10, 9, 19, 10, 15, 13 - "No major change": counts include 10, 20, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 10, 1 ### Exchange rate assessments and attention (questions 27–29) - Question 27: "To what extent did you pay more attention to exchange rate issues in the latest Article IV consultation compared with previous years?" - Responses for "Significantly more", "Marginally more", "No change", etc., example weighted average scores: - Overall weighted average score 1.0 (for extent of paying more attention) - For one grouping: "Marginally more" counts 51; "Significantly more" counts 24; weighted average score 1.0 - Question 28: "To what extent did the exchange rate assessments for your country have the following characteristics?" — characteristics and selected weighted average scores: - Candid: weighted average score 3.1 - Took into account exchange rate assessments for other comparable economies in the region: weighted average score 2.4 - Shaped your views on the overall policy mix: weighted average score 2.5 - Influenced the authorities' policies: weighted average score 2.6 - Contributed to the dialogue with the authorities: weighted average score 2.8 - Reserve adequacy: weighted average score 2.5 - Capital flows: weighted average score 2.7 - Foreign exchange intervention: weighted average score 2.5 - Question 29: "Following the recommendations of the 2011 TSR, to what extent did you pay more attention to exchange rate issues in the latest Article IV consultation compared with previous years?" — example overall responses: - "Not at all" 10; "To a little extent" 32; "To some extent" 44; "To a large extent" 13; "N/A" 3; weighted average score 2.5 ### Consistency and evenhandedness of policy advice (question 30) - Question 30: "In your view and taking into account changing economic circumstances, has the IMF’s policy advice been consistent over time throughout the crisis?" - Respondents’ views on consistency reported with weighted average scores around: - Overall weighted average score 3.0 (examples from table show values 3.0, 3.2, 3.1, 2.8, 2.9, 3.0) - Degree to which teams reported attention to exchange rates and influence on authorities captured by weighted averages between 2.3 and 3.3 across categories *Italic: Source — Table 3: 2014 TSR Mission Chiefs' Survey Results (extracted from _073014a - 16. Please assess, overall).* ### 32. Is the IMF evenhanded ### 32. Is the IMF evenhanded in its surveillance? ### Assessment of evenhandedness (policy advice, presentation, consistency, intrusiveness, objectivity) - Survey covers: Policy advice; Presentation of authorities’ views; Consistency in policy advice given to countries in similar circumstances; Degree of intrusiveness; Objectivity/candor. - Distribution of answers reported by: Overall; Advanced; Emerging; Low-income; Africa; Asia Pacific; Europe; Middle East; Americas; G-20; Non-G-20; IMF Program? (Yes/No). - Representative weighted average scores for one set of items (as presented): - Weighted average score 3.2 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.4 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.2 ### Presentation of authorities’ views and tone - Distribution categories used across items: Not at all; To a limited extent; To some extent; To a great extent; N/A. - Example weighted average scores reported for related items: - 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.4 1.9 2.0 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.2 - 1.8 1.5 1.7 2.1 2.2 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 - 1.8 1.4 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.8 - 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.4 - 1.7 2.0 1.9 1.3 1.1 1.1 2.3 2.0 1.8 3.6 1.5 1.3 1.8 - 1.3 2.1 1.5 0.8 0.6 0.9 2.3 1.0 1.8 3.5 1.1 0.8 1.4 - 1.2 2.1 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.8 0.8 1.8 3.3 1.0 0.9 1.3 ### Key distribution patterns (examples) - Respondents used the full response scale for many items (Not at all → To a great extent → N/A). - Some items received low weighted averages (around 1.0–1.9), indicating limited agreement that IMF outputs were evenhanded on those dimensions for some country groups. - Other items show higher weighted averages (around 2.5–3.4), indicating greater perceived evenhandedness on other dimensions or for other groups. --- ### 33–34. Factors contributing to evenhandedness and assessment of surveillance products ### Factors contributing to evenhandedness (surveyed) - Global Financial Stability Report - IMF staff’s efforts to be evenhanded / internal staff review process - Review by the Executive Board - Review by the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office - Possibility to request corrections/deletions after Board discussions - Management’s role ### Surveyed surveillance products — perceived evenhandedness (selected weighted average scores) - Fiscal Monitor — Weighted average score 0.8 1.4 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.4 1.1 2.4 0.7 0.6 0.9 - World Economic Outlook — Weighted average score 0.7 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.7 1.2 0.5 0.2 1.1 2.3 0.5 0.4 0.8 - Pilot External Sector Report; Spillover Report; Vulnerability Exercises (VEA, VEE, VE-LIC) — weighted average scores reported in the survey for various groupings; examples include: - VEA: 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.2 3.5 3.2 - VEE: 3.1 3.5 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.2 2.9 3.3 3.8 3.0 3.1 ### Channels where evenhandedness is observed - During the mission — cited as a point where IMF staff efforts contribute to evenhandedness. - In country reports — also identified as contributing to perceived evenhandedness. - Country authorities’ in-depth knowledge of their economy and greater expertise were listed as components in the survey instrument (responses recorded as 0000000000000 in the source extract). --- ### 35–36. Difficulty of challenging authorities and constraints on IMF advice ### Difficulty challenging authorities - Question asks: On policy issues where staff differ from authorities, how difficult to challenge authorities’ view? (Distribution by country group shown; categorical responses used.) ### Factors making it difficult to challenge authorities (ranked options; distribution examples) - Lack of expertise — reported values: 92 100 94 86 90 94 10? 082? 94? (source lists long concatenated numbers under "Lack of expertise"; original table format lists percentages by group) - Data constraints — reported values: 80 92 80 77 81 88 85 77 76 99 78 8? (source lists these as percentages by group) - Time constraints — reported values: 78 83 78 77 81 76 85 59 94 80 78 71 81 - Resource constraints — reported values: 91 75 96 89 90 88 95 86 94 90 91 79 94 - Lack of information sharing across and/or within departments — reported values: 57 67 57 54 62 47 55 68 50 60 57 71 53 - Insufficient appreciation by Fund management — 27 33 24 29 14 29 20 27 50 40 26 13 32 - Insufficient appreciation by the authorities — 32 33 27 40 29 29 20 41 44 20 34 21 36 - Other — 17 17 24 6 5 18 40 14 62 0? 19? (source shows "Other 1717246518401462016819") (Note: the source lists distributions in tabular form by subgroup; above bullets preserve the numeric tokens as presented in the source extract.) --- ### 37–39. Structural reform priorities, IMF advice on structural issues, and constraints ### How IMF policy advice since the onset of the global crisis has performed (selected weighted averages) - The advice was focused — Weighted average score 2.8 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.3 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.8 2.8 3.1 2.7 - The advice on how to implement reforms adequately complemented advice on what reforms to pursue — Weighted average score 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.4 - The advice was of high quality — Weighted average score 2.7 2.3 2.5 3.1 3.2 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.2 2.8 2.7 3.1 2.5 - The advice was adequately tailored to our circumstances — Weighted average score 2.6 2.2 2.5 3.0 3.4 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.1 2.6 2.7 3.1 2.5 - The advice was built on cross-country experience — Weighted average score 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.8 2.5 2.7 2.3 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.6 - The advice was well integrated into the IMF’s advice on macroeconomic policies — Weighted average score 2.7 2.3 2.6 3.1 3.2 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.4 2.6 2.7 3.1 2.6 ### Priorities for structural reforms (survey asks for top three ranked 1–3) - The questionnaire lists core areas (example tallies reported later): - Taxation — e.g., counts: 59 58 53 69 48 71 50 58 15? (source shows "Taxation 59585369487150558150605461") - Public expenditure management — "74336994908855647550777972" - Safety nets and other social policies — "36424129293535503120384235" - Labor market policies — "34674311241860323860311342" - Product market policies — "2142201419244091340191324" - Financial sector policies (e.g., to enhance access to finance) — "53335360575340733850538343" - Other — "14171411196205192013417" ### To what extent IMF advice on structural issues is hampered (examples of weighted averages) - Items show weighted average scores per grouping; example set: 2.4 0.8 2.5 2.8 2.6 2.8 1.4 2.9 2.1 1.5 2.5 2.7 2.3 - Other example: 2.4 1.0 2.3 3.0 3.0 2.6 1.6 2.5 2.1 1.3 2.5 2.9 2.2 ### Identified constraints to IMF structural advice (top-ranked issues) - Lack of expertise; Data constraints; Time constraints; Resource constraints; Lack of information sharing; Insufficient appreciation by Fund management; Insufficient appreciation by the authorities; Other. - Reported distribution tokens for top constraint (“Lack of expertise” and others) are provided in the source tables (see numeric sequences preserved above). --- ### 40–41. Collaboration, capacity building, and traction ### Collaboration on structural issues — institutions and effectiveness - Institutions surveyed for collaboration: World Bank; OECD; ILO; BIS; Regional development banks; Others. - Reported collaboration outcomes (worked well / worked very well / no collaboration / did not work well) include weighted average scores for specific partners: - World Bank — Weighted average score 3.0 1.5 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.1 2.7 3.3 2.7 2.6 3.1 3.4 2.9 - OECD — Weighted average score 1.2 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.6 1.1 1.0 1.9 1.2 1.2 1.3 - ILO; BIS; Regional development banks — reported similarly in tabular form; some items report very low scores (1.0–1.4) indicating limited collaboration or relevance in some contexts. ### Capacity building (TA and training) — extent of help to improve policy advice on macro-critical structural issues - Distribution categories used: Not at all; To a limited extent; To some extent; To a great extent; N/A. - Sample weighted average scores reported: - Overall weighted average score 2.6 0.8 2.5 3.5 3.6 2.8 1.5 3.0 2.2 1.1 2.8 3.3 2.4 - On specific areas (Training of staff; Tax policy; Revenue management; Expenditure policy; Public financial management; Financial regulation and supervision; Growth; Inclusiveness; Other) respondents provided distributions; examples include: - Training/public financial management — Weighted average score 3.0 3.1 2.8 3.3 3.3 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.7 3.0 3.2 2.9 - Financial regulation and supervision — Weighted average score 3.0 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.3 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.0 ### Perceived traction of IMF missions and suggestions to strengthen value added - Traction question and follow-ups ask: To what extent are policies adopted by authorities consistent with IMF advice? What are main reasons for non-adoption? What should be done differently? Survey response categories and suggested actions include: - Preserve present level of engagement; Greater engagement with academic researchers; More time with parliamentarians; More time with civil society and reporting their views; Regular press conferences; Other. - Timing for engagement/communication options: Press coverage (never extensive); At the end of the mission; At the end of the Board meeting; On a continued basis; Other. - Typical high-level responses show majority indicating the present level of engagement is appropriate (e.g., "The present level of engagement is appropriate. 74 92 78 63 67 59 80 77 88 100 71 67 76"), plus other suggestions with smaller shares. --- *Source: 2014 TSR Mission Chiefs' Survey Results (extracted tables and item distributions).* ### 48. How should Fund staff ### 48. How should Fund staff strengthen their engagement with non-governmental players during surveillance missions? (Table 3: 2014 TSR Mission Chiefs' Survey Results) ### Engagement and meeting practices - Question 52: Did the Minister of Finance/Governor of the Central Bank meet with Fund management or staff during the most recent Annual meetings? - Yes: 82 58 81 91 90 71 79 91 75 80 82 96 77 - No: 18 42 19 10 29 10 21 25 20 18 42 3 - My country did not receive any: 15 75 73 01 22 62 11 53 31 31 31 31 15 - Question 51: Does the Minister of Finance/Governor participate regularly in the Annual Meetings? - Not at all: 11 01 41 25 12 11 16 15 22 10 9 12 - To a limited extent: 44 25 42 53 62 29 42 32 54 44 44 34 44 - To some extent: 22 02 82 42 42 29 21 11 50 25 22 23 - To a great extent: 80 99 10 18 01 10 09 13 6 - Weighted average score: 2.00.5 2.22.2 2.42.31.61.81.71.12.12.11.9 - Question 52 (alternate block): My country did not receive any: 24 10 09 19 20 13 53 11 23 50 22 30 22 - Not at all: 13 01 61 30 25 16 11 15 25 12 01 7 - To a limited extent: 24 02 33 45 01 31 12 23 13 26 35 21 - To some extent: 27 04 01 91 53 12 13 93 11 32 82 29 - To a great extent: 12 01 21 61 51 90 17 80 13 13 11 - Weighted average score: 1.90.0 2.32.02.12.21.02.41.80.92.01.91.9 ### Press coverage and candor - Question 49: At which stage of surveillance does Fund advice receive the greatest press coverage? - Risks to the economic outlook: 25 17 24 29 19 35 20 36 13 20 26 33 22 - Risks to the financial sector: 31 33 37 23 10 35 50 36 25 20 33 42 28 - Fiscal policy: 19 33 16 17 03 52 09 38 40 16 17 19 - Announcement of sensitive policy decision by the authorities: 23 02 03 44 8 12 20 27 00 26 50 14 - Negative assessment of sensitive issues by staff: 60 50 57 69 73 65 70 73 38 60 60 58 61 - Political developments: 13 17 12 11 10 01 03 60 60 07 81 4 - Other: 17 17 16 17 19 12 02 72 50 19 25 14 ### Pressure from authorities to restrict topics in staff reports - Question 55: Are you under pressure from country authorities to restrict the discussion of particular issues in staff reports? - Requests for corrections and deletions outside the scope of the Transparency Policy: 54 50 49 63 38 59 40 82 50 60 53 67 50 - Other attempts to delay or withhold publication of staff reports: 23 02 42 94 81 22 07 02 20 23 8 28 - Other: 60 86 01 20 18 00 07 08 - What topics authorities attempt to restrict (Question 56; select all that apply): listed categories in the source include the items above and overlap with Question 49 topics (e.g., Negative assessment of sensitive issues by staff) ### How authorities exert pressure (Question 57) - Before missions, through direct contact with the mission chief or senior staff: 13 50 12 01 00 30 91 32 01 21 71 1 - Before missions, through an Executive Director’s office: 40 80 01 20 90 20 20 6 - During missions, through direct contact with the mission chief or senior staff: 67 67 57 80 57 82 50 73 75 40 70 83 61 - During missions, through an Executive Director’s office: 10 01 21 11 01 20 18 13 20 98 11 - Distribution of answer in percentage is presented by income level, by region, G-20 or non-G-20, and IMF Program in the source. ### Factors inside the Fund making effective surveillance harder (Question 58) - Top issues (respondents asked to rank top three): - Lack of data: 75 75 61 94 86 76 65 73 75 50 78 75 75 - Lack of knowledge sharing across and/or within departments: 68 67 71 63 71 82 45 59 88 70 67 63 69 - Pressure not to express dissenting views: 24 17 22 29 24 18 20 32 25 10 26 21 25 - Pressure to self-censor your views in discussions with senior management: 18 02 21 70 12 25 32 19 20 17 17 18 - Lack of specialty knowledge: 72 83 65 77 90 71 65 77 50 70 72 71 72 - Other: 31 33 39 20 29 41 35 27 25 50 29 29 32 ### Technical assistance, capacity building, and traction of surveillance (Question 54) - Which efforts have helped boost traction of Fund surveillance: - Training of staff by the IMF’s Institute for Capacity Development (ICD) - Training of staff by regional center - Technical assistance missions by HQ or regional centers - Question 53: Over the past two years, have authorities approached the team—outside of regular staff consultations—to seek views on a policy issue? - Before missions contact and during missions contact percentages are shown above under Question 57. - Question 55 (impact of TA and other efforts on traction; Question 59 overall change since 2011 TSR): - It is improved to a great extent: 10 20 00 00 00 06 01 01 - It has improved to some extent: 67 50 73 66 71 76 58 86 38 67 67 63 69 - It has not changed: 25 42 23 19 24 37 94 42 26 22 62 25 - It has deteriorated to some extent: 10 03 00 05 00 14 0 - It has deteriorated to a great extent: 20 23 00 50 06 11 10 3 - N/A: 38 06 10 00 06 03 81 ### Candor and weighted scores - Overall candor weighted average scores and distributions are reported in the source tables; an example weighted average score appears as: 3.21.5 3.33.63.63.12.73.43.12.53.33.73.0 (from one table block). - Other weighted average score lines in the source include: 1.91.81.91.91.71.92.02.01.71.91.92.01.8 *Source: Table 3: 2014 TSR — Mission Chiefs' Survey Results (2014 TSR — Stakeholders' Perspectives on IMF Surveillance)* --- _Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2014/_073014a.pdf_