## 2014 TRIENNIAL SURVEILLANCE REVIEW—EXTERNAL COMMENTARY—SURVEILLANCE IN A WORLD OF VOLATILE CAPITAL FLOWS

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [2014 TRIENNIAL SURVEILLANCE REVIEW—EXTERNAL COMMENTARY—SURVEILLANCE IN A WORLD OF VOLATILE CAPITAL FLOWS](https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2014/_073014k.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2014/_073014k.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2014/_073014k.pdf.json)

---

### Overview and key proposal themes
- The paper identifies "Four innovations" to make Fund surveillance more effective:
  - More needs to be done to allay suspicions that Fund analysis is excessively anchored in the orthodoxy favored in industrial-country Treasuries.
  - Bilateral surveillance could be used more effectively to help countries manage volatile capital flows with appropriate signaling to markets.
  - Surveillance should promote a collective process to get major countries to coordinate macro policies to reduce global instability risk.
  - Introduce a system of external critiques of IMF surveillance reports to open the process to greater scrutiny.
- The author: Montek S. Ahluwalia (views are the author's and do not necessarily represent IMF views or IMF policy).
- Date: July 30, 2014.

### Tailoring analysis to reflect structural constraints
- Findings:
  - There is a widespread perception among developing countries that the Fund’s analysis is excessively anchored in conventional policy analysis and not open enough to heterodox solutions (paragraph 1).
  - Structuralist characteristics cited as reasons for heterodoxy include: weak institutions, missing markets (notably forward markets and deep and liquid debt markets), supply side rigidities, and information asymmetries (paragraph 1).
  - These structural constraints can produce long lags in policy impact and generally make policy less effective; neglecting them is cited as a key weakness in Fund analysis (paragraph 1).
- Policy recommendation:
  - Fund staff should be specifically tasked to take into account the structural constraints that dominate the domestic debate when making policy recommendations; acknowledgement of constraints may not alter recommendations but should modify assessments of expected outcomes to avoid unrealistic claims (paragraph 2).

### The merits of regulating capital flows
- Findings:
  - The expanded scale and increased volatility of capital flows presents major challenges for exchange rate management in emerging market countries, with pressures driven by factors often unconnected with the domestic economy (paragraph 3).
  - The current consensus (to which the Fund subscribes) recognizes that developing countries may need to intervene, including by imposing capital controls—a departure from the “either fully fixed or fully flexible” approach (paragraph 4).
  - There is no operational clarity on what types of intervention are appropriate and in what circumstances; the Fund’s institutional view falls short of an operational guide for deciding when and how to resort to capital controls on inflows or outflows, and how best to signal intentions to reverse them (paragraph 4).
- Background and political context:
  - In the mid 1990s Fund Management pushed to amend the Articles of Agreement to make capital account liberalization an explicit objective; this was strongly opposed by developing countries for reasons including that capital account liberalization could not be equated with trade liberalization and could be tied to Fund conditionality (paragraph 5).
  - There is no case or appetite for giving the Fund an explicit mandate to promote capital account liberalization (paragraph 6).
- Proposal for a discipline/regulatory framework:
  - The present freedom for countries to introduce any capital control may add to investor uncertainty; an imbalance exists because trade policy is constrained by WTO rules and banking by internationally agreed rules, while capital flows operate without agreed rules (paragraph 6).
  - Proposed voluntary discipline: countries could subscribe to a system analogous to choosing an exchange rate regime—countries free to choose or change the degree of capital controls while only informing the Fund, preserving sovereignty (paragraph 7).
  - For exceptional, temporary intensification of capital controls, a country could inform the Fund and follow up with consultations indicating intentions to return to status quo when normalcy is restored; this need not involve a fixed timetable but could specify objective trigger conditions for reversal (paragraph 7).
  - Such arrangements would not limit what countries can do but would provide an option to signal actions are exceptional and that the country remains committed to stable capital flows; Fund consultations and monitoring would increase credibility versus unilateral statements (paragraph 8).
- Terminology recommendation:
  - Replace the term “controls on capital flows” with “regulations on capital flows” to treat capital flows as normal but subject to transparent regulatory objectives (paragraph 9).

### The merits of policy coordination
- Findings:
  - Diagnosing the nature of global imbalances is critical and the Fund is extensively engaged; the Fund’s failure to anticipate the crisis of 2008 dented its reputation though the Fund was not alone in that failure (paragraph 10).
  - The harder challenge is using surveillance to achieve sufficient coordination of policies among major countries to improve global outcomes; without an effective mechanism, multilateral surveillance risks being ritualistic (paragraph 11).
- Three essential components of successful policy coordination (paragraph 12):
  - First: sufficient agreement on the nature of underlying imbalance to give broad corrective policy directions.
  - Second: agreement on the relative size of effort to be made by each major country.
  - Third: each major country must be convinced that coordinated action will produce an outcome better for itself than acting alone.
- Practical experience and obstacles:
  - The Fund’s 2006 synchronized bilateral consultations on current account imbalances with major countries was spectacularly unsuccessful—countries agreed a problem existed but each expected corrective steps from others (paragraph 13).
  - Policy coordination requires voluntary sacrifice of sovereignty, which countries are reluctant to accept (paragraph 14).

A. The “Hard” Approach: Amending the Articles of Agreement
- Truman proposal summary (paragraphs 15–17):
  - Amend Articles to clarify member obligations to ensure effective operation of the international monetary system and achieve global economic and financial stability; empower the Fund to prescribe performance parameters across monetary, fiscal, foreign exchange, financial and structural policies for a group of “significant” countries (paragraph 16).
  - Establish basis for punitive action against countries that violate performance parameters and do not heed Fund recommendations (paragraph 16).
  - This would imply very strict surveillance for identified significant countries—tantamount to a permanent Fund program—and is unlikely to be politically acceptable; technical problems exist in agreeing quantified performance parameters, especially if non-performance could trigger corrective action (paragraph 17).
  - The proposal increases Fund power for intensive surveillance without comparable improvement in Fund governance, making it a non-starter (paragraph 18).

B. “Soft” Governance: The G-20 MAP Exercise
- Nature of the approach (paragraphs 19–21):
  - Soft governance is country-led (not Fund-led) consultation among systemically important countries with Fund analytical support (paragraph 19).
  - Component steps:
    - a) Each country defines national objectives consistent with agreed global objectives and the national policy actions to achieve them (paragraph 20a).
    - b) The Fund examines whether each country’s policy choices are consistent with projected improvements; many countries initially failed to specify additional policy actions commensurate with targeted improvements (paragraph 20b).
    - c) The Fund checks whether the sum of individual country projections is consistent with global constraints and helps identify alternative policy combinations if projections are infeasible; answers require consultations among countries with Fund technical support (paragraph 20c).
- Assessment and role for the Fund (paragraphs 21–23):
  - The G-20 MAP has not reached credible agreement consistent with resuming robust growth, but it has generated better understanding and perhaps consensus on broad directions; public positions may understate underlying commonality due to domestic delivery constraints (paragraph 21).
  - The G-20 MAP is a work in progress; while not suited for quick decisions with firm commitments, it provides a framework for continuous high-level consultations among major countries to facilitate collaboration in crises (paragraph 22).
  - The Fund’s multilateral surveillance could strengthen the soft approach if integrated more effectively with the G-20 MAP; the Fund could report G-20 MAP results to the IMFC with its own candid assessment for discussion in the more representative forum (paragraph 23).

### A final thought: external critiques of surveillance reports
- Finding:
  - Surveillance reports are submitted to Management and the Board without a formal mechanism for external professional criticism; Board debate is not equivalent to external, possibly adversarial, professional scrutiny (paragraph 24).
- Proposal:
  - Introduce review by up to two external reviewers, chosen by the country under review, who would comment on the report keeping in mind the country’s official response; comments would go to Management and the Board (paragraph 25).
  - Reviewers should be chosen from a Fund-maintained panel, be of a nationality different from the country under review, and be paid an appropriate consulting fee by the Fund (paragraph 25).
  - The practice would be particularly useful for developing countries that may have reservations about the Fund’s analysis but lack capacity or tactical willingness to engage Management and staff; many countries may opt out if they find reports broadly acceptable (paragraph 26).

*2014 Triennial Surveillance Review—External Commentary: Surveillance In A World Of Volatile Capital Flows*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/np/pp/eng/2014/_073014k.pdf_
