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### Macroeconomic stabilization and remaining vulnerabilities
- Context (2011–14):
  - Portugal faced a sudden stop in capital inflows in 2011 and implemented fiscal adjustment and structural reforms to restore credibility and growth.
  - Outcomes: fiscal deficits declined, exports grew, current account moved to surpluses, output expanded after a sharp contraction in 2011–12, unemployment has been decreasing since 2013, and market access was restored in 2013 with historically low borrowing costs.
- Stock vulnerabilities that remain:
  - High public debt.
  - High private debt.
  - High nonperforming loans (NPLs).
  - Underutilization of labor (high labor slack).
  - Low investment.
- Macro policy challenge:
  - Maintain external balance (EB) while restoring internal balance (IB) by raising competitiveness and potential growth (movement along the EB line).
  - Avoid a leftward shift of the IB line (reduction in potential growth without competitiveness improvements), which would yield prolonged low growth and high labor slack.

### Chapter highlights and policy prescriptions (selected)
- Chapter 2 — Restoring internal balance: creating jobs for lower-skilled workers
  - Lower-skilled workers bore the brunt of employment losses; job gains for lower-skilled have been limited during the recovery.
  - Simulations using a production function with skilled and lower-skilled labor suggest present policies and growth projections are unlikely to create sufficient jobs to absorb labor slack over the medium term.
  - Policy measures:
    - Structural reforms in public and financial sectors (see Chapter 7).
    - A prudent minimum wage policy.
    - Measures to increase managerial skills.
    - A more inclusive and transparent social partner dialogue for labor market outsiders.
- Chapter 3 — Maintaining external balance: structural reforms to boost competitiveness
  - Portugal achieved strong external adjustment in gross exports, but sustainability is uncertain without continued competitiveness gains.
  - Structural areas lagging peers:
    - Rigid labor markets.
    - High (relative to income) energy prices.
    - Low degree of domestic competition.
    - FDI biased toward nontradables.
- Chapter 4 — Dealing with public debt overhang: fiscal adjustment and challenges
  - Precrisis weak expenditure controls; program adjustment was more revenue-based than planned.
  - Authorities should increase public expenditure efficiency, focusing on public wages and pensions.
  - Little fiscal space to scale up public investment; education reform can improve skills composition.
- Chapter 5 — Corporate debt restructuring
  - Corporate debt rose markedly precrisis and remains high, constraining investment and growth.
  - Recommend a standardized bank-led, time-bound framework to raise bank capital, increase provisioning, and accelerate write-offs to restore private credit flow to viable firms.
- Chapters 6–7 — Structural reforms overview
  - Institutional change should empower the tradables sector.
  - Firm survey: 35 reform areas, 494 reform actions; many reforms had some positive effects but few had significant perceived impact on competitiveness.

### Labor market slack and lower-skilled workers (Chapter 2)
- Headline indicators (2014):
  - Unemployment rate: about 14 percent.
  - Broader labor slack: about 20 percent of available labor resources unemployed, underemployed, or discouraged.
- Key developments since 2008:
  - Conventional unemployment almost doubled since 2008.
  - Involuntary part-timers almost tripled since 2008.
  - Discouraged workers quadrupled since 2008.
  - Portugal has the highest (albeit declining) share of lower-skilled labor in employment in the EU.
- Broader slack measure (method):
  - Add discouraged workers to officially unemployed and labor force; adjust for involuntary part-time by adding 0.5 times involuntary part-time workers to unemployed and discouraged.
- Migration sensitivity:
  - Accounting for permanent net migration during 2008–13 raises the slack rate in 2013 by 1.7 percentage points compared with excluding permanent migration flows.
- Labor absorption modeling (2015–20):
  - Two-level production function calibrated on 2002–14 data; skilled and lower-skilled labor are substitutes; skilled labor and capital equipment are complements.
  - Labor supply baseline uses INE central population projection:
    - INE assumption: net migration will converge from present net outflow of about 13,000 to close to zero by 2020.
  - Baseline additionally assumes discouraged and involuntary part-time slack revert to precrisis (2008) levels.

### Absorption vs baseline scenarios and productivity implications
- Baseline:
  - Staff baseline for output growth and unemployment during 2015–20; skill premium assumed to decline by ½ percent per year on average.
  - Result: number of skilled and lower-skilled jobs created falls far short of restoring precrisis employment rates; lower-skilled employment remains especially depressed.
- Absorption scenario:
  - Determines paths for output growth and skill premium needed to bring slack rates for skilled and unskilled back to 2008 levels via job creation or conversion of involuntary part-time to full-time.
- Output and productivity signals:
  - Absorbing large amounts of lower-skilled labor may not require substantially higher output growth than baseline ("Real GDP index 2014=100" annotated "2.0percent").
  - Absorbing lower-skilled workers likely accompanies a phase of low overall labor productivity growth:
    - Labor Productivity index 2014=100 annotated values: "1.4percent", "0.7percent", "1.0percent".
  - Skill Premium index 2014=100 annotated values: "6.1percent", "3.6percent", "-0.5percent", "-0.3percent".
- Alternative medium-term growth assumptions:
  - IMF staff baseline projects medium-term growth at 1¼ percent.
  - Authorities’ Stability Program projects medium-term growth plateauing at 2½ percent during 2015–19.
  - Projected unemployment rates under both growth paths are almost identical, implying faster growth alone may not absorb lower-skilled workers without targeted policies.

### Production-function framework (Box 2.2) — key modeling inputs
- Two-level aggregate production function with:
  - Skilled labor (Ls) and unskilled labor (Lu).
  - Separate capital structures (K_Structure) and capital equipment (K_Equipment).
  - Neutral technology factor A.
- Parameters and assumptions:
  - Share parameters α, β, γ estimated from Portuguese data.
  - Common elasticity of substitution 1/(1-σ) between equipment and skilled/unskilled implied by estimated σ.
  - Parameter ρ set equal to Krusell et al. (2000) value: 0.5.
  - Skill-biased technological progress: efficiency of skilled labor increases ½ percent each year; unskilled efficiency unchanged.

### Policy considerations for lower-skilled labor
- Minimum wage:
  - Recommendation: prudent approach — update regularly for inflation; real adjustments decided every few years based on employment and productivity trends for lower-skilled workers.
  - Consider complementing with an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) to separate employers’ labor cost from workers’ take-home pay.
  - EITC advantages: targeted to low earners (e.g., families with more children), lower risk of compressing skill premium and substituting lowest-skilled workers with capital or higher-skilled labor.
  - Caveat: EITC design issues and tight fiscal envelope in Portugal.
- Managerial skills:
  - Managerial skill scores are relatively low in Portugal; human resource management particularly weak.
  - Multinationals in Portugal exhibit much higher managerial skill scores than domestic firms.
  - Policy recommendations:
    - Attract more FDI to export sectors.
    - Increase competition in product markets to reduce badly managed firms.
    - Extend programs to promote managerial skills alongside ALMPs; consider private consultants for efficiency.
  - Box 2.3 cross-country managerial scores (selected reported sequences preserved exactly):
    - Figure 2.3.1 sequence: 2.42.52.62.72.82.933.13.23.3 (countries: Greece; Portugal; Ireland; Poland; France; Italy; U.K.; Sweden; Germany).
    - Figure 2.3.2 sequence: 2.32.42.52.62.72.82.933.1 (countries: Greece; Portugal; France; Italy; Ireland; Poland; Sweden; U.K.; Germany).
    - Figure 2.3.3 sequence: 2.42.62.833.23.43.6 (series: Greece; Ireland; Portugal; Poland; U.K.; France; Italy; Germany; Sweden; Domestic firms; Multinationals).

### Early indicators of skill mismatches
- Manufacturing survey indicator ("Percent of firms in manufacturing saying that lack of qualified workers is the most important bottleneck for production") has crept up since 2013 but remains below precrisis levels.
- OECD 2015: Portugal faces multiple skill challenges over the medium term.

### Corporate debt and restructuring (Chapters 5; Boxes 5.1–5.3)
- Corporate leverage and NPLs:
  - NFC debt peaked at more than €214 billion (126.9 percent of GDP) in June 2013.
  - As of June 2015, NFC debt: €201 billion (112.7 percent of projected 2015 GDP).
  - SME segment accounted for about half of outstanding debt.
  - Firms’ leverage ratio: 200 percent as of June 2015.
  - Interest coverage ratio: 3.5 as of end-March 2015.
  - NPLs to corporations: 21.1 percent of loans to corporations in 2015:Q2 (up from 3½ percent in 2008:Q4).
- Real economy impacts:
  - Interest coverage ratio declined from 6.7 at end-2010 to 2.6 at end-2012.
  - Share of firms with overdue loans: 31 percent as of January 2015.
  - Construction sector: about €14.6 billion of bank loans (17 percent of bank loans); one-third of these loans nonperforming.
- Disincentives to restructure:
  - Firm-side: weak corporate governance, personal guarantees, late recourse to restructuring.
  - Bank-side: collateral reliance, difficulty marking collateral, insufficient provisioning, average Common Equity Tier 1 ratio 11.6 percent as of June 2015.
- Recommended framework:
  - A standardized bank-led, time-bound framework that incentivizes banks to raise capital, increase provisioning, and accelerate write-offs.
  - Tighten supervisory policies on provisioning and write-offs; facilitate liquidation of nonviable firms; reform tax treatment to allow deductibility of write-offs and align public creditors’ treatment.
- Tax policy for deleveraging (Box 5.3):
  - Portugal’s measures to limit interest deductibility:
    - 2013: restrict deductibility for net interest payments exceeding €3 million; limit deductibility to 70 percent of EBITDA in 2013 with planned reduction to 30 percent in 2017.
    - IMF FAD estimate: yields €115 million additional revenue in 2017 (from €24 million in 2014).
    - 2014: threshold reduced to €1 million; CIT rate cut from 25 to 23 percent.
  - Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) as a recommended instrument to neutralize debt bias; example: Italy set notional rate at 3 percent for first three fiscal years.

### Structural determinants of Domestic Value-Added (DVA) exports (Chapter 3)
- Key structural relationships (Figure 3.3 and regression tables):
  - Lower employment protection associated with higher DVA exports.
  - Larger unit wage cost gap between services and manufacturing associated with higher DVA exports.
  - Greater intensity of local competition associated with higher DVA exports.
  - Greater integration with global value chains associated with higher DVA exports.
- Selected regression coefficients (from Tables 3.2–3.5; dependent variables: DVA exports and Gross exports, Percent of GDP):
  - DVA exports (Table 3.3 examples):
    - Degree of employment protection: -8.858*** (0.916); alternate specification: -4.078*** (0.922).
    - Unit wage cost gap b/w services and manufacturing: 0.974*** (0.125); 0.964*** (0.183).
    - Intensity of local competition: 5.295*** (1.367); 4.473*** (1.253).
    - Degree of integration with global value chain: 0.978*** (0.083); 0.587*** (0.114).
    - Observations: 170, 214, 168, 216, 134 (vary by column). R-squared: 0.358, 0.224, 0.083, 0.394, 0.667.
  - Gross exports (Table 3.5 examples):
    - Degree of employment protection: -16.183*** (1.979); -5.473*** (1.913).
    - Unit wage cost gap: 2.113*** (0.253); 2.286*** (0.380).
    - Intensity of local competition: 9.596*** (2.866); 6.811*** (2.599).
    - Degree of integration with global value chain: 2.082*** (0.168); 1.344*** (0.237).
- Portugal’s performance and implications:
  - Between 2010 and 2013: empirically implied increase of 2 to 3 percent of GDP in DVA exports versus a 10 percent of GDP growth in gross exports, suggesting much gross export growth reflected increased imports of intermediates.
  - Structural rankings (2014/latest):
    - Portugal ranked 21st among EU countries in labor market efficiency.
    - Intensity of local competition ranked 22nd among EU countries.
    - Portuguese consumers pay among the highest income-adjusted energy prices (next to only Cyprus).
    - Most FDI flows into nontradables rather than tradables.
  - Policy priorities to sustain external adjustment:
    - Strengthen external competitiveness via structural reforms: labor market flexibility, boost manufacturing/tradables, intensify local competition, and improve integration with global value chains.

### Fiscal outcomes, public debt, and expenditure policy (Chapter 4)
- Public debt and fiscal dynamics:
  - Debt-to-GDP ratio: 130.2 percent of GDP at end-2014.
  - Gross public debt nearly doubled from 2006 to 2014.
  - Fiscal deficit reached 11.2 percent of GDP in 2010 (ESA95).
  - Sources of debt increase:
    - About two-thirds due to fiscal deficits (loose fiscal policies since euro adoption and adverse interest-rate movements).
    - Expansion of public expenditure: public expenditure increased by more than 9 percentage points of GDP between 2000 and 2010; social benefits rose by +5.7 percentage points of GDP.
    - Cumulative PPP investment of 12 percent of GDP in 1990–2011; reclassification of several SOEs to general government added over 10 percent of GDP to public debt.
- Program outcomes 2010–14:
  - Target: reach fiscal deficit of 3 percent of GDP by 2013 (from 9.1 percent of GDP in 2010).
  - Implemented overall primary structural adjustment of 8.8 percent of GDP since 2010.
  - Shift to a sizable structural primary surplus since 2012.
  - Composition: nearly half of structural primary adjustment from 2011–14 came from higher revenue (VAT and PIT) rather than planned expenditure consolidation.
  - General government gross fixed capital formation reduced by about 3.3 percent of GDP (2010–14).
- Spending trends (selected exact figures):
  - Non-interest current spending declined by 0.9 percent of GDP (2010–2014).
  - Compensation of employees fell by –1.9 percent of GDP (2010–2014).
  - Social benefits rose by 1.1 percent of GDP (2010–2014).
  - Total expenditure (% of GDP): 2008: 45.3; 2009: 50.2; 2010: 51.8; 2011: 50.0; 2012: 48.5; 2013: 49.9; 2014: 51.7; Difference (2014 ̶ 2010): -0.1 percentage points of GDP.
  - Current spending (% of GDP): 2008: 41.3; 2009: 45.4; 2010: 44.6; 2011: 45.6; 2012: 45.3; 2013: 46.7; 2014: 45.7; Difference (2014 ̶ 2010): 1.1.
  - Interest payments (% of GDP): 2008: 3.1; 2009: 3.0; 2010: 2.9; 2011: 4.3; 2012: 4.9; 2013: 4.9; 2014: 4.9; Difference (2014 ̶ 2010): 2.0.
  - Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP): 2008: 3.7; 2009: 4.1; 2010: 5.3; 2011: 3.5; 2012: 2.5; 2013: 2.2; 2014: 2.0; Difference (2014 ̶ 2010): -3.3.
- Spending by level of government (percent of GDP):
  - General Government nominal primary spending: 2000: 39.6; 2001: 41.1; 2005: 44.1; 2010: 48.9; 2014: 44.0; Change 2000 ̶ 2010: 9.3; Change 2010 ̶ 2014: -4.9.
  - Central Government: 2000: 29.3; 2001: 30.2; 2005: 32.8; 2010: 36.1; 2014: 31.8; Change 2000 ̶ 2010: 6.8; Change 2010 ̶ 2014: -4.3.
  - Local Government: 2000: 5.9; 2001: 6.3; 2005: 6.4; 2010: 7.4; 2014: 6.1; Change 2000 ̶ 2010: 1.5; Change 2010 ̶ 2014: -1.3.
  - Social Security Funds: 2000: 9.3; 2001: 9.7; 2005: 10.7; 2010: 12.4; 2014: 13.3; Change 2000 ̶ 2010: 3.1; Change 2010 ̶ 2014: 0.9.
- Expenditure rules and MTBF reforms:
  - Recommendation: adopt expenditure rules excluding interest payments; extend MTBF coverage to social security and own-source revenue spending; set real primary expenditure targets to achieve annual structural adjustment under SGP.
  - Estimate: keeping real primary expenditures unchanged in real terms from 2016 to 2018 consistent with authorities’ April 2015 Stability Program targeting reduction in primary spending of 3.3 percent of GDP from 2015 to 2019.
- Public sector employment and compensation:
  - General government employment declined about 10 percent between 2011 and 2014.
  - Table of employees (general government): 2011: 727,294; 2012: 699,480; 2013: 674,338; 2014: 655,820; Percent change (2011-2014): -9.8.
  - Public entities out of general government (2012–2014 percent change): Total Public Entities: 2012: 72,855; 2013: 57,986; 2014: 57,512; Percent change (2012-2014): -21.1.
- Pensions:
  - Reforms implemented: sustainability factor (2007), legal retirement age increased to 66 years with automatic increases linked to life expectancy, suspension of pension indexation (excluding minimum pensions), solidarity surcharge on higher pensions, convergence law for public sector pensions (March 2014).
  - Public pension spending path (EC 2015): increase to 15.0 percent of GDP in 2030; gradual decline to 13.8 percent of GDP by 2055.
  - Dependency ratio expected to more than double by 2050, becoming highest in the EU.
  - Recommendation: limit indexation, shorten transition periods, reduce grandfathering, tighten CGA eligibility, consider raising employees’ CGA contribution gradually (example: 1 percentage point increase yields about 0.1 percent of GDP annually).

### Public investment, maintenance, and education
- Public investment and capital stock:
  - Portugal’s long precrisis public investment led to a large public capital stock; little need to scale up further.
  - If current public investment levels are maintained, capital stock would converge to the euro area level by 2022; without adequate maintenance, public capital stock could deplete back to 1993 levels by 2030.
  - Footnote specifics: caps set to €1 million in net interest payments; cap on percentage of EBITDA from 70 percent in 2013 to 30 percent in 2017; central government SOEs investment in fixed assets about 0.4 percent in 2012 and 2013, net of government investment grants (0.3 percent of GDP).
- Education:
  - Education spending rose before adjustment (+0.7 percent of GDP over 2000–10) and remains above EU average.
  - Student numbers: overall students fell 2.4 percent between 1998 and 2012; primary students projected to shrink by about 20 percent during 2013–30 and another 15 percent during 2030–60.
  - Staff costs as share of current spending for public institutions: 92.1 percent in 2011 (EU average 77.2 percent).
  - Policy recommendations: align staffing with shrinking school-age population, continue structural reforms, develop vocational training, reduce early dropout, decentralize decision making, strengthen teacher training and evaluation.

### Firm-level exports and structural reform implementation (Chapters 7 and Boxes)
- Firm-level export dynamics (2010–12):
  - Net change in exports by all manufacturing firms: €5.2 billion.
  - Components (2010–12):
    - Persistent exporters: €4.7 billion (19.1 percent change); domestic sales –0.1; value added –0.4.
    - Other firms: €0.4 billion (17.1 percent change); domestic sales –1.9; value added –1.3.
    - Established firms not persistent exporters increased exports by €2.0 billion; firms that exported in 2010 but not in 2012 reduced exports by €1.7 billion.
  - Persistent exporters characteristics (Table 7.3):
    - Workers per firm: All firms 16.3; Persistent Exporters 73.7; All other firms 10.2.
    - Value added per worker (Euros per year): All firms 26,601; Persistent Exporters 34,369; All other firms 20,571.
    - Investment per worker (Euros per year): All firms 4,629; Persistent Exporters 6,733; All other firms 2,996.
    - Return on Equity (ROE) (Percent): All firms 4.8; Persistent Exporters 8.4; All other firms -1.0.
    - Debt/Equity (Ratio): All firms 1.8; Persistent Exporters 1.7; All other firms 2.0.
    - Debt/Value added (Percent): All firms 322.5; Persistent Exporters 326.2; All other firms 317.7.
    - Debt/EBITDA (Ratio): All firms 8.6; Persistent Exporters 7.1; All other firms 11.8.
- Reform architecture and firm perceptions:
  - Program: 4 reform fields, 35 reform areas, 73 reform objectives, 494 reform actions; about half of actions in initiating or legislating phases; about a third focused on implementation.
  - Firm survey (response rate 17.4 percent) findings:
    - Many reforms perceived as having some positive impact; few perceived as having significant impact on competitiveness.
    - Labor market reforms perceived most positively; product market reforms perceived least positively.
    - Firms prioritize revisiting public and financial sector reforms, improving public administration, courts, payment discipline, and insolvency frameworks.
- Implementation lessons (Box 7.2 port reforms example):
  - Port reform objective: reduce user cost by 25–30 percent.
  - Actions: port labor law (February 2013); elimination of TUP Cargo fee (January 2014); renegotiations of port concessions (April 2014); transport regulator bylaws (May 2014).
  - Measured outcomes: authorities estimate 16 percent reduction in port invoice costs (2011–13); private sector study estimates 2 percent decline; both short of 25–30 percent objective.
  - Reasons for limited impact: slow implementation, transport regulator not operational, lack of legal mechanisms to ensure pass-through of efficiency gains, renegotiations ongoing.

### Key data highlights (Appendix Table 3.1.1 and other datapoints)
- DVA exports: Mean 28.7; Standard Deviation 8.8; Minimum 9.8; Maximum 53.1; Unit: Percent of GDP; Observations: 216.
- Gross exports: Mean 45.2; Standard Deviation 18.2; Minimum 13.3; Maximum 96.0; Unit: Percent of GDP; Observations: 216.
- Employment protection (Index): Mean 2.0; Standard Deviation 0.7; Minimum 0.8; Maximum 3.8; Observations: 170.
- Unit wage cost gap services vs manufacturing (Index): Mean 4.5; Standard Deviation 4.3; Minimum -4.1; Maximum 23.9; Observations: 214.
- Intensity of local competition (Index): Mean 5.4; Standard Deviation 0.5; Minimum 4.1; Maximum 6.4; Observations: 168.
- Integration with global value chain (Percent): Mean 73.8; Standard Deviation 5.7; Minimum 59.8; Maximum 85.6; Observations: 216.
- PPP-based GDP per capita: Mean 26.2; Standard Deviation 9.1; Minimum 7.8; Maximum 42.7; Unit: Thousand US$; Observations: 216.
- Real exchange rate deviation: Mean 6.8; Standard Deviation 12.0; Minimum -18.8; Maximum 54.5; Unit: Percent; Observations: 216.
- Real growth of major trade partners' domestic demand: Mean 1.9; Standard Deviation 2.0; Minimum -4.2; Maximum 4.4; Unit: Percent; Observations: 216.

*Source: IMF staff (content unit _eur1602).*

### FOREWORD ______________________________________________________________________________________ x

### FOREWORD

### Macroeconomic stabilization and recovery (2011–14)
- In 2011, following years of large-scale external imbalance financed by debt, Portugal lost the confidence of its creditors and faced a sudden stop in capital inflows to the public sector, banks, and corporations.
- To restore credibility and economic growth, the country embarked on a path of fiscal adjustment and structural reforms.
- By many metrics, Portugal’s 2011–14 macroeconomic stabilization program has been a success:
  - Fiscal deficits declined as revenues rose and spending was constrained, arresting the accumulation of public debt.
  - Exports grew strongly, and the current account began to register surpluses for the first time in decades.
  - Following a sharp contraction in 2011–12, output expanded steadily.
  - The headline unemployment rate has been decreasing since 2013.
  - Market access was restored in 2013, with Portugal enjoying historically low borrowing costs, aided by a supportive monetary policy stance.

### Remaining vulnerabilities and constraints
- Despite the recovery, substantial stock vulnerabilities remain:
  - High public debt.
  - High private debt.
  - High nonperforming loans (NPLs).
  - Underutilization of labor (high labor slack).
  - Low investment.
- These constraints weigh on activity, employment, and medium-term growth prospects.

### Macro policy challenge: restoring internal balance while maintaining external balance
- The key challenge is to maintain external balance (EB) while returning to internal balance (IB) by raising competitiveness and potential growth through structural reforms (movement along the EB line).
- A less desirable alternative would be a reduction in potential growth without competitiveness improvements (shift of the IB line to the left), which would result in prolonged low growth, high labor market slack, and high unemployment.
- The agenda requires:
  - Restoring internal balance.
  - Maintaining external balance.
  - Reducing public and corporate debt overhangs.
  - Generating sustainable growth.

### Chapter highlights and policy prescriptions
- Chapter 2 — Restoring internal balance: creating jobs for lower-skilled workers
  - The brunt of employment losses during the recession fell on the lower skilled; the lower skilled have seen few job gains during the recovery so far.
  - Simulations based on a production function with skilled and lower-skilled labor and different capital types suggest that, given present growth projections and policies, job creation is unlikely to be sufficient to absorb existing labor slack over the medium term.
  - Policy measures to support job creation for the lower skilled include:
    - Badly needed structural reforms in the public and financial sectors (see Chapter 7).
    - A prudent minimum wage policy.
    - Measures to increase the limited pool of managerial skills.
    - A more inclusive and transparent social partner dialogue that takes into account the interests of labor market outsiders.

- Chapter 3 — Maintaining external balance: structural reforms to boost competitiveness
  - Portugal achieved impressive external adjustment in recent years, but absent continued competitiveness gains, the recovery may lead to reopening of external imbalances as domestic consumption and investment rebound.
  - The analysis suggests Portugal continues to lag many peers in structural areas linked to higher value added in exports:
    - Rigid labor markets.
    - High (relative to income) energy prices.
    - Low degree of domestic competition.
    - FDI biased toward nontradables sectors.

- Chapter 4 — Dealing with public debt overhang: fiscal adjustment and challenges ahead
  - Weak expenditure controls were key in the buildup of precrisis fiscal imbalances; adjustment under the program was more revenue-based than initially planned.
  - Authorities should focus on increasing public expenditure efficiency, with particular emphasis on public wages and pensions.
  - Expenditure rationalization would create room for pro-growth fiscal measures, such as reduction in the tax debt bias.
  - There is little fiscal space to scale up public investment; however, education reform can positively affect the skills composition of the labor force.

*Prepared by Dmitry Gershenson, Albert Jaeger, and Subir Lall; Poul M. Thomsen, Director of the European Department.*

### Chapter 5 discusses corporate debt restructuring. The level of corporate debt increased

### Chapter 5: Corporate Debt Restructuring; Chapters 6–7: Structural Reforms; Chapter 2: Restoring Internal Balance — Creating Jobs for Lower-Skilled Workers

### Corporate debt restructuring (Chapter 5)
- Findings
  - The level of corporate debt increased markedly in the precrisis years and remains high today, constraining investment and growth.
  - Corporations and banks do not have incentives to speed up debt restructuring, due to weak corporate governance and banks’ reliance on lending backed by assets for which there is no obvious valuation.
  - The current benign environment affords an opportunity to implement a systemic approach to debt restructuring.
- Policy recommendations / Framework proposed
  - Implement a standardized bank-led, time-bound framework that:
    - calls on banks to raise more capital,
    - increase provisioning, and
    - accelerate the pace of write-offs to deal with debt restructuring.
  - Expected outcomes:
    - restore the flow of private credit to viable firms to support economic growth,
    - improve the overall asset quality of the banking system.

### Structural reforms overview (Chapters 6–7)
- Chapter 6: Institutional change
  - Findings
    - Portugal’s working-age population and capital stock are contracting.
    - Productivity growth is stifled by inefficient allocation of resources due to rent-seeking.
  - Objective
    - Institutional change should aim to empower the country’s tradables sector, allowing it to compete successfully in the global economy.
- Chapter 7: Firm survey and reform assessment
  - Empirical evidence
    - On staff’s count, specific structural reforms were initiated in 35 different reform areas, with 494 reform actions taken.
    - Firms perceived that many of the reforms had some positive effects, but few reforms were perceived as having had a significant impact so far on firms’ competitiveness or growth prospects.
  - Firms’ priorities for further reform
    - Public sector: low efficiency of public administration and courts, payment of bills on time.
    - Financial sector: insolvency and debt restructuring procedures and credit allocation by banks.
- Overall guidance
  - The paper provides a guide to key areas of reform and identifies benchmarks for measuring success based on outcomes.
  - It falls on the authorities to identify specific needs in each sector and ensure reforms induce the needed reallocation of resources from less productive to more productive activities to improve competitiveness and achieve balanced growth.

### Labor market slack and jobs for lower-skilled workers (Chapter 2)
- Context and headline indicators
  - In 2014, the unemployment rate stood at about 14 percent.
  - A broader measure of labor slack indicated that about 20 percent of available labor resources were unemployed, underemployed, or discouraged from looking actively for jobs.
  - The broader slack measure does not take into account migrants who have left the country to work abroad.
- Key labor-market developments since 2008
  - Conventional unemployment almost doubled since 2008.
  - The number of involuntary part-timers has almost tripled since 2008.
  - The number of discouraged workers has quadrupled since 2008.
  - A feature of Portugal’s labor market is the very high (albeit declining) share of lower-skilled labor in employment, by far the highest in the European Union.
- Broader slack measure and divergence
  - A simple broader slack approach: add discouraged workers to the officially unemployed and to the labor force, and adjust for involuntary part-time work by adding 0.5 times involuntary part-time workers to the number of unemployed and discouraged workers.
  - Since the onset of the global financial crisis, the broader slack measure has diverged from the unemployment rate, with labor slack for the lower skilled increasing significantly more than for skilled workers.
- Migration and slack
  - Outward migration can mask actual labor slack; accounting for migration can raise measured slack.
  - Illustrative benchmark: assuming the stock of permanent migrants outside the country was zero in 2007 and cumulating permanent net migration during 2008–13, the slack rate in 2013 would have been 1.7 percentage points higher than a slack rate excluding permanent migration flows.
- Macroeconomic drivers of labor slack
  - Precrisis large external deficits and inflows of foreign savings were channeled largely to consumption, housing, or low-performing firms, while potential growth slowed sharply.
  - The adjustment program restored external balance but opened a large internal imbalance (labor-market slack).
  - Aggregate firm leverage and public debt rose to excessive levels before the crisis; during the program they stabilized, albeit at excessive levels.
  - Unemployment during 2010–12 increased by more than predicted by a historical Okun’s law relationship.
- Labor absorption modeling and assumptions (2015–20)
  - A two-level production function calibrated on 2002–14 data is used to pin down labor demand for skilled and lower-skilled labor; skilled and lower-skilled labor are substitutes, while skilled labor and capital equipment are complements.
  - Labor supply baseline uses INE central population projection.
    - INE projection assumption: net migration of permanent migrants will converge from the present net outflow rate of about 13,000 to close to zero by 2020.
  - An additional labor supply assumption under baseline: the added slack generated by discouraged workers and involuntary part-time workers will revert to precrisis (2008) levels.
- Policy measures to support job creation for lower-skilled workers (Chapter outline)
  - Structural reforms should be complemented by:
    - a prudent minimum wage policy,
    - measures that increase the limited pool of managerial skills, and
    - a more inclusive and transparent social dialogue.

*Source: IMF staff.*

### 5.5 percent

### 5.5 percent

### Demographic context and migration sensitivity
- Charted values appearing in the source: "5.5 percent", "7.0 percent", "5.8 percent", "7.4 percent".
- Portugal: demographic cliff separating the 25–29 years age cohort from the 30–34 years age cohort.
- Germany: demographic cliff separating the 35–39 and 40–44 years age cohorts.
- Implication: population aging in Germany leads Portugal by about 10 years; large worker cohorts in Germany are transitioning to or approaching retirement over the next 5–10 years, which could generate a migration pull for countries like Portugal.
- Note: labor supply projections are sensitive to labor demand developments in Portugal and to population aging and economic trends elsewhere in the EU.

### Labor demand: baseline vs absorption scenarios
- Baseline assumptions:
  - Uses staff’s baseline scenario for output growth and unemployment during 2015–20 to determine demand for two skill categories.
  - Skill premium assumed to continue on its historical trend: decline by ½ percent per year on average.
  - Finding: number of skilled and lower-skilled jobs created under these assumptions falls far short of what would be needed to bring the overall employment rate back to precrisis levels; employment rate for lower-skilled workers remains especially depressed relative to precrisis levels.
- Absorption scenario:
  - Model determines paths for output growth and skill premium needed to bring labor slack rates for both skilled and unskilled workers back to 2008 levels.
  - Discouraged and involuntary part-time worker levels revert to precrisis levels through job creation for the discouraged or shifting involuntary part-time workers to full-time work.
- Panel/chart indications in text:
  - Unemployment rate, Labor slack rate, Employment rate tracked for 2008–2020 under baseline and absorption scenarios for all labor, skilled labor, and lower-skilled labor.

### Production-function framework for labor skills (Box 2.2)
- Framework: two-level aggregate production function with skilled labor (Ls) and unskilled labor (Lu) inputs; separate capital structures (K_Structure) and capital equipment (K_Equipment).
- Technology: neutral technology factor A treated as a residual.
- Labor measured in efficiency units (εs as efficiency index for skilled labor); capital inputs adjusted for utilization.
- Parameters: α, β, γ (share parameters) estimated from Portuguese data; 1/(1-σ) is the (common) elasticity of substitution between equipment and skilled labor and between equipment and unskilled labor; estimated σ based on Portuguese data. 1/(1-ρ) is the elasticity of substitution between equipment and skilled labor; parameter ρ set equal to Krusell et al. (2000) value: 0.5 (expressed in source as "       .").
- Capital-skill complementarity and skill-biased technological progress:
  - Efficiency of skilled labor increases ½ percent each year while unskilled labor efficiency remains unchanged.
- Approximation for growth rate in the skill premium (ratio of skilled wages to unskilled wages) decomposes into:
  - Effect of relative growth rates of skilled and unskilled labor (given skilled labor has grown faster and εs > 1, this effect is unambiguously negative).
  - Effect of capital-skill complementarity (if skilled labor is more complementary with equipment, faster growth in capital equipment than in skilled labor would increase the skill premium).
  - Effect of skill-biased technological progress (positive, will increase the skill premium).

### Output and productivity under absorption scenario
- Implied path for output suggests absorbing large amounts of labor slack may not require output growth rates substantially higher than the baseline because absorbing lower-skilled labor does not require substantially higher growth than absorbing a comparable magnitude of skilled labor (Figure 2.12).
- A phase of absorbing large numbers of lower-skilled workers would likely be accompanied by a phase of low overall labor productivity growth (Figure 2.13).
- Figure/index values and rates appearing in the source:
  - Real GDP index 2014=100 (Figure 2.12): Baseline and Absorption scenario; annotated "2.0percent".
  - Labor Productivity index 2014=100 (Figure 2.13): Baseline and Absorption scenario; annotated "1.4percent", "0.7percent", "1.0percent".
  - Skill Mix index 2014=100 (Figure 2.14): Baseline and Absorption scenario; annotated "40 60 80 100 120 140".
  - Skill Premium index 2014=100 (Figure 2.15): Baseline and Absorption scenario; annotated "6.1percent", "3.6percent", "-0.5percent", "-0.3percent".

### Skill mix, skill premium, and alternative baseline growth
- Skill mix: relative skill mix continues upward trend under both baseline and absorption scenarios, albeit at a slower pace under absorption.
- Skill premium: continues to decline in both scenarios, at a slower pace in the absorption scenario compared with baseline.
- Alternative medium-term growth assumption:
  - IMF staff baseline projects medium-term growth at 1¼ percent.
  - Authorities’ Stability Program projects medium-term growth plateauing at 2½ percent during 2015–19.
  - Figure 2.16 shows projected Real GDP Growth (Percent) for 2014–2019 with two series: "IMF staff projection" and "Stability program 2015-2019".
  - Figure 2.17 shows projected Unemployment Rate in Portugal, 2014–2019 (Percent of labor force); despite different growth projections, unemployment rate projections are almost identical.
- Implication: faster output growth alone may not be sufficient to facilitate absorption of lower-skilled workers without policy changes that provide additional support for this labor market group.

### Skill mismatches and early indicators
- Early indications that finding qualified labor may be emerging as an obstacle to growth:
  - Manufacturing survey indicator ("Percent of firms in manufacturing saying that lack of qualified workers is the most important bottleneck for production") has been creeping upward since the recovery started in 2013 (Figure 2.18).
  - The indicator remains significantly below levels reached before the crisis and has barely changed in other sectors.
- OECD 2015: Portugal faces multiple skill challenges over the medium term.
- Figure 2.18 annotations: "0 5 10 15 20 25 2002200420062008201020122014", "Lack of qualified labor indicator", "Labor slack rate".

### Policy considerations: minimum wage and labor absorption
- Theoretical framing:
  - Minimum wages set a floor for employer wage costs for lower-skilled workers; affect labor absorption and poverty alleviation.
  - Two long-standing questions: To what extent do minimum wages diminish poverty? Are there more efficient poverty-reducing alternatives?
- Empirics:
  - Broad consensus in empirical literature (particularly U.S.): difficult to establish a significant relationship between minimum wages and poverty; results sensitive to estimation technique (e.g., Burkhauser 2014).
  - For Portugal, empirical link between minimum wages and poverty is hard to explore due to lack of counterfactual.
  - Poverty risk in Portugal strongly associated with labor market status: poverty risk increased for unemployed persons (Figure 2.19).
  - Poverty risk strongly associated with number of children in families (Figure 2.20).
  - Earned Income Tax Credits (EITCs) tend to be more efficient in reducing poverty than increasing minimum wages (Hotz and Scholz 2003).
- Policy recommendations and considerations:
  - A more prudent minimum wage approach: update minimum wage regularly for inflation, and decide on real adjustments every few years based on in-depth study of employment and productivity trends for lower-skilled workers.
  - Consider use of an EITC to fight poverty:
    - EITCs lower the risk of raising minimum wages to levels compressing the skill premium such that lowest-skilled workers are substituted by capital or higher-skilled labor.
    - EITCs can be targeted to low earners at particular risk of poverty (e.g., families with many children).
    - Combination of minimum wage floor and EITC could seek to minimize adverse employment effects while targeting poverty reductions.
  - Caveat: EITC design issues and tight fiscal envelope in Portugal.

### Policy considerations: managerial skills and productivity of lower-skilled workers
- Theoretical points:
  - Worker productivity depends on worker’s own skills and on skills of coworkers and managers.
  - Productivity of lower-skilled workers can be increased by raising worker skills, adding capital, or improving managerial quality (complementarities between lower-skilled workers and managers).
  - Improvements in schooling increase scarcity of lower-skilled workers in Portugal.
- Empirics (Portugal-specific):
  - Overall managerial skill scores relatively low compared with other countries.
  - Scores for human resource management particularly low.
  - Multinational firms in Portugal tend to have much higher managerial skill scores than domestic firms.
  - Cross-country literature links high managerial skills to: stronger product market competition; less rigid labor market regulations (better HR management); fewer family-run or government-run firms; greater export orientation.
  - Note: Bloom and others 2012 database covers firms with more than 50 employees and does not cover micro or smaller SMEs that dominate Portugal’s firm distribution.
- Policy recommendations:
  - Attract more FDI to export sectors to harness superior managerial skills of multinational firms.
  - Increase competition in product markets to reduce the number of badly managed firms.
  - Extend and deepen programs to promote managerial skills in Portugal, in parallel with ALMPs; carefully monitor and evaluate public programs.
  - Use of private consultants could be a more efficient route to improving managerial skills.

*International Monetary Fund*

### Box 2.3. Managerial Skills: Cross-Country Evidence

### Box 2.3. Managerial Skills: Cross-Country Evidence

### Summary findings
- Cross-country evidence confirms that managerial skills could be a bottleneck for absorbing labor, and that public policy interventions that focus on improving managerial skills could have high social payoffs.
- Three cross-country findings stand out:
  - First, among the EU countries represented in the sample, Portugal’s overall managerial skills scores are quite low (Figure 2.3.1).
  - Second, among the three managerial skill areas scored—monitoring, targets, human resource management—Portuguese firms are particularly weak on human resource management skills (Figure 2.3.2).
  - Third, multinational firms active in Portugal receive much higher managerial skill scores than domestic firms.

### Evidence and descriptive detail
- Data source and sample:
  - Bloom et al. (2012) assembled a cross-country data set that includes managerial skill scores for 193 Portuguese firms with more than 50 employees.
  - Managerial skills scores source: World Management Survey.
- Supplementary evidence:
  - Martins (2015) focuses on selected programs funded by the EU and finds that firm performance can increase significantly following participation in training programs.
- Figures (values reported exactly as in the source):
  - Figure 2.3.1. Managerial Skills Scores (sequence as presented)
    - 2.42.52.62.72.82.933.13.23.3
    - Countries listed in the figure: Greece; Portugal; Ireland; Poland; France; Italy; U.K.; Sweden; Germany
  - Figure 2.3.2. Human Resources Management (sequence as presented)
    - 2.32.42.52.62.72.82.933.1
    - Countries listed in the figure: Greece; Portugal; France; Italy; Ireland; Poland; Sweden; U.K.; Germany
  - Figure 2.3.3. Management Skills Scores of Multinationals and Domestic Firms (sequence as presented)
    - 2.42.62.833.23.43.6
    - Countries/series listed in the figure: Greece; Ireland; Portugal; Poland; U.K.; France; Italy; Germany; Sweden; Domestic firms; Multinationals

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Managerial skills are a potential constraint on labor absorption; improving managerial skills could yield high social returns.
- Policy actions suggested by the evidence:
  - Consider targeted programs to strengthen managerial and human resource management skills, including leveraging EU-funded training and professional development programs (evidence: Martins (2015) finds significant firm performance gains after participation).
  - Pay particular attention to smaller firms, where managerial skill deficiencies are likely to be more prevalent than in the sampled firms (the sample covers 193 Portuguese firms with more than 50 employees, which are relatively large by Portuguese standards).

*Source: Box 2.3, “Managerial Skills: Cross-Country Evidence,” as presented in the supplied IMF content unit.*

### 3.3 suggests that countries with lower degrees of employment protection tend to have

### _eur1602 - 3.3 suggests that countries with lower degrees of employment protection tend to have

### Structural determinants of Domestic Value-Added (DVA) exports
- Employment protection:
  - Countries with lower degrees of employment protection tend to have higher DVA exports.
  - Employment protection is measured as a simple average of two LAF indicators: (1) regular Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) and (2) temporary EPL.
- Gap in unit wage costs between services and manufacturing:
  - A bigger gap indicates the country’s manufacturing sector is more developed compared with its service sector.
  - The top-right panel of Figure 3.3 suggests a country with a more developed manufacturing sector (vis-à-vis services) tends to have higher DVA exports.
- Intensity of local competition:
  - More intense local competition can boost external competitiveness by forcing domestic producers to raise productivity and cut costs.
  - The bottom-left panel of Figure 3.3 indicates a positive relationship between intensity of local competition and DVA exports.
- Degree of integration with global value chains:
  - Defined as the percent share of global value chain related exports in gross exports.
  - Countries better integrated into global value chains tend to have higher DVA exports (bottom-right panel of Figure 3.3).

### Empirical strength and robustness of the linkages
- Panel regression evidence (Table 3.2) shows the structural indicators:
  - Have strong bilateral relationships with DVA exports, and
  - All their coefficients remain highly significant when included simultaneously in a regression.
- Sample-period robustness (Table 3.3):
  - Coefficients stay highly significant in precrisis samples and in samples covering 2009–11.
  - The strength of the linkages does not seem particularly sensitive to the sample periods.
- Robustness to additional controls (Table 3.4):
  - Relationships between DVA exports and structural indicators stay qualitatively the same even after adding income levels, exchange rates, growth in major trade partners, or time dummies.
- Similar relationships hold for gross exports (Table 3.5):
  - Countries tend to export more if they have:
    - (1) a lower degree of employment protection,
    - (2) a larger unit wage cost gap between services and manufacturing,
    - (3) more intense local competition, and
    - (4) better integration into the global value chain.

### Selected regression coefficients and statistics (from Tables 3.2–3.5)
- From Table 3.3 (dependent variable: DVA exports, Percent of GDP):
  - Degree of employment protection: -8.858*** (0.916) in one specification; other columns show values such as -4.078*** (0.922).
  - Unit wage cost gap b/w services and manufacturing industries: 0.974*** (0.125) and 0.964*** (0.183) in sample columns.
  - Intensity of local competition: 5.295*** (1.367) and 4.473*** (1.253) in sample columns.
  - Degree of integration with global value chain: 0.978*** (0.083) and 0.587*** (0.114) in sample columns.
  - Observations vary by specification: 170, 214, 168, 216, 134 in reported columns.
  - R-squared reported across columns: 0.358, 0.224, 0.083, 0.394, 0.667.
- From Table 3.5 (dependent variable: Gross exports, Percent of GDP):
  - Degree of employment protection: -16.183*** (1.979) and -5.473*** (1.913) in reported columns.
  - Unit wage cost between services and manufacturing industries: 2.113*** (0.253) and 2.286*** (0.380).
  - Intensity of local competition: 9.596*** (2.866) and 6.811*** (2.599).
  - Degree of integration with global value chain: 2.082*** (0.168) and 1.344*** (0.237).
  - Observations and R-squared reported similarly to DVA regressions.

### Where does Portugal stand?
- DVA exports and gross exports, 2010–13:
  - Empirical relationship suggests an increase of 2 to 3 percent of GDP in Portugal’s DVA exports between 2010 and 2013.
  - This contrasts with a 10 percent of GDP growth in gross exports, indicating much of the gross export growth reflected increased imports of intermediate inputs.
  - The 2 to 3 percent of GDP range reflects different assumptions on the change in degree of integration with the global value chain between 2010 and 2013, from no change to a sharp rise.
- Structural rankings and constraints (2014 and latest available data):
  - Portugal ranked 21st among EU countries in terms of labor market efficiency in 2014.
  - Intensity of local competition in Portugal ranked 22nd among EU countries.
  - Portuguese consumers pay among the highest income-adjusted energy prices (next to only Cyprus).
  - Most FDI is flowing into the nontradables sectors rather than tradables.
- Interpretation and implications:
  - Despite stellar external performance measured by gross exports-to-GDP, the improvement may not be fully sustainable when measured by DVA exports.
  - DVA exports exhibit strong and robust empirical linkages with a small set of structural indicators.
  - Portugal continues to lag peers in key structural areas; observed improvement in external performance is likely more transitory than desired.
  - Structural indicators point to key areas for reform: labor market flexibility and development of manufacturing/tradables sectors.

### Summary policy implications and recommendations
- For sustainable external adjustment and higher investment to absorb labor slack:
  - Continue strengthening external competitiveness through structural reforms.
  - Focus on labor market flexibility (reducing employment protection where appropriate and addressing other labor market indicators that relate to DVA exports).
  - Promote development of manufacturing/tradables sectors to raise the unit wage cost gap in favor of manufacturing.
  - Intensify local competition to raise productivity and reduce costs.
  - Improve integration with global value chains to raise the percent share of global value chain related exports in gross exports.
- Specific note for Portugal:
  - As a member of the currency union with limited fiscal space, Portugal has no alternative to structural reforms to sustain competitiveness gains.
  - The structural factors identified are consistent with policy recommendations made during the 2011–14 IMF program.

### Data highlights (Appendix Table 3.1.1)
- DVA exports: Mean 28.7, Standard Deviation 8.8, Minimum 9.8, Maximum 53.1; Unit: Percent of GDP; Number of observations: 216.
- Gross exports: Mean 45.2, Standard Deviation 18.2, Minimum 13.3, Maximum 96.0; Unit: Percent of GDP; Number of observations: 216.
- Employment protection (Index): Mean 2.0, Standard Deviation 0.7, Minimum 0.8, Maximum 3.8; Number of observations: 170.
- Unit wage cost gap between services and manufacturing industries (Index): Mean 4.5, Standard Deviation 4.3, Minimum -4.1, Maximum 23.9; Number of observations: 214.
- Intensity of local competition (Index): Mean 5.4, Standard Deviation 0.5, Minimum 4.1, Maximum 6.4; Number of observations: 168.
- Integration with global value chain (Percent): Mean 73.8, Standard Deviation 5.7, Minimum 59.8, Maximum 85.6; Number of observations: 216.
- PPP-based GDP per capita: Mean 26.2, Standard Deviation 9.1, Minimum 7.8, Maximum 42.7; Unit: Thousand US$; Number of observations: 216.
- Real exchange rate (deviation from long-term mean): Mean 6.8, Standard Deviation 12.0, Minimum -18.8, Maximum 54.5; Unit: Percent; Number of observations: 216.
- Real growth of major trade partners' domestic demand: Mean 1.9, Standard Deviation 2.0, Minimum -4.2, Maximum 4.4; Unit: Percent; Number of observations: 216.

### Dealing with Public Debt Overhang: Fiscal adjustment and challenges ahead (selected points)
- Public debt and fiscal consolidation context:
  - Debt-to-GDP ratio: 130.2 percent of GDP at the end of 2014.
  - Gross public debt nearly doubled from 2006 to 2014, reaching 130 percent of GDP (EDP notification basis).
  - Fiscal deficit reached 11.2 percent of GDP in 2010 (ESA95).
- Sources of debt increase:
  - About two-thirds of the debt increase due to fiscal deficits (loose fiscal policies since euro adoption and adverse interest-rate movements).
  - Contraction in output during 2011–13 contributed to the debt ratio increase.
  - Expansion of social spending: public expenditure increased by more than 9 percentage points of GDP between 2000 and 2010; social benefits rose by +5.7 percentage points of GDP.
  - Off-budget spending and contingent liabilities:
    - Cumulative PPP investment of 12 percent of GDP in 1990–2011.
    - Reclassification of several SOEs to general government added over 10 percent of GDP to public debt.
- Program strategy and outcomes:
  - IMF-supported Extended Arrangement aimed to stabilize public debt through sharp improvement in the primary balance and reach a fiscal deficit of 3 percent of GDP by 2013 (from 9.1 percent of GDP in 2010).
  - Structural fiscal reforms prioritized: arrears monitoring, commitment controls, subnational financial arrangements, PPP and SOE fiscal risk management, and tax administration modernization.
  - Outcomes 2010–14:
    - Overall primary structural adjustment of 8.8 percent of GDP implemented since 2010.
    - Shift to a sizable structural primary surplus since 2012.
    - Composition deviated from program design: nearly half of the structural primary adjustment from 2011–14 came from higher revenue (VAT and PIT changes) rather than the planned expenditure consolidation.
    - General government gross fixed capital formation reduced by about 3.3 percent of GDP under the adjustment program (2010–14); current spending continued to increase.

*Source: IMF staff estimations and text from the provided content unit.*

### 1.1 percent of GDP). Non-interest current spending declined by 0.9 percent of GDP

### _eur1602 - 1.1 percent of GDP). Non-interest current spending declined by 0.9 percent of GDP

### Spending trends and headline fiscal outcomes
- Non-interest current spending declined by 0.9 percent of GDP from 2010 to 2014.
- Compensation of employees fell by –1.9 percent of GDP (2010–2014).
- Social benefits rose by 1.1 percent of GDP (2010–2014).
- The 2014 outturn was revised to reclassify the loan provided to the Portuguese resolution fund for the recapitalization of Novo Banco as a fiscal outlay, increasing the deficit to 7.2 percent of GDP from 4.5 percent as initially reported.
- Total expenditure levels shown (percent of GDP): 2008: 45.3; 2009: 50.2; 2010: 51.8; 2011: 50.0; 2012: 48.5; 2013: 49.9; 2014: 51.7; Difference (2014 ̶ 2010, percentage points of GDP): -0.1.
- Current spending (percent of GDP): 2008: 41.3; 2009: 45.4; 2010: 44.6; 2011: 45.6; 2012: 45.3; 2013: 46.7; 2014: 45.7; Difference (2014 ̶ 2010): 1.1.
- Interest payments (percent of GDP): 2008: 3.1; 2009: 3.0; 2010: 2.9; 2011: 4.3; 2012: 4.9; 2013: 4.9; 2014: 4.9; Difference (2014 ̶ 2010): 2.0.
- Capital spending (percent of GDP): 2008: 4.7; 2009: 4.7; 2010: 7.2; 2011: 4.4; 2012: 3.5; 2013: 3.1; 2014: 5.9; Difference (2014 ̶ 2010): -1.3.
- Gross fixed capital formation (percent of GDP): 2008: 3.7; 2009: 4.1; 2010: 5.3; 2011: 3.5; 2012: 2.5; 2013: 2.2; 2014: 2.0; Difference (2014 ̶ 2010): -3.3.

### Functional composition of spending changes
- From a functional perspective, the reduction in spending was concentrated in the economic and security sectors.
- Between 2010 and 2013, savings in the security sector and economic sector (driven by a sharp decline in transport spending) exceeded total expenditure reduction.
- Cuts in health (mainly on medical products and outpatient services) and education spending (particularly on primary and secondary education) were fully offset by higher social protection spending, driven by public pension outlays.
- General public services outlays increased significantly due to higher debt service payments.
- Functional-class figures (percent of GDP) and differences (2014 ̶ 2010, percentage points of GDP) include:
  - General public services: Difference 0.8.
  - Defense: Difference -0.9.
  - Public order and safety: Difference 0.1.
  - Economic affairs: Difference -1.6.
  - Environment protection: Difference -0.2.
  - Housing and community amenities: Difference 0.0.
  - Health: Difference -0.6.
  - Recreation, culture, and religion: Difference -0.1.
  - Education: Difference -0.9.
  - Social protection: Difference 1.8.

### Spending by level of government and historical growth
- General Government nominal primary spending (percent of GDP) for Portugal: 2000: 39.6; 2001: 41.1; 2005: 44.1; 2010: 48.9; 2014: 44.0; Change 2000 ̶ 2010: 9.3; Change 2010 ̶ 2014: -4.9.
- Central Government (percent of GDP) for Portugal: 2000: 29.3; 2001: 30.2; 2005: 32.8; 2010: 36.1; 2014: 31.8; Change 2000 ̶ 2010: 6.8; Change 2010 ̶ 2014: -4.3.
- Local Government (percent of GDP) for Portugal: 2000: 5.9; 2001: 6.3; 2005: 6.4; 2010: 7.4; 2014: 6.1; Change 2000 ̶ 2010: 1.5; Change 2010 ̶ 2014: -1.3.
- Social Security Funds (percent of GDP) for Portugal: 2000: 9.3; 2001: 9.7; 2005: 10.7; 2010: 12.4; 2014: 13.3; Change 2000 ̶ 2010: 3.1; Change 2010 ̶ 2014: 0.9.
- Real primary spending growth outpaced real output growth for all levels of government in 2000–10, particularly in the social security sector; by comparison, euro area countries’ real growth in primary spending was more in line with real output growth.

### Creating fiscal space: expenditure rules and MTBF reforms (policy recommendations)
- Empirical evidence suggests that spending rules are associated with expenditure containment and higher primary balances, and have a higher likelihood of compliance than other fiscal rules.
- Recommendation: Expenditure rules should exclude interest payments to neutralize the impact of shifts in financial market conditions on interest costs and to ensure savings from favorable market conditions are applied to debt reduction.
- Since 2012, Portugal’s MTBF sets expenditure ceilings for 10 high-level programs for the budget year plus one, and a binding overall spending limit for budget years plus two and three; Portugal has integrated the “expenditure benchmark” of the SGP in national legal framework, but it has yet to be implemented.
- Real primary expenditure targets should preferably be set to achieve the annual structural adjustment called for under the SGP.
- Estimates: Keeping real primary expenditures unchanged in real terms from 2016 to 2018 would be consistent with the adjustment envisaged in the authorities’ April 2015 Stability Program, which targets a reduction in primary spending of 3.3 percent of GDP from 2015 to 2019.
- Institutional requirements to make spending rules operational:
  - Real primary expenditure targets should cover all general government expenditure and be sufficiently binding across all levels of government.
  - The new Budget Framework Law 151/2015 requires that from 2019 the MTBF also covers social security (excluding unemployment spending) and expenditures financed with own-source revenues.
  - Indicative aggregate spending targets for local governments and social security funds should be set in the medium-term fiscal strategy or a specific fiscal law.
  - The intergovernmental coordination council should monitor local government outturns.
  - Mechanisms to monitor and adjust spending should include incentives for local governments (linking central transfers to expenditure targets) and alert mechanisms for health spending with obligations for in-year corrective actions.
  - MTBF extension is needed to better capture central government spending financed by own revenue sources.
- Specific policy measures to contain spending should focus on public sector wages and pensions:
  - Public sector wages and pensions account for nearly 25 percent of GDP and more than half of non-interest government spending.
  - Wage bill reductions achieved under the program may be reversed over the medium term in line with Constitutional Court rulings.
  - Public spending on pensions continued to increase, albeit at a slower pace since 2010, and remains significantly above the euro area average.
- The authorities’ Stability Program targets expenditure savings of 2.5 percent of GDP from 2015 to 2019 from rationalization of the public sector wage bill and social security reform.

### Determinants of Portuguese interest rates (Box 4.1 findings)
- Portuguese 10-year yields spiked during 2008–09 global turbulence, receded with market conditions, and rose again during the European debt crisis; several factors drove yields down since early 2012:
  - A package of economic reforms.
  - Macroeconomic recovery.
  - Elevated investor risk sentiment easing.
  - Establishment of a more robust European backstop.
- Stylized facts indicate global factors explain most of the decline in spread volatility:
  - Credit ratings across European sovereigns did not improve significantly, but their relationship with spreads was compressed.
  - Outlier trading days with Portuguese spread moves greater than two standard deviations saw other European sovereign spreads move in the same direction, implying common global drivers.
- Figures and indices cited include measures of sovereign spreads and investor risk aversion (VIX; VDAX; European High Yield Bond Index) and analyses of spread decompositions on event dates.

*Sources: INE; Eurostat; and IMF staff estimates.*

### Box 4.1. Determinants of Portuguese Interest Rates (Concluded)

### Box 4.1. Determinants of Portuguese Interest Rates (Concluded)

### Determinants of Portuguese 10-year sovereign bond spreads
- Panel regressions with domestic, pan-European, and global variables indicate global and euro area-wide factors played a lead role in the decline in spreads.
- Estimates imply Portuguese sovereign yields could rise significantly if investor risk sentiment and conditions in Europe return to their average values over the past 15 years.
- Improvements in Portuguese economic flow variables have been largely offset by persistent stock imbalances, which continue to weigh on investors’ assessments.
- Quantile regressions indicate:
  - Portuguese spreads are particularly sensitive to stock imbalances, especially the public debt-to-GDP ratio, when spreads are high.
  - Sensitivity to measures of risk aversion holds at all spread levels.
- Several local factors (not included in the panel analysis due to data limitations) may have contributed to the decline in spreads, including:
  - perceptions of Portuguese program ownership;
  - establishment of a sizable cash buffer;
  - lengthening of average debt maturity;
  - diversification of the investor base.
- Alternative methodologies (for example, a risk-on/risk-off regime-switching model) might suggest current spreads can be maintained as long as current conditions persist.
- Policy-relevant implication:
  - If observed gains reflect greater investor confidence in the European backstop, these gains may be treated as largely permanent.
  - Normalization of investor risk sentiment (for example, monetary policy liftoff in the United States and other global sources of volatility) could cause a shift in credit risk pricing.
  - A decisive and durable reduction in stock imbalances would help limit Portuguese fiscal exposure to such global conditions and secure recent gains from other reforms.

### Public Sector Employment and Compensation — key findings
- General government employment declined by about 10 percent between 2011 and 2014.
- Table of employees (number of employees):
  - General government: 2011: 727,294; 2012: 699,480; 2013: 674,338; 2014: 655,820; Percent change (2011-2014): -9.8
  - Central government: 2011: 551,373; 2012: 529,844; 2013: 509,520; 2014: 497,020; Percent change (2011-2014): -9.9
  - Local governments: 2011: 163,178; 2012: 157,324; 2013: 153,072; 2014: 148,078; Percent change (2011-2014): -9.3
  - Social Security Funds: 2011: 12,743; 2012: 12,312; 2013: 11,746; 2014: 10,722; Percent change (2011-2014): -15.9
- Public entities out of general government (2012–2014 percent change):
  - Total Public Entities out of general government: 2012: 72,855; 2013: 57,986; 2014: 57,512; Percent change (2012-2014): -21.1
  - Central government component: 2012: 56,135; 2013: 41,608; 2014: 41,348; Percent change (2012-2014): -26.3
  - Local governments component: 2012: 16,720; 2013: 16,378; 2014: 16,164; Percent change (2012-2014): -3.3
  - Total Public sector: 2011: 772,335; 2012: 732,324; 2013: 713,332; Percent change (2011-2013): -7.6
- Attrition was the main driver of employment rationalization; mobility pool and termination scheme proved less successful than expected.
- Efforts to contain the public wage bill by curtailing compensation spending were less successful because of successive Constitutional Court (CC) rulings:
  - A first round of wage cuts was permitted by the court but are expected to be fully reversed by end-2016, at a total cost of 0.3 percent of GDP.
  - Suspension of holiday and Christmas allowances for civil servants after 2012 (and second wave of wage cuts adopted in the 2014 Budget Law) were successively canceled (with no retroactive effect).
  - As a result, average monthly public earnings now exceed its end-2011 level, partly due to the payment of the Christmas bonus in 12 installments.
- Structural reforms that were expected to generate savings will have limited short- and medium-term impact due to design issues and extensive phasing-in:
  - Single Wage Scale expected savings: about 0.4 percent of GDP (initial expectation).
  - Expected savings from Single Supplements Scale: about 0.1 percent of GDP.
- CC decisions impose legal constraints on future wage-bill consolidation:
  - Consolidation must be through structural reforms of public employment rather than nominal wage cuts.
  - Burden of fiscal consolidation must be shared between civil servants and the rest of the population.
- Public sector fragmentation and reform scope:
  - Portugal has 6,095 separate institutional units.
  - Central government comprises 331 units, including 298 autonomous funds and services.
  - Progress under program included reclassification of 141 SOEs within general government, privatization or dissolution of about half of local SOEs, and a reduction of nearly one-third in the number of parishes responsible for municipal administration.
  - A large number of SOEs remain outside general government; a reassessment of roles and functions of government levels is needed.
- Recommended measures to rationalize public employment and wages:
  - Increase natural attrition, target overstaffed sectors (including education where staffing needs should fall with declining school-age population).
  - Enhance the requalification pool and scale up termination by mutual agreement.
  - Enforce increase in required working hours to 40 per week across the public sector, particularly in local governments.
  - Reduce disparity between public and private sector wages:
    - Identify specific skills needed in public sector and revise relatively flat wage structure that depends mostly on years of experience rather than performance.
  - Further slow automatic progression by lengthening maximum duration for a civil servant in each scale level, anchored on extensions of retirement age, to make career progression more gradual.
- Wage drift concerns:
  - Automatic progression historically led to early attainment of higher wage levels and contributed to wage drift.
  - Authorities have replaced automatic progression with promotions and salary increases linked to staff appraisals and subject to budget constraints.

### Pension System — key findings and recommendations
- Reforms implemented include:
  1. Introduction of a “sustainability factor” in 2007 linking initial benefits with improvements in life expectancy at retirement.
  2. Increase in the legal retirement age to 66 years, with further automatic increases linked to life expectancy.
  3. Suspension of pension indexation (excluding minimum pensions).
  4. Creation of a solidarity surcharge levied on higher pensions.
  5. For the public sector, a "convergence law" entered into force in March 2014, aligning public sector pension rules (CGA) with changes for new entrants to the general social security system.
- Impact of changes limited by legal roadblocks and extensive grandfathering:
  - Reforms introduced will generate savings only over the long term due to grandfathering protecting current retirees.
  - Public pension spending expected path (EC 2015):
    - Increase to 15.0 percent of GDP in 2030.
    - Gradual decline to 13.8 percent of GDP (its 2013 level) only by 2055.
  - EU average projection: gross pension spending spikes at 11.7 percent of GDP in 2035, then declines to 11.3 percent in 2055.
- CC rulings invalidated a number of pension changes implemented under the program and require reforms to account for equity and intergenerational solidarity and not undermine acquired rights of current pensioners.
- Demographic pressures:
  - Dependency ratio in Portugal expected to more than double by 2050 to become the highest in the EU.
- Recommended further reforms:
  - Limit indexation and shorten transition period to the new pension system because gross spending on public pensions is expected to increase in the medium term (from 13.8 to 15.0 percent of GDP between 2013 and 2035, according to EC 2015).
  - Revisit indexation mechanisms (based on GDP growth and CPI) that were suspended during the adjustment program (except for minimum pensions).
  - Further reduce grandfathering for those not yet retired and tighten pension eligibility rules, particularly for CGA beneficiaries (civil servants hired before December 2005).
  - Increase employees’ contribution to CGA over time; example: an increase by 1 percentage point of employees’ CGA contribution would provide about 0.1 percent of GDP of additional revenues annually.
  - Consider applying an economic adjustment factor to pension bonuses reinstated by the CC, conditioning payment of bonuses on achievement of a certain level of GDP growth (as in Hungary).
  - Pension reforms could contribute to higher labor force participation through:
    - Increase the reward for additional years of contributions for low-income workers.
    - Set the minimum pension to increase in strict proportion to the number of years of contributions, eliminating current step increases at 20 and 30 years that create informality incentives.

### Supporting Growth through Targeted Fiscal Measures — Growth-friendly tax policy
- General principles:
  - Corporate tax reform and increased incentives for labor force participation are typical growth-friendly tax policy recommendations.
  - Corporate income taxes are generally most harmful to growth, followed by personal income taxes, then consumption and property taxes (OECD 2010).
  - Shifting from direct income tax to indirect consumption and property tax is usually supportive of growth, but VAT is regressive in advanced economies and reforms should balance distributional and efficiency objectives.
  - Minimizing exemptions or reduced VAT rates and using proceeds to increase social benefits can significantly reduce inequality while boosting tax revenues (IMF 2014a/b).
  - Increasing tax incentives for private R&D spending supports innovation and productivity growth.
- Portugal-specific facts and developments:
  - In 2012, labor taxation in Portugal was significantly lower than the euro area average and lower than in other southern European countries, while implicit taxation of capital was significantly higher.
  - Recent program-period developments: decline in implicit taxation on capital and increase in the share of indirect taxation, in particular VAT.
  - Incidence analysis indicates corporate taxes tend to fall on labor to the extent labor is less mobile than capital; empirical evidence suggests between 45 and 75 percent of corporate tax burden falls on wages (IMF 2014a/b).
  - Despite reforms, implicit taxation of labor increased during the program period through higher PIT.
- Corporate income tax (CIT) reforms:
  - 2013 comprehensive reform package addressed CIT deficiencies:
    - CIT rate reduced from 25 percent in 2013 to 21 percent in 2015.
    - Reform of provisions applicable to holding corporations to attract and retain multinational companies.
    - 2014 revision of previously ineffective investment tax incentives to offer higher CIT credits for investment in poor regions, information and communication technologies, and SMEs.
  - Tax incentives for R&D in Portugal compare favorably with peers; little need to expand current framework. 2013 reforms introduced intellectual property incentives for income derived from patents and extended carry-forward period for R&D spending.
- Recommended future tax reforms:
  - Focus on eliminating capital tax-induced distortions to growth and reducing informality and tax avoidance.
  - Authorities committed to further reductions in standard CIT rate; priority should be elimination of the state CIT surcharge because its progressive rates create distortions in investment decisions.
  - To partially finance CIT cuts:
    - Remove tax incentives for investment in medium term (removing preferential treatment created by surcharge should improve quality of investment).
    - Reduce VAT exemptions and use of reduced rates to partially offset fiscal costs and shift tax burden from income to consumption.
    - Use targeted transfers and progressive PIT transfers rather than VAT exemptions/reduced rates to support the poor and vulnerable.
    - Revenue administration reforms to lower compliance costs and reduce tax avoidance.
  - Introduce a deduction for corporate equity (allowance for corporate equity, ACE) to reduce corporate debt bias and help corporate deleveraging:
    - ACE provides deduction for normal return on equity (proxy: government bond rate).
    - Estimates for selected advanced countries suggest ACE would have significant impact on deleveraging and output gains (De Mooij, Keen, and Orihara 2015).
    - Tentative calculations indicate ACE for advanced countries involves average budgetary cost of 0.5 percent of GDP; revenue cost can be mitigated by applying ACE only to new investment (as recently implemented in Italy).
- Complementary tax-policy measures to support labor market reform:
  - Reduce disincentives to labor participation for low-income families who may lose social benefits if a second earner enters the labor force.

*International Monetary Fund*

### introduction of an earned-income tax credit that would separate employers’ labor cost from

### introduction of an earned-income tax credit that would separate employers’ labor cost from 
workers’ take-home pay.

### More Efficient Productive Public Expenditure to Support Growth
- Public infrastructure investment can boost output short-term through demand effects and crowding in private investment, and long-term by raising productive capacity.  
- Debt-financed projects could have large output effects without increasing the debt-to-GDP ratio if clearly identified infrastructure needs are met through efficient investment.  
- Constraints specific to Portugal:
  - High public debt limits scope to increase borrowing without potentially large adverse impacts on financing costs.
  - Public investment in Portugal increased significantly in the two decades before the crisis and was significantly higher than in the euro area until recently, resulting in a large and high-quality public capital stock.
  - Public capital stock is likely underestimated due to the large role of public-private partnerships and SOEs, which are reported outside the general government in public investment.
- Policy implication: There is little need for a further scaling up of public investment; priority should be on maintaining the quality of capital stock.

### Public Investment, Capital Stock, and Maintenance
- If Portugal and other euro area countries maintain current public investment levels in the long term, Portugal’s capital stock would converge to the euro area level by 2022 (even with the drop in public investment in Portugal in 2013–14).
- In the absence of higher spending on maintenance:
  - Portugal’s public capital stock would significantly deplete afterward and return to its 1993 level by 2030.
- Near-term priority: Ensure maintenance spending is sufficient to prevent rapid deterioration in infrastructure quality, particularly in the transport sector where private and public maintenance spending have been low compared to other advanced economies.
- Footnote detail preserved:
  - The cap has been set to €1 million in net interest payments, and has been limited to a percentage of the EBITDA (from 70 percent in 2013 to 30 percent in 2017). In addition, the CIT rate cuts adopted in 2014 will contribute to limit the bias toward debt as less tax is saved at lower rates.
  - Central government SOEs investment in fixed assets was about 0.4 percent in 2012 and 2013, net of government investment grants for private and public investment (0.3 percent of GDP).

### Education Spending, Outcomes, and Efficiency
- Historical and comparative facts:
  - Education spending rose significantly before the adjustment program (+0.7 percent of GDP in total over 2000–10), particularly on secondary and tertiary education.
  - Despite a subsequent decrease, education spending remains above the EU average in percent of GDP and significantly higher than in other southern European countries with higher GDP per capita.
  - Average class size in Portugal was well below the 2012 EU average in primary education, with significantly lower student-teacher ratios at the secondary level.
- Outcomes:
  - Despite higher average growth in attainment rates in Portugal than the EU average over 2000–12, education attainment remains lower for both tertiary and non-tertiary educations.
  - Portugal’s PISA scores significantly improved between 2003 and 2012 but remain below the EU average in mathematics and science.
- Fiscal cost and staffing:
  - Teachers benefit from a significant wage premium compared with other workers with tertiary education, while the EU average shows a large compensation gap for teachers.
  - Staff costs as a share of current spending (92.1 percent, for public institutions only) were the highest in the EU in 2011 (the EU average was 77.2 percent) (OECD 2014).
- Demographic trends and implications:
  - Overall number of students in Portugal fell by 2.4 percent between 1998 and 2012, and is projected to decline further.
  - Number of students at the primary level is expected to shrink by about 20 percent during 2013–30 and by a commensurate further 15 percent during 2030–60, with a commensurate decline in the number of secondary students as they move through the system (IMF 2013).
  - Student projections for Portugal differ significantly from comparators and the EU average, which are expected to see a limited decline (Spain, EU average) or a small increase (Ireland, Italy).
- Policy recommendations for education:
  - Better align staffing levels with the shrinking school-age population, including further adjustment to the school network and number of teachers, particularly in rural areas.
  - Continue ambitious structural reforms launched to improve education quality, including rationalization of the school network and reduction in staffing.
  - Future priorities: a new vocational training system to better match private sector needs, a program to reduce early dropout rates and increase education attainment, transfer of decision making to the local level, reducing grade repetition, better supporting disadvantaged students and schools, increasing family choices, strengthening teacher training and evaluation, and further decentralizing decision making.

### Improving Management and Implementation of Fiscal Reforms
- The IMF-supported program provided institutional setup to discuss and monitor fiscal reforms and leverage for effective implementation:
  - A reform unit was created within the prime minister’s office to centralize and manage policy discussions on structural reforms.
  - Various ad hoc committees carried out public policy evaluations, such as the expenditure review in 2012 and more recent pension reform reviews.
  - The program provided a framework for monitoring and assessing implementation of structural reforms, including in the fiscal sector.
- Need to institutionalize reform management:
  - Establish mechanisms to anticipate changes and evaluate reform options on a daily basis to ensure buy-in by civil servants and reinforce a reform culture.
  - Reduce reliance on ad hoc and temporary commissions and working groups; ensure continuity and horizontal coordination.
  - Proposal: A reform unit within the Ministry of Finance, under the authority of the minister, could coordinate the public sector reform agenda and provide regular reporting to the Prime Minister’s Office, building on the Office of Planning, Strategy, Evaluation, and International Relations in the Ministry of Finance and relying on expertise of core departments.
- Move toward a more policy-oriented budgeting approach:
  - Current budget function is geared to detailed line-item budgeting and control and lacks a programmatic view.
  - Reorganization of the Budget Office should enable analysis of drivers of public spending.
  - Embed spending review into the annual budget process and put in place a performance-based budget framework to better evaluate efficiency of spending.
  - Recent changes in fiscal reporting, forecasting, and budgeting, and the adoption of a new Budget Framework Law provide a blueprint for public sector reform.

### Conclusions
- Portugal achieved sizable fiscal consolidation since 2010 but relied more than initially planned on revenue measures and investment spending reductions, as it proved difficult to rein in current expenditure.
- Public debt developments:
  - Public debt continued to rise partly reflecting the materialization of large contingent liabilities.
  - The level of public indebtedness exceeded 130 percent of GDP at the end of 2014 and remains a significant vulnerability, with only a gradual decline projected over the medium term under current fiscal policies.
- Policy priorities:
  - Further fiscal adjustment is essential to accelerate the downward trajectory of public debt and minimize scope for a significant worsening of debt dynamics if downside risks materialize.
  - Balance the need for further fiscal adjustment with potentially negative implications for growth given a modest recovery.
  - Adopt expenditure targets and institutional reforms to underpin spending rationalization going forward.
  - Identify specific policy measures to rein in spending with focus on public sector wages and pensions.
  - Targeted tax policy measures could help address bottlenecks to growth created by high corporate indebtedness and labor slack.
  - Little fiscal space or need to further scale up public investment to support growth; focus on education reform to improve skills composition of the labor force.
  - Institutionalize fiscal reform management and move toward a more policy-oriented approach; implement the new Budget Framework Law to advance the agenda over the medium term.

### Dealing with Private Debt Overhang: Corporate Debt Restructuring (introductory points)
- Pre-crisis corporate sector experienced rapid debt accumulation.
- Stock of nonfinancial corporation (NFC) debt stands at 112.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on a consolidated basis as of 2015:Q2, one of the largest in the EU.
- Excessive corporate leverage constrains profitability, resulting in higher nonperforming loans (NPLs) and lower business investment.
- Banks and NFCs face disincentives to speed up deleveraging.
- Authorities have taken steps to facilitate corporate debt restructuring, including enhancing the legal and institutional framework.
- Current economic and financial environment offers an opportunity to tackle the corporate debt overhang more ambitiously with a standardized bank-led, time-bound framework.

*International Monetary Fund*

### Introduction

### Introduction

### Portugal’s Leveraging-Up Process
- Corporate sector experienced rapid debt accumulation following adoption of the euro, driven by large capital inflows and low funding costs.
- By April 2008, credit to NFCs was growing at 14½ percent; long-term borrowing (over five years) was growing at 21 percent.
- By June 2013, the stock of debt of NFCs—defined as loans, debt securities, and trade credits, on a consolidated basis—peaked at more than €214 billion (126.9 percent of GDP).
- As of June 2015, the stock of NFC debt stood at €201 billion (112.7 percent of projected 2015 GDP).
- The SME segment accounted for about half of outstanding debt.
- Portugal’s firms’ leverage ratio was 200 percent as of June 2015.
- Interest coverage ratio was just 3.5 as of end-March 2015.
- Nonperforming loans to corporations comprised 21.1 percent of loans to corporations in 2015:Q2, up from 3½ percent in 2008:Q4.

### The Impact of Excessive Corporate Debt on the Real Economy
- Excessive corporate leverage constrains profitability, resulting in higher NPLs and lower business investment.
- Interest coverage ratio declined from 6.7 at end-2010 to 2.6 at end-2012.
- Share of firms with overdue loans was 31 percent as of January 2015.
- High NPLs eroded bank profitability through additional provisions and credit impairments, reducing banks’ capital and causing banks to restrict loan supply.
- Misallocation of credit: the construction sector remained the largest recipient sector of bank loans at about €14.6 billion as of end-June 2015 (17 percent of bank loans), with one-third of loans to this sector nonperforming.
- Literature and empirical findings cited:
  - Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli (2010): corporate debt becomes a drag on growth for levels beyond 90 percent of GDP.
  - Goretti and Souto (2013): higher debt overhang reduces firms’ investment to capital ratio.
  - Bergthaler and others (2015): high corporate debt and NPLs are a significant drag on investment.
  - European Investment Bank (EIB 2015): negative relationship between NFC credit growth and the share of NPLs.

### Disincentives for Nonfinancial Corporations and Banks to Restructure Corporate Debt
- Firm-side deterrents:
  - Legal and institutional framework, though recently strengthened, still burdens restructuring: many firms access the framework too late and face institutional hurdles that slow the process.
  - Weak corporate governance: SME-dominated sector where owners typically distribute (rather than retain) earnings, reducing equity ratios and shifting risk to banks.
  - Frequent use of personal guarantees as business collateral, creating strong personal disincentives for owners to accept restructuring.
- Bank-side deterrents:
  - Reliance on collateralized lending and difficulty of marking-to-market collateral create incentives to postpone provisions and write-offs.
  - Insufficient capital buffers and modest provisioning levels:
    - Average Common Equity Tier 1 ratio was 11.6 percent as of June 2015 (below the euro area average).
    - Provisioning levels, although found adequate during the Asset Quality Review, are not high enough to avert a material reduction in capital if write-offs accelerate.
  - Low profitability and collateral dependency: decline in real estate market made foreclosure and liquidation outcomes unattractive relative to book values, incentivizing banks to postpone resolution.

### The Outlines of a Way Forward—Using the Toolkit at Hand
- Authorities’ prior measures:
  - Introduced a less favorable tax treatment of debt financing.
  - Lowered threshold for creditor approval in restructuring plans.
  - Streamlined and strengthened in- and out-of-court workouts (PER and SIREVE).
  - Provided a fresh start for entrepreneurs declaring bankruptcy.
  - Developed an early warning system.
- Rationale: waiting for growth alone likely insufficient; a systemic, bank-led, time-bound framework could accelerate restructuring but would impose costs on corporations and banks and must be carefully calibrated to preserve financial stability.
- Policy toolkit priorities:
  - Activate the stock channel: incentivize firm owners to accept debt-equity swaps and encourage banks to resolve NPLs through write-offs.
  - Activate the flow channel: encourage firm owners to retain more earnings or inject additional equity.
  - Tighten supervisory policies on provisioning and write-offs to speed NPL resolution, including:
    - Introducing new guidelines on provisioning to increase provisions for restructured loans (as in Spain or Malta).
    - Tightening supervisory requirements to speed up write-offs, such as imposing higher capital charges or time limits on NPL write-offs.
    - Facilitating liquidation of nonviable firms by imposing stricter impairment triggers and discounted cash flow analysis to distinguish between viable and nonviable borrowers.
    - Enabling swifter recognition and exit of nonviable borrowers (example: Sweden’s quick ushering into bankruptcy or liquidation for borrowers with low interest coverage ratio and high leverage).
  - Strengthen supervisory guidance on the use of personal guarantees as collateral for business lending.
  - Remove tax impediments to loan restructuring by introducing the tax deductibility of write-offs and allowing public creditors with claims against distressed debtors to agree to similar restructuring treatment as other creditors.
  - Legal reforms to improve in- and out-of-court restructuring and consider systemic workouts offering standardized solutions, particularly for SMEs, overseen by a body with sufficient sway over banks.

### Data and Institutional Notes (Box summaries)
- Box 5.1 (Corporate Debt: Data and Statistical Issues):
  - Corporate debt measurement challenges due to discrepancies across INE, Bank of Portugal, and ECB data and migration to ESA 2010.
  - This paper relies mainly on Bank of Portugal data through September 2015.
  - Corporate debt measured on a consolidated basis (loans, debt securities, trade credits), which nets out intragroup financing and is preferred for assessing trends affecting economic activity.
- Box 5.2 (The Legal and Institutional Framework):
  - Streamlined and strengthened in- (pre-pack) and out-of-court workouts (PER, SIREVE) were important reforms.
  - Remaining issues hampering use of the framework:
    - Firms attempt restructuring too late; prohibition for directors trading while insolvent is not enforced.
    - Institutional constraints due to surge in insolvency cases (insufficient specialized judges, limited capacity at support institutes, small number of qualified insolvency administrators).
    - Legal constraints (no principal write-off, ceiling of 150 installments) impede meaningful participation of public creditors in restructuring.
  - While some issues were addressed during the IMF-supported program (new judicial organization, new statute for insolvency administrators), the revised framework cannot provide a systemic solution for processing large numbers of SMEs quickly and equitably; systemic workouts with standardized solutions would help.

*Prepared by Antoine Bouveret, Irene Yackovlev, Wolfgang Bergthaler, and Maximilien Queyranne.*

### Box 5.3. How Can Tax Policy Contribute to Corporate Deleveraging?

### Box 5.3. How Can Tax Policy Contribute to Corporate Deleveraging?

### Debt bias in tax systems
- Corporations typically face tax bias favoring debt because interest payments are deductible for corporate income tax (CIT) purposes while equity returns (dividends and capital gains) are typically not deductible.
- For domestic investors subject to personal income tax (PIT) on capital income, taxes on interest mitigate the debt advantage; taxes on capital gains and dividends magnify the debt bias.
- Mitigating debt bias requires either reducing the tax deductibility of interest or introducing similar deductions for equity returns.

### Portugal’s reforms to limit interest deductibility
- Prior to reforms, Portugal had no limitation on tax deductibility of interest.
- 2013 measures:
  - Restricted deductibility of interest for companies whose net interest payments exceeded €3 million.
  - Limited interest deductibility to 70 percent of EBITDA in 2013.
  - Planned further reduction to 30 percent in 2017.
  - IMF FAD estimate: this yields an estimated €115 million additional revenue in 2017 (from €24 million in 2014).
- 2014 CIT reform:
  - Reduced the threshold to €1 million.
  - CIT rate cut from 25 to 23 percent, which reduces the tax saved from interest and thus contributes to limiting debt bias.
- These measures align with tax actions in other EU countries, notably Germany (2008) and France (2013).

### Measures to encourage equity investment
- 2014 change to capital injection tax relief:
  - Increased relief for individual investors and venture capital companies by capping the deduction to 5 percent of taxable income (from 3 percent).

### Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) proposal
- The ACE grants firms a deduction for the normal return on equity, neutralizing the preferential tax treatment of debt.
- Key features:
  - Deduction equals the rate of government bonds (used as a proxy for the risk-free rate of return on capital).
  - Normal equity returns become fully CIT-deductible and are taxed only at the individual level; returns above the normal rate remain taxed at both corporate and individual levels.
  - The base for the allowance is the book value of equity, minus equity participations in other firms (to avoid duplication of tax relief).
- ACE helps avoid tax incentives for artificially high leverage, especially in financial institutions.
- Example implementation note: for the first three fiscal years (2011–13) of ACE implementation in Italy, the notional interest rate was set at 3 percent.

### Policy implications
- Reducing interest deductibility (as Portugal has phased in) and/or introducing ACE-style equity allowances can help rebalance corporate capital structures and contribute to deleveraging.
- Complementary reforms (e.g., capital injection relief, thresholds for deductibility, CIT rate adjustments) can be combined to limit debt bias while supporting equity financing and investment.

*Source: Box 5.3. How Can Tax Policy Contribute to Corporate Deleveraging?*

### References

### _eur1602 - References

### Selected references
- Acemoglu, D., and J. Robinson. 2008. “Persistence of power, elites, and institutions.” American Economic Review 98 (1): 267–293.
- Amador, J., and C. Coimbra. 2007. “Characteristics of the Portuguese Economic Growth: What Has Been Missing?” Working Paper 8/2007, Banco de Portugal. Lisbon.
- Amador, J., and A. Soares. 2012. “Competition in the Portuguese Economy: An Overview of Classical Indicators.” Working Paper 8/2012, Banco de Portugal. Libon.
- Banco de Portugal. 2009. (cited in chapter discussion)
- Bento. 2010. (cited in chapter discussion)
- Bernhard and Jensen 2004; Altomonte, Aquilant, and Ottaviano 2012. (cited in chapter discussion)
- Bouis and Duval 2011. (cited in chapter discussion)
- Drazen, A., and W. Easterly. 2001. “Do Crises Induce Reform? Simple Empirical Tests of Conventional Wisdom.” Economics and Politics 13 (2): 129–57.
- EC 2014; OECD 2014a. (indicator- and micro-based approaches cited)
- Harberger 1998. (quoted phrase: “stemming from 1001 different sources”)
- International Monetary Fund. 2005. “Building institutions.” World Economic Outlook. Washington, September, 125–60.
- INE. 2014. “Resident Population Projections 2012–2060.” Press release, March 28. Lisbon.
- Krueger, A. 1974. “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society.” American Economic Review 64 (3): 291–303.
- Levchenko, A. 2013. “International Trade and Institutional Change.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 29 (5): 1145–81.
- Mukherji, R. 2008. “The Political Economy of India’s Economic Reforms”. Asian Economic Policy Review 3: 315–31.
- North, D. 1991. “Institutions.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (1): 97–112.
- Pina, A., and I. Abreu. 2012. “Portugal: Rebalancing the Economy and Returning to Growth Through Job Creation and Better Capital Allocation.” Economic Department Working Paper 994, OECD. Paris.
- Rajan, R. 2004. “Why Are Structural Reforms So Difficult?” Finance and Development. June: 56-7.
- Reis, R. 2013. “The Portuguese Slump and Crash and the Euro Crisis.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Spring: 143–193.

### Key findings and analysis from chapter: Generating Sustainable Growth: A Firm-Level Perspective on Structural Reforms
- Purpose and context
  - Membership in a monetary union and spillover considerations severely constrained Portugal’s macroeconomic toolbox, leaving structural reforms as the main available policy tool to mend accumulated imbalances.
  - Fiscal policy’s primary role was restoring credibility to gradually regain full market access; structural reforms were expected to boost external competitiveness and potential growth.
- Expected firm-level effects of structural reforms
  - A successful structural reform should:
    - lead to significant cost reductions in reform areas relevant to firms;
    - be underpinned by significant changes of formal or informal rules;
    - be backed up by sufficient implementation capacity to make rule changes stick without adverse side effects.
  - If any of these three features is weak or missing, firms are likely to perceive little impact on competitiveness and growth prospects.
- Firm survey perceptions
  - Firms perceived that many reforms had at least some positive effects, but few reforms were seen as having had a significant impact.
  - Firms’ perceived urgency to revisit or step up reforms—especially in the public and financial sectors—reflects these reforms’ importance for reducing high transaction costs, particularly for exporting firms.
  - The limited perceived impact of public sector reforms likely reflects implementation capacity constraints.
- Why a firm-level perspective matters
  - Macro aggregates and sector aggregates can be misleading for assessing external competitiveness because firms are heterogeneous.
  - A firm-level perspective helps evaluate whether reforms facilitate the scaling up or emergence of high-performing firms, which tend to be exporters.
- Structural reforms’ mechanism at firm level
  - Structural reforms are expected to reduce production costs (unit costs of labor, capital, intermediate inputs) and transaction costs (searching for information, bargaining, decision-making, enforcing contracts).
  - Reduced transaction costs shape organizational and contractual arrangements and the quantity of goods and services available on the market.

### Stylized facts on exporting firms in Portugal (2010–12, firm-level data)
- Extensive margins of exports (share of exporting firms in sector)
  - Manufacturing and mining: about 13–14 percent.
  - Transportation and communication services: about 10 percent.
  - All sectors: 5.2 percent.
  - Table 7.1 (selected entries preserved exactly as in source):
    - Agriculture: All firms 4.1; Large firms 66.7; SMEs 14.1; Micro firms 3.1.
    - Mining: All firms 12.7; Large firms 100.0; SMEs 25.5; Micro firms 7.0.
    - Manufacturing: All firms 13.9; Large firms 80.6; SMEs 32.0; Micro firms 5.0.
    - Transportation and communication: All firms 10.1; Large firms 32.0; SMEs 30.0; Micro firms 7.8.
    - All sectors: All firms 5.2; Large firms 34.8; SMEs 17.0; Micro firms 3.4.
  - Note: An exporting firm is defined by INE as a firm that exports at least 50 percent of its turnover, or that exports at least 10 percent of its turnover and it amounts to more than €150,000.
- Firm size distribution (2010–12)
  - Size distribution is heavily tilted toward SMEs and micro firms, limiting extensive margins because larger firms are more likely to export.
  - Table 7.2 (selected entries preserved exactly as in source):
    - Agriculture: All firms 100.0; Large firms 0.1; SMEs 8.8; Micro firms 91.1.
    - Manufacturing: All firms 100.0; Large firms 0.8; SMEs 30.7; Micro firms 68.5.
    - Transportation and communication: All firms 100.0; Large firms 0.5; SMEs 9.9; Micro firms 89.7.
    - All sectors: All firms 100.0; Large firms 0.3; SMEs 11.9; Micro firms 87.8.
- Performance differentials: persistent exporters vs. other manufacturing firms (2010–12)
  - Persistent exporters are firms classified as exporting firms in each of the years 2010–12.
  - Table 7.3 (values preserved exactly as in source):
    - Workers per firm: All firms 16.3; Persistent Exporters 73.7; All other firms 10.2.
    - Value added per worker (Euros per year): All firms 26,601; Persistent Exporters 34,369; All other firms 20,571.
    - Investment per worker (Euros per year): All firms 4,629; Persistent Exporters 6,733; All other firms 2,996.
    - Return on Equity (ROE) (Percent): All firms 4.8; Persistent Exporters 8.4; All other firms -1.0.
    - Debt/Equity (Ratio): All firms 1.8; Persistent Exporters 1.7; All other firms 2.0.
    - Debt/Value added (Percent): All firms 322.5; Persistent Exporters 326.2; All other firms 317.7.
    - Debt/EBITDA (Ratio): All firms 8.6; Persistent Exporters 7.1; All other firms 11.8.
  - Persistent exporters tended to be about seven times larger in employment than other firms, had higher productivity per worker, invested more per worker, were more profitable, and had lower debt/EBITDA ratios.
- The 2010–12 export surge (Box 7.1)
  - Nominal exports by manufacturing firms rose by about 19 percent during 2010–12.
  - About 90 percent of the increase in exports is accounted for by persistent exporters.
  - Persistent exporters broadly maintained employment and nominal domestic sales levels during 2010–12, while nominal value added declined by about 4 percent.
  - Return on equities of persistent exporters shrunk significantly during 2010–12 but remained positive.
  - Other firms also saw a double-digit increase in nominal exports from a lower level, but their employment and nominal value added shrunk significantly, and their ROE turned negative during 2010–12.
  - Newly established firms since 2010 that were exporting in 2012 contributed €0.2 billion to the €5.2 billion export increase during 2010–12.

*Source: _eur1602 - References (chapter excerpts and reference list).*

### 12. At the same time, already established firms that are not classified as persistent exporters increased

### _eur1602 - 12. At the same time, already established firms that are not classified as persistent exporters increased

### Exports and firm-level dynamics (2010–12)
- Net change in exports by all manufacturing firms: Billions of euros 5.2.
- Changes 2010–12 by component (Table 7.1.1):
  - Persistent exporters: Billions of euros 4.7; Percent 19.1; Domestic sales –0.1; Value added –0.4; Employment (blank in source table).
  - Other firms (not persistent exporters): Billions of euros 0.4; Percent 17.1; Domestic sales –1.9; Value added –1.3; Employment (blank in source table).
  - Established firms that are not persistent exporters increased their exports during 2010–12 by €2.0 billion.
  - Firms that exported in 2010 but were no longer classified as exporters in 2012 reduced exports by €1.7 billion.
- Net interpretation: Contribution to export increase by new firms was relatively small; substantial gross shifts into and out of export activities occurred among other firms.

*Source: IMF staff estimates based on data from the SCIE.*

### Program’s Structural Reform Agenda (design and scope)
- Reform fields targeted by the adjustment program (text chart): (1) product market reforms, (2) labor market reforms, (3) public sector reforms, and (4) financial sector and insolvency reforms.
- Organizational structure of reforms:
  - Reform fields (Total 4)
  - Reform areas (Total 35)
  - Reform objectives (Total 73)
  - Reform actions (Total 494)
  - Reform phases: (1) initiate, (2) legislate, (3) implement, (4) evaluate.
- Historical context: Many PEC IV (2011) measures—particularly privatization and fiscal consolidation—were integrated into the adjustment program design.

### Architecture and distribution of reform actions
- On staff’s count: 494 structural reform actions taken to achieve 73 reform objectives.
- Distribution by reform fields (text table numbers preserved as presented):
  - Product markets: 152 (initiation) 31 (legislation) 67 (implementation) 47 (evaluation) 7 (additional column entries as in source).
  - Labor market: 5 11 3 15 15 8 (as presented in source).
  - Public sector: 2 39 76 55 90 18 (as presented in source).
  - Financial sector and insolvency: 5 21 11 12 6 4 (as presented in source).
  - All reform actions: 494 131 148 178 37 (as presented in source).
- By phase: about half of the reform actions were initiating or legislating; about a third focused on implementation.

### Perceived impact of structural reforms — Firm survey evidence
- Survey design:
  - Sent at the beginning of March 2015 to about 200 large firms and about 300 SMEs.
  - Covered 34 reform areas across the four reform fields; respondents rated perceived impact (no impact, some impact, significant impact) and urgency of more reforms (no need, some need, urgent need).
  - Responses standardized to range –1 to +1; color thresholds: red < –0.5, orange between –0.5 and 0, light green between 0 and 0.5, dark green > 0.5.
- Survey response summary:
  - Response rate: 17.4 percent.
  - About half respondents were large firms; about two-thirds were exporting firms.
  - Sector distribution: most respondents in manufacturing (one-third), then trade and transportation sectors.
- Aggregate perceptions (text summary of Table 7.5):
  - Many reforms perceived as having some positive impact, with substantial variation across fields.
  - Labor market reforms: perceptions most positive.
  - Product market reforms: perceptions least positive; none perceived as having had a significant positive impact on firms’ competitiveness.
  - Public and financial sector reforms: generally positive but low scores.
- Specific survey highlights (preserve wording and scores approach):
  - Product market low scores: particularly low for reducing cost of using railways and cost of professional and other services.
  - Labor market positive scores: areas scoring well include increasing work-time flexibility, reducing hiring and firing costs, and active labor market policies (exporters and SMEs reported strong positive impacts).
  - Labor market low scores: collective bargaining and effectiveness of employment agencies scored low.
  - Public sector: highest scoring reforms deal with cost of paying taxes and investment incentives; exporting firms more positive than non-exporters.
  - Financial sector: exporting firms more positive than non-exporters; SMEs positive about provision of alternative financing options.

### Perceived urgency of more structural reforms (survey)
- Strong consensus across firm types that public and financial sector reforms should be revisited or stepped up.
- Urgent needs identified particularly by exporting firms and SMEs:
  - Increase effectiveness of public administration at central and local levels.
  - Increase effectiveness of various courts of the justice system.
  - Improve payment discipline of public sector entities.
  - Improve functioning of the insolvency and corporate debt restructuring frameworks.
- Privatization seen as lower priority across firms.
- Exporters also urged additional reforms in:
  - Energy, road pricing, costs of railways, enforcement of competition (product market).
  - Hiring and firing costs and increasing effectiveness of employment agencies (labor market).
- Non-exporters generally perceive less urgency; firm size has little effect on urgency perceptions.

### Interpreting survey results and implications for reform design
- Potential biases and mitigations:
  - Respondent awareness and attribution biases acknowledged; survey allowed “no answer” to mitigate uninformed responses.
  - Sample focused on large firms and relatively successful SMEs to reduce distortion from firm-internal problems.
- Timing and implementation considerations:
  - Some reforms—especially public and financial sector—may require more time to yield perceived impact due to behavioral and capacity changes in public administration, justice system, regulators, or banks.
- Analytical framework for perceived impact:
  - Reform Impact conceptualized multiplicatively as:
    - Reform Impact = Bottleneck Factor x Depth Factor x Capacity Factor.
  - Bottleneck Factor: relevance to firm production/transaction costs.
  - Depth Factor: significance of rule changes (parameters, criteria, organizational structure).
  - Capacity Factor: ability to implement and realize changes.
- Interpretation for product vs. labor market reforms:
  - Low perceived impact of product market reforms likely reflects absence of deep reforms (depth factor) or, in some areas (energy policy, port costs), binding capacity constraints.
  - Labor market reforms rated more positively, suggesting greater depth or implementation in those areas.

*Source: IMF staff.*

### Box 7.2. Portugal: Reducing Port User Cost: An Implementation Game in Progress

### Box 7.2. Portugal: Reducing Port User Cost: An Implementation Game in Progress

### Importance of ports for exports and firm costs
- In 2013, the fraction of Portuguese exports shipped via ports was 58 percent by weight and 37 percent by value.
- For some exporters, port user costs can reach 10 percent of production costs.

### Reform objective and actions (2012–2014)
- Objective: reduce user cost by 25–30 percent.
- Actions taken:
  - Adoption of a port labor law in February 2013.
  - Elimination of the TUP Cargo fee in January 2014.
  - Start of the renegotiations of port concessions in April 2014.
  - Publication of the transport regulator bylaws in May 2014.

### Measured outcomes and firm perceptions
- Authorities’ estimate: a 16 percent reduction in the port invoice costs was achieved during the period 2011–13.
- Private sector study estimate: decline in user cost of only 2 percent.
- Both estimates fall short of the original objective to reduce user costs by 25–30 percent.
- Firm survey responses suggest firms do not see major payoffs from the port reform so far.

### Reasons the reform has not had a larger impact to date
- Slow implementation pace:
  - The transport regulator is still not operational.
  - Negotiations with and among trade unions, port authorities, and concession operators are not closed.
- Lack of legal mechanisms:
  - No legal mechanism to ensure the pass-through of efficiency gains and cost reductions to intended beneficiaries (especially exporting firms); gains may be captured by other players.
- Lack of incentives:
  - Port concession terms must provide the right incentives to both port authorities and concession operators.
  - Renegotiations of concessions are still ongoing, with only one closed.

### Related program context and implications
- Labor market reforms showed relatively high positive impact due to their parametric nature and high relevance; they require little implementation capacity and can directly affect unit labor costs (example: work-time flexibility reform).
- Capacity constraints are likely to emerge for active labor market policies and employment offices, reflected in higher urgency flagged by firms for these reform areas.
- The initial program design recognized the risk that product and labor market reforms may have moderate and slowly emerging effects on production costs, especially for exporters.
- In response to that risk, the program included a fiscal devaluation measure to mimic the effects of real exchange rate devaluation; implementing a fiscal devaluation proved much more difficult than foreseen and the option was abandoned about a year and a half into the program (see Box 7.3).

### Implementation lessons and priorities (implied by findings)
- Ensure operationalization of the transport regulator to support reform implementation.
- Close renegotiations of port concessions and design concession terms to align incentives for cost pass-through to exporters.
- Establish legal mechanisms that ensure efficiency gains are passed through to intended beneficiaries.
- Monitor and reconcile divergent cost-reduction estimates (authorities’ 16 percent vs. private sector 2 percent) to build consensus on measured outcomes and adjust implementation accordingly.

*Source: Box 7.2. Portugal: Reducing Port User Cost: An Implementation Game in Progress*

### References

### _eur1602 - References

### References
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- Altomonte, Carlo, Tommaso Aquilant, and Gianmarco Ottaviano. 2012. “The Triggers of Competitiveness: The EFIGE Cross-Country Report.” Bruegel Blueprint Series 17.
- Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department. 2009. “The Portuguese Economy in the Context of Economic, Financial and Monetary Integration.” Banco de Portugal Publishing. Lisbon.
- Bento, Vítor. 2010. “O Nó Cego da Economia. Como resolver o principal bloqueio do crescimento económico.” Bnomics. Lisbon.
- Bernard, Andrew, and Bradford Jensen. 2004. “Why Some Firms Export.” Review of Economics and Statistics 86 (2): 561-569.
- Bouis, Romain, Orsetta Causa, Lilas Demmou, Romain Duval, and Aleksandra Zdzienicka. 2012. “The Short-Term Effects of Structural Reforms: An Empirical Analysis.” OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 949, OECD Publishing.
- Cohen, Michael D., James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen. 1972. “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice.” Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (1): 1–25.
- European Commission. 2014. “Market Reforms at Work in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece.” European Economy 5/2014. Brussels.
- Harberger, Arnold C. 1998. “A Vision of the Growth Process.” American Economic Review 88 (1 ): 1–32.
- Hausmann, Ricardo, Lant Pritchet, and Dani Rodrik. 2005. “Getting the Diagnosis Right.” Finance and Development 43 (1): 12.
- Navaretti, Giorgio, Matteo Bugamelli, Fabiano Schivardi, Carlo Altomonte, Daniel Horgos, and Daniela Maggioni. 2011. “The Global Operations of European Firms – The Second EFIGE Policy Report.” Bruegel Blueprint Series, Vol. 12.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2014a. “OECD Economic Surveys: Portugal.” OECD Publishing. Paris.
- ———. 2014b. “The 2012 Labour Market Reform in Spain: A Preliminary Assessment.” OECD Publishing. Paris.
- Puchal, Pol Antràs, and Diego Rodríguez Rodríguez. 2010. “Firms in International Trade (With an Application to Spain).” Series Invited Lecture. Harvard University Invited Lecture Series.

*Source: _eur1602 - References*

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