## Emigrant remittances

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### Measurement and data
- Workers’ remittances is the balance of payments item that best represents periodic, unrequited transfers used in modeling remittances.
- Three balance of payments components often discussed:
  - Workers’ remittances: current transfers by migrants resident in host countries (expected stay of a year or more).
  - Employee compensation: wages, salaries, benefits earned by nonresidents for work in the host country (recorded under income).
  - Migrants’ transfers: contra-entries to goods and financial changes arising from changes of residence (recorded under capital transfers).
- Data coverage and totals (1970–2005 series; 2003 most recent full-year dataset in the chapter):
  - 154 countries provided data on workers’ remittances and employee compensation (totaling US$199 billion).
  - 104 provided data on workers’ remittances (totaling US$114 billion).
  - 107 reported employee compensation (US$14 billion).
  - 49 reported migrants’ transfers (US$4 billion).
- Key measurement conclusions:
  - Aggregating workers’ remittances, employee compensation, and migrants’ transfers is problematic; these series behave differently and combining them can mislead analysis.
  - The proposed BPM5/SNA revisions (personal transfers; supplementary personal remittances; removal of migrants’ transfers; residency-based approach) align with the paper’s recommendation to focus on workers’ remittances/personal transfers.

### Stylized facts and magnitudes
- Global measured flows of workers’ remittances:
  - US$6 billion in the early 1970s; US$50 billion in the mid-1990s; US$114 billion in 2003.
- Developing countries received US$104 billion in remittance flows in 2003 (91 percent of global workers’ remittances) — equal to 1.4 percent of total developing country GDP in 2003.
- Per-country averages and coverage:
  - Average remittances per reporting country increased from US$150 million to US$1.2 billion over the study period; almost doubled between 1994 and 2003.
  - 104 countries reported in 2003; 92 in 2004; 40 in 2005.
  - Extrapolating 2005 per-country average to 104 countries yields estimated global flows of US$135 billion for 2005.
- Cross-country average ratios (workers’ remittances to GDP):
  - Mean: 3.7 percent (1970–2005); 3.6 percent (1995–2004); 4.2 percent (2004).
  - Cross-country standard deviation: 4.9 percentage points (1970–2005); 5.8 percentage points (1995–2004).
  - Distribution (1995–2004): 48 countries (44 percent) ≤ 1 percent of GDP; 25 countries (23 percent) in 2–5 percent range; 7 countries (6 percent) ≥ 15 percent of GDP.
- Relative importance vs other inflows (1995–2004 mean across countries and time):
  - Ratio of Workers’ Remittances to Official Transfers: 12.2.
  - Ratio to Official Capital Flows: 9.6.
  - Ratio to Private Capital Flows: 2.4.
  - Ratio to Exports: 0.3.
- Volatility (standard deviation of detrended ratio to GDP, averages across countries):
  - Workers’ Remittances: 1.8 (1970–2005); 1.3 (1995–2005).
  - Official Transfers: 2.9; Official Capital Flows: 3.5; Private Capital Flows: 6.6 (1970–2005).
  - Exports: much higher (examples: exports 74 times as volatile as remittances referenced elsewhere).

### Determinants and behavioral characterization
- Empirical remittance-determination regression (specification reported):
  - wr_it = b_0 + b_1(r_i – r_US)_t + b_2(y_US – y_i)_t + b_3$E_it + E_t,
    - wr is log(workers’ remittances/GDP); r is a real deposit or money market interest rate; y is real GDP per capita (PPP); $E is change in nominal exchange rate (increase = depreciation).
- Main empirical findings on determinants:
  - Income differentials (y_US – y_i) are highly significant in nearly all subperiods (significant at 1 percent in nearly all cases) — widening income differentials lead to additional workers’ remittances in GDP terms (countercyclical/compensatory behavior).
  - Currency depreciations in recipient countries are associated with decreases in workers’ remittances (significant at 5 or 10 percent in most cases) — consistent with remitters smoothing purchasing power in recipient currency.
  - Interest rate differentials are generally not robust determinants except in some post-2001 short-sample specifications where effects are ambiguous and sample-shortness cautioned.
- Behavioral classification:
  - Workers’ remittances: on average countercyclical (supporting altruistic/insurance motives).
  - Employee compensation and migrants’ transfers: on average procyclical, more like private capital flows.
  - Recommendation: use workers’ remittances series alone for remittance-behavior studies.

### Uses of remittances (micro evidence)
- Three stylized facts from micro studies:
  1. A significant portion, often the majority, of remitted funds are spent on consumption (examples report consumption accounting for between 60 and 80 percent in some Latin American samples).
  2. A significant, though smaller, share is saved or invested, often in housing, land, and financial assets (bank deposits).
  3. Household saving and investment financed by remittances is not necessarily productive at the aggregate level — much goes to land, existing houses, jewelry, or nonproductive assets; business investment evidence mixed and often limited.
- Caveats: some studies find investment effects in particular contexts, but measurement differences and inclusion of migrants’ transfers/employee compensation complicate inference.

### Theoretical macro channels and general-equilibrium model findings
- Key model assumptions and calibration:
  - Stochastic dynamic general equilibrium with money; remittances specified exogenously as countercyclical real income transfers (increase when domestic output falls).
  - Government finances via labor-income taxation or consumption taxation; government cannot tax remittances directly.
  - Calibrations for Chile and United States; remittances-to-GDP simulations at 5 percent, 15 percent, 25 percent.
  - Selected calibration facts: U.S. outward remittances in 2004 $39 billion (0.3 percent of GDP); Chile remittances in 2004 $13 million (0.1 percent of GDP); Chile government spending-to-GDP = 12 percent; U.S. government spending-to-GDP = 14 percent.
- Exact steady-state results (selected values from Tables 6.1 and 6.2):
  - Under Labor Taxation (Chile, remittances-to-income 0% | 5% | 15% | 25%):
    - Output: 1.61 | 1.55 | 1.44 | 1.35
    - Labor: 0.44 | 0.41 | 0.37 | 0.34
    - Shadow price of debt: 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.05
    - Inflation rate: –2.2 | 1.0 | 4.5 | 4.6
    - Tax rate: 25.0 | 22.8 | 20.4 | 21.9
  - Under Consumption Taxation (Chile, remittances-to-income 0% | 5% | 15% | 25%):
    - Output: 1.56 | 1.51 | 1.42 | 1.34
    - Labor: 0.42 | 0.40 | 0.36 | 0.33
    - Shadow price of debt: 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.01
    - Inflation rate: –2.2 | –2.2 | –2.2 | –2.2
    - Tax rate: 18.8 | 18.4 | 17.7 | 17.1
- Model main findings (enumerated as presented):
  - Remittances increase consumption and leisure, improving household welfare and helping poverty reduction.
  - Remittances improve government debt sustainability and reduce country risk by lowering marginal cost of servicing debt.
  - Remittances make labor supply more procyclical and increase the magnitude of the domestic business cycle (negative externality).
  - Insurance benefits of remittances depend on the economy’s cash-credit intensiveness.
  - Consumption-based taxation is less distortionary than labor-income taxation as remittances rise; it allows governments to access a broader tax base without inducing greater inflation tax reliance.
- Additional model-specific quantitative points:
  - Shadow price of debt declines almost 55 percent (from 0.11 to 0.05) when remittances-to-income ratio rises to 25 percent in the Chile labor-tax case.
  - Under labor taxation, business cycle volatility rises by one-third with remittances; under consumption taxation it rises by one-fourth.
  - Labor becomes procyclical at a remittances-to-income ratio of about 8 percent and reaches unity correlation at 25 percent.

### Empirical macro evidence (growth, volatility, real exchange rate, debt sustainability)
- Growth (Chapter 7 empirical synthesis):
  - It is difficult to obtain a consistently robust positive effect of workers’ remittances on GDP growth across econometric specifications.
  - Positive and significant estimated effects on growth appear mainly when investment is excluded and country fixed effects are absent.
  - IV estimations using an external instrument (remittances-to-GDP of the rest of the world, fitted wrrow) often yield negative and significant effects of remittances on growth, operating primarily through reductions in total factor productivity (TFP) in some specifications.
  - Interaction terms (remittances × financial depth) suggest remittances may help growth only in countries with shallow financial sectors in some OLS results, but IV/fixed-effects weaken or reverse this conclusion.
- Volatility:
  - Cross-country regressions and panel evidence indicate remittances diminish macroeconomic volatility over long horizons (example: Box 7.5 cross-section coefficient on workers’ remittances-to-GDP in a volatility regression = –0.164 (–1.68)* — interpretation: a one percentage point increase in remittances-to-GDP reduces standard deviation of GDP growth by 0.164 percent).
  - Empirical evidence aligns with model predictions that remittances can smooth consumption and reduce measured GDP volatility, though model also indicates remittances may increase business cycle volatility via labor reallocation depending on tax regime and cash-credit structure.
- Real exchange rate (REER) and Dutch disease:
  - Theoretical presumption: a permanent increase in remittances tends to appreciate the long-run equilibrium REER.
  - Empirical evidence mixed but generally consistent with appreciation:
    - Single-country studies (Cape Verde, Pakistan, Jordan) find appreciation associated with remittances.
    - Multi-country studies (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004); Holzner (2006)) find remittances appreciate REER.
    - Izquierdo and Montiel (2006) find mixed country results in Central America.
    - Rajan and Subramanian (2005) find no evidence of remittances harming manufacturing growth in their sample.
  - Implication: appreciation can generate Dutch disease effects and potential long-run growth costs even if short-run consumption gains occur.
- Debt sustainability and fiscal effects:
  - Remittances can raise the sustainable value of government debt by increasing the tax base (directly under consumption taxation or indirectly via higher consumption) and by reducing sovereign risk premia if remittances stabilize revenues.
  - Empirical averages (1990–2005) show positive relationships between remittances-to-GDP and (1) credit to government as share of total credit, (2) net general government debt-to-GDP, and (3) government consumption-to-GDP.
  - Box 7.1 debt dynamics highlight that increases in remittances-to-GDP, all else equal, improve external and domestic-currency debt sustainability metrics, but benefits depend on remittance persistence, remittance elasticities, composition of public debt, and exchange-rate interactions.
  - Caveat: remittances can reduce governments’ incentives for fiscal discipline; empirical evidence suggests governments may borrow and consume more when remittances provide fiscal space.

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Measurement:
  - Use workers’ remittances (or the proposed personal transfers classification) for analysis and policy design; do not aggregate with employee compensation or migrants’ transfers.
- Tax policy:
  - Remittances should not be taxed directly — direct taxation risks reducing remittance flows, increasing informality, and harming household welfare.
  - Shift toward consumption-based taxation is recommended where feasible:
    - Consumption taxation captures remittance-financed consumption directly, is less distortionary than labor-income taxation, and reduces reliance on the inflation tax.
    - Careful design should exempt basic necessities (food, clothing) to protect poverty alleviation objectives.
- Use of fiscal space:
  - Any fiscal space afforded by remittance inflows should be directed to public investments that enhance long-run growth (physical infrastructure, governance/institutions) rather than nonproductive consumption.
  - Prioritize public expenditure that raises returns to private investment given evidence remittances alone do not reliably increase productive investment.
- Macro policy design:
  - Policy prescriptions must be country-specific; a one-size-fits-all approach is inappropriate.
  - Diagnostic analyses should assess remittances’ incentive effects (on labor supply), effects on money demand and financial development, and constraints on growth.
  - Where remittances are significant, consumption taxation and careful monetary policy operations (to manage liquidity and inflation implications) can mitigate negative externalities.
- Political economy and governance:
  - Remittances can create moral hazard by reducing public pressure for reforms and delaying infrastructure upgrades (“remittances trap” risk).
  - International financial institutions and outside engagement may be required to prompt reforms in remittance-receiving countries.
- Research and data needs:
  - Cross-country longitudinal household-level studies are critical to identify remittance motivations, intended functions, and end uses to better inform policy.

*International Monetary Fund. Occasional Paper No. 259 — Emigrant remittances.*

### 1.  Emigrant  remittances.    2.  Macroeconomics.    3.  Emigrant

### Emigrant remittances

### Publication and ordering information
- Price: US$30.00
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- Orders to: International Monetary Fund, Publication Services, 700 19th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20431, U.S.A.
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- Library classification: JV6118 .M337 2008

### Table of contents — major themes and chapter structure
- Preface
- I Introduction
- II Remittances: Measurement Matters
  - Why Study the Macro Effects of Remittances?
  - Measuring Remittances
  - Examining the Data: Measurement Matters
  - New Balance of Payments Methodology
  - Conclusion
- III Remittances: Stylized Facts
  - Stylized Facts Using Aggregate Data on Workers’ Remittances
  - Stylized Facts Using a Cross-Country Database of Workers’ Remittances
  - Conclusion
- IV What Drives Remittance Flows?
  - Factors Driving Remittances
  - Uses of Remittances
- V Macroeconomic Implications of Remittances: Theory
  - Workers’ Remittances and Short-Run Macroeconomic Performance
  - Remittances and Growth
  - Remittances and Government Debt Sustainability
  - Conclusion
- VI Macroeconomic Implications of Remittances: A General Equilibrium Model with Money
  - Remittances in a Business Cycle Framework
  - Results with Labor Income Taxation
  - Results with Consumption Taxation
  - Remittances and Macroeconomic Risks
  - Welfare Implications of Remittances
  - Conclusion
  - Appendix 6.1. The Model
- VII An Empirical Investigation of the Macroeconomic Effects of Remittances
  - Remittances and GDP Growth
  - Remittances and Macroeconomic Volatility
  - Workers’ Remittances and the Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate
  - Remittances, Fiscal Policy, and Debt Sustainability
  - Appendix 7.1. Data Definitions, Sources, and Coverage
- VIII Policy Implications
  - Policy Implications of Remittances

### Tables, figures, and boxes indexed in the chapter
- Boxes include: 7.1 Remittances and Fiscal Sustainability; 7.2 Remittances and External Sustainability
- Select tables (by number and heading):
  - 2.1 Summary Business Cycle Correlations
  - 2.2 Business Cycle Correlations: Subsample
  - 3.1 Emerging Economies: Workers’ Remittances
  - 3.2 Developing Countries: Workers’ Remittances in Relation to Selected Balance of Payments Inflows
  - 3.3 Emerging Economies: Volatility of Workers’ Remittances in Comparison to Selected Balance of Payments Inflows
  - 3.4 Emerging Economies: Correlations Between Workers’ Remittances and Other Selected Balance of Payments Inflows
  - 3.5 Emerging Economies: Selected Macroeconomic Variables Across Percentiles of Workers’ Remittances, 1995–2004
  - 4.1–4.3 Determinants of Workers’ Remittances (various periods)
  - 6.1–6.4 Steady-State and welfare tables under alternative tax regimes
  - 7.1–7.6 Empirical regressions and cointegrating relations
- Select figures (by number and heading):
  - 2.1 Correlation of Workers’ Remittances and Employee Compensation
  - 3.1 Worldwide Workers’ Remittances, 1970–2003
  - 3.2 Workers’ Remittances by Region: Developing Countries, 1980–2003
  - 3.3–3.6 Top 20 Recipient Countries: workers’ remittances and ratios to GDP
  - 3.7 Workers’ Remittances and Other Inflows to Developing Countries
  - 3.8 Volatility of Inflows to Developing Countries, 1980–2003
  - 6.1–6.2 Labor Market Dynamics and Remittance-Dependent Economies
  - 7.1–7.3 Output volatility, real exchange rate, and fiscal policy in remittance-dependent economies

### Editorial and notation conventions cited
- In tables, a blank cell indicates “not applicable,” ellipsis points (. . .) indicate “not available,” and 0 or 0.0 indicates “zero” or “negligible.”
- An en dash (–) between years or months (for example, 2005–06 or January–June) indicates the years or months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months; a slash (/) between years or months (for example, 2005/06) indicates a fiscal or financial year; FY denotes fiscal year (for example, FY2006).
- “Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.
- “Basis points” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent to ¼ of 1 percentage point).
- The term “country” covers some territorial entities that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.

*International Monetary Fund. Occasional Paper No. 259 — Emigrant remittances.*

### Preface

### _op259 - Preface

### Preface and purpose
- Macroeconomic Consequences of Remittances was prepared in response to the growth of cross-country remittance flows and the request of the IMF’s Executive Board for a thorough investigation of remittances and remittance systems, including their effect on poverty and macroeconomic performance.
- Authors and contributors:
  - Team led by Ralph Chami (IMF Institute) with Adolfo Barajas (IMF Institute), Thomas Cosimano (University of Notre Dame), Connel Fullenkamp (Duke University), Michael Gapen (IMF Institute), and Peter Montiel (Williams College).
  - Michael Harrup (External Relations Department) edited and coordinated production.
  - Research support and data analysis by Anastasia Guscina; research assistance by Deanna Ford, Chi Nguyen, and Pinn Siraprapasiri; administrative support by Asmahan Bedri and Yasmina Zinbi.
- The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Monetary Fund, its Executive Directors, or IMF policy.

### Introduction: scale and policy questions
- Remittances are private, unrequited transfers from migrants to family members and aggregate to large amounts:
  - US$114 billion in 2003 (official channels; informal flows likely raise the total).
- For many developing economies remittance flows:
  - Exceed foreign direct investment, portfolio flows, and official development assistance in some cases.
  - Can represent a substantial portion of imports and a nontrivial fraction of GDP.
- Two main policy questions:
  - How to manage remittances’ macroeconomic effects.
  - How to harness their development potential.
- Broad finding: remittances improve household welfare by lifting families out of poverty and insuring against income shocks, but there are important macroeconomic caveats and policy considerations.

### Main findings and policy-relevant conclusions
- Measurement
  - The balance of payments item workers’ remittances best represents the economic concept used in modeling remittances.
  - Combining workers’ remittances with employee compensation and migrants’ transfers can lead to invalid conclusions and suboptimal policies.
- Fiscal policy
  - Remittances should not be taxed directly.
  - Consumption-based taxation provides the optimal incentive structure to maximize remittance benefits.
  - Labor income taxation exacerbates labor-leisure disincentives and encourages use of inflation as an indirect tax.
  - Recommendation: remittance-receiving countries should shift toward consumption-based tax systems to mitigate negative effects on growth, minimize policy-induced distortions, and capture tax-induced investment increases from remittances.
- Debt sustainability
  - Remittances can reduce country risk and improve government debt sustainability by increasing household saving and expanding the government’s revenue base.
- Fiscal discipline
  - Remittances may reduce governments’ incentives to maintain fiscal discipline; empirical evidence suggests governments may consume and borrow more when remittances provide fiscal space.
- Economic growth
  - Remittances are not necessarily associated with increased domestic investment or more efficient allocation of investment.
  - Recipients may substitute unearned remittance income for labor income; with labor and capital complementary in production, this can negatively affect capital accumulation.
  - Empirical analysis reveals remittances have no statistically significant effect on GDP growth.
- Dutch disease effects
  - Remittances are positively correlated with real exchange rate appreciation, indicating potential Dutch disease effects.
  - Policymakers must mitigate real exchange rate appreciation or address resulting competitiveness losses.
- Governance and incentives
  - Remittances can create moral hazard by reducing political pressure for policy reform.
  - Compensatory remittances that insure the public against shocks can reduce incentives to demand government reforms and delay public infrastructure upgrades.
- Role of international financial institutions
  - Outside engagement may be required to prompt governments to undertake needed reforms in the presence of remittances.
  - A differentiated, country-specific approach is preferable to a one-size-fits-all reform strategy.

### Why study macro effects: three motivating features
- Size: remittance flows rose from US$48 billion in 1994 to US$114 billion in 2003 (WDI series workers’ remittances).
- Permanence: globalization and labor mobility trends make continued remittance flows likely.
- Distinctness: remittances differ from official aid and private capital because they are unrequited, nonmarket transfers with familial motivations (altruism or exchange), so their macro effects may differ.

### Measurement matters: definitions and components
- Three balance of payments components often considered in remittance statistics:
  - Workers’ remittances: current transfers by migrants employed in host countries who are resident there (expected stay of a year or more); recorded under current transfers in BPM5.
  - Employee compensation: wages, salaries, and benefits earned by nonresidents for work performed for residents of the host country; recorded under income in the current account in BPM5.
  - Migrants’ transfers: contra-entries to goods and financial changes arising from changes of residence; recorded under capital transfers in BPM5.
- Workers’ remittances most closely match the notion of periodic, unrequited, nonmarket transfers between households across countries.
- Problems with including migrants’ transfers:
  - Often represent transfer of accumulated assets on return migration or mere reclassification of assets on change of residence (may not involve actual flows).
  - Example raised: reclassifying a large resident’s change of residency as a remittance would distort real outcomes.
  - No worldwide wave of reverse migration supports a global increase in migrants’ transfers; limited conceptual justification to include migrants’ transfers as remittances.
- Problems with including employee compensation:
  - Represents earned income, not transfers; frequently dominated by remuneration of long-term nonresidents rather than seasonal workers.
  - Example data: in 2004, half of the top 10 recipients of the aggregate workers’ remittances and employee compensation were developed European countries (France US$12.7 billion, Spain US$6.9 billion, Belgium US$6.8 billion, Germany US$6.5 billion, United Kingdom US$6.4 billion), with employee compensation accounting for the majority of those flows.
  - Lesotho example: employee compensation ~US$341 million in 2004 vs workers’ remittances US$14 million; on average around 70 percent of its GDP in employee compensation between 1970 and 2005.
  - Netting out host-country expenditures (recorded under travel) to compute net compensation is impracticable due to data limitations.

### Empirical evidence: behavioral differences across components
- Data coverage and totals (1970–2005 series, 2003 as most recent full-year dataset):
  - 154 countries provided data on workers’ remittances and employee compensation (totaling US$199 billion).
  - 104 provided data on workers’ remittances (totaling US$114 billion).
  - 107 reported employee compensation (US$14 billion).
  - 49 reported migrants’ transfers (US$4 billion).
- Business cycle correlations (log of series in percent of GDP, filtered with Hodrick-Prescott):
  - Workers’ remittances mean correlation with real GDP per capita: –0.080 (full sample); –0.084 (emerging economies).
  - Workers’ remittances and employee compensation mean correlation: –0.026 (full sample); –0.031 (emerging economies).
  - Workers’ remittances, employee compensation, and migrants’ transfers mean correlation: 0.029 (full sample); 0.024 (emerging economies).
  - Interpretation: workers’ remittances are on average countercyclical (supporting altruistic remittance behavior). Employee compensation and migrants’ transfers are on average procyclical, more like private capital flows.
- Subsample of countries reporting workers’ remittances and employee compensation separately (34 countries; accounts for 51.2 percent of total workers’ remittances and 17.2 percent of total employee compensation in 2003):
  - Correlation between workers’ remittances and employee compensation: mean 0.034; median –0.004; standard deviation 0.300; minimum –0.623; maximum 0.652.
  - Distribution clustered around zero; most observations not near unity—series are largely uncorrelated.
- Conclusion from data tests: workers’ remittances, employee compensation, and migrants’ transfers capture different behavioral characteristics; researchers should use the workers’ remittances series when studying remittance behavior. The paper intentionally omits employee compensation and migrants’ transfers from remittance measures for econometric/statistical analysis.

### New balance of payments methodology (proposed changes)
- A working group (World Bank, IMF, other institutions) and a United Nations technical subgroup prepared revisions to BPM5/System of National Accounts (to be completed in 2008 per Reinke (2007)), with important changes:
  - Personal transfers to replace workers’ remittances: include all current transfers in cash or in kind between resident households and nonresident households, independent of employment and migration status.
  - Creation of a new supplementary item: personal remittances (personal transfers plus net compensation of employees), designated as supplementary (not part of official IMF/World Bank databases).
  - Removal of migrants’ transfers from the balance of payments framework: changes in assets/liabilities from residency changes recorded under other changes of assets and liabilities.
  - Elimination of the concept of migrant in the balance of payments: residency-based approach makes the migrant concept unnecessary.
- Implications:
  - The new category personal transfers better captures periodic, recurring, unrequited current transfers between residents of different countries.
  - Eliminates confusion between transfers out of wage income and other income, and the grey areas caused by the migrant concept.
  - Inclusion of employee compensation as a supplementary item and removal of migrants’ transfers align with empirical findings that those series behave more like private capital flows and should be separate from personal transfers.

*Source: _op259 - Preface*

### Conclusion

### Conclusion

### Measurement and classification of remittances
- Aggregating the current categories workers’ remittances, employee compensation, and migrants’ transfers into one series is problematic and can lead to serious misspecification and faulty conclusions.
- Employee compensation and migrants’ transfers are conceptually different from and behave differently than workers’ remittances; measurement matters.
- Researchers and policymakers should reexamine previous conclusions drawn from aggregated series using the more precisely defined category workers’ remittances alone.
- The category workers’ remittances most closely captures the generally accepted definition of remittances and matches the classification the official community has stated will be accepted.
- The authors welcome the proposed changes by the IMF Committee on Balance of Payments Statistics and the Advisory Expert Group on National Accounts to classify remittances as personal transfers, with the hope these changes will yield greater clarity.

### Stylized facts and macroeconomic importance (aggregate and regional)
- Global measured flows of workers’ remittances:
  - US$6 billion in the early 1970s
  - US$50 billion in the mid-1990s
  - US$114 billion in 2003
- Developing countries received US$104 billion in remittance flows in 2003, equal to 91 percent of global workers’ remittances in that year and 1.4 percent of total developing country GDP.
- Average remittances per reporting country increased from US$150 million to US$1.2 billion over the study period, an increase by a factor of eight, and almost doubled between 1994 and 2003.
- Data availability and reporting:
  - 104 countries reported in 2003.
  - 92 countries had available data in 2004.
  - 40 countries had available data in 2005.
- Per-country figures suggest the upward trend continued, rising from US$1.1 billion in 2003 to US$1.3 billion in 2005.
- Extrapolating the 2005 per-country average to the 104 countries that reported in 2003 yields estimated global remittance flows of US$135 billion for 2005.
- Regional and country-level observations:
  - Developing Asia and the western hemisphere receive the largest amounts of workers’ remittances; the Middle East doubled remittance flows between 2000 and 2003.
  - Mexico was the largest developing-country recipient in 2004 with US$16.6 billion.
  - The five largest developing-country recipients over 1990–2004 were, in order, India, Mexico, Lebanon, Egypt, and Turkey.
  - Among the top 20 developing-country recipients for 2004, remittances equaled between 9 and 24 percent of GDP.
  - The five largest recipients by ratio in 2004—Haiti, Lebanon, Guyana, Jordan, and Jamaica—received remittances equaling 17 percent of GDP or more.
  - The largest recipients relative to GDP over 1990–2004 were Samoa, Tonga, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Yemen, and Jordan.

### Relative stability and comparison with other balance of payments flows
- Workers’ remittances exceed both official aid and non-FDI private capital inflows to developing countries and have generally done so consistently since 1998.
- Volatility comparisons (1980–2003), based on the standard deviation of the detrended ratio of each flow to GDP:
  - Official aid was three times as volatile as workers’ remittances.
  - FDI was 17 times as volatile as workers’ remittances.
  - Non-FDI private capital inflows were 22 times as volatile as workers’ remittances.
  - Exports were 74 times as volatile as workers’ remittances.
- The relative stability of workers’ remittances versus other inflows may provide macroeconomic benefits by reducing volatility of output and consumption.

### Cross-country heterogeneity and implications
- Aggregating remittances across countries underestimates their importance for many individual countries; cross-country averaging gives a different perspective.
- Cross-country average ratios of workers’ remittances to GDP:
  - 3.7 percent for 1970–2005 (cross-country sample average)
  - 3.6 percent for 1995–2004
  - 4.2 percent in 2004
- Cross-country dispersion:
  - Cross-country standard deviation of average remittances was 4.9 percentage points of GDP for 1970–2005 and 5.8 percentage points during 1995–2004.
  - Distribution (1995–2004):
    - 48 countries (44 percent of the observations) received an average of 1 percent of GDP or less per year in workers’ remittances.
    - 25 countries (23 percent of the observations) recorded an average ratio of workers’ remittances to GDP in the 2–5 percent range.
    - 7 countries (6 percent of the observations) received average annual flows of 15 percent of GDP or more.
- The heterogeneity of exposure to remittances across countries is critical for empirical analysis and provides variability needed to test remittances’ effects on macroeconomic performance.

### Overall assessment
- Workers’ remittances have grown consistently and represent the second-largest balance of payments inflow to developing countries.
- Proper measurement—using the workers’ remittances category rather than aggregated series—is essential for accurate analysis of their nature, macroeconomic impact, and implications for household decisions and policy.

*Source: Conclusion, _op259 - Conclusion*

### 2003. However, the average ratio of workers’ remittances to GDP is

### _op259 - 2003. However, the average ratio of workers’ remittances to GDP is

### Stylized facts on remittances: levels and country coverage
- Countries reporting remittances for at least 25 years (i.e., 1980–2004) received an average of 6 percent of GDP in workers’ remittances in the last two years of the sample period, compared to just over 4 percent 10 years ago.
- Table summary (1970–2005, 1995–2004, 2004):
  - Mean workers’ remittances–to–GDP ratio across countries and time: 3.7, 3.6, 4.2
  - Maximum workers’ remittances–to–GDP ratio across countries and time: 64.0, 40.8, 17.9
  - Number of countries: 145, 108, 77
  - Number of observations: 1,906, 839, 77
  - Cross-country standard deviation: 4.9, 5.8, 5.2

### Workers’ remittances relative to other balance of payments inflows (1995–2004 and 2004)
- Recent period: 1995–2004 (mean across countries and time)
  - Ratio of Workers’ Remittances to Official Transfers: 12.2
  - Ratio to Official Capital Flows: 9.6
  - Ratio to Private Capital Flows: 2.4
  - Ratio to Exports: 0.3
  - Maximum country average: 217.1 (Official Transfers), 371.5 (Official Capital Flows), 39.7 (Private Capital Flows), 4.0 (Exports)
  - Cross-country standard deviation: 34.2, 47.9, 6.0, 0.7
  - Country with average ratio of workers’ remittances to GDP: 1.9 (Official Transfers), 3.4 (Official Capital Flows), 1.5 (Private Capital Flows), 0.2 (Exports)
- Recent observation: 2004
  - Mean: 41.8 (Official Transfers), 12.7 (Official Capital Flows), 2.6 (Private Capital Flows), 0.2 (Exports)
  - Maximum: 1,648.7 (Official Transfers), 145.6 (Official Capital Flows), 39.7 (Private Capital Flows), 3.2 (Exports)
  - Cross-country standard deviation: 212.5, 32.6, 2.6, 0.5
  - Country with average ratio of workers’ remittances to GDP: 4.5 (Official Transfers), 1.3 (Official Capital Flows), 0.3 (Private Capital Flows)

- Representative example: Senegal averaged 3.7 percent of GDP in workers’ remittances during the period, equal to about one-fifth of exports, 1.5 times private capital flows, more than three times official capital flows, and almost twice official transfers.

### Volatility and stability of remittance flows (standard deviations in ratio to GDP, averages across countries)
- Table 3.3 sample periods (Standard deviation in ratio to GDP, average across countries):
  - 1970–2005: Official Transfers 2.9; Official Capital Flows 3.5; Private Capital Flows 6.6; Workers’ Remittances 1.8
  - 1980–2005: Official Transfers 2.9; Official Capital Flows 3.5; Private Capital Flows 6.5; Workers’ Remittances 1.8
  - 1995–2005: Official Transfers 2.0; Official Capital Flows 2.7; Private Capital Flows 5.5; Workers’ Remittances 1.3
  - Country with average ratio of workers’ remittances to GDP: 0.7 (Official Transfers); 0.6 (Official Capital Flows); 2.1 (Private Capital Flows); 2.0 (Workers’ Remittances)
- Key observations:
  - Average annual standard deviation of workers’ remittances was 1.8 percentage points of GDP over 1970–2005.
  - In 1995–2005 the standard deviation of remittances was 1.3 percentage points of GDP, remaining below official transfers (2.0), about half official capital flows (2.7), and under a quarter of private capital flows (5.5).

### Correlations between remittances and other inflows
- Full sample period: 1970–2005 (correlation over time—country averages)
  - Remittances vs Official Transfers: 0.13
  - Remittances vs Official Capital Flows: –0.11
  - Remittances vs Private Capital Flows: –0.07
  - Percentage of countries with negative correlations: 41 (Official Transfers), 64 (Official Capital Flows), 58 (Private Capital Flows)
  - Number of countries: 76, 75, 88
- Recent period: 1995–2005
  - Correlation over time—country averages: 0.06 (Official Transfers), –0.07 (Official Capital Flows), –0.03 (Private Capital Flows)
  - Percentage of countries with negative correlations: 38 (Official Transfers), 56 (Official Capital Flows), 57 (Private Capital Flows)
  - Number of countries: 64, 63, 79
- Interpretation:
  - Remittances tend to be uncorrelated or negatively correlated with other international flows, supporting the view that remittances behave differently from official and profit-seeking private flows.

### Macroeconomic associations: remittances and country-level performance (1995–2004, 100-country sample)
- General patterns from quintile analysis:
  - Average workers’ remittances in percent of GDP by quintile: 0.1, 0.4, 1.7, 3.8, 11.1
  - Per Capita GDP (PPP) $US in 1995 by quintile: $6,907; $3,572; $3,402; $2,827; $2,620
  - Real GDP Growth (period averages) by quintile: 4.1; 4.2; 3.3; 3.8; 4.5
  - Inflation by quintile: 10.8; 4.3; 3.7; 4.3; 4.4
  - Percentage Change in REER by quintile: 0.8; 19.5; 11.2; 8.8; 14.4
  - Liquid Liabilities in Percent of GDP by quintile: 0.7; 1.0; –0.3; –1.1; –1.4 (note: table formatting in source lists differing positions; preserve supplied values)
  - Fiscal Balance in Percent of GDP by quintile: –0.1; –3.3; –3.6; –3.0; –3.2
  - Correlations with workers’ remittances: Real GDP Growth 0.15; Inflation –0.05; Percentage Change in REER –0.20; Liquid Liabilities 0.12; Fiscal Balance –0.11; Per Capita GDP –0.24
- Selected percentile points:
  - Lowest decile: Average workers’ remittances 0.0; Real GDP Growth 4.2; Inflation 11.4; Percentage Change in REER 0.04; Liquid Liabilities 42.9; Fiscal Balance –1.6; Per Capita GDP $5,908
  - 50th percentile: Average workers’ remittances 1.7; Real GDP Growth 1.4; Inflation 9.3; Percentage Change in REER –2.0; Liquid Liabilities 34.7; Fiscal Balance –1.1; Per Capita GDP $4,450
  - Highest decile: Average workers’ remittances 15.5; Real GDP Growth 4.7; Inflation 11.6; Percentage Change in REER 0.75; Liquid Liabilities 52.4; Fiscal Balance –3.6; Per Capita GDP $2,744
- Interpretations and caveats:
  - Negative association between remittances and level of income: average per capita GDP declines from $6,907 in the lowest remittance quintile to $2,620 in the highest; correlation –0.24.
  - Little correlation between average real GDP growth and remittance level; small positive overall correlation driven by an outlier (Bosnia and Herzegovina); excluding that country yields lower growth in the top remittance quintile (from 4.4 percent to 3.9 percent).
  - Inflation shows little relation to remittances (correlation near zero).
  - Liquid liabilities (proxy for financial system size) display a nonmonotonic pattern across quintiles and a positive correlation 0.12 with remittances.
  - Countries receiving remittances of 1 percent of GDP or more exhibited noticeably weaker fiscal outcomes over the study period (correlation between remittances and fiscal balance –0.11).
  - Apparent tendency for larger remittance recipients to exhibit less currency appreciation, but interpretation limited by small country coverage for real exchange rate series (only 48 countries had sufficient REER series).

### Conclusions and implications
- By multiple measures, workers’ remittances have grown rapidly worldwide, particularly since the early 1990s, and are now a sizable component of recipient countries’ balance of payments.
- Relative size: remittances are second only to FDI in size among international flows considered, and several times larger than other official and private flows.
- Stability: remittances tend to be significantly more stable over time than other balance of payments flows, especially private capital flows and exports.
- Correlations: remittances are largely uncorrelated with other foreign exchange inflows, consistent with their character as unrequited private transfers among family members.
- Heterogeneity: nearly half of developing countries receive remittances of less than 1 percent of GDP, while others exceed 15 percent of GDP and may surpass a country’s total export earnings.
- Research implications: the heterogeneity and relative stability of remittances justify treating them distinctly in macroeconomic analysis; relationships between remittances and macroeconomic performance are likely complex, conditioned by other variables, and potentially nonlinear. Subsequent chapters explore these interactions and econometric issues in more detail.

*Source: World Bank (2006), IMF (2006a, 2006b), and authors’ calculations as presented in the supplied content.*

### References

### References

### III REMITTANCES: STYLIZED FACTS
- Key cited works (selected): Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah (2003); Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2005); Hodrick and Prescott (1997); IMF (2005, 2006a, 2006b); Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2006); World Bank (2006).
- Aggregate- and micro-data limitations highlighted:
  - Aggregate remittance data have important measurement limitations; Chapter 3 adds further cautions.
  - Microeconomic data sets often were not constructed specifically for remittance study and are not comparable across samples in content or measurement.
  - Lack of cross-country longitudinal data on individual remittance-sending and remittance-receiving households is a severe constraint.

### IV WHAT DRIVES REMITTANCE FLOWS? — Theory
- Three explicit aspects of remittance determination:
  - Motivation for remitting (two basic motivations identified: altruism and exchange/self-interested exchange).
  - Intended use of remittances (classified by economic purpose into risk sharing (insuring) and altering the intertemporal path of consumption (consuming, saving, and investing); also “overhead” transfers that purchase services to replace the migrant’s household labor).
  - End uses (implemented by recipients: consumption of final goods and services, financial assets including cash, or real assets including human capital).
- Framework implications:
  - Complete theories must pair motivation → intended function → end use; partial theories (e.g., “insurance” or “inheritance”) describe only intended function and are not complete.
  - Altruism and exchange motivations can coexist; exchange (implicit contracts) often requires enforcement mechanisms based on altruism.
  - Generalized exchange / merit goods framework: remitter utility U_E(c_E, a, U_H) where c_E is emigrant consumption, a is recipient action, U_H is recipient utility.
  - Chami (1998) and related work show it is difficult to distinguish altruistic from exchange motives ex post using market outcome data; common empirical tests may fail when merit goods and informational problems are introduced.

### IV WHAT DRIVES REMITTANCE FLOWS? — Evidence and empirical approach
- Typical explanatory variables used in empirical remittance-determination equations:
  - Economic condition variables: migrant income, family income.
  - Demographic variables: stock of migrants in host country (or family characteristics in micro data), migrant’s length of stay, family size, number of other migrants in family.
  - Opportunity/financial variables: interest rates, black market exchange premiums, proxies for political risk.
- Stylized empirical finding:
  - Demographic and income variables (e.g., proxies for migrant capacity to remit and strength of family ties) are consistently significant determinants of amount and timing of remittances.
- Identification problems emphasized:
  - Correlations in data are consistent with multiple theories; few conclusive empirical tests distinguish motivations.
  - Single remittance flows may contain multiple components corresponding to different theoretical chains, creating errors-in-variables and reducing statistical significance.
- Recharacterization suggested as policy-relevant distinction:
  - Compensatory versus opportunistic transfers:
    - Compensatory: remittances sent to compensate recipients for unfavorable economic conditions (consistent with insurance or consumption-smoothing motives).
    - Opportunistic: remittances sent to take advantage of favorable investment conditions (similar to capital flows).
  - The economic impact differs sharply depending on whether transfers are predominantly compensatory or opportunistic.

### Empirical specification reported in the chapter
- Remittance-determination regression estimated:
  - wr_it = b_0 + b_1(r_i – r_US)_t + b_2(y_US – y_i)_t + b_3$E_it + E_t,
    - where wr is the log of the ratio of workers’ remittances to GDP,
    - r is a real deposit or money market interest rate,
    - y is real GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity,
    - $E is the change in the nominal exchange rate (increase = depreciation of country i currency relative to the U.S. dollar).
- Interpretation of coefficients:
  - Positive coefficient on (r_i – r_US) implies remittances behave like opportunistic capital flows.
  - Positive coefficient on (y_US – y_i) implies remittances are countercyclical (compensatory).

### Empirical results summarized (periods and main conclusions)
- Time periods for regressions: 1970–2005, 1985–2005, and 2001–2005 (pooled, fixed effects, random effects estimators used).
- Main empirical findings:
  - Workers’ remittances decrease in response to currency depreciations (depreciations of recipient country’s currency relative to the dollar result in a lower ratio of workers’ remittances to GDP); results significant at the 5 or 10 percent level in most cases — interpretable as remitters smoothing purchasing power in local currency (compensatory behavior).
  - Interest rate differentials:
    - Not a significant determinant of remittance flows until after 2001.
    - In the full 1970–2005 data, real interest rate differentials alone are a significant determinant but have very low explanatory power (R-squared).
    - Once income differentials are added, interest rate differentials lose significance.
    - After 2001, interest rate differentials become significant only after income differentials are included, with the coefficient turning negative in some specifications (a widening real interest rate gap in favor of country i leads to less remittances), but interpretation should be cautious due to short sample length (2001–2005).
  - Income differentials are a highly significant determinant of remittances in each subperiod, favoring countercyclicality (widening income differentials lead to additional workers’ remittances in terms of GDP); the coefficient is significant at the 1 percent level in nearly all cases.
  - Overall interpretation: strong indication that remittances behave like compensatory transfers (insurance / countercyclical) rather than opportunistic capital flows.

- Regression time-sample observations examples (as reported in tables):
  - Observations: 1,869 (1970–2005 pooled/full sample), 1,515 (1985–2005 pooled/full sample), 412 (2001–2005 pooled/full sample).
  - Significance notation used in tables: * significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; *** significant at 1 percent level.
  - Note: detailed coefficient values and test statistics appear in Tables 4.1–4.3 (tables list constants, (r_i – r_US), (y_US – y_i), dE coefficients and test statistics, and R-squared within/between/overall).

### Uses of remittances — stylized facts from micro evidence
- Three stylized facts on end uses of remittances:
  1. A significant portion, often the majority, of remitted funds are spent on consumption.
     - Inter-American Development Bank’s Multilateral Investment Fund (2004) found consumption accounted for between 60 and 80 percent of remittance use in a sample of five Latin American countries.
     - Numerous country studies (e.g., Oberai and Singh (1980); Durand and others (1996); Gilani, Khan, and Iqbal (1981); Glytsos (1993); World Bank (2006)) support consumption predominance.
     - Some studies (e.g., Adams (2005) for Guatemala) find a smaller propensity to consume out of remittances than out of other income.
  2. A significant, though generally smaller, share of remittances is saved or invested, often in housing, land, and financial assets (bank deposits).
     - Examples: Alderman (1996) and Adams (1998) (Pakistan) — investment in land and buildings; Brown (1994) (Western Samoa and Tonga) — housing largest expenditure out of remittance income; Adams (1991) (Egypt) — remittances increase marginal propensity to invest (residences and land).
  3. Household saving and investment funded by remittances is not necessarily productive at the aggregate-economy level.
     - Transfers into land, existing houses, and jewelry often represent wealth transfers rather than net additions to productive capital stock.
     - Sofranko and Idris (1999) (Pakistan) found little channeling of remittances into actual business investment.
     - Lopez and Seligson (1991) (El Salvador) found 40 percent of business owners who receive remittances do not invest remittances in their businesses.
- Caveats on exception studies:
  - Taylor (1992) (Mexico): increased cattle holdings associated with remittances in a sample of 55 farm families — interpretability limited because cattle may be preferred store of wealth when land is not marketable.
  - Woodruff and Zenteno (2001) (Mexico): positive correlation between migration and business investment at state level, but migration measure includes returning migrants and the remittance data include migrant transfers (monies brought home by returning migrants), limiting inference about workers’ remittances properly defined.
  - World Bank (2006) finds both compensatory and opportunistic evidence in Latin America, but its remittance series combine workers’ remittances, migrant transfers, and employee compensation, complicating interpretation.

### Synthesis and policy-relevant implications
- Aggregate conclusion from theory and evidence:
  - Remittances are motivated by factors different from those driving other international financial flows; they are non-market transfers often serving compensatory (insurance / consumption-smoothing) purposes, with predominant end use on consumption and some household asset accumulation that may not translate into aggregate productive investment.
  - Thus remittances’ economic impacts may be more akin to public, non-market compensatory transfers (public social insurance programs or aid flows) than to profit-driven capital flows.
- Policy implication emphasized by the chapter:
  - There is a critical need for cross-country longitudinal studies that follow cohorts of migrants and their families over time to collect accurate data on remittances and end uses, and to conduct interviews to understand migration and remittance decision processes. Such studies are necessary to resolve lingering questions about predominant motivations, intended functions, and end uses of remittances and to provide policymakers with the understanding needed about remittances’ roles in economic development.

*Italicized source attribution: IMF Working Paper — content drawn from the “References” / Chapter text supplied.*

### References

### References

### Empirical studies on remittances and household/poverty/investment impacts
- Adams, Richard H., Jr., 1991, “The Economic Uses and Impact of International Remittances in Rural Egypt,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 39 (July), pp. 695–722.
- Adams, Richard H., Jr., 1998, “Remittances, Investment, and Rural Asset Accumulation in Pakistan,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 47 (October), pp. 155–73.
- Adams, Richard H., Jr., 2005, “Remittances, Poverty, and Investment in Guatemala,” in International Migration, Remittances, and the Brain Drain, ed. by Caglar Ozden and Maurice Schiff (Washington: World Bank).
- Aggarwal, Reena, and Andrew W. Horowitz, 2002, “Are International Remittances Altruism or Insurance? Evidence from Guyana Using Multiple-Migrant Households,” World Development, Vol. 30 (November), pp. 2033–44.
- Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina, and Susan Pozo, 2006, “Remittances as Insurance: Evidence from Mexican Immigrants,” Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 19 (June), pp. 227–54.
- Brown, Richard P.C., 1994, “Migrants’ Remittances, Savings and Investment in the South Pacific,” International Labor Review, Vol. 133, No. 3, pp. 347–67.
- de la Brière, Bénédicte, Elisabeth Sadoulet, Alain de Janvry, and Sylvie Lambert, 2002, “The Roles of Destination, Gender, and Household Composition in Explaining Remittances: An Analysis for the Dominican Sierra,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 68 (August), pp. 309–28.
- Durand, Jorge, William Kandel, Emilio A. Parrado, and Douglas S. Massey, 1996, “International Migration and Development in Mexican Communities,” Demography, Vol. 33 (May), pp. 249–64.
- Funkhouser, Edward, 1995, “Remittances from International Migration: A Comparison of El Salvador and Nicaragua,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 77 (February), pp. 137–46.
- Gubert, Flore, 2002, “Do Migrants Insure Those Who Stay Behind? Evidence from the Kayes Area (Western Mali),” Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 30 (October), pp. 267–87.
- Hoddinott, John, 1994, “A Model of Migration and Remittances Applied to Western Kenya,” Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 46 (July), pp. 459–76.
- Ilahi, Nadeem, and Saqib Jafarey, 1999, “Guestworker Migration, Remittances and the Extended Family: Evidence from Pakistan,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 58 (April), pp. 485–512.
- Lopez, Jose Roberto, and Mitchell A. Seligson, 1991, “Small Business Development in El Salvador: The Impact of Remittances,” in Migration, Remittances and Small Business Development: Mexico and Caribbean Basin Countries, Series on Development and International Migration in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean Basin, Vol. 4, ed. by Sergio Diaz-Briquets and Sidney Weintraub (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press).
- Mulligan, Casey B., and Tomas J. Philipson, 2000, “Merit Motives and Government Intervention: Public Finance in Reverse,” NBER Working Paper No. 7698 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
- Poirine, Bernard, 1997, “A Theory of Remittances as an Implicit Family Loan Arrangement,” World Development, Vol. 25 (January), pp. 589–611.
- Sofranko, A.J., and Khan Idris, 1999, “Use of Overseas Migrants’ Remittances to the Extended Family for Business Investment: A Research Note,” Rural Sociology, Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 464–81.
- Vanwey, Leah K., 2004, “Altruistic and Contractual Remittances Between Male and Female Migrants and Households in Rural Thailand,” Demography, Vol. 41 (November), pp. 739–56.
- Woodruff, Christopher, and Rene Zenteno, 2001, “Remittances and Microenterprises in Mexico,” SCCIE Working Paper No. 01-25 (Santa Cruz, California: Santa Cruz Center for International Economics). Available via the Internet: http://sccie.ucsc.edu/documents/working_papers/2001/Remittances_Mexico.pdf
- World Bank, 2006, The Development Impact of Workers’ Remittances in Latin America, Vol. 2: Detailed Findings, Report No. 37026 (Washington).
- Yang, Dean, 2007, “Coping with Disaster: The Impact of Hurricanes on International Financial Flows, 1970–2002” (unpublished; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan). Available via the Internet: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~deanyang/papers/yang_copedist.pdf
- Yang, Dean, and HwaJung Choi, 2007, “Are Remittances Insurance? Evidence from Rainfall Shocks in the Philippines,” World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 219–48.

### Theoretical and behavioral models of remittances, altruism, and family motives
- Becker, Gary, 1991, A Treatise on the Family (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, enlarged ed.).
- Bernheim, Douglas, Andrei Shleifer, and Lawrence Summers, 1985, “The Strategic Bequest Motive,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93 (December), pp. 1045–76.
- Chami, Ralph, 1998, “Private Income Transfers and Market Incentives,” Economica, Vol. 65 (November), pp. 557–80.
- Chami, Ralph, and Jeffrey H. Fischer, 1996, “Altruism, Matching, and Nonmarket Insurance,” Economic Inquiry, Vol. 34 (October), pp. 630–47.
- Chami, Ralph, Connel Fullenkamp, and Samir Jahjah, 2005, “Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of Capital for Development?” IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 52 (April), pp. 55–81.
- Cox, Donald, 1987, “Motives for Private Income Transfers,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 95 (June), pp. 508–46.
- Glytsos, Nicholas P., 1988, “Remittances in Temporary Migration: A Theoretical Model and Its Testing with the Greek-German Experience,” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 124, No. 3, pp. 524–49.
- Glytsos, Nicholas P., 1993, “Measuring the Income Effects of Migrant Remittances: A Methodological Approach Applied to Greece,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 42 (October), pp. 131–68.
- Lucas, Robert E.B., and Oded Stark, 1985, “Motivations to Remit: Evidence from Botswana,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93 (October), pp. 901–18.
- Merkle, Lucie, and Klaus F. Zimmermann, 1992, “Savings, Remittances and Return Migration,” Economics Letters, Vol. 38 (January), pp. 77–81.
- Poirine, Bernard, 1997, “A Theory of Remittances as an Implicit Family Loan Arrangement,” World Development, Vol. 25 (January), pp. 589–611.
- Stark, Oded, 1991, “Migration in LDCs: Risk, Remittances, and the Family,” Finance and Development, Vol. 28 (December), pp. 39–41.
- Stark, Oded, and D. Bloom, 1985, “The New Economics of Labor Migration,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 75 (May), pp. 173–78.
- Stark, Oded, and Robert E.B. Lucas, 1988, “Migration, Remittances, and the Family,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 36 (April), pp. 465–81.

### Macro and policy-related analyses; determinants and capital flow interactions
- El-Sakka, M.I.T., and Robert McNabb, 1999, “The Macroeconomic Determinants of Emigrant Remittances,” World Development, Vol. 27 (August), pp. 1493–502.
- Buch, Claudia M., Anja Kuckulenz, and Marie-Helene Le Manchec, 2002, “Worker Remittances and Capital Flows,” Working Paper No. 1130 (Kiel, Germany: Kiel Institute for World Economics). Available via the Internet: http://www.ifw-kiel.de/pub/kap/2002/kap1130.pdf
- Gupta, Poonam, 2005, “Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances: Evidence from India,” IMF Working Paper 05/224 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Swamy, Gurushri, 1981, “International Migrant Workers’ Remittances: Issues and Prospects,” Staff Working Paper No. 481 (Washington: World Bank).
- Multilateral Investment Fund, 2004, Sending Money Home: Remittance to Latin America and the Caribbean (Washington: Inter-American Development Bank). Available via the Internet: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=547263
- World Bank, 2006, The Development Impact of Workers’ Remittances in Latin America, Vol. 2: Detailed Findings, Report No. 37026 (Washington).

### Region- and country-specific studies and case studies
- Banerjee, Biswajit, 1984, “The Probability, Size and Uses of Remittances from Urban to Rural Areas in India,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 16 (December), pp. 293–311.
- Gilani, Ijaz, Fahim Khan, and Munawar Iqbal, 1981, “Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Middle East and Its Impact on the Domestic Economy, Part 1,” PIDE Research Report No. 126 (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics).
- Oberai, A.S., and H.K. Manmohan Singh, 1980, “Migration, Remittances and Rural Development: Findings of a Case Study in the Indian Punjab,” International Labour Review, Vol. 119, pp. 229–41.
- Russell, Sharon Stanton, 1986, “Remittances from International Migration: A Review in Perspective,” World Development, Vol. 14 (June), pp. 677–96.
- Secondi, Georgio, 1997, “Private Monetary Transfers in Rural China: Are Families Altruistic?” Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 33 (April), pp. 487–511.
- Taylor, J. Edward, 1992, “Remittances and Inequality Reconsidered: Direct, Indirect, and Intertemporal Effects,” Journal of Policy Modeling, Vol. 14 (April), pp. 187–208.
- Vanwey, Leah K., 2004, “Altruistic and Contractual Remittances Between Male and Female Migrants and Households in Rural Thailand,” Demography, Vol. 41 (November), pp. 739–56.

*References list as provided in the content unit.*

### References

### V    Macroeconomic Implications of Remittances: Theory

### Short-run macroeconomic performance: framing and key analytical distinctions
- Remittances are initially modeled as pure income transfers (not capital flows, not merit goods); later modifications consider merit-good and capital-flow interpretations.
- Analytical approach distinguishes two fundamental cases:
  - Remittances treated as exogenous shocks to the receiving economy.
  - Remittances treated as endogenous, driven by motives such as altruism or investment by the sending/receiving household.
- Macro effects depend on: characteristics of remittance flows, characteristics of the recipient economy, and how remittances respond to shocks.

### Exogenous remittances — basic framework and channels
- Reference economy: two production sectors (traded and nontraded goods), homogeneous labor mobile between sectors, initially perfectly open financially (uncovered interest parity), nonmonetary, costless domestic financial intermediation.
- Representative household optimizes intertemporally; initial specification: utility depends on consumption of traded and nontraded goods only (aggregate labor supply exogenous); world real interest rate equals household rate of time preference (flat consumption path).
- Government modeled as nonoptimizing agent levying lump-sum taxes and either saving or spending exogenously.

Key implications when remittances are exogenous and untaxed:
- A permanent, unanticipated increase in remittances raises household income permanently; with flat optimal consumption, households spend the increased income fully on traded and nontraded goods.
- Welfare of recipient households rises unambiguously.
- Higher demand for nontraded goods induces reallocation of the fixed aggregate labor supply toward nontraded production via a real exchange rate appreciation.
- Current account remains unchanged; trade balance deteriorates by exactly the increase in remittances (combination of lower traded-goods output and higher demand for traded goods).
- Magnitude of real appreciation increases with: the share of consumption devoted to nontraded goods and the smaller the elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods in production.
- Distributional consequences depend on remittance allocation across households and household consumption patterns; households oriented toward traded goods benefit relatively more when the real exchange rate appreciates.

Effects when remittances are directly taxed (lump-sum taxation):
- If government saves additional tax revenue: Ricardian equivalence implies households behave as without taxation; macro effects unchanged and welfare still increases.
- If government spends additional revenue on traded goods (with government consumption not affecting household utility/production): increase in remittances has no effect on domestic consumption, welfare, or current account; trade balance deterioration arises solely from higher government spending on traded goods.
- If government spends additional revenue on nontraded goods: effect equivalent to exogenous reduction in nontraded output; household disposable income unchanged; real exchange rate appreciates; production shifts from traded to nontraded goods; greater remittances can reduce household welfare in this case.
- Conclusion: the macroeconomic effects of taxing remittances depend crucially on how governments use the proceeds.

### Endogenous labor supply
- When household utility includes leisure (labor supply endogenous), an increase in remittances leads households to substitute toward leisure and reduce labor supply.
- Consequences:
  - Aggregate real output falls.
  - Household consumption rises by less than the remittance increase (due to lower labor income).
  - Real exchange rate must appreciate to equilibrate nontraded goods market.
  - Remittance flows are countercyclical in this setup: increases in remittances associate with reductions in domestic output (causation runs from remittances to output via labor supply).

### Extension: endogenous country risk premium
- If country risk premiums are inversely related to remittance flows, an exogenous increase in remittances reduces the domestic interest rate.
- Effects when the country is a net debtor:
  - Household welfare increases for two reasons: higher resources from remittances and lower debt-servicing costs from reduced interest rates.
  - Exogenous labor supply case: consumption increase on impact is larger than the remittance inflow because lower domestic real rates prompt intertemporal substitution toward present consumption; current account deficit increases on impact as households borrow internationally to sustain higher consumption.
  - Demand for nontraded goods rises more, implying greater real appreciation than when interest rate is exogenous.
  - Endogenous labor supply case: lower interest rates amplify substitution into leisure and current consumption, magnifying the contraction in domestic real output while welfare still rises.

### Endogenous remittances under altruism — mechanics and responses to shocks
- Assumption: remitters are altruistic and migrants value recipients’ utility within their own utility function (intercohort discount factor unity in the speciﬁcation cited).
- Endogenous remittances imply that the appropriate shock to analyze is an exogenous variable affecting remittances (not a change in remittances per se).
- Two illustrative shocks analyzed: sectorally neutral favorable productivity shock and policy-induced real exchange rate depreciation.

Productivity shock (sectorally neutral), with inelastic labor supply:
- Shock raises domestic output and household resources; altruistic migrants, valuing recipient welfare, increase their own consumption and reduce remittances.
- Net effect: domestic output rises; remittances fall; some benefits of the productivity shock are exported to émigrés.
- If remittances fall one-for-one with domestic income increase, domestic consumption may remain unchanged while output rises, necessitating a real exchange rate depreciation (nontraded relative price falls).
- General case: partial remittance offset implies domestic consumption increases less than without remittances; the larger the remittance offset, the larger the depreciation induced by the productivity shock.

Anticipated productivity shock and labor supply:
- Anticipation: recipients increase consumption and reduce labor supply immediately, causing an on-impact fall in domestic real income; altruistic migrants reduce remittances—remittances can move procyclically when shocks are anticipated.
- With endogenous labor supply and substitution effects dominating, productivity improvement can raise labor supply and domestic income; remittances fall and remain countercyclical (but causation is from the productivity shock to both variables).

Real exchange rate depreciation under altruism:
- A depreciation increases migrants’ real income (earned in traded goods) and increases the real value of remittances for recipients; migrants may reduce remittances measured in traded-goods units because increased purchasing power allows migrants to retain more of their earnings.
- How the depreciation is achieved matters:
  - If via reduction in government spending on nontraded goods accompanied by tax cuts: recipient households’ real income rises and remittances tend to fall.
  - If via an increase in government spending on traded goods financed by higher taxes: recipient households’ welfare falls and remittances tend to increase; net effect ambiguous.

### Altruistic remittances and implications for structural policy choices
- Altruistic remittances alter the stochastic properties of domestic income by dampening favorable domestic shocks (remittances fall when domestic productivity rises) and transmitting foreign output fluctuations via remittance flows.
- Implications:
  - Capital account liberalization: altruistic remittances can increase correlation between domestic income and the world business cycle, mimicking portfolio diversification under autarky and potentially lowering the cost of capital for high-return/high-risk domestic projects—this weakens some arguments for liberalization. If labor is endogenous, however, labor-supply effects may magnify domestic business cycles and strengthen the case for liberalization.
  - Exchange rate regime choice: altruistic remittances act as external transfers that help absorb asymmetric real shocks, weakening the case for floating exchange rates when such shocks are important.

### Remittances and growth — channels and distinctions
Remittances may affect long-run productive capacity via three channels:
- Effects on growth of the economy’s technological capacity (TFP frontier shifts).
- Effects on accumulation of productive assets (domestic investment).
- Effects on the efficiency of allocation of new capital.

Remittances and technological capacity
- Dutch disease channel: remittance-induced real exchange rate appreciation may contract traded-goods production.
- If traded-goods production contributes positively to technological capacity (training, learning-by-doing, demonstration, self-discovery), contraction can reduce TFP growth.
- No necessary “disease” if there are no underlying distortions—real appreciation may be optimal in an undistorted economy.

Remittances and investment — three motive cases
- Considered motives: pure transfers, transfers with a merit-good component, and remittances as disguised capital flows. The disposition of an additional dollar does not depend on whether remittances are exogenous, altruistic, or investment-generated.

Pure transfer remittances
- Frictionless open economy (uncertain or permanent remittance perception):
  - If perceived permanent: larger share consumed; if perceived temporary: more saved.
  - Under perfect international capital mobility, additional saving does not raise domestic investment (foreign asset accumulation instead); remittances do not affect domestic investment.
- Financial autarky / perfect capital controls:
  - Domestic real interest rate equals marginal product of capital; saving must finance domestic investment.
  - Additional remittance saving increases domestic investment; effect larger the shorter the perceived duration of remittances (shorter-duration leads to more saving in equilibrium).
- With frictions and an external finance premium (exogenous):
  - Households face r > R (market rate exceeds time preference); permanent remittances shift consumption path upward without changing slope; remittances affect domestic investment only when external capital mobility is less than perfect.
- Claims linking remittances to higher investment via easing credit constraints require that remittance recipients be the credit-constrained households with viable projects, that remittances ease constraints, and that recipients invest rather than consume. Micro evidence generally indicates remittances finance consumption more often than investment.
- If the external finance premium is endogenous and depends on collateralizable net worth, remittances are unlikely to lower the premium since remittance income is not collateralizable; thus this channel is weak.

Remittances as transfers with a merit-good component
- Migrants may care about specific uses of remittances (e.g., education, housing), potentially biasing funds toward investment in human/physical capital.
- Effectiveness depends on: importance of merit-good motive, whether merit good is consumption or investment, and migrants’ ability to enforce preferences (resource fungibility and asymmetric information can dilute enforcement). In extreme cases, preferences are disregarded and situation reduces to pure transfer.

Remittances as disguised capital flows
- Some recorded unrequited transfers may be investments where migrants retain ownership and recipients invest on their behalf (family-based intermediation).
- Growth implications ambiguous:
  - Loans can finance consumption or investment.
  - Familial lending across distance raises adverse selection and moral hazard concerns; productivity of investment uncertain.
  - Remittances should respond to return differentials between residence and origin countries if they are disguised capital flows.

Remittances and investment efficiency
- Short run: merit-good transfers aimed at investment may raise investment efficiency if migrants are better informed about returns or better at enforcing projects; disguised capital flows can change intermediary quality relative to domestic financial institutions.
- Long run: remittances may affect financial development by altering demand for domestic liabilities and money:
  - Exogenous remittances raise household expenditure and transactions demand for money.
  - Under altruism, remittances provide insurance, potentially lowering domestic macroeconomic uncertainty and affecting domestic demand for money; this can shape the development and depth of domestic financial intermediation and therefore the efficiency of investment allocation.

*Source: V Macroeconomic Implications of Remittances: Theory (References section of the supplied content).*

### Chapter  4),  the  presence  of  such  remittances  tends  to

### Chapter 4

### Remittances, Money Demand, and Financial Development
- Altruistic remittances reduce the impact of aggregate uncertainty on recipients, weakening the effect of aggregate uncertainty on their demand for money. 8
- For a given level of aggregate uncertainty, altruistic remittances tend to increase the demand for money at any given level of income. 8
- Footnote 8 formulation (verbatim):
  - "In other words, suppose the nominal demand for money (M_D) can be written as a function of the price level (P), interest rates (i), income (Y), and uncertainty (S), such that M_D = PL(i, Y, S), where the signs beneath the variables indicate the relationship between money demand and that variable. Then altruistic remittances reduce the absolute value of the coefficient of S."
- Remittance inflows increase the supply of funds facing the domestic banking system, lowering the cost of borrowing for banks and, with the marginal cost of intermediation held constant, reducing the cost of funds for private and public borrowers.
- Conventional indicators such as the ratio of M2 to GDP or the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP tend to rise with remittance inflows, but these are crude proxies; the core measure of financial development is the external finance premium, operationalized as the spread between deposit and lending rates.
- Channels through which remittances can reduce the external finance premium:
  - Economies of scale in the domestic banking industry as demand for bank liabilities increases and the banking system expands, reducing unit costs.
  - Political-economy channel: increased demand for domestic intermediation may cause the public to pressure the government to implement financial reforms that improve financial system efficiency.
- Perverse political-economy risk:
  - Increased demand for bank liabilities may instead lead the public to pressure for greater bank security, incentivizing policies that promote concentration in the financial system and cause banks to hold relatively safe assets (e.g., government bonds), potentially harming financial development.

### Remittances and Government Debt Sustainability
- The fiscal response to the arrival or increase of workers’ remittances critically influences short-run macroeconomic equilibrium.
- Remittances can affect government intertemporal budget constraints through effects on both the magnitude and stability of government revenues.
- The Certainty Case:
  - The maximum sustainable value of the ratio of government debt to GDP equals the present value of the ratio to GDP of the government's maximum sustainable primary surplus plus seigniorage revenue, discounted at a rate equal to the difference between the real interest rate and the economy’s sustainable real growth rate.
  - If workers’ remittances are taxable, an increase in the ratio of remittances to GDP increases the government’s tax base without necessarily raising tax rates, raising the sustainable primary surplus and thus the sustainable value of government debt.
  - Even if remittances are not taxable, an increase in remittance flows can increase the maximum sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio via:
    - Indirect increases in revenues from other taxes (e.g., consumption taxes) even if tax rates are unchanged.
    - Enabling the government to raise the tax rate on the taxable portion of household incomes because remittance income raises household incomes.
    - Increasing the economy’s growth rate (see "Remittances and Growth"), which lowers the discount rate applied to future primary surpluses plus seigniorage revenue.
    - Raising demand for banking sector liabilities and thereby increasing demand for monetary base; for a given inflation rate, this raises seigniorage revenue.
  - Net implication: whether taxable or not, remittance flows tend to increase the sustainable value of government debt and hence borrowing capacity. 9
  - Footnote 9 text (verbatim):
    - "In this case, even if remittances do not affect the rate of growth of GDP, they may affect the rate of growth of the tax base if the government’s maximum sustainable tax effort depends on the ratio of remittances to GDP and that ratio is increasing over time because remittances grow faster than GDP."
- Banking-sector demand for government debt channel:
  - If banks prefer holding government debt and remittance inflows increase the size of the domestic banking sector, demand for government debt rises and the government’s cost of financing falls, raising the maximum sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio.

### The Role of Uncertainty
- Because future fiscal intentions and exogenous shocks are uncertain, the appropriate discount factor for a government’s future primary surpluses plus seigniorage is the interest rate applicable to cash flows with the risk characteristics of government debt—not the risk-free real rate.
- Remittances can affect the maximum sustainable government debt-to-GDP ratio via their influence on the stability of government revenues:
  - If remittances stabilize government revenue (for example, by stabilizing household consumption and consumption-tax revenue), the interest rate for discounting government debt falls (sovereign risk premium declines), raising the sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio.
  - If remittances destabilize government revenue, the opposite effect occurs and the sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio falls.
- Example: Countercyclical remittances that stabilize the time path of real GDP stabilize the government’s tax base and the future ratio of primary surplus to GDP, reducing the sovereign risk premium and increasing the present value of future primary surpluses plus seigniorage—thereby increasing borrowing capacity.

### Conclusion and Policy Implications
- Workers’ remittances have heterogeneous macroeconomic effects across countries and over time; uniform prescriptions are unlikely to be appropriate.
- Policymakers should undertake thorough diagnostic analyses of remittances’ roles in their economies, focusing on:
  - Incentive effects of remittance flows (e.g., on labor supply).
  - Effects of remittances on macroeconomic variables of interest (money demand, financial development indicators, government revenues and debt sustainability).
  - Existence of specific constraints on economic growth in the particular environment.
- Any specific policy recommendations must follow detailed examination of the interplay between economic structure and remittances.
- The subsequent chapter develops a real business cycle model to analyze optimal fiscal and monetary policy when remittances affect household labor supply and interact with technology and government spending shocks.

*Source: Chapter 4, _op259*

### References

### References

### Purpose and research questions
- Examine how real and nominal variables behave in remittance-dependent economies relative to economies receiving little or no remittances.
- Assess how remittances influence the conduct of optimal monetary and fiscal policy.
- Determine whether a preferred policy structure exists to achieve policymakers’ objectives when the remittances-to-GDP ratio is significant or growing.
- Method: stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model with money and distortionary government policy; remittances specified exogenously as countercyclical real income transfers; government allowed labor-income taxation or consumption taxation.

### Model structure and key assumptions
- Representative household derives utility from leisure and two consumption goods: a cash good and a credit good; must accumulate money to facilitate cash-good consumption (cash-in-advance constraint).
- Output produced using capital, labor, and stochastic exogenous technology.
- Remittances: exogenously specified countercyclical real income transfers that increase when domestic output falls and decrease during expansions; remittances are less than fully compensatory.
- Government: benign welfare-maximizing policymaker financing exogenous government spending via taxes (labor or consumption), printing money, or issuing one-period real bonds; government cannot tax remittances directly.
- Two main shocks: technology and government spending.
- Calibration targets: Chile and United States baseline economies (remittances-to-GDP ratio initially zero), then simulations with remittances-to-GDP ratios of 5 percent, 15 percent, and 25 percent.

### Main findings (enumerated exactly as presented)
- Remittances increase consumption and leisure in the recipient household, indicating that remittances improve welfare and can be effective in poverty reduction.
- Remittances improve the sustainability of government debt in the recipient economy and reduce country risk by lowering the marginal cost of servicing debt.
- Remittances cause the labor supply in the recipient economy to become more procyclical and increase the magnitude of the domestic business cycle, indicating that the presence of remittances in an economy yields some negative externalities.
- The ability of remittances to provide an insurance effect against shocks to household income is dependent on the recipient economy’s cash-credit intensiveness.
- Tax structures and the conduct of optimal fiscal and monetary policy may differ across countries, since consumption taxes in lieu of labor income taxes enable the government to finance its operations with fewer distortionary costs to economic activity when remittance flows become significant.

### Policy implications and mechanisms
- Baseline optimal monetary policy without remittances: Friedman rule (money growth set equal to the rate of time preference) to equate real return on money balances and government debt.
- Under labor-income taxation with rising remittances:
  - Households choose more leisure → domestic output falls → smaller labor tax base.
  - Governments respond by increasing money growth relative to baseline and using both labor income taxes and the inflation tax to finance obligations.
  - Country-specific responses differ by transaction structure (cash-based vs. credit-based economy).
    - Chile (cash-based): larger inflation-tax base from cash transactions allows money growth to rise and equilibrium labor tax rates to fall.
    - United States (credit-based): inflation tax accesses a smaller base; optimal policy moves to both higher money growth and higher labor-income tax rates.
- Under consumption taxation with remittances:
  - Government taxes total consumption (domestic consumption plus remittances) so the tax base increases with remittances.
  - Government can maintain the Friedman rule and reduce steady-state consumption tax rates as remittances rise, making policy less distortionary than under labor taxation.
  - Consumption taxation delivers larger reductions in the shadow price of debt and greater improvement in debt sustainability compared with labor taxation.

### Steady-state numerical results (selected exact figures from Table 6.1 and Table 6.2)

- Table 6.1. Steady-State Values Under Labor Taxation (levels and percent; inflation rate, real interest rate, and money growth rate expressed as quarterly growth rates in net terms; tax rate as percent of labor income)

  Chile (Cash-Based Economy) — Remittances-to-Income Ratio: 0% | 5% | 15% | 25%
  - Output: 1.61 | 1.55 | 1.44 | 1.35
  - Remittances: 0.08 | 0.22 | 0.34 | 0.08
  - Cash good: 0.85 | 0.86 | 0.88 | 0.90
  - Credit good: 0.28 | 0.29 | 0.31 | 0.32
  - Labor: 0.44 | 0.41 | 0.37 | 0.34
  - Shadow price of debt: 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.05
  - Inflation rate: –2.2 | 1.0 | 4.5 | 4.6
  - Real interest rate: 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2
  - Money growth rate: –2.2 | 0.9 | 4.4 | 4.5
  - Tax rate: 25.0 | 22.8 | 20.4 | 21.9

  United States (Credit-Based Economy) — Remittances-to-Income Ratio: 0% | 5% | 15% | 25%
  - Output: 1.73 | 1.67 | 1.55 | 1.45
  - Remittances: 0.08 | 0.23 | 0.36 | 0.08
  - Cash good: 0.49 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.51
  - Credit good: 0.63 | 0.64 | 0.67 | 0.69
  - Labor: 0.31 | 0.29 | 0.26 | 0.23
  - Shadow price of debt: 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.11
  - Inflation rate: –0.9 | 1.1 | 4.2 | 5.9
  - Real interest rate: 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9
  - Money growth rate: –0.9 | 1.1 | 4.1 | 5.7
  - Tax rate: 31.4 | 31.7 | 32.5 | 34.1

  Note: Example textual interpretation in source — as remittances-to-income ratio rises to 25 percent in Chile, steady-state labor supply declines by 23 percent and output falls by slightly more than 16 percent relative to the baseline.

- Table 6.2. Steady-State Values Under Consumption Taxation — Chile (Cash-Based Economy) — Remittances-to-Income Ratio: 0% | 5% | 15% | 25%
  - Output: 1.56 | 1.51 | 1.42 | 1.34
  - Remittances: 0.08 | 0.21 | 0.34
  - Cash good: 0.84 | 0.86 | 0.90 | 0.93
  - Credit good: 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.29 | 0.31
  - Labor: 0.42 | 0.40 | 0.36 | 0.33
  - Shadow price of debt: 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.01
  - Inflation rate: –2.2 | –2.2 | –2.2 | –2.2
  - Real interest rate: 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2
  - Money growth rate: –2.3 | –2.3 | –2.2 | –2.2
  - Tax rate: 18.8 | 18.4 | 17.7 | 17.1

### Additional notes on interpretation
- Remittances expand household disposable income even when households reduce labor supply; the reduction in domestic output does not fully offset the increase in remittance income.
- Under labor taxation, governments may rely more heavily on the inflation tax as remittances grow, potentially conflicting with inflation-targeting regimes.
- Under consumption taxation, governments can tax remittance-financed consumption directly, reducing distortionary reliance on inflation and improving debt sustainability.

*VI Macroeconomic Implications of Remittances: A General Equilibrium Model with Money*

### 6.1 declines almost 55 percent, from 0.11 to 0.05, when

### 6.1 declines almost 55 percent, from 0.11 to 0.05, when

### Shadow price of debt and tax systems
- Under consumption taxation, the shadow price of debt in Table 6.2 declines 88 percent in value as the remittances-to-income ratio increases.
- The shadow price of debt declines almost 55 percent, from 0.11 to 0.05, when the economy moves from the baseline to a remittances-to-income ratio of 25 percent.
- Interpretation:
  - The relatively larger decline in the shadow price of debt under consumption taxation suggests improved debt sustainability and reduced country risk through implementation of a consumption tax system.
  - Remittances act as countercyclical income transfers, creating a countercyclical revenue base that consumption taxation can access directly without creating a wedge between cash and credit consumption.
  - Consumption taxation is more efficient at extracting resources to service existing or new debt than a combination of the labor tax and the inflation tax.

### Remittances and macroeconomic risks — aggregate simulation findings
- Baseline model behavior:
  - The baseline economy without remittances generates about half of the standard deviation of output as found in the actual Chilean economy.
  - Model economies without remittances generate volatilities for consumption, prices, and inflation that more closely match actual data reported by Bergoeing and Soto (2002).
- Effects of adding remittances:
  - Presence of remittances increases business cycle volatility in all tax systems examined.
  - Business cycle volatility rises by one-third under the labor tax case and by one-fourth under the consumption tax case.
  - Increased volatility arises because remittances raise the correlation between labor supply and output; as remittances-to-income rises, household labor supply becomes more procyclical.
- Government policy volatility:
  - In economies without remittances, nearly all volatility in government policy appears in taxes as labor and consumption tax rates fluctuate to preserve the Friedman rule.
  - Under labor taxation with remittances, mean equilibrium growth rate of money and its volatility increase.
  - Under consumption taxation with remittances, the government benefits from a countercyclical tax base and the increased money growth and volatility effects are removed.
  - In both tax structures the volatility of the shadow price of debt increases when remittances are present, reflecting debt use as a shock absorber.

### Labor market dynamics and mechanism
- Labor market response to a positive technology shock in baseline (no remittances):
  - Initial equilibrium at point A: H1 hours at real wage W/P1.
  - Positive technology shock → demand for labor shifts outward; higher income induces households to supply less labor (higher real wage required), leading to equilibrium moving from A to B with lower hours and higher real wage.
  - Net effect: negative correlation between labor and technology (labor smooths consumption and leisure).
- Labor market with remittances:
  - Initial hours with remittances H3 < H1, but technology shocks generate a larger outward shift in labor demand (D1 to D2) because marginal product of labor is higher.
  - Labor supply inward shift is smaller (S1 to S2) because remittance channel dampens household desire to reduce labor.
  - Net effect: equilibrium moves from C to D with labor supply increasing from H3 to H4.
  - Correlation between labor hours and income:
    - Starts negative with no remittances.
    - Becomes positive at a remittances-to-income ratio of about 8 percent.
    - Reaches unity at a remittances-to-income ratio of 25 percent.
  - Result: household labor becomes more procyclical to smooth consumption and leisure, producing additional business cycle volatility despite being optimal household behavior.

### Table 6.3 — Standard Deviation of Calibrated Chile Economies (In percent)
- Remittances-to-Income Ratio columns: 0% 5% 15% 25% under Labor Taxation and 0% 5% 15% 25% under Consumption Taxation.
- Selected series from Table 6.3 (values preserved exactly as reported):
  - Output: 1.17 1.25 1.39 1.56 1.18 1.24 1.37 1.49
  - Remittances: 0.62 0.70 0.78 0.62 0.68 0.75
  - Cash good: 1.67 1.68 1.65 1.59 1.66 1.61 1.52 1.43
  - Credit good: 1.66 1.54 1.39 1.36 1.66 1.61 1.52 1.43
  - Labor: 0.26 0.13 0.10 0.37 0.23 0.13 0.07 0.26
  - Shadow price of debt: 3.78 3.90 3.86 3.87 3.41 3.26 2.87 8.83
  - Price level: 1.67 1.70 1.82 1.76 1.41 1.38 1.30 1.23
  - Inflation: 1.21 1.18 1.13 1.10 1.03 1.00 0.94 0.89
  - Real interest rate: 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
  - Debt: 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.17
  - Money growth rate: 0.02 0.15 0.29 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  - Tax rate: 1.56 1.33 0.90 1.13 1.90 1.87 1.80 1.73
- Notes from source:
  - “Output” is standard deviation of output from production (excluding remittances).
  - Standard deviation of the interest rate is based on the gross real interest rate.
  - Standard deviation of the tax rate is based on the tax on labor income or consumption.

### Insurance effects, consumption composition, and tax interaction
- Insurance provided by remittances:
  - Remittances provide an insurance effect for consumption of the credit good because they can be converted into credit-good consumption in the same period received.
  - Cash-in-advance constraint requires remittance resources to be transferred over time to consume the cash good, increasing volatility of cash good consumption—mainly under labor taxation.
- Tax-system interaction:
  - Under labor taxation in the U.S. example, volatility of credit good consumption declines with remittances while cash good consumption volatility increases as remittances rise (U.S. calibrated economy is credit-intensive).
  - Under consumption taxation, volatilities for both cash and credit goods decline.
  - The ability of remittances to provide consumption insurance depends on:
    - Relative importance of the cash and credit good in household consumption.
    - Type of tax system in place.
- Inflation tax channel:
  - Need to use the inflation tax to access a small cash-good tax base under labor taxation increases inflation and cash-good consumption volatility.
  - Switching to consumption taxation eliminates the need for the inflation tax and improves optimal government policy outcomes.

### Cross-country preliminary evidence
- Preliminary data examination for remittance-dependent economies (remittances-to-GDP ratio ≥ 5 percent, 1990–2003) generally confirms model results:
  - Economies with higher reliance on remittances experienced higher output volatility and higher average inflation rates.
  - Relationship between remittances and business cycle volatility appears particularly strong; relationship with inflation is relatively weaker possibly due to greater prevalence of consumption-based taxation in developing countries.

### Welfare implications and utility equivalence measures
- Method:
  - Utility equivalence measures the per period increase in utility that makes the household indifferent between the economy without remittances and the economy with remittances under a selected tax structure.
  - Measures constructed for both the United States and Chile under labor income and consumption taxation.
- Net welfare effects:
  - Gains from higher consumption and leisure due to remittances greatly outweigh costs from increased volatility.
  - Example for Chile under labor taxation:
    - Per period gain moving from no remittances to 5 percent remittances-to-income is 5.0 percent.
    - Per period gain at 25 percent remittances-to-income is 21.2 percent.
  - Most of the increase in per period utility derives from additional leisure (nearly 60 percent of the overall rise).
- Consumption vs. labor taxation (Table 6.4: Difference in per period increase in utility, in percent; consumption taxation minus labor taxation):
  - Total utility:
    - Chile: 5% → 0.05, 15% → 0.22, 25% → 0.51
    - United States: 5% → 0.05, 15% → 0.29, 25% → 0.66
  - Consumption:
    - Chile: 1.60 3.77 6.12
    - United States: 1.45 3.98 6.32
  - Cash good:
    - Chile: 8.66 18.89 24.52
    - United States: 2.82 7.41 10.73
  - Credit good:
    - Chile: –1.30 –2.54 –1.73
    - United States: –0.23 –0.24 0.84
  - Labor:
    - Chile: –0.83 –1.80 –2.70
    - United States: –0.98 –2.44 –3.55
- Interpretation:
  - Consumption-based taxation is preferable to labor-based taxation in remittance-dependent economies for remittance-receiving households.
  - Gains in total utility from switching to consumption taxation are small but meaningful (per period increases in utility for Chile range from 0.05 percent to 0.51 percent; U.S. up to 0.66 percent at 25 percent remittances).
  - Elimination of the inflation tax under consumption taxation restores a more optimal balance between cash and credit consumption and boosts utility from cash-good consumption more than the loss in credit-good consumption.
  - The value of choosing the correct tax system is roughly equivalent in magnitude to classical estimates of business cycle costs and gains from eliminating moderate inflation (e.g., Lucas (1987); Cooley and Hansen (1991); Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein (1998)).
  - Using Lucas (1987) framework and current calibration yields a gain in per period utility of 0.9 percent through elimination of the business cycle; Cooley and Hansen (1991) report gains of 0.4 percent and 0.6 percent for transitions from 5 percent and 10 percent inflation to zero inflation, respectively.

*Source: Authors’ calculations.*

### Conclusion

### Conclusion

### Main findings on remittances and welfare
- Remittances increase household consumption and leisure, supporting the view that remittances can be useful in reducing poverty levels.
- Remittances improve the sustainability of government debt by reducing the marginal cost of servicing debt, allowing the government to:
  - expand its debt, or
  - service existing debt with less distortionary costs to the economy,
  thereby reducing country risk.
- The additional sustainable debt can be used to improve infrastructure or public education when the remittance-receiving country has a public project with high positive net present value.
- Alternatively, if positive net present value projects reside in the private sector, the government’s increased flexibility can be used to reduce country risk and encourage private investment or development of human capital.
- The increase in debt sustainability from remittances can lead to higher long-run economic growth as investment in physical and human capital increases.

### Macroeconomic risk, business cycles, and financial development
- Gains from remittances come at the cost of greater macroeconomic risk.
- Remittances that cause the labor supply to become more procyclical increase the magnitude of the domestic business cycle.
- The countercyclical nature of remittances provides some insurance against increased volatility of output and income from domestic production, but:
  - the level of insurance is dependent on the cash or credit intensiveness of the economy,
  - the economy’s level of financial development plays a role in maximizing the benefits of altruistic income transfers.

### Policy implications and tax instrument choice
- The presence of remittances highlights the need for policymakers to select the correct—or least distortionary—set of policy instruments when implementing fiscal and monetary policy.
- Reliance on labor income taxation may force the government to use the inflation tax to access the revenue base provided by remittances, injecting additional distortions into the economy.
- The ability to enact a consumption tax removes this incentive and allows the government to finance its budgetary expenditures with the least distortionary impact on economic activity.
- Governments and advisory institutions should recognize that efficient policy conduct may require a different policy apparatus when remittance flows become significant and should avoid a one-size-fits-all approach to tax structure and policy implementation across countries.

### Appendix 6.1 — The model (overview)
- Model purpose: explain how remittances affect the economy and the conduct of optimal government policy using a dynamic general equilibrium model with countercyclical remittance flows and distortionary government policy.
- Agents: representative household, representative firm, government, and remitters.
- Production:
  - Output, Y_t, is produced from a constant-returns-to-scale production function,
    Y_t = exp(Q_t)H_t A K_t 1–A
    where K_t and H_t are aggregate capital stock and labor supply, A is the share of income attributable to labor, and Q_t represents technology.
  - Technology evolves as Q_t = R_Q Q_{t–1} + E_t, with E_t normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation S_Qt; the realization is known at the beginning of period t.
  - Investment equation: K_{t+1} = (1 – D)K_t + X_t, with X_t = X = DK when capital stock is fixed.
- Households:
  - Utility: E_t sum_{t=0}^∞ β^t [ a log(C_{1t}) + (1 – a) log(C_{2t}) – G H_t ], with 0<β, a<1 and G>0.
  - Remittances specification (countercyclical): H_t = r_0( (Ȳ – Y_t) / ? ) r_1,Y_t  (text as presented: Y– H_t = r_0 ( –– ) r_1 ,(6.5) Y_t) — the source formulation indicates Y– is the steady-state level of output and r_0 and r_1 are positive constants, with r_0 determining responsiveness to the business cycle and r_1 equaling the steady-state level of remittances.
  - Cash-in-advance constraint: P_t C_{1t} b M_t (equation (6.7) as presented).
- Government and taxation regimes:
  - Labor taxation: household budget constraint and government budget constraint given by equations (6.6)–(6.8) as presented; money demand M_{t+1}, price level P_t, labor tax T^h_t, and government spending G_t enter constraints.
  - Consumption taxation: household and government budget constraints modified as in equations (6.13)–(6.15); consumption tax T^c_t applies at the same rate to both credit and cash goods and is paid on credit goods with credit and on cash goods with previously accumulated money balances according to equation (6.14).
  - Government spending evolves as G_t = exp(g_t) G_{t–1}; money supply evolves as M_{t+1} = exp(Μ_{t+1}) M_t.
  - Spending shock: g_t = R_g g_{t–1} + X_t, with X_t normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation S_gt.
  - Economy-wide resource constraint: C_{1t} + C_{2t} + X + G_t = Y_t + H_t.
- Ramsey equilibrium with remittances:
  - Government maximizes household welfare subject to raising revenues through distortionary means; chooses policy profile after shocks are revealed.
  - Under labor taxation, the government maximizes the present value of utility with choice variables $t = (T_t, μ_{t+1}, B_{t+1}) and state s_t = (B_t, M_t / P_{t–1}, Q_{t–1}, g_{t–1}, T_{t–1}, R_{t–1}), with L_t the Lagrange multiplier on the government budget constraint (equation (6.16) as presented).
  - Solving for the multiplier as an endogenous policy variable reveals how the shadow price of debt behaves relative to marginal taxation and money growth.
- Solution method:
  - The optimal policy system is nonlinear; a projection approach (Judd, 1992, 1998) defines optimal policies (H_t, μ_{t+1}, T_t, L_t) as polynomial functions of exogenous shocks and state variables.
  - Economies are solved using a nonlinear equation optimizer in Matlab.
  - Simulations: each economy was simulated under technology and government spending shocks; statistics computed by conducting simulations of 10,000 periods in length, taking logarithms, and filtering each simulated time series using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.

*IMF Working Paper chapter conclusion and Appendix 6.1 as provided in the source document.*

### References

### VII        An Empirical Investigation of the Macroeconomic Effects of Remittances

### Executive summary — main findings
- It is difficult to obtain a consistently robust positive effect of workers’ remittances on economic growth across a variety of econometric specifications.
- A positive and significant coefficient on the effect of workers’ remittances on economic growth appears only when the estimation excludes investment and in the absence of country fixed effects.
- The econometric evidence suggests that remittances may decrease economic growth in some countries through a reduction in total factor productivity.
- Remittances diminish macroeconomic volatility over long horizons, likely through reductions in aggregate consumption volatility.
- Higher remittance receipts tend to appreciate the equilibrium real exchange rate, implying that the beneficial effects of remittances in generating higher and more stable levels of consumption may come at the expense of long-run growth.
- The presence of remittances can support higher future debt levels in countries that receive such flows in sufficient quantities, though enhanced sustainability depends on the persistence and elasticity of these flows with respect to income differentials, interest rate differentials, and changes in exchange rates.

### Chapter organization and empirical focus
- The chapter is organized into four sections, each considering how remittances affect a particular macroeconomic variable of interest to policymakers: GDP growth, GDP volatility, the real exchange rate, and debt sustainability.
- Descriptions of the data used in the chapter are provided in the chapter appendix.
- The chapter proceeds: empirical relationship between workers’ remittances and GDP growth; remittances’ effects on economic volatility and the real exchange rate; discussion of debt sustainability in remittance-dependent countries.

### Remittances and GDP growth — mechanisms that can generate positive effects
- Remittances may increase or enhance investment in physical capital:
  - If frictions in domestic financial intermediation exist and imperfect capital mobility is present, remittances may raise the domestic investment rate.
  - Remittances can ease credit constraints for households rationed out of credit markets, allowing those households to expand investment rather than consume, provided they have access to productive investment opportunities.
  - If remittances are “disguised” capital flows (recipients invest on behalf of the remitter), investment efficiency may be enhanced when the recipient has informational advantage or expertise relative to formal financial intermediaries.
- Remittances can facilitate human capital formation:
  - Even though the majority of remitted funds are devoted to consumption and residential investment (see Chapter 4), improved nutrition and shelter can produce productivity spillovers if recipients participate in the labor market.
  - A significant fraction of remittances may be spent on education, boosting total factor productivity assuming educated recipients do not emigrate.
- Remittances may foster financial development:
  - By increasing demand for money, remittances expand the supply of funds to the banking system.
  - This can reduce the external finance premium and raise growth through (1) economies of scale, or (2) a political economy effect where a larger depositor constituency pressures governments to undertake beneficial financial reform.

### Remittances and GDP growth — mechanisms that can generate negative or null effects
- Positive impacts are contingent on specific circumstances; absent those conditions remittances may not boost growth.
- If capital mobility is high, remittances will have limited effect on the domestic investment rate.
- If remittances are perceived as permanent, they will tend to be consumed in their entirety and will not affect aggregate investment.
- Even when credit constraints are relaxed by remittances, recipients may allocate additional funds to consumption rather than to investment, limiting growth effects.

### Literature notes and methodological context
- Earlier studies used growth-accounting exercises or estimated Keynesian multipliers (examples listed in the chapter’s literature notes).
- A long-run multiplier example: Hyun (1989) using a computable general equilibrium model for Korea found that a 10 percent increase in remittances increases GDP by 0.22 percent.1

*Source: _op259 - References*

### Chapter 4 reviews the empirical evidence on the extent to which

### _op259 - Chapter 4 reviews the empirical evidence on the extent to which

### Channels linking remittances to growth and possible adverse effects
- Remittances may be consumed rather than invested; recipients may be less skilled in investing than financial intermediaries, with implications if remittances are disguised capital flows.
- Human capital and financial sector impacts depend on prevailing circumstances:
  - If recipient families’ standard of living is already sufficiently high, the labor productivity effect of remittances vanishes for that family.
  - Human capital accumulation effects require recipient participation in the labor force after accumulation; in some societies education funded by remittances is intended to enable migration.
  - An increase in the size of the banking system (financial deepening) via remittances does not necessarily reduce the external finance premium; political economy effects (depositors lobbying for safety over intermediation) may induce banks to hold safe assets rather than lend.
- Two channels through which remittances can decrease growth:
  - Dutch disease: remittances may cause real exchange rate appreciation and harm a traded-goods sector that generates positive externalities. Example: Acosta, Lartey, and Mandelman (2007) find qualitative agreement between a calibrated two-sector RBC model and a B-VAR for El Salvador (1991–2006), during which remittances increased 500 percent and the country’s real exchange rate appreciated 30 percent.
  - Moral hazard (Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah, 2003): remittances as non-market transfers under asymmetric information can reduce recipients’ labor effort and induce riskier investments, lowering growth. Empirical and anecdotal evidence exists for reduced labor force participation (e.g., Kozel and Alderman (1990); Itzigsohn (1995)).

### Recent cross-country empirical findings (summary of literature)
- Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah (2003), sample of 83 countries, 1970–1998:
  - Regressed growth in real GDP per capita on workers’ remittances–to–GDP ratio and change in that ratio, controlling for investment rate, inflation, regional dummies, and net private capital flows–to–GDP.
  - Found workers’ remittances–to–GDP ratio either not significant or negatively related to growth; annual changes in the ratio were negative and significant for growth.
  - Instrumental variables first stage: workers’ remittances–to–GDP ratio as function of income gap and real interest rate gap relative to the United States; predicted remittances remained negatively related to growth.
- IMF (2005), 101 countries, 1970–2003:
  - Used aggregate remittances (workers’ remittances + employee compensation + migrant transfers).
  - Two instruments: distance between migrants’ home and main destination country, and common language dummy (time invariant; panel estimation not possible).
  - Found no statistically significant effect of total remittances on economic growth.
- Faini (2006), 68 countries, average annual per capita GDP growth 1980–2004:
  - Used aggregate remittances; OLS coefficient on total remittances–to–GDP ratio positive and significant for average and initial remittances; IV estimation (distance instrument) left coefficient positive but insignificant.
- Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2005), 73 countries, 1975–2002, five-year averages:
  - Used aggregate remittances; OLS, fixed effects, and SGMM with internal instruments.
  - Total remittances not significantly related to growth in basic specification.
  - Found significant negative interaction between total remittances–to–GDP and financial deepening indicators (M2/GDP, deposits/GDP, credit/GDP): total remittances appear to have positive effects on growth only in countries with small financial sectors.
- Catrinescu et al. (2006), 114 countries, 1991–2003:
  - Included institutional variables (UN Human Development Index, six governance indicators, ICRG risk ratings).
  - Found robust positive relationship between growth and gross capital formation and some institutional variables; some mild evidence of a positive relationship between growth and total remittances.
- World Bank (2006), 67 countries, 1991–2005:
  - SGMM with migration instruments (share of migrants to top five OECD destinations × OECD country economic performance) and distance instruments.
  - Found consistently positive relationship between total remittances–to–GDP ratio and GDP growth when investment included or excluded; coefficients lost significance when investment excluded. Calculated contribution of total remittances to growth as small.
  - Later specification with interaction terms (remittances × education, × financial depth, × institutional quality): total remittances–to–GDP ratio negative and significant but interaction terms positive and significant; argued net positive impact when complementarities included. Investment regressions showed similar pattern.

### Key methodological issues and preferred practices
- Preferred remittance measure: ratio of workers’ remittances to GDP (workers’ remittances conceptually distinct from employee compensation and migrant transfers).
  - Of earlier papers, only Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah (2003) used workers’ remittances.
- Three ways workers’ remittances–to–GDP (wr) are incorporated in subsequent estimations:
  - wr alone;
  - wr and wr-squared to allow nonlinearities;
  - wr interacted with financial deepening (M2-to-GDP) to test credit-constraint hypothesis (following Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2005)).
- Time period and sample choices matter; estimations here cover 1970–2004 and analyze two country sets: all countries and emerging economies (as defined in Chapters 2 and 3).
- Conditioning sets vary:
  - Basic: initial per capita GDP; trade-to-GDP (log); M2-to-GDP (log); inflation (five-year averages).
  - Second: adds domestic investment-to-GDP (five-year average log).
  - Full: adds FDI-to-GDP, fiscal balance-to-GDP, population growth, composite ICRG political risk (five-year averages).
- Five-year averages used to smooth cyclical fluctuations.

### Instrument for remittances used in the chapter
- Proposed external instrument: wrrow_i — the ratio of remittances-to-GDP of all other recipient countries (rest of the world), excluding country i, in year t.
  - First-stage regression: wr_it = A_i + B wrrow_it + u_it, where wr_it is log ratio of workers’ remittances to GDP in country i and year t.
  - Rationale: wrrow_i captures global trends in remittances (including transaction cost trends); excluding country i avoids direct causal link with country i’s domestic macro variables; diversification across countries dilutes correlation with trade-driven growth in country i.
  - Fitted values from first stage used in second-stage regressions to address endogeneity.

### Empirical findings from panel and IV estimations (main results and interpretation)
- Using wr (log workers’ remittances/GDP) directly (OLS and fixed effects):
  - Little evidence that workers’ remittances increase growth through TFP channel.
  - Positive and significant impacts of remittances on growth occur only in a few OLS regressions, mainly when the conditioning set excludes domestic investment (first column).
  - Inclusion of the investment ratio or country fixed effects often eliminates significant remittance impacts.
  - wr-squared is often negative but never statistically significant; quadratic effect not supported.
  - Interaction wr × M2-to-GDP tends to be negative; significant in only one case: OLS for emerging economies excluding investment ratio (first column of Table 7.2). This suggests a small easing of credit constraints in countries with small banking systems, but effect vanishes when investment ratio or country fixed effects are included.
  - Minor differences between full country and emerging economy samples; interaction negative effect slightly stronger in emerging economies.
- Using fitted wr from wrrow instrument (IV / two-stage):
  - Some fixed-effects estimations (primarily with second conditioning set including investment) show a significant negative impact of remittances on economic growth — implying the remittance portion related to global remittance trends reduces growth.
  - Where negative IV effects occur while investment is included, effect operates primarily through a reduction in TFP.
  - In some cases, the fitted remittances’ squared term is negative and significant.
  - Significance of negative interaction between remittances and financial deepening increases under IV estimation.
  - Ambiguity remains on whether remittances have a positive direct impact even at very low financial deepening: e.g., Table 7.4 column 2 shows negative significant interaction but direct impact negative and nonsignificant — implying remittances may not be positive for growth even with underdeveloped financial systems.
- Overall synthesis:
  - It is difficult to obtain a robust positive effect of workers’ remittances on economic growth.
  - In many specifications wr has no significant correlation with growth.
  - A positive significant coefficient appears mainly when investment is excluded and country fixed effects are absent.
  - When endogeneity is controlled for using the wrrow instrument, remittances’ effect often becomes negative and significant regardless of investment inclusion, suggesting remittances may reduce growth via lower TFP in many countries.

### Select table excerpt (Table 7.1: OLS and Fixed-Effects — wr coefficient examples, Sample: All Countries)
- Specification 1. wr only (t-statistics in parentheses):
  - OLS, Basic Conditioning Set (excludes domestic investment): wr 0.200 (2.50)**; R2 0.049; Observations 383; Countries 108.
  - Fixed Effects, Basic Conditioning Set: wr 0.172 (0.90); R2 0.169; Observations 383; Countries 108.
  - OLS, Basic + Investment: wr 0.171 (2.21)**; R2 0.139; Observations 374; Countries 105.
  - Fixed Effects, Basic + Investment: wr 0.202 (1.09); R2 0.218; Observations 374; Countries 105.
  - OLS, Full Conditioning Set: wr 0.056 (0.61); R2 0.354; Observations 189; Countries 66.
  - Fixed Effects, Full Conditioning Set: wr –0.099 (0.48); R2 0.373; Observations 189; Countries 66.
- Notes: wr denotes the log of the ratio of workers’ remittances to GDP. Basic conditioning set and additions are defined above. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.

### Remittances and macroeconomic volatility (introductory observations)
- Chapters 4 and 5 suggest macroeconomic fluctuations strongly influence remittances; remittances in turn affect economic fluctuations through multiple, sometimes contradictory, pathways.
- The chapter proceeds to examine the remittances–volatility relationship, building on the evidence that remittances respond to macroeconomic shocks and may dampen or amplify volatility depending on channels at work.

*Source: Chapter 4 and related sections as provided in the content unit.*

### Chapter  4  suggests  that  remittances  are  motivated  by

### _op259 - Chapter  4  suggests  that  remittances  are  motivated  by

### Motivations and consumption smoothing
- Remittances are motivated by altruism: migrants compensate households for negative impacts of economic fluctuations in the home country.
- Empirical evidence in the chapter shows remittances tend to be compensatory rather than opportunistic; remittances enable recipient households to smooth consumption over time.
- If sufficiently large, remittances will reduce economic fluctuations in a remittance-receiving country.

### Effects on investment and channels to volatility
- Two channels through which remittances can reduce investment volatility:
  - Firms rely mostly on internal financing; smoother household consumption implies smoother business earnings, hence smoother investment.
  - If remittances flow through the financial system, they may ease firms’ borrowing and enable firms to smooth investment expenditures over time.
- Channels through which remittances may increase economic volatility (moral hazard effects):
  - Labor-income moral hazard: recipients may reduce labor effort, increasing likelihood of poor firm performance and imposing more risk on firms; firms may shift risk back to households by increasing dispersion of wages and employment across the business cycle.
  - Investment-effort moral hazard: recipients may choose riskier projects or expend less effort on existing investments, increasing dispersion of investment returns and output volatility.
- Theoretical model in Chapter 6 indicates remittances may generate increased volatility if remittances make household labor supply more procyclical.

### Empirical evidence from panel regressions (summaries of Tables 7.2–7.4)
- IMF (2005) and World Bank (2006) found negative and significant relationships between remittances (total remittances–to–GDP) and measures of volatility: GDP volatility, consumption volatility, and investment volatility.
- Table 7.2 (Emerging Economies, OLS and Fixed-Effects) — selected reported figures:
  - Specification 1 (wr only): wr coefficients: 0.207 (2.50)**, 0.192 (0.97), 0.182 (2.28)**, 0.223 (1.16), 0.053 (0.57), –0.095 (0.46). R2 values: 0.051, 0.724, 0.140, 0.221, 0.353, 0.375. Observations: 365, 365, 356, 356, 184, 184. Countries: 104, 104, 101, 101, 64, 64.
  - Specification 2 (wr and wr-squared): wr coefficients: 0.119 (1.16), –0.012 (0.05), 0.109 (1.08), 0.008 (0.03), –0.005 (0.04), 0.008 (0.03). wr-squared coefficients: –0.039 (1.46), –0.073 (1.46), –0.031 (1.20), –0.076 (1.55), –0.027 (0.70), 0.030 (0.55). R2 values: 0.054, 0.179, 0.141, 0.228, 0.352, 0.376. Observations and countries match Specification 1.
  - Specification 3 (wr and interaction with M2-GDP): wr coefficients: 0.933 (2.14)**, 0.564 (0.84), 0.617 (1.46), 0.429 (0.64), 0.076 (0.14), –1.068 (1.20). wrsM2-GDP coefficients: –0.216 (1.69)*, –0.110 (0.58), –0.129 (1.05), –0.061 (0.32), –0.007 (0.04), 0.308 (1.12). R2 values: 0.056, 0.173, 0.140, 0.221, 0.389, 0.382. Observations and countries match Specification 1.
- Tables 7.3 and 7.4 (OLS-IV and Fixed-Effects–IV, All Countries and Emerging Economies respectively) — selected reported figures:
  - Table 7.3 Specification 1 (All Countries, fitted wr): fitted wr coefficients: 0.091 (1.07), –5.667 (2.33)**, 0.044 (0.53), –5.997 (2.56)**, 0.036 (0.36), 6.822 (1.35). R2 values: 0.037, 0.169, 0.128, 0.233, 0.353, 0.382. Observations: 383, 383, 374, 374, 189, 189. Countries: 108, 108, 105, 105, 66, 66.
  - Table 7.3 Specification 3 (fitted wr and interaction with M2-GDP): fitted wr coefficients: 1.270 (2.86)***, –3.005 (1.10), 0.854 (1.98)**, –4.321 (1.57), 0.134 (0.26), 6.441 (1.22). fitted wrs M2-GDP coefficients: –0.349 (2.70)***, –0.652 (2.07)**, –0.239 (1.91)*, –0.389 (1.16), –0.029 (0.19), 0.092 (0.25). R2 values: 0.052, 0.195, 0.134, 0.237, 0.350, 0.382. Observations and countries match above.
  - Table 7.4 (Emerging Economies, OLS-IV and Fixed-Effects–IV) Specification 1 (fitted wr): fitted wr coefficients: 0.094 (1.06), –5.312 (2.08)**, 0.052 (0.60), –5.732 (2.33)**, 0.035 (0.34), 6.877 (1.34). R2 values: 0.038, 0.183, 0.128, 0.233, 0.388, 0.384. Observations: 365, 365, 356, 356, 184, 184. Countries: 104, 104, 101, 101, 64, 64.
  - Table 7.4 Specification 3 (fitted wr and interaction with M2-GDP): fitted wr coefficients: 1.536 (3.22)***, –2.526 (0.88), 1.007 (2.15)**, –3.998 (1.38), 0.187 (0.34), 6.488 (1.20). fitted wrs M2-GDP coefficients: –0.431 (3.08)***, –0.669 (2.07)**, –0.284 (2.07)**, –0.395 (1.14), –0.046 (0.28), 0.092 (0.24). R2 values: 0.060, 0.197, 0.136, 0.237, 0.349, 0.384. Observations and countries match above.
- Notes on regressions:
  - wr denotes the log of the ratio of workers’ remittances to GDP.
  - fitted wr denotes the fitted value from a first-stage regression of the log of the ratio of workers’ remittances to GDP as a function of remittances in the rest of the world.
  - Basic conditioning set: five-year averages of initial GDP per capita, the trade-to-GDP ratio, the M2-to-GDP ratio (all in logs), and the inflation rate.
  - Second conditioning set adds a five-year average of the log of the investment-to-GDP ratio.
  - Full conditioning set adds five-year averages of logs of ratios to GDP of foreign direct investment, the fiscal balance, population growth, and the log of the five-year average of the composite ICRG political risk indicator.
  - t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 percent; ***significant at 1 percent.

### Cross-sectional regression on output volatility (Table 7.5) — key statistics and interpretation
- Regression setup:
  - Sample: 70 countries (16 advanced economies, 54 developing countries).
  - Dependent variable: standard deviation of real per capita GDP growth over 1970–2004 (calculated only over years for which data are present for all explanatory variables).
  - Explanatory variables include workers’ remittances to GDP plus conditioning variables (relative income in 1970, terms of trade volatility, trade openness, financial openness, government consumption, institutional quality, a financial sector development indicator, trade concentration ratio, commodity composition of exports). Averages are over 1970–2004 except relative income.
- Key coefficient on workers’ remittances to GDP:
  - Coefficient: –0.164 (–1.68)*.
  - Interpretation: An increase in the workers’ remittances–to–GDP ratio of one percentage point leads to a reduction of 0.164 percent in the standard deviation of GDP growth, according to the regression results.
- Other reported coefficients (conditioning variables):
  - Terms of trade volatility: 0.090 (1.95)*.
  - Financial openness: 0.012 (2.04)**.
  - Commodity export composition: 0.016 (1.79)*.
  - Government consumption to GDP: 0.066 (1.75)*.
  - Government consumption to GDP * Industrial: –0.064 (–2.28)**.
- Goodness of fit and sample:
  - R2: 0.374.
  - Observations: 70.
- The chapter notes the remittance coefficient is of marginal statistical significance and similar in sign and magnitude to earlier IMF and World Bank studies. Figure 7.1 (described) suggests the negative relationship would have been stronger absent one outlier (Jordan).

### Interpretation, caveats, and reconciliation of results
- Overall empirical results suggest volatility-dampening effects of remittances may outweigh volatility-increasing moral hazard effects in the long-run cross-country data.
- Caveats and reasons why empirical results may not fully reflect theoretical predictions:
  - Measurement frequency mismatch: The theoretical moral hazard model is a business cycle model (relevant at quarterly or annual frequency), while empirical exercises necessarily use long-run estimates of volatility (1970–2004 standard deviations), limiting direct applicability.
  - Labor market assumptions: The theoretical model assumes full employment and a strong labor-leisure trade-off; many remittance-receiving countries have high under- or unemployment, so average households may not exhibit the modeled labor-leisure trade-off.
  - Data and measurement issues highlighted as important qualifications for interpreting empirical findings.

*Source: _op259 - Chapter  4  suggests  that  remittances  are  motivated  by*

### Chapter  6.  Finally,  given  the  evidence  on  remittances

### Chapter 6. Finally, given the evidence on remittances

### Remittances and macroeconomic volatility
- Empirical results support that remittances reduce macroeconomic volatility over long horizons.
- Any impact remittances may have on the riskiness of investment is probably too small to detect in aggregate data.
- Likely mechanism (conjecture): remittances reduce output volatility at the aggregate level because they dampen consumption volatility at the household level; increased smoothness of consumption directly lowers measured GDP volatility since consumption accounts for a large share of GDP.
- Conclusive identification of the mechanism requires detailed longitudinal studies of household consumption and investment including both remittance-receiving and nonreceiving households.

### Workers’ remittances and the equilibrium real exchange rate — theoretical framework
- Equilibrium real exchange rate defined in Nurksian terms: the value simultaneously consistent with internal and external balance, conditioned on sustainable values of the economy’s underlying real fundamentals.
- External balance: ongoing current account deficit financed by sustainable capital inflows. In Montiel (2006) this generates a positive trade-off between the real exchange rate and real domestic consumption (EB locus).
- Internal balance: market for nontraded goods in equilibrium at full employment; generates a negative trade-off between the real exchange rate and real domestic consumption (IB locus).
- Intersection of EB and IB determines the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate (point A); an increase in remittances shifts EB downward producing a more-appreciated long-run equilibrium real exchange rate and higher real domestic consumption (point B).
- Quantitative impact depends on elasticities of EB and IB: greater substitutability between traded and nontraded goods in production and consumption → smaller impact of remittances on equilibrium REER.

### Montiel (2006): qualifications and countervailing mechanisms
- If remittance inflows include a component inversely related to real income in the recipient country, the effect of exogenous remittances on equilibrium REER is weaker than without this endogenous component.
- If remittance receipts are disproportionately devoted to spending on traded goods (e.g., transfers in kind or used to import consumer durables), effects on the long-run equilibrium REER are weakened and can be eliminated. Example: if all remittances are spent on traded goods, EB and IB shift right equally; long-run domestic real consumption rises by the increased remittance income but equilibrium REER remains unchanged.
- If external creditors treat remittance receipts as part of the country’s wealth and an increase in remittances lowers the country risk premium, a permanent increase in receipts can produce a transitory consumption boom while leaving the long-run equilibrium REER unaffected.
- Net theoretical presumption: a permanent increase in remittance inflows is associated with an appreciation of the recipient economy’s long-run equilibrium REER; under empirically plausible conditions this effect may be weak or absent. Therefore, the effect is ultimately an empirical question.

### Empirical evidence on remittances and the real exchange rate
- Single-country studies:
  - Bourdet and Falck (2003) for Cape Verde (1980–2000): an increase in remittance receipts associated with an appreciation of the equilibrium REER.
  - Hyder and Mahboob (2005) for Pakistan (1978–2005): higher remittances tended to appreciate the equilibrium REER.
  - Saadi-Sedik and Petri (2006) for Jordan (1964–2005): similar appreciation result.
- Multi-country and panel studies:
  - Izquierdo and Montiel (2006), sample of six Central American and Caribbean countries (1960–2004): mixed results. In Honduras, Jamaica, and Nicaragua workers’ remittances were not part of a cointegrating vector with the real effective exchange rate despite large inflows. In the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Guatemala, remittances were important determinants of the equilibrium REER, with stronger appreciation effects in El Salvador and Guatemala than in the Dominican Republic.
  - Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004), panel of 13 Latin American and Caribbean countries (1978–98): increase in workers’ remittances appreciated the real exchange rate.
  - Holzner (2006), worldwide sample: increase in workers’ remittances appreciated the real exchange rate.
  - Rajan and Subramanian (2005), sample of 15 countries during the 1990s: higher remittance receipts were not associated with slower growth in manufacturing industries with higher labor intensity or greater export orientation — i.e., no evidence of Dutch disease effects operating through an appreciated REER in their sample.
- Overall: evidence does not speak with a single voice, but most research to date is consistent with the conventional presumption that higher remittance receipts tend to appreciate the equilibrium REER. If Dutch disease effects operate, short-run welfare gains from higher and more stable consumption may come at the expense of reduced long-run growth.

### Remittances, fiscal policy, and debt sustainability — conceptual channels
- Remittances enter the recipient economy through family transfers; governments have no direct claims on these transfers. Remittances affect fiscal policy and debt sustainability indirectly via remittance-receiving households’ consumption and saving decisions.
- Distinction from natural resources and public aid:
  - Natural resources: governments may own and directly derive revenue.
  - Public aid transfers: enter government budget constraint directly.
- Transmission channels:
  - Higher consumption of domestic and imported goods can affect government revenues through consumption- and trade-based taxation.
  - Increased deposits in the banking system and, if marginal propensity to consume < 1, higher private saving can affect credit market activity.
  - These channels alter the fiscal balance and evolution of public and private sector liabilities, thus affecting debt sustainability.
- Government budget/household budget interaction (simplified economy, government issues only domestic-currency debt; household receives remittances in domestic currency):
  - The government’s intertemporal budget constraint (derived explicitly in Box 7.1) shows that increases in remittances that do not raise household consumption one-for-one will support new sequences of taxes, money growth, and bond issuance.
  - For a given future stream of tax revenues and money growth, an increase in remittances will be met with an increase in future debt issuance B_{t+i+1} for some future period.
  - Increase in government bond issuance can absorb additional household saving S_{t+i} and support household consumption smoothing.
  - Alternatively, if the fiscal authority does not increase future debt levels, the increase in remittances must be met by an increase in future tax revenue.
  - Remittances do not enter directly into the government budget constraint, and empirical evidence suggests governments generally do not tax remittances directly; however, governments receive tax revenue from remittances indirectly (e.g., consumption taxes).
  - For a given stream of future tax revenue and bond issuance, the monetary authority may meet an increase in remittances with an increase in money creation. Remittance inflows thus have macroeconomic policy implications similar to inflows of market-based capital; inflation-target regimes need liquidity operations to manage changes in liquidity from remittances.
- Policy implication: remittances can be viewed as part of the potential tax base in addition to labor income from production, depending on the tax structure in place.

### Key quantitative results reported (Table 7.6: Cointegrating relations for the real exchange rate, 1960–2004)
- Dominican Republic:
  - Workers’ remittances/GDP: –1.085 (standard error 0.720)
  - Average productivity of labor: –0.174 (0.409)
  - Government consumption/GDP: –0.410 (0.012)
  - Time trend: 0.241 (0.004)
- El Salvador:
  - Workers’ remittances/GDP: –35.255 (0.444)
  - Average productivity of labor: 6.626 (0.662)
  - Government consumption/GDP: –0.010 (0.006)
  - Trade openness: 0.008 (0.008)
  - Terms of trade: –0.006 (0.001)
  - International investor position/GDP: –0.004 (0.000)
  - Time trend: 0.069 (0.005)
- Guatemala:
  - Workers’ remittances/GDP: –44.611 (2.937)
  - Average productivity of labor: –5.340 (0.814)
  - Government consumption/GDP: –0.028 (0.008)
  - Trade openness: 0.003 (0.000)
  - Terms of trade: –0.003 (0.001)
  - International investor position/GDP: –0.003 (0.000)
  - Time trend: –0.032 (0.005)
- Honduras:
  - Average productivity of labor: –7.544 (0.725)
  - Government consumption/GDP: –0.025 (0.002)
  - Terms of trade: –0.007 (0.000)
  - Time trend: –0.061 (0.003)
- Jamaica:
  - Average productivity of labor: 22.091 (5.088)
  - Government consumption/GDP: –0.008 (0.019)
  - Time trend: 0.222 (0.065)
- Nicaragua:
  - Average productivity of labor: (figure reported in table)
  - Government consumption/GDP: (figure reported in table)
  - Terms of trade: –0.065 (0.010)
  - Time trend: (figure reported in table)
- Note: Table lists standard errors in parentheses. The log of the real effective exchange rate is included in the cointegrating equation. An increase (decrease) in the real effective exchange rate corresponds to a depreciation (appreciation).

*Source: IMF. Content based on Chapter 6 and related sections as provided in the supplied text.*

### 2005.  Averages  were  computed  for  the  ratio  of  work-

### Box 7.1. Remittances and Fiscal Sustainability

### Data sample and descriptive statistics
- Averages were computed for the ratio of workers’ remittances to GDP, credit to the government as a percentage of total credit, the net general government debt-to-GDP ratio, and government consumption as a percentage of GDP.
- The minimum and maximum average remittances-to-GDP ratios in this sample were 3.1 and 18.3 percent, respectively.
- Variables are averages for each country between 1990 and 2005. Remittance data include workers’ remittances while excluding employee compensation and migrants’ transfers.
- Figure 7.3 (1990–2005) shows:
  - A positive relationship between the ratio of workers’ remittances to GDP and the ratio of credit to the government to total credit.
  - A positive relationship between the ratio of workers’ remittances to GDP and the average net general government debt-to-GDP ratio.
  - A positive relationship between the ratio of workers’ remittances to GDP and average government consumption to GDP.

### Theoretical framework: household and government budget constraints
- Aggregate household budget constraint (notation preserved):
  - M_{t+1}/P_t + B_{t+1}/P_t + C_t = Y_t + Rem_t – T_t + (M_t)/P_t + B_t R_t
  - R is the gross domestic interest rate, or R = (1+r); P is the price level.
- Government budget constraint (notation preserved):
  - G_t + B_t R_t = T_t + M_t/P_t + B_{t+1}/P_t
- Economy-wide resource constraint:
  - C_t + G_t = Y_t + Rem_t

### Intertemporal government budget constraint and remittances
- Successive substitution yields (notation preserved):
  - M_{t+1}/P_{t+i} B_t = Σ_{i=0}^I q_i [T_{t+i} – G_{t+i} + (M_{t+i+1}/P_{t+i})(μ_{t+i+1} – 1)] + q_I B_{t+I+1}/P_{t+i}
  - where μ is the growth rate of nominal money balances and 1/q_i = Π_{n=1}^{i+1} 1/R_{t+n–1}
- Substituting the economy-wide resource constraint and denoting S_{t+i} as household saving:
  - M_{t+1}/P_{t+i} B_t = Σ_{i=0}^I q_i [T_{t+i} – (Y_{t+i} + Rem_{t+i} – C_{t+i}) + (M_{t+i+1}/P_{t+i})(μ_{t+i+1} – 1)] + q_I B_{t+I+1}/P_{t+i}

### Debt dynamics with remittances (domestic-currency perspective)
- Normalizing the intertemporal government budget constraint by income from production plus remittances yields an approximate evolution of debt (equation preserved):
  - (1 + r) b_{t+1} = (1 + P + G + H)^{-1} b_t – (t_t – g_t), (7.1)
  - where b is the stock of domestic-currency-denominated government debt, r is the net interest rate, P is the growth rate of the GDP deflator, G is the growth rate of real GDP, H is the growth rate of remittances in domestic currency terms, and (t_t – g_t) is taxes less noninterest government spending (the primary fiscal balance).
- Implication: For given remaining variables, increases in the growth rate of remittances in domestic currency units improve debt sustainability.

### Debt dynamics with foreign-currency debt and exchange rate effects
- Including foreign-currency debt and remittance currency translation yields (equation preserved):
  - (1 + E)(1 + r*)H_t b_{t+1} = [(1 + P)(1 + G) H_{t+1}]^{-1} (1 + r) H_t b_t^f + [(1 + P)(1 + G) H_{t+1}]^{-1} (1 + r) b_t – (t_t – g_t), (7.2)
  - where lowercase terms denote ratios to income from production and remittances (Y_{t+i} + Rem_{t+i}) in domestic currency terms, E = (e_{t+1} – e_t)/e_t is the change in the exchange rate (units of domestic currency per U.S. dollar), r* is the net interest rate on foreign-currency-denominated debt, b^f is the stock of foreign-currency-denominated debt, and H_t = 1 + (Rem_t – e_t)/Y_t.
- Exchange rate effects:
  - An increase in the ratio of remittances to GDP in period t + 1 relative to t improves debt dynamics since H_{t+1} increases relative to H_t.
  - An increase in the exchange rate (e_{t+1} > e_t) increases the domestic currency value of foreign currency debt (worsening sustainability) but also increases the domestic currency value of remittances (improving sustainability through H_{t+1} > H_t). Net effect depends on magnitudes and composition.

### External debt dynamics and remittances
- External debt evolution (notation preserved):
  - D_{t+1} = (1 + r) D_t – CAB_t
  - D_{t+1} = (1 + r) D_t – [TB_t + Inc_t + Tr_t], where Tr includes workers’ remittances.
- Normalized external debt-to-GDP ratio:
  - (1 + r) d_{t+1} = (1 + G)(1 + R)^{-1} d_t – tb_t – inc_t – tr_t
  - Change in debt-to-GDP ratio:
    - d_{t+1} – d_t = [(r – G – R – GR)/(1 + G + R + GR)] d_t – tb_t – inc_t – tr_t
  - Implication: An increase in the level of the remittances-to-GDP ratio, all else equal, improves external sustainability. Indirect benefits arise if remittances reduce external borrowing costs or cause domestic currency appreciation.

### Empirical findings and qualifiers
- Empirical relationships (1990–2005 averages) indicate:
  - Banking systems in remittance-dependent economies tend to channel additional household saving from remittances into credit provision to the government rather than the private sector.
  - Remittances tend to be associated with higher levels of public sector debt.
  - Additional government financing associated with remittances is correlated with higher government consumption.
- Important qualifiers to improvements in debt dynamics:
  - Cyclicality of remittances (Chapter 4): remittances can be countercyclical; declines in remittances during domestic booms or foreign slowdowns can offset gains.
  - Real exchange rate appreciation (Chapter 5): appreciation may improve public debt sustainability but can worsen external sustainability via trade competitiveness.
  - Elasticities of remittances with respect to income differentials, interest rate differentials, and exchange rate changes are crucial inputs for full sustainability assessments.
  - Inclusion of remittances in the government’s potential revenue base depends on tax structure and the government’s capacity to access that base without undue distortion.

### Policy implications and assessment guidance
- For remittance-dependent economies, debt-sustainability analysis should consider a broader income base than GDP alone; candidates include:
  - Gross national disposable income (GNDI), though it includes net factor income from nonresidents and public transfers and may be inappropriate depending on flow composition.
  - GDP plus net current private transfers (an alternative measure suggested).
- Evaluations of fiscal and external sustainability should:
  - Incorporate remittance flows and their expected persistence.
  - Use estimated elasticities from remittance-determination analysis (Chapter 4) to project remittance behavior under shocks to domestic and foreign income, interest rates, and exchange rates.
  - Account for the composition of public debt (domestic vs. foreign currency) and the exchange-rate exposure of liabilities.
- Conclusion: In countries with sufficiently large remittance inflows, remittances can support higher future public debt levels and are correlated with higher government spending; however, the capacity to sustain higher debt depends on remittance persistence, elasticities to macro variables, exchange-rate interactions, and tax/accessibility considerations.

*Sources: IMF (2006b) and World Bank (2006). Variables are averages for each country between 1990 and 2005. Remittance data include workers’ remittances while excluding employee compensation and migrants’ transfers.*

### References

_op259 - References

### Policy implications: measurement and macroeconomic effects of remittances
- Proper measurement:
  - The variable known as "workers’ remittances" in data sources such as the World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2006) is the best measure of the private, unrequited transfers relevant for modeling remittances and ascertaining their economic impact.
  - The economic and statistical properties of workers’ remittances differ significantly from those of employee compensation and migrants’ transfers; combining these three transfers into a single measure can lead to invalid conclusions and non-optimal policy decisions.
  - The IMF Committee on Balance of Payments Statistics and the Advisory Expert Group on National Accounts have proposed changes to properly classify, collect, and track remittance flows that align with this measurement approach.

- Remittances: benefits paired with potential costs
  - Three optimistic attributes of remittances: they are private, dependable, and substantial; however, each attribute carries potential pitfalls that must be managed.
  - Household welfare and consumption smoothing:
    - Remittances directly and indirectly improve household welfare by lifting families out of poverty and insuring them against income shocks.
    - Survey evidence (Chapter 4) indicates remittances primarily fund consumption; econometric analysis suggests remittances are compensatory rather than opportunistic transfers.
    - Theoretical analysis (Chapter 6) shows increased consumption and leisure from remittances reflect optimal household decisions and lead to significant welfare gains.
    - Simulation results confirm the consumption-smoothing effect is robust across different economic structures and tax regimes; empirical evidence (Chapter 7) associates remittances with lower output volatility.
  - Effects on investment and labor supply:
    - Chapter 5 indicates remittances are not necessarily associated with increased or more efficient domestic investment.
    - The relative permanence of remittance flows influences whether funds are used for consumption versus investment.
    - Remittances alter incentives to work: recipients substitute unearned remittance income for labor income, increasing leisure and potentially reducing labor supply (illustrated in Chapter 6 models).
    - Because labor and capital are complementary, reduced labor supply may negatively affect capital accumulation economy-wide.
    - The effect of remittances on investment efficiency depends on their impact on financial development and the marginal cost of financial intermediation, which could be positive or negative.
    - Survey evidence shows remittances primarily fund consumption and housing/real estate accumulation rather than business capital.
    - Estimates in Chapter 7, using properly measured remittance data and an improved instrument, show remittances have no statistically significant effect on GDP growth.
  - Fiscal and debt sustainability implications:
    - Remittances can improve government debt sustainability by increasing the revenue base directly or indirectly, reducing the marginal cost of raising revenue for debt service.
    - Remittances may lead to additional household saving; traditional debt sustainability analysis can incorporate remittance-dependent economies (discussed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7).
    - Presence of remittances can reduce country risk and enable governments to service existing debt with less distortionary cost or to maintain the same distortions with higher debt.
    - Risk: remittances may reduce government incentives to maintain fiscal discipline, loosening the intertemporal budget constraint and prompting additional public borrowing or non–growth-enhancing expenditure/tax reductions.
    - Empirical evidence (Chapter 7) suggests governments may consume and borrow more when afforded fiscal space by remittances; however, remittances should not be a reason to postpone needed fiscal consolidation.
  - Balance of payments and Dutch disease:
    - Remittances constitute a source of financing for current account deficits and can facilitate higher domestic consumption.
    - This benefit is matched by a potential cost: remittance inflows are positively correlated with real exchange rate appreciation, providing evidence of remittance-driven Dutch disease effects in remittance-receiving countries.

### Policy design challenge
- Primary objective: design policies that allow remittance benefits to accrue to households and the economy while limiting or offsetting counterproductive side effects (labor disincentives, limited productive investment, fiscal indiscipline, and Dutch disease).
- Governments should use any fiscal space created by remittance inflows in constructive ways, avoiding reliance on remittances to postpone necessary fiscal consolidation.

*From References and VIII    Policy Implications.*

### Chapter  7  indicates,  however,  this  is  an  area  in  which

### Policy Implications of Remittances

### Key findings and interpretation
- The previous seven chapters provide a more nuanced and complete picture of remittances, improving understanding of puzzles in the data.
- Remittances are often compensatory in nature and are not primarily intended to promote economic growth.
- The compensatory nature of remittances can alter work and investment incentives, weakening their potential to increase economic growth.
- Given the above, it is difficult to detect a robust positive effect of workers’ remittances on economic growth.
- A complete understanding of remittances and their macroeconomic impacts provides a sound basis for policy advice.

### Tax policy recommendations
- Remittances should not be taxed directly; direct taxation may:
  - Cause a decline in remittance activity.
  - Increase transaction costs as flows migrate from formal to informal channels.
  - Reduce net transfers to recipients, thereby reducing remittances’ ability to alleviate poverty and causing a large loss in welfare.
- Consumption-based taxation is recommended as providing the correct incentive structure to:
  - Maximize the benefits of remittances to households.
  - Permit governments to finance budgetary expenditures with the least-distortionary impact on economic activity.
- Overreliance on labor income taxation may:
  - Exacerbate labor-leisure trade-off incentives created by remittances.
  - Encourage the use of inflation as an indirect tax, which is distortionary.
- Remittance-receiving countries that rely too heavily on labor taxes should be advised to shift toward consumption-based tax systems to:
  - Mitigate possible negative effects on economic growth.
  - Minimize distortions generated by fiscal and monetary policy.
  - Benefit from tax-induced increases in investment resulting from remittance inflows.
- Care must be taken when implementing consumption taxes to exempt basic necessities such as food and clothing, in order to avoid adverse effects on poverty alleviation.

### Use of fiscal space and public expenditure
- Any loosening of the government budget constraint due to remittances should be used to channel remittances into activities that promote long-run economic development while preserving short-run poverty-reducing effects.
- Poverty alleviation and growth promotion can be complementary to the extent growth promotion involves public expenditure.
- Public expenditure priorities to enhance remittances’ development impact include improving:
  - Physical infrastructure.
  - Public institutions (governance).
- The receipt of remittances exacerbates the negative impact of poor infrastructure on private investment; more remittances raise the quality of public infrastructure required to induce a given amount of private investment.
- Using improvements in public infrastructure and institutions to increase the return to private investment is crucial given the difficulty in finding a robust positive effect of workers’ remittances on economic growth.

### Political economy and moral hazard concerns
- Remittances may pose a moral hazard problem by reducing political will to enact policy reform:
  - Remittances that insure the public against adverse economic shocks may reduce households’ incentives to pressure governments for reforms and improvements.
  - Receipt of remittances loosens fiscal constraints on governments, potentially postponing necessary policy corrections.
  - Remittance flows can act as a buffer between households and governments, creating the potential for a negative political economy effect.
- Remittances can delay needed upgrades to public infrastructure by reducing public demand for them and reducing the likelihood of a crisis that would make reforms necessary.
- In the extreme case, a “remittances trap” could emerge in which:
  - Households receive significant remittances that lift living standards.
  - Private investment remains low due to poor infrastructure and malfunctioning institutions, keeping economic growth low.
  - Governments spend revenues on nonproductive consumption and maintain a high debt-to-GDP ratio financed at a high interest rate.
  - Frustrated individuals migrate and send remittances back, while those remaining lack incentive to pressure for reform, perpetuating low growth, poor policy, and high remittances.
- Outside engagement may be required to prompt governments to undertake needed reforms when a country receives significant remittance inflows.
  - International institutions have an important role in convincing remittance-receiving countries to undertake or accelerate necessary reforms.
  - A review of governance and institutional quality is routinely undertaken as part of IMF Article IV consultations; the incentive effects of remittance flows suggest such reviews are of particular importance in remittance-receiving economies.

### Tailored reform strategies
- A one-size-fits-all reform strategy is likely counterproductive.
- A nuanced approach that differentiates among countries based on their reliance on remittances will likely be more successful.
- Growth and development strategies should involve diagnosis and policy design tailored to the most significant constraints on growth across countries.
- In remittance-receiving countries, the constraints on growth will likely require a different policy reform package than in countries that do not receive such flows.
- A complete understanding of how remittances affect the macroeconomy will allow tailoring policy recommendations to preserve positive benefits while minimizing negatives.

### Outlook and imperative for policy
- Labor migration and remittances have a long history and will continue into the future.
- Globalization and the aging of some developed-economy populations will sustain demand for migrant workers.
- The volume of workers’ remittances is likely to continue to grow, increasing the challenge of unlocking their maximum societal benefit.

*Source: Policy Implications of Remittances, Chapter extracted from Occasional Paper Macroeconomic Consequences of Remittances (IMF Occasional Paper No. 259).*

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