## _cr04109

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [_cr04109](https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/_cr04109.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/_cr04109.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/_cr04109.pdf.json)

---

### Executive summary — introduction and overall findings
- Assessment of fiscal transparency practices in Peru against the IMF’s Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency based on documentation and meetings with government representatives.
- Assessment structure:
  - Description of current practices based on IMF fiscal transparency questionnaire and authorities' information.
  - IMF staff commentary on fiscal transparency in Peru.

### Major initiatives and progress
- Improvements in budget formulation.
- Partial phase-in of an integrated financial management information system (SIAF-SP).
- Introduction of an open procurement process (SEAC).
- Estimation of tax expenditures.
- Adoption of a medium-term macroeconomic framework (MMM).
- Increased autonomy of the external audit function.
- Most public entities legally required to make fiscal information publicly available, including through electronic means.

### Remaining weaknesses (summary)
- Lack of stability and clarity in fiscal legislation.
- Ambiguities in demarcation of functions between government and the rest of the public sector.
- Inadequate information on contingent liabilities and quasi-fiscal operations.
- Lack of a coherent civil service system.
- Insufficient resources for external and internal audits.
- Unwieldy proliferation of tax preferences.
- Congressional gaps:
  - No clear assignment of spending responsibilities and revenue sources at different levels of government.
  - No transparent mechanism of intergovernmental transfers.
  - No established limits on internal borrowing.

### IMF team corrective suggestions and policy recommendations (summary)
- Clarify functions within the public sector.
- Explicitly assign spending responsibilities, revenue sources and borrowing limits for subnational governments.
- Establish clear criteria for intergovernmental transfers.
- Ensure transparent management and regulation of the civil service.
- Create a stable and unified legal framework covering the budget process, treasury operations and debt management.
- Promote efficient use and wider coverage of SIAF-SP.
- Enhance tax transparency through a more disciplined legislative process.
- Strengthen capacity for external audit.
- Reconcile institutional coverage of government statistics.
- Ensure regular publication of estimates of quasi-fiscal operations, contingent liabilities, and fiscal sustainability assessments.

---

### Clarity of roles and institutional definitions
- Three legal/statistical definitions of government for fiscal purposes:
  - Definition in the Public Sector Budget Law (LPSP).
  - Definition in the amendment to the Law on Fiscal Prudence and Transparency (LPTF) (amendment approved April 8, 2003).
  - Definition used by the Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP) for government finance statistics.
- Only the LPTF amendment and the BCRP definition are consistent with the IMF’s Manual on Government Finance Statistics.
- The LPSP (2002) excludes entities such as ESSALUD, SUNAT, SUNASS, certain supervisory agencies, and legally incorporated funds including the Consolidated Reserve Fund (FCR) and the Fiscal Stabilization Fund (FEF).

---

### Decentralization and subnational fiscal framework
- Constitutional reform introduced a regional level of government effective from January 2003.
- Regional Government Law (Law 27867 of November 8, 2002, amended by Law 27902 of December 20, 2002) sets powers and includes regional fiscal discipline provisions.
- Executive instructed to submit a fiscal decentralization law to Congress in the course of 2004 addressing tax measures and budget transfers.
- Basic Decentralization Law (Law 27783 of July 17, 2002) further clarifies expenditure distribution among levels of government.
- Premature to assess macro-fiscal aspects of decentralization prior to enactment of basic regional finance legislation and regulations.

---

### Local governments: responsibilities, revenues, borrowing
- Municipalities: political, economic, administrative autonomy; law provides minimum and specific responsibilities but often without clear distinctions between provincial and district municipalities.
- Financing: primarily central government transfers; smaller share from taxes and other revenue.
- Transfer allocation criteria: generally based on income level and population; MEF annually determines indicators and weights.
- Municipal taxes established by law include property, non-sporting public events, real estate transfer (alcabala), vehicle ownership, gaming and casinos.
- Municipalities may create/change fees, contributions, charges for municipal services (arbitrios), royalties and license fees, but law determines rates and bases.
- Constitutional provision allows municipalities to borrow to finance non-recurrent expenditure against own revenue and assets without legal authorization, except external borrowing guaranteed by central government; conflicts with government authorization requirement in the Basic Decentralization Law.

---

### Allocation of fiscal responsibilities — executive and legislature
- Draft Public Sector Budget (PPSP) must be submitted to Congress before August 30 each year, together with legislation governing indebtedness and financial balance.
- LPSP must be approved by November 30; if not approved, the PPSP submitted by the executive comes into force.
- Congress can reduce spending and reallocate resources within the overall expenditure ceiling but cannot directly create or increase public spending; indirect increases occur through tax exemption legislation.
- Constitutionally, tax exemption legislation must be reviewed in a report by the MEF, which is not binding on Congress.
- President can veto laws wholly or in part; Congress can override veto by a simple majority of the legal quorum.

---

### Extrabudgetary activities and public enterprises
- Extrabudgetary activities: few in number but quantitatively significant; include regulatory and supervisory agencies (SUNAT, SUNASS) and social development funds (MIVIVIENDA, ESSALUD).
- These entities subject to budget procedures established by FONAFE for public enterprises.

---

### BCRP statutory autonomy and monetary–fiscal relations
- BCRP sole responsibility: preserve monetary stability; governed by Article 84 of the Constitution and charter of December 1992.
- Subject to ex post control by the Comptroller General of the Republic and supervision by the Superintendency of Banking and Insurance (SBS).
- Board of Directors: seven directors; President of the Board appointed by the executive and ratified by Congress; three directors appointed by Congress; three appointed by the executive with term coinciding with the President of the Republic.
- Legal restrictions:
  - BCRP not allowed to provide financing to the Treasury or official development financial institutions, nor to extend collateral or guarantees.
  - May operate on the secondary market to purchase treasury securities for monetary policy, subject to limits on annual increase in holdings.
  - Quasi-fiscal transaction from 1994 recapitalization: unremunerated treasury bonds amount to less than US$30 million; retired through transfer of 25 percent of BCRP’s earnings to the Treasury as required by law.
- Coordination:
  - No specific operational coordination rules between monetary and fiscal policy; consensus exists on the MMM.
  - BCRP represented in the Treasury Operations Committee that meets monthly to establish ceilings on expenditure financed from current revenue.
  - BCRP does not engage in quasi-fiscal operations.
- Additional roles: agent for government in relations with multilateral credit institutions; administers government deposits in foreign currency; manages the Consolidated Reserve Fund (FCR) and the Fiscal Stabilization Fund (FEF).

---

### Public financial institutions and quasi-fiscal activities
- Public financial institutions (COFIDE, BN and Agricultural Bank (BA)) fall under FONAFE; account for about 12 percent of assets in the financial system.
- COFIDE: second-tier development bank.
- Banco de la Nación (BN):
  - Fiscal agent for the government; charges above-market fees.
  - Holds mostly non-remunerated public sector deposits; charges a fixed annualized rate of 14 percent on overdrafts.
  - Commission for collecting taxes: 0.55 percent, which would yield approximately US$30 million in 2002.
  - Provides loans at preferential interest rates; balance of such loans amounted to approximately US$1.1 billion in September 2002.
- Agricultural Bank (BA): created to provide direct loans to small farmers at preferential rates, funded by the Treasury.
- COFIDE operations: issues domestic securities and external lines, channels funds to SBS-supervised institutions for medium- and long-term financing to export sector and small businesses; manages funds for public entities via trusts and asset management contracts.
- Quasi-fiscal operations mainly confined to BN.
- MIVIVIENDA channels mortgage lending and offers discounts of up to 20 percent for borrowers with good payment records.

---

### Privatization, public enterprises and FONAFE oversight
- Substantial reduction of public sector involvement through privatizations and concessions, but privatizations sometimes lacked clear procedures and proper public supervision.
- Legislative Decree 674 created COPRI for privatization; weaknesses included concentration of executive power and lack of oversight by Congress or supervisory agencies.
- By Supreme Decree 027 of April 25, 2002 several entities including COPRI were merged into PROINVERSION.
- FONAFE:
  - Manages state entrepreneurial activity; records and holds government's equity shares.
  - Covers 32 enterprises with state majority interest, 30 with minority interest and 27 in liquidation (excluding BN, BA, COFIDE).
  - Manages ELECTROPERU and ESSALUD affiliates SILSA and ESVICSAC.
  - FONAFE profits revert to the Treasury and it provides cross-subsidies between enterprises; Board approves consolidated budgets for majority state-owned enterprises.
  - FONAFE-controlled enterprises subject to the Transparency and Access to Public Information Law and must publish standard financial statements on a detailed and consolidated basis.
- Major sources of quasi-fiscal activity in state enterprises: internal pension plans (cédula viva) and cross-subsidies in public utilities (SEDAPAL, ELECTROPERU).

---

### Regulation and supervision of private sector utilities and financial system
- Significant progress in regulation and transparency for nonfinancial private sector utilities.
- No general procedures for preparing regulations affecting the nonfinancial private sector or for public consultation and periodic regulatory review.
- Regulatory agencies (OSIPTEL, OSINERG, OSITRAN, SUNASS) make supervisory/regulatory decisions more transparent: substantiation of decisions, publication in El Peruano, public hearings when necessary.
- Supreme Decree 124 of November 29, 2001 and Law 27838 of September 12, 2002 establish transparency rules for regulated prices and rate setting.
- Financial supervision framework adequate and in line with international standards.
  - SBS, BCRP and CONASEV responsible for supervision.
  - SBS autonomous; can intervene and liquidate institutions.
  - Regulatory framework does not distinguish between private/public or domestic/foreign institutions.
  - Well-defined system for financial assistance, corrective action and bank resolution.
  - Recent proliferation of ad hoc programs for assisting banks complicates identification of fiscal costs.
  - BCRP supervises interbank and exchange rate markets and payments system but lacks some regulatory powers; in exceptional circumstances may set maximum and minimum interest rates.
  - CONASEV regulates the securities market according to the manual on best practices in monetary and financial policies.

---

### Fiscal management framework and tax administration
- Legal/administrative framework: fairly comprehensive and public but excessively fragmented across provisions with different hierarchy and short time span (most valid for only one year), causing uncertainty and instability.
- No comprehensive legislation governing financial administration and budgeting (no permanent budget code).
- Existing regulations focus on financial and legal compliance rather than outcomes.
- Framework centralizes programming and coordination of aggregate spending under MEF; execution and spending amendment authority decentralized among budgetary entities.
- Absence of fully integrated financial information system complicates information and coordination.
- Tax law:
  - Constitution establishes principle of legality for taxation.
  - Tax Code (Consolidated Text, Supreme Decree 135-99-EF) sets general principles and procedures; taxes must be supported by specific legislation except customs tariffs and rates.
  - Tax legislation public and accessible; SUNAT posts regulations on its website.
  - SUNAT services include online consultations, submission of complaints and suggestions, 20 direct service centers, and published Standards for Providing Service to Taxpayers (Notice 016-2001).
  - Complexity: many exemptions, differentiated treatment across sectors and regions, frequent amnesties and installment payment schemes.

---

### Taxpayer rights, publication requirements and data dissemination
- Taxpayer rights:
  - Rights and duties established in the Tax Code.
  - Tax decisions may be appealed within tax administration, to the Tax Court, and ultimately to ordinary courts.
- Ethics framework:
  - Ethics Code for the Civil Service (Law 27815 of August 2002) binding on all public administration employees; principles include neutrality, transparency and accountability; prohibitions on conflicts of interest, acceptance of improper advantages and political advocacy.
- Legal publication requirements and timing:
  - LPTF requires MMM to be published at the beginning of June each year with technical opinion from BCRP.
  - LPTF requires publication, within 60 calendar days after each semester, of a report on compliance with MMM targets.
  - LTAIP (Law 27806 of July 2002) requires broad publication and consistency between budget documentation and MMM projections.
  - LTAIP requires MEF to publish numerous items within specified timeframes (examples: fiscal balance for consolidated public sector within 90 calendar days after fiscal year end; quarterly public debt details; timetable of quarterly disbursements and amortizations; balance of the FEF within 30 calendar days after fiscal year end).
- SDDS alignment:
  - Peru subscriber to SDDS since 1998.
  - Calendar generally consistent with SDDS; MEF publishes BTF with a lag of three weeks, no formal calendar for BTF.

---

### Information coverage, consistency and key data sources
- BTF (MEF) includes detailed monthly data on central government budget execution (LPSP coverage) and on nonfinancial public enterprises; quarterly data on financing of consolidated public sector (LPTF coverage) and public debt stock.
- BCRP publishes monthly data on central government with coverage consistent with international standards, including supervisory/regulatory agencies, MIVIVIENDA and ESSALUD (under FONAFE).
- Coverage gaps and inconsistencies:
  - LPSP does not provide comparable information for immediately preceding fiscal years nor forecasts for future years; forecasts appear only in the MMM (LPTF coverage) which differs from budget coverage.
  - No reconciliation provided between principal budget aggregates as approved and final execution.
  - Annual changes in budget presentation impede comparisons.
- Debt data:
  - DGCP maintains historical external debt data from 1970 and current quarterly data (external/domestic, by creditor, currency and interest rate), flow data and monthly debt service projections.
  - Domestic public debt information from DGCP and BTF differs significantly from BCRP publications.
  - MEF information not consolidated for the public sector as required by Public Sector Borrowing Law; excludes short-term domestic debt and certain local/regional obligations.
  - BCRP adjusts and publishes estimates of outstanding obligations and central government short-term debts to BN, but does not include local government liabilities to private financial institutions.
- Fiscal balance reporting:
  - Fiscal balance published for general government and public sector as a whole but coverage differs across MEF, BTF and BCRP.
  - BTF coverage of consolidated public sector (LPTF) excludes local governments; BTF coverage of general government excludes local governments, ESSALUD and regulatory agencies.
  - BCRP classification aligns with international standards; amendment to LPTF aligns LPTF coverage with international standards.

---

### Open budget preparation, execution and reporting — issues and limitations
- MMM and PPSP:
  - Budget documents specify medium-term objectives but do not include fiscal sustainability analysis or show how PPSP links to MMM objectives or sectoral strategic plans.
  - MMM presents three-year objectives and targets and indicates trend of debt-to-GDP ratio; recent amendment to LPTF requires MMM to include indicators of fiscal sustainability over medium and long term.
  - PPSP must be consistent with sectoral objectives from PESMs but PESMs are summarized in the Statement of Objectives and are not presented to Congress or linked explicitly to programs.
- Macro-fiscal rules:
  - Constitution: permanent expenditure cannot be financed with borrowing (Article 78).
  - LPTF establishes quantitative limits on consolidated fiscal balance and non-financing spending; rules on election years and use of FEF for anticyclical policy.
  - In the last two years, the budget balance rule was suspended by Congress at the executive branch's request.
  - Recent amendment to LPTF introduces rules limiting deficit and borrowing of subnational governments.
- Budget presentation issues:
  - Expenditure classification not compatible with Government Finance Statistics Manual; budget data not always shown in gross terms.
  - PPSP classification facilitates administrative control but hinders program impact analysis; includes residual "other capital expenditure".
  - Wage expenditure included as non-personal services under goods and services.
  - Tax revenue excludes SUNAT commissions and municipal promotion tax (earmarked for FONCOMUN) levied at 2 percent of IGV tax base.
  - PPSP does not present budget balance nor reconcile PPSP with fiscal target for NFPS set by MMM; accounting methodology for NFPS not stated.

---

### Budget execution, accounting systems and SIAF-SP limitations
- Accounting:
  - National Accounting Office defines, enforces and evaluates accounting systems.
  - Current chart of accounts adopted in 1998; SIAF-SP used since 1999 for official budgetary, financial and accounting records.
- SIAF-SP features and limitations:
  - In principle provides full institutional coverage for central administration; records commitment, accrual and payment phases; includes budget execution, cash flow and accounting modules.
  - In practice functions mainly as a financial management tool for Treasury-managed public funds covered by DNPP.
  - Limitations:
    - Does not record budget amendments.
    - Does not allow formulation of monthly and quarterly budget allocations.
    - Commitments registered based on monthly advances, not actual contract/order amounts.
    - Requires duplicate records; methodological differences between SIAF-SP and DNPP system.
    - Problems with expenditure classification, link to chart of accounts and incomplete recording of payments.
  - Consequences:
    - Impede reliable monitoring of payment arrears.
    - Prevent automatic reconciliation of the budget with accounting and banking records.

---

### Internal control, procurement and personnel management
- Internal control system:
  - "Partially operational" and being modified to reinforce effectiveness.
  - Important regulations issued but "only one in three public entities observes those rules."
  - Ex ante and simultaneous controls rest with entity officials; ex post control exercised by entity head and Internal Audit Office (OAI).
  - OAI audit reports not published but submitted to the CGR along with semi-annual evaluations of audit plans.
  - National Control System Law made heads of OAI administratively subordinate to CGR.
  - CGR oversees installation/equipping of OAIs, approves/supervises annual audit plans, may exercise ex post external control or contract external audits, and has launched a program to upgrade in-house expertise and computer resources.
- Procurement:
  - Government Contracting and Procurement Law (Supreme Decree 012-PCM of 2001) requires Annual Procurement and Contracting Plan (PAAC), Special Committees, public records of selection processes, CONSUCODE registers, quarterly reporting to CONSUCODE and CGR, and a Government Contracting and Procurement Tribunal.
  - Implementation problems: frequent violations; fewer than half of public entities have prepared a PAAC; waivers abused to circumvent procedures; special contracting rules persist for some institutions.
- Personnel:
  - Hiring and remuneration described as "opaque and open to discretion."
  - "Fewer than half the workers in the executive branch are career civil servants."
  - Multiple personnel regimes and remuneration schemes; private activity regime extended to government institutions.
  - Widespread use of non-personal service contracts; in SIAF-SP these are recorded as goods and services, underestimating personnel expenditure.
  - No entity issues comprehensive policy in this area; no reliable record of public sector personnel.
  - Draft civil service law being prepared by PCM proposing integrated civil service regime.

---

### Performance evaluation, data integrity and audit independence
- Performance evaluation:
  - National system being developed; Multiyear Strategic Sectoral Plans (PESMs) for 2001-05 and indicators prepared; MEF publishes semi-annual monitoring report.
  - "The first comprehensive semi-annual performance evaluation of PESMs for 2002-06 has yet to be conducted or published."
- Data integrity and reconciliation:
  - MEF and BCRP present quarterly fiscal information with about a five-week lag.
  - Reconciliation between budget and accounting not automatic; done manually each quarter.
  - Banking reconciliation lags for operations involving extraordinary resources or delegated execution.
  - Fiscal information meets SDDS integrity standards.
- Audit and statistics agencies:
  - CGR: autonomous, responsible for National Control System, formulates National Control Plan and approves internal audit plans; publishes audit decisions and monitors compliance; audit practices consistent with INTOSAI standards.
  - No legal obligation to evaluate the National Control Plan; plan not published and no evaluation made.
  - No formal mechanism for independent evaluation of fiscal forecasts and macroeconomic assumptions; no ex post comparison of observed outcomes with projections; macroeconomic/fiscal model details not published.
  - INEI: autonomous in technical matters; obtains annual data from General Account and SIAF-SP and coordinates reconciliation with BCRP.

---

### IMF staff commentary — overall assessment
- Recent initiatives have significantly improved transparency and moved practices closer to good international practices after a period of opacity and discretion.
- Evidence of progress includes implementation of SIAF-SP, strengthening of CONSUCODE, increased CGR autonomy, measurement of tax expenditure budget, and legal obligation for public sector entities to publish information (Economic Transparency websites and BTF).
- Authorities recognize further improvements are needed and have planned additional measures.

---

### Key risks, recommendations and reform priorities
- Key risks:
  - Ambiguities in demarcation of functions and responsibilities between central government, public financial institutions and subnational governments.
  - Central government shortcomings: lack of resources for internal/external controls; lack of transparency in human resource management; proliferation of tax preferences; voluminous/diverse information that may confuse stakeholders.
  - Legal instability affects private sector confidence.
- Management and distribution of functions — recommendations:
  - Expand institutional scope of government to include decentralized entities devoted to noncommercial activities and extrabudgetary activities mostly financed with public funds.
  - Identify quasi-fiscal activities of public financial institutions and nonfinancial public enterprises and clarify management of entities engaged in financial/commercial activities outside the budget process.
- Transparency at subnational level — recommendations:
  - Define expenditure responsibilities at each level.
  - Identify tax revenue and permanent financing sources for subnational governments.
  - Base intergovernmental transfers on transparent criteria ensuring vertical balance (examples: inter-regional equity, tax capacity weighted with quantitative indicators).
  - Enforce borrowing rules with strong supervision and sanctions; subject subnational governments to same transparency and uniform accounting/disclosure practices as central government.
  - Identify municipal quasi-fiscal operations (e.g., water and sanitation enterprises) and their deficit impacts.
- Public sector human resource management — recommendations:
  - Standardize civil service in a single regime with salary scale reflecting productivity and labor market conditions; apply uniform treatment to all financing sources.
  - Create detailed personnel database matching SIAF-SP scope.
  - Draft legal/regulatory framework for different government levels including Executive Branch Organization Law and Administrative Career Law.
  - Eliminate appointments that may give rise to conflicts of interest.
- Fiscal management and SIAF-SP — recommendations:
  - Draft/approve a general budget and financial administration law (budget code) to replace annual revisions and provide permanent norms on budget, cash management, debt management, accounting and control.
  - Consolidate repeated annual provisions into regulations under the general budget law.
  - Expand SIAF-SP coverage to all expenditure regardless of financing source; record commitments based on total contract/order value; enable real-time budget amendment information; identify expenditure classifiers compatible with international standards; fully develop budget module to dismantle DNPP system.
- Taxation — recommendations:
  - Strengthen executive oversight of tax law amendments; make MEF opinion binding to reduce proliferation of exemptions and tax preferences.
  - Maintain annual tax expenditure budget prepared by SUNAT.
  - Reduce frequent tax amnesties and deferred payment plans.
- Control and audit — recommendations:
  - Increase material and human resources for CGR to strengthen performance, compliance and financial audits and monitoring of reliable indicators.
  - Consider implications of placing senior audit officials of budgetary entities under CGR administrative authority on internal control development.
- Fiscal information, statistics and MMM enhancement — recommendations:
  - Reorganize and expand fiscal statistics to present reliable measures and forecasts for fiscal position at different government levels.
  - Include quasi-fiscal operations systematically and estimate their fiscal impact.
  - Budget documentation should quantify new policy measures and principal sources of fiscal risk; present execution and forecasts on uniform accounting and classification; reconcile ex ante and ex post presentations at sufficient disaggregation consistent with LPTF.
  - Enhance MMM by incorporating indicative multiyear budget program, supporting medium- and long-term fiscal sustainability exercises including present value of contingent liabilities, and publish sustainability calculations and methodology annually.

---

### Contingent liabilities — measurement, reporting and pension obligations
- Need to supplement public debt stock statistics with public sector contingent liabilities coverage, including cumulative guarantees with projections of probable realization, distinguishing certain liabilities from contingent ones.
- Contingent liabilities to be presented at present value as supplement to real debt.
- Medium- and long-term forecasts of defined-benefit pension regimes required and to be published with methodology, demographic and macroeconomic assumptions and discount rate.
- ONP present value estimates:
  - US$I5,151 million under Decree Law 19990
  - US$24,415 million under Decree Law 20530
- Supreme Decree No. 106-2002-EF requires public entities to provide information to ONP to calculate present value of pension liabilities.
- ONP publishes methodology for present value calculation (Resolución Jefatural No. 052-96/ONP-JEFATURA).
- LRTF (law No. 27958, published May 8th, 2003) aligned coverage differences between Public Sector Budget law and BCRP.
- Proposed Fiscal Decentralization Law published on December 31 2003 for public consultation; Subsection 16 of Article 1 envisages rules to improve fiscal decentralization and tax collection efficiency at local level.
- Public Sector Financial Administration Framework Law (Law No. 28112, November 28, 2003) establishes basic rules for management of public resources and registry/submission of information.
- Since mid-June 2003, ESSALUD no longer included under FONAFE coverage (Law No. 28006), restoring autonomy.

### Selected fiscal and public employment figures
- VAT rate: 17 percent
- Municipal promotion tax (IPM): 2 percent
- Combined IGV+IPM rate: 19 percent
- Total number of public servants at end-2003: 1,568,282
  - Permanent employees: 778,701
  - Pensioners: 704,931
  - Hired by service contracts and others: 84,600

*IMF staff report content from _cr04109.*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Introduction
- This report assesses the fiscal transparency practices in Peru against the International Monetary Fund’s Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency.
- The assessment is based on relevant documentation and meetings with government representatives.
- The assessment consists of two parts: (i) description of current practices based on responses to the IMF fiscal transparency questionnaire and additional information from the authorities; and (ii) an IMF staff commentary on fiscal transparency in Peru.

### Major initiatives and recent progress toward fiscal transparency
- Improvements in budget formulation.
- Partial phase-in of an integrated financial management information system (SIAF-SP).
- Introduction of an open procurement process (SEAC).
- Estimation of tax expenditures.
- Adoption of a medium-term macroeconomic framework (MMM).
- Increased autonomy of the external audit function.
- Most public entities are required by law to make available to the public—including through electronic means—an unprecedented volume of information on fiscal developments and prospects.

### Remaining weaknesses and areas needing improvement
- Lack of stability and clarity in fiscal legislation.
- Ambiguities in the demarcation of functions between government and the rest of the public sector.
- Inadequate information on contingent liabilities and quasi-fiscal operations.
- Lack of a coherent civil service system.
- Insufficient resources to conduct external and internal audits.
- Unwieldy proliferation of tax preferences.
- Congress has yet to:
  - Assign clearly spending responsibilities and revenue sources at different levels of government.
  - Design a transparent mechanism of intergovernmental transfers.
  - Establish limits on internal borrowing.

### IMF team corrective suggestions and policy recommendations
- Clarify functions within the public sector.
- Explicitly assign:
  - Spending responsibilities for subnational governments.
  - Revenue sources for subnational governments.
  - Borrowing limits for subnational governments.
- Establish clear criteria for determining intergovernmental transfers.
- Ensure transparent management and regulation of the civil service.
- Create a stable and unified legal framework encompassing:
  - The budget process.
  - Treasury operations.
  - Debt management.
- Promote efficient use and wider coverage of the integrated financial management information system (SIAF-SP).
- Enhance transparency in the tax system through a more disciplined legislative process.
- Strengthen capacity for external audit.
- Reconcile institutional coverage of government statistics.
- Ensure regular publication of:
  - Estimates of quasi-fiscal operations.
  - Estimates of contingent liabilities.
  - Fiscal sustainability assessments.

### Clarity of roles and responsibilities — scope of government and institutional definitions
- The public sector is clearly distinguished from the rest of the economy, but multiple legal and statistical definitions of government complicate demarcation.
- Three different definitions of the government for fiscal purposes:
  - Definition in the Public Sector Budget Law (LPSP).
  - Definition in the amendment to the Law on Fiscal Prudence and Transparency (LPTF) (amendment approved April 8, 2003).
  - Definition used by the Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP) for government finance statistics.
- Only the LPTF amendment and the BCRP definition are consistent with the IMF’s Manual on Government Finance Statistics.
- The LPSP legal definition contains incomplete coverage of the government sector; the LPSP for 2002 excludes entities including ESSALUD, SUNAT, SUNASS, certain supervisory agencies, and legally incorporated funds such as the Consolidated Reserve Fund (FCR) and the Fiscal Stabilization Fund (FEF).

### Decentralization and subnational government fiscal framework
- Recent constitutional reform strengthens the decentralization process and introduces a regional level of government effective from January 2003.
- Regional Government Law (Law 27867 of November 8, 2002, amended by Law 27902 of December 20, 2002) describes exclusive and shared powers of regional governments and includes provisions for regional fiscal discipline.
- Transitional, supplementary and final provisions of the Regional Government Law instruct the executive to submit to Congress a fiscal decentralization law addressing major outstanding issues (tax measures concerning the regions, and budget transfers) in the course of 2004.
- Prior to enactment of basic legislation and regulations governing regional finances, it is premature to assess macro-fiscal aspects of decentralization or transparency of fiscal relations between central and regional governments.
- The Basic Decentralization Law (Law 27783 of July 17, 2002) further clarifies expenditure distribution among levels of government.

### Local governments: responsibilities, revenues, and borrowing
- Constitution grants political, economic, and administrative autonomy to provincial and district municipalities; law provides minimum and specific responsibilities but often without clear distinction between provincial and district municipalities.
- Municipalities financed primarily through central government transfers and, to a lesser extent, taxes and other revenue.
- Transfer allocation criteria are generally based on income level and population; the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) annually determines actual indicators and weights.
- Municipal taxation capacity is limited; municipal taxes created by law include property, non-sporting public events, real estate transfer (alcabala), vehicle ownership, gaming and casinos.
- Municipalities may create or change fees, contributions, charges for municipal services (arbitrios), royalties and license fees, but law determines rates and bases.
- Constitutional provision allows municipalities to borrow to finance non-recurrent expenditure against their own revenue and assets without legal authorization, except for external borrowing guaranteed by central government; this conflicts with a government authorization requirement in the Basic Decentralization Law.

### Allocation of fiscal responsibilities between executive and legislature
- Draft Public Sector Budget (PPSP) must be submitted to Congress before August 30 each year, together with legislation governing indebtedness and financial balance.
- The LPSP must be approved by November 30; if not approved, the PPSP submitted by the executive comes into force.
- Congress can reduce spending and reallocate resources within the overall expenditure ceiling but cannot create or increase public spending directly; however, indirect expenditure increases occur through tax exemption legislation.
- Constitutionally, tax exemption legislation must be reviewed in a report by the MEF, which is not binding on Congress.
- The President can veto the LPSP and other laws wholly or in part; Congress can override the veto by a simple majority of the legal quorum.

### Extrabudgetary activities
- Extrabudgetary activities are few in number but quantitatively significant.
- Extrabudgetary activities primarily include regulatory and supervisory agencies (SUNAT, SUNASS) and social development funds (MIVIVIENDA, ESSALUD).
- These entities are subject to budget procedures established by the National Fund for Financing State Enterprises (FONAFE) for public enterprises.

*IMF staff assessment: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (_cr04109 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY).*

### 7.      The Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP) enjoys statutory autonomy in the

### _cr04109 - 7.      The Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP) enjoys statutory autonomy in the

### BCRP statutory autonomy and monetary–fiscal relations
- The BCRP has its own legal status and charter; its sole responsibility is to preserve monetary stability.
- Its activities are governed by Article 84 of the Constitution and its own charter of December 1992; it is subject to ex post control by the Comptroller General of the Republic and to supervision by the Superintendency of Banking and Insurance (SBS).
- The BCRP’s Board of Directors is appointed on an equal basis by the executive and legislative branches.
  - The Board is composed of seven directors (the President of the Board is appointed by the executive and ratified by Congress, three directors are appointed by Congress and the other three are appointed by the executive branch with a term in office that coincides with that of the President of the Republic).
- Current director appointments: some BCRP directors hold high positions in the government (e.g., a director holds the positions of Vice Minister of Finance) or maintain interest in the private sector; no evidence of conflict of interest is reported.
- Legal restrictions and operations:
  - The BCRP is not allowed to provide financing to the Treasury or to official development financial institutions, and to extend collateral or guarantees.
  - The BCRP may operate on the secondary market to purchase securities issued by the treasury for monetary policy purposes, subject to limits on the annual increase in its holdings of such securities.
  - The only quasi-fiscal transaction on its balance sheet derives from the 1994 recapitalization of the BCRP, through unremunerated treasury bonds which offset losses accumulated to that date (its current holdings of those bonds amount to less than US$30 million). These bonds are being retired through the transfer of 25 percent of the BCRP’s earnings to the Treasury, as required by law.
- Coordination with fiscal authorities:
  - No specific rules for operational coordination between monetary and fiscal policy exist, but there is consensus on the Multiyear Macroeconomic Framework (MMM).
  - The BCRP is represented in the Treasury Operations Committee that meets monthly to establish ceilings on expenditure financed from current revenue.
  - At present, the BCRP does not engage in quasi-fiscal operations.
- Additional roles: the BCRP could serve as agent for the government in relations with multilateral credit institutions and financial agencies of foreign governments; it administers government deposits in foreign currency and manages the Consolidated Reserve Fund (FCR) and the Fiscal Stabilization Fund (FEF).

### Public financial institutions and quasi-fiscal activities
- Remaining public financial institutions and systemic weight:
  - The public financial institutions (COFIDE, BN and Agricultural Bank (BA)) fall under the tutelage of FONAFE and account for about 12 percent of assets in the financial system.
  - COFIDE is a second-tier development bank.
- Banco de la Nación (BN):
  - BN is the fiscal agent for the government and charges above-market fees for services.
  - It holds public sector deposits, most of which are not remunerated, and charges a relatively high interest rate on central government overdrafts.
  - It charges a fixed annualized rate of 14 percent on overdrafts.
  - The commission for collecting taxes is 0.55 percent, which would yield approximately US$30 million in 2002.
  - BN provides loans to the government, public entities, public sector employees and pensioners, at preferential interest rates; the balance of such loans amounted to approximately US$1.1 billion in September 2002.
- Agricultural Bank (BA):
  - BA was created recently to provide direct loans to small farmers at preferential rates, funded by the Treasury, as well as indirect loans through private financial institutions.
- COFIDE operations:
  - It raises funds through issuance of domestic securities and external lines of credit to the government, channels these funds to institutions supervised by the SBS for medium- and long-term financing to the export sector and to small businesses, at interest rates that exceed the cost of its funds.
  - It also manages funds for public entities in the form of trusts and asset management contracts [comisiones de confianza].
- Quasi-fiscal operations: quasi-fiscal operations are confined mainly to the BN; at present, the BCRP does not engage in quasi-fiscal operations.
- Other public funds: MIVIVIENDA channels mortgage lending through financial institutions supervised by the SBS; it offers discounts of up to 20 percent for borrowers with a good payment record.

### Privatization, public enterprises, and FONAFE oversight
- Privatization history and weaknesses:
  - Public sector involvement in productive activities has been substantially reduced through privatizations and, to a lesser extent, through operating concessions; however, privatizations were not always conducted in accordance with clear procedures and under proper public supervision.
  - Legislative Decree 674 created the Private Investment Promotion Commission (COPRI) as the body responsible for designing and conducting the privatization process; members of COPRI were appointed by supreme resolution for approval by the President of the Council of Ministers and reported directly to the President of the Republic.
  - Weaknesses identified: executive concentrated power over design and approval; lack of oversight by Congress or supervisory agencies; regulators for privatized utilities sometimes created only after privatization and lacking sufficient autonomy.
  - By Supreme Decree 027 of April 25, 2002, several entities, including COPRI, were merged into PROINVERSION.
- FONAFE and nonfinancial public enterprises:
  - Nonfinancial public enterprises are grouped in a holding company known as FONAFE, responsible for managing the state’s entrepreneurial activity, administering resources from state ownerships, and recording and holding government's equity shares.
  - FONAFE covers 32 enterprises in which the state has a majority interest, 30 enterprises where the state has a minority interest, and 27 enterprises in liquidation (excluding BN, BA, and COFIDE).
  - FONAFE manages ELECTROPERU and ESSALUD with affiliates SILSA and ESVICSAC.
  - FONAFE earns profits which revert to the Treasury and provides cross-subsidies between enterprises; its Board of Directors approves consolidated budgets for majority state-owned enterprises.
  - Transparency: FONAFE-controlled enterprises are subject to the Transparency and Access to Public Information Law and must publish standard financial statements on a detailed and consolidated basis; they are also subject to directives relating to transparency in the management of enterprises under FONAFE.
- Major sources of quasi-fiscal activity in state enterprises:
  - Internal pension plans (cédula viva) and cross-subsidies between user categories in public utilities such as SEDAPAL and ELECTROPERU.

### Regulation and supervision of private sector utilities and financial system
- Regulation of nonfinancial private sector:
  - Significant progress in regulating the nonfinancial private sector—especially utility companies—and in making their activities more transparent.
  - No general procedures exist for preparing regulations affecting the nonfinancial private sector or publishing draft regulations, holding public hearings, conducting periodic assessments, or determining whether regulations should be maintained, modified or abolished.
  - Regulations for disclosure of administrative decisions by senior officials are partial and insufficient.
- Regulatory agencies and transparency:
  - Supervision and regulation of public utility companies by regulatory agencies (OSIPTEL, OSINERG, OSITRAN, SUNASS) are far more transparent.
  - Regulatory decisions must be substantiated and criteria must be understandable and predictable; general regulations must be published in the official gazette (El Peruano), and public hearings must be held if necessary.
  - Supreme Decree 124 of November 29, 2001 establishes rules to ensure transparency in setting of regulated prices; Law 27838 of September 12, 2002 addresses transparency and simplification of rate setting procedures.
- Financial system supervision:
  - The legal and regulatory framework for supervising the financial system and financial markets is adequate and in line with international standards.
  - The Superintendency of Banking and Insurance (SBS), BCRP and the National Securities and Exchange Commission (CONASEV) are responsible for supervision of the financial sector.
  - The SBS is an autonomous institution that regulates and supervises banks, public financial entities, insurance and reinsurance companies, and private pension funds; it issues prudential regulations and can intervene and liquidate institutions.
  - The regulatory framework does not distinguish between private and public institutions, or between domestic and foreign ones.
  - Peru has a well-defined system of financial assistance, corrective action, and resolution strategy for distressed banks.
  - Recent proliferation of ad hoc and uncoordinated programs for assisting banks complicates identification of actual and potential fiscal costs.
  - The BCRP supervises the interbank and exchange rate markets and the payments system but does not have authority to issue compulsory-purchase instruments, impose limits on composition of banks’ loan portfolios, or establish multiple exchange rates; in exceptional circumstances, it may set maximum and minimum interest rates to stabilize the market.
  - CONASEV regulates the securities market in accordance with the manual on best practices in monetary and financial policies.

### Fiscal management framework and tax administration
- Legal and administrative framework for fiscal management:
  - The framework is fairly comprehensive and public but excessively fragmented across various legal provisions with different hierarchy and time span (most valid for only one year), introducing uncertainty and instability.
  - There is no comprehensive legislation governing financial administration and budgeting that provides a basic and stable set of norms on major aspects of fiscal administration (budget process, cash management, public credit, accounting and supervision).
  - Existing regulations focus primarily on financial and legal compliance rather than outcomes; fragmentation into rules of varying ranking complicates analysis.
  - The framework centralizes programming and coordination of aggregate spending under the MEF, while execution and authority over spending amendments is widely decentralized among budgetary entities.
  - Absence of an integrated financial information system poses serious difficulties in information and coordination.
  - Important and constant aspects of financial management must be regulated through annual directives due to lack of a more permanent legal framework.
- Tax law and administration:
  - The Constitution establishes the principle of legality for taxation.
  - The Tax Code (Consolidated Text of the Tax Code, Supreme Decree 135-99-EF) sets forth general principles, institutions, procedures and rules governing the tax law system; taxes must be supported by specific legislation except customs tariffs and rates.
  - Tax legislation is public and readily accessible; tax regulations are published in the official gazette and SUNAT posts them on its website (see http://www.sunat.gob.pe).
  - SUNAT provides online consultations (responses establish precedents), submission of complaints and suggestions, 20 direct service centers, and published Standards for Providing Service to Taxpayers or the Public (Notice 016-2001).
  - Complexity and fragmentation: the simplicity of the tax system has been compromised by a large number of exemptions and highly differentiated treatment across sectors and regions, frequent amnesties and installment payment of tax liabilities.

*Italic: IMF staff report content from _cr04109 - 7.      The Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP) enjoys statutory autonomy in the*

### 16.      Taxpayer rights and resolution of tax disputes are clearly defined by law. The

### _cr04109 - 16.      Taxpayer rights and resolution of tax disputes are clearly defined by law.

### Taxpayer rights and ethics framework
- The Tax Code establishes the rights and duties of taxpayers and the system of sanctions.
- Tax decisions may be challenged:
  - by appeal to a higher authority within the tax administration;
  - to the Tax Court if unresolved by the administration;
  - ultimately to the ordinary courts of justice.
- Ethics framework:
  - The Ethics Code for the Civil Service (Law 27815 of August 2002) is binding on all public administration employees (regular career positions, “trust” positions, or performing activities on behalf of the government).
  - Principles: neutrality, transparency and accountability.
  - Prohibitions: conflicts of interest, acceptance of improper advantages, and political advocacy.

### Publication of information (legal requirements and timing)
- Publication of detailed fiscal information within specific time limits is a legal requirement (legal basis includes the LPTF and its regulations (Supreme Decree 039-2000-EF), Emergency Decree 035-2001-PCM, and the LTAIP (Law 27806 of July 2002)).
- Key legal requirements:
  - The LPTF requires government disclosure of medium-term economic and fiscal policy objectives in the MMM, published at the beginning of June of each year, together with the technical opinion from the BCRP.
  - Publish, within 60 calendar days after the end of each semester, a report on compliance with the targets established in the MMM.
  - The LTAIP requires broad publication of fiscal information and consistency between budget documentation and MMM projections regarding the fiscal balance and changes in public debt.
  - The LTAIP requires all public administration entities to publish budgets on a quarterly basis with details on investment projects, staffing levels, contracting and procurement procedures, and to send this information to the MEF for posting on its website.
  - The LTAIP requires the MEF to publish the fiscal balance for the consolidated public sector within 90 calendar days after the end of the fiscal year, together with the balances for the two preceding fiscal years; quarterly information on revenue and expenditure of the Central Government and Decentralized Agencies covered by the budget law; drafts of the Borrowing, Financial Equilibrium and Budget Law and their rationale, within the first two working days of September; quarterly detailed information on the balance and profile of the external and domestic public debt owed or guaranteed by the public sector, and by creditor, amount, terms, and interest paid and payable; a timetable of quarterly disbursements and amortizations, by source of financing; quarterly information on public investment projects; the balance of the FEF within 30 calendar days after the end of the fiscal year; results of the budgetary evaluation at the end of the fiscal year.
- The MMM must contain:
  - an analysis of fiscal risks from substantial deviations in macroeconomic assumptions (with an indication of contingency measures), and
  - estimates of tax expenditures.

### Alignment with international dissemination standards
- Calendar for publishing information is generally consistent with the Special Data Dissemination Standards (SDDS).
  - Peru has been a subscriber to the SDDS since 1998.
  - Peru publishes information on operations of the consolidated public sector and on central government debt within the time limits established, though there is a longer lag (five weeks) in publishing data on monthly operations of the central government.
  - The MEF has recently begun publishing fiscal statistics in the Fiscal Transparency Bulletin (BTF) with a lag of three weeks; there is no formal calendar for issuing the BTF.

### Information on fiscal activity: coverage and consistency
- Volume and sources:
  - The BTF (MEF) includes detailed monthly data on budget execution (revenue and expenditure) for the central government (LPSP coverage) and on nonfinancial public enterprises.
  - Quarterly data are published on financing of the consolidated public sector (LPTF coverage) and on the stock of public debt.
  - With the recent amendment to the LPTF, BTF coverage is expected to be consistent with the Manual on Government Finance Statistics.
  - The BCRP publishes monthly data on the central government with coverage consistent with international standards, including supervisory and regulatory agencies, MIVIVIENDA and ESSALUD (under FONAFE).
- Coverage gaps and inconsistencies:
  - The LPSP does not provide comparable information for immediately preceding fiscal years, nor forecasts for future years; such forecasts appear only in the MMM (LPTF coverage), which differs from budget coverage.
  - No information provided for reconciling principal budget aggregates as originally approved with subsequent revisions and final execution.
  - Annual changes in presentation of budget documents impede comparisons over time.
  - The BTF provides historical data with budgetary coverage for reference purposes.
- Tax expenditures and contingent liabilities:
  - The PPSP for 2003 includes an estimate of tax expenditures but provides no information on contingent liabilities and quasi-fiscal activities of financial and nonfinancial public entities.
  - The draft budget for 2003 is the first to include tax expenditure estimates; regional government tax expenditures imputed using an index of physical infrastructure shortages.
  - No systematic quantification of public contingent liabilities, though an amendment to the LPTF contains a transitional provision requiring the MEF to determine and identify the types and legal bases of contingent liabilities.
  - Quasi-fiscal operations exist that are not mentioned or quantified in budget documents.

### Public financial assets and liabilities: data sources and divergences
- Available sources:
  - The General Account of the Republic includes financial, treasury and public debt statements for the central government and for the public sector as a whole.
  - The General Directorate of Public Credit (DGCP) maintains a database with historic annual data (from 1970 for external debt) and current quarterly data broken down between external and domestic debt, by creditor, currency and interest rate; includes flow data on new loans, disbursements and debt service for the period, updated debt balance, and monthly debt service projections for the remainder of the year and for future years until obligations are repaid.
  - Aggregate data are published monthly in the BTF.
- Data inconsistencies:
  - Domestic public debt information from the DGCP and the BTF differs significantly from that published by the BCRP.
  - MEF information is not consolidated for the public sector as required by the Public Sector Borrowing Law, nor does it include short-term domestic debt; it excludes obligations of local and regional governments to BN and certain public securities issued in operations to support the financial system, and outstanding obligations to contributors who have transferred to the private pension system.
  - The BCRP adjusts and publishes estimates (methodology details not provided) of outstanding obligations and central government short-term debts (overdrafts) to BN, but does not include local government liabilities to private financial institutions.
  - Net financial asset reporting for the central government by BCRP and BTF is partial, with differing and somewhat complementary coverage.

### Fiscal balance reporting and coverage distinctions
- The fiscal balance is published for the general government and the public sector as a whole, but coverage differs:
  - MEF and BCRP provide quarterly fiscal information with a lag of approximately five weeks.
  - BTF information is based on the consolidated public sector as defined by the LPTF, which excludes local governments.
  - BTF coverage of general government excludes local governments, ESSALUD and the regulatory agencies.
  - The BCRP classification (nonfinancial public sector and general government) is in line with international standards; amendment to the LPTF aligns LPTF coverage with international standards.

### Open budget preparation, execution and reporting — structure and gaps
- Medium-term framework and documentation:
  - Budget documents specify medium-term economic and fiscal policy objectives but do not include analysis of fiscal sustainability nor indicate how the PPSP links to MMM objectives or sectoral strategic plans.
  - The MMM presents three-year economic and fiscal policy objectives and sets quantitative targets for principal fiscal aggregates for the general government and the consolidated public sector; indicates trend of the debt-to-GDP ratio for the following three years consistent with fiscal balance targets, but originally did not include an analysis of fiscal sustainability (recent amendment to the LPTF requires MMM to include indicators of fiscal sustainability over the medium and long term).
  - The PPSP must be consistent with sectoral objectives established in Institutional Operating Plans derived from Multiyear Sectoral Strategic Plans (PESMs) approved each year by the MEF and PCM; PESMs are summarized in the Statement of Objectives but are not presented to Congress and do not discuss linkage between budgetary programs and fulfillment of institutional objectives.
- Macro-fiscal rules and reporting:
  - Macro-fiscal rules are defined by law and the executive branch must report to Congress on compliance.
  - Constitutionally, permanent expenditure cannot be financed with borrowing (Article 78).
  - The LPTF establishes quantitative limits on the consolidated fiscal balance and on non-financing spending by the general government and defines circumstances and procedures for waivers; establishes rules on balance and non-interest expenditure during election years, and rules on accumulation and use of FEF funds for anticyclical fiscal policy.
  - In the last two years, the budget balance rule has been suspended by Congress at the request of the executive branch; degree of compliance with expenditure rules and the FEF has not been ascertained in either the MMM or the PPSP.
  - The recent amendment to the LPTF introduces rules limiting the deficit and borrowing of subnational governments.
- Macroeconomic framework and linkage to budget:
  - The PPSP is not based on a multiyear budget framework but is formulated within a comprehensive macroeconomic framework prepared by the MEF using a quantitative macroeconomic model (model includes five blocs (supply, demand, external, fiscal and prices), provides estimates for a three-year horizon, using 67 equations and quarterly information for the period 1993-2001).
  - By law, the MEF must submit the draft MMM to the BCRP for a technical opinion on the macroeconomic framework and on compatibility with balance of payments, net international reserves and monetary policy.
  - Although PPSP is consistent with MMM fiscal targets, budget documentation does not explicitly indicate how that consistency is achieved; MMM is approved by the Council of Ministers and published, along with the BCRP report, in full in the official gazette and at the MEF website.
- Fiscal risk analysis and policy quantification:
  - No analysis of fiscal risks in budget documentation; new revenue policies are identified but their impact is not quantified; expenditure policy changes are not clearly distinguished.
  - The Statement of Objectives does not include sensitivity tests of fiscal aggregates to changes in economic parameters nor analysis of principal contingent liabilities; the document specifies but does not quantify new tax policy and administration measures.
- Budget presentation issues:
  - Expenditure classification is not compatible with the Government Finance Statistics Manual and budget data are not always shown in gross terms.
  - The PPSP uses a functional programming classification submitted and approved by budget institution, source of financing, function, program, subprogram, activity, project, and generic expenditure group; this facilitates administrative control but hinders analysis of economic impact by program.
  - The PPSP proceeds directly from functions to activities and does not permit identification of budget allocations by program; includes a residual item for "other capital expenditure" that undermines transparency of investment spending.
  - Expenditure on wages is included as non-personal services under the goods and services heading.
  - Tax revenue does not include commissions received by SUNAT, nor the municipal promotion tax (earmarked for the Municipal Compensation Fund (FONCOMUN)) levied at a 2 percent rate of the General Sales Tax (IGV) tax base.
  - The PPSP does not present the budget balance nor provide a reconciliation between the PPSP and the fiscal target for the nonfinancial public sector (NFPS) set by the MMM; neither the MMM nor the PPSP state the accounting methodology for deriving the financial position of the NFPS.

### Budget execution, accounting systems and limitations
- Accounting framework and systems:
  - Principles and standards of public sector accounting are general in scope and consistent with international accounting standards (norms part of the System of National Accounts established by Article 145 of the Constitution, regulated by Law 24680 of 2000).
  - The National Accounting Office defines, enforces and evaluates accounting systems for institutions under the PPSP.
  - Current chart of accounts adopted in 1998; since 1999 the Integrated Public Sector Financial Management Information System (SIAF-SP) has been used for official budgetary, financial and accounting records on revenue and expenditure for public sector spending units.
- SIAF-SP coverage and operational limitations:
  - In principle SIAF-SP provides full institutional coverage for the central administration and allows recording at each phase of expenditure (commitment, accrual, payment); includes three modules (budget execution, cash flow operations and accounting).
  - In practice SIAF-SP functions mainly as a financial management tool for public funds managed by the Treasury and covered by a budget administration system in the National Directorate of the Public Budget (DNPP).
  - Limitations:
    - Does not currently record information on budget amendments.
    - Does not allow formulation of monthly and quarterly budget allocations.
    - Commitments are registered on the basis of monthly advances, not on actual contract and order amounts.
    - Requires duplicate records; methodological differences exist between SIAF-SP and the DNPP system.
    - Problems with expenditure classification, its link to the chart of accounts, and incomplete recording of payments.
  - Consequences:
    - Impede reliable monitoring of payment arrears;
    - Prevent automatic reconciliation of the budget with accounting and banking records.

*Source: _cr04109 - 16.      Taxpayer rights and resolution of tax disputes are clearly defined by law. — https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/_cr04109.pdf*

### 32.      The internal control system is partially operational and is being modified in

### _cr04109 - 32.      The internal control system is partially operational and is being modified in

### Internal control system: structure and recent changes
- Internal control system is "partially operational" and "being modified in order to reinforce its effectiveness."
- Important regulations issued over the past decade on internal control and resource management, but "in practice only one in three public entities observes those rules."
- Ex ante and simultaneous internal control: rests exclusively with officials of each entity, based on internal procedures.
- Ex post internal control:
  - Exercised by the head of each public entity and by the Internal Audit Office (OAI) required by law for each entity.
  - OAI responsibilities: conducting financial and management audits and special reviews (financial and/or operational objectives).
  - OAI audit reports are not published but are submitted to the Office of the Comptroller General (CGR), together with semi-annual evaluations of the annual audit plan.
- The recently approved National Control System Law made heads of the OAI administratively subordinate to the CGR (previously this subordination was only functional).
- The Office of the Comptroller General (CGR):
  - Responsible for overseeing installation and equipping of the OAI and approves and supervises annual audit plans for all public entities.
  - May require specific steps for internal control, exercise ex post external control directly, or contract external audit firms through competitive bids to conduct external audits if entities can cover costs.
  - Has launched a program to upgrade in-house technical expertise and computer resources.

### Government contracting and procurement: legal framework and implementation gaps
- Government Contracting and Procurement Law: national scope; based on principles of impartiality and transparency (Supreme Decree 012-PCM of 2001 and its regulations).
- Law requirements:
  - Entities must approve and publish an Annual Procurement and Contracting Plan (PAAC).
  - Entities must appoint a Special Committee of at least three members (permanent or per selection process).
  - Records on selection processes are public; any contract exempted from the general law must be approved by institutional resolution and published in the official gazette.
  - Regulation and supervision: Senior Council on Government Contracting and Procurement; CONSUCODE administers National Register of Contractors and Register of Persons Ineligible for Government Contracts (public).
  - Entities must provide quarterly reports to CONSUCODE and CGR on contracting procedures.
  - Government Contracting and Procurement Tribunal: highest authority for settling disputes during selection processes.
  - Subcontracting is permitted with prior approval; any increase to a contract exceeding 15 percent in value requires approval by the CGR—once the new law on the national control system is approved.
- Implementation problems:
  - Government Contracting and Procurement Law is frequently violated.
  - "Fewer than half of the public entities have prepared a PAAC or adapted their internal organization to the requirements of the law."
  - Waivers for emergency reasons are invoked without real justification to circumvent normal procedures; approval of additions to contracts is abused.
  - Special contracting rules still exist for specific institutions without justification.
  - Contracting process frequently entrusted to private entities not subject to the same general regulations.

### Hiring, remuneration, and public personnel records
- Procedures for hiring and remunerating government personnel are described as "opaque and open to discretion."
- "Fewer than half the workers in the executive branch are career civil servants."
- Multiple personnel regimes and remuneration schemes exist, subject to different principles, criteria and standards.
- Private activity regime has been widely extended to institutions of a clearly government nature.
- Non-personal service contracts (hiring under contract without adequate regulation of rights and benefits) are widely used; in the SIAF-SP their pay is recorded as expenditure on goods and services, "thereby underestimating personnel expenditure."
- Variety of interpretations of wage and salaries has resulted in significant salary discrepancies across regimes and even within the same regime.
- Contracts and pay arrangements of this type are present in projects associated with international agencies (UNDP, IDB, World Bank).
- "Currently there is no entity issuing policy in this area, nor any reliable record of personnel working in the public sector."
- A draft law on the civil service is being prepared by the PCM proposing reorganization into an integrated civil service regime.

### Obligation to provide fiscal information and reporting timelines
- During the fiscal year, the executive branch is legally required to submit quarterly reports on budgetary execution to Congress and to the CGR (Article 41 of the LGP and the annual budget laws).
- Budget execution reports generally present the most recently amended revenue and expenditure budget and compare this against execution; reports usually use the preceding year's budget execution as reference rather than the initially approved budget.
- Consolidated reports on financial execution of the PPSP: submitted quarterly by the MEF to Congress and the CGR, "within 30 days after the end of the quarter."
- Quarterly reports on physical and financial execution of the budget are submitted separately by each entity of the PPSP to Congress and to the CGR.
- Local governments and their decentralized public agencies must submit reports on financial and physical execution of their budgets to the MEF, the Congress and the CGR, but "on a semi-annual basis."
- General Account of the Republic:
  - Constitutionally the executive branch must submit it to Congress together with the CGR audit report.
  - By law the General Account contains financial statements, information on tax performance, budget execution, cash flow operations, public debt, public investment, social spending, special funds, and a general balance sheet for the public sector.
  - Submission deadline: "must be submitted to Congress by November 15 following the fiscal year in question, and published about 15 months after the end of the year in question."
  - By law, entities must submit information for the General Account to the National Accounting Office by March 31 of the following year. The National Accounting Office prepares the General Account and submits it by July 31 of each year to the CGR, which then conducts and reports on its audit to the MEF. After presentation to the Congressional Committee on the General Account of the Republic on November 15, that committee has 90 days to examine it and issue an opinion; if Congress does not issue a determination during this time, the opinion of the review committee is sent to the executive branch, which must promulgate the General Account by Legislative Decree within the next 15 days.
  - In the last four years, "about 90 percent of entities have submitted information on time."
  - The General Account is available at the MEF website; underlying documentation must be retained on file for at least 10 years and must be open at all times to audit and inspection.

### Performance evaluation and strategic planning
- National system of performance evaluation of public entities is being developed and implemented.
- Strategic planning began in early 2000 with preparation of Multiyear Strategic Sectoral Plans (PESMs) for 2001-05 and with definition of qualitative and quantitative indicators for measuring and evaluating performance.
- MEF coordinates PESM measurement and evaluation system and publishes a semi-annual monitoring report on progress on its website.
- PESM evaluation responsibilities:
  - Spending units: monitor input and output indicators.
  - Budgetary entities: monitor strategic objectives and outcome indicators.
  - Institutional sectors: evaluate final impact of government activity.
- "The first comprehensive semi-annual performance evaluation of PESMs for 2002-06 has yet to be conducted or published."

### Assurances of integrity — data quality and independent scrutiny
- Fiscal data publication and coverage:
  - MEF and BCRP present quarterly fiscal information with broader coverage, with a lag of "about five weeks."
  - BTF coverage is based on the consolidated public sector as defined by the LPTF, which excludes local governments.
  - Coverage of general government in the BTF excludes local governments, ESSALUD and the regulatory agencies.
  - Consolidated classification presented by the BCRP (for the nonfinancial public sector, and the general government) is "in line with international standards."
  - With the recent amendment to the LPTF, the coverage of the BTF is expected to be in line with international standards.
- Accounting basis and reconciliation:
  - Budget documentation prepared by the MEF "does not explicitly indicate the accounting basis or the standards used in its compilation."
  - Accounting regulations issued by the National Accounting Office and the government's chart of accounts are publicly published at the National Accounting Office (CPN) website.
  - Reconciliation between budget and accounting information is not automatic and is done manually every quarter.
  - Banking reconciliation reveals lags for certain operations involving extraordinary resources or delegated execution, since the SIAF-SP deals only with spending units.
  - Fiscal information meets the integrity standards of the SDDS.
- Independence and role of audit and statistics agencies:
  - Office of the Comptroller General (CGR): autonomous entity exercising external control over the public sector; technical agency responsible for the National Control System; required to formulate a National Control Plan and approve annual internal control plans of individual entities.
  - CGR publishes decisions based on its audits and monitors compliance with its recommendations; detailed reports withheld from publication to protect individual rights and pre-trial evidence, but any legislator may request them.
  - CGR's audit practices are consistent with INTOSAI standards.
  - There is no legal obligation to evaluate the National Control Plan; the plan is not published and no evaluation has yet been made.
  - No formal mechanism exists for the evaluation of fiscal forecasts and underlying macroeconomic assumptions by independent experts; to date, "there has been no ex post comparison of observed outcomes with previous projections," nor have details of macroeconomic and fiscal models used for forecasts been published.
  - The LPTF requires the BCRP to issue an independent technical opinion; the MMM (published in advance of the budget’s submission to Congress) serves to stimulate public discussion of medium-term projections and goals.
  - National Statistics and Data Processing Institute (INEI): autonomous in technical matters; obtains annual data from the General Account and the SIAF-SP and coordinates with the BCRP to ensure reconciliation of fiscal accounts with national accounts methodology.
  - The Constitution and the charter of the BCRP require publication of principal macroeconomic statistics; the BCRP performs a more thorough reconciliation of fiscal accounts with the rest of the macroeconomic accounts.

### IMF Staff Commentary — summary of assessment
- Recent initiatives have significantly improved transparency and moved financial management closer to internationally accepted good practices after a period of opacity and excessive discretionality.
- Evidence of progress includes:
  - Implementation of the SIAF-SP.
  - Strengthening of CONSUCODE.
  - Increasing autonomy of the CGR.
  - Measurement of the tax expenditure budget.
  - Obligation of public sector entities to publish information (mainly through the websites on Economic Transparency and the BTF), in accordance with the LTAIP.
- Despite progress, authorities recognize that many improvements still require further effort and have planned additional measures to strengthen good practices within a coherent and stable institutional framework.

*Source: _cr04109 - 32. The internal control system is partially operational and is being modified in — IMF staff report content provided.*

### 47.      Notwithstanding the initiatives under way, there are still areas that require

### _cr04109 - 47.      Notwithstanding the initiatives under way, there are still areas that require

### Key risks and identified shortcomings
- Potential risks to medium and long-term fiscal viability arise from prevailing ambiguities in the demarcation of functions and responsibilities between the central government and the rest of the public sector—above all, the public financial institutions and subnational governments—and from certain shortcomings within the central government.
- Shortcomings within the central government include:
  - lack of resources for internal and external controls;
  - lack of transparency in human resource management;
  - proliferation of tax preferences (including frequent tax amnesties and facilities for extended payment tax arrears).
- The availability and dissemination of voluminous and diverse information on public finances may be confusing; there is a lack of relevant, timely and readily understandable information useful to the public, the Congress and government entities.
- Stability in the legal system is essential for the longer term as it affects the private sector.

### Recent progress toward fiscal transparency (Box 1)
- Adoption of a Multiyear Macroeconomic Framework (MMM)
  - Legal establishment of an MMM to provide the context for budget preparation. The MMM is approved by the Council of Ministers and disclosed to the public.
- Reform of the budget system
  - Adoption of Multiyear Strategic Plans in the 26 institutional sectors of the public administration.
  - Introduction of accounting rules consistent with international standards.
  - Development of an Integrated Financial Management Information System, with broad coverage including the traditionally secret sectors of Defense and Interior.
  - Estimates of tax expenditures.
  - Establishment of a pilot program for civil society participation into the capital budget for 2003.
- Timely and compulsory disclosure of fiscal information
  - Establishment of the Economic Transparency website, the monthly Fiscal Transparency Bulletin, and websites for public institutions.
  - Annual and semi-annual publication of medium-term economic and fiscal policy guidelines through the MMM.
  - Quarterly publication of budget execution, including detailed information on ongoing investment projects.
  - Quarterly publication of the stock and contracting of the external and domestic public debt, including publicly guaranteed liabilities.
  - Quarterly publication of audited balance sheets and financial statements for public enterprises.
- Strengthening the Office of the Comptroller General (CGR)
  - Expansion of the CGR authority over private entities, with respect to public resources and assets that they may receive or manage.
  - Strengthening of the enforcement and sanctions capacity of the CGR.
  - Greater CGR control over additions to work contracts.
- Strengthening the procurement and contracting system
  - Approval and publication of an Annual Procurement and Contracting Plan by each public entity.
  - Introduction of the Electronic Government Procurement and Contracting System (SEAC).
  - Issuance of regulations on secret military procurement and contracting.
- Progress in regulating the nonfinancial private sector
  - Definition of procedures for setting regulated prices.
  - Public disclosure of information used by regulatory agencies.

### Management and distribution of functions — recommendations
- Legal redefinition of the scope of government:
  - Expand the institutional scope of government for fiscal purposes by incorporating all decentralized public entities devoted essentially to noncommercial activities.
  - Include all extrabudgetary activities that are wholly or mostly financed with public funds or that perform public services but are currently classified outside government.
  - Identify quasi-fiscal activities of public financial institutions and nonfinancial public enterprises, including those internal cross-subsidies with no net budgetary impact (examples cited: ELECTROPERU, SEDAPAL, MIVIVIENDA).
- Clarify management of entities engaged primarily in financial or commercial activities that operate outside the budget process but are subject to oversight (through FONAFE), accounting and pricing regulation or banking supervision.

### Transparency at subnational levels and intergovernmental relations
- Clearly define expenditure responsibilities at each level of government.
- Identify tax revenue and other permanent sources of financing for subnational governments (beyond occasional sources such as the proceeds from privatization).
- Base intergovernmental transfers on sufficiently transparent criteria that ensure vertical balance between levels of government (criteria might include inter-regional equity and tax capacity weighted with relevant quantitative indicators).
- Enforce rules on borrowing with strong supervision and sanction capacity by the central government and sound budget practices at the subnational level.
- Subject subnational governments to the same degree of transparency in management and control as central government entities, including uniform accounting and information disclosure practices.
- Identify extensive quasi-fiscal operations conducted by municipal water and sanitation enterprises (which in some cases lack pricing regulation) that produce deficits requiring discretionary transfers from the central government.

### Clarity in public sector human resource management
- Standardize the civil service within a single regime and establish a salary scale reflecting workers’ productivity and labor market conditions; apply standard treatment to all financing sources, including international agencies.
- Create a detailed personnel database with the same scope as the SIAF-SP.
- Draft a legal and regulatory framework covering different levels of government and the rest of the public sector (based on drafts of the Executive Branch Organization Law and the Administrative Career Law).
- Eliminate appointments to state entities where they could give rise to potential conflicts of interest.

### Fiscal management — legal framework and SIAF-SP
- Draft and approve a general budget and financial administration law (budget code) to replace the tradition of annual revisions and provide a permanent set of basic regulations for fiscal administration (budget, cash management, debt management, accounting and control).
- Consolidate many repeated annual provisions into regulations to the general budget law to improve certainty and stability.
- Expand and better use the SIAF-SP by:
  - Expanding coverage to all expenditure regardless of financing source (not only those financed from regular revenue).
  - Properly recording commitments based on the total value of contracts and orders (not monthly advances) so the system can measure payment arrears.
  - Clearly treating additional commitments, especially where this involves adding staff to payrolls of budgetary units.
  - Identifying all expenditure items using classifiers compatible with international standards and reviewing their relationship with the chart of accounts.
  - Fully developing the budget module so the DNPP budget management system can be dismantled.
  - Enabling SIAF-SP to offer real-time information on budget amendments and facilitate programming of monthly and quarterly budgetary allocations.

### Taxation — enhancing transparency
- Greater discipline in the legislative process so proposed amendments to tax laws and the tax code are subject to executive oversight; the opinion of the MEF on congressional initiatives should be binding rather than merely advisory to help reverse proliferation of exemptions and tax preferences.
- The annual tax expenditure budget prepared by the SUNAT is an important contribution to public debate.
- Greater clarity and stability in drafting and applying the tax code are required.
- Frequent tax amnesties and deferred tax payment plans pose the greatest threat to the transparency, credibility and integrity of tax administration.

### Control and audit
- The significant increase in the autonomy of the CGR should be accompanied by a substantial increase in material and human resources to strengthen capacity for performance, compliance and financial audits and the design and monitoring of reliable indicators.
- Appointing senior audit officials of each budgetary entity under CGR administrative authority is not necessarily positive and could undermine development of adequate internal controls within each entity.

### Fiscal information, statistics, reconciliation and MMM enhancement
- Reorganize and expand fiscal statistics to present more reliable information for measuring and forecasting the fiscal position at different government levels and for the general government.
- Government accounts should include information on quasi-fiscal operations in the rest of the public sector; such operations should be systematically identified and, to the extent possible, their impact on the fiscal balance should be estimated.
- The recent amendment to the LPTF adopting new institutional coverage of government is close to international practice and facilitates adjusting and consolidating government accounts with public enterprises to measure the nonfinancial public sector borrowing requirement.
- Budget documentation should:
  - Quantify any new policy measure (tax policy, administration or expenditure measures) introduced in the annual budget, as well as the principal sources of fiscal risk.
  - Present budget execution and forecasts on a uniform basis of accounting and classification (economic and functional).
  - Reconcile ex ante and ex post presentations of public sector operations at a sufficient level of disaggregation to provide a baseline for evaluating fiscal performance and compliance with fiscal goals, consistent with the LPTF.
- Enhancement of the MMM:
  - Incorporate an indicative multiyear budget program showing major expenditure items consistent with the MMM’s time frame, methodology and macroeconomic assumptions.
  - Support the MMM with medium- and long-term fiscal sustainability exercises, including information on the present value of contingent liabilities.
  - Annual publication of such sustainability calculations, together with the budget program (including methodology and basic assumptions) in the MMM and budget documentation, to offer a true multiyear macro-fiscal framework.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/_cr04109.pdf*

### 59.      Information on contingent liabilities.

### 59.      Information on contingent liabilities.

### Need for contingent liabilities statistics and presentation
- Information on the stock of outstanding public debt (including the net stock of floating debt and other short-term liabilities) should be supplemented with information on the public sector’s contingent liabilities.
- Statistics should cover the cumulative amount of guarantees, with a projection of their probable realization.
- It is important to distinguish between guarantees that are certain to give rise to a government obligation (actual liabilities) and those that might but will not necessarily result in a government obligation (contingent liabilities).
- Information on contingent liabilities is to be presented at present value, as a supplement to the real debt of the public sector.
- Forecasts of contingent liabilities would facilitate assessment of important sources of fiscal risk in medium- and long-term fiscal sustainability scenarios.

### Pension-related contingent liabilities and forecasting
- As part of contingent liabilities reporting, prepare (subject to annual review) medium- and long-term forecasts of the financial situation of defined-benefit pension regimes of all public sector entities (including the cédula viva pensions under Decree 20530), since they constitute a growing future obligation of the general government.
- These medium- and long-term forecasts should be published with information on the methodology used and on the underlying demographic and macroeconomic assumptions, including the discount rate used in present value calculations.
- The Public Pension Standardization Office (ONP) uses an updated actuarial calculation for the general pension scheme under Decree Law 19990.
- For Decree Law 20530, ONP estimates the present value of pension liabilities with information from 1997 payrolls, estimating an aging rate of the workforce.
- Reported present values of pension liabilities:
  - US$I5,151 million under Decree Law 19990
  - US$24,415 million under Decree Law 20530
- Supreme Decree No. 106-2002-EF requires public entities to give information to ONP to calculate the present value of pension liabilities of each public entity.
- The ONP publishes the methodology for the calculation of the present value of pension liabilities (Resolución Jefatural No. 052-96/ONP-JEFATURA).

### Transparency, methodology, and institutional coverage
- Information contained in the MMM should be transparent in terms of methodology, parameters and other assumptions about underlying economic policy measures.
- Transparency in the accounting base and institutional coverage is essential for applying macro-fiscal rules.
- The LRTF (Fiscal Responsibility and Transparency Law) requires fiscal sustainability calculations and establishes coverage consistent with the IMF - Handbook of Public Finance Statistics.
- The LRTF coverage includes regional and local governments; the Fiscal Transparency Bulletin (BTF) contains information based on the general government.
- The MMM (2004-2006 and Revised MMM 2004-2006) must include an analysis of fiscal sustainability and sensitivity analysis of the fiscal outlook.
- Suggestions to improve the MMM have been introduced.

### Institutional and legal developments relevant to fiscal information
- The Fiscal Responsibility and Transparency Law (law No. 27958, published on May 8th, 2003) aligned coverage differences previously present between the Public Sector Budget law and the Central Bank of Peru.
- A proposed Fiscal Decentralization Law (FDL) was published on December 31 2003 on the Ministry of Economy web page for public consultation; Subsection 16 of Article 1 envisages legal rules to improve fiscal decentralization and tax collection efficiency at local government level.
- The Public Sector Financial Administration Framework Law (Law No. 28112, November 28, 2003) establishes basic rules for comprehensive and efficient management of collection and allocation of public resources and the registry and submission of appropriate information.
- Since mid-June 2003, ESSALUD is no longer included under the coverage of FONAFE, restoring its administrative, economic, financial and budget autonomy (Law No. 28006).

### Selected fiscal and public employment figures cited
- VAT rate: 17 percent
- Municipal promotion tax (IPM): 2 percent
- Combined IGV+IPM rate: 19 percent
- Total number of public servants at end-2003: 1,568,282
  - Permanent employees: 778,701
  - Pensioners: 704,931
  - Hired by service contracts and others: 84,600

*Prepared by the Ministry of Finance of Peru; April 6, 2004.*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/_cr04109.pdf_
