## _cr05300

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [_cr05300](https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/_cr05300.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/_cr05300.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/_cr05300.pdf.json)

---

### Executive summary — scope and approach
- This report assesses fiscal transparency practices in Bulgaria against the IMF Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency.
- Assessment is based on: discussions with the authorities and other organizations; the authorities’ response to the IMF fiscal transparency questionnaire; and other sources of information.
- The assessment replaces the fiscal transparency ROSC prepared in August 1999 and reissued in March 2000.
- The assessment comprises: (1) a description of practice prepared by IMF staff; and (2) an IMF staff commentary on fiscal transparency in Bulgaria.
- IMF staff assessment based on discussions in Sofia during March 22–April 5, 2005, and authorities’ questionnaire responses.

### Major improvements since 2000 ROSC
- Bulgaria has made considerable progress in improving fiscal transparency, much linked to European Union accession requirements.
- Areas of improvement include:
  - Closure of most extrabudgetary funds.
  - Publication of arrears data.
  - Clarification of procurement, customs, and privatization legislation.
  - Strengthening of tax and customs administration.
  - Reductions in quasi-fiscal activities of public corporations.
  - Development of a more medium-term approach to budgeting.
- Bulgaria meets Code requirements in several areas:
  - Consistent use of the general government as the basis for fiscal management.
  - Clear definition of the fiscal roles of the branches of government.
  - Independence of external audit.
- Areas approaching best practice:
  - Timeliness of within-year fiscal reporting and reporting on the final general government outturn.
  - Debt reporting.

### Remaining challenges and key weaknesses
- Effective implementation of recently-enacted laws is crucial to achieve the transparency levels stipulated in legislation.
- Implementation challenges stem from long-standing weaknesses in public administration and control systems.
- Specific concerns:
  - Establishment outside the budget of a Public Infrastructure Projects (PIP) company that will undertake general government capital expenditure, constituting an extrabudgetary fund.
  - No consolidated publicly available information on the overall extent of government equity holdings in private companies.
  - Some significant quasi-fiscal activities of NFPCs remain, notably in transport (e.g., Bulgaria Railways operating at a loss for passenger transportation and accumulating liabilities to other state-owned entities).
  - Concerns about openness of some large-scale privatizations despite legislative improvements; privatization planned to be completed in 2008.
  - Perceived inadequacies in enforcement of business regulation due to slowness of court proceedings and corruption in judicial and administrative personnel.
  - Need to strengthen regulation of the pensions and insurance industries.

### Key recommendations — priority actions (nine items)
- 1. Eliminate provisions permitting the government to spend, without prior parliamentary appropriation, revenues that exceed those forecast in the budget.
- 2. Publish the budget execution report promptly at the time of its tabling in parliament.
- 3. Significantly expand the information provided to parliament with the annual budget (examples: full medium-term fiscal forecasts; expanded information on fiscal risks; details of concessions; financial asset holdings).
- 4. Discontinue the use of company structures to carry out predominately government fiscal activities.
- 5. Strengthen the independence of the procurement agency.
- 6. Modernize internal control.
- 7. Further strengthen tax and customs administration.
- 8. Appropriate spending in the budget to a more disaggregated level of administrative units, and reduce the discretionary ability of the government to transfer funds between appropriations during budget execution.
- 9. Present a mid-year report to parliament on budget execution.
- A number of the above recommendations should, as a matter of priority, be included in the Organic Budget Law.

### Institutional and coverage findings
- General government is largely defined consistently with Government Finance Statistics (GFS) principles and is well covered in the budget process.
  - The Budget Report presents fiscal activity on a “Consolidated Fiscal Program” (CFP) basis largely consistent with the GFS concept of general government; CFP covers general government bodies directly governed by annual budget appropriations, extrabudgetary funds, and municipalities.
- Improvement since 2000: fiscal reporting on CFP basis now covers many formerly excluded extrabudgetary funds.
- Public corporations and state aid:
  - Council of Ministers exercises ownership control; individual ministers act as shareholders for sectoral enterprises; trend toward line ministries withdrawing from company management.
  - Current policy: 50 percent of profits of all central government public enterprises are transferred to the budget each year; the remainder is retained by the enterprise. This policy is set out in the Annual Budget Law.
  - Fiscal assistance to NFPCs is covered by the Law on State Aid; the Commission for the Protection of Competition authorizes and controls state aid; reporting to the Minister of Finance is required; the State Aid Report cited is for 2003 and was published in July 2004.
- Privatization:
  - Privatization and Post-Privatization Control Act revised in 2002; managed by the Privatization Agency which publishes an annual plan and reports twice a year to the National Assembly.
  - Privatization receipts: 90 percent transferred to the state budget, 10 percent to the Privatization Expense Recovery Fund.

### Central bank independence, government–central bank relations, and financial institutions
- LoBNB prohibits the BNB from providing credit to government except against purchases of Special Drawing Rights from the IMF as part of a stabilization program supported by the Fund.
- The LoBNB requires the BNB to report twice a year to the National Assembly; BNB expenditures are audited by the National Audit Office; 20 percent of BNB profits go to a reserve fund and the remainder transferred to the government budget after deductions for special funds.
- With January 2005 amendments (Art. 43, para. 1) the government is required to pay at market prices for all fiscal agency services provided by the BNB.
- Under the currency board arrangement, the only monetary policy tool available to the BNB is the setting of reserve deposit requirements; the BNB does not pay interest to commercial banks on these deposits.
- Government ownership of financial institutions:
  - With privatization of the State Savings Bank, only remaining central government-owned bank is the Encouragement Bank (small, SME-lending, financed mainly through concessional foreign loans guaranteed by government).
  - Municipal Bank majority owned by the municipality of Sofia.
- Financial sector regulation:
  - Banking regulation meets international standards; external assessments find banking sector generally well supervised and complies with the Basle core principles.
  - Banks required to contribute an annual fixed 0.5 percent of deposits to the Deposit Insurance Fund; Fund reserves being increased in line with EU standards.
  - Nonbank financial sector regulated by an independent Financial Sector Commission; need to strengthen regulation of pensions and insurance industries.

### Fiscal framework, macro assumptions, and fiscal risks
- The overall balance of general government is the main fiscal indicator; primary focus is the Consolidated Fiscal Program (CFP).
- Article 10 of the State Debt Law imposes a 60 percent ceiling on gross general government (CFP) debt/projected GDP; since 2003 the debt/GDP ratio has been below this level.
- Macroeconomic assumptions are presented in the Budget Report but there is no formal consultation process to agree on a consistent macroeconomic framework.
  - MoF compiles the medium-term macrofiscal framework; AEAF prepares twice-yearly macroeconomic framework; BNB prepares forecasts and shares with MoF.
- Fiscal sustainability and risk analysis:
  - Fiscal sustainability issues are not presented in the Budget Report.
  - Long-term projections of social security expenditures and net present value estimates of accident insurance liabilities are produced by NSSI but are not publicly available.
  - No comprehensive analysis of contingent or hidden liabilities is presented; MoF guidelines require costing of new initiatives but the information is used only within the executive.
  - Sensitivity analysis is limited; Budget Report identifies main risks but presents no sensitivity analysis beyond interest-rate variations on interest expenditures.

### Budget management, accounting, and internal control
- Legal and administrative framework:
  - Organic Budget Law defines budget preparation and execution processes; Article 35(2) endows the Minister of Finance with authority to increase expenditure above aggregate amount approved by the National Assembly if revenues are higher than expected and the budget deficit target will not be compromised.
  - Over recent years, total revenues were 4 and 10 percent higher than estimated in the 2003 and 2004 budgets respectively, giving the executive capacity to spend above the level approved by the National Assembly.
- Treasury and FMIS:
  - Most central government payments and receipts handled through a treasury single account (TSA) under MoF; SEBRA automated payment system handles state budget payments except EU resources in the National Fund and judiciary payments (expected within SEBRA by end-September 2005).
  - Municipalities’ accounts are not included in TSA; municipal-level arrears persist.
  - MoF pilot testing a fully-developed integrated FMIS with planned rollout during 2006.
- Internal audit and controls:
  - Internal audit not fully effective and undergoing reform; Public Internal Financial Control Agency (PIFCA) responsible for internal audit and financial inspection; Central Harmonization Unit established in MoF in May 2004.
  - European Commission and OECD SIGMA recommend decentralization of internal audit; new draft Law on Public Internal Financial Control (Sept 2004) needs redrafting to embody EU recommendation.
- Public procurement:
  - Public Procurement Law of 2004 complies with most EU directives; Public Procurement Agency mainly monitors and has limited enforcement powers; NAO audits procurement and found irregularities in approximately one-third of all cases.
- Accounting practices:
  - Budget transactions are essentially recorded on a cash basis.
  - All general government entities apply partial accrual accounting (excluding depreciation), per the “Unified Chart of Accounts for Budget Entities” adopted in 2001.
  - Statements of accounting policy are not included in the budget and final accounts documents for the Consolidated Fiscal Program.

### Budget preparation, reporting timetables, and transparency
- Budget preparation timetable (key milestones):
  - Fiscal year on calendar-year basis.
  - End-January / early February: CoM issues Decision specifying timetable for three-year budget forecast and annual State Budget Law.
  - End-February: Minister of Finance issues instructions on three-year budget forecasts.
  - Early April: first-level spending units submit three-year forecasts; MoF develops three-year tax policy proposal and related estimates.
  - End-May: MoF submits updated three-year budget forecast to CoM.
  - Mid-June: CoM approves budget forecast.
  - End-July to Mid-October: draft budgets prepared and approved by CoM.
  - End-October: draft budget submitted to National Assembly.
  - End-December: Budget approved by National Assembly.
- Reporting timeliness and coverage:
  - Monthly Budget Execution Reports on cash basis with ~one month lag.
  - Interim quarterly reports prepared 60 days after quarter end; include payment arrears data available quarterly on MoF website.
  - Consolidated general government final annual accounts compiled three months after financial year end; Report on execution completed by end of May each year; submitted to CoM in June and then to National Assembly.
  - Annual fiscal data disseminated by MoF six months after end of budget year.
  - Legislature does not undertake a mid-year budget review; no formal procedure to present monthly and quarterly reports to the National Assembly.
  - Audited final accounts presented to National Assembly within nine months of year-end but have not always been promptly made public; government policy has been to make Budget Execution Reports public only after National Assembly approval.
- Public availability of fiscal information:
  - Budget Report provides comprehensive data on general government including municipal governments and most extrabudgetary funds.
  - Defense and security expenditures are included in aggregates but not decomposed in the economic classification.
  - Budget Report provides two prior years’ aggregates and diagrammatic projections for two subsequent years but does not report projected values; medium-term “Budget Forecast” with projected revenues/expenditures for two years following budget year is not made public.
  - MoF publishes complete official register of government guaranteed debt and aggregate guarantees in annual and monthly debt reports.
  - Other contingent liabilities not centrally recorded; 2004 amendment to Law for the Concessions requires a public National Concession Register.
  - No published estimates of QFAs or tax expenditures.
  - Partial government balance sheet developed as part of GFSM 2001 move but not publicly available; NSI anticipates publishing national financial accounts with government financial asset estimates in the near future.
  - MoF publishes monthly reports on total balance in the Fiscal Reserve Account.

### Accounting policy, reconciliation, and external audit
- Accounting policy and reconciliation:
  - Most treasury transactions executed through TSA enabling timely reconciliation with banking system.
  - BNB undertakes detailed reconciliation of monetary survey and budget execution data monthly.
  - Process of accounts reconciliation described as mostly effective.
- External audit and legislative oversight:
  - External audit is independent; NAO starts auditing cash report in February–March and usually submits report to National Assembly three months later; summary published on NAO website after adoption.
  - NAO cannot audit public corporations unless parliament takes a special decision and cannot initiate audit of companies performing general government activities (e.g., PIP company).
  - NAO has separate independent budget approved by National Assembly.
  - Legislature lacks processes for systematically following up on audit findings; NAO reports are not automatically presented to National Assembly and there is no specialized “Public Accounts Committee.”
  - Little public awareness of NAO reports.
- Statistical independence and forecasting:
  - NSI has substantial legal independence; Director and Deputy Directors appointed for seven-year terms and NSI reports directly to Eurostat.
  - External scrutiny of macroeconomic models and assumptions is not generally encouraged; AEAF willing to provide information on request but model descriptions are not published.

### IMF staff commentary — progress, concerns, and priority recommendations
- Progress noted:
  - Use of consolidated general government for fiscal policy and reporting.
  - Clear articulation of fiscal targets and rules.
  - Independent external audits.
  - Clear definition of fiscal roles of branches of government.
  - Reporting of public debt; timeliness of within-year reporting; government/central bank relations; reporting of state aid; financial sector regulation.
  - Publication of expenditure arrears data; transparent treatment of community service obligations; introduction of medium-term budgeting perspective; development of program budgeting; improved tax and customs internal control systems.
- Main concerns:
  - Legislation quality and, crucially, implementation given long-standing corruption problems.
  - The PIP company should be regarded as an extrabudgetary fund and its expenditure counted in the CFP; this was not applied in the 2005 state budget.
  - Organic Budget Law allows the Minister of Finance (in practice the Council of Ministers) to authorize additional discretionary spending at year-end when revenue over-performance occurs, reducing transparency and encouraging year-end “spend-up.”
- Highest priority recommendations (selected and restated):
  - Eliminate executive provisions to spend revenue in excess of budget forecasts without prior parliamentary approval; limit aggregate expenditure to amounts expressly appropriated by the National Assembly.
  - Provide for customary year-end salary and pension bonuses in the Annual Budget Law.
  - Manage unanticipated spending changes through supplementary budgets (with limited contingency allowances and appropriate virement provisions).
  - Routinely publish the audited annual report on budget execution at time presented to the National Assembly, without requiring prior acceptance by the National Assembly; immediately publish unpublished reports for previous years.
  - Align economic classification further with international standards, allocating defense and security expenditure by economic item.
  - Discontinue use of company structures (e.g., PIP company) to carry out predominantly government fiscal activities.

### High priority and other recommendations (selected)
- High priority:
  - Publish projections of main fiscal aggregates (aggregate expenditure, aggregate revenue, budget balance, debt and financing) for at least the two years subsequent to the budget year.
  - Strengthen independence and role of Public Procurement Agency beyond monitoring.
  - Strengthen independence of tax administration by reversing the 2003 amendment empowering the Minister of Finance to issue binding instructions to tax authorities (Article 232(2)2 of the Tax Procedure Code).
  - Present a statement of central government contingent liabilities with the annual budget and in the Budget Execution Report.
  - Regularly publish data on the level and composition of general government financial asset holdings.
  - Improve fiscal risk analysis to cover the full range of key macroeconomic and other variables and include it in budget documents.
  - Improve accuracy of revenue forecasting and coordinate forecasting agencies; include discussion of revenue outcomes vs forecasts in budget and execution reports.
  - Present monthly and quarterly GFS data on a disaggregated basis; decompose expenditure by economic and functional category.
  - Annual Budget Law should provide separate appropriations to significant second-level spending units (e.g., National Revenue Agency and Customs Agency).
  - Prepare a mid-year report on budget execution for National Assembly including revised forecasts and corrective action; make public when presented.
  - Modernize internal control by separating inspection and audit in PIFCA and decentralizing internal control to departmental managers.
- Other recommendations:
  - Consolidate and publish data on government equity holdings.
  - Accompany annual budget with a statement of tax expenditures, progressively expanding scope and detail.
  - Formally table all NAO reports in the National Assembly.
  - Require annual reports to National Assembly from central government ministries, agencies and public corporations including financial statements and nonfinancial performance.
  - Encourage judiciary to adopt sound financial management and anticorruption measures analogous to civil service.
  - Extend NAO audit mandate to central government public corporations receiving general government funding.
  - Ensure central government transfers to municipalities are based on clearly defined public rules; discontinue discretionary year-end supplementary grants when national revenues are strong.
  - Formalize consultation between MoF, AEAF and BNB via a Macroeconomic Forecast Committee; make macroeconomic model available to outside experts.
  - Accompany annual Budget Execution Report and agency financial statements with statements of accounting policy.
  - Consider establishment of a public accounts committee in the National Assembly to follow up NAO reports.
  - National Social Security Institute should regularly publish long-term projections of social security expenditures and net present value estimates of the workers compensation scheme.
  - Present an annual statement on concessions (public private partnerships) to the National Assembly; amend Law for the Concessions to require competitive award processes.
  - Expand budget documents to discuss public policy purpose and performance indicators for subsidies to corporations.
  - Require NFPCs to disclose financial impact of quasi-fiscal activities in annual reports.
  - Consider withdrawing serving civil servants from Supervisory Boards of NFPCs.
  - Consider BNB paying interest on compulsory reserve deposits when macroeconomic conditions are appropriate.

### Revisions to the Organic Budget Law (recommended)
- Required fiscal reporting provisions to be included:
  - Obligation to publish the annual Budget Execution Report on presentation to parliament.
  - Obligation to present to the National Assembly and make public a mid-year Budget Execution Report.
  - Required budget document content: fiscal risk analysis; identification and costing of all new budget expenditure and revenue initiatives; medium-term estimates; information on financial assets, contingent liabilities, concessions, and tax expenditures.
  - Specification of timing of reporting.
- Required budget management provisions:
  - Expenditure limited to an aggregate total explicitly approved in advance by the National Assembly.
  - Limits on transferring funds between budget appropriations.
  - Requirement that spending from own-revenues be authorized by parliament.
- Appropriations and program budgeting:
  - Separate appropriations for significant second-level spending units.
  - Changes to appropriation and budget information required by program budgeting, including role of program appropriation and requirements for program goals and performance information.
- Many recommendations require amendments to the present Organic Budget Law; the current budget law needs updating in line with other developments.

### Summary assessment — selected key findings
- General government largely defined consistently with GFS principles and well covered in the budget process. (1.1.1)
- Fiscal roles of executive, legislative and judicial branches are clearly defined in law; responsibilities across levels of government relatively clear. (1.1.2)
- Need to ensure extrabudgetary funds continue to be transparently reported and subject to appropriate procedures. (1.1.3)
- Clear separation between monetary and fiscal authorities; BNB has a high degree of independence. Relationships between government and NFPCs are being clarified. (1.1.4)
- Legal framework for management of public funds mostly clear and comprehensive. (1.2.1)
- Tax and customs administration being strengthened; hidden economy remains around a quarter of the economy and corruption magnitude continues to be a major problem. (1.2.2)
- Progress on public availability of information: fiscal reporting covers all of general government, but defense and security expenditures are not transparently reported in the budget; priority to allocate defense and security expenditure by economic item in accordance with GFS principles. (2.1.1)
- Commitments for regular publication of fiscal data not enshrined in law; priority to include reporting requirements in the Organic Budget Law. (2.2.1)
- Legislature does not undertake a mid-year budget review; such reviews should be instituted. (3.4.1)
- Audited final accounts are presented to the National Assembly within nine months of year-end, but have not always been promptly made public; Budget Execution Report, including final accounts, should be made public promptly at time presented to National Assembly. (3.4.2)

*Source: _cr05300 — IMF staff assessment and description of practice.*

### Executive Summary

### Executive Summary

### Introduction and Scope
- This report assesses fiscal transparency practices in Bulgaria against the IMF Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency.
- Assessment is based on: discussions with the authorities and other organizations; the authorities’ response to the IMF fiscal transparency questionnaire; and other sources of information.
- The report replaces the fiscal transparency ROSC prepared in August 1999 and reissued in March 2000.
- The assessment has two parts: (1) a description of practice prepared by IMF staff; and (2) an IMF staff commentary on fiscal transparency in Bulgaria.

### Major Improvements Since 2000 ROSC
- Bulgaria has made considerable progress in improving fiscal transparency, much linked to European Union accession requirements.
- Areas of improvement include:
  - Closure of most extrabudgetary funds.
  - Publication of arrears data.
  - Clarification of procurement, customs, and privatization legislation.
  - Strengthening of tax and customs administration.
  - Reductions in quasi-fiscal activities of public corporations.
  - Development of a more medium-term approach to budgeting.
- Bulgaria meets the Code’s requirements in several areas:
  - Consistent use of the general government as the basis for fiscal management.
  - Clear definition of the fiscal roles of the branches of government.
  - Independence of external audit.
- Areas approaching best practice:
  - Timeliness of within-year fiscal reporting and reporting on the final general government outturn.
  - Debt reporting.

### Remaining Challenges and Key Weaknesses
- Effective implementation of recently-enacted laws is crucial to achieve the transparency levels stipulated in legislation.
- Implementation challenges stem from long-standing weaknesses in public administration and control systems.
- Specific concerns highlighted in the description of practice:
  - Establishment outside the budget of a Public Infrastructure Projects (PIP) company that will undertake general government capital expenditure, constituting an extrabudgetary fund.
  - No consolidated publicly available information on the overall extent of government equity holdings in private companies.
  - Some significant quasi-fiscal activities of NFPCs remain, notably in transport (e.g., Bulgaria Railways operating at a loss for passenger transportation and accumulating liabilities to other state-owned entities).
  - Concerns about openness of some large-scale privatizations despite legislative improvements; privatization planned to be completed in 2008.
  - Perceived inadequacies in enforcement of business regulation due to slowness of court proceedings and corruption in judicial and administrative personnel.
  - Need to strengthen regulation of the pensions and insurance industries.

### Key Recommendations (priority actions)
- The report lists nine key areas where action is recommended:
  1. Eliminate provisions permitting the government to spend, without prior parliamentary appropriation, revenues that exceed those forecast in the budget.
  2. Publish the budget execution report promptly at the time of its tabling in parliament.
  3. Significantly expand the information provided to parliament with the annual budget (examples: full medium-term fiscal forecasts; expanded information on fiscal risks; details of concessions; financial asset holdings).
  4. Discontinue the use of company structures to carry out predominately government fiscal activities.
  5. Strengthen the independence of the procurement agency.
  6. Modernize internal control.
  7. Further strengthen tax and customs administration.
  8. Appropriate spending in the budget to a more disaggregated level of administrative units, and reduce the discretionary ability of the government to transfer funds between appropriations during budget execution.
  9. Present a mid-year report to parliament on budget execution.
- A number of the above recommendations should, as a matter of priority, be included in the Organic Budget Law.

### Institutional and Coverage Findings
- General government is largely defined consistently with Government Finance Statistics (GFS) principles and is well covered in the budget process.
  - The Budget Report presents fiscal activity on a “Consolidated Fiscal Program” (CFP) basis largely consistent with the GFS concept of general government; CFP covers general government bodies directly governed by annual budget appropriations, extrabudgetary funds, and municipalities.
- Boxed inventory elements (excerpted from Box 1: General Government in Bulgaria) identify central government units covered by the central budget; central government units outside the budget (extrabudgetary funds such as Social Security Funds, Health Insurance Fund, Teacher Pension Fund, Privatization Expenditures Fund, Agricultural Fund, National Fund, State Enterprise for Management of Environmental Activities, Employees’ Guaranteed Claims Fund); local government units and municipal extrabudgetary funds.
- Fiscal reporting is on the CFP basis, a significant improvement from 2000 when many extrabudgetary funds were not encompassed by fiscal reporting.

### Public Corporations, Subsidies, and State Aid
- Relationships with NFPCs are being clarified: Council of Ministers exercises ownership control; individual ministers act as shareholders for sectoral enterprises; trend toward line ministries withdrawing from company management.
- Current policy: 50 percent of profits of all central government public enterprises are transferred to the budget each year; the remainder is retained by the enterprise. This policy is set out in the Annual Budget Law and expected revenues from state dividends are indicated in the Report on the State Budget Act.
- Fiscal assistance to NFPCs is covered by the Law on State Aid. The Commission for the Protection of Competition authorizes and controls the granting of state aid. All central and local government bodies must submit details of aid granted or planned to the Minister of Finance, who must publish a consolidated annual report. The latest State Aid Report noted in the text is for 2003 and was published in July 2004.

### Privatization and Business Regulation
- Privatization legal framework revised in 2002 by the Privatization and Post-Privatization Control Act; privatization managed by the Privatization Agency which publishes an annual plan and reports twice a year to the National Assembly.
- Privatization receipts are remitted to a special budget account managed by the Minister of Finance: 90 percent of receipts are transferred to the state budget, and 10 percent to the Privatization Expense Recovery Fund.
- Concerns remain about the openness of some large-scale privatizations and the quality of implementation of improved business regulation; enforcement by courts is generally inadequate and perceived corruption persists.

### Financial Sector Regulation
- Regulation of the banking sector meets international standards; the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) is responsible for prudential regulation.
- External assessments find the banking sector is generally well supervised and complies with the Basle core principles.
- Banks are required to contribute an annual fixed 0.5 percent of deposits to the Deposit Insurance Fund; the level of the Fund’s reserves is being increased in line with EU standards.
- Regulation of the nonbank financial sector is conducted by an independent agency, the Financial Sector Commission; need identified to strengthen regulation of pensions and insurance industries.

*IMF staff assessment based on discussions in Sofia during March 22–April 5, 2005, and authorities’ questionnaire responses.*

### 11. There is a clear separation between the monetary and fiscal authorities, and the

### 11. There is a clear separation between the monetary and fiscal authorities, and the

### Central bank independence and operations
- The Law on the Bulgarian National Bank (LoBNB) prohibits the BNB from providing credit to government except against purchases of Special Drawing Rights from the IMF as part of a stabilization program supported by the Fund.
- The annual budget of the BNB is set by its Managing Board, published in the government gazette, and reported to the National Assembly.
- The LoBNB requires the Bank to report twice a year to the National Assembly on its activities.
- Expenditures are audited by the National Audit Office.
- The LoBNB stipulates that twenty percent of BNB profits go to a reserve fund, and the remainder is transferred to the government budget – after any amount deducted for special funds, which may be set up under a decision of the Managing Board.
- The amount of the annual transfer to the government budget is shown in the Report on the State Budget Act.
- The BNB law does not make fully clear the basis upon which the amounts deducted from profits for special funds is determined.
- With the passage of amendments to the LoBNB (Art. 43, para. 1) in January 2005, the government is required to pay at market prices for all fiscal agency services provided to it by the BNB.
  - The requirement related to selling issues of government securities targeted at citizens and servicing external market debt has been applied since 1997.
  - The requirement related to state budget information servicing has been applied since 2000.
- Under the currency board arrangement, the only monetary policy tool available to the BNB is the setting of reserve deposit requirements.
- The BNB does not pay interest to commercial banks on these deposits.
- The Bank does not provide quasi-fiscal assistance to public financial corporations.
- The BNB is empowered to conduct a lender of last resort function, although this facility has not been utilized.

### Government ownership of financial institutions
- With the privatization of the State Savings Bank, there is only one remaining central government-owned bank, the Encouragement Bank.
  - This bank is small in the context of the Bulgarian banking sector and provides loans to small and medium enterprises.
  - It is mainly financed through concessional foreign loans guaranteed by government.
  - The BNB subjects it to the same prudential regulations that it applies to the rest of the banking sector in Bulgaria.
- There is also the Municipal Bank, majority owned by the municipality of Sofia.

### Fiscal roles of branches of government
- The 1991 Constitution of Bulgaria (Article 84) makes budget approval, taxation and state borrowings the prerogatives of the National Assembly.
- The Council of Ministers is charged with presenting the budget to the National Assembly and executing the budget when it becomes law (Articles 86(1) and 106).
- The Organic Budget Law (Law on the Structure of the State Budget) defines processes and responsibilities for preparation and execution of the budget.
- Article 26 of the Organic Budget Law provides arrangements for carrying out fiscal activities should the National Assembly delay adoption of the budget until after the start of the fiscal year.

### Fiscal relations among different levels of government
- Significant fiscal decentralization reforms have been introduced via the Local Self-Government and Local Administration Law, the Municipal Budgets Law, and the Local Taxes and Fees Law.
- Assignment of expenditure responsibilities is specified in these laws and in sectoral legislation (education, health, culture).
- Tax assignment and forms of fiscal transfer from national government to municipalities are specified in legislation, with some principles subject to joint determination by national government and representatives of the National Association of Municipalities.
- Intergovernmental working parties have been active in defining principles governing fiscal equalization and grants for state-delegated activities; these principles have been published.
- Municipalities face within-year uncertainty in relation to transfers because municipalities are guaranteed only 90 percent of the appropriated amount of national funding in respect to certain important grant categories, with the remaining 10 percent being conditional on the national government not exceeding the budget deficit approved in the State Budget Act.
- Municipalities may apply for end-of-the-year supplementary funding from the central government, potentially available on a discretionary basis if there is revenue overperformance in the central budget.
- The Municipal Budgets Law specifies the purposes for which municipalities may borrow and requires provision of information to the national government on borrowing.
- The State Debt Law (Article 11) empowers the national government to propose in the Annual Budget Law restrictions on municipal borrowing if the ratio of Bulgarian general government gross debt/projected GDP exceeds 60 percent.

### Legal and administrative framework for budget management
- Article 60 of the Bulgarian Constitution stipulates that citizens shall pay taxes and duties established by law proportionately to their income and property, and that any tax concession or surtax shall be established by law.
- The Constitution requires that the National Assembly approve by law all international contracts which contain financial obligations for the state.
- Key principles for management of the state budget of the Republic of Bulgaria are described in the Organic Budget Law.
  - The state budget includes the republican budget (central budget and state authorities budgets, including that of the National Audit Office) and the budget of judicial authorities.
  - The Supreme Judicial Council prepares a draft judicial budget presented to the Ministry of Finance to be included in the draft state budget; the National Assembly adopts the judicial budget by judicial authorities as an independent part of the state budget.
- The Municipal Budgets Law sets out similar arrangements for municipal budgets.
- Procedures for issuance of government guarantees are specified in the State Debt Law and the Municipal Budgets Law.
- The State Debt Law defines obligations of the Minister of Finance concerning public debt management, including concluding government loan agreements and issuing government securities (see Articles 4–5, 12 and 16 of the State Debt Law).
- The Tax Procedure Code, the Law for Taxation of the Income of Physical Persons, the Corporate Income Levying Tax, the VAT law and the Excise Act establish tax rates and bases for domestic taxes.
- Customs duties are determined by the Customs Act.
- The Local Taxes and Fees Act defines the scope and coverage of all local revenues.
- The Ministry of Finance (MoF) plays a central role in fiscal management and oversees reform processes to align fiscal legislation with EU accession convergence requirements.
- Article 35(2) of the Organic Budget Law endows the Minister of Finance with authority to increase expenditure above the aggregate amount approved by the National Assembly if revenues are higher than expected and the budget deficit target will not be compromised.
  - Over recent years, total revenues were 4 and 10 percent higher than estimated in the 2003 and 2004 budgets respectively, giving the executive the capacity to spend, on a discretionary basis, well above the level approved by the National Assembly.
- Mechanisms for coordination and management of budgetary and extrabudgetary activities are well defined:
  - Chapter 7 of the Organic Budget Law provides that procedures regulating extrabudgetary funds are in general the same as those that regulate the central government budget.
  - The draft state budget shall be accompanied by consolidated estimates and supplementary information on the financial position of the extrabudgetary funds, and reports on state budget implementation shall be accompanied by reports on implementation of EBF budgets.
  - Social security funds and the National Health Insurance Fund are financed by earmarked payroll contributions.
  - Budgets of the Social Security Funds are adopted by the annual Law on the Budget of the State Social Security Fund; the NHIF budget is adopted by the annual Law on the NHIF Budget.
  - The National Assembly considers draft annual budgets of the State Social Security Fund and the NHIF in parallel with the draft State Budget Law.
  - Remaining extrabudgetary funds are approved by the Council of Ministers, but financial information about them is provided to the National Assembly in the annual Budget Report.
  - Transfers from the central budget to the social security funds, the National Health Insurance Fund, the Agricultural Fund and the National Fund are approved by the National Assembly.
- The 2003 reorganization of the MoF led to closer integration of capital and current expenditure planning within the ministry.
- Program budgeting has assisted in integrating current and capital budgeting more closely.

### Tax policy and administration
- Legislative bases for some taxes have been harmonized with EU standards: VAT, customs, and excise taxes definitions and structures have been progressively harmonized.
- Tax legislation specifies tax base, tax rates, and tax concessions for each tax, but numerous changes in tax policy have not always been accompanied by adequate explanatory materials for taxpayers, reducing predictability in a self-assessment system.
- Tax concessions have been reduced, but no estimates of their fiscal impact have been published.
  - An estimate of the fiscal impact of tax exemptions was prepared for the EU, but no estimates have been published.
- The Tax Procedure Code sets out arrangements for tax administration. A common taxpayer identification number (TIN) is used for all tax administration purposes; a single identifier for all tax and social security contribution payments—the Bulstat number—has been introduced.
- Improvements in compliance have been made; one estimate indicates the hidden economy remains around a quarter of the economy.
- Improvements to the VAT refund process speed up payment of refunds.
- Tax and customs administrations have introduced procedures to reduce corruption and improve efficiency by reducing face-to-face contact (call centers, integrated financial management information systems, electronic filing).
- Procedures have been put in place to reduce administrative discretion and improve uniformity of interpretation across regional offices.
- Codes of Ethics for customs officials and tax officials were introduced in 2003 and 2004 respectively, supported by staff training.
- Surveys suggest corruption remains a major problem.
- Responsibility for tax administration is being progressively transferred to a National Revenue Agency (NRA), expected to unify collection of all taxes (other than customs duties) and social security contributions from January 2006.
- Taxpayers’ legal rights are well defined in the Tax Procedure Code: rights to information, clarification, confidentiality, and appeal.
  - A tax assessment decision may be appealed, partially or fully, before a Regional Tax Director within fourteen days of its serving.
  - The Regional Tax Director is required to issue a decision within forty-five days.
  - Taxpayers may then appeal the decision before the Regional Court.
  - Bulgarian tax law does not provide for the provision of advance tax rulings.

### Public servants’ code of behavior and anti-corruption activity
- Public servants are legally subject to a code of behavior and probity requirements (such as obligations to report asset holdings and potential conflicts of interest).
- The relevant legislation is quite new and implementation remains a challenge.
- Compliance with asset reporting requirements by all civil servants is hindered by the refusal of a significant group of parliamentarians to comply with similar reporting requirements for members of parliament.

### Open budget preparation, execution, and reporting
- The annual budget process is mostly open but the presentation is not fully consistent with international standards.
- The budget preparation process is clearly defined in the annual decision issued by the Council of Ministers with a set timetable for preparation.
- The budget classification in the annual Budget Report is based upon the “national methodology,” under which the “Consolidated Fiscal Program” covers general government.
  - The economic classification approximates that of GFS 1986, except defense and security expenditures are presented as one functional total rather than decomposed.
  - Migration to GFS 2001 is reflected: net lending to nonfinancial enterprises, acquisition of financial assets and equity, and privatization receipts are treated as financial assets and shown “below the line.”
  - The functional classification is consistent with the Classification of the Functions of Government in GFS 1986.
- Expenditure is also classified administratively in the annual Budget Report at a high level of aggregation.
  - Expenditure appropriations in the Annual Budget Law are made largely to ministries (“first level” spending agencies).
  - Funding of “second level” agencies below ministries is subsumed within ministry appropriations, even when those agencies are significant and largely independent (e.g., the Tax Administration and the Customs Agency).
- With progressive introduction of program budgeting, classification by objective is being developed.

### The budget preparation timetable (Box 2 highlights)
- Fiscal year set on a calendar-year basis by the Organic Budget Law.
- End-January / early February: CoM issues a Decision specifying a time schedule and responsibilities for first-level spending units in preparing the three-year budget forecast and annual State Budget Law.
- End-February: Minister of Finance gives instructions to first-level spending units on preparation of three-year budget forecast, including unified models.
- Early April: First-level spending units update and submit their three-year forecasts to MoF.
- Early April: MoF develops a three-year tax policy proposal (including assessment of impact on economic growth and budget), a proposal on national expenditure policy, and a proposal on debt policy as well as estimates for payments due.
- End-May: MoF develops and submits an updated three-year budget forecast to CoM.
- Mid-June: CoM discusses and approves the budget forecast.
- End-June: MoF prepares budgetary guidelines to first-level spending units on preparation of annual budgets.
- End-July: First-level spending units develop and submit their draft budgets for the following year to MoF.
- Mid-September: MoF and first-level spending units agree on their draft budgets.
- Mid-October: MoF submits the draft state budget to CoM for approval.
- End-October: CoM approves the draft budget (Organic Budget Law / CoM Decision).
- End-October: Draft budget is submitted to National Assembly by CoM for discussion and approval (Organic Budget Law).
- End-December: Budget is approved by National Assembly (Organic Budget Law).

*Source: _cr05300 - 11. There is a clear separation between the monetary and fiscal authorities, and the*

### 24. The overall balance of general government is the main indicator of the fiscal

### 24. The overall balance of general government is the main indicator of the fiscal position of the budget, and the general government balance is monitored during the year. The primary focus of fiscal policy has been the balance of the Consolidated Fiscal Program, incorporating municipalities as well as central government.

### Fiscal framework and rules
- The overall balance of general government is the main indicator of the fiscal position; the general government balance is monitored during the year.
- The primary focus of fiscal policy has been the balance of the Consolidated Fiscal Program, incorporating municipalities as well as central government.
- The broader public sector balance is not targeted, justified by: (i) the greatly reduced size of the public corporation sector after the large-scale privatization program of recent years; (ii) the reduction in quasi-fiscal activities by public corporations; and (iii) the comprehensive reporting of state aid to public corporations.
- Article 10 of the State Debt Law imposes a sixty percent ceiling on the ratio of gross general government (consolidated fiscal program) debt to projected GDP. Since 2003, the debt/GDP ratio has been below this level.

### Macroeconomic assumptions and medium-term planning
- Macroeconomic assumptions underlying the budget are presented in the annual Budget Report to the National Assembly, but there is no formal consultation process to agree on a consistent macroeconomic framework for the budget.
- The medium-term macrofiscal framework is compiled by MoF.
- The Agency for Economic Analysis and Forecasting (AEAF) prepares twice a year a macroeconomic framework as an input into budget preparation; it includes medium-term macroeconomic indicators, a detailed breakdown of GDP by components and the balance of payments.
- The BNB also prepares macroeconomic forecasts and shares these with MoF.
- A statement on medium-term fiscal policy objectives is included in the Budget Report; these involve targets for the budget balance, objectives for the primary balance, and the debt/GDP ratio.
- The government has a medium-term tax strategy set out in the Report on the State Budget Act for 2003 with objectives to reduce the tax burden; maintain a stable tax system; align legislation with EU requirements; determine exactly the rights and obligations of taxpayers and the tax administration; and achieve sectoral neutrality and equal treatment of taxpayers.

### Fiscal sustainability and risk analysis
- Fiscal sustainability issues are not presented in the Budget Report.
- Long-term projections of social security expenditures and estimates of the net present value of liabilities of the accident insurance scheme are produced by the National Social Security Institute (NSSI), but they are not publicly available.
- Estimates of the fiscal impact of new initiatives and ongoing costs are not distinguished in budget documents presented to the National Assembly.
- Within the executive, MoF guidelines require first level spending units to cost all new policy initiatives, but this information is used only within the executive government.
- Assessment of sensitivity of budget estimates to economic variable changes is limited; the Budget Report identifies main external and domestic macroeconomic factors threatening fiscal targets but presents no sensitivity analysis beyond possible variations in international interest rates on interest expenditures.
- No broader analysis of fiscal risks—for example, contingent and other hidden liabilities—is presented.

### Clarity of control of budget execution and financial management
- Accounting and internal control procedures are gradually improving.
- Most budgetary and extrabudgetary payments and receipts of central government (including social security funds) are handled through a treasury single account (TSA) under MoF’s supervision and management.
- A significant number of central government suspense accounts are part of the TSA; the automated payment system (SEBRA) handles all payments of state budget entities except EU resources in the National Fund and judiciary payments (expected to be brought within SEBRA by the end of September 2005).
- Municipalities’ accounts are not included in TSA; municipal-level arrears persist despite substantial reductions in central government arrears.
- Tax arrears data are available in a separate information system of the tax and social security administrations not based on double entry recording; a new information system with double entry modified accrual recording for taxes and social security contributions is under development by the NRA.
- Linkage between cash and debt management has been improving with creation of a fully operational debt management unit in MoF tasked to compile government domestic and external debt management strategy.
- Internal audit is not fully effective and is undergoing major reform; the Public Internal Financial Control Agency (PIFCA) is responsible for internal audit and financial inspection; a Central Harmonization Unit was established in MoF in May 2004 to facilitate reforms. The European Commission and the OECD SIGMA have recommended decentralization of internal audit to spending agencies.
- A new draft Law on Public Internal Financial Control introduced in September 2004 will need redrafting to embody the EU recommendation on decentralization. Further training is crucial for reforms to succeed.
- Public Procurement Law of 2004 is in compliance with most EU directives; thresholds in Article 14 of the Law are lower than EU thresholds. The Public Procurement Agency mainly monitors procurement and has limited enforcement powers; appeal process is via civil courts. The NAO audits procurement procedures and has found irregularities in approximately one-third of all cases.
- New civil service legislation in 2003 contains compulsory competitive appointment and promotion procedures, clearly defined grading and salary ranges, and probity principles; implementation and applicability to judiciary administrative staff remain unclear.

### Accounting, reporting, and budget documentation
- Monthly Budget Execution Reports of general government are prepared on a cash basis with a lag of approximately one month.
- Interim quarterly reports of general government are prepared 60 days after the end of the quarter; these include data on payment arrears available quarterly on MoF’s website.
- MoF compiles consolidated general government final annual accounts three months after the end of the financial year (January to December) and completes the report on its execution by the end of May each year. In June the Minister of Finance submits these reports to the Council of Ministers, after which the government presents them for adoption by the National Assembly.
- Annual fiscal data provided by the Council of Ministers to the National Assembly are disseminated by MoF six months after the end of the budget year.
- MoF is pilot testing implementation of a fully-developed integrated financial management information system (FMIS); if successful, rollout to all other line ministries is planned during 2006.
- Fiscal reporting covers all of general government on both a “national methodology” basis and on a GFS basis; national methodology reports Consolidated Fiscal Program, central government, local government, social security funds and National Health Insurance Fund; GFS data covers consolidated general government.
- The legislature does not undertake a mid-year budget review; no formal procedure exists to present monthly and quarterly reports to the National Assembly. In-year changes or supplementary expenditures not changing budget balance targets have not been subject to legislature approval in recent years.
- Audited final accounts are presented to the National Assembly within nine months of the end of the fiscal year, but have not always been promptly made public. The government’s policy has been to make Budget Execution Reports public only after National Assembly approval; the 2003 report was not approved and initially not made public but was subsequently placed on MoF website.

### Results-oriented budgeting
- Objectives and expected results are discussed in budget documents only for selected ministries piloting program budgeting.
- Budget documents have included program budgeting appendices for some piloting ministries containing program objectives and performance indicators.
- Program budgeting is not fully integrated; the aim is to place the whole budget on a program basis by 2007 and adjust appropriation and other procedures accordingly.

### Public availability of fiscal information
- The Budget Report presented with appropriation legislation provides comprehensive data on general government (including municipal governments and, with limited exceptions, extrabudgetary funds).
- Defense and security expenditures are included in expenditure aggregates but are not decomposed in the economic classification information.
- The budget document discloses main general government fiscal aggregates for two years prior to the budget year and provides some information for the two years beyond the budget year.
- The Budget Report presents diagrammatic data on projected general government budget balance and primary balance as a percentage of GDP for the two years beyond the budget year, but does not report the projected values; no information on projected expenditure, revenue or financing is presented in that report.
- A medium-term budgeting document (“Budget Forecast”) presented to the Council of Ministers and made available to the budget committee contains projected expenditures and revenues for general government for the two years following the budget year, but does not project the budget balance or financing; this document is not made public.
- MoF maintains a complete official register of government guaranteed debt and publishes aggregate amounts of such guarantees for central government and municipalities in annual and monthly debt reports.
- Other contingent liabilities are not centrally recorded, though an amendment to the Law for the Concessions in 2004 requires a publicly available National Concession Register including details of liability for nonfulfillment under the contract.
- No estimates of QFAs or of tax expenditures are published.
- Comprehensive monthly and annual reports of general government gross debt are available on MoF’s website; debt is reported by source (external or domestic), external debt broken down by type of instrument and domestic debt by creditor, with breakdowns by currency, interest-rate structure, maturity and other characteristics.
- BNB publishes information on government debt in its quarterly Government Securities Market bulletin.
- Partial balance sheet identifying government financial assets has been developed as part of move to GFSM 2001 but is not publicly available currently; National Statistical Institute anticipates publishing national financial accounts with estimates of government financial asset holdings in the near future.
- Government publishes monthly reports on the total balance in the Fiscal Reserve Account, comprising all central government budgetary and extrabudgetary bank accounts.

### Timeliness, dissemination, and data integrity
- Commitments for regular publication of fiscal data are not enshrined in law.
- Timelines for preparation and presentation of the annual report on budget execution are set by MoF in consultation with the NAO.
- Monthly and quarterly Budget Execution Reports are prepared and made publicly available on a timetable established by the Council of Ministers by regulation pursuant to the Annual Budget Law.
- Procedure for preparation and submission of the Budget Execution Report to the National Assembly is defined in Art. 41 of the Organic Budget Law administered by the Minister of Finance.
- There is an administratively-defined timetable for publication of GFS 1986 data.
- Bulgaria committed to publication of extensive fiscal data through participation from 2003 in the Special Data Dissemination Standard.
- Budget estimates are not a reliable indicator of actual budget outcome: the Minister of Finance’s ability to authorize additional expenditure in the second half of the year when revenue over-performance occurs has led to actual expenditure significantly exceeding the level expressly authorized by the Annual Budget Law in recent years.
- In both 2003 and 2004 actual outturns of aggregate revenues were much higher than budgeted.
- Underbudgeting of certain expenditures (e.g., customary end-of-year staff and pension bonuses) reinforces tendency for actual expenditure to exceed budget.
- Variation between estimate and outturn for aggregate expenditure is disclosed in monthly reports on MoF’s website, but nonpublication of the 2003 Budget Execution Report reduced transparency.
- In 2004 the legislature requested and was provided with an explanation of the revenue overperformance.
- Organic Budget Law (Article 34) allows the Minister of Finance to change budget appropriations between line ministries or within a spending agency provided targeted budget balance is maintained; this has led to three or more changes in budget allocations per year during recent years.

*Source: Excerpt from IMF country report section on budgetary framework and fiscal reporting.*

### 51. Statements on accounting policy are not included in the budget and final

### _cr05300 - 51. Statements on accounting policy are not included in the budget and final

### Accounting practices and coverage
- Budget transactions are essentially recorded on a cash basis.
- All general government entities apply partial accrual accounting (excluding depreciation), based on the methodology as set out in the “Unified Chart of Accounts for Budget Entities,” as adopted in 2001.
- The MoF is responsible for setting accounting policies and standards, and for enforcing compliance with established accounting standards.
- Statements of accounting policy are not included in the budget and final accounts documents for government as a whole (the Consolidated Fiscal Program).

### Reconciliation and treasury arrangements
- Most treasury transactions are now executed through the TSA, allowing for timely reconciliation of information on treasury transactions with banking system.
- The BNB undertakes a detailed reconciliation of the monetary survey and budget execution data on a monthly basis.
- The process of accounts reconciliation is described as mostly effective.

### External audit and legislative oversight
- External audit is independent of the executive branch; the NAO starts auditing the cash report on execution of the budget in February–March of each year.
- The report of the NAO is usually submitted to the National Assembly three months later; after adoption a summary is published on the NAO website.
- The NAO does not have the right to audit public corporations unless the parliament takes a special decision; it cannot initiate an audit of companies performing general government activities (e.g., the newly-established Public Infrastructure Projects company).
- The NAO has a separate independent budget, approved by the National Assembly, after which it becomes an integral part of the State Budget of the Republic of Bulgaria.
- Capacity for financial audits is adequate, but more staff training will be needed as the NAO moves into performance and other specialized audits.
- The legislature does not have processes for systematically following up on audit findings; NAO reports are not automatically presented to the National Assembly and there is no specialized “Public Accounts Committee.”
- There is little public awareness in Bulgaria of the availability of NAO reports.

### Macroeconomic forecasting and statistical independence
- External scrutiny of macroeconomic models and assumptions is not generally encouraged; only some general data of the macroeconomic forecasts are published.
- The AEAF indicates willingness to provide information on request to outside experts; the Agency provides forecasts and assumptions to the MoF, which publishes them in budget documentation, but no description of the model itself is published.
- The National Statistical Institute (NSI) has substantial legal independence: the Director and Deputy Directors are appointed for terms of seven years; the NSI has autonomous status under the Council of Ministers and a direct reporting relationship with Eurostat.

### IMF Staff commentary — progress and concerns
- Bulgaria has made considerable progress since the 2000 fiscal transparency ROSC and the 2001 and 2002 updates, meeting the fiscal transparency code in a number of areas, including:
  - Use of the consolidated general government as the basis for fiscal policy and reporting.
  - Clear articulation of fiscal targets and rules.
  - Independent external audits.
  - Clear definition of fiscal roles of branches of government.
- Areas approaching best practice include:
  - Reporting of public debt.
  - Timeliness of within-year fiscal reporting and reporting of the general government outturn.
  - Advance release date calendar for fiscal reporting.
  - Government/central bank relations.
  - Reporting of state aid to corporations.
  - Financial sector regulation.
- Recent progress noted in:
  - Publication of expenditure arrears data.
  - Transparent treatment of community service obligations with explicit government funding for some public corporations.
  - Introduction of a medium-term budgeting perspective with forward expenditure estimates and greater consideration of macroeconomic parameters.
  - Development of a program budgeting system.
  - Improved systems for internal control in taxation and customs, though implementation challenges and corruption risks remain.
- Concerns and specific issues:
  - Legislation quality and, crucially, implementation given long-standing corruption problems.
  - The newly-established Public Infrastructure Projects company should be regarded as an extrabudgetary fund and its general government expenditure should be counted as part of the CFP; this treatment was not applied in the 2005 state budget.
  - The Organic Budget Law allows the Minister of Finance (in practice the Council of Ministers) to authorize additional discretionary spending at year-end in the event of revenue over-performance, which reduces fiscal transparency and accountability and encourages year-end “spend-up.”

### Highest priority recommendations for improving fiscal transparency
- Eliminate provisions permitting executive government to spend revenue in excess of that forecast in the budget without prior parliamentary approval from the Organic Budget Law; limit aggregate expenditure to amounts expressly appropriated in advance by the National Assembly.
- Provide for customary year-end salary and pension bonuses in the Annual Budget Law.
- Manage unanticipated changes in spending through supplementary budgets (in conjunction with limited contingency allowances and appropriate virement provisions).
- Routinely publish the audited annual report on budget execution at the time it is presented to the National Assembly, without requiring prior acceptance by the National Assembly; immediately publish unpublished reports pertaining to previous financial years.
- Align the economic classification of expenditure further with international standards, through allocation of defense and security expenditure by economic item.
- Discontinue the use of company structures, such as the Public Infrastructure Projects company, to carry out predominantly government fiscal activities.

### High priority recommendations for improving fiscal transparency
- In addition to prior year information, annual budget documents should report projections of the main fiscal aggregates (including aggregate expenditure, aggregate revenue, the budget balance, debt and financing) for at least the two years subsequent to the budget year.
- Improve procurement procedures by strengthening the independence and role of the Public Procurement Agency beyond monitoring.
- Strengthen the independence of the tax administration by reversing the 2003 amendment that empowers the Minister of Finance to issue binding instructions to the tax authorities on the uniform application of tax legislation (Article 232(2)2 of the Tax Procedure Code).
- Present a statement of central government contingent liabilities in documents accompanying the annual central government budget and in the annual Budget Execution Report.
- Regularly publish data on the level and composition of financial asset holdings of general government.
- Significantly improve fiscal risk analysis to cover variations in the full range of key relevant macroeconomic and other variables and include it in the budget documents.
- Improve the accuracy of revenue forecasting, including further enhancements to macroeconomic forecasting and coordination of forecasting agencies; include discussion in the budget report and annual execution report on outcomes of revenues compared to forecasts and reasons for deviations.
- Present monthly and quarterly GFS data on a disaggregated basis, reporting types of revenue and decomposing expenditure by both economic and functional category.
- The Annual Budget Law should provide separate appropriations to significant second level spending units, such as the National Revenue Agency and the Customs Agency.
- Prepare a mid-year report on budget execution for presentation to the National Assembly, including revised fiscal forecasts and proposed corrective action; make these reports public at the time of presentation to the National Assembly.
- Modernize internal control operations by separating inspection and audit in PIFCA (making PIFCA responsible only for inspection) and decentralizing internal control responsibility to departmental managers to enhance managerial accountability.

### Other recommendations for improving fiscal transparency
- Consolidate and regularly publish data on equity holdings of government.
- Accompany the annual budget with a statement of tax expenditures, starting with a list of all tax expenditures and any existing estimates of their fiscal impacts, and progressively expanding to include public policy purpose, duration, intended beneficiaries and fiscal impact.
- Formally table all reports of the National Audit Office in the National Assembly.
- Require all central government ministries, agencies and public corporations to present annual reports to the National Assembly containing annual financial statements and a report on nonfinancial performance.
- Encourage the judiciary to adopt budgetary and other practices consistent with sound financial management and probity, and adopt anticorruption measures for the judicial administration similar to those for the state civil service.
- Extend the scope of the NAO’s audit mandate to cover central government public corporations insofar as they are recipients of general government funding.
- Ensure all central government transfers to municipalities are based on clearly defined and publicly known rules and principles; discontinue discretionary end-of-the-year supplementary grants to municipalities when national revenues are strong.
- Improve coordination of agencies tasked with setting the macroeconomic framework for the budget by formalizing consultation between the MoF, Agency for Economic Analysis and Forecasting, and the Central Bank through a Macroeconomic Forecast Committee.
- Make the macroeconomic model used to provide the framework for the budget available to outside experts.
- Accompany the annual Budget Execution Report and annual financial statements of agencies with statements of accounting policy.

### Moving toward international best practice
- Consider establishment of a public accounts committee or sub-committee in the National Assembly to follow up NAO reports, receive reports, consider agencies’ responses, determine which reports require further parliamentary action, and hold hearings and investigations.
- The National Social Security Institute should regularly publish long-term projections of future social security expenditures and estimates of the net present value of the workers compensation scheme.
- Present an annual statement on concessions (public private partnerships) to the National Assembly; amend the Law for the Concessions to require that concessions can only be awarded after a competitive process.
- Expand annual government budget documents to discuss the public policy purpose of each subsidy to corporations, together with performance indicators expected of each recipient.
- Require public nonfinancial corporations to disclose the financial impact of any quasi-fiscal activities in their annual reports (e.g., community service obligations beyond government subsidies; cross-subsidies).
- Consider withdrawing serving civil servants from the Supervisory Boards of public nonfinancial corporations.
- Consider by the BNB paying interest on the compulsory reserve deposits of banks, to be introduced when macroeconomic conditions are appropriate.

### Revisions to the Organic Budget Law
- Many recommendations require amendments to the present Organic Budget Law; the current budget law needs updating in line with other developments currently underway.

*Source: _cr05300 - 51. Statements on accounting policy are not included in the budget and final*

### 96. The Organic Budget Law should be revised in order to incorporate, amongst other

### The Organic Budget Law should be revised in order to incorporate, amongst other things

### Required revisions to fiscal reporting provisions
- Obligation to publish the annual Budget Execution Report on presentation to parliament.
- Obligation to present to the National Assembly and make public a mid-year Budget Execution Report.
- Required content of budget documents to include:
  - fiscal risk analysis;
  - the identification and costing of all new budget expenditure and revenue initiatives;
  - medium-term estimates;
  - information on financial assets, contingent liabilities, concessions, and tax expenditures.
- Specification of the timing of reporting.

### Required revisions to budget management provisions
- Requirement that expenditure be limited to an aggregate total explicitly approved in advance by the National Assembly.
- Limits on transferring funds between budget appropriations.
- Requirement that spending from own-revenues be authorized by parliament.

### Appropriations and program budgeting
- Provision of separate appropriations for significant current second-level spending units important enough to require their own distinct budget.
- Changes to appropriation and budget information required by the introduction of program budgeting, including:
  - the role of program appropriation;
  - requirements for information on program goals and program performance information.

### Key findings from the Summary Assessment of Practices (selected)
- General government is largely defined consistently with Government Finance Statistics (GFS) principles and is well covered in the budget process. (1.1.1)
- The fiscal roles of the executive, legislative and judicial branches are clearly defined in law; responsibilities of different levels of government are relatively clearly defined. (1.1.2)
- Need to ensure extrabudgetary funds continue to be transparently reported and subject to appropriate procedures. (1.1.3)
- Clear separation between monetary and fiscal authorities; BNB has a high degree of independence. Relationships between government and nonfinancial public corporations are being progressively clarified. (1.1.4)
- Legal framework for management of public funds is mostly clear and comprehensive. (1.2.1)
- Tax and customs administration are being strengthened; hidden economy remains large and the magnitude of corruption continues to be a major problem. (1.2.2)
- Progress on public availability of information: fiscal reporting covers all of general government, but defense and security expenditures are not transparently reported in the budget. High priority should be attached to allocating defense and security expenditure by economic item in accordance with GFS principles. (2.1.1)
- Commitments for the regular publication of fiscal data have not been enshrined in law; priority should be attached to including reporting requirements in the Organic Budget Law. (2.2.1)
- The legislature does not undertake a mid-year budget review; such reviews should be instituted. (3.4.1)
- The audited final accounts are presented to the National Assembly within nine months of the end of the fiscal year, but have not always been promptly made public. The Budget Execution Report, including the final accounts, should be made public promptly at the time it is presented to the National Assembly. (3.4.2)

### Public availability and transparency issues (selected items from Table 2)
- Central government (CG) budget estimates: Yes, mostly for GG. Published/press/internet. (Para. Ref. 22-23, 38-39, 42) (Code Ref. 2.1.1)
- CG Defense Expenditures: Yes, but not decomposed in the economic classification presented in the budget execution reports. Yes, but in aggregated format. (Para. Ref. 43) (Code Ref. 2.1.1)
- CG EBFs (including special development funds, social security funds, resource revenue funds): Yes. Consolidated in state budget data and published in annual budget documents. Yes. The OBL specifies that financial information of EBFs should accompany reports on the state budget. (Para. Ref. 16) (Code Ref. 2.1.1)
- CG Budget outturns: Yes. Annual Budget Reports contain expenditure, revenues and the budget balance for consolidated general government for the two years prior to the current budget year. Yes, but last 2 years not presented to the legislature. (Para. Ref. 44) (Code Ref. 2.1.2)
- CG Budget forecasts: Some. Annual Budget Reports contain in diagrammatic form data on the projected general government budget balance and primary balance as a percentage of GDP for the two years beyond the budget year, without reporting the projected values. No forward forecasts of revenue and expenditure are reported. No, it is not made public. (Para. Ref. 44) (Code Ref. 2.1.2)
- CG Contingent liabilities: Some. Information on government guaranteed debt is published but not provided for in the budget. Some limited information available from National Concessions Register. Yes, information on loan guarantees is published on MoF’s website. (Para. Ref. 45) (Code Ref. 2.1.3)
- CG Tax Expenditures: No. Some estimates on tax expenditure have been attempted but no listing has been published. No, not published. (Para. Ref. 45) (Code Ref. 2.1.3)
- CG QFAs: No information on QFAs are available. No, not published. (Para. Ref. 45) (Code Ref. 2.1.3)
- CG Debt: Yes. Information on state debt is available on a monthly and annual basis. The MoF periodically presents to the government, parliament, and public a statement of public debt, with composition of public and publicly guaranteed debt. Yes. (Para. Ref. 46) (Code Ref. 2.1.4)
- CG Financial Assets: No. No. (Para. Ref. 47) (Code Ref. 2.1.4)
- Monthly/quarterly reports on fiscal outturn: GG data is available on a quarterly basis (with one quarter lag). Reconciliation with monetary data. No mid-term review document is prepared. Yes. Website. (Para. Ref. 42) (Code Ref. 3.4.1)
- Consolidated general government Final Accounts: Yes. Audited final accounts are usually presented to legislature 9 months after year-end. Yes, but last two years not made public—awaiting approval of National Assembly. (Para. Ref. 40) (Code Ref. 3.4.2)

*Source: IMF staff assessment and Appendix I tables as presented in the provided content.*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/_cr05300.pdf_
