## _cr0558

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### Executive summary — background, progress, and key recommendations
- Assessment requested by the authorities in early 2004 of fiscal transparency practices in Spain relative to the IMF Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency (FTC).
- Based on discussions, the authorities’ questionnaire responses, and other sources.
- Progress and overall judgment:
  - Spain has made major progress in macroeconomic and fiscal adjustment, modernizing and strengthening fiscal institutions, and disseminating information about government operations.
  - Spain now fully meets or exceeds the FTC’s standards in many areas, though certain aspects require further progress.
- Key remaining issues and recommended improvements:
  - Publication of timely information on subnational fiscal accounts: provisional quarterly info compiled by IGAE should be regularly published.
  - Transparency of boundaries and interactions between general government and public enterprises: criteria for delineation, nature of transfers, and QFAs should be more transparently explained in individual cases.
  - PPPs and contingent liabilities: medium- to long-term fiscal costs and risks associated with PPPs at all government levels should be systematically quantified, disclosed in budgetary documentation, and included in fiscal scenarios and long-term projections.
  - Reconciliation between budget and national accounts: publish detailed reconciliation of general government operations on a budget basis with national accounts; inclusion for central administration in 2005 budget documents is a welcome step.
  - Transparency of budget projections and scrutiny: methodologies and assumptions should be explained in budget documents; encourage independent scrutiny.
  - Medium-term budgeting and performance orientation: develop a detailed MTBF and improved indicators for progressive introduction of performance budgeting; shift internal controls toward cost-effectiveness.
  - External audit timeliness: accelerate external audits by the Court of Accounts.

### Public sector structure, classification, and national accounts
- Public sector structure:
  - Three levels of government: central government, regional governments (Comunidades Autónomas, CCAA), and local governments (Ayuntamientos or Municípios, Diputaciones Provinciales, Cabildos, and Consejos Insulares).
  - Central government includes: state/central administration (Administración General del Estado), social security funds, autonomous administrative bodies, public funds without legal status (sin personalidad jurídica), consortia between public administrations, and any other public entity that redistributes income, does not provide goods and services at market conditions, and is mainly financed with transfers from the central administration.
  - Public enterprise sector includes: entidades públicas empresariales, sociedades mercantiles, and public foundations.
  - Central government and its public enterprises together form the state public sector (Sector Público Estatal).
- National accounts classification:
  - Division between general government and public enterprises aligns with ESA-95.
  - General government includes public units performing administrative functions and public entities not producing marketable goods, or for which such sales do not cover 50 percent of operating costs.
  - Some entities classified as public enterprises in budgetary accounting are included in general government in national accounts.
  - Per EUROSTAT, capital injections to public entities outside general government can be classified as purchase of a financial asset only if investments are expected to yield a positive rate of return.

### Role of public enterprises and quasi-fiscal activities (QFAs)
- Shift of infrastructure provision and fiscal implications:
  - Since the mid-1990s, infrastructure increasingly built and managed by public enterprises (entidades públicas empresariales or sociedades mercantiles).
  - Many engaged in long-term infrastructure projects expected to yield a positive rate of return.
  - Investments of these enterprises at the state level amounted to 1.4 percent of GDP in 2003.
- Classification uncertainty:
  - Inclusion/exclusion judgments sometimes rely on expectations of future revenues/costs, creating uncertainty; EUROSTAT decides status case-by-case.
- SEPI trends:
  - SEPI’s contribution to GDP fell from 6.9 percent in 1983 to 0.1 percent in 2003.
  - SEPI’s share in stock market capitalization fell from 10.9 percent in 1996 to 0.4 percent in 2002.
- QFAs undertaken by nonfinancial public corporations:
  - Explicit subsidies capture much of the fiscal burden for below-cost mandated services (railways, postal services, coal mines).
  - RTVE:
    - Operating losses previously financed with debt; EUROSTAT classified RTVE as part of general government for EDP consolidation.
    - RTVE’s 2005 deficit: about 0.1 percent of GDP.
    - RTVE’s stock of debt: around 1 percent of GDP.
  - Tax benefits/exemptions generating QFAs: Correos y Telégrafos VAT and corporate tax exemptions; SEPI restructuring operations exempt from some taxes.
  - State Waterworks Companies engage in investment projects where charges are not expected to recover costs.
  - QFA disclosure: 2005 budget yellow book included summary exposition of selected public enterprises’ possible future impact on the state budget.
- Regulated industries and QFAs:
  - Electricity: provision to the islands at below-cost prices; encouragement to purchase domestic coal at above-market prices with compensation in regulated price.
  - Telecommunications: Telefónica obliged to provide universal service, reduced rates for pensioners, and phone booths in all municipalities; dominant position may compensate for costs.
  - Enterprises disclosed: RTVE, GIF/ADIF, State Waterworks Companies, AENA, HUNOSA, MAYASA, IZAR.
- Profit transfers, performance contracts, taxation:
  - Profit transfers to the budget and wage/hiring decisions determined by executive; remittances decided case-by-case by cabinet.
  - Public enterprises usually subject to performance contracts specifying minimum performance requirements.
  - Except Correos y Telégrafos, public enterprises subject to same tax and regulatory regime as private enterprises.

### Territorial fiscal distribution and intergovernmental arrangements
- Territorial distribution (2004, after full health care devolution):
  - Central government estimated to account for less than 30 percent of general government expenditure (excluding social security).
  - Autonomous communities accounted for slightly over 50 percent of general government expenditure (excluding social security).
  - Local governments accounted for the remaining 20 percent.
- Context and scale:
  - 17 CCAA and 8,100 municipalities, 80 percent of which have a population below 20,000 inhabitants.
- Intergovernmental financing and fiscal rules:
  - Legal framework: 1978 Constitution and Organic Law 7/2001 (LOFCA).
  - Two CCAA (Basque Country and Navarre) have almost full fiscal autonomy (régimen foral); other 15 CCAA under régimen común.
  - CCAA access financial markets directly, subject to restrictions; borrowing not guaranteed by central government.
  - Long-term debt must be used for capital expenditure; debt burden (interest plus long-term redemption) must not exceed 25 percent of current revenue.
  - Issuance of foreign-currency debt requires state authorization conditional on compliance with BSLs.
  - FFPC coordinates CCAA fiscal policy; legally advisory but de facto decision-making; regional Finance Councilors combined vote weight equals that of MOEF and Ministry of Public Administration combined.
  - 2001 arrangement for régimen común CCAA (starting 2002) granted tax powers and an equalization fund; included sufficiency fund and interterritorial compensation fund equal to 30 percent of state investment expenditures.

### Municipal financing, borrowing, and PPPs at local level
- Municipal financing modalities (excluding Basque Country and Navarre):
  - Large local governments (>75,000 inhabitants):
    - Receive 1.6875 percent of personal income tax, 1.7897 percent of VAT, and 2.0454 percent of excises collected in their jurisdictions.
    - For provinces: 0.9936, 1.0538, and 1.2044 percent respectively.
    - Complementary transfers indexed to state revenues not shared with CCAA.
  - Small municipalities: financed exclusively with transfers from the state, based on needs.
  - Municipalities with significant tourist business and population above 20,000 obtain extra financing via participation in excises.
- Financing for infrastructure:
  - Capital gains from zoning changes often provide financing; municipalities entitled by law to up to 15 percent of capital gains generated by zoning operations, earmarked for capital expenditures.
  - Transfers of land by private investors are sometimes not recorded as municipal revenue.
- Borrowing constraints:
  - Municipal long-term loans must be for capital expenditure.
  - State authorization required for debt issuance/loans with nonresident institutions, conditional on compliance with BSLs.
  - Debt not allowed to exceed 110 percent of current revenues.
- PPPs and concessions:
  - Law of Concessions (13/2003) defines concession characteristics; requires financial viability reports with minimum and maximum returns; allows revision of contract terms when returns fall outside specified range.
  - PPPs used since 1970s and increased at regional/local levels; popular forms: regular concessions, “shadow toll” concessions, and “low-toll” concessions.
  - Investment equaling 6 percent of GDP (at current prices and 2003 GDP) has been executed through PPPs since the mid-1990s (incomplete data).
  - Shadow tolls used more frequently by regional governments (Madrid, Cataluña, Navarra, Castilla-La Mancha, and Murcia).
  - Fiscal risks:
    - State-level PPPs have limited fiscal risks but these are not disclosed.
    - Scope and fiscal risks at CCAA and local levels are not systematically monitored; no comprehensive registry of long-term PPP commitments exists.
  - Accounting/classification:
    - State-level PPP investments registered as private investment in Spain’s budgetary accounting.
    - EUROSTAT ruling: PPPs where private operator receives most revenues from public administration must be classified as private investment if private operator bears most construction risk and most of either performance or demand risks.
    - Spain’s national accounts submission expected to adjust to EUROSTAT’s ruling.

### Budget preparation, presentation, forecasting, and medium-term frameworks
- Budget process timetable highlights (indicative due dates):
  - December 11–12: budgetary offices meeting.
  - January 2: MOEF order for MTBS preparation.
  - January 7: DGB decision establishing expenditure policies for MTBS.
  - January 20: draft agreement for three-year stability targets.
  - March 14: COM approval of draft agreement and state nonfinancial expenditure limit; sent to parliament.
  - April 10: FFPC approval of deficit target for CCAA.
  - July 25: first COM review of draft budget.
  - September 30: deadline to send draft budget to parliament.
- Presentation and classifications:
  - Budget information presented in gross terms; revenues in administrative and economic classifications; expenditures in institutional, economic, program, and functional classifications.
  - Economic classification aligned with ESA-95; functional classification not consistent with GFS 2001 and varies across CCAA.
  - Public enterprises’ information not consolidated with general government; public enterprise classification differs from government classifications.
- Macroeconomic and revenue forecasting, scrutiny:
  - Macroeconomic forecasts by Directorate General for Economic Policy; revenue forecasts by a Revenue Commission (DGB and AEAT).
  - BOS prepares macro projections but does not publish or share them with Directorate General for Economic Policy.
  - Methodologies and assumptions not made public; external scrutiny limited.
  - Historical bias: Real GDP growth tended to be overestimated; inflation tended to be underestimated.
  - Sensitivity analysis:
    - Included in SP updates for GDP and interest rates, but not in the annual budget.
  - Medium-term projections:
    - Medium-term budget scenarios not published clearly; role in annual budget preparation unclear.
    - BSLs require three-year rolling fiscal framework; 2005 budget extended deadline for final approval of stability targets to June (first applied for 2006).

### Fiscal rules, guarantees, and contingent liabilities
- Fiscal rules and primary indicators:
  - Main indicator: overall balance of general government defined per ESA-95.
  - BSLs apply to all government levels; require overall balance or surplus each year and at each level; medium-term horizon required.
  - IGAE tasked to verify compliance and inform government and FFPC by September 1 of the following year.
  - Sanctions: only if general government deficit > 3 percent of GDP triggering EU sanctions; noncomplying jurisdictions would contribute to fines proportionally.
- Guarantees and contingent liabilities:
  - GBL regulates granting of guarantees; annual budget law authorizes total amount of guarantees in the year; list of guarantees provided published with final accounts.
  - Treasury maintains a register of loan guarantees approved, cancelled, or honored.
  - Stock of guarantees to public enterprises modest: 0.9 percent of GDP as of end-2003.
  - Little information on judicial contingencies and pensions; pension long-term projections included in SP but not in budget.
  - Public debt disclosure: BOS publishes quarterly data on central administration, social security fund, CCAA, and local governments; consolidated general government debt provided quarterly with reconciliation to ESA-95 net borrowing.
- Privatization and turnkey project treatments:
  - Budgetary accounting: direct privatization registers book value as sale of financial asset (Chapter VIII); price above book value recorded as dividend (Chapter V).
  - ESA-95: entire privatization proceeds registered as sale of a financial asset.
  - Indirect privatizations via SEPI: if SEPI transfers proceeds to state, Spain records proceeds as dividends (Chapter V); under ESA-95 proceeds and related tax receipts treated as privatization proceeds and do not reduce deficit. If SEPI keeps receipts, Spain’s budget shows no effect, but ESA-95 records them as subsidy to SEPI, increasing fiscal deficit.
  - Turnkey projects: spending registered only when payments made; green series annex indicates commitments for three years following budget year; under ESA-95 expenditure recorded in year product delivered or level of work completed.

### Accounting, reporting, internal control, and external audit (IGAE, GFMIS, COA)
- Accounting and systems:
  - Public accounting based on 1994 National Public Accounting Plan (deviates from ESA-95); budget transactions recorded on a modified accrual basis.
  - Integrated GFMIS covers central government, capable of real-time budget execution and timely fiscal reports; social security has separate similar system.
  - Statements on accounting policy are not included in budget and final accounts documents.
- IGAE internal control and audit functions:
  - IGAE operates:
    - ex ante control of legality (limited to significant transactions);
    - ex post financial control of legality, accounting regularity, and performance using audit procedures;
    - ex post control of subsidies and public grants.
  - Audits focus mainly on legality and financial compliance; performance audits limited to a few programs.
  - Audit conclusions and recommendations are not made available to the public.
  - IGAE is integrated within the executive via MOEF and independent from controlled entities; internal audit offices of ministries are variably specified.
- Procurement and transparency:
  - Legislative Royal-Decree 2/2002 governs public contracts; principles of publicity, transparency, and nondiscrimination.
  - GDPS maintains register of all contracts awarded and provides procurement information online; e-procurement system under development.
- Final accounts, timeliness, and COA role:
  - Final accounts audited by Court of Accounts (COA) are not available within twelve months as called for by FTC; in practice parliamentary approval of SGA usually takes more than two years.
  - Public entities have six months to send final accounts to IGAE; IGAE must send SGA to COA before October 31; COA has six months to prepare reports; government allowed two–three months for allegations and two months for internal processing before COA sends accounts to parliament.
  - COA:
    - Independent, budgetary and organizational autonomy.
    - Composition: 12 members elected by parliament (six by congress and six by senate) with three-fifths majority for nine-year terms.
    - Audits focus mainly on compliance; performance auditing capacity limited by lack of performance indicators.
    - COA reports published in BOE; delays reduce effectiveness.
  - Regional OCEX (9 CCAA) exist and coordinate with COA.
- Reconciliations and statistics:
  - Reconciliations between budget appropriations and execution are properly carried out; bank statement reconciliations with BOS systematic.
  - IGAE carries out reconciliations of above-the-line and below-the-line annual data; BOS reconciles general government in ESA-95 terms.
  - INE is autonomous, responsible for national statistics and national accounts; IGAE delegated mandate for compiling general government revenue/expenditure; INE receives quarterly outturn info but lacks authority to publish it.

### Public availability, disclosure gaps, and IMF staff recommendations
- Public availability:
  - Central government budget documents comprehensive (~50 volumes) including program breakdowns; similar documentation at regional and municipal levels but sometimes less detailed and dispersed.
  - Monthly data on state fiscal outturns published on MOEF website with a three-week lag; AEAT monthly tax collection report distributed in the third week following the reported month; social security monthly data available with similar lag.
  - IGAE’s provisional quarterly subnational fiscal data compiled but not published due to quality concerns and required CCAA agreement.
  - IGAE publishes comprehensive Cuentas de las Administraciones Públicas with a two-year lag; Actuación Económica y Financiera de las Administraciones Públicas with a lag over one year; report on Cuentas de las Empresas Públicas not published for four years.
- Disclosure gaps and recommendations:
  - Reconcile and publish budget and national accounts presentations for central administration, social security, and historical series.
  - Publish provisional quarterly consolidated national accounts compiled by IGAE and shorten delay in final annual data publication to under one year.
  - Subnational governments should publish preliminary quarterly outturns and final accounts on their websites; IGAE should host links and consolidated accounts.
  - Concessions and PPP contracts should be fully disclosed with financial analysis and sensitivity tests; known future costs and expected value of guarantees/contingent liabilities should be disclosed and included in medium- to long-term fiscal sustainability analysis.
  - Prepare an annual report on concessions and PPPs by MOEF (and analogous reports by CCAA) and compile data to show fiscal implications at general government level.
  - Improve publication of methodologies and assumptions underlying budget projections; include sensitivity analysis and independent scrutiny; publish BOS internal forecasts and consider a nonpartisan parliamentary budget office.
  - Develop a full-fledged rolling MTBF with multi-year projections disaggregated by function/program and quantify multi-year effects of new policy initiatives; include long-term projections for pensions and health periodically.
  - Bring functional classification into line with GFS 2001; progressively develop monitorable indicators of results for program budgeting.
  - Shift IGAE focus from generalized ex ante controls to ex post and performance-oriented controls, delineate internal audit roles, and consider separation of accounting and control within IGAE.
  - Accelerate COA audits, focus more on value-for-money, reduce publication lags, and strengthen mechanisms for government response and follow-up.
  - Strengthen legal basis protecting tax administration from political interference (e.g., fixed-term mandates for highest officials).
  - Publish statements on accounting policies in budget/final accounts and consider comprehensive revision of the government accounting plan to align with ESA-95.
- Specific numeric and factual points highlighted for transparency:
  - Investments of state public enterprises: 1.4 percent of GDP in 2003.
  - SEPI contribution to GDP: 6.9 percent in 1983 and 0.1 percent in 2003.
  - SEPI share in stock market capitalization: 10.9 percent in 1996 and 0.4 percent in 2002.
  - RTVE: 2005 deficit about 0.1 percent of GDP; stock of debt around 1 percent of GDP.
  - Stock of loan guarantees to public enterprises: 0.9 percent of GDP as of end-2003.
  - AEAT activity statistics (2003): 19,885,000 booklets published; 32,616,773 pieces of personal correspondence sent; 7,212,250 phone calls answered.
  - Territorial counts: 17 CCAA; 8,100 municipalities; 80 percent of municipalities have population below 20,000.
  - PPP investment executed since mid-1990s: 6 percent of GDP (at current prices and 2003 GDP).
  - Municipal shares of tax revenues for large municipalities: 1.6875 percent of personal income tax, 1.7897 percent of VAT, 2.0454 percent of excises; provinces: 0.9936, 1.0538, 1.2044 percent respectively.
  - Municipal entitlement from zoning capital gains: up to 15 percent.
  - Debt constraint for municipalities: not exceed 110 percent of current revenues.
  - CCAA debt burden constraint: interest payments plus long-term debt redemption must not exceed 25 percent of current revenue.
  - GBL contingency line item: equivalent to 2 percent of the annual spending ceiling.
  - COA composition: 12 members elected by parliament for nine-year terms.
  - Timeliness concerns: IGAE Cuentas de las Administraciones Públicas published with a two-year lag; some publications with lags over one year; report on Cuentas de las Empresas Públicas not published for four years; final accounts audited by COA published with over two-year delays.
- IMF staff commentary (summarized):
  - Legal framework broadly clear and ESA-95-consistent in principle, but application in individual cases and reliance on projected future revenues has blurred boundaries between government and public enterprises.
  - Subnational reporting needs substantial improvement for effective application of BSLs.
  - Privatization accounting has at times deviated from ESA-95, complicating comparability.
  - Recommendations emphasize greater disclosure, publication of IGAE provisional consolidated data, better reconciliation, strengthened MTBF and medium-term documentation, improved disclosure on PPPs/QFAs/guarantees, publication of forecasting methodologies and BOS forecasts, and acceleration and refocusing of external audit.

*Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY and selected sections of IMF assessment of fiscal transparency practices in Spain (content unit: _cr0558).*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### _cr0558 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Background and scope
- Assessment of fiscal transparency practices in Spain relative to the IMF Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency (FTC), requested by the authorities in early 2004.
- Based on discussions with the authorities and other organizations, the authorities’ response to the IMF fiscal transparency questionnaire, and other sources of information.
- Recommends consulting the IMF Manual on Fiscal Transparency for further explanation of terms and concepts.

### Progress and overall judgment
- Spain has made major progress in macroeconomic and fiscal adjustment, modernizing and strengthening fiscal institutions, and disseminating information about government operations.
- Spain now fully meets or exceeds the FTC’s standards in many areas, though certain aspects require further progress.

### Key remaining issues and recommended improvements
- Publication of timely information on subnational fiscal accounts:
  - The provisional quarterly information on fiscal outturns on a national account basis, already compiled by the General Controller and Accounting Directorate (IGAE), should be regularly published.
- Transparency of boundaries and interactions between general government and public enterprises:
  - The criteria used to delineate boundaries between general government and public enterprises, the nature of transfers between them, and the quasi-fiscal activities (QFAs) carried out by some nonfinancial public enterprises should be more transparently explained in individual cases.
- Private-public partnerships (PPPs) and contingent liabilities:
  - Medium- to long-term fiscal costs and risks associated with various forms of private-public partnerships at all levels of government should be systematically quantified, transparently disclosed in budgetary documentation, and taken into account in fiscal scenarios and long-term projections.
- Reconciliation between budget and national accounts:
  - A detailed reconciliation of data on general government operations on a budget basis with those on a national accounts basis should be regularly published.
  - The inclusion of such a reconciliation of the national accounts and budgetary presentations for central administration accounts in the 2005 budget documents is noted as a welcome step.
- Transparency of budget projections and scrutiny:
  - Methodologies and assumptions underlying budget projections should be explained in detail in the budget documents, and independent scrutiny should be encouraged.
- Medium-term budgeting and performance orientation:
  - As called for by the recent General Budget Law, a detailed medium-term budget framework (MTBF) should be developed, along with improved indicators of results of budgetary programs, needed for the progressive introduction of performance budgeting in Spain.
  - This would facilitate a progressive increase in the focus of internal controls on the cost-effectiveness of government spending.
- External audit timeliness:
  - Efforts should be made to accelerate external audits by the Court of Accounts, with a view to enhancing their effectiveness.

### Public sector structure and classification issues
- Public sector structure:
  - Three levels of government: the central government, the regional governments (Comunidades Autónomas, CCAA), and the local governments (Ayuntamientos or Municípios, Diputaciones Provinciales, Cabildos, and Consejos Insulares).
  - The central government includes: the state or central administration (Administración General del Estado), the social security funds, autonomous administrative bodies, public funds without legal status (sin personalidad jurídica), consortia between public administrations, and any other public entity that redistributes income, does not provide goods and services at market conditions, and is mainly financed with transfers from the central administration.
  - The public enterprise sector includes: entidades públicas empresariales, sociedades mercantiles, and public foundations.
  - The central government and its public enterprises together form the state public sector (Sector Público Estatal).
- National accounts classification:
  - The division between general government and public enterprises in the national accounts is in line with the 1995 European System of Accounts (ESA-95).
  - General government, on a national accounts basis, includes all public units that carry out administrative functions of the general government and public entities that do not produce marketable goods, or for which such sales do not cover 50 percent of operating costs.
  - Some entities classified as public enterprises in Spain’s budgetary accounting are included in general government in the national accounts.
  - Following EUROSTAT criteria, capital injections to public entities outside general government can only be classified as the purchase of a financial asset if such investments are expected to yield a positive rate of return.

### Role of public enterprises and related fiscal implications
- Shift of infrastructure provision:
  - Since the mid-1990s, infrastructure at all levels of government has increasingly been built and managed by public enterprises (either entidades públicas empresariales or sociedades mercantiles).
  - Many of these public enterprises are engaged in long-term infrastructure projects expected to yield a positive rate of return.
  - Investments of these enterprises, at the state level, amounted to 1.4 percent of GDP in 2003.
- Classification uncertainty:
  - Because some enterprises are not yet generating income from leasing infrastructure or other operating income, judgments on inclusion or exclusion from general government rely on expectations of future revenues and costs, creating uncertainty.
  - EUROSTAT has decided the status of these enterprises on a case-by-case basis, sometimes resulting in reclassification (example: MINTRA).
- Government holdings and SEPI trends:
  - SEPI’s contribution to GDP fell from 6.9 percent in 1983 to 0.1 percent in 2003.
  - SEPI’s share in stock market capitalization fell from 10.9 percent in 1996 to 0.4 percent in 2002.
  - Most SEPI stakes are majority holdings in industrial state-owned or controlled enterprises; SEPI maintains minority stakes in strategic sectors.
  - SEPI has financial autonomy and is self-sufficient; in line with EU directives on state aid, neither SEPI nor its affiliate companies receive financial support from the state budget, except HUNOSA (Hulleras del Norte Sociedad Anónima).

### Territorial fiscal distribution (2004)
- In 2004, following the full devolution of health care expenditure:
  - The central government is estimated to have accounted for less than 30 percent of general government expenditure (excluding social security).
  - Autonomous communities accounted for slightly over 50 percent of general government expenditure (excluding social security).
  - Local governments accounted for the remaining 20 percent.
- Context:
  - At present, there are 17 CCAA and 8,100 municipalities, 80 percent of which have a population below 20,000 inhabitants.

*Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY of IMF assessment of fiscal transparency practices in Spain*

### 6.  Some public nonfinancial corporations carry out quasi-fiscal activities (QFAs).

### 6.  Some public nonfinancial corporations carry out quasi-fiscal activities (QFAs)

### QFAs undertaken by public nonfinancial corporations
- Public and private entities in some sectors are required by the government to provide services at below-cost prices; the fiscal burden has been largely captured by explicit subsidies in the state budget to public enterprises with social or public interest objectives (the railways, postal services, and coal mines).
- Radio Televisión Española (RTVE):
  - Subsidies from the state until recently had not fully covered the costs of providing universal TV and radio services with minimum advertising revenue, creating a “quasi-fiscal deficit” reflected in RTVE’s operating balance and financed with debt.
  - RTVE’s operating losses were described in an annex to the budget.
  - EUROSTAT ruled that RTVE must be classified as part of the general government for national accounts consolidation in the context of the excessive deficit procedure.
  - RTVE’s 2005 deficit: about 0.1 percent of GDP.
  - RTVE’s stock of debt: around 1 percent of GDP.
- Tax benefits and exemptions generating QFAs:
  - Correos y Telégrafos receives exemptions from the VAT and corporate income tax on operations related to the provision of the universal postal services.
  - Operations related to restructuring processes carried out by the holding company SEPI of public enterprises are exempt from some taxes.
- State Companies for Water Works (Sociedades Estatales de Aguas) engage in investment projects where charges for services are not expected to recover costs.
- The 2005 budget documentation (the yellow book) contained a summary exposition of selected public enterprises’ possible future impact on the state budget.

### QFAs in regulated industries
- Electricity sector:
  - Enterprises are required to provide electricity to the islands at below-cost prices.
  - Enterprises are encouraged to purchase domestic coal at above-market prices, with compensation explicitly indicated in the determination of its regulated price.
- Telecommunications:
  - Telefónica is obliged to provide universal service, reduced rates for pensioners, and provide phone booths in all municipalities.
  - Note: “The dominant position of Telefónica in the provision of this universal service may more than compensate for its costs in fulfilling this obligation.”
- Enterprises covered in related disclosures included RTVE, GIF (renamed ADIF since January 2005), the State Waterworks Companies, AENA, two mining companies (HUNOSA and Minas de Almadén y Arrayanes, MAYASA), and the shipbuilding company IZAR.

### Profit transfers, performance contracts, and taxation of public enterprises
- Profit transfers from state-owned enterprises to the budget, as well as wage-setting and hiring, are determined by the executive branch.
- Profit remittances are decided by the cabinet of ministers on a case-by-case basis.
- Public enterprises usually must meet minimum performance requirements (rate of return, service provision, etc.) spelled out in performance contracts.
- With the exception of Correos y Telégrafos, public enterprises are subject to the same tax and regulatory regime as private enterprises.

### Privatization framework and procedures
- Legal framework and institutions:
  - Modernization of the public enterprise sector: Cabinet Agreement of May 1996 and Law 33/2003 on the Assets of the Public Administrations.
  - SEPI acts as the government’s executing agency for privatization.
  - SEPI hires external consultants through competitive bidding to prepare proposals and advise on techniques and procedures.
  - The Consulting Council for Privatization (Consejo Consultivo de Privatizaciones, www.ccp.es) provides a nonbinding report on transparency, competitive conditions, and efficiency.
  - SEPI must seek assessment from the Spanish antitrust authority (Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia) and the European Union (EU) on competition effects.
  - The council of ministers chooses the sale method and decides on the final agreement for each operation.
  - Within a three-month period after completion of a privatization operation, the General Controller and Accounting Directorate (IGAE) must conduct an audit.
- Conditional post-privatization requirements:
  - In certain sectors, the government can require privatized enterprises to seek government authorization for certain operations and to follow an investment and employment plan.

### Regulation of the nonfinancial private sector and regulatory agencies
- Government regulation is fully consistent with EU legislation.
- The antitrust authority, the Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia, is an autonomous body under the authority of the ministry of economy and finance (MOEF).
- Investigations of potentially anticompetitive behavior are undertaken by the Servicio de Defensa de la Competencia, an administrative body of the MOEF.
- CCAA may establish competition authorities for their territory but must abide by EU and national legislation.
- Specialized regulatory agencies have been established for former government monopolies (telecommunications and energy), led by boards appointed by the government for six-year periods.
- The board of the Commission for Capital Markets consists of five members: the head of the treasury, the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Spain (BOS), and three members appointed by the government that serve a four-year term.
- Appeal and consultation processes, independence to establish tariffs, and authority to issue fines are clearly established by law.

### Central bank, public financial corporations, and QFAs
- The Bank of Spain (BOS) is independent and does not carry out QFAs.
- Public financial corporations are small and carry out only limited QFAs (e.g., through the Instituto Nacional de Crédito).
- Spain is a member of the European Monetary Union; the BOS is part of the European System of Central Banks, whose main objective is to maintain price stability within the euro area.
- BOS roles and fees:
  - BOS retains its role as lender of last resort for Spanish banks and banker for the government.
  - Government deposits with the BOS are not remunerated.
  - Services provided by the BOS to the government are not remunerated, excluding a fee that the treasury pays to the BOS for public debt auctions.
  - As most public debt operations are now carried out by a clearing house (IBERCLEAR), the treasury is negotiating with the BOS a reduction of these fees.

### Constitutional and parliamentary fiscal roles and budgetary procedures
- Constitutional allocation of powers:
  - Article 97: government exercises the executive function and regulatory power.
  - Article 117: justice is administered by the judicial power; judges are independent and irremovable.
  - Articles 66 and 117: parliament exercises the legislative power and shall approve and control the budget of the government, and authorize it to contract public debt or obtain loans.
  - Article 134: government prepares the state budget and must present it to parliament at least three months before the expiration of the previous year.
  - State budget shall be annual and include the totality of expenditure and revenues of the state sector (Sector Público Estatal), including the tax expenditures that affect state taxes.
  - Parliament shall examine, amend, and approve the budget before January 1; any amendment increasing expenditures or decreasing revenues requires the agreement of the government.
  - If the budget is not approved before December 31, the previous fiscal year’s budget is automatically extended until the approval of the new one.
  - Once approved, the government may present bills increasing or reducing revenues corresponding to the same budget year.
- Parliamentary budgetary procedures and constraints:
  - Budget discussion and approval procedures take the form of a two-stage process: first vote on total revenue and budget expenditure, then vote on specific appropriations.
  - Any amendment that increases expenditures in one budgetary line-item (concepto) must include a proposed reduction of the same amount in another line-item of the same budgetary subchapter (sección).
  - Fast-track approval of expenditures is expressly prohibited.
  - Any draft law or amendment that involves increased expenditures or decreased revenues requires the agreement of the government.
  - Obligation to send to parliament, on a quarterly basis, information on the execution of the Contingency Fund.

### Expenditure responsibilities across levels of government
- Constitutional delineation:
  - Article 149: state has full exclusive responsibility in areas including justice, defense, foreign affairs, the monetary system, constitutional rights, national infrastructure, academic degrees, meteorological services, mining and energy, health service standards, arms and explosives, and control of air and marine spaces.
  - Article 148: CCAA may assume regulatory and executive responsibilities not included within the state’s exclusive area, including urban regulation, housing, regional infrastructure, inland water fishing, health, social assistance, environment, culture, and tourism within limits of state legislation.
  - Article 149 clarifies: (i) any matter not defined as reserved to the state belongs to the CCAA as in their Statutes of Autonomy; (ii) matters not envisaged by the Statutes belong to the state; (iii) state legislation is supplementary to CCAA laws and prevails in conflicts.
- Resolution of conflicts over devolution of expenditures has generally occurred bilaterally or via the Constitutional Court over 24 years since the Constitution’s enactment.
- Local governments: law establishes list of basic expenditure responsibilities that all local governments must implement, including public lighting, cemeteries, drinking water supply, sewer, waste management, paved roads, urban planning, and building control.
  - Municipal mandates vary by population thresholds: over 5,000; over 20,000; over 50,000 (specific service obligations delineated).

### Intergovernmental financial arrangements and CCAA fiscal rules
- Legal framework:
  - 1978 Spanish Constitution and Organic Law 7/2001 on the Financing of the Regional Governments (Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas, LOFCA).
- Regimes:
  - Two CCAA (the Basque Country and Navarre) have almost full fiscal autonomy (régimen foral); the other 15 CCAA have more limited fiscal autonomy (régimen común).
- CCAA financing and borrowing:
  - CCAA have direct access to financial markets, subject to several restrictions.
  - CCAA (and municipal) borrowing is not guaranteed by the central government.
  - Law does not explicitly prohibit the state from bailing out subnational governments in case of servicing difficulties.
  - CCAA long-term debt must be used for capital expenditure.
  - Debt burden (interest payments plus long-term debt redemption) must not exceed 25 percent of current revenue.
  - Issuance of foreign currency-denominated debt must be authorized by the state; authorization is conditional on CCAA compliance with the Budgetary Stability Laws (BSLs).
  - Laws do not clearly establish who has authority to verify CCAA compliance with borrowing constraints; until September 2004 no information was published on such compliance; summary data on fiscal balance outcomes for 2003 was published in September 2004.
- Fiscal discipline and coordination:
  - CCAA must formulate and execute their budget in line with the “balanced budget or surplus” rule enshrined in the Budgetary Stability Laws (BSLs).
  - The Fiscal and Financial Policy Council (Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera, FFPC), co-chaired by the ministers of economy and finance and public administration and composed of regional governments’ representatives, coordinates CCAA fiscal policy with the central government and negotiates financial arrangements with régimen común CCAA.
  - Legally, the FFPC is an advisory body; in practice it has become decision-making on all aspects of CCAA financing. The combined vote weight of regional Finance Councilors (17 CCAA) equals that of the ministry of finance and ministry of public administration (combined).
- Recent arrangements and transparency issues:
  - In 2001 the central government and the régimen común CCAA negotiated a new financial arrangement starting in 2002 encompassing all devolved expenditure responsibilities and granting CCAA tax powers, including an equalization fund.
  - The arrangement reduced dependence on discretionary transfers by granting CCAA a large share of national tax revenues.
  - The arrangements include a sufficiency fund, Asignaciones de Nivelación, and an interterritorial compensation fund equal to 30 percent of state investment expenditures, allocated to infrastructure investment and maintenance; eligibility and distribution criteria are legally specified.
  - The government committed to revisit health care financing in the course of 2005.
  - Details on negotiations have not always been fully disclosed; discrepancies existed between FFPC agreements published in the official gazette and final laws approved by congress, involving total devolved resources and distribution criteria.
- Fiscal outcomes and constraints:
  - In the first year of operation (2003) of the new arrangements, 11 of 17 regions had budget deficits, albeit in many cases quite small.
  - CCAA long-term debt and borrowing constraints: legal restrictions and conditional state authorization for foreign-currency issuance.

*Source: _cr0558 - 6.  Some public nonfinancial corporations carry out quasi-fiscal activities (QFAs).*

### 17. The financial arrangement between the state and local governments are clearly

### 17. The financial arrangement between the state and local governments are clearly established by law.

### Municipal financing modalities and borrowing rules
- Recent municipal arrangements (not applying to municipalities in the Basque Country and Navarre) establish several financing modalities according to municipality or province size and economic structure.
- Large local governments (more than 75,000 inhabitants):
  - Financed by a share of state tax revenues collected in their jurisdictions and complementary transfers funded with state resources.
  - Large municipalities receive 1.6875 percent of the personal income tax, 1.7897 percent of the VAT, and 2.0454 percent of excises collected in their jurisdictions. For provinces, the respective percentages are 0.9936, 1.0538, and 1.2044.
  - Complementary transfers are indexed each year to the state revenues that are not shared with the CCAA.
- Small municipalities:
  - Financed exclusively with transfers from the state, based on needs-based criteria.
- Municipalities with significant tourist business and population above 20,000 inhabitants:
  - Obtain additional financing through participation in excises collected in their jurisdictions.
- Financing for municipal infrastructure:
  - Provided from capital gains—often paid in the form of land transfers—provided by private constructors benefiting from changes in zoning status.
  - By law, municipalities are entitled to receive up to 15 percent of the capital gains generated by zoning operations; these resources must be earmarked for capital expenditures.
  - In some cases private investors provide land rather than cash; such transfers of land are not recorded as revenue in municipal fiscal accounts.
- Borrowing constraints:
  - Municipal long-term loans must be earmarked for capital expenditure (no sanctions specified for noncompliance).
  - Municipalities require state authorization, conditional on compliance with the BSLs, for issuance of debt and/or contracting loans with nonresident financial institutions.
  - Debt is not allowed to exceed 110 percent of current revenues.

### Legal and administrative framework for fiscal management
- Fiscal management is defined by a clear legal and administrative framework applicable to central and subnational governments.
- The CCAA have used this framework as a model to enact their own budget legislation.
- Legal framework components:
  - Framework legislation including the 47/2003 General Budget Law (GBL) and the BSLs, annual budget laws, and annual budget formulation decrees.
  - The GBL was reformed in 2003, with some articles implemented in the context of the 2004 draft budget.
- Extrabudgetary funds and consolidation:
  - State budget currently captures only capital injections to extrabudgetary funds.
  - With the full adoption of the GBL in 2005, all extrabudgetary funds will be fully consolidated into the budget.
  - All resources from the European Structural Funds (ESFs) are included in the budget, along with the expenditure financed by them.
  - All fees and charges of autonomous administrative bodies are fully integrated into the budget and shown in gross terms.

### Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and concessions
- Legal framework:
  - New law on concessions (13/2003) defines concession characteristics, extends use to all kinds of infrastructure and activities, requires financial viability reports with minimum and maximum returns, and allows revision of contract terms when returns fall outside the specified range.
- Key PPP features and practices:
  - PPPs used since the 1970s at central level; increased use in recent years by CCAA and municipalities.
  - Most popular forms: regular concessions, “shadow toll” concessions, and “low-toll” concessions.
  - Investment equaling 6 percent of GDP (at current prices and 2003 GDP) has been executed through PPPs since the mid-1990s (incomplete data hamper full assessment).
  - Instruments to share risk include the “préstamo participativo” (subsidized loan with revenue-sharing provisions).
  - Shadow tolls used more frequently by regional governments (Madrid, Cataluña, Navarra, Castilla-La Mancha, and Murcia).
  - PPPs in the form of management contracts used by local governments for water, electricity, and street-cleaning services.
- Fiscal risks and monitoring:
  - PPP contracts at the state level have limited fiscal risks.
  - The scope of PPPs in CCAA and local governments and their fiscal risks have not been systematically monitored.
  - Absence of a comprehensive registry of long-term PPP commitments hampers assessment of regional fiscal risks.
- Accounting and classification:
  - Investments related to PPPs at the state level are always registered as private investment in Spain’s budgetary accounting.
  - EUROSTAT has recently ruled that PPPs in which the private operator receives most revenues from the public administration must be classified as private investment if the private operator bears most construction risk and most of either performance or demand risks.
  - Spain’s submission of fiscal data on a national accounts basis is expected to adjust to EUROSTAT’s recent ruling.

### Taxation, tax administration, and compliance
- Legal base and allocation:
  - Article 133 of the Constitution: original power to establish taxes by law belongs exclusively to the state.
  - Municipalities enjoy limited powers to modify local taxes, which must be approved by law.
  - CCAA have limited tax authority on assets and economic activities not taxed by the state.
  - By law, CCAA must compensate municipalities for any regional tax levied on assets and activities already taxed by municipalities; the state must compensate municipalities for any state tax exemption on municipal taxes.
  - Any tax exemption affecting state taxes must be established by virtue of law.
  - Article 134 of the Constitution: the state budget cannot create new taxes; tax changes underlying budgetary revenue projections must be made through another law.
- General Tax Code:
  - The pre-constitutional General Tax Code (GTC) of 1963 (Law 230) was replaced on July 1, 2004, by the revised 2003 General Tax Code (58/2003).
  - Main changes: adaptation of tax administration to new technologies, reinforcement of taxpayers’ rights, introduction of new mechanisms for reducing litigation.
- Tax administration and taxpayer assistance:
  - State Agency for Tax Administration (Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria, AEAT) publishes annually updated booklets and provides assistance via website, special phone lines, prearranged meetings in customer service offices, personal correspondence, and free software for self-assessment.
  - Taxpayers’ inquiries must be answered within a six-month period; responses of general interest are published on AEAT’s website.
  - CCAA and municipalities have their own units for administering their taxes; cooperation occurs via bilateral agreements and councils/committees.
- AEAT activity statistics (2003):
  - AEAT published 19,885,000 booklets.
  - AEAT sent 32,616,773 pieces of personal correspondence.
  - AEAT answered 7,212,250 phone calls.

### Rights of taxpayers and dispute resolution
- The new 2003 GTC (58/2003) describes taxpayers’ rights comprehensively and is observed in practice.
- Rights and procedures:
  - Right to obtain relevant information and receive correct and effective assistance from tax officials, with confidentiality guarantees.
  - Right to appeal tax administration decisions through a three-stage complaint process:
    - Appeal to the MOEF and seek intermediation of the Council for the Defense of Taxpayers.
    - Appeal to the Tribunal Económico Administrativo (special administrative tax tribunal).
    - Final recourse to the legal system.
  - The new GTC makes advice provided through consultations binding for the tax agency and reduces taxpayers’ obligation to pay tax liabilities and sanctions before the appeal process has ended.

### Civil service ethics, recruitment, and oversight
- Civil service categories and legal framework:
  - Three types of civil servants: laborales, funcionarios, and eventuales (advisors).
  - No single code of conduct, but numerous laws and administrative norms (including Article 103 of the Constitution) regulate recruitment, conflicts of interest, and safeguards for political impartiality.
- Conflict of interest and asset rules:
  - Law 53/1984 on conflicts of interest forbids private activities in the same field as the post held and limits holdings of civil servants in public enterprises or private contractors to 10 percent of the firm.
  - Provisions for compulsory declaration of assets apply only to high-ranking officials.
  - Some categories (military, police, diplomats, health providers, teachers, employees of constitutional and regulatory bodies) have separate regimes.
  - High-ranking officials of financial market regulatory entities and immediate family must contract a financial intermediary to manage private portfolios.
- Oversight and enforcement:
  - Service Inspection Unit in each line ministry monitors observance of civil service conduct legislation.
  - Law 12/1995 requires the government to report biannually to parliament on observance of this legislation (report is not made public).
  - Most civil service positions (except eventuales) are filled by open competition based on merit.
  - Interministerial Executive Commission on Public Servant Remuneration authorizes public employment at central government level.
  - Superior Council for Public Functions is the forum for coordination of central and regional public employment policies (had not met in the last three years).
  - Special attorney, the Anticorruption Attorney (Fiscalía Anticorrupción), prosecutes corruption cases.

### Public availability of budget and fiscal information
- Coverage and accounting basis:
  - Budget documents comprehensively cover fiscal activities.
  - A consolidated budget for the central government is prepared and presented to the legislature encompassing state administration, social security, and autonomous institutions dependent on central government budget support; separate budgets for these groups are also provided.
  - Budgets of state-owned entities (entidades públicas empresariales and sociedades mercantiles) are also presented.
  - Central government accounts are prepared on a modified accrual basis (claims and obligations) with some exceptions; public enterprises’ accounts are recorded on an accrual basis.
- Documentation and timing:
  - An exhaustive set of budget documents is presented, comprising approximately 50 volumes, including a breakdown of spending by program.
  - This documentation structure is repeated at regional and municipal levels, sometimes with less detail.
  - The timetable for provision of state budget documents and availability of other fiscal data is summarized in the source (annual and periodic documents, monthly and quarterly reporting, EDP notifications, and parliamentary reporting).

*Source: _cr0558 - 17. The financial arrangement between the state and local governments are clearly*

### 27. Data on capital transfers, capital injections, and subsidies from the state to public

### 27. Data on capital transfers, capital injections, and subsidies from the state to public entities

### Coverage and presentation of capital transfers, capital injections, and subsidies
- Detailed budget documents fully capture capital transfers, capital injections, and subsidies by:
  - Presenting subsidies (Chapter IV), capital transfers (Chapter VII), and purchases of financial assets (Chapter VIII) by ministry and program, indicating the public entity that will receive the support.
- The economic and financial report that accompanies the draft budget (the 560-page Informe Económico y Financiero) provides less detailed data:
  - A disaggregation of capital injections by enterprise is not provided.

### Defense spending and related commitments
- Defense expenditures are comprehensively reported in the budget; detailed data on defense spending are included in the budget documents.
- Details regarding future spending commitments in defense are not included in the budget, despite future commitments being especially extensive:
  - Between 2005 and 2021, future spending commitments in this sector are estimated to increase roughly tenfold.
- Intelligence spending:
  - Is included in the state budget and is regulated by law 11/1995.
  - Only the ministries of interior, foreign affairs, and defense can be assigned reserve funds related to intelligence spending.
  - These funds are controlled by the Parliamentary Committee for Official Secrets.

### Reconciliation of Stability Program (SP) targets and budget targets
- Since enactment of the BSLs in 2001, the economic and financial report accompanying the budget has included a table with some reconciliation information between SP and budget targets.
- Starting with the 2005 budget:
  - Budget documentation includes a more detailed table and explanatory text reconciling the budget and national accounts (ESA-95) presentations of the state’s accounts.
  - The table is included in the yellow book.
  - The most significant adjustments pertain to revenues and interest payments.
- Limitations of the reconciliation table:
  - It only refers to the central administration (state) and its autonomous administrative organisms (i.e., social security is not included).
  - It does not include an historical series.

### Boundaries of general government and classification issues
- Frequent and insufficiently explained changes in the boundaries of general government have reduced the clarity of budgetary data.
- A working group comprising Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), IGAE, and the BOS is charged with determining the proper classification of public entities.
- The working group:
  - Does not disseminate reports on its decisions regarding the proper classification of enterprises.
  - Changes in classification of enterprises are not disclosed to the public (except, most recently, in the 2005 budget).
- Frequent changes in classification have hampered comparisons of budget figures over time.

### Reporting of fiscal outturns and timeliness
- State administration:
  - Monthly data on fiscal outturns are published on a cash and national accounts basis on the MOEF website with a three-week lag.
  - Information is made public by the vice-minister of finance in his monthly meeting with the press.
  - AEAT publishes a monthly report of tax collection distributed to about 250 users in the third week following the reported month.
  - For social security, monthly data are also available on the web with approximately the same lag.
  - In-year data on administrative autonomous bodies or state public enterprises are not available on a timely basis.
  - Annual publications with rich detail on tax revenues exist, although some are produced with a lag of over one year.
  - IGAE’s Empresas Estatales: Informe Provisional provides detailed information on state enterprises’ performance, but with a lag of over a year.
- Subnational governments (CCAA):
  - Data on fiscal outturns for individual CCAA are not timely and of mixed quality.
  - Large quantity of information is available on some CCAA websites, but summary files are often not provided and data are dispersed.
  - Data for 2003 were not published until September 2004, and only in terms of aggregate outturn, despite more detailed data being compiled and reported to IGAE.
  - Provisional quarterly fiscal data compiled by IGAE have not been published due to quality concerns and need for prior agreement from CCAA.
- General government and enterprises (ESA-95 basis):
  - IGAE publishes comprehensive data (Cuentas de las Administraciones Públicas) with a two-year lag.
  - Less aggregated national accounts data are provided in Actuación Económica y Financiera de las Administraciones Públicas, with a lag of over one year.
  - The report on Cuentas de las Empresas Públicas has not been published for four years.
- Box 4 (subnational availability highlights):
  - Subnational budget documents published and detailed; some include public enterprises’ financial statements (e.g., Cataluña and Valencia).
  - Quarterly subnational debt data published in the Bank of Spain’s Statistical Bulletin; Cataluña publishes monthly debt data on the internet.
  - 2003 fiscal outcomes for individual subnational governments (national accounts basis) were made available in September 2004, in aggregate only.
  - Quarterly in-year outcomes are not made public but are submitted to IGAE.
  - Accord in July 2003 expects subnational governments to submit quarterly and annual information to IGAE and publish comprehensive lists of subnational public enterprises.

### Compliance with Fiscal Transparency Code (FTC) on historical and medium-term data
- Budget documents (red series) cover only the previous year outturn, the current year’s budget, and the proposed budget.
- Grey series provides data and analysis of projected execution of the current budget.
- Yellow series provides a memorandum on program performance covering the previous two years in physical indicators.
- Medium-term information is limited:
  - Forecast of three-year expenditure commitments under ongoing investment programs is in a green series volume.
- Summary documents in the yellow series focus only on the current and proposed budget.
- The FTC indicates best practice: dissemination of data on the outturns of the two preceding fiscal years, together with forecasts of the main budget aggregates for two years following the budget.

### Fiscal risks, contingencies, guarantees, PPPs, and related disclosure gaps
- Guarantees and credit operations:
  - GBL regulates granting of guarantees by the central government.
  - Annual budget law authorizes the total amount of guarantees to be provided during the budget year; in special circumstances, guarantees may be approved by the council of ministers.
  - A list of all guarantees provided during the budget year is published with the final accounts for the year.
  - Data on the stock of loan guarantees compiled by the treasury are not published.
    - The stock of these guarantees to public enterprises is modest: 0.9 percent of GDP as of end-2003.
  - Final account documents in some CCAA provide information on stock of debt guarantees (e.g., Asturias, Castilla y Leon, Valencia). Cataluña will also provide this information from 2004 onward.
- Judicial contingencies and pensions:
  - Information on fiscal risks related to pending judicial decisions is not disclosed.
  - Summary projections for pension expenditures over the longer term are included in the SP documents, but not in the budget.
- Public-private partnerships (PPPs):
  - A comprehensive registry of state PPP contracts is maintained by Ministerio de Fomento for toll road concessions, but not for other PPPs.
  - Fiscal risks for PPPs at the state level are limited but not disclosed.
  - There is no registry of PPPs undertaken by CCAA and local governments, and potential fiscal risks of these contracts are not disclosed in subnational budget documents.
  - Some ex-post analysis of PPPs is undertaken: Ministerio de Fomento audits compliance with state toll road concession contracts.

### Tax expenditures and quasi-fiscal activities (QFAs)
- Tax expenditures:
  - Are rigorously estimated, included in budget documentation, and approved by law.
  - Article 134 of the Constitution requires the state budget to include the amount of tax expenditures that affect the state’s taxes.
  - Law 41/1994 established the obligation to include a report explaining estimated tax benefits in state budget documentation; the law does not specify the content of the report.
  - The report includes methodology and an economic and functional classification of tax benefits.
  - No ex post assessment of actual tax benefits is undertaken.
  - Starting with the 2004 budget, estimated tax benefits included in state budget documents include only effects on the state’s tax revenues (effects on subnational tax revenue through co-participation are excluded).
  - Some CCAA (e.g., Madrid) include an estimation of total tax benefits (including own-region taxes and the region’s share in state taxes) in regional documentation.
- Quasi-fiscal activities (QFAs):
  - No information is provided in the budget on the costs of QFAs.
  - The cost of QFAs not already captured by explicit subsidies is relatively small, given the limited size of the public enterprise sector.
  - Information on costs of QFAs by regulated private industries is provided on regulatory bodies’ websites.
    - Example: Cost of Telefonica’s below-market prices in 2004 projected at € 110 million and disclosed on the National Commission for the Telecommunication Market’s website.
    - Costs to electricity enterprises of their QFAs are reflected in consumers’ electricity bills (National Commission for Energy website).

### Public debt, financial assets, and privatization/turnkey accounting treatments
- Public debt disclosure:
  - BOS publishes quarterly data on debt of the central administration, the social security fund, the CCAA, and local governments in its statistical bulletin.
  - Data for CCAA are provided for both individual communities and the group as a whole, with disaggregation of short- and long-term debt.
  - Consolidated general government debt is provided quarterly, including reconciliation of annual changes in the stock of general government debt with net borrowing on an ESA-95 basis.
  - Public enterprise debt data are reported quarterly for central government and CCAA; BOS will begin publishing data on public enterprise debt of individual CCAA and some largest local governments in the near future.
- Gross and net government financial assets:
  - Also published by BOS in the Statistical Bulletin for the units mentioned above.
- Treatment of privatization proceeds (Box 5):
  - Direct privatizations:
    - Under Spain’s budgetary accounting: book value of the asset is registered as sale of a financial asset (Chapter VIII) and has no effect on the budget deficit; any price above book value is registered as a dividend (Chapter V), increasing nontax revenue and reducing the deficit.
    - Under ESA-95: entire value of privatization proceeds is registered as sale of a financial asset.
  - Indirect privatizations via SEPI:
    - If SEPI transfers proceeds to the state, Spain’s budgetary accounting records proceeds (including capital gains above book value) as dividends (Chapter V); taxes paid by SEPI on capital gains are recorded as tax receipts.
    - Under ESA-95: proceeds from sale and tax receipts owing to related capital gains are treated as part of privatization proceeds and do not reduce the deficit.
    - If SEPI keeps privatization receipts, Spain’s budgetary accounting shows no effect on fiscal balance, but under ESA-95 non-transferred privatization receipts from SEPI to the state are recorded as a subsidy to SEPI, increasing the fiscal deficit.
- Turnkey projects:
  - Spain’s budgetary accounting registers spending on turnkey projects only when payments are made, allowing infrastructure spending to be undertaken without registering it until a later date.
  - Commitments to pay for turnkey projects are indicated in green series annex on future investment spending commitments, covering the three years following the budget year.
  - Under ESA-95, expenditure is registered in the year the product is delivered or corresponding to level of work completed.
  - This form of financing has become less prominent at the state level, perhaps owing to a recent EUROSTAT ruling.

### International commitments and timetable compliance
- Spain subscribes to the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) and meets the timetable for providing data on state administration and general government operations.
  - Monthly data are provided on state revenue and expenditures (except debt data, which are quarterly), and general government operations on an annual basis.
- Spain adheres to commitments to provide annual general government fiscal data to the European Union in the context of the excess deficit exercise and SP updates.
- Legal and institutional reporting requirements:
  - Article 136 of Law 47/2003 establishes that, starting in 2005, IGAE must report on execution of the budget on a monthly basis in the BOE, without specific timeliness requirements.
  - Commitments to timely reporting on subnational government data on a quarterly and annual basis were made as part of the July 2003 accord within the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council; implementation is still underway.

*Source: _cr0558 - 27. Data on capital transfers, capital injections, and subsidies from the state to public entities*

### 41. The annual budget process is open, and budget presentation is partly consistent

### 41. The annual budget process is open, and budget presentation is partly consistent

### Budget preparation process (Box 6)
- Fiscal year: set on a calendar-year basis by the Constitution.
- Main indicative due dates and activities:
  - December 11–12: Meeting with the budgetary offices of the ministries to coordinate the budget process
  - January 2: Order of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF) for the preparation of the Medium-Term Budget Scenario (MTBS)
  - January 7: Decision of the General Directorate for the Budget (DGB) establishing the expenditure policies to be incorporated into the MTBS
  - January 20: Preparation of the draft agreement setting the budgetary stability targets for the following three years
  - January 27: Submission of the draft agreement to the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council (FFPC) and the National Committee of Local Administrations (in preparation of the FFPC meeting one month later)
  - January 28: Letter of the minister of economy and finance to the secretary of the FFPC proposing the budgetary stability targets for the CCAA
  - February 15: Deadline for the spending units to send the proposed MTBS to the MOEF
  - March 6: Plenary session of FFPC to prepare the report on the draft agreement on budget targets
  - March 14: Approval by the Council of Ministers (COM) of the draft agreement setting the budgetary stability targets, and the limit on nonfinancial expenditure of the state for the next budget year. The agreement and the expenditure limit are sent to parliament
  - March 27–April 8: Approval by the parliament (first by congress and then by the senate) of the agreement and the expenditure limit
  - April 10: Approval by the FFPC of the deficit target for the CCAA
  - March–April: Preparation by the DGB of the MTBS
  - April 24: Order of the MOEF providing guidelines for the preparation of next year’s budget
  - April 29: Meeting of the Expenditure Policies Committee
  - May–June: Meetings of the Program Review Committees
  - June: Approval by the COM of the MTBS
  - July 25: First review by the COM of the draft budget
  - September 30: Deadline to send the draft budget to parliament

### Budget presentation and classifications
- Budget information is presented in gross terms.
- Revenues: presented in both administrative and economic classifications.
- Expenditures: presented in institutional, economic, program, and functional classifications.
- The economic classification is in line with international standards (ESA-95 referenced).
- Functional classification:
  - Not consistent with IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFS 2001); it is based on policy areas differing from the GFS functional specification.
  - CCAA functional classifications differ from the central government, complicating consolidation.
- Public enterprises:
  - Economic classification used for public enterprises is not the same as that used for the government; the functional classification is not applicable to them.
  - Budgets of the CCAA should be prepared following homogeneous criteria with the central government (LOFCA article 21), but in practice CCAA use economic classifications very similar to the central government while functional classifications differ more significantly.
- Consolidation: information on public enterprises is not consolidated with general government; therefore, the financial situation of the public sector as a whole is not documented.

### Macroeconomic and revenue forecasting, scrutiny, and sensitivity analysis
- Macroeconomic forecasts are prepared by the Directorate General for Economic Policy.
- Revenue forecasts are prepared by a Revenue Commission comprising representatives of the DGB and AEAT.
- BOS prepares macroeconomic projections but does not publish them nor share them with the Directorate General for Economic Policy.
- Technical underpinnings and assumptions of forecasts are not made public, making assessment of realism difficult.
- External scrutiny: macroeconomic forecasts and models are not made public and comments are not actively sought from outside government during budget preparation.
- Historical bias noted:
  - Real GDP growth has tended to be overestimated in recent years.
  - Inflation rate has tended to be underestimated; underestimation of inflation led to underbudgeting of social security pension expenditures, offset by underestimation of revenues from social security contributions, so outturn for the balance of the system has been broadly in line with budget projection.
- Sensitivity analysis:
  - A sensitivity analysis to changes in GDP and interest rates is included in the updates of the Stability Program (SP), but not in the annual budget.
  - The sensitivity of budget estimates to changes in economic variables is not assessed in the annual budget.
- Medium-term projections and publication:
  - Medium-term budget scenarios are not published, and their role in preparation of the annual budget is not clear.
  - In practice, a constant (trend) growth has been assumed for macro-fiscal variables after the first year of updates, with the assumption that the output gap is closed by the end of the projection period.
  - The rationale for selection of specific medium-term targets and criteria for distribution among the CCAA are not clearly explained; there is no requirement to publicize this distribution.
  - Fiscal sustainability analysis in SP updates is largely qualitative, though medium-term scenarios for the general government debt-to-GDP ratio are included.
  - Sensitivity analysis in the SP is limited to assessing impact of changes in GDP and interest rates.
- Frequency and placement of medium-term targets:
  - Medium-term fiscal policy targets are published twice a year, but they are not included in the budget documents.
  - Fiscal sustainability issues are discussed only in the update of the SP.
  - BSLs require three-year budgetary stability targets to be decided in the first quarter of every year and submitted to parliament for approval; 2005 annual budget extended deadline for final approval of stability targets to June (to be applied first time for 2006 budget).

### Fiscal rules, targets, and guarantees
- Main fiscal indicator: overall balance of the general government, defined according to ESA-95; fiscal targets in SP updates and budgetary stability targets approved by parliament are expressed in these terms.
- Parliament approves a spending limit for the state consistent with the budgetary stability target for the following year, in terms of budgetary accounting.
- Budgetary Stability Laws (BSLs):
  - Apply to all levels of government; budgetary stability defined as overall balance or surplus (in ESA-95 terms) at every year and each level of government; financial equilibrium for public enterprises (not specifically defined).
  - Medium-term budget horizon required; annual budgets framed within rolling multi-year scenarios consistent with SP updates submitted to EU.
  - Transparency principle: entities must present information needed to verify compliance with stability principle.
  - Efficiency principle: paves way for progressive introduction of performance budgeting.
  - BSLs envisage:
    - Presentation by government to parliament, by the end of April each year, of a rolling three-year fiscal framework agreed with the FFPC and consistent with balance or surplus at each level of government.
    - Simultaneous proposal of an overall expenditure ceiling for the next state budget consistent with the framework and revenue forecast.
    - Negotiation within FFPC of allocation of overall regional fiscal target among individual CCAA; any region arguing for a deficit must present detailed justification and a credible three-year adjustment program.
  - Verification: IGAE tasked to verify compliance and inform government and FFPC by September 1 of the following year; compliance assessed according to ESA-95 standards.
  - Sanctions: BSLs do not envisage specific sanctions for noncompliance except if a deficit of over 3 percent of GDP is recorded for general government as a whole, triggering EU sanctions; noncomplying jurisdictions would be required to contribute to fines in proportion to their contribution to the excessive deficit.
  - Debt issuance: central government should consider a jurisdiction’s compliance with budgetary stability when authorizing bonds or non-euro denominated debt.
  - Use of surpluses: central government surpluses should be used to reduce public debt; Social Security System surpluses should be accumulated in reserve fund to pre-finance projected long-term deficits; laws silent on regional/local surpluses.
  - Contingency line item: BSLs introduce a general contingency line item in the budget equivalent to 2 percent of the annual spending ceiling to meet unforeseen nondiscretionary spending during execution; any increase in budgeted appropriation can only be funded by drawing on this reserve or by reducing other appropriations (within specific limits).
- Guarantees and contingent liabilities:
  - GBL regulates granting of guarantees for credit operations; guarantees generally approved by law.
  - Annual budget law authorizes total amount of guarantees to be provided during the budget year; in special circumstances guarantees may be approved by Council of Ministers.
  - Treasury maintains a register of all loan guarantees approved, cancelled, or honored.
  - A list of all guarantees provided during the budget year is published together with the final accounts for the year.
  - There is little information on other contingent liabilities. (2005 budget provides a qualitative assessment of potential future risks arising from certain public enterprises.)

### Budget execution, cash management, internal control, and audit
- Responsibilities:
  - Execution: responsibility of spending entities, under supervision of MOEF.
  - DGB: responsible for budget modifications.
  - Directorate General for the Treasury: responsible for cash and debt management.
  - IGAE: unit in charge of internal control, audit, accounting, and reporting.
- Coordination and cash management:
  - No program assigning quarterly ceilings to spending units to control flow of payments consistent with revenue forecasts and to minimize short-term borrowing costs.
  - Treasury prepares a cash plan to guide payments, but it is disconnected from commitments and obligations flow.
  - Treasury single account in the BOS covers the state general administration; treasury account balances consolidated at end of each day and invested overnight.
  - Autonomous bodies currently have their own treasuries but are scheduled to be integrated into the single account soon.
  - Social security fund expected to remain outside the treasury single account.
- Internal control and internal audit:
  - Focus mainly on legal and financial compliance.
  - IGAE undertakes functions related to internal control and internal audit for central government and its enterprises; IGAE is integrated within the executive branch through the MOEF and is independent from controlled entities.
  - Creation of entity-specific internal control and audit bodies is not precluded, in accordance with their legislation.
  - Table 2 (organization and reporting responsibilities) indicates IGAE coverage and reporting lines: IGAE covers all entities of the state public sector for legal, financial, performance, budgetary, and investments control and inspects services of the MOEF (except AEAT); other inspection and internal audit arrangements specified for AEAT and ministries.

*Source: _cr0558 - 41. The annual budget process is open, and budget presentation is partly consistent*

### 54. The rules and regulations for internal control and audit operated by IGAE are

### _cr0558 - 54. The rules and regulations for internal control and audit operated by IGAE are

### Internal control and audit structure (IGAE and ministries)
- IGAE operates three kinds of internal control:
  - ex ante control of the legality of the different stages of expenditure, limited to significant transactions;
  - ex post control (so-called financial control) of legality, accounting regularity, and performance of all state public sector entities using audit procedures; and
  - ex post control of subsidies and public grants.
- In practice, audits focus on legality and financial compliance; performance audits are limited to a few spending programs where proper objectives and performance indicators are available.
- The conclusions and recommendations of the audit reports are not made available to the public.
- Internal control undertaken by the internal audit offices of individual ministries is not clearly specified; only the internal audit office of the MOEF is well regulated.

### Public procurement
- Procurement legal framework:
  - Legislative Royal-Decree 2/2002 on the Compiled Legislation on Contracts of the Public Administration must be observed by all public entities of the state and municipalities.
  - Regional laws must be consistent with the national legal framework.
  - General principles: publicity, transparency, and nondiscrimination.
- Procedures and publication:
  - Public entities may use open or closed tender; negotiated tenders are allowed under law-specified circumstances.
  - Large contracts are awarded by collegiate bodies (Juntas de Contratación, Mesas de Contratación).
  - Calls for bids (requirements, deadlines, award dates, awarded bidder) must be published in the BOE and, for contracts above a certain threshold, in the EU official gazette.
- Award criteria and systems:
  - Open tender: combination of economic and technical criteria.
  - Closed tender: awarded to the low-cost bidder.
- Centralized information and e-procurement:
  - The GDPS maintains a register of all contracts awarded by public entities at all levels of government and provides detailed procurement information on its website.
  - A catalogue of routinely purchased goods is available; an e-procurement system is being developed.

### Tax administration and AEAT
- Institutional setup:
  - Tax policy design: General Directorate of Taxes.
  - Tax administration: AEAT (autonomous body under MOEF authority).
- AEAT financing sources (exact shares):
  - state’s general revenues (85 percent);
  - a share on tariff collections (6 percent)—for collecting them on behalf of the EU;
  - a share of fines (4.5 percent) collected by the agency; and
  - fees (4.5 percent).
- Scope and governance:
  - AEAT manages, inspects, and collects all taxes except those collected by the foral CCAA, Basque Country and Navarre.
  - AEAT head is appointed by the minister of economy and finance.
  - AEAT officials enjoy technical independence over the interpretation of tax laws.

### Accounting system, reporting, and reconciliations
- Accounting framework:
  - Public accounting based on the 1994 National Public Accounting Plan (norms deviate from ESA-95).
  - Accounting records stages of expenditure: authorization, commitment, obligation, order of payment, and payment.
  - System allows monitoring of payables and arrears.
- Systems and coverage:
  - Integrated GFMIS covering the central government, capable of providing information in real time on budget execution and timely fiscal reports.
  - Social security has its own information system with a similar capacity.
- In-year reporting and legislature access:
  - Legislature receives timely in-year reports; a number of monthly reports are available to the legislature and the public.
  - Vice-minister of finance voluntarily reports quarterly to the budget committee of the lower house on budget execution.
  - AEAT reports quarterly to parliament on tax collections in the fourth week following the end of the quarter.
  - These reports are not required by law.
  - New GBL (starting January 2005) provides that IGAE will send to the budget committees of parliament, on a monthly basis, information on budget execution; the general controller for social security will send similar monthly information on the corresponding budget outturn.
- Reconciliations:
  - Budget execution reports are properly reconciled with budget appropriations.
  - Reconciliation between accounting reports and bank statements (BOS) is systematic.
  - Reconciliations of annual data above the line and below the line are carried out by IGAE (1994 General Public Accounting Plan) and by the BOS in terms of ESA-95; such reconciliations are published with varying degrees of delay.
- Accounting policy and disclosure:
  - Statements on accounting policy are not included in the budget and final accounts documents.
  - Budget transactions recorded on a modified accrual basis (claims and obligations); revenues recorded at accrual and collection stages.
  - 1994 Accounting Plan deviates significantly from ESA-95 accounting conventions (e.g., treatment of privatization proceeds and interest payments).
  - Full correspondence between budget classification and account classification; classifications largely homogeneous among levels of government though some differences in functional classification.
  - The accounting plan for local governments is approved by the MOEF.

### Final accounts, deadlines, and transparency
- Timeliness and legal deadlines:
  - Final accounts audited by the Court of Accounts are not available within twelve months of the end of the fiscal year, as called for by the FTC.
  - Public entities have a six-month deadline to send to IGAE their final accounts.
  - IGAE must, by law, send the State General Accounts (SGA) to the Court of Accounts before October 31.
  - The COA has six months to prepare the reports.
  - Law allows two to three months for the government to present allegations, and two additional months for internal processing and approval by the COA before the accounts are sent to parliament.
  - There is no deadline for the review of the SGA by parliament.
- Practice and delays:
  - Approval by parliament of the SGA usually takes more than two years.
  - The SGA for 2001 have not been approved yet by the parliament.
  - The last report on the autonomous and municipal public sectors corresponds to 2000.

### Performance objectives, program audits, and performance budgeting
- Budget presentation and program information:
  - In accordance with the GBL (Article 37), the annual budget presented to parliament is to be accompanied by descriptions of expenditure programs and their annual objectives.
  - Documents focus more on missions and qualitative descriptions than on specification of objectives in terms of outputs and/or outcomes.
  - Objectives for program activities in the budget year are compared with performance indicators for the previous two years.
- Performance auditing and monitoring:
  - Number of spending programs with well-defined objectives for appropriate performance audit is small: less than 20 programs a year are audited for results; the outcome of these audits is communicated to the COM and parliament.
  - Minister of economy and finance approves guidelines for reporting on achievement of objectives and the reporting forms.
  - Annual budget law contains a list of programs subject to special monitoring and financial control.
- Legal progress toward performance budgeting:
  - New GBL (Article 31) requires authorities to make progress towards performance budgeting:
    - annual state budget should be consistent with the MTBS;
    - should aim at fulfilling objectives of medium-term programs;
    - resources allocated should take into consideration the degree of fulfillment of program objectives in previous years.
  - These provisions have not yet been regulated by the executive.

### External audit institutions, scope, and parliamentary follow-up
- Court of Accounts (COA):
  - COA is independent of the executive; mandate covers all public sector activities per Constitution and relevant laws (Article 136.1; Organic Law 2/1982, of May 12, of the COA; Law 7/1988, of April 5, on the Operation of the COA).
  - Composition: 12 members elected by parliament (six by congress and six by the senate) with a qualified majority of three-fifths of the members, for a period of nine years.
  - COA has budgetary and organizational autonomy; members enjoy same independence and incompatibility rules as judiciary.
  - COA prepares audit reports on accounts of all components of the public sector and on contracts of the central public sector; utilizes reports prepared by IGAE and private audit firms; has jurisdiction on accounting responsibilities.
  - An attorney appointed by the general attorney participates in the collective decision-making body, with voice and vote (this somewhat weakens autonomy).
- Regional external controls and municipalities:
  - Nine CCAA have created their own external control entities (Órganos de Control Externo, OCEX) (these OCEX are usually referred to as Sindicaturas de Cuentas or Cámaras de Cuentas).
  - OCEX may audit municipalities; COA receives corresponding reports and includes them in its own reports.
  - Law provides OCEX should coordinate activities with COA to avoid duplication and differing auditing criteria.
  - Audits of municipalities are carried out with significant delays due to frequent noncompliance by municipalities with legal deadlines to present final accounts.
- Scope and capacity:
  - COA audits focus mainly on compliance with legislation and financial targets; performance auditing capacity constrained by low quality or absence of performance indicators.
  - For current COA functions, number and capacity of staff is appropriate.
- Parliamentary engagement and follow-up:
  - President of the COA presents finalized reports to parliament.
  - Standing committee (Joint Committee of Congress and the Senate for Relations with COA) examines COA reports; committee votes on resolutions presented by parliamentary groups; approved resolutions presented to chambers for final decision.
  - Compliance with recommendations approved by parliament is followed up by COA.
  - Reports are published in the BOE.
  - Deadlines for COA to send reports to parliament depend on report type; approval delays noted above.

### Statistics and INE
- INE responsibilities and status:
  - INE is an autonomous administrative body responsible for the national statistics system and utilizes fiscal information to prepare the national accounts.
  - Head is nominated by the minister of economy and finance and appointed by the council of ministers.
  - Law 12/1989 on public statistics (Article 30 and 35) provides INE shall act on the basis of “objective and scientific neutrality”.
  - INE prepares a multi-annual national statistics plan, delegates functions to other public entities, and establishes a calendar for release of statistics.
- Limitations and coordination:
  - IGAE has the delegated mandate of compiling general government revenue and expenditure (per GBL).
  - Issues on accounting and reporting pertaining to fiscal accounts are discussed in informal working group meetings including representatives of the three entities.
  - INE regularly receives information on quarterly outturn of the CCAA but does not have authority to publish it.
  - INE advisory bodies: Superior Council of Statistics (Consejo Superior de Estadística) and Territorial Council of Statistics (Consejos Territoriales de Estadística).

### IMF Staff commentary — Clarity of roles, decentralization, privatization, and reporting
- Delineation and classification:
  - Legal framework for scope and responsibilities of general government and subsectors is in principle clear and in line with ESA-95 criteria.
  - In practice, application in individual cases, often using projected future revenues and costs, has blurred boundaries between government and public enterprises and created uncertainties about classification of budgetary transfers; rationale for accounting treatment should be more consistently and transparently publicized.
- Intergovernmental fiscal relations:
  - Framework has evolved with increased decentralization and is generally clear; expenditure responsibilities relatively well defined; overlapping and duplication of functions do not appear significant; mechanisms exist for dispute resolution.
  - Revenue assignments, revenue sharing, and intergovernmental transfers based on a detailed, largely formula-driven legal framework; constraints on subnational borrowing clearly specified.
- Budgetary equilibrium and subnational reporting:
  - BSLs (promulgated in late 2001) established principle of budgetary equilibrium for regional, local, and central governments.
  - Information on subnational government budget execution is not adequate for full and timely control of BSL application.
  - Government considering revision of the BSLs — revisions should strengthen reporting and transparency requirements and better coordinate with other prior legislation (e.g., on borrowing limitations).
- Privatization and regulatory framework:
  - Central government’s role in productive activities substantially reduced via privatizations under clear legal framework.
  - Accounting of privatization receipts in the budget has deviated in some instances from ESA-95 criteria, requiring reclassifications that blur relation of budgetary statistics with national accounts.
  - Government’s retained powers in partially privatized enterprises (e.g., golden shares) are clearly delineated.
  - Regulatory framework for privatized utilities generally clear; regulatory authorities provided adequate independence by law.
  - Some QFAs by public or privatized enterprises are compensated through budget transfers; others are met through cross-subsidies (e.g., electricity sector). It would be desirable to show transparently in budget documents the cost of such activities and the extent of budget compensation.

*Source: _cr0558 - 54. The rules and regulations for internal control and audit operated by IGAE are*

### 76. The recent Law of Concessions (13/2003) has strengthened and clarified the legal

### _cr0558 - 76. The recent Law of Concessions (13/2003) has strengthened and clarified the legal

### Concessions and PPPs: legal framework and fiscal risk
- The Law of Concessions (13/2003) has strengthened and clarified the legal framework for concessions and other PPPs and broadened the scope for their application.
- These operations are not reflected in government budgets.
- Treatment in national fiscal accounts is expected to conform to the recent EUROSTAT ruling, which classifies them as private investments when the private sector bears most of the construction risk, and of either the performance or demand risks.
- Such treatments do not make clear the known or potential future budgetary costs of operations such as:
  - “shadow toll” arrangements;
  - minimum revenue guarantees by the government to the private concessionary;
  - subsidized borrowing (préstamos participativos).
- Current assessment:
  - Fiscal risks from PPPs in the state sector appear to be small at the present time.
  - This has not been disclosed to the public.
  - At the regional and local levels, the size and scope of any fiscal risks are unknown, given the paucity of information on these contracts.
- Recommended actions at both the state and subnational level:
  - concessions and PPP contracts continue to be fully disclosed, and their financial analysis (with appropriate sensitivity tests) by the relevant government agencies be duly publicized;
  - any known future costs associated with these contracts be disclosed in the budget documentation and taken into account in the medium-term fiscal scenarios; where there are no fiscal costs expected from these contracts, a statement in the budget indicating this would facilitate fiscal transparency;
  - assessments be made of the expected value of any guarantees and other contingent liabilities associated with these projects, and they be taken into account in the analysis of medium- to long-term fiscal sustainability;
  - an annual report on concessions and PPPs, including the analyses above, be prepared by the MOEF, in consultation with the relevant sectoral ministries, for inclusion in budget documentation. This should also be undertaken by individual CCAA (including for municipalities within the CCAA). The MOEF should also compile these data from both sources to provide a report to the public on the fiscal implications of PPPs at the level of general government.

### Taxation and tax administration
- The legal framework for taxation in Spain is transparent.
- The revenue costs of tax benefits in existence at the time of presentation of the budget are comprehensively and transparently disclosed in the budget.
- Tax administration progress and reforms:
  - Over the last decade, the tax administration has made substantial progress in the modernization of its systems and procedures, and in taxpayer services.
  - It is adapting its operations to the requirements of the new GTC (Ley General Tributaria, 58/2003) which came into effect on July 1, 2004, further strengthening taxpayer’s rights in tax collection and enforcement.
  - Recommendation: strengthen the legal basis for protection from political interference, including by establishing fixed-term mandates for its highest officials.

### Civil service ethics framework
- Although there is no unified code of conduct for civil servants, the legal framework contained in various laws defining ethical standards for civil servants is clear and comprehensive and applies throughout the national territory.

### Public availability of information
- Overall assessment: public availability of information on government operations in Spain could be improved in certain respects.
- Specific observations:
  - Coverage of government operations in budget documents is relatively comprehensive. The central government budget presents detailed information on projected operations of the state, its autonomous entities and enterprises, and social security funds. Similar information is presented in the budgets of regional and larger local governments. However, this information is quite dispersed and not always easily accessible to the general public. A consolidation of subnational government budgets is not compiled.
  - The central government budget includes comprehensive information on defense expenditures, tax expenditures, and transfers to public enterprises and regional and local authorities. In contrast, QFAs are not comprehensively reported in the budget documents.
  - Information on budget outturns at the central government level only partly meets the FTC’s standards: monthly data on budget execution (both on a cash and national accounts basis) are disseminated on a timely basis, but publication of final accounts, audited by the COA, is delayed for more than two years.
  - Public information on budget outturns of regional and local authorities needs substantial improvement: regional and most local governments report to IGAE on a quarterly basis, but these reports are not published; annual data are published with substantial delays by individual jurisdictions and are not compiled into a single, easily accessible document. These lags have complicated the application of the BSLs.
  - Information on long-term expenditure commitments is not published.
- Recommended actions:
  - regional and larger local governments should begin to publish, including on their websites, their preliminary quarterly budget outturns and their final accounts, in as timely and detailed a manner as possible;
  - IGAE should establish a website with links to those of the regional and larger local governments, and post on it consolidated accounts for these levels of government.

### Consolidated accounts and statistics
- Provisional consolidated national accounts for the general government are compiled on a quarterly basis by IGAE, but are not published. Publication of annual consolidated general government accounts is subject to long lags.
- Recommendation: publish the quarterly preliminary data on general government compiled by IGAE, and shorten the delay in publication of final annual data to under one year.
- In contrast, BOS statistics on debt and financial assets of various components of the public sector (including public enterprises) are of high quality and timeliness.

### Open budget preparation, forecasting, and presentation
- Budget formulation is significantly influenced by EMU membership requirements, notably rolling multi-year SPs submitted to the EU.
- Recommendations to increase transparency in budget formulation:
  - provide a clearer and detailed explanation of the rationale for specific fiscal targets in each annual budget, and discuss how current cyclical developments are expected to affect the fiscal position;
  - carry out a comprehensive revision of the government accounting plan over the longer run to closely align it to ESA-95.
- Recommendations to enhance transparency of budget forecasts and risk analysis:
  - better detail technical methodologies and assumptions underlying main macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts (e.g., in an annex to the budget document), including how budget forecasts for main revenue and expenditure items are arrived at and explicit quantification of the impact of new policy initiatives;
  - expand reporting of sensitivity analysis results for main assumptions underlying macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts;
  - improve analysis of fiscal risks and contingencies in budget documents by systematically reporting on the stock of government guarantees, calls on these guarantees, and risks associated with pending judicial decisions;
  - disclose information on long-term expenditure commitments;
  - include past outturns in the budget document for previous years, along with estimates for the current year, to facilitate comparison with projections;
  - extend the detailed reconciliation of data on central government operations on a budgetary basis with those on a national accounts basis to cover social security, and provide a reconciliation of historical data.
- Classification and program budgeting:
  - Functional classification in the budget should be brought fully in line with GFS 2001 standards.
  - Usefulness of program classification should be enhanced by progressively developing improved, monitorable indicators of results for a broad range of budgetary programs to enable performance budgeting as mandated by the GBL (47/2003).
- Medium-term framework:
  - The medium-term fiscal scenario should be developed into a full-fledged rolling MTBF, including multi-year projections for main revenue categories and for expenditures disaggregated on a functional or program classification basis. This framework should be published with the annual budget and quantify multi-year effects of new policy initiatives.
  - Budget documentation could include, at least every few years, long-term projections of expenditure categories sensitive to demographic trends (notably pensions and health expenditures), detailing methodology and assumptions. Independent reviews by qualified professionals should be encouraged.

### Budget execution, control, and procurement
- Central government budget execution and control systems are generally clear and in line with good international practice:
  - revenue developments are monitored on a timely basis by the tax administration;
  - all stages of the expenditure process are recorded in the GFMIS, with information on each stage available on a timely basis;
  - the new GBL sets out procedures for and limitations on changes in budgeted appropriations during the year; increases in appropriations resulting from unforeseeable spending necessities must be funded through the contingency fund or reductions in other spending lines within the same budget chapter, strengthening fiscal discipline;
  - there is an effective treasury single account covering all the central administration (ministries) and soon the autonomous entities as required by the GBL;
  - procurement rules are clear and generally transparently applied;
  - civil service employment procedures are clear and well publicized.
- Areas for improvement in execution and control:
  - introduce commitment programming and control, and closer coordination of Budget and Treasury Directorates to optimize cash management;
  - publish the annual government procurement program, and increase use of electronic auctions for purchases of goods and services;
  - progressively redirect IGAE from generalized ex ante controls toward ex post and performance-oriented controls as improved indicators of results are developed; ex ante controls should be carried out automatically through the GFMIS for most transactions;
  - delineate functions of internal audit offices of ministries to minimize overlap with IGAE; consider separation of accounting and control functions within IGAE to eliminate potential conflicts of interest.

### Accounting and reporting
- Central government accounting standards are comprehensively documented in the General Accounting Plan of 1994.
- Given the modern GFMIS, IGAE can produce timely and accurate in-year reports on central government budget outturns transmitted regularly to parliament; however, final accounts audited by the COA are published with a lag of more than two years.
- Regional and local governments must prepare budgets and report execution to facilitate IGAE reporting to the EU on consolidated general government, but lingering inconsistencies in functional classifications between the state and some CCAA contribute to substantial delays in compiling final accounts for the general government; efforts should eliminate these inconsistencies and reduce delays.
- Reconciliation of budgetary (above the line) and financial (below the line) data is regularly carried out by IGAE for the central government (in government accounting plan terms) and by the BOS for the general government in national accounting terms.

### Assurances of integrity, audit, and independent scrutiny
- Deviations between budget forecasts and outturns are not systematically and clearly explained in budget documents.
  - Since enactment of the BSLs and introduction of the contingency fund, spending outturns have tended to be closely aligned with initial budgets.
  - On the revenue side, outturns have tended to exceed forecasts—sometimes against a background of lower-than-projected GDP growth—partly reflecting a cautious attitude in preparing forecasts.
  - The explanation of deviations included in the yellow book for the Presentation of the 2005 Draft Budget of the State should be extended to cover other budgetary items as well as social security.
- Recommendations to enhance transparency and reliability of forecasts:
  - systematically subject budget forecasts to independent scrutiny (e.g., by academic experts);
  - publish the BOS’s internal forecasts;
  - consider creation in parliament of a nonpartisan budget office to provide independent analysis of the government’s budget proposal and of costs and benefits of new policy initiatives.
- External audit:
  - The COA is independent of the executive, has budgetary and organizational autonomy, and its members are elected by parliament with a nine-year mandate.
  - COA competencies are not clearly delineated vis-à-vis regional courts of accounts.
  - COA audits still mainly focus on legal and financial compliance rather than cost-effectiveness.
  - Audit reports are sent to parliament and published in the official gazette with a lag of over two years, reducing their effectiveness.
  - Recommended reforms: reduce lags, focus external audits on value-for-money considerations, more effectively publicize results, and strengthen requirements for response and follow-up by government units and agencies on COA findings and recommendations.
- Statistical independence:
  - The independence of the INE from political interference is clearly established in law.
  - INE has only a limited role in compilation and dissemination of fiscal statistics, since these functions have been largely delegated to IGAE and, for financial data, to the BOS.

*Source: _cr0558 - 76. The recent Law of Concessions (13/2003) has strengthened and clarified the legal*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/_cr0558.pdf_
