## 1. General Government Expenditure, 2004

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### Clarity of roles and responsibilities — definition of general government
- The definition of general government is not fully consistent with GFS principles and is not well covered in the budget process.
- Units of the general government (Box 1):
  - Central government units covered by the budget (General Public Services, including the King, the parliament, the judiciary, the prime minister, 25 ministries, and eight governorates) — 45.8 percent of GDP (excluding interest payments, and transfers to subnational government).
  - Central government units with individual budgets — 42.3 percent of GDP.
  - Central government autonomous agencies — 34.3 percent of GDP.
  - Social Security Corporation — 5.8 percent of GDP.
  - Universities — 2.2 percent of GDP.
  - Other autonomous agencies — 0.8 percent of GDP.
  - Off-budget accounts (OBAs) — n.a.
  - Extrabudgetary funds (EBFs) — n.a.
  - Local government: Municipalities (100) — n.a.
  - Total (line shown) — 2.7 percent of GDP.
- Autonomous agencies (39 in 2005, often referred to as “own-budget” agencies) have budgets approved by cabinet and available to the public, but are not consolidated into the government budget in GFS format.
- Consolidated data for the general government have only been available since mid-2005 and remain incomplete.
- Municipalities vote own budgets, approved by the ministry of municipal affairs, and receive transfers from the central government budget.

### Quasi-fiscal activities and public financial institutions
- Four public financial institutions provide development loans at below-market interest rates; government owns shares directly or indirectly and such institutions may receive budgetary subsidies.
- Industrial Development Bank (IDB) specifics: the government guarantees a 6 percent dividend to shareholders and the face value of the bank’s capital in case of bankruptcy.
- No centralized reporting or quantification of quasi-fiscal costs; identification occurs only in annual reports of public financial institutions and the central bank.
- At end-2002, total credits of the four development institutions amounted to JD 407 million (7 percent of total bank credits).
- The CBJ’s past outstanding advances to banks under liquidation and other ailing commercial banks amounted to 5.4 percent of GDP (at end-2003).

### Government holdings, public nonfinancial corporations, and privatization
- Government involvement in commercial activities is moderate and declining with ongoing privatization.
- JIC holdings: shares in 48 companies at end-October 2004 (down from 54 during 2000–03); market value about JD 180 million (2 percent of GDP).
- Privatization proceeds up to April 2005 amounted to about US$1,271 million (64 transactions completed, divestiture in 52 companies under JIC’s portfolio).
- Revenues from public companies and autonomous agencies at end-2004 amounted to JD 100 million (1½ percent of GDP), of which JD 30 million from the central bank and JD 25.8 million from the JIC.
- Social Security Corporation (SSC) budget is not consolidated with the government budget; SSC’s investment portfolio is managed commercially via an independent investment unit; government appoints nine of the 15 SSC board members upon recommendations by the minister of labor.
- Quasi-fiscal activities significant in energy (fuel subsidies) and Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ) via losses:
  - Since 2004, fuel subsidies are reflected in government operations (3 percent of GDP) and are planned to be eliminated progressively through fuel price adjustments and full liberalization of fuel trade by 2007.
  - WAJ’s losses, financed through issuance of bonds guaranteed and serviced by the central government, amount to some ½ percent of GDP; these losses are not covered by government transfers and are not disclosed in full detail.
- No clear legal framework for public/private partnerships (PPPs); contingent liabilities (e.g., sovereign guarantees) are not reported. Cabinet-authorized transfers of government properties to nongovernmental entities in PPPs have occurred without parliamentary approval or disclosure of asset values.
- Privatization Law (Law No. 25 of 2000):
  - Provides a transparent framework for privatization.
  - Privatization proceeds are deposited in an extrabudgetary privatization proceeds fund and used in part to reduce public debt.
  - Law requires audited accounts for the Executive Privatization Commission by the Audit Bureau, but no formal complaints framework for unsuccessful bidders.

### Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) and fiscal interactions
- CBJ law (Law No. 23 of the CBJ of 1971, as amended) provides financial and administrative autonomy but includes objectives that could allow government influence (promotion of economic growth “in accordance with the general economic policy of the government”).
- CBJ may extend an interest-free advance to the government not to exceed 20 percent of domestic revenue estimated in the budget law.
- The 2001 Public Debt Law discontinued central bank facilities; however, a ceiling of central bank advances (JD 803 million) under a memorandum between MOF and CBJ was breached in early 2005.
- CBJ activities constituting quasi-fiscal operations:
  - Participation in capital of local (some public) financial institutions (JD 6.9 million at end-2003).
  - Non-interest advances to banks and financial institutions.
  - Rediscount facilities to Agriculture Credit Corporation, IDB, and the Export and Finance Bank.
- Establishment of the deposit insurance corporation (Law No. 33 of 2000) is expected to help eliminate resort to CBJ special facilities.

### Fiscal roles across branches and levels of government
- Constitutional elements (Articles 94, 111–119, 113):
  - Taxes and duties are imposed by law.
  - National Assembly cannot increase expenditure when approving draft general budget law.
  - Article 113 envisages monthly appropriations of 1/12th of the budget of the previous fiscal year if the general budget law cannot be enacted before the new financial year.
  - Article 94 allows the Council of Ministers to issue provisional laws in emergency, subject to subsequent parliamentary approval.
- In practice, the executive has adopted by-laws (including for supplementary budgets) not subsequently approved by parliament.
- Municipality Law (Law No. 29 of 1955):
  - Municipalities receive transfers equal to 6 percent of the proceeds from the sale of fuel, distributed by formula (population, potential local revenues, financing needs).
  - Out of 39 tasks assigned to municipalities by ministry of planning, only eight are effectively carried out; central government has assumed key services (school and health).
  - Only 7 municipalities collect the property tax; for others, MOF collects property taxes on their behalf with a 10 percent MOF collection fee.
  - Greater Amman’s budget (51 percent of the total) is approved by the prime minister.
  - Local authorities generally borrow only from public financial institutions with government guarantees; Greater Amman can borrow from commercial banks without government guarantees. Municipal debt is very low.

### Identified transparency and reporting gaps
- Consolidated data for general government available only since mid-2005 and incomplete.
- OBAs and EBFs collect fees, donations, and privatization receipts outside the main budget framework; some extrabudgetary funds (customs, tax department, ministry of industry and trade) established through separate laws.
- No unified register of government and public entity holdings.
- Costs of quasi-fiscal activities, contingent liabilities from PPPs, and transfers of government assets under PPPs are not disclosed in official documents.
- WAJ losses and some subsidies (e.g., to the refinery prior to 2004) are not fully disclosed on a gross basis in budget documents.

---

### 11. The legal framework for management of public funds is clear; but the responsibilities are fragmented across government institutions.

### Legal and institutional framework for public funds
- Financial by-law (pursuant to Article 114 of the Constitution) regulates execution of the government budget, financial and accounting basis and rules, and gives the minister of finance a strong central role.
- All revenue collections by any public entity should be transferred to the treasury; minister of finance can authorize collecting entities to keep some collected revenue.
- By-law stipulates all cash and in-kind grants or donations should be recorded in the budget; in practice, some in-kind grants—particularly to the military—are not recorded.
- By-law confers role of budget managers to secretary generals of ministries and to regional governors.
- Financial by-law defines the government’s general budget to cover the consolidated CG, including the central administration and autonomous agencies.
- Subsequent laws allow some line ministries to collect fees to finance spending, which must be incorporated and managed within the budget.
- Debt management covered under the 2001 Public Debt Law, which sets targets on reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio.

### Coordination and management of budgetary and extrabudgetary activities
- Coordination mechanisms for budgetary and extrabudgetary activities are not well defined.
- Minister of finance issues instructions setting limits on balances of OBAs; revenue and expenditure transactions in OBAs are not incorporated in the budget and amounts are unknown.
- MOF has less control over special bank accounts related to external loans and grants managed by MOP and other line ministries, which reach over 5 percent of GDP.

### Tax legal framework, exemptions, and administration
- Major taxes: income tax, general sales tax (GST), and customs duties. Tax laws and regulations are published and updated annually.
- Income tax has been frequently modified by investment promotion regulations; GST has seen changes in thresholds, sectors covered, and rates.
- Income tax compliance weak (notably for family-owned businesses) due to incomplete observance of accounting rules and ineffective anti-fraud measures.
- Article 29 of the Income Tax Law permits direct discussions between the assessing officer and the taxpayer, leaving scope for discretionary interpretation.
- Tax enforcement is cumbersome, particularly on input deductions and GST refunds.
- Tax exemptions are extensive; corporate income tax rates differentiated by sector and investment promotion law provides generous incentives.
- GST exemptions previously granted to hotel accommodations, transport and electricity, and until recently, petroleum products.
- Tax holidays under investment promotion arrangements are provided uniformly if conditions are met; individual exemptions approved by cabinet.
- MOF estimated tax expenditures two years ago, but estimates are not systematic or disclosed.

### Tax administration safeguards and taxpayer rights
- Tax collection by Income and Sales Tax Department (ISTD) for domestic revenue and the Customs Department for foreign trade taxes.
- Withholding tax of 2 percent on imports introduced July 2003; since early 2004, taxpayers certified as tax-compliant by ISTD are exempted.
- Tax administration can recover arrears through courts or out-of-court settlements but cannot write off uncollectible arrears.
- Merger of ITD and STD into ISTD and use of single tax identification numbers (TIN) with customs via a computerized cross-checking system has reduced fraud opportunities; operational integration is ongoing.
- Accountability mechanisms: internal audit, Audit Bureau (AB) supervision for tax payments exceeding JD 10,000, mandatory approval of refunds by a financial controller, formation of assessment committees, and an objection and appeals process.
- Taxpayer rights guaranteed by constitution, tax laws, and investment promotion law, including protections against double taxation and appeal modalities to the Income Tax Court of Appeals.
- Customs complaints follow Customs court of first instance, Customs Court of Appeals, and Court of Cassation; proposals to move GST complaints to the Income Tax Court of Appeals.

### Civil service ethics and implementation weaknesses
- Civil Service Law (Civil Service Regulations (1) of 1998) defines ethical responsibilities, disciplinary actions, and sanctions; independent Civil Service Bureau reports to the prime minister.
- No adequate framework ensures civil servants abide by the law; an anti-corruption bill under discussion would mandate financial disclosure for high officials.
- Some arrangements condone petty corruption (e.g., on-site special sales tax officers in tobacco and alcohol factories receive transportation allowance from the companies they control), which should be paid from the government budget.

### Budget preparation, macro framework, and fiscal risk disclosure
- Annual budget process not very open; presentation lacks broad consistency with international standards.
- Budget circular’s steps and timing not well regulated and change year-to-year; constitutional timing for presentation and approval not met in the last two years.
- Progress in 2005: setting aggregate spending limits for line ministries and integrating the Program for Social and Economic Transformation (PSET) into the budget.
- Budget documents to parliament lack a complete economic budget classification; functional classification mainly organizational and permits lump-sum budgets for military and security organizations.
- Main fiscal indicator is overall balance of an incomplete CG definition: excludes OBAs, extrabudgetary funds, and autonomous agencies transactions.
- Local government activity in budget documents limited to CG transfers; local spending ~7 percent of total central government spending.
- Budgets of autonomous agencies presented to parliament with CG budget for the first time in 2005 (for information only); agencies do not follow GFS format, complicating consolidation.
- Macroeconomic indicators based on structural macroeconomic model used by MOP; budget speech lacks explicit macroeconomic framework and annual targets for the path of the debt-to-GDP ratio required to achieve medium-term debt objective.
- MOF developing a medium-term fiscal framework for internal use; quarterly debt reports by Public Debt Directorate posted on MOF website since early last year; compliance reports with the debt rule not legally required.
- Fiscal sustainability analysis carried out by MOF mainly for internal use.
- Budget documents do not distinguish costs of new initiatives from ongoing costs, do not include sensitivity tests of fiscal aggregates or analysis of principal contingent liabilities.
- 2001 Public Debt Law restricted extension of government guarantees to loans by mandating cabinet approval, yet some government agencies receive loans without formal guarantees.
- New contingent liabilities arise from sovereign guarantees in PPP schemes and are not disclosed in the budget.

### Budget execution, accounting, internal control, and TSA reforms
- Accounting and internal control procedures insufficient for adequate control of government spending.
- Current arrangements lack a comprehensive general ledger based on a sound chart of accounts and an integrated financial management information system.
- MOF depends on monthly cash accounting reports from line ministries and lacks centralized recording of commitments and a commitment control system; arrears tracking unreliable.
- Managing certain resources outside the TSA undermines central spending controls.
- No internal audit function as defined by international standards (The institute of internal auditors: International standards for the professional practice of internal audit, (revised) 2004); coordination between MOF departments weak; cash and debt management coordination ineffective; no annual or medium-term debt management strategy disclosed.
- Box 3 — cash management reforms highlights:
  - In 2002, government agencies had established over 400 separate bank accounts to keep off-budget revenues.
  - Banking operations rationalization initiated in 2003: closure of unauthorized accounts, merger of trust accounts into one consolidated bank account per agency, creation of analytical accounts in agency ledgers, and conversion of main treasury account into a TSA by December 2003.
  - By April 2004, TSA extended to defense, interior and similar agencies, bringing them under regular budget ceilings.
  - Some commercial bank accounts remain, mostly outside Amman; zero-balance approach extension scheduled from mid-2005 and to be completed before year-end.
  - Special bank accounts for donor-funding of capital projects remain outside the TSA, though related project expenditures were incorporated in the budget and MOF accounts.
  - TSA and bank account rationalization increased fiscal transparency by strengthening MOF oversight of off-budget resources and enhancing ability to provide up-to-date information on government revenues, expenditures, and financial flows.

---

### 26. Procurement rules are open and transparent.

### Procurement regulatory framework and practices
- Supplies Act 32 of 1993 governs procurement; cabinet regulations “clearly defined.”
- Procurement management is highly centralized for civil works, consultant services and supplies.
- Procurement above JD 20,000 managed by Government Tender Directorate (Ministry of Public Works) and the General Supplies Department of MOF.
- Tendering required for most procurement; exclusions: procurement below JD 20,000 and military equipment linked to security purposes.
- Audit Bureau (AB) representatives participate in tender committees as observers; final contract-award decisions are made by the minister involved.
- Special tender committees can be formed for particular projects without threshold restrictions.
- Decisions are open to audit; mechanisms exist to manage, hear, and settle bidders’ complaints.
- Government launched an e-procurement initiative to streamline processes, increase transparency, reduce transaction costs, and enhance supplier competitiveness.

### Civil service employment and procurement-related practices
- Civil Service Statute No 55 of 2002 applies to most government agency staff (non-uniformed); AB and Prime Minister Office staff excluded.
- Recruitment and wage policies are centralized with competitive exams and publicity of vacancies in principle.
- Cabinet decisions sometimes override merit-based criteria to authorize higher-than-average salary increases for certain sectors.
- Exemptions and supplementary pay benefits awarded outside basic salary affect transparency and distort salary structure across public agencies.

### Tax administration, reporting, and oversight related to procurement
- Tax administration not legally protected from political interference.
- Prior to merger, ITD and STD had separate procedures; integration into ISTD and standardized internal auditing mechanisms are under development.
- General Accounts Directorate receives monthly budget execution reports from ministries via internal control units; reports exclude expenditure commitments and arrears.
- Absence of unified financial management information system constrains verification and consolidation.
- MOF began publishing consolidated general government transactions since Q2 2005, with substantial time lag and incomplete coverage.
- National assembly did not consider/approve final accounts for 2002 and 2003 due to additional spending authorized without parliamentary approval.
- AB introduced yearly comparisons and detailed explanations of financial results to contextualize final accounts.

### Results-oriented budgeting, public availability, and contingent liabilities
- Budget program objectives presented to parliament but lack clear measurable links between inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes.
- Government performance unit linked to prime minister’s office developing indicators; pilot projects have had limited impact due to missing building blocks (budget classification, accounting, internal audit).
- Main budget documents: budget speech, annual budget law, and budgets of autonomous agencies.
- Annual budget law covers line ministries and agencies but excludes extrabudgetary funds and OBAs even for information.
- Financing data in the annual budget law presented only in aggregate table; no provisions for line ministries’ financial assets and liabilities flows; debt management not well connected with the budgetary process.
- Budgets of 39 autonomous agencies presented for information and published in a document compiled by General Budget Directorate for 2005 fiscal year.
- Defense and off-budget activity:
  - Military expenditure financed by U.S. grants outside the budget and not reported in fiscal statistics.
  - Armed forces’ budgetary appropriation represented 14.8 percent of total budgeted expenditures (included as a single item in 2004 budget).
  - Some ministry of defense components (Communications Authority, Directorate for Military Education, Center for Design and Development) represented 5 percent of ministry global appropriation and were included as separate line items.
  - Indications that military carries out commercial activities (notably construction), but size not reported.
  - Off-budget PPP involving construction activity including new private university on old military base in Amman.
- No statement of contingent liabilities included in budget documents; contingent liabilities associated with minimum dividend-capital ratio guaranteed to IDB equity holders not presented.
- Sovereign guarantees in build, operate, and transfer projects imply contingent liabilities not reported in the budget.
- No estimates of tax expenditures included in budget documents or annual accounts; some concessions discussed in budget speech without cost estimates.
- Quasi-fiscal activities by public financial institutions (loans at below-market interest rates); no centralized reporting of their cost.

### Publication of debt and financial asset data; dissemination
- Gross public debt data published monthly in Government Finance Bulletin (GFB) and Public Debt Department’s Quarterly Bulletin.
- Data presented for CG domestic debt, autonomous entities debt, and external public debt; CG domestic and autonomous entities debt presented gross and net and broken down by instruments (treasury bills and bonds, development bonds, and loans).
- Government deposits in banking system presented to explain difference between gross and net debt; external public debt distinguishes multilateral, bilateral, bank and private bond holders.
- MOF’s monthly bulletin reports some contingent liabilities as government guaranteed debt; comprehensive debt restructuring and debt swap information reported quarterly.
- Information on government financial assets limited: CG and autonomous agencies’ holdings of bank deposits published monthly; no systematic information on holdings of companies and other financial assets.
- MOF’s GFB provides monthly fiscal outturn and government debt data, usually with a one month delay; government does not commit to a fixed publication schedule.
- Starting April 2005, monthly GFB covers consolidated general government.
- No legal framework enshrines MOF responsibilities in reporting fiscal data.
- Jordan has conformed financial reports to IMF GFS 2001 since 2003, subscribes to GDDS since 2000, meets SDDS requirements on coverage, periodicity and timeliness for CG operations data, and is taking steps to become compliant with SDDS regarding general government operations.

### Audit, reconciliation, and external scrutiny
- Initial budget estimates unreliable; significant differences occurred during 2002–04 between initial estimates and actual outturns.
- Budget document gives initial and updated estimates for year preceding the budget year, but no comparison of initial estimates and final outturns for any year.
- AB report for 2003 provides comparison but not publicly available; MOF monthly bulletin compares budget to preliminary outturns, not final outturns.
- No centralized government accounting system; accounting based on cash principle and double-entry recording; accounting framework not consistent with IPSAS; MOF does not publish comprehensive government balance sheets.
- Account reconciliation processes partly effective due to organizations operating outside budget with unknown bank accounts, multiplicity of incompatible information systems, and MOF inability to access transaction-level ministry data; no overall reconciliation of aggregate fiscal data with monetary data.
- Audit Bureau (Law No. 28 of 1952) requirements:
  - Submit annual report to parliament; director general appointed by cabinet for open-ended period, guaranteed immunity from legal prosecution, removable only with consent of national assembly except when parliament is not sitting.
  - AB’s budget included as separate item in budget law; mandate covers regular budget organizations and autonomous agencies but excludes OBAs and extrabudgetary funds.
  - AB pre-audits all tax payments above JD 10,000 and all tax refunds; has emphasized systemic and performance audits recently.
- Strengthening audit capacity required: AB had 545 staff members as of April 2005, most in field units, with plans to close many field units and transfer staff to new headquarters; staff capacity needs upgrading in systemic, IT, and performance audits.
- Legislature discusses AB annual report in Financial committee; after submission to parliament report generally becomes available to press but not systematically disseminated to public. Follow-up of audit findings mainly by task forces between ministries and AB.
- External scrutiny of macroeconomic models/assumptions is not encouraged: MOP prepares macro projections based on an econometric model with no publicly available documentation; no mechanisms ensure independent scrutiny; no other institutions prepare projections; limited internal and public discussion; no systematic, publicly available tracking and comparison of projections against actual outturns.

---

### 48. The National Statistics Office is not given legislative assurance of independence.

### Status and legal basis of the National Statistics Office (NSO)
- Statistics agency subordinate to the MOP.
- Statistics Law (Law no 24 of 1950) recently revised by cabinet (By-law No. 8 of 2003), but revision not yet approved by parliament.
- Revised law does not give specific assurances of technical independence.
- Director general appointed by the cabinet for an open-ended period; law contains no specific safeguards against political involvement in his activities.
- Agency asserts established practice of substantial technical independence; de facto independence greater than de jure.

---

### IMF staff assessment of fiscal transparency, key recommendations, and priorities

### Overall assessment
- Jordan has made important progress toward greater fiscal transparency (introduction of a debt target, enhanced coverage/timeliness/periodicity of budget and fiscal reports, reforms related to budget classification and treasury management).
- Overall conclusion: Jordan fails to meet several requirements of the IMF Code of Fiscal Transparency; a broad and sustained effort required to approach international good practices.

### Key short-term recommendations (1–2 years)
- Complete ongoing reforms to improve openness of budget preparation, execution and reporting:
  - Establish an operational macrofiscal unit in the MOF to improve consistency and comprehensiveness of the medium-term budget framework.
  - Revise budget classification to better allocate government funds and facilitate accounting, control, reconciliation, and auditing.
  - Implement a functional TSA to improve transparency in management of government financial resources and strengthen cash and debt management.
- Implement relatively simple measures with significant transparency impact:
  - Clarify the budget preparation process; establish clear procedures and timetables and announce changes well ahead.
  - Provide explicit comparisons and analysis of budget estimates versus outcomes in the annual budget document; establish a firm publication calendar for MOF’s monthly bulletin.
  - Provide explicit statements of accounting policies in annual final accounts; strengthen macrolevel reconciliation between fiscal and monetary data.
  - Establish procedure for systematic publishing and disseminating the AB annual reports.
  - Fully document the MOP macroeconomic model, make it publicly available, and regularly publish estimates and analysis based on the model.

### Medium-term priorities and measures
- Priority 1 — Clarify government and broader public sector boundaries:
  - Review activities of autonomous agencies, extrabudgetary funds and OBAs to incorporate agencies undertaking mainly governmental activities into the definition of government and classify mainly commercial entities as nonfinancial public enterprises.
  - Produce inventory of quasi-fiscal activities through public financial and nonfinancial institutions to quantify and disclose fiscal costs in budget documents.
  - Disclose holdings by government and public institutions in private companies comprehensively; establish complete register of government and public entity holdings.
- Priority 2 — Improve transparency in fiscal policy management:
  - Widen fiscal policy and budget coverage from a partial CG definition to a GFS 2001 definition of consolidated CG; submit or integrate budgets for autonomous agencies and extrabudgetary funds into general annual budget.
  - Eliminate cabinet approval practice of mid-year or ex-post budget increases without subsequent parliamentary endorsement.
  - Disclose all cabinet fiscal policy decisions made outside the budget law (award of government guarantees, approval of tax concessions, sales/donations of government properties); consider publicly-available register of cabinet decisions.
- Priority 3 — Strengthen assurances about integrity of fiscal information:
  - Concentrate budget execution management in MOF, giving MOF responsibility for capital and foreign-financed projects.
  - Adopt comprehensive government accounting standards based on IPSAS.
  - Further consolidate TSA to include external grants and loans.

### Relevant factual and numeric details preserved
- Law no 24 of 1950.
- By-law No. 8 of 2003.
- Audit Bureau (AB) plans to reduce within the next two years the number of staff members to 350.
- Last final accounts were published in 2001.
- Comprehensive Government Finance Bulletin (GFB) covering the general government launched by MOF in April 2005.
- Jordan is taking steps to become compliant with SDDS.
- MOF’s GFB monthly document is published with no fixed time after month-end and lacks reconciliation with debt data and no mid-term review.

*Source: IMF staff report — “1. General Government Expenditure, 2004.”*

### 1. General Government Expenditure, 2004 ...............................................................................4

### 1. General Government Expenditure, 2004

### Clarity of roles and responsibilities — definition of general government
- The definition of general government is not fully consistent with GFS principles and is not well covered in the budget process.
- The units of the general government are listed in Box 1 and include:
  - Central government units covered by the budget (General Public Services, including the King, the parliament, the judiciary, the prime minister, 25 ministries, and eight governorates) — 45.8 percent of GDP (excluding interest payments, and transfers to subnational government).
  - Central government units with individual budgets — 42.3 percent of GDP.
  - Central government autonomous agencies — 34.3 percent of GDP.
  - Social Security Corporation — 5.8 percent of GDP.
  - Universities — 2.2 percent of GDP.
  - Other autonomous agencies — 0.8 percent of GDP.
  - Off-budget accounts (OBAs) — n.a.
  - Extrabudgetary funds (EBFs) — n.a.
  - Local government: Municipalities (100) — n.a.
  - Total (line shown) — 2.7 percent of GDP.
- Autonomous agencies (39 in 2005, often referred to as “own-budget” agencies) have budgets approved by cabinet and available to the public, but are not consolidated into the government budget in GFS format.
- Many central government entities maintain off-budget accounts (OBAs) and extrabudgetary funds (EBFs); consolidated data for the general government have only been available since mid-2005 and remain incomplete.
- At the local level, municipalities vote own budgets, which are approved by the ministry of municipal affairs and receive transfers from the central government budget.

### Quasi-fiscal activities and public financial institutions
- The central government owns shares directly or indirectly in four public financial institutions that provide development loans at below-market interest rates; these institutions may receive budgetary subsidies.
- The Industrial Development Bank (IDB) example: the government guarantees a 6 percent dividend to shareholders and the face value of the bank’s capital in case of bankruptcy.
- There is no centralized reporting or quantification of the cost of quasi-fiscal activities; such activities are identified only in annual reports of public financial institutions and the central bank.
- At end-2002, total credits of the four development institutions amounted to JD 407 million (7 percent of total bank credits).
- The CBJ’s past outstanding advances to banks under liquidation and other ailing commercial banks amounted to 5.4 percent of GDP (at end-2003).

### Government holdings, public nonfinancial corporations, and privatization
- Government involvement in commercial activities is moderate and declining with ongoing privatization; further decline expected on completion of major privatizations.
- The JIC held shares in 48 companies at end-October 2004 (down from 54 during 2000–03); value of its share portfolio at market value was about JD 180 million (2 percent of GDP).
- Privatization proceeds up to April 2005 amounted to about US$1,271 million (64 transactions completed, divestiture in 52 companies under JIC’s portfolio).
- Revenues from public companies and autonomous agencies at end-2004 amounted to JD 100 million (1½ percent of GDP), of which JD 30 million from the central bank and JD 25.8 million from the JIC.
- The Social Security Corporation (SSC) budget is not consolidated with the government budget; SSC’s investment portfolio is managed commercially via an independent investment unit. The government appoints nine of the 15 SSC board members upon recommendations by the minister of labor.
- Public nonfinancial corporations increasingly operate on a commercial basis; quasi-fiscal activities have been significant in the energy sector (fuel subsidies) and the Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ) via losses.
  - Since 2004, fuel subsidies are reflected in government operations (3 percent of GDP) and are planned to be eliminated progressively through fuel price adjustments and full liberalization of fuel trade by 2007.
  - WAJ’s losses, financed through issuance of bonds guaranteed and serviced by the central government, amount to some ½ percent of GDP; these losses are not covered by government transfers and are not disclosed in full detail.
- There is no clear legal framework for public/private partnerships (PPPs); contingent liabilities associated with PPPs (for example sovereign guarantees) are not reported in official documents. Cabinet-authorized transfers of government properties to nongovernmental entities in the context of PPPs have occurred without parliamentary approval or disclosure of asset values.
- The Privatization Law (Law No. 25 of 2000) provides a transparent framework for privatization; privatization proceeds are deposited in an extrabudgetary privatization proceeds fund and used in part to reduce public debt. The law requires audited accounts for the Executive Privatization Commission by the Audit Bureau, but there is no formal framework to address complaints by unsuccessful bidders.

### Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) and fiscal interactions
- The CBJ law (Law No. 23 of the CBJ of 1971, as amended) provides financial and administrative autonomy but includes objectives that could allow government influence (promotion of economic growth “in accordance with the general economic policy of the government”).
- The CBJ law regulates advances to the treasury and financial support that the government could extend to the CBJ. The CBJ may extend an interest-free advance to the government not to exceed 20 percent of domestic revenue estimated in the budget law.
- The 2001 Public Debt Law discontinued the provision of central bank facilities; however, the ceiling of central bank advances (JD 803 million) established under a memorandum of understanding between MOF and CBJ was breached in early 2005.
- The CBJ has participated in capital of local (some public) financial institutions (JD 6.9 million at end-2003), granted non-interest advances to banks and financial institutions, and provided rediscount facilities to Agriculture Credit Corporation, IDB, and the Export and Finance Bank. Such subsidized facilities constitute quasi-fiscal activities on behalf of the central government.
- Establishment of the deposit insurance corporation (Law No. 33 of 2000) is expected to help eliminate resort to CBJ special facilities.

### Fiscal roles across branches and levels of government
- The Constitution (as promulgated in 1952 and amended later) divides powers into executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Articles 111–119 indicate that:
  - Taxes and duties are imposed by law.
  - In approving the draft general budget law, the National Assembly cannot increase expenditure, or amend expenditures or revenues fixed by contract.
  - Tax exemptions are sanctioned by law.
  - If the general budget law cannot be enacted before the new financial year, Article 113 envisages monthly appropriations of 1/12th of the budget of the previous fiscal year.
  - Article 94 allows the Council of Ministers to issue provisional laws in case of emergency, subject to subsequent parliamentary approval.
- In practice, the executive has at times adopted by-laws, including for supplementary budgets, which were not subsequently approved by parliament.
- Municipality Law (Law No. 29 of 1955) defines relations between the central government and municipalities and details municipal duties and revenues. Municipalities receive transfers from central government (6 percent of the proceeds from the sale of fuel) distributed according to a formula (population, potential local revenues, financing needs).
  - Out of 39 tasks assigned to municipalities by ministry of planning, only eight are effectively carried out; central government has assumed key services (school and health).
  - Because of weak technical capacity, only 7 municipalities collect the property tax; property taxes for others are collected by MOF on their behalf, with a 10 percent MOF collection fee.
  - Municipality accounts are inspected by the Audit Bureau. Greater Amman’s budget (51 percent of the total) is approved by the prime minister.
  - Generally, local authorities borrow only from public financial institutions with government guarantees; Greater Amman can borrow from commercial banks without government guarantees. Municipal debt is very low.

### Identified transparency and reporting gaps
- Consolidated data for general government were only available since mid-2005 and are incomplete.
- OBAs and EBFs often collect fees, donations, and privatization receipts outside the main budget framework; some extrabudgetary funds (customs, tax department, ministry of industry and trade) are established through separate laws.
- No unified register exists of government and public entity holdings.
- Costs of quasi-fiscal activities, contingent liabilities from PPPs, and transfers of government assets under PPPs are not disclosed in official documents.
- WAJ losses and some subsidies (e.g., to the refinery prior to 2004) are not fully disclosed on a gross basis in budget documents.

*Source: IMF staff report — “1. General Government Expenditure, 2004.”*

### 11. The legal framework for management of public funds is clear; but the

### 11. The legal framework for management of public funds is clear; but the responsibilities are fragmented across government institutions.

### Legal and institutional framework for public funds
- The financial by-law, pursuant to Article 114 of the Constitution, regulates execution of the government budget by any department or institution, and any institution with administrative and financial autonomy, together with the financial and accounting basis and rules.
- The by-law gives the minister of finance a strong central role in fiscal management.
- All revenue collections by any public entity should be transferred to the treasury; however, the minister of finance can authorize collecting entities to keep some of the collected revenue.
- The by-law stipulates that all cash and in-kind grants or donations should be recorded in the budget; in practice, some in-kind grants—particularly to the military—are not recorded.
- The by-law determines modalities for issuing budget appropriations and confers the role of budget managers to secretary generals of ministries and to regional governors.
- The financial by-law defines the government’s general budget to cover the consolidated CG, including the central administration and autonomous agencies.
- Subsequent laws have allowed some line ministries to collect fees under their control to finance spending; ministries are required to incorporate and manage these resources within the budget.
- Debt management is covered under the 2001 Public Debt Law, which sets targets on the reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio.

### Coordination and management of budgetary and extrabudgetary activities
- Mechanisms for coordination and management of budgetary and extrabudgetary activities are not well defined.
- The minister of finance issues instructions that set limits on balances of OBAs belonging to revenue collecting agencies, which are allowed by law to retain part of collected revenue.
- Revenue and expenditure transactions in these OBAs are not incorporated in the budget, and there is no information on the amounts involved.
- The MOF has less control over special bank accounts related to external loans and grants managed by the MOP and other line ministries, which reach over 5 percent of GDP.

### Tax legal framework and exemptions
- The tax framework includes three major taxes: the income tax, the general sales tax (GST), and customs duties.
- Tax laws and regulations are published and updated on an annual basis.
- The income tax has been frequently modified by investment promotion regulations; the GST has been subject to changes in thresholds, sectors covered, and rates.
- Tax compliance for the income tax (notably for family-owned businesses) remains weak due to incomplete observance of accounting rules and ineffective efforts to combat fraud, hindering effective self-assessment.
- Article 29 of the Income Tax Law allows direct discussions between the assessing officer and the taxpayer, leaving scope for discretionary interpretation by tax officials.
- Tax enforcement is cumbersome, particularly regarding deductions for inputs and refunds under the GST.
- Tax exemptions are extensive; corporate income tax rates are differentiated by sector and the investment promotion law introduced generous tax incentives by sector and region.
- GST exemptions were granted to hotel accommodations, transport and electricity, and, until recently, petroleum products.
- Tax holidays under investment promotion arrangements are provided uniformly if conditions are met; individual taxpayer exemptions are approved by the cabinet.
- Tax exemptions have led to distortions and significant revenue losses; the MOF carried out some research estimating tax expenditures two years ago, but these estimates are not systematically conducted and disclosed.

### Tax administration, taxpayer rights, and safeguards
- Tax revenue collection is carried out by the Income and Sales Tax Department (ISTD) for domestic revenue and the Customs Department for taxes on foreign trade.
- An income tax withholding tax of 2 percent on imports was introduced in July 2003; since early 2004, taxpayers certified as tax-compliant by ISTD are exempted from this tax.
- The tax administration has powers to collect taxes, including recovery of tax arrears through courts or out-of-court settlements; however, the tax administration has no ability to write off uncollectible tax arrears.
- The merger of the Income Tax Department (ITD) and the Sales Tax Department (STD) into ISTD, and the extensive use of single tax identification numbers (TIN) between ISTD and the customs department via a computerized cross-checking system, has reduced fraud opportunities; operational integration is ongoing.
- Mechanisms to minimize discretionary authority and ensure accountability include an internal audit system, supervision by the AB for tax payments exceeding JD 10,000, mandatory approval of refunds by a financial controller, formation of assessment committees, and an objection and appeals process.
- Taxpayers’ legal rights are guaranteed by the constitution, tax laws, and the investment promotion law: protections against double taxation, correction of factual errors, statutory delays after which assessment is considered approved, and appeal modalities to the Income Tax Court of Appeals.
- Customs complaints are settled through the Customs court of first instance, the Customs Court of Appeals, and the Court of Cassation; proposals exist to move GST complaints to the Income Tax Court of Appeals.

### Civil service ethics and implementation weaknesses
- The Civil Service Law (Civil Service Regulations (1) of 1998) defines ethical responsibilities, disciplinary actions, and sanctions for civil servants.
- An independent Civil Service Bureau reporting to the prime minister is charged with ensuring regulations are implemented transparently, efficiently and fairly.
- No government employee shall take advantage of office for personal benefit or accept gifts, bonuses or grants from persons with a financial link to their department.
- There is no adequate framework to ensure civil servants abide by the law; an anti-corruption bill under discussion would mandate financial disclosure for high officials.
- Some administrative arrangements condone petty corruption practices—for example, on-site special sales tax officers in tobacco and alcohol factories receive a transportation allowance from the companies they control; such payments should be paid out of the government budget.

### Budget preparation: process, presentation, and macroeconomic basis
- The annual budget process is not very open and presentation lacks broad consistency with international standards.
- Main steps and timing for budget preparation are not well regulated in the budget circular and change year-to-year; constitutional timing for presentation and approval of the budget were not met in the last two years.
- Progress in 2005 included setting aggregate spending limits for line ministries and integrating the Program for Social and Economic Transformation (PSET) into the budget.
- Budget documents submitted to parliament do not contain a complete economic budget classification, making it difficult to evaluate macroeconomic impact.
- The functional classification is mainly based on organizational classification and permits lump-sum budgets for military and security organizations.
- The main indicator of fiscal position in the budget is the overall balance of an incomplete definition of the CG: focus is on the overall balance of the CG excluding OBAs, extrabudgetary funds, and transactions of autonomous agencies.
- Local government activity information in budget documents is limited to CG transfers; local spending represents approximately 7 percent of total central government spending.
- Budgets of autonomous agencies were presented to parliament with the CG budget for the first time in 2005, though only for information purposes; these agencies do not follow a GFS format, complicating consolidation.

### Macroeconomic framework, medium-term planning, and fiscal risks
- Budget forecasts and underlying macroeconomic assumptions are not clearly presented; the budget speech gives quantitative indicators but lacks an explicit macroeconomic framework providing consistency checks.
- Macroeconomic indicators are based on a structural macroeconomic model used by the MOP, which provides the macroeconomic framework for the budget.
- A statement on medium-term fiscal policy objectives is included in the budget document, referencing the debt rule in the 2001 Public Debt Management Law.
- The budget speech does not include annual targets for the path of the debt-to-GDP ratio required to achieve the medium-term debt objective, nor a medium-term rolling macrofiscal framework or medium-term budget scenario broken down by institution or policy.
- The MOF is developing a medium-term fiscal framework for internal use.
- Quarterly debt reports are prepared by the Public Debt Directorate of the MOF and posted on the MOF website since early last year; compliance reports with the debt rule are not legally required.
- Fiscal sustainability analysis is carried out by the MOF mainly for internal use.
- Estimates of the budgetary cost of new initiatives and ongoing costs are not clearly distinguished in budget documents; costs of new spending programs are not quantified separately from ongoing activities.
- The budget documents do not include sensitivity tests of fiscal aggregates to changes in economic parameters nor analysis of principal contingent liabilities.
- The 2001 Public Debt Law restricted extension of government guarantees to loans by mandating cabinet approval; nevertheless, some government agencies receive loans without formal guarantees.
- New contingent liabilities arise from sovereign guarantees in PPP schemes and are not disclosed in the budget.

### Budget execution, accounting, and internal control
- Basic accounting and internal control procedures are insufficient to maintain adequate control of government spending.
- Current accounting arrangements lack a comprehensive general ledger based on a sound chart of accounts and an integrated information system for financial management.
- The MOF depends on monthly cash accounting reports from line ministries and lacks a centralized recording of commitments and a commitment control system; tracking accumulation of arrears is not reliably possible.
- Despite progress expanding TSA coverage, managing certain resources outside the TSA undermines central spending controls.
- There is no internal audit function as defined by international standards (The institute of internal auditors: International standards for the professional practice of internal audit, (revised) 2004), and coordination between main MOF departments involved in government financial management is weak.
- As a result, coordination between cash and debt management is ineffective; there is no annual or medium-term debt management strategy disclosed by the government.
- Box 3 findings on cash management reforms:
  - In 2002, government agencies had established over 400 separate bank accounts to keep off-budget revenues.
  - Jordan initiated a banking operations rationalization in 2003, resulting in closure of many unauthorized accounts, merger of trust accounts into one consolidated bank account per agency, creation of analytical accounts in agency ledgers, and conversion of the main treasury account into a TSA by December 2003.
  - By April 2004, the TSA was extended to defense, interior and similar agencies, bringing them under regular budget ceilings.
  - Some accounts in commercial banks remain, mostly outside Amman; extension of zero-balance approach to these accounts was scheduled to commence from mid-2005 and be completed before year-end.
  - Special bank accounts for donor-funding of capital projects remain outside the TSA, though related project expenditures were incorporated in the budget and MOF accounts.
  - The TSA and bank account rationalization increased fiscal transparency by (1) strengthening MOF oversight of off-budget resources without infringing spending agencies’ authority, and (2) enhancing ability to provide up-to-date information on government revenues, expenditures, and financial flows.

_Source: _cr0621 - 11. The legal framework for management of public funds is clear; but the_ (PDF chapter).

### 26. Procurement rules are open and transparent.

### 26. Procurement rules are open and transparent.

### Procurement regulatory framework and practices
- The regulatory framework for procurement is governed by the Supplies Act 32 of 1993 and is "clearly defined" by cabinet regulations.
- Management of procurement is highly centralized for civil works, consultant services and supplies.
- The management of procurement activities above JD 20,000 is the responsibility of the Government Tender Directorate of the Ministry of Public Works and the General Supplies Department of the MOF.
- Tendering mechanisms are legally required for most procurement activities; excluded from tendering are procurement activities below JD 20,000 and military equipment linked to security purposes.
- Representatives from the AB participate in tender committees as observers; final contract-award decisions are made by the minister involved in the activity.
- Special tender committees can be formed for a particular project and are not restricted to any threshold.
- Decisions are open to audit and mechanisms exist to manage, hear, and settle bidders’ complaints.
- The government has launched the e-procurement initiative "to streamline the procurement processes, make them more transparent, reduce transaction costs, and enhance the competitiveness among suppliers for its procurement."

### Civil service employment procedures
- Civil Service Statute No 55 of 2002 applies to staff in most government agencies; the term “civil service” refers to non-uniformed employees of the central administration as well as employees from autonomous agencies.
- Staff from the AB and the Prime Minister Office, among others, are not covered by this statute.
- In principle, recruitment and wage policies are highly centralized and operate under standards for competitive exams and publicity of vacancies.
- Cabinet decisions sometimes override merit-based criteria to authorize higher-than-average salary increases for certain sectors.
- Exemptions to normal procedures and authority granted to heads of departments to award supplementary pay benefits outside the basic salary have affected transparency and distorted the salary structure across public agencies.

### Tax administration and internal controls
- Tax administration does not have legal protection from political interference.
- Before their recent merger, the income and sales tax departments had separate policies, procedures, standards, and enforcement powers; uniform procedures for tax audits and collections are being put in place after integration into a single umbrella organization.
- Standardized internal auditing mechanisms are under development after the recent integration.

### Reporting on budget execution and coverage
- The General Accounts Directorate of the MOF receives monthly budget execution reports from ministries via internal control units; these reports do not include information on expenditure commitments or arrears.
- Absence of a unified and integrated financial management information system at the MOF constrains verification of monthly information and consolidated reports.
- Ministries do not report information on activities outside the budget; the MOF began publishing transactions of consolidated general government since the second quarter of 2005, albeit with substantial time lag and incomplete coverage.
- The General Budget Department also receives monthly budget execution reports from autonomous agencies.

### Legislative oversight of final accounts
- The national assembly did not consider and approve the final accounts for 2002 and 2003 due to additional spending authorized without the approval of the parliament.
- The AB has introduced yearly comparisons and detailed explanations of financial results to put final accounts in perspective.

### Results-oriented budgeting and performance monitoring
- Objectives of major budget programs are presented to parliament, but current programs "do not provide a clear and measurable link between program inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes."
- A government performance unit linked to the prime minister’s office is responsible for developing indicators; some pilot projects underway have had little impact due to absence of key building blocks (e.g., appropriate budget classification system, accounting arrangements, and an internal auditing system).

### Public availability and completeness of budget documents
- Main budget documents: budget speech, the annual budget law, and the budgets of autonomous agencies.
- The annual budget law covers line ministries and agencies but does not include extrabudgetary funds and OBAs even for information.
- The annual budget law includes budget revenue by major categories and current and capital expenditures provisions by ministries and line agencies; financing data are only presented in an aggregate table.
- No budgetary provisions are made for line ministries’ financial assets and liabilities flows; debt management is "not well connected with the budgetary process."
- The budgets of the 39 autonomous agencies are presented for information and published in a document compiled by the General Budget Directorate for the 2005 fiscal year.

### Defense, off-budget activity, and contingent liabilities
- The budget law includes most defense expenditures but with more restrictive coverage than other expenditures; military expenditure financed by grants from the U.S. government are outside the budget and are not reported in any fiscal statistics.
- Armed forces’ budgetary appropriation represented 14.8 percent of total budgeted expenditures, but was included as a single item in the 2004 budget.
- Communications Authority, Directorate for Military Education, and the Center for Design and Development (representing 5 percent of the ministry of defense’s global appropriation) were included as separate line items.
- Indications exist that the military carries out commercial activities (notably construction), but the size is not reported.
- An off-budget PPP initiative entails construction activity, including a new private university on an old military base in Amman.
- No statement of contingent liabilities is included in the budget documents; contingent liabilities associated with the minimum dividend-capital ratio guaranteed to the IDB equity holders are not presented.
- Sovereign guarantees in build, operate, and transfer projects imply contingent liabilities that are not reported in the budget.
- No estimates of tax expenditures are included in the budget documents or annual accounts; some concessions are discussed in the budget speech but without cost estimates.
- Quasi-fiscal activities exist (loans at below-market interest rates by public financial institutions); no centralized reporting of their cost is available.

### Publication of debt and financial asset data
- Gross public debt data are published on a monthly basis in the Government Finance Bulletin (GFB) and the Public Debt Department’s Quarterly Bulletin.
- Data are presented for CG domestic debt, autonomous entities debt, and external public debt; CG domestic debt and autonomous entities debt are presented on a gross and net basis and broken down by instruments (treasury bills and bonds, development bonds, and loans).
- Government deposits in the banking system are presented to explain the difference between gross and net debt; external public debt distinguishes multilateral, bilateral, bank and private bond holders.
- The MOF’s monthly bulletin reports some contingent liabilities as government guaranteed debt; comprehensive debt restructuring and debt swap information is reported quarterly.
- Information on government financial assets is limited: CG and autonomous agencies’ holdings of bank deposits are published monthly, but there is no systematic information on government holdings of companies and other financial assets.

### Commitment to timely publication and data dissemination
- The MOF’s GFB provides monthly fiscal outturn and government debt data, usually published with a one month delay; the government does not commit to a fixed publication schedule.
- Starting in April 2005, the monthly GFB also covers the consolidated general government.
- No legal framework enshrines the MOF responsibilities in reporting fiscal data.
- Jordan has conformed its financial reports to the IMF requirements of GFS 2001 since 2003, subscribes to the GDDS since 2000, meets SDDS requirements on coverage, periodicity and timeliness for dissemination of CG operations data, and is taking steps to become compliant with SDDS regarding dissemination of general government operations.

### Assurances of integrity: accounts, reconciliation, and audit
- Initial budget estimates are not reliable; significant differences occurred during 2002–04 between initial budget estimates and actual outturns.
- The budget document gives information about initial and updated estimates for the year preceding the budget year, but there is no comparison of initial budget estimates and final outturns for any year.
- The AB report for 2003 provides a comparison of initial budgets and outturns, but this document is not available to the general public; the MOF monthly bulletin compares the budget to preliminary outturns, but not to the final outturns.
- Jordan does not have a centralized government accounting system; accounting is based on the cash principle and double-entry recording. The accounting framework is not consistent with IPSAS; the MOF does not publish comprehensive government balance sheets.
- Account reconciliation processes are only partly effective due to (i) government organizations operating outside the budget with bank accounts not controlled or known by the MOF, (ii) multiplicity of incompatible information systems, and (iii) MOF’s inability to access transaction-level data in ministries. No overall reconciliation of aggregate fiscal data with monetary data is performed.
- The AB law (Law No. 28 of 1952) requires the Bureau to submit its annual report to parliament; the director general is appointed by the cabinet for an open-ended period, guaranteed immunity from legal prosecution, and removable only with the consent of the national assembly except when parliament is not sitting.
- The AB’s budget is included as a separate item in the budget law; its mandate covers all regular budget organizations and autonomous government agencies, but does not cover OBAs and extrabudgetary funds.
- The AB traditionally focuses on regularity and compliance controls (notably procurement) and auditing final accounts; AB officials pre-audit all tax payments above JD 10,000 and all tax refunds. In recent years, the AB has emphasized systemic and performance audits.
- Strengthening audit capacity is required: the AB had 545 staff members as of April 2005, most in field units, with plans to close many field units and transfer staff to the new headquarters; staff capacity needs upgrading in systemic, information technology, and performance audits.
- The legislature discusses the AB annual report in the Financial committee; after submission to parliament the report generally becomes available to the press but is not systematically disseminated to the public. Follow-up of audit findings is mainly done by task forces between involved ministries and the AB.
- External scrutiny of macroeconomic models and assumptions is not encouraged: the MOP prepares macroeconomic projections based on an econometric model with no publicly available documentation; no mechanisms ensure independent scrutiny; no other institutions prepare projections; there is limited internal and public discussion; no systematic, publicly available tracking and comparison of projections against actual outturns.

*Italicized source attribution: _cr0621 - 26. Procurement rules are open and transparent.*

### 48. The National Statistics Office is not given legislative assurance of independence.

### _cr0621 - 48. The National Statistics Office is not given legislative assurance of independence.

### Status of the National Statistics Office (NSO)
- The statistics agency is subordinate to the MOP.
- The Statistics Law (Law no 24 of 1950) was recently revised by the cabinet (By-law No. 8 of 2003), but the revision has not yet been approved by parliament.
- The revised law does not give any specific assurances of technical independence.
- The director general is appointed by the cabinet for an open-ended period, and the law has no specific safeguards against political involvement in his activities.
- According to the agency, the established practice is that it has substantial technical independence, and there are no attempts by the government to influence its reports.
- The statistics agency has substantial technical independence, though more de facto than de jure.

### IMF staff assessment of fiscal transparency (context)
- Jordan has made important progress toward greater fiscal transparency, including:
  - Introduction of a debt target to anchor the medium-term fiscal framework.
  - Enhanced coverage, timeliness, and periodicity of budget and fiscal reports.
  - Reforms related to budget classification and treasury management.
- Overall conclusion: Jordan fails to meet several requirements of the IMF Code of Fiscal Transparency; a broad and sustained effort is required to approach international good practices.

### Key short-term recommendations (1–2 years)
- Complete ongoing reform efforts that will improve openness of budget preparation, execution and reporting:
  - Establish an operational macrofiscal unit in the MOF to improve consistency and comprehensiveness of the medium-term budget framework.
  - Revise budget classification to better allocate government funds and facilitate accounting, control, reconciliation, and auditing.
  - Implement a functional TSA to improve transparency in management of government financial resources and strengthen cash and debt management.
- Implement fairly simple measures with significant transparency impacts:
  - Clarify the budget preparation process; establish clear procedures and timetables, ensure changes are announced well ahead.
  - Provide more explicit comparison and analysis of budget estimates versus outcomes in the annual budget document; establish a firm publication calendar for the MOF’s monthly bulletin.
  - Provide explicit statements of accounting policies in the annual final accounts; strengthen macrolevel reconciliation between fiscal and monetary data.
  - Establish a procedure for systematic publishing and disseminating the AB annual reports.
  - Fully document the MOP macroeconomic model, make it publicly available, and regularly publish estimates and analysis based on the model.

### Medium-term priorities and measures
- Priority 1 — Clarify boundaries of government and broader public sector:
  - Review activities of autonomous agencies, extrabudgetary funds and OBAs to incorporate agencies undertaking mainly governmental activities into the definition of government; classify mainly commercial entities as nonfinancial public enterprises.
  - Produce an inventory of quasi-fiscal activities carried out through public financial and nonfinancial institutions to quantify and disclose fiscal costs in budget documents.
  - More comprehensively disclose holdings by government and public institutions in private companies; establish a complete register of government and public entities holdings.
- Priority 2 — Improve transparency in fiscal policy management:
  - Widen fiscal policy and budget coverage from a partial definition of CG to a GFS 2001 definition of consolidated CG; submit or integrate budgets for autonomous agencies and extrabudgetary funds into the general annual budget.
  - Eliminate the practice of cabinet approval of mid-year or ex-post budget increases without subsequent parliamentary endorsement.
  - Disclose all cabinet fiscal policy decisions made outside the budget law, including award of government guarantees, approval of tax concessions, and approval of sales/donations of government properties; consider a publicly-available register of cabinet decisions.
- Priority 3 — Strengthen assurances about integrity of fiscal information:
  - Concentrate management of budget execution in the MOF, giving MOF responsibility for management of capital and foreign-financed projects.
  - Adopt comprehensive government accounting standards based on IPSAS.
  - Further consolidate the TSA to include external grants and loans.

### Relevant factual and numeric details preserved from source
- Law no 24 of 1950.
- By-law No. 8 of 2003.
- The AB plans to reduce within the next two years the number of staff members to 350.
- Last final accounts were published in 2001.
- A comprehensive GFB covering the general government was launched by the MOF in April 2005.
- Jordan is currently taking steps to become compliant with SDDS.
- The MOF’s GFB monthly document is published with no fixed time after month-end and lacks reconciliation with debt data and no mid-term review.

*Source: _cr0621 - 48. The National Statistics Office is not given legislative assurance of independence.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/_cr0621.pdf_
