## _cr06295 — Introduction and Overview

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---

### Key medium-term challenges and objectives
- Fiscal and financial sustainability challenges:
  - Budget relies on oil revenues equal to 25 percent of GDP; these revenues are projected to be halved over the next ten years.
  - Oil rent to the budget projected to fall from about 25 percent of GDP in 2006 to less than 12 percent in 2015.
- Growth and labor market challenges:
  - Labor force projected to increase at 4 percent a year; unemployment could exceed 20 percent by the end of the decade.
  - Historical job creation: declined from 4.8 percent in the 1990s to about 2.9 percent a year since 2000.
  - Unemployment estimated to have risen from 9½ percent in 2000 to 14 percent in 2004.
  - An average employment growth rate of 4½ percent a year would need to be sustained over the next 10 years to reverse the unemployment trend.
- Five-Year Plan (FYP) targets and reform focus:
  - Growth target: accelerate growth to 7 percent by 2010.
  - Labor target: lower unemployment to 8 percent by 2010.
  - Fiscal side: reforms in tax policy and tax administration, public finance management, civil service, price subsidies, and public enterprises.
  - Structural tools: improve financial intermediation, enhance the business environment, liberalize external trade, unify the exchange rate, strengthen the monetary policy framework.
- Purpose of paper:
  - Refine diagnosis, evaluate prior reform results, and identify critical reforms for the next 1–2 years. Chapters I–II: fiscal sustainability; Chapters III–V: growth-promoting policies.

### Fiscal Policy Framework (FPF): rationale, objectives, and rules
- Rationale for FPF:
  - Large budget deficits historically produce demand pressures, inflation, balance-of-payments strain, higher public debt, crowding out of private investment, higher interest rates, and constrained fiscal flexibility.
  - “Deficit bias” results from pro-cyclical discretionary spending, political-economy factors, and weak fiscal management/quasi-fiscal activities.
- Safeguards to address deficit bias:
  - Transparency: broaden fiscal reporting to extrabudgetary activities; identify and quantify main fiscal risks; adopt forward-looking multi-year budgets; provide benchmarks to increase accountability.
  - Fiscal rules: pre-commit governments to fiscal discipline through clear numerical benchmarks for main fiscal aggregates.
- Taxonomy and examples of fiscal rules:
  - Deficit rules: EU Stability and Growth Pact: 3 percent of GDP overall budget deficit ceiling; WAEMU: 4 percent of GDP on budget deficits excluding grants; Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland: balanced budget over the cycle; Sweden: budget surplus of 2 percent of GDP over the cycle.
  - Debt rules: EU SGP debt ceiling: 60 percent of GDP; UK “Sustainable Investment Rule”: net public debt at 40 percent of GDP; Jordan: reduce debt-to-GDP ratio to 60 percent by 2010; Tunisia: reduce to 45 percent by 2011.
  - Borrowing rules: WAEMU: 10 percent of the previous year’s revenues limit on access to central bank financing; UK Golden Rule: borrow only to invest (current budget balanced over the cycle).
  - Expenditure rules: set ceilings on spending or components; Sweden example addressing expansion to 65 percent of GDP.
- Proposed orientation for Syria’s FPF:
  - Aim: smooth fiscal transition as oil revenues decline by targeting a steady improvement in the non-oil budget deficit rather than attempting inter-generational wealth preservation.
  - Key elements: transparent reporting, identification of fiscal risks, and a fiscal rule tailored to oil-related volatility with regular reassessment.

### Fiscal Responsibility Laws (FRLs) and suitability for Syria
- Purpose/mechanisms of FRLs:
  - Enshrine legal force to fiscal policy objectives; pre-commit to monitorable fiscal targets; penalties or automatic triggers; mix of procedural and numerical rules.
  - Historical examples: New Zealand Fiscal Responsibility Act, 1994; Australia Charter for Budget Honesty; United Kingdom Code of Fiscal Stability.
- Risks and limitations:
  - Can remove needed discretion; creative accounting; adherence to letter not spirit (e.g., fire sales of assets); may prevent discretionary spending to mitigate shocks; breaches may elicit negative market reactions.
- Recommended components for a Syrian FPF / legal amendments:
  - Fiscal transparency principles: clear roles and timely fiscal data.
  - Accountability: independent external audit reporting to the legislature on budget execution.
  - Stability: budget objectives and targets cast in a medium-term framework.
  - Performance: report recent outcomes of budget programs in budgetary documents.
  - Fiscal rule selection should optimize fiscal sustainability defined as expected NPV of government revenues equaling expected NPV of government spending.

### Non-renewable resource constraints and intergenerational equity
- NPV of oil wealth and intergenerational equity calculation:
  - NPV of Syria’s oil wealth estimated at about US$90 billion, i.e., 325 percent of GDP.
  - To ensure equal benefit to all generations indefinitely, per capita consumption out of this wealth should be limited to US$70 per person per year (assuming a real rate of return of 4 percent and on-going population growth rate of 2.5 percent).
  - Current consumption out of the oil wealth is about US$370 per person.
  - To ensure inter-generational equity, today’s generation would have to take a cut of over 80 percent of the benefit it is enjoying, implying an upfront fiscal adjustment of close to 20 percent of GDP.
  - Conclusion: Forgoing the right of future generations to the remaining oil wealth seems unavoidable.
- Optimal management objective:
  - Adopt a rule targeting a steady improvement in the non-oil budget balance to smooth adjustment, stem time-inconsistent policies, insulate economy from oil revenue volatility, and allow annual reassessment given uncertainty over oil prices, proven reserves, and extraction paths.

### Steady-improvement rule: illustrative cases and advantages
- Model and heuristic:
  - Social planner problem and heuristic solution preserve notation and shape from the source; unique slope for the non-oil budget balance equates savings area while oil revenues are positive and dissavings thereafter.
- Appendix comparison conclusions:
  - Both balanced-budget and steady-improvement-in-non-oil-balance rules yield same performance if oil revenues decline smoothly.
  - Steady-improvement rule superior when oil revenues level off before declining or when future oil-revenue paths are uncertain.
- Numerical examples from source:
  - Case A — Gradual decline in oil revenue:
    - Assumption: oil revenues in year 1 = 18 percent of GDP, decline by 2 percentage points each year until depleted in year 10.
    - Balanced budget: Non-oil deficit path: -18, -16, -14, -12, -10, -8, -6, -4, -2, 0 (percent of GDP by year 1–10). Overall budget balance: 0 each year.
    - Steady 2 percentage point annual improvement yields the same adjustment path.
  - Case B — Oil revenues level off then drop:
    - Assumption: oil revenues = 18 percent of GDP for first five years, drop to zero in year 6.
    - Balanced budget: non-oil deficits = -18 percent of GDP for five years; sharp cut in year 6 from -18 to 0.
    - Steady 2 percentage point improvement: non-oil balance path: -18, -16, -14, -12, -10, -8, -6, -4, -2, 0 (percent of GDP by year 1–10).
    - Budget balance path under steady rule: 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, -8, -6, -4, -2, -20 (percent of GDP) as shown in source chart.
    - Cumulative savings by end of year 5: 20 percentage points of GDP (cumulative savings series: 0, 2, 6, 12, 20, 12, 6, 2, 0, 0).
  - Policy implication: steady-improvement rule reduces risk of abrupt painful adjustment and protects public investment and social spending; preferable given implementation lags for structural measures.

### Fiscal outlook and medium-term adjustment scenario
- Projected trends and combined fiscal impact:
  - Oil rent to the budget projected fall: about 25 percent of GDP in 2006 to less than 12 percent in 2015.
  - If domestic prices of subsidized petroleum products are kept constant in real terms, PPS cost will level off at about 14½ percent of GDP.
  - Combined effect: drop in net government revenues in excess of 10 percent of GDP without policy adjustment.
- Adjustment objective and path:
  - Adjustment in the non-oil budget deficit of some 11 percentage points of GDP is consistent with a stable macroeconomic environment and prudent debt dynamics over the next decade.
  - Policy target: improve non-oil budget balance on average by about 1 percentage point of GDP per year over the next ten years.
- Projected outcomes under the scenario:
  - Non-oil deficit strengthened from 13 percent of GDP in 2006 to about 2 percent of GDP by 2015.
  - Overall budget deficit averaging 2.8 percent of GDP per year, below FYP objective of 5 percent of GDP.
  - Public debt contained to about 40 percent of GDP by 2015.
- Recommended pillars of fiscal adjustment:
  - Reform of petroleum price subsidies (PPS).
  - Introduction of a broad-based VAT.
- Proposed adjustment timeline and VAT path:
  - Gradually adjust the price of diesel to international levels starting in 2007 and completing by 2010.
  - Introduce VAT at 5 percent in 2008, increasing gradually to 15 percent by 2012. (Table note: 1/ Assume the VAT is introduced at the rate of 5 percent in 2008, then raised in steps to 15 percent from 2014 on.)
  - Rationale: low initial VAT rate to facilitate introduction and encourage compliance.

### Fiscal projections and key fiscal figures (selected values preserved)
- Revenue (percent of GDP): 2005: 26.5; 2006: 27.5; 2015: 29.6.
- Oil-related proceeds (percent of GDP): 2005: 8.8; 2006: 10.0; 2010: 5.2; 2012: 2.0; 2013: 0.7; 2014: -0.6; 2015: -1.7.
- Non-oil tax revenue (percent of GDP): 2005: 10.4; 2006: 10.4; 2015: 11.8.
  - Income and profits: 2005: 3.6; 2006: 3.7; 2015: 4.2.
  - International trade: 2005: 1.8; 2006: 1.7; 2015: 1.2.
  - Other: 2005: 5.1; 2006: 5.1; 2015: 6.3.
- Non-oil non-tax revenue (percent of GDP): 2005: 7.2; 2006: 7.1; 2015: 7.7.
- Impact of VAT (assumed introduction): 2008: 0.6; 2009: 1.5; 2010: 2.4; 2011: 2.9; 2012: 3.8; 2013: 4.9; 2014: 4.9; 2015: 4.9.
- Impact of phasing petroleum price subsidies (selected years, percent of GDP):
  - Gross yield: 2007: 7.1; 2008: 8.7; 2009: 10.1; 2010: 11.4.
  - Minus cash compensation (each year 42 percent of gross yield returned to households assumed): 2007: 3.0; 2008: 3.7; 2009: 4.3; 2010: 4.8.
- Expenditure (percent of GDP): 2005: 30.7; 2006: 30.7; 2015: 33.5.
  - Current expenditure: 2005: 18.8; 2006: 18.9; 2015: 20.3.
  - Development expenditure: 2005: 11.8; 2006: 11.8; 2015: 13.2.
- Overall balance (percent of GDP): 2005: -4.2; 2006: -3.2; 2015: -4.0.
- Non-oil balance (percent of GDP): 2005: -13.0; 2006: -13.1; 2015: -2.3.
- Identified financing (percent of GDP): 2005: 4.3; 2006: 3.2; 2015: 4.0.
  - External financing: 2006: -0.6; 2007: -0.1; 2008 onward: 1.5 rising to 2.4 by 2015.
  - Domestic bank financing: 2005: 4.3; 2006: 2.9; 2015: 1.2.
- Memorandum items:
  - Government debt (percent of GDP): 2005: 38.2; 2006: 37.9; 2015: 40.4.
    - Domestic: 2005: 13.2; 2006: 15.2; 2015: 14.5.
    - External: 2005: 25.0; 2006: 22.6; 2015: 25.9.
  - Nominal GDP (in billions of Syrian pounds): 2005: 1424; 2006: 1566; 2015: 3988.
- Table assumptions and notes:
  - Diesel price adjustment assumption: diesel prices adjusted in 2007 to close 60 percent of the gap with respect to international prices; remaining adjustment spread over following three years; remaining implicit subsidy beyond 2010 reflects subsidies on fuel oil.
  - Each year 42 percent of gross yield to the government is returned to households (baseline compensation assumption).

### Petroleum price subsidies (PPS): scope, targeting, and reform design
- Scale and distribution:
  - By 2006, net subsidies on petroleum products could swell to 14½ percent of GDP.
  - World Bank estimate: the richest population decile benefits 25 times more than the poorest decile; the poorest half captures less than 20 percent of total benefits.
- Authorities’ proposed reform (balanced approach highlighted):
  - Focus initial reform on diesel (bulk of PPS).
  - Close 60 percent of the diesel price gap in 2007 and phase out remaining adjustment by 2010.
    - Adjusting diesel prices to international levels implies increase of 385 percent; raising prices by 230 percent would close 60 percent of the gap.
  - In absence of targeting mechanisms, return a flat per person cash compensation equal to a share of gross fiscal gain; baseline share: 42 percent of gross savings.
    - World Bank study: returning 42 percent of gross savings would make 50 percent of population better off.
- Projected fiscal impacts under baseline proposal:
  - Net gain to budget estimated at 4½ percent of GDP per year by 2010 when diesel subsidies fully withdrawn.
  - Gross budgetary saving projected at about 6½ percent of GDP (additional gross revenue of 11.3 percent of GDP minus 4.8 percent of GDP cost of cash compensation).
  - Higher diesel prices will increase government spending on goods and services and on developmental expenditure, estimated at 2 percent of GDP per year when diesel subsidies fully withdrawn.
- Inflation and welfare implications:
  - First-round and second-round CPI impacts shown in source figures: e.g., Raising Diesel Prices by 230% yields Overall CPI 4.2; by 385% yields Overall CPI 9.6 (and 16.0 in other permutations shown).
  - Most CPI increase reflects diesel price itself and first-round impacts on government-controlled public transportation and agricultural product prices.
- Calibration under alternative oil price scenarios:
  - If international prices average US$20 per barrel less than baseline, cash compensation calibrated to 21 percent of gross savings (versus 42 percent baseline) would achieve same net revenues.
  - Lower international prices require smaller domestic price adjustments and smaller consumer welfare losses (example: cumulative loss of 86 percent of 2006 GDP under lower-price scenario versus 97 percent in baseline in source simulations).
- Compensation design and targeting:
  - Two critical choices: speed of adjustment to international prices; amount and distribution of compensation.
  - Flat per person cash compensation baseline; improved targeting would yield greater net fiscal savings.
  - Use coupon system for sugar and rice as interim compensation delivery; build database of working poor and social assistance delivery network.
  - Increasing civil service wages is not advisable due to irreversibility and increased fiscal rigidity.

### Tax reform and VAT introduction: rationale and design
- Rationale:
  - Syria’s tax-to-GDP ratio was 10½ percent of GDP in 2005, low relative to regional comparators.
  - Regional comparators (percent of GDP): Syria 10.4; Egypt 13.7; Jordan 15.8; Lebanon 15.7; Morocco 22.4; Tunisia 20.6; Turkey 21.0; regional average (excluding Syria) 18.2.
  - Indirect tax share of total taxes (memo): Syria 0.3; regional average (excluding Syria) 0.6.
- Shortcomings of existing consumption tax (late 2004):
  - Positive list coverage, a dozen rates, tax cascading, narrow base, high administrative burden, no registration threshold, small businesses not excluded.
- Advantages of replacing with properly designed VAT:
  - Zero-rating exports; broad base; incentivizes filing for refunds; small traders excluded via turnover threshold.
- VAT design recommendations:
  - Destination principle; full credit for inputs including capital goods; broad scope; exemptions severely limited (hard-to-tax sectors such as financial services).
  - Prefer a single rate VAT to reduce compliance costs; single-rate examples: Lebanon 10 percent.
  - Initial high taxable threshold: advisable initial registration target between 4,000-6,000 taxpayers for first 2–3 years.
- Revenue projections and rate path (preliminary estimates preserved):
  - Preliminary estimate: each point of VAT could yield about 0.35 percent of GDP in revenue on a gross basis in initial years.
  - Case for starting VAT at 5 percent:
    - With a comprehensive base and adjustments for agricultural/trading exemptions and 10 percent leakage due to evasion, a standard rate of 5 percent will yield about 1.8 percent of GDP.
    - On a net basis (replacing present consumption tax of about 1.2 percent of GDP), initial yield projected at 0.6 percent of GDP in 2008.
  - Longer-term: as rate increases toward 15 percent and taxpayer base rises, VAT could raise 5 percent of GDP or more.
- Recommended complementary excises:
  - Retain excises on alcoholic and tobacco products; consider excises on petroleum products, cars, telecommunications; higher excises on luxury goods; avoid excises on products produced/distributed at numerous locations due to enforcement costs.
- Administrative considerations:
  - VAT law should be adopted at least six months ahead of implementation.
  - Design a VAT refund system with clear legal provisions, simple forms, and a risk-based audit system.
  - Integrated, function-based tax administration and mid-level project team established to prepare for VAT implementation in 2008.

### Public expenditure reorientation and public enterprise measures
- Reorient expenditure toward pro-growth programs in education, health, and infrastructure.
- Curtail transfers to loss-making public enterprises and reduce general subsidies.
- Strengthen public expenditure management: unify recurrent and capital budgets; improve budget accounting and reporting.
- Structural reforms: public enterprise restructuring, pension reform, civil service reform, and VAT introduction are needed but have implementation lags—hence the preference for steady-improvement fiscal rule to provide smoothing.

---

### Financial Sector Reform: assessment, priorities, and risks

### Initial conditions and progress to date
- Preconditions and liberalization milestones:
  - Law 28 (April 2001) allowed establishment of private banks; Bank of Syria and Overseas opened January 2004 as first private bank since 1963.
  - Insurance, Islamic banking, Capital Market Law, and Capital Market Authority developments in 2004–2006.
- Initial conditions (early 2000s):
  - Financial sector very small; competition limited; virtually no banking regulation and supervision.
  - Six state-owned banks provided no more than 25 percent of GDP credit to the economy, of which close to 2/3 was issued to the government and quasi-governmental agricultural procurement agencies.
  - Cash-dominated economy: clearing system processed about 5,000 checks per day; cash-to-deposit ratio as high as 60 percent.
  - Stock of broad liquidity increased from 25 percent of GDP in 1963 to some 80 percent in recent years.
  - Real interest rates averaged 7½ percent in 1997-2002; rates reduced in 2003.
- Progress and remaining gaps:
  - Financial intermediation increased but remains shallow; private banks entered but system dominated by inefficient state banks; administrative controls on pricing of liquidity and financial risks.
  - Credit to private sector doubled to 15 percent of GDP by end-2005; overall domestic credit at end-2005 increased to 40 percent of GDP.
  - Insurance sector: one state-owned company with gross annual premium less than 1 percent of GDP.

### Private banks: entry and performance
- Six private banks fully operational; about 10 percent market share.
- All are subsidiaries of foreign banks; Law 28 sets 49 percent limit on foreign participation in banks’ capital.
- Profitability reportedly good after tax reductions on financial services; two have decided to expand capital base.
- Significant domestic investor interest: IPOs oversubscribed.

### State banks: governance, efficiency, and soundness metrics
- SBs dominate and suffer weak governance and low efficiency.
- Drivers of low efficiency:
  - Low staff qualifications due to noncompetitive wages and weak HR management.
  - Poor managerial information systems and IT infrastructure.
  - Weak risk management; mostly collateral-based lending.
- Performance and soundness indicators:
  - Return on assets (ROA): about 0.4 percent.
  - Return on equity (ROE): about 2.5 percent.
  - Regional 2004 averages: ROA 1.5 percent; ROE ranged from 10 percent (Egypt) to 21 percent (Bahrain).
  - Non-performing loans (NPLs): equivalent to 16½ percent of total assets on average.
  - Average capital-to-asset ratio: 4.8 percent (lowest in region).
  - Loans to public enterprises (excluding agricultural procurement agencies): 3¼ of GDP at end-2005.
  - Loans to quasi-governmental agricultural procurement agencies: equivalent to 10 percent of GDP and 78 percent of loans to public enterprises.
- Applying international loan classification and provisioning likely increases NPL ratio and undercapitalization.

### Interest rate controls, monetary instruments, and dollarization
- Controls maintained on deposit rates with a 1 percent margin introduced January 2004 (designed +/-0.5 percent in practice).
- One percent downward margin on SBs’ lending rates introduced January 2004 (unused).
- No controls on private banks’ lending rates.
- Interbank lending subject to central bank approval introduced in 2004 but little used.
- FX deposits: ratio in private banks = 53 percent of total deposits; in SOBs = 9 percent.
- Implication: absence of money markets and central bank rediscount facility makes Syrian pound liquidity management difficult and encourages dollarization.

### Supervision, regulation, and payments system
- New regulations adopted (2004–2005): credit and interest rate risk management; loan classification and provisioning; internal control standards; operational risk management; international accounting standards; minimum capital adequacy ratio; limits on open FX positions.
- Supervision capacity gaps:
  - 45 additional staff hired; Banking and Training and Rehabilitation centre opened.
  - Independent banking supervision department head vacant; about 60 staff in supervision department with high turnover and only half pursuing training.
  - Compliance culture eroded after 40 years of quasi-absence of supervision.
- Payments system deficiencies:
  - No Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system.
  - No electronic/automated clearing check system.
  - Major transactions manual; system does not observe many Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems.
  - Progress expected: acquisition of RTGS system in coming months (as noted).

### Main problems/tensions and policy implications
- Four main tensions from seven-year reform experience:
  - Growing resistance to competition for fear SB inefficiencies become contingent liabilities.
  - Incompatibility between improving SB efficiency and using them as instruments of public policy.
  - Lack of progress toward indirect monetary instruments, requiring controls on deposit rates and undermining competition.
  - Legacy skills deficit in risk management and prudential supervision from 40 years of socialist banking.
- State bank restructuring and privatization considerations:
  - Privatization central to separating public policy functions and improving efficiency.
  - Opening capital base to strategic private investors to raise efficiency and address skills gap.
  - Level playing field: allow all banks right to provide international trade financing.
  - During PE restructuring a transitional public bank role may be needed; avoid substituting budget money with easy SB lending.
- Interest rate liberalization sequencing:
  - Liberalization can promote efficiency; sequence deposit rate liberalization with development of market-based monetary instruments.
  - Subsidized credit programs should be re-examined, scoped down, or replaced by direct assistance where appropriate; consider explicit subsidy mechanisms to allow private bank participation.
- Capacity-building priorities:
  - Strengthen banking regulation and supervision in parallel with liberalization.
  - Build capacity for effective on-site and off-site supervision and develop internal procedures.
  - Complete AML/CFT framework and address central bank remuneration constraints to attract qualified supervisors.

### Licensing, payment systems, and central bank institutional capacity
- Licensing policy should account for existing banks’ growth plans, market absorption capacity, and attractiveness for strategic investors.
- Develop a licensing manual to ensure prudent and transparent licensing.
- Modernize payment and settlement system to increase interbank transfer effectiveness, minimize payment risk, and facilitate fund management.
- Build CBS capacity:
  - Establish public credit registry or private credit bureaus (draft law, licensing, supervision required).
  - Improve accounting standards for banks.
  - Make timely data available about economic, monetary, and financial developments.

---

### Trade Regime Reform: progress, remaining barriers, and recommendations

### Overview of progress and remaining restrictiveness
- Syria had one of the most restrictive trade regimes in early 2000s (import prohibitions, public enterprise trading monopolies, extensive licensing, high and dispersed tariffs, multiple exchange rates).
- Recent liberalization (last three years):
  - Tariffs lowered; some import restrictions eliminated (textiles and cement ban lifted); access to foreign exchange for current transactions partly facilitated.
  - Association Agreement with EU and free trade agreement with Turkey negotiated/finalized; GAFTA membership allows free circulation of goods within GAFTA as of early 2005.
- Remaining restrictiveness mainly due to pervasive non-tariff barriers: unclear regulations, quantitative restrictions, licensing requirements, and other non-tariff measures that raise costs and unpredictability.

### Customs tariff and procedural issues
- Tariff evolution and characteristics:
  - Pre-2002: customs duties could accumulate up to 255 percent spread over 20 categories.
  - Over last three years, duties unified and lowered to a maximum of 65 percent.
  - Authorities intend to further simplify and reduce maximum rate to 50 percent and reduce categories to 5 (decision not formal yet).
  - Tariff not comprehensively published; most up-to-date schedule (Arabic only) last updated mid-2005; subsequent decrees published separately.
  - Tariff dispersion wide: many raw materials and equipment duty free or taxed at 1 percent or below; semi-manufactured and final consumer/luxury goods in medium/upper range.
- Recommendations on tariff:
  - Reduce number of categories to 3 or 4 (including zero rate).
  - Limit number of items at maximum rate.
  - Publish revised tariff promptly and, when possible, in English.
  - Create electronic version for updating and analysis.
- Customs modernization and remaining delays:
  - Introduced WCO single administrative document (SAD); new customs law finalization underway; one-stop border offices and “green line” for registered exporters.
  - Average clearance estimated at 15 days (companies), compared with 8 days in Egypt, 7 in India, 6 in China.
  - Implementation of ASYCUDA-World system planned over coming 24 months across airports, ports, and ~60 border stations.

### Non-tariff barriers: types and policy responses
- Types and status:
  - Prohibited imports lists for protection gradually reduced; import licensing for raw materials abolished; export licenses replaced by statistical forms; export bans mostly eliminated.
  - Non-tariff barriers remain complex, opaque, and costly: restrictions (security/environment/health; domestic industry protection; public enterprise monopolies; permit-and-fee imports), industrial quotas (eliminated early 2006 then reinstated), import licenses requiring technical ministry authorizations, and numerous administrative impediments (consulate authorizations with 1 percent stamp fee capped at US$1,500).
- Policy recommendations to reduce non-tariff barriers:
  - Publish negative list on restricted imports differentiating types of restrictions.
  - Replace restrictions (other than environment, security, health) with maximum tariff or appropriate tariff category, phasing out where needed.
  - Abolish industrial quotas.
  - Grant autonomy to public enterprises for their imports; abolish fees paid by private traders to public enterprises (replace by explicit subsidy if merited).
  - Gradually remove public trading monopolies.
  - Replace technical ministry verification with open general or specific license schemes.
  - Abolish consulate stamp fee and related verification to reduce red tape.

### Foreign exchange restrictions and trade financing
- Limited access to foreign exchange and multiple exchange rates encourage parallel market transactions.
- Authorities estimate about 65 percent of imported goods can be traded in official market (at exchange rate adjusted daily to parallel market with low spread).
- Foreign exchange trade financing by banks through official market accounted for about 20 percent of total estimated private sector imports in 2005.
- Parallel market trade financing may lead to undervaluation of invoiced amounts; customs officials lack means to verify off-shore transactions.

### Administered exchange rate use and budget implications
- Administered exchange rate in 2005 varied between a minimum of 4.9 percent and a maximum of 13.9 percent below the parallel market exchange rate.
- Public sector uses administered rate for all external transactions and customs administration uses it to convert trade invoices into Syrian pounds.
- Difference between budget and parallel market rates equates to an implicit subsidy applied to full transaction amounts in public sector and dutiable part for other transactions.
- Using fixed administered rate cushions the effect of import value increases when Syrian pound depreciates.

### Bilateral and regional agreements and strategic implications
- GAFTA: trade nearly fully liberalized with Arab countries since 2005; imports from GAFTA enter duty free (2 percent surcharge applied).
- Association Agreement with EU (signed 2004; initialized October 2004; stalled at EU Council of Ministers):
  - Would phase out customs duties for most goods over 12 years; require elimination of main non-tariff barriers for EU countries and update 12 economic laws (company law, commercial code, competition law, IPR, consumer protection, leasing).
  - EU to provide technical assistance and financial resources; European Investment Bank to help modernize infrastructure.
- Free Trade Agreement with Turkey expected effective later in 2006.
- Risk mitigation:
  - Reduce differential in relative preferences by lowering customs tariffs on Most Favored Nation basis in parallel with preferential agreements.
  - Priority: remove non-tariff barriers for all trading partners.

---

### Textile Sector: potential as a driver of non-oil exports

### Sector importance and recent policy change
- Cotton and textile sector significance:
  - Cotton is second most important cash crop after cereals; employs 2.7 million farmers and dependents (about 15 percent of population).
  - Textile industry accounts for about 20 percent of production and employment in industrial sector.
- Policy change in early 2006:
  - Ban on garment imports abolished; most restrictions on cotton fabric imports lifted.
- Objective of analysis:
  - Assess ability to respond to increased competition and policy recommendations to drive non-oil export growth.

### Cotton sector production, capacity, and fiscal implications (selected figures)
- Recent production levels and capacity:
  - Raw cotton production (unginned, thousand tons): 2000: 1,040; 2001: 979; 2002: 747; 2003: 1,379; 2004: 1,006; 2005: 992.
  - Area (thousand ha): 2000: 270.3; 2001: 257.1; 2002: 199.8; 2003: 205.4; 2004: 234.2; 2005: 237.0.
  - Yield (ton/ha): 2000: 3.9; 2001: 3.8; 2002: 3.6; 2003: 3.9; 2004: 4.3; 2005: 4.2.
  - Ginned cotton production (thousand tons): 2000: 346; 2001: 315; 2002: 235; 2003: 270; 2004: 333; 2005: 328.
  - Exports of ginned cotton (thousand tons): 2000: 218; 2001: 246; 2002: 80; 2003: 104; 2004: 114; 2005: 145.
  - Over last five years, raw cotton production ranged between 700 thousands and 1 million tons; Syria was tenth-largest cotton producer in world in 2005.
  - Production likely to peak at about 1 million tons; water supply limits expansion.
- Fiscal/subsidy implications:
  - Purchase price to farmers (LS/kg, beginning of season to mid-November, preliminary 2005): 2000: 30.75; 2001: 27.90; 2002: 26.80; 2003: 30.75; 2004: 30.75; 2005: 29.30.
  - Price effectively paid by CMO for 2004 and 2005: 15.00 (LS/kg).
  - Implicit subsidy (billion LS): 2004: 15.8; 2005: 14.2.
  - Implicit subsidy as percent of GDP: 2004: 1.3 percent; 2005: 1.1 percent.
  - Agricultural Bank loans in kind and cash equal to 0.1 percent of GDP; one-third estimated nonperforming.
  - CMO sells ginned cotton to local industry at world prices since 2001; cotton imports banned and domestic manufacturers must purchase exclusively from CMO.
- World price comparisons (US$/kg):
  - Average sales price by CMO: 2000: 1.1; 2001: 0.76; 2002: 1.13; 2003: 1.30; 2004: 1.05; 2005: 1.22.
  - Average world price (Liverpool Index): 2000: 1.30; 2001: 1.06; 2002: 1.02; 2003: 1.40; 2004: 1.36; 2005: 1.21.

### Textile industry structure, trade statistics, and competitiveness
- Industry structure and market orientation:
  - Textile manufacturing supplies mostly domestic market; second largest sector after agro-industries (excluding oil-related activities).
  - Public sector share about 25 percent of production; only 10 percent of fabric and garment sub-sectors.
  - Historically inward-looking: garments and most cotton fabric imports banned until early 2006; exports only 15-20 percent of production.
- Textile trade statistics (imports and exports, 2000–2004, US$ million):
  - Imports (total): 2000: 506; 2001: 292; 2002: 344; 2003: 421; 2004: 437.
    - Yarn: 2000: 286; 2001: 185; 2002: 174; 2003: 188; 2004: 208.
    - Fabric: 2000: 113; 2001: 73; 2002: 91; 2003: 152; 2004: 126.
    - Machinery and parts: 2000: 107; 2001: 34; 2002: 80; 2003: 81; 2004: 103.
  - Exports (total): 2000: 268; 2001: 100; 2002: 214; 2003: 358; 2004: 274.
    - Yarn exports: 2000: 95; 2001: 50; 2002: 70; 2003: 140; 2004: 92.
    - Fabric exports: 2000: 60; 2001: 19; 2002: 3; 2003: 96; 2004: 92.
    - Garments exports: 2000: 113; 2001: 32; 2002: 140; 2003: 120; 2004: 90.
  - Net trade (imports-exports): 2000: 237; 2001: 192; 2002: 130; 2003: 62; 2004: 162.
  - Excluding machinery and parts net trade: 2000: 131; 2001: 158; 2002: 51; 2003: (18); 2004: 59.
- Export geography and composition:
  - Higher value-added products exported mostly to GAFTA countries and Turkey (75 percent for fabric and 60 percent for garments in 2004).
  - Textile exports accounted for 13 percent of non-oil exports in 2004 (8 percent excluding yarn).
  - 65 percent of yarn produced was exported to EU in 2004.
  - Textile exports to EU represented about 3 percent of Syria’s total exports.

### Competitiveness challenges and policy recommendations
- Short-run recommendations:
  - Ensure prices of ginned cotton and yarn (subject to public monopolies) truly reflect world prices to level domestic and external competition.
- Near- to medium-term measures:
  - Remove ban on cotton imports and marketing obligations to local suppliers.
  - Rescind monopoly on production of yarns and remove ban on yarn imports; remove administrative planning of annual share of yarns to be sold to local market.
  - Allow final goods manufacturers to choose inputs (Syrian cotton and yarn or imports) based on economics.
- Structural/institutional reforms:
  - Restructure/liquidate non-profitable public companies to shift resources to most profitable companies.
  - Strengthen business environment and reduce red tape to boost competitiveness.
- Expected outcomes:
  - Enhanced synergies between cotton and textile sectors.
  - Potential transformation into both a cotton producer and textile exporter model.
  - Possibility to shift from low exporter to fast-developing exporting model similar to low-labor-cost producers with local manufacturing.

---

*Source: _cr06295 — IMF staff report excerpts and projections (Introduction and Overview; Chapters I–V; selected annexes).*

### Introduction and Overview ..............................................................................................

### _cr06295 - Introduction and Overview

### Key medium-term challenges
- Syria faces two interrelated challenges from the prospective decline in oil reserves:
  - Preserve fiscal sustainability and financial stability: the budget relies on oil revenues equal to 25 percent of GDP; these revenues are projected to be halved over the next ten years.
  - Boost growth to expand and diversify production and exports before oil resources are exhausted and to absorb a bulge in entrants to the labor force. The labor force is projected to increase at 4 percent a year; unemployment could exceed 20 percent by the end of the decade. An average employment growth rate of 4½ percent a year would need to be sustained over the next 10 years to reverse this trend.

- Historical labor market context:
  - The rate of job creation declined from 4.8 percent in the 1990s to about 2.9 percent a year since 2000.
  - Unemployment is estimated to have risen from 9½ percent in 2000 to 14 percent in 2004.

### Five-Year Plan (FYP) objectives and reform focus
- Fiscal side: far-reaching reforms in tax policy and tax administration, public finance management, civil service, price subsidies, and public enterprises.
- Growth and labor: accelerate growth to 7 percent by 2010, lower unemployment to 8 percent by 2010, reduce poverty.
- Structural tools: improve financial intermediation, enhance the business environment, liberalize external trade, unify the exchange rate, strengthen the monetary policy framework.
- Purpose of this background paper: refine diagnosis, evaluate prior reform results, and flesh out critical reforms for the next 1–2 years. Chapters I–II focus on fiscal sustainability; Chapters III–V address growth-promoting policies.

### Chapter summaries (high-level findings)
- Chapter I: Fiscal Policy Framework (FPF)
  - Argues Syria’s remaining oil reserves are too low to aim for inter-generational equity in oil wealth use.
  - Recommends managing remaining oil reserves to smooth the adjustment toward a sustainable long-run fiscal position by targeting a steady improvement in the non-oil budget deficit.
  - Notes that given uncertainty about oil prices, proven reserves, and extraction paths, the optimal pace of non-oil deficit adjustment must be reassessed regularly.

- Chapter II: Fiscal reforms for consolidation
  - Quantifies the fiscal challenge in more detail (see Chapter II).
  - Recommends a pro-growth fiscal consolidation relying principally on phasing out petroleum price subsidies (PPS) and introducing a VAT.
  - Notes PPS cost likely to surge to 14½ percent of GDP in 2006; reform design should allow flexibility tied to prevailing international oil prices and calibrate speed of price adjustment and household compensation.
  - Advises against mitigating PPS removal by increasing civil service wages due to risky rigidity.
  - VAT design recommendations: (i) a single rate, with option to impose excises on luxury items; (ii) broad coverage with exemptions limited to hard-to-tax sectors such as financial services; (iii) initially high taxable threshold for cost effectiveness.

- Chapter III: Financial sector reform assessment
  - Seven-year reform experience identified four main problems/tensions:
    - Growing resistance to competition for fear state bank inefficiencies could become contingent liabilities.
    - Incompatibility between improving state bank efficiency and using them as instruments of public policy.
    - Lack of progress toward indirect monetary instruments, requiring controls on banks’ deposit rates to set an interest rate benchmark, undermining competition and efficiency.
    - Legacy skills deficit in risk management and prudential supervision after 40 years of socialist banking.
  - Offers recommendations on state bank restructuring/privatization, interest rate liberalization, and supporting measures.

- Chapter IV: Trade regime reform
  - Recent reforms have significantly opened Syria’s trade regime from one of the most restrictive in the world.
  - Remaining challenges: pervasive non-tariff barriers influenced by vested interests; need to remove them to improve resource allocation, lower transaction costs, reduce red tape, and establish credibility for WTO accession.
  - Association Agreement with the European Union could be instrumental in removing barriers and establishing a regulatory environment conducive to investment and integration into the global economy.

- Chapter V: Textile sector potential
  - Textile activities (including cotton production) represent a sizable share of the non-oil economy but have been highly subsidized and protected, resulting in an inward-looking sector.
  - Recent removal of key protections (e.g., ban on import of garments) raises the question whether Syria can capitalize on increased competition to become a competitive textile exporter.
  - Chapter offers sector-specific policy recommendations (see Chapter V).

### Fiscal policy framework: rationale and components
- Rationale:
  - Large budget deficits historically produce demand pressures, inflation, balance-of-payments strain, higher public debt, crowding out of private investment, higher interest rates, and constrained fiscal flexibility.
  - “Deficit bias”: tendency for fiscal policy to generate deficits rather than balances, often from pro-cyclical discretionary spending that becomes ossified; supported by political-economy factors and weak fiscal management/quasi-fiscal activities.

- Safeguards to address deficit bias:
  - Transparency:
    - Broaden fiscal reporting coverage to extrabudgetary activities.
    - Identify and, where possible, quantify main fiscal risks (e.g., fall in price of main exports).
    - Adopt forward-looking budget formulation (multi-year budgets; better coordination of current and capital expenditure).
    - Increased accountability through provision of benchmarks.
  - Fiscal rules:
    - Pre-commit governments to fiscal discipline by providing clear numerical benchmarks for main fiscal aggregates.
    - Adoption of fiscal rules signals seriousness about tackling fiscal profligacy.

### Taxonomy and examples of fiscal rules
- Deficit rules:
  - Set a ceiling on the overall deficit; useful for short-term macroeconomic control.
  - Examples and benchmarks cited:
    - EU Stability and Growth Pact: 3 percent of GDP overall budget deficit ceiling.
    - WAEMU: 4 percent of GDP on budget deficits excluding grants.
    - Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland: call for a balanced budget over the cycle.
    - Sweden: Spring Fiscal Policy Bill calls for a budget surplus of 2 percent of GDP over the cycle (aims included reducing public debt that was as high as 70 percent of GDP when introduced).
- Debt rules:
  - Put a ceiling on net or gross debt to directly target debt sustainability.
  - Examples and benchmarks cited:
    - EU SGP debt ceiling: 60 percent of GDP.
    - UK “Sustainable Investment Rule”: net public debt at 40 percent of GDP.
    - Jordan: aim to reduce debt-to-GDP ratio to 60 percent by 2010.
    - Tunisia: aim to reduce debt-to-GDP ratio to 45 percent by 2011.
- Borrowing rules:
  - Limit government borrowing from domestic sources or the central bank to avoid debt monetization.
  - Examples and benchmarks cited:
    - WAEMU: 10 percent of the previous year’s revenues limit on access to central bank financing.
    - UK Golden Rule: current budget balanced over the cycle, so borrowing only to invest.
    - Note: practical sustainability concerns due to fiscal dominance/monetization risk.
- Expenditure rules:
  - Set ceilings on overall spending or on components; effective at attacking expenditure-driven deficit bias.
  - Example cited: Sweden addressing expansion of government spending to 65 percent of GDP.

### Proposed orientation for Syria’s FPF
- Aim: smooth the fiscal transition as oil revenues decline by targeting a steady improvement in the non-oil budget deficit rather than attempting inter-generational wealth preservation.
- Key design elements:
  - Transparent reporting and identification of fiscal risks.
  - A fiscal rule tailored to address the specific fiscal outlook and volatility associated with oil revenues, with regular reassessment given uncertainty about oil prices, proven reserves, and extraction paths.

*Source: _cr06295 - Introduction and Overview*

### 8.      In some countries FPFs have been enshrined in Fiscal Responsibility Laws

### _cr06295 - 8.      In some countries FPFs have been enshrined in Fiscal Responsibility Laws

### Fiscal Responsibility Laws (FRLs): purpose and examples
- FRLs are institutional devices that aim to consolidate a government’s commitment to fiscal discipline by attaching legal force to fiscal policy objectives, and making those responsible for fiscal policy more accountable to the legislature and to the public (Hemming and Kell, 2001).
- Mechanisms:
  - Pre-commitment to a monitorable fiscal target.
  - Penalties in case of failure to adhere to it, which could be either reputational or automatic triggers to cut expenditure.
  - Combination of procedural rules (transparency and accountability requirements) and numerical rules (quantitative fiscal targets) with varying emphasis.
- Historical examples:
  - New Zealand: Fiscal Responsibility Act, 1994 (first).
  - Australia: Charter for Budget Honesty.
  - United Kingdom: Code of Fiscal Stability.
  - More recently implemented in several Latin American and European countries.

### Risks and limitations of FRLs
- FRLs are not a panacea and can be harmful by removing needed discretion.
- Problems identified:
  - Creative accounting to meet numerical targets (example: classify current expenditure as capital expenditure).
  - Adherence to the letter rather than the spirit of rules (example: fire sale of state assets to meet deficit targets).
  - When fully observed, may prevent discretionary spending to mitigate unexpected shocks.
  - When breached to face contingencies, breaches may elicit negative market reactions (see Milesi-Ferretti, 2000).

### A suitable Fiscal Policy Framework (FPF) for Syria: rationale
- Syria faces:
  - Political economy factors and weak fiscal management creating deficit bias.
  - A severe deterioration in its fiscal outlook over the medium term (see Chapter II for quantification).
- A transparent FPF would:
  - Guard against deficit bias and maintain fiscal discipline.
  - Provide added benefit given the more daunting fiscal challenge.

### Recommended components of a Syrian FPF
- Amend the basic finance law to enshrine:
  - Fiscal transparency principles: clear definition of roles of public bodies and timely provision of fiscal data.
  - Accountability: independent external audit reporting to the legislature on budget execution.
  - Stability: cast budget objectives and targets in a medium-term framework.
  - Performance: report recent outcomes of budget programs in budgetary documents.
- Fiscal rule selection should optimize the macroeconomic objective: fiscal sustainability defined as the expected NPV of government revenues equaling the expected NPV of government spending (see Blanchard and others, 1990).

### Challenges posed by non-renewable natural resource endowments (oil)
- Specific issues:
  - Fiscal sustainability: income stream from selling the resource stops when exhausted.
  - Inter-generational equity: distribution across generations of income from resource wealth.
- Two policy choices highlighted:
  - Consume oil revenues while they last and adjust fiscal policy when they dry up.
  - Cap consumption now so the stock of wealth remains constant (absolute or per capita) to pass on to future generations.
- Exact calibration for Syria (assessment of intergenerational equity):
  - Net present discounted value (NPV) of Syria’s oil wealth estimated at about US$90 billion, i.e., 325 percent of GDP.
  - To ensure equal benefit to all generations indefinitely, per capita consumption out of this wealth should be limited to US$70 per person per year (assuming a real rate of return of 4 percent and the on-going population growth rate of 2.5 percent).
  - Current consumption out of the oil wealth is about US$370 per person.
  - To ensure inter-generational equity, today’s generation would have to take a cut of over 80 percent of the benefit it is enjoying, implying an upfront fiscal adjustment of close to 20 percent of GDP.
  - Conclusion: Forgoing the right of future generations to the remaining oil wealth seems unavoidable.

### Optimal management objective: smoothing the adjustment
- Policy goal: smooth adjustment toward a sustainable long-run fiscal position by targeting a steady improvement in the non-oil budget balance.
- Model setup (symbols preserved as in source):
  - Let t nob be the non-oil balance at time t, t r oil revenue at time t, and tt ddnob = the fiscal adjustment at time t.
  - Social planner problem (as presented): minimize ∫0∞ e−ρt 2 t ddt subject to ∫0∞ e−ρt (r t dte nob dt) = 0 (notation preserved from source).
- Heuristic solution for flat oil revenues over a horizon then drop to zero:
  - Unique slope for the non-oil budget balance such that the area of triangle OAB equals the area of triangle BCD, representing savings while oil revenues are positive and dissavings to smooth adjustment thereafter.
- Under uncertainty:
  - The social planner’s problem becomes an optimal control problem to be solved each year, updating the pace of adjustment in light of revised NPV of oil wealth.
  - Upward revision of NPV implies relaxation of adjustment pace; downward revision implies acceleration.
  - Realized oil outcomes determine overall balance in the year but do not change the pre-determined intra-year adjustment path, lending predictability and stability.

### Policy recommendation for Syria
- Adopt a rule targeting a steady improvement in the non-oil budget balance to:
  - Stem time-inconsistent and short-sighted policies.
  - Insulate the domestic economy from volatility of oil revenues.
  - Allow annual reassessment of the optimal pace of adjustment given uncertainty over oil prices, proven reserves, and extraction paths.
  - Factor in cyclical position and macroeconomic conditions when determining annual adjustments.

### Appendix comparison: Balanced budget rule versus steady improvement in non-oil balance
- Summary conclusion:
  - Both rules yield the same performance if oil revenues decline smoothly.
  - The steady-improvement-in-non-oil-balance rule is superior if oil revenues level off before declining, or when future oil-revenue paths are uncertain.

- Case A — Gradual decline in oil revenue (numerical example):
  - Assumption: oil revenues in year 1 = 18 percent of GDP, decline by 2 percentage points each year until depleted in year 10.
  - Under balanced budget rule:
    - Non-oil budget deficit path: -18, -16, -14, -12, -10, -8, -6, -4, -2, 0 (percent of GDP by year 1–10).
    - Overall budget balance: 0 in each year.
  - Under steady 2 percentage point annual improvement in non-oil deficit:
    - The same adjustment path and continuous balanced budget result.
  - Table presented in source (values preserved in prose above).

- Case B — Oil revenues level off before declining (numerical example):
  - Assumption: oil revenues = 18 percent of GDP for first five years, drop to zero in year 6.
  - Under balanced budget rule:
    - Government can run non-oil deficits = -18 percent of GDP for five years.
    - In year 6, must cut non-oil deficit from -18 to 0, a sharp adjustment causing a deep recession and long-term harm.
  - Under steady improvement of 2 percentage points of GDP per year in the non-oil deficit:
    - Year-by-year non-oil budget balance path: -18, -16, -14, -12, -10, -8, -6, -4, -2, 0 (percent of GDP by year 1–10).
    - Budget balance path: 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, -8, -6, -4, -2, -20 (percent of GDP) as shown in the source chart (values preserved).
    - Cumulative savings by end of year 5: 20 percentage points of GDP (cumulative savings series: 0, 2, 6, 12, 20, 12, 6, 2, 0, 0 presented in source).
    - The accumulated savings buffer finances deficits after oil revenue falls, smoothing adjustment until year 10 when non-oil balance is in equilibrium and cumulative savings used up.
  - Conclusion: steady improvement rule reduces risk of painful abrupt adjustment and protects public investment and social spending; it is preferable given implementation lags of structural measures (public enterprise restructuring, pension reform, civil service reform, introducing a VAT).

### Reform agenda context (selected points from following chapter)
- Syria faces formidable fiscal challenges as oil production has fallen by over 20 percent in the last five years to slightly above 20 million tons in 2005 and is projected to decline further to about 15 million tons per year by the middle of next decade.
- Domestic oil consumption has increased by some 40 percent to about 15 million tons in the last five years, and is projected to rise to over 20 million tons by the middle of next decade at an average annual rate of about 5½ percent.
- If trends hold, Syria will become a net oil importer by the end of this decade, and dependence on imported oil will grow thereafter.

*Source: _cr06295 - 8.      In some countries FPFs have been enshrined in Fiscal Responsibility Laws*

### 27.      These projected trends will have a significant adverse impact on net oil proceeds

### 27.      These projected trends will have a significant adverse impact on net oil proceeds

### Projected trends and fiscal impact
- Oil rent to the budget (value of oil production net of production costs and valued at international prices) is projected to fall from about 25 percent of GDP in 2006 to less than 12 percent in 2015.
- If domestic prices of subsidized petroleum products are kept constant in real terms:
  - The fiscal cost of petroleum price subsidies (PPS) will level off at about 14½ percent of GDP, assuming no further increases in the relative price of oil and domestic oil consumption grows in line with the overall growth of the economy.
- Combined effect:
  - Both trends will result in a drop in net government revenues in excess of 10 percent of GDP, threatening fiscal sustainability in the absence of policy adjustment.
- Definitions and notes:
  - 1/ Defined as oil production valued at international prices plus taxes on gasoline minus petroleum price subsidies.
  - 2/ Net of production costs.
- Sources: Syrian authorities; and IMF staff projections.

### Medium-term fiscal adjustment scenario and targets
- Adjustment objective:
  - An adjustment in the nonoil budget deficit of some 11 percentage points of GDP is consistent with delivering a stable macroeconomic environment with a prudent debt dynamic in the next decade.
  - A policy targeting an improvement in the nonoil budget balance on average of about 1 percentage point of GDP per year over the next ten years should be pursued.
- Projected outcomes under the scenario:
  - Strengthening in the nonoil deficit from 13 percent of GDP in 2006 to about 2 percent of GDP by 2015.
  - Overall budget deficit averaging 2.8 percent of GDP per year, below the FYP objective of 5 percent of GDP.
  - Public debt contained to about 40 percent of GDP by 2015.
- Recommended main pillars of fiscal adjustment:
  - Reform of petroleum price subsidies (PPS).
  - Introduction of a broad-based VAT.
- Adjustment measures proposed (timeline and rates):
  - Gradually adjust the price of diesel to international levels starting in 2007 and completing it by 2010.
  - Introduce the VAT at a rate of 5 percent in 2008, increasing it gradually to 15 percent by 2012.
  - Rationale: The low initial VAT rate would facilitate introduction and encourage greater compliance.

### Fiscal projections and key figures (Table 1 highlights, in percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated)
- Revenue (selected years): 2005: 26.5; 2006: 27.5; 2015: 29.6.
- Oil-related proceeds (selected years): 2005: 8.8; 2006: 10.0; 2010: 5.2; 2012: 2.0; 2013: 0.7; 2014: -0.6; 2015: -1.7.
- Non-oil tax revenue (selected years): 2005: 10.4; 2006: 10.4; 2015: 11.8.
  - Income and profits: 2005: 3.6; 2006: 3.7; 2015: 4.2.
  - International trade: 2005: 1.8; 2006: 1.7; 2015: 1.2.
  - Other: 2005: 5.1; 2006: 5.1; 2015: 6.3.
- Non-oil non-tax revenue: 2005: 7.2; 2006: 7.1; 2015: 7.7.
- Impact of the VAT (assumed introduction): 2008: 0.6; 2009: 1.5; 2010: 2.4; 2011: 2.9; 2012: 3.8; 2013: 4.9; 2014: 4.9; 2015: 4.9.
- Impact of phasing petroleum price subsidies:
  - Gross yield (selected years): 2007: 7.1; 2008: 8.7; 2009: 10.1; 2010: 11.4.
  - Minus cash compensation (each year 42 percent of gross yield returned to households assumed): 2007: 3.0; 2008: 3.7; 2009: 4.3; 2010: 4.8.
- Expenditure (selected years): 2005: 30.7; 2006: 30.7; 2015: 33.5.
  - Current expenditure: 2005: 18.8; 2006: 18.9; 2015: 20.3.
  - Development expenditure: 2005: 11.8; 2006: 11.8; 2015: 13.2.
- Overall balance (selected years): 2005: -4.2; 2006: -3.2; 2015: -4.0.
- Non-oil balance (selected years): 2005: -13.0; 2006: -13.1; 2015: -2.3.
- Identified financing (selected years): 2005: 4.3; 2006: 3.2; 2015: 4.0.
  - External (selected years): 2006: -0.6; 2007: -0.1; 2008 onward: 1.5 rising to 2.4 by 2015.
  - Domestic bank financing (selected years): 2005: 4.3; 2006: 2.9; 2015: 1.2.
- Memorandum items:
  - Government debt (percent of GDP): 2005: 38.2; 2006: 37.9; 2015: 40.4.
    - Domestic: 2005: 13.2; 2006: 15.2; 2015: 14.5.
    - External: 2005: 25.0; 2006: 22.6; 2015: 25.9.
  - Nominal GDP (in billions of Syrian pounds): 2005: 1424; 2006: 1566; 2015: 3988.
- Sources: Ministry of Finance; and Fund staff estimates and projections.
- Assumptions and notes from table:
  - 1/ Assume the VAT is introduced at the rate of 5 percent in 2008, then raised in steps to 15 percent from 2014 on.
  - 2/ Takes into account the impact of the increase in diesel prices on government purchases.
  - 3/ Assumes diesel prices are adjusted in 2007 to close 60 percent of the gap with respect to international prices. The remaining adjustment is spread over the following three years. The remaining implicit subsidy beyond 2010 reflect subsidies on fuel oil.
  - 4/ Assumes that each year 42 percent of gross yield to the government is returned to households.

### Reforming petroleum price subsidies (PPS): rationale, design, and impacts
- Recent trend and scale:
  - Fiscal cost of petroleum subsidies has risen sharply since 1999.
  - By 2006, net subsidies on petroleum products could swell to 14½ percent of GDP.
- Equity and efficiency concerns:
  - World Bank estimate: the richest population decile benefits 25 times more than the poorest decile; the poorest half of the population captures less than 20 percent of total benefits.
  - Subsidies generate large deadweight losses and are inequitable.
- Proposed reform strategy (authorities’ proposal highlighted as balanced):
  - Focus initial reform on diesel, as the subsidy on diesel accounts for the bulk of PPS.
  - Close 60 percent of the gap between domestic and international price of diesel upfront (in 2007) and phase out the remaining adjustment by 2010.
    - Note: Adjusting diesel prices to international levels would imply an increase of 385 percent; raising prices by 230 percent would close 60 percent of the gap with international prices.
  - In the absence of targeting mechanisms, return to all households a flat per person cash compensation equal to a share of the gross fiscal gain from the price adjustment.
    - A World Bank study indicates returning 42 percent of the gross savings would make 50 percent of the population better off.
- Projected fiscal impacts under the proposal:
  - Net gain to the budget estimated at 4½ percent of GDP per year by 2010 when domestic diesel subsidies are completely withdrawn.
  - Gross budgetary saving projected at about 6½ percent of GDP, comprising additional gross revenue of 11.3 percent of GDP minus a 4.8 percent of GDP cost of the envisaged cash compensation.
  - Higher diesel prices will increase government spending on goods and services and on developmental expenditure, estimated at 2 percent of GDP per year when diesel subsidies are fully withdrawn.
- Inflation implications:
  - First-round and second-round effects on CPI estimated (examples shown): overall CPI impacts for specified diesel price adjustments (e.g., Raising Diesel Prices by 230% yields Overall CPI 4.2; by 385% yields Overall CPI 9.6 and 16.0 in other permutations as presented in figures).
  - Most CPI increase would reflect the diesel price itself and first-round impacts on government-controlled public transportation and agricultural product prices.

### Calibration under alternative international oil price scenarios
- If international oil prices are lower than baseline:
  - A more front-loaded adjustment would probably better balance inflation-expectation risks and adjustment fatigue.
  - The share of gross savings returned to households should be lower. Example: if prices average US$20 per barrel less than baseline, cash compensation calibrated to 21 percent of gross savings (versus 42 percent in baseline) would achieve the same net revenues.
  - Lower international prices require smaller domestic price adjustments, leading to smaller consumer welfare losses; a cash compensation of 21 percent of gross savings could produce a smaller welfare loss (cumulative loss of 86 percent of 2006 GDP) than the baseline case (97 percent).
- Charts and simulations in the source show cumulative net budgetary impacts and household welfare losses under baseline and US$20-per-barrel-lower scenarios (results presented graphically in the source).

### Compensation design, targeting, and complementary reforms
- Compensation design and trade-offs:
  - Two critical choices: speed of adjustment toward international prices; and amount and distribution of compensation to households.
  - Trade-offs include risk of destabilizing inflation expectations versus adjustment fatigue, and fiscal savings versus political palatability.
- Compensation options evaluated:
  - Flat per person cash compensation returning a share of gross savings (baseline assumption: 42 percent).
  - Increasing civil service wages is not advisable because:
    - It only eases the impact for public sector employees, not other deserving groups.
    - It risks social unrest by excluding broader population segments.
    - Salary increases are irreversible and create fiscal rigidity.
    - Low public sector wages should be addressed via comprehensive civil service reform.
- Targeting improvements and institutional needs:
  - Improved targeting will yield greater net fiscal savings than a flat cash compensation scheme.
  - Building a database of the working poor and a delivery network of social assistance is important and should be pursued expeditiously.
  - The existing coupon system for sugar and rice could be used to implement interim compensation schemes.
- Broader tax and expenditure reforms recommended alongside PPS reform:
  - Introduce a comprehensive tax reform to simplify the tax system, focusing on revamping personal and corporate income taxation to improve revenue buoyancy.
  - Strengthen tax administration: modernize operations, develop self assessment, introduce a large taxpayer unit.
  - Reorient expenditure toward pro-growth programs in education, health, and infrastructure; curb transfers to loss-making public enterprises and reduce general subsidies.
  - Strengthen public expenditure management: unify recurrent and capital expenditure budgets and improve budget accounting and reporting systems.

### Introducing a broad-based VAT and raising tax effort
- Rationale:
  - Syria’s tax-to-GDP ratio was 10½ percent of GDP in 2005, low relative to regional comparators; increasing tax revenue should be feasible without undue burden if tax choice, design, and implementation are judicious.
- Regional comparators (percent of GDP, selected):
  - Tax revenue: Syria 10.4; Egypt 13.7; Jordan 15.8; Lebanon 15.7; Morocco 22.4; Tunisia 20.6; Turkey 21.0; regional average (excluding Syria) 18.2.
  - Indirect tax share of total taxes (memo): Syria 0.3; regional average (excluding Syria) 0.6.
- Implication:
  - A broad-based VAT combined with PPS reform could materially close the fiscal gap from declining oil revenues while supporting a shift to more sustainable and equitable revenue sources.

*Source: Syrian authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections, extracted from the IMF staff report section titled “These projected trends will have a significant adverse impact on net oil proceeds.”*

### 41.      As some taxes, especially ill-designed ones, might be detrimental to growth, it is

### _cr06295 - 41.      As some taxes, especially ill-designed ones, might be detrimental to growth, it is

### Rationale for shifting to non-distortionary taxes and a VAT
- Direct taxes such as income and profit taxes, social security taxes, payroll taxes, and property tax tend to reduce growth (Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell (1999)).
- Non-distortionary taxation such as a broad base consumption tax on goods and services (i.e., a VAT) is neutral for growth.
- In Syria, reliance on indirect taxes has been fairly low relative to direct taxes and compared to other countries in the region, implying considerable potential to raise tax revenue efficiently by introducing properly designed and implemented indirect taxes.
- The absence of a broad-based tax on consumption explains the observed low indirect tax to total tax ratio.

### Shortcomings of the existing consumption tax (introduced late 2004)
- Applies only to a positive list of goods and services (imported or locally produced).
- Has a dozen rates, together with a credit mechanism, and a refund system for exporters (only).
- Suffers from:
  - Tax cascading, which distorts business activity.
  - A narrow base, limiting revenue potential.
  - High burden on tax administration and high compliance costs on taxpayers due to complicated rate structure and the absence of a registration threshold.
- Small businesses are not excluded; because they have limited capacity to maintain proper accounting records, administrability is considerably increased without appreciable revenue gain.

### Advantages of replacing the present consumption tax with a properly designed VAT
- Will not impose a burden on investment and exports (via zero-rating exports), supporting long-term growth.
- Can yield high revenue collection if the base is broad.
- Could nurture a taxpaying culture by giving taxpayers an incentive to file returns to recover VAT refunds.
- If well-designed, will have relatively little impact on the poor, who are unlikely to make bulk purchases from VAT-registered traders; small traders would be excluded via a turnover threshold.

### VAT design recommendations
- Levy VAT on the destination principle: tax both domestically produced goods and imports; exports zero-rated via input tax credit mechanism.
- VAT credit should be provided for all inputs, including capital goods; full credit for investment to avoid taxing investment.
- Scope should be broad—bring virtually all goods and services into the tax net.
- Exemptions should be severely limited, preferably to hard-to-tax sectors such as financial services (and those excluded via the threshold).
- Prefer a single rate VAT:
  - Single rate reduces compliance costs and administrative burden.
  - More than 40 percent of countries with VAT have chosen a single rate; Lebanon has a single rate of 10 percent.
  - Differential rates for redistributive aims are better addressed through targeted spending or selective excises on luxury goods.
- Taxable (registration) threshold:
  - Set at a high level to keep out small businesses.
  - Advisable initial registration target: between 4,000-6,000 taxpayers for the first 2–3 years of implementation.
  - Coverage can be expanded as administrative capacity builds.
  - Setting an appropriate threshold requires a good database on the distribution of businesses by turnover.

### Revenue projections and rate path (preliminary estimates)
- Preliminary estimate: each point of the VAT could yield about 0.35 percent of GDP in revenue on a gross basis in the initial years.
- Case for starting VAT at a low rate of 5 percent:
  - On the assumption of a comprehensive VAT base (with adjustments for base reduction due to small businesses in agriculture and trading below the threshold and for some leakages due to evasion), a standard rate of 5 percent will yield about 1.8 percent of GDP in revenue.
  - On a net basis, since the VAT will replace the present consumption tax (about 1.2 percent of GDP), its initial yield is projected at 0.6 percent of GDP in 2008.
- Assumptions behind the 1.8 percent of GDP estimate (calculated using 2002 data):
  - (a) 50 percent of sales of the agricultural sector (virtually all unprocessed food sold to consumers) and 75 percent of trade margins of wholesalers and retailers are exempt from the tax.
  - (b) A leakage of 10 percent due to evasion.
- Longer-term prospect:
  - As the rate is increased over time and the number of VAT taxpayers rises, reaching eventually 15 percent, it is foreseeable that the VAT could easily raise 5 percent of GDP or more (a productivity yield about on par with the single rate Lebanese VAT).
- To limit revenue impact of VAT refunds for capital goods, some countries mandate that excess VAT credits be carried over to subsequent filing periods rather than refunded immediately.

### Recommended complementary excises
- Retain excises on alcoholic and tobacco products to address negative externalities.
- Consider excises on petroleum products, cars, and telecommunication given broad bases and limited distribution points.
- Higher excises could be levied on certain luxury goods such as luxury cars.
- Avoid excising products produced and/or distributed at numerous locations (e.g., leather products, cosmetics, jewelry, watches) because enforcement and collection would be costly.

### VAT implementation and administrative considerations
- A mid-level project team has been set up to prepare for VAT implementation in 2008; general policy direction is to implement the VAT within an integrated, function-based tax administration.
- Key tasks needing prompt attention:
  - Careful planning for VAT implementation.
  - Design of a VAT refund system (little has been done so far), requiring:
    - Clear provisions in the law (for example, ensuring prompt refund of excess VAT credits to exporters).
    - Simple forms and procedures.
    - A risk-based system to focus audit resources on refund claims with high risk.
- Critical procedural requirement: the VAT law should be adopted at least six months ahead of the effective date of implementation.

---

### Financial sector reform: context and evaluation (summary of subsequent section)
- Reform objectives and steps:
  - Early 2000s program of financial sector liberalization and reform aimed to promote growth by enhancing financial system efficiency and allowing the market greater role.
  - Private banks were allowed to operate first in “free zones”; Law 28 enacted in April 2001 allowed establishment of private banks.
  - Bank of Syria and Overseas opened in January 2004 as the first private bank since 1963 nationalization.
  - Insurance companies were allowed in free zones before a law in late 2005 opened insurance to the private sector; a law allowing Islamic banking was passed in May 2005.
  - Capital Market Law enacted in late 2005 and Capital Market Authority established in early 2006.
- Initial conditions (early 2000s):
  - Financial sector very small; competition limited; virtually no banking regulation and supervision.
  - Six state-owned banks provided no more than 25 percent of GDP credit to the economy, of which close to 2/3 was issued to the government and to quasi-governmental agricultural procurement agencies.
  - Most transactions conducted in cash; clearing system processed about 5,000 checks per day; cash-to-deposit ratio as high as 60 percent.
  - Stock of broad liquidity increased from 25 percent of GDP in 1963 to some 80 percent in recent years.
  - Real interest rates averaged 7½ percent in 1997-2002; rates reduced in 2003.
- Progress to date and remaining gaps:
  - Financial intermediation increased but remains shallow; range of financial services and instruments limited.
  - Private banks have made inroads but system remains dominated by inefficient state banks; pricing of liquidity and financial risks still subject to administrative controls.
  - Economy remains essentially a cash economy; considerable supervisory gap persists.
  - Credit to the private sector doubled to 15 percent of GDP by end-2005; overall domestic credit at end-2005 increased to 40 percent of GDP.
  - Insurance sector: one state-owned insurance company with gross annual insurance premium less than 1 percent of GDP (significantly below the 9 percent international average).
  - Non-bank financial institutions effectively absent, except for a small microfinance portfolio at the agency for combating unemployment.

*Source: IMF staff report content provided in the supplied PDF excerpt.*

### 59.      Private banks have made inroads.  Six private banks are now fully operational and

### Private banks have made inroads.

### Private banks: market entry and performance
- Six private banks are now fully operational and have already gained about 10 percent market share.
- All are subsidiaries of foreign banks, although foreign investors do not have a majority share, since Law 28 sets a 49 percent limit on their participation in banks’ capital.
- Following measures to reduce the taxation of financial services, their profitability is reported to be good, and two have already decided to expand their capital base.
- Manifold oversubscription to the IPOs of these banks’ shares on the local market shows great interest from domestic investors.

### State banks (SBs): governance, efficiency, and soundness
- SBs continue to dominate the system and suffer from weak governance and low efficiency.
- SB boards have limited powers and little independence vis-à-vis the bank’s management.
- Low efficiency drivers include:
  - Low staff qualifications owing to noncompetitive wages and weak training policies and human resources management.
  - Poor managerial information systems and IT infrastructure.
  - Weak risk management systems and practices; most lending is collateral-based.
- The activities of the Commercial Bank of Syria (CboS), which has a lion’s share of the market, have been impaired by the recent U.S. administration’s decision to sever its link with the U.S. financial system over concerns about “its involvement in money laundering and terrorism financing.”
- These weaknesses are reflected in low profitability, undercapitalization, low asset quality, and recurrent liquidity problems:
  - Return on assets (ROA) is about 0.4 percent.
  - Return on equity (ROE) is about 2.5 percent.
  - In 2004 in the MENA region, the average ROA was 1.5 percent, while the ROE ranged from 10 percent in Egypt to 21 percent in Bahrain.
  - On average, non-performing loans (NPLs) are equivalent to 16½ percent of total assets.
  - The average capital-to-asset ratio at 4.8 percent is the lowest in the region.
- Applying international standards for loan classification and provisioning, and taking into account loans to the quasi-governmental agricultural procurement agencies (equivalent to 10 percent of GDP and 78 percent of loans to public enterprises), is likely to increase the NPL ratio and the undercapitalization problem significantly.
- Stock of outstanding loans to public enterprises (excluding the loans to the quasi-governmental agricultural procurement agencies) stood at 3¼ of GDP at end-2005.

### Interest rate controls and their effects
- Controls on deposit rates were maintained, with some added flexibility: a 1 percent margin around the regulated rates was introduced in January 2004 (designed as +/-0.5 percent margin in practice).
- A one percent downward margin on SBs’ lending rates was also introduced in January 2004, though it has not been used by any SBs as regulated rates are already below market.
- No controls on private banks’ lending rates were ever introduced.
- Interbank lending subject to central bank approval was introduced in 2004, although banks reportedly made very little use of it.
- Observations on liberalization:
  - Interest rate liberalization can promote efficiency by allowing credit to be rationed through prices rather than administratively.
  - The risk of increased financial volatility from liberalization is judged limited in Syria because of relative macroeconomic stability and the fact that real interest-rates are already in the positive range.
  - In the absence of market-based monetary control, maintaining ceilings/floors on deposit rates is considered a second-best solution to provide an interest rate anchor until monetary policy instruments are developed.
  - The absence of money markets and deposit and rediscount facility at the central bank makes it difficult for banks to manage Syrian pound liquidity and creates an incentive for the private banking sector to be dollarized.
  - Ratio of FX deposits to total deposits in private banks is equal to 53 percent compared with 9 percent for SOBs.
  - Lending rates: the decision not to impose ceilings on private banks’ lending rates is appropriate; however, effectiveness is limited because SBs provide subsidized credit and do not compete much with private banks on regular credit activities.
  - Interest rate subsidies should be re-assessed; where maintained they could be turned into explicit subsidies allowing private bank participation and competition to reduce fiscal cost.

### Banking regulation, supervision, and capacity
- New regulations adopted include:
  - Minimum requirements for credit and interest rate risk management (December 2004).
  - Loan classification and provisioning (December 2004).
  - Minimum requirements for effective internal control and role of management and board in risk management (March 2005).
  - Minimum standards for operational risk management strategy and policy (February 2005).
  - Implementing international accounting standards for banks (August 2004 and February 2005).
  - Minimum capital adequacy ratio (timing unspecified).
  - Limits on banks’ open foreign exchange positions.
- Progress in setting up a comprehensive supervision system remains limited:
  - 45 additional staff were hired and substantial investment made in training new bank supervisors.
  - A Banking and Training and Rehabilitation centre has opened.
  - An independent banking supervision department with clear business processes, mandate, and adequately trained staff remains a long-term objective.
  - The banking supervision department head position is still vacant.
  - There are about 60 staff members in the department for on-site and off-site supervision; most appointed recently and only half are pursuing training programs; turnover is high due to low pay and low morale.
- Compliance culture in SBs is much eroded after forty years of quasi-absence of supervision; absence of clear responsibilities among supervisory agencies weakens the central bank’s authority.
- Strengthening supervision capacity requires:
  - Building capacity for effective onsite and offsite supervision and developing internal procedures.
  - Completing the regulatory framework, including strengthening the AML/CFT framework.
  - Addressing low pay at the central bank by de-linking central bank pay scales from the civil service, enabling hiring of outside experts, and providing regular training.

### Payments system
- Very limited progress in modernizing the payments system:
  - No Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system.
  - No electronic or automated clearing check system.
  - Major payment transactions are still manual; large payments transmitted via checks and paper-based payment orders without adequate risk management.
  - The current payment system does not observe many of the Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems.
  - Progress in acquiring an RTGS system is expected in the coming few months (as noted).

### Issues to consider for furthering financial sector development
- Main problems and sources of tension:
  - Growing resistance to greater competition because inefficiencies in SBs could translate into contingent liabilities for the state; yet competition is needed for efficiency gains.
  - SBs continue to be seen as instruments of public policy (provision of subsidized loans and job creation), limiting their efficiency.
  - In the absence of indirect instruments of monetary control, controls on banks’ deposit rates remain the sole instrument for setting a benchmark interest rate, constraining competition.
  - A significant legacy skills deficit in risk management and prudential supervision from 40 years of socialist banking is a handicap for improving SB performance and a risk if regulatory and supervisory capacity does not keep pace with liberalization.
- State bank restructuring/privatization considerations:
  - Privatization is a central element of financial liberalization to separate public policy functions from financial functions and improve efficiency.
  - Without discharging SBs from social obligations, strengthening governance, and turning them into autonomous, profit-oriented entities, efficiency will remain low.
  - Opening the capital base of SBs to strategic private investors is an effective means to raise efficiency and address the skills deficit; only a massive infusion of outside expertise can quickly address the skills gap.
  - The playing field should be fully leveled for all banks; in particular, all banks should have the right to provide international trade financing.
  - Interlinkages between public enterprise (PE) reform, SB restructuring, and severing the link between the budget and PEs need careful examination:
    - Substitute easy budget money with easy SB lending would reduce incentives for PE efficiency and saddle SBs with bad loans.
    - During PE restructuring, PEs may need financing that purely private banks may not provide; a balance is needed so PEs are exposed to market discipline but not completely cut off from financing sources. A public bank may have a useful transitional role.
- Interest rate liberalization considerations:
  - Liberalization is part of financial liberalization; risks of volatility are judged limited in Syria.
  - Deposit rate liberalization should be sequenced with development of market-based monetary instruments to avoid premature exposure to high-risk lending.
  - Subsidized credit programs should be re-examined, scoped down, or replaced by direct assistance where appropriate; allow private bank participation via explicit subsidy mechanisms tied to spreads.
- Supporting measures and capacity building:
  - Strengthen banking regulation and supervision in parallel with liberalization.
  - Build capacity to assess risk, identify unsafe practices, and implement timely corrective actions as SBs are restructured/privatized and domestic banks enter the market.
  - Address central bank remuneration and staffing constraints to enable recruitment and retention of qualified supervisors and external experts.

*Source: IMF staff report text (excerpts).*

### 79.      Carefully screening the entry of new banks will also be critical to protect the

### Carefully screening the entry of new banks will also be critical to protect the soundness of the banking system.

### Banking licensing and supervision
- Findings:
  - Licensing policy should take into account: the growth plans of existing banks, the absorption capacity of the market, and the need to preserve the attractiveness of the market for potential strategic investors in state-owned banks.
  - Factors to be examined during licensing review include: the strategy or philosophy of new banks, line-of-business, funding sources, scope of activities, relation with parent company, country risk of the parent company, geographical concentration of ownership, and level of banking supervision in the home country.
  - Footnote: "This includes the possibility of sharing supervisory information with the home country supervisory authority."
- Recommendation:
  - Develop a licensing manual based on the licensing policy to ensure a prudent and transparent licensing process.

### Payment and settlement system
- Findings:
  - The payment and settlement system needs modernization and efficiency enhancements to: increase effectiveness of interbank funds transfers, minimize payment risk, and facilitate fund management via faster, safer, and more reliable transfers.
- Implication:
  - Modernization is essential for reducing payment risk and improving interbank liquidity management.

### Institutional capacity at the Central Bank of Syria (CBS)
- Findings:
  - Institutional capacity needs to be built up at the CBS to enable it to promote an enabling environment for further financial sector development.
- Specific measures:
  - Establish a public credit registry or private credit bureaus (note: "This would entail drafting the law, licensing the bureaus, and supervising the sector.").
  - Push for improvement in accounting standards of banks, with an indirect positive impact on accounting standards for enterprises.
  - Make available timely data about economic, monetary and financial developments.

### Syria’s trade regime: overview and progress
- Findings:
  - In the early 2000s, Syria had one of the most restrictive trade regimes in the world with prohibitions of imports of most consumer goods, public enterprise trading monopolies, extensive licensing requirements, and a high and dispersed customs tariff; foreign exchange restrictions (multiple exchange rate regime and no current account convertibility) reinforced these restrictions.
  - Over the last three years, authorities gradually liberalized trade: tariffs lowered; some import restrictions eliminated (notably a ban on imports of textiles and cement); access to foreign exchange for current transactions partly facilitated; negotiations for an Association Agreement with the European Union and a free trade agreement with Turkey finalized; as of early 2005, goods can freely circulate within GAFTA.
  - Despite reforms, Syria’s trade regime remains relatively restrictive (excluding trade with GAFTA), largely due to non-tariff barriers: unclear regulations, quantitative restrictions, and other non-tariff requirements add to costs and length of international trade transactions and generate resource allocation distortions.

### Customs tariff
- Findings:
  - Before 2002, customs duties could accumulate up to 255 percent spread over 20 categories.
  - Over the last three years, customs duties have been unified and gradually lowered to a maximum of 65 percent.
  - The tariff is not published comprehensively; the most up-to-date tariff schedule (in Arabic only) was last updated in mid-2005; subsequent government decrees revising the tariff are published separately and are not compiled in a comprehensive tariff document (no electronic version available).
  - Customs officials were unable to identify the number of lines in the tariff at the time of preparation, while the number of categories could only be estimated (at 20).
  - Tariff dispersion remains wide: most raw materials and industrial equipment, live animals and some medicines are duty free or taxed at 1 percent or below; semi-manufactured products/intermediates and final consumer/luxury goods remain taxed in the medium and upper range.
  - Authorities intend to further simplify and reduce the tariff in 2006 (decision not formal yet): lower the maximum rate to 50 percent and reduce the number of categories to 5.
- Recommendations:
  - ¾ reduce the number of categories to 3 or 4 (including the zero rate) to facilitate use of the tariff;
  - ¾ limit the number of items at the maximum rate to limit effective protection and encourage exports;
  - ¾ publish as soon as possible the revised tariff to keep traders and investors informed about tariff revisions; when possible, publish a version in English;
  - ¾ create an electronic version to facilitate updating of the tariff, as well as analysis and international comparisons.
- Comparative measure (effective protection, 2004):
  - In percent of importsIn percent of GDP
    - Algeria10.72.3
    - Bahrein2.31.3
    - Egypt5.41.4
    - Jordan5.23.2
    - Lebanon4.11.8
    - Libya5.31.5
    - Morocco9.23
    - Saudi Arabia5.60.9
    - Syria9.32.5
    - Tunisia4.11.8
    - U.A.E.1.70.8
  - Source: Staff estimates.

### Non-tariff barriers
- Progress:
  - Number of prohibited imports for protection reasons has been gradually reduced and was extended in 2006 to sensitive sectors such as textile and cement.
  - Public sector monopoly on imports rescinded for consumer goods such as cars.
  - Import licensing for raw materials abolished.
  - Export license requirements replaced by a statistical form; export bans (except seasonal agricultural products) and specific taxes and fees eliminated.
- Ongoing issues:
  - Trade regulations and non-tariff barriers remain complex, opaque, and believed to impose costs substantially exceeding those of tariffs.
  - Lack of transparency in rules and procedures increases unpredictability, discretion, and corruption, and encourages noncompliance.
- Types of non-tariff barriers (summarized):
  - Restrictions on imports comprising: (i) prohibitions for security, environmental, and health reasons; (ii) prohibition of imports to protect domestic industry; (iii) public enterprises trading monopoly for certain goods; and (iv) goods that can be imported by the private sector after receiving a permit and paying a fee. The lists of prohibited or restricted imports are not published.
  - Industrial quotas allow import of limited quantities of raw materials and semi-manufactured products at reduced duties; quota levels set by the ministry of Industry based on annual stated production capacities. The scheme was eliminated in early 2006 but reinstated shortly thereafter.
  - Import licenses required for all goods (itemized) except imports from GAFTA countries; license can be obtained in 3-4 days if no further authorization needed; many goods require authorization from technical ministries that can be lengthy.
  - Other impediments: restrictive public tender conditions; mandatory use of Syrian ports for maritime shipments; complex storage and border fees; all imports must be authorized by Syrian Consulates abroad and subject to a stamp fee of 1 percent of the value of imports capped at US$1,500; free trade zones face administrative controls and porous boundaries.
- Box 1 highlights (examples of restricted import lists; note: "Detailed information on restricted imports is difficult to collect, therefore the following may contain inaccuracies"):
  - Goods that cannot be imported because of negative impact on Syrian industry: long list including flowers, animal products, vegetable oils, sugar-based products, plastic and rubber products, leather, wood, glass, electrical machinery, and materials.
  - List of goods that can only be imported by the public sector includes oil and oil-related products, alcohol and beer, arms, cotton, some cereal products, tobacco, pharmaceutical products, some chemical products, salt, fish, fruits, olive oils, televisions and television components, animal feedstock, and phosphates.
  - List of goods that were previously imported only by particular public entities and which can be imported by the private sector, provided payment of a fee of 2 to 5 percent of the value of imports to these public entities, includes cars and transport machinery, steel and steel products, wood, cement, some pharmaceutical products, coffee, tea, rice, canned fish, meat, raw sugar, fertilizers, raw leather, and paper.
  - The list of goods that cannot be imported for security, environmental, and health reasons is not public.
- Policy recommendations to address non-tariff barriers (authorities could consider):
  - ¾ publish a negative list on goods that are restricted for imports (differentiating the four types of restrictions) to inform traders and signal willingness to enhance transparency and predictability;
  - ¾ replace restrictions on imports for reasons other than environment, security, and health by applying the maximum tariff rate (with phasing-out when needed) or the rate corresponding to the type of goods consistent with the tariff;
  - ¾ abolish industrial quotas (authorities are considering doing it soon);
  - ¾ grant autonomy to public enterprises for their imports of goods to reduce monopoly costs;
  - ¾ abolish fees paid by private traders to public enterprises, and replace them by an explicit government subsidy if its merit can be established;
  - ¾ remove gradually public trading monopolies to enhance competition;
  - ¾ replace the licensing process (in particular, verification by technical ministries) with an open general or a specific license scheme to expedite international transactions;
  - ¾ abolish the payment of a stamp at the Consulates and the related verification to reduce red tape.

### Implications of foreign exchange restrictions on trade
- Findings:
  - Limited access to foreign exchange and the use of multiple exchange rates encourages transactions in parallel markets.
  - Authorities estimate that about 65 percent of imported goods can now be traded in the official market (at an exchange rate adjusted daily to the parallel market rate to which a low spread is applied).
  - Foreign exchange trade financing by banks through the official market accounted for about 20 percent of total estimated imports by the private sector in 2005.
  - Trade financing in the parallel market may lead to invoicing below actual transaction levels; customs officials must rely on weak valuation procedures due to absence of means to verify amounts conducted through off-shore banks.

*Source: _cr06295 (IMF staff report excerpt).*

### 97.      The setting of an administered exchange rate each year for the budget also

### _cr06295 - 97.      The setting of an administered exchange rate each year for the budget also

### Administered exchange rate and budget implications
- The administered exchange rate varied between a minimum of 4.9 percent and a maximum of 13.9 percent below the parallel market exchange rate in 2005.
- This administered rate is used by the public sector for all external transactions and by the customs administration to convert the value of trade invoices into Syrian pounds.
- The difference between the budget and the parallel market rate is equivalent to an implicit subsidy applied to:
  - the full amount of the transaction in the public sector, and
  - the dutiable part for all other transactions.
- Using this fixed rate cushions the effect of an increase of the value of imports when the Syrian pound depreciates.

### Customs procedures: progress and remaining issues
- Noteworthy progress in the past three years to streamline customs procedures:
  - Introduction of the World Customs Organization’s single administrative document (SAD).
  - Finalization underway of a new customs law to modernize operations.
  - Simplified clearing: one-stop offices at the border and a “green line” for frequent fully registered exporters and for goods from mostly developed countries.
- Remaining problems and delays:
  - Syrian companies estimate average clearance takes 15 days (maximum over a month) (World Bank Doing Business survey), compared with eight days in Egypt, seven days in India, and six days in China.
  - Clearance is lengthened by non-tariff barriers and sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) verification requirements (including by laboratories).
  - Companies report testing and clearance procedures are difficult to understand and predict; exporters doubt whether SPS verifications are based on scientific and realistic risk assessments.
  - Syrian legislation lacks reference to recognized international standards such as the SPS agreement under the WTO.
- Customs valuation shortcomings:
  - Customs law defines valuation as the usual price paid between two traders, but the process lacks reliable sources of reference prices, which can be above or below actual value.
  - Price distortion arises because the exchange rate used to value goods is revised once a year in the budget law.
  - With the decline in the average tariff, the incentive to reduce declared values at customs should fall, improving tax collection efficiency.
- Authorities’ intended remedies:
  - Establishment of an effective single window at the border under sole supervision of customs will require cooperation from technical ministries.
  - Gradual computerization of the customs administration should provide access to relevant databases and references.
  - Authorities intend to acquire the ASYCUDA-World system to automate customs processes; implementation over the coming 24 months, with rollout to the majority of international airports, ports, and some 60 border stations.

### Bilateral and regional trade agreements: liberalization and risks
- GAFTA/Arab countries:
  - Trade nearly fully liberalized with Arab countries since the beginning of 2005, both tariff and non-tariff.
  - All imports from countries adhering to GAFTA enter Syria duty free (a 2 percent surcharge is applied)—and Syrian exports are treated similarly.
  - Licensing requirements removed as well as most import prohibitions.
  - Substantial preferences currently granted to GAFTA countries given prevailing tariff and non-tariff restrictions applied to Syria’s non-GAFTA trading partners.
- Association Agreement with the European Union (signed in 2004; initialized October 2004; stalled at EU Council of Ministers):
  - Would phase out customs duties for most goods over a period of 12 years.
  - Would require elimination of main non-tariff barriers applied to EU countries and updating/establishing key economic regulations.
  - Would prompt updating of company law, commercial code; establishment of a competition law and regulatory body; laws on intellectual property rights, consumer protection, and leasing; overall 12 economic laws planned for adoption.
  - EU intends to provide technical assistance and financial resources; European Investment Bank to help modernize economic infrastructure.
- Free Trade Agreement with Turkey expected to become effective later in 2006; provides broadly similar preferences to those in the Association Agreement.
- Risks and recommendations:
  - Risks of trade diversion increase with relative preferences given to a group of countries.
  - Reducing differential in relative preferences will help fully benefit from trade liberalization.
  - Priority should be given to removing non-tariff barriers for all trading partners (high barriers whose elimination bears no fiscal costs).
  - Lowering customs tariffs for all trading partners (Most Favored Nation basis) in parallel with implementation of preferential agreements with the EU and Turkey would reduce the preferential gap and facilitate competitive access to efficient import goods, while taking into account possible fiscal costs.

### Conclusion on trade reform
- Trade reform has just started; Syria’s trade regime is relatively restrictive.
- Eliminating key non-tariff barriers should be the first priority and will signal determination to address the trade agenda.
- Implementing regulatory measures provided for in the Association Agreement with the EU will help Syria progress toward observing WTO rules and disciplines.
- As reforms are implemented, Syria will:
  - gain credibility as a full-fledged trading partner,
  - establish a solid track record in shifting toward an open economy,
  - boost its potential for insertion into the global economy.

*Source: IMF staff report content provided in the supplied PDF text.*

### V. Could the textile sector be a main driver of non-oil export growth? — Introduction
- The textile sector’s role:
  - Cotton is the second most important cash crop (after cereals) and employs 2.7 million farmers and their dependents (about 15 percent of the population).
  - The textile industry accounts for about 20 percent of production and employment in the industrial sector.
- Policy change in early 2006:
  - The ban on garment imports was abolished, along with most restrictions applied to cotton fabric imports.
- Objective of chapter:
  - Analyze the ability of Syria’s textile sector to respond to greater international competition and set out policy recommendations to turn the challenge into an opportunity to drive non-oil export growth.

### The cotton sector — production, capacity, and exports
- Recent production levels:
  - Over the last five years, raw cotton production ranged between 700 thousands and 1 million tons.
  - Syria was the tenth-largest cotton producer in the world in 2005.
- Peak and constraints:
  - Production likely to peak at about 1 million tons.
  - Yield per unit increased to 4.3 tons in 2004, the highest level in the world after Australia.
  - Limited water supply prevents expansion to new fields; government licenses farmers to produce cotton in designated areas to regulate water use.
- Ginning capacity:
  - Ginning capacity is now high enough to absorb the annual crop after investments in the early 2000s.
  - Ginning handled by 14 government-owned plants under the Cotton Marketing Organization (CMO) based in Aleppo.
  - Full annual production was ginned in 2005, yielding 328,000 tons.
- Marketing obligations and export destinations:
  - With a ban on cotton imports, CMO meets local industry demand before surplus export.
  - Under marketing obligations, CMO exported between one- and two-thirds of production.
  - In 2004: one-fourth to the European Union, one-fourth to neighboring countries (GAFTA and Turkey), and the remaining half to textile-manufacturing countries (China, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh).
- Table 1 (selected series presented in text):
  - Cotton production (unginned) (thousand of tons): 2000 1,040; 2001 979; 2002 747; 2003 1,379; 2004 1,006; 2005 992.
  - Area (thousand of ha): 2000 270.3; 2001 257.1; 2002 199.8; 2003 205.4; 2004 234.2; 2005 237.0.
  - Yield (ton/ha): 2000 3.9; 2001 3.8; 2002 3.6; 2003 3.9; 2004 4.3; 2005 4.2.
  - Cotton production (ginned) (thousand of tons): 2000 346; 2001 315; 2002 235; 2003 270; 2004 333; 2005 328.
  - of which: exports: 2000 218; 2001 246; 2002 80; 2003 104; 2004 114; 2005 145.

### Cotton prices and fiscal/subsidy implications
- Purchase price to farmers (LS/kg) (between beginning of season and mid-November; preliminary for 2005):
  - 2000 30.75; 2001 27.90; 2002 26.80; 2003 30.75; 2004 30.75; 2005 29.30.
- Price effectively paid by CMO (US$ or LS/kg context in table; noted in text as LS/kg 15 for 2004–05 equivalent to US$/kg 0.3):
  - For 2004 and 2005: 15.00.
- Implicit subsidy (in billion of LS):
  - 2004 15.8; 2005 14.2.
- Implicit subsidy as percent of GDP:
  - 2004 1.3 percent; 2005 1.1 percent.
- Mechanism and fiscal bearing:
  - Price paid to farmers is an administered price set by the ministry of agriculture, adjusted downward during the season to encourage early collection.
  - Authorities implicitly recognize the world price equivalent to be paid to farmers would be much lower, probably no more than half of what is actually paid.
  - The difference is equivalent to a producer price subsidy.
  - Government bears the cost through the government-owned Agricultural Bank; CMO purchases at administered price but reimburses Agricultural Bank at the lower price reflecting world price level, Agricultural Bank bears the nonreimbursed share.
  - Estimates of the subsidy: could amount to 1.3 percent of GDP in 2004 and 1.1 percent in 2005.
  - At the start of the season, the Agricultural Bank also provides loans in kind and in cash (40-60 percent, respectively) at concessional rates to farmers and cooperatives for an amount equivalent to 0.1 percent of GDP; one-third of the loans are estimated to be nonperforming.
- Justifications and policy stance:
  - Authorities justify subsidy on economic and social grounds: cotton supply critical for textile industry; cotton-generated incomes are main cash resource in many rural areas; subsidized in many producing countries.
  - Authorities support need for subsidy but reluctant to support increased production due to potential environmental costs.
- CMO sales to local industry:
  - Since 2001, ginned cotton sold to local textile industry at world prices.
  - Cotton imports are banned; domestic manufacturers must purchase exclusively from CMO.
- Table 3 (prices in US$/kg):
  - Average sales price by CMO: 2000 1.1; 2001 0.76; 2002 1.13; 2003 1.30; 2004 1.05; 2005 1.22.
  - Average world price (Liverpool Index): 2000 1.30; 2001 1.06; 2002 1.02; 2003 1.40; 2004 1.36; 2005 1.21.

### Textile industry: structure, market orientation, and export performance
- Size and market focus:
  - Textile manufacturing is one of the largest industrial sectors, supplying mostly the domestic market.
  - It is the second largest sector following agro-industries (excluding oil-related activities), accounting for about 20 percent of industrial production.
  - Share of public sector production represents about 25 percent of the total, but only 10 percent of the fabric and garment sub-sectors.
- Historical protection and market orientation:
  - Garments and most cotton fabric could not be imported until early 2006; industry was inward-looking with little incentive to target foreign markets.
  - Domestic manufacturers increased output to meet needs of a fast-growing population; exports amounted to only 15-20 percent of production.
- Export geography and composition:
  - Textile exports accounted for 13 percent of non-oil exports in 2004 (8 percent excluding yarn).
  - Export markets concentrated: products with higher added value exported mostly to GAFTA countries and Turkey (75 percent for fabric and 60 percent for garments in 2004).
  - Exports of fabric and garments to the EU accounted for respectively 10 percent and 23 percent, amounting to a marginal share of the EU’s imports.

*Source: IMF staff report content provided in the supplied PDF text.*

### 121.     As the industry is mostly directed toward local consumption, Syria has been a

### _cr06295 - 121.     As the industry is mostly directed toward local consumption, Syria has been a

### Textile trade statistics (2000-2004)
- Table 4: Imports and Exports of Textile Products, 2000-2004 (in million of U.S. dollars)
- Imports (by category and year)
  - Textile - Yarn: 286 (2000), 185 (2001), 174 (2002), 188 (2003), 208 (2004)
  - Textiles - Fabric: 113 (2000), 73 (2001), 91 (2002), 152 (2003), 126 (2004)
  - Textiles - Garments: - (2000), - (2001), - (2002), 1 (2003), - (2004)
  - Textile - Machinery and Parts: 107 (2000), 34 (2001), 80 (2002), 81 (2003), 103 (2004)
  - Total imports: 506 (2000), 292 (2001), 344 (2002), 421 (2003), 437 (2004)
- Exports (by category and year)
  - Textile - Yarn: 95 (2000), 50 (2001), 70 (2002), 140 (2003), 92 (2004)
  - Textiles - Fabric: 60 (2000), 19 (2001), 3 (2002), 96 (2003), 92 (2004)
  - Textiles - Garments: 113 (2000), 32 (2001), 140 (2002), 120 (2003), 90 (2004)
  - Textile - Machinery and Parts: - (2000), - (2001), - (2002), 3 (2003), - (2004)
  - Total exports: 268 (2000), 100 (2001), 214 (2002), 358 (2003), 274 (2004)
- Net trade (imports-exports)
  - Net trade: 237 (2000), 192 (2001), 130 (2002), 62 (2003), 162 (2004)
  - excl. machinery and parts: 131 (2000), 158 (2001), 51 (2002), (18) (2003), 59 (2004)
- Additional data points from text
  - 65 percent of the yarn produced was exported to the EU in 2004.
  - Textile exports to the EU represented about 3 percent of Syria’s total exports.

### Policy context and recent reforms
- 2006 reform: removal of the ban on imports of garments and most cotton fabrics, opening the sector to external competition.
- Remaining government restrictions:
  - Production of cotton yarn remains a government monopoly and imports are prohibited.
  - Synthetic and blended yarns can be imported, but fees and insurance costs must be paid to the government agency managing cotton yarn production.
  - Agency requested since 2004 that yarn be sold at the world price level.
- Implication noted: reliance on imports of synthetic and blended yarns and machinery for manufacturing.

### Competitiveness challenges and possible firm responses
- Competitive pressures from removal of import ban likely to:
  - Primarily affect less efficient government-owned companies.
  - Lead most profitable companies to shift production toward products with lowest marginal costs and highest external competitiveness (including niche products exported to Arab markets).
  - Allow the industry to possibly gain shares on other markets due to low labor costs, domestic access to cotton varieties, and long-standing manufacturing tradition.
- Two-group characterization of cotton-producing countries:
  - Producers with high labor costs and no local manufacturing industry (the United States and Australia).
  - Producers with low labor costs allowing for local exporting industry development (China, Bangladesh, and Turkey).
- Syria’s position:
  - Relatively low exporter so far despite attractive labor costs.
  - Potential to move to the second, fast-developing model.

### Policy recommendations (short run; near to medium term; structural)
- Short run
  - Ensure prices of ginned cotton and yarn, still subject to public monopolies, truly reflect world prices to level off domestic and external competition.
- Near to medium term
  - Remove the ban on cotton imports and marketing obligations to local suppliers to improve supply choices and cost effectiveness.
  - Rescind the monopoly on the production of yarns and the related ban on imports, and remove administrative planning regulating the annual share of yarns to be sold to the local market.
  - Allow Syrian final goods manufacturers (fabric and garments) to choose Syrian cotton and yarn only for economic and financial reasons (lower costs, limited freight and insurance costs, trustworthy distribution networks, and product quality).
- Structural and institutional measures
  - Restructure/liquidate non-profitable public companies to encourage a resource shift to the most profitable companies.
  - Strengthen ongoing efforts to improve the business environment and reduce red tape to boost industry competitiveness.
- Rationale notes
  - Given that Syria produces cotton locally, domestic yarn production benefits from a natural advantage.
  - Half of the yarn is already exported, reflecting external demand for Syrian specific yarns.
  - The CMO indicated they could withstand lifting the ban on cotton imports and the removal of domestic supply obligations as they are confident the sector is competitive.

### Expected outcomes if recommendations implemented
- Enhanced synergies between the cotton and textile sector.
- Potential transformation of Syria into both a cotton producer and a textile exporter.
- Possibility of shifting from a relatively low exporter to a fast-developing exporting model akin to low-labor-cost producers with local manufacturing.

*Source: UNCTAD .*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/_cr06295.pdf_
