## _cr07264

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---

### The Subprime Shakeout — Overview and Risks
- U.S. economy cooled more than expected over the past year; employment remains strong and growth abroad has picked up.
- Slowdown largely reflects a drag from residential investment; unexpected weakness in business investment and net exports, and an inventory correction, amplified the downturn in early 2007.
- Private consumption remained robust; unemployment remained extremely low; core inflation has only recently started to ease.
- Baseline staff and officials’ scenario: a soft landing with:
  - Gradual acceleration in final domestic demand growth in 2007 as housing drag lessens.
  - Consumption decelerates mildly.
  - Business fixed investment recovers.
  - Net exports rebound on strong foreign demand.
  - Growth returns to potential of almost 3 percent by mid-2008; core inflation falls to below 2 percent.
- Key risks:
  - Year-on-year growth likely to remain close to the 2 percent “stall speed.”
  - Subprime mortgage difficulties could extend the housing downturn and weaken consumption.
  - Financial conditions could tighten if lax underwriting standards prove broader/systemic.
  - Cost pressures from low unemployment, elevated commodities prices, and falling productivity could boost inflation.

### Financial Conditions, Innovation, and Regulatory Challenges
- Financial conditions assumed supportive under the soft-landing baseline despite subprime problems.
- Subprime developments:
  - Origination of subprime loans rose substantially in 2005-06 to about 20 percent of all new mortgages.
  - At end-2006 subprime loans probably made up 12-15 percent of outstanding U.S. mortgages; near-prime (“Alt-A”) constituted another 10 percent.
  - Early payment defaults and delinquencies on recent subprime ARM vintages rose sharply; total foreclosures almost doubled in the year to May 2007.
  - Spreads on lower-rated tranches of ABSs and CDOs widened dramatically in H1 2007.
  - Most specialized subprime originators have failed, been sold, or closed to new business.
  - Majority of losses appear to lie with holders of the riskier tranches of ABS and CDOs exposed to 2006 loans.
- Structural evolution and incentive issues:
  - Income of commercial and investment banks increasingly derives from bundling and servicing securitized assets (ABSs) and collateralized debt/loan obligations (CDOs/CLOs).
  - System composition: (i) profitable, well-capitalized core; (ii) innovative, lightly-regulated periphery; (iii) wider transfer/diversification of credit risk via securitization and derivatives.
  - “Originate to distribute” model created weaker loan-quality incentives; rating agencies and investors underestimated weakened lending standards in 2005–06.
- Contagion and spillovers:
  - Limited contagion outside near-prime; little evidence so far of spillovers to delinquencies on prime mortgages, auto loans, or credit card debt.
  - Staff analysis: an unexpected 1 percentage point increase in corporate paper spreads would reduce real GDP by almost ½ percentage point over one year.
- Regulatory and supervisory concerns:
  - Fragmented regulatory system hampers rapid response; staff supports moving to a more risk-based approach guided by overarching principles.
  - Staff-supported reforms include instituting a national insurance charter, reforming oversight of government-sponsored housing enterprises, and modifying the industrial loan company charter.
  - Staff suggested publishing a Financial Stability Report to improve communication.
  - Concerns about agency ratings, hedge fund disclosure, counterparty risks, and consumer protection in mortgage markets.

### Housing, Household Spending, and Business Investment
- Residential investment:
  - Residential investment declined rapidly, subtracting about 1 percentage point from growth since spring 2006.
  - Residential investment: -4.2 (2006), -13.8 (2007), -2.0 (2008), 2.2 (2009), 2.0 (2010), 2.0 (2011), 2.0 (2012).
  - Housing starts fell below trend; inventories stabilized; builders cut prices; share of residential investment in GDP moved toward historical averages.
  - Drag on growth should moderate, but subprime foreclosures and tighter lending could delay recovery.
- Private consumption:
  - Consumption grew at a robust 3¼ percent in 2006 despite weaker housing; household saving remained negative.
  - Private final consumption: 3.2 (2006), 3.2 (2007), 2.6 (2008), 2.7 (2009), 2.8 (2010), 2.7 (2011), 2.8 (2012).
  - Rising equity prices maintained a near-record household wealth-to-income ratio despite slowing house prices.
  - Staff and officials expect consumption to moderate as house price appreciation slows and household saving recovers modestly.
- Business fixed investment:
  - After solid expansion during 2003–06, nonresidential fixed investment slowed: 7.2 (2006), 3.2 (2007), 5.9 (2008), 6.3 (2009), 6.2 (2010), 6.2 (2011), 6.2 (2012).
  - Deceleration exceeded what fundamentals explain; temporary sector-specific factors cited.
  - Leading indicators suggest a revival, but officials note causes are not fully understood—recovery not assured.
  - Productivity concerns: officials view much of the productivity slowdown as cyclical; staff and analysts have marked down medium-term prospects after data revisions.

### Key Staff Projections (United States: Medium-Term)
- Real GDP (percent change): 3.3 (2006), 2.0 (2007), 2.8 (2008), 3.0 (2009), 3.0 (2010), 2.9 (2011), 2.9 (2012).
- Total domestic demand: 3.2 (2006), 1.7 (2007), 2.6 (2008), 3.0 (2009), 3.0 (2010), 3.0 (2011), 2.9 (2012).
- Unemployment rate (percent): 4.6 (2006), 4.8 (2007), 5.0 (2008), 4.9 (2009), 4.8 (2010), 4.8 (2011), 4.8 (2012).
- CPI inflation: 3.2 (2006), 2.6 (2007), 2.8 (2008), 2.5 (2009), 2.4 (2010), 2.4 (2011), 2.4 (2012).
- Unified federal balance (percent of GDP; fiscal year): -1.9 (2006), -1.4 (2007), -1.6 (2008), -2.0 (2009), -1.8 (2010), -1.7 (2011), -1.1 (2012).
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): -6.1 (2006), -6.0 (2007), -6.0 (2008), -5.9 (2009), -5.9 (2010), -5.8 (2011), -5.8 (2012).
- Memorandum:
  - Output gap (percent of potential GDP): 0.3 (2006), -0.7 (2007), -0.8 (2008), -0.6 (2009), -0.4 (2010), -0.2 (2011), 0.0 (2012).
  - Oil prices (APSP, $/Barrel): 64.3 (2006), 63.8 (2007), 68.8 (2008), 68.5 (2009), 66.8 (2010), 66.0 (2011), 65.5 (2012).

### Monetary Policy and Inflation Outlook
- Current federal funds rate: 5¼ percent; stance described as “mildly restrictive.”
- Core PCE inflation fell to 1.9 percent (year-on-year) in May.
- Most measures of inflation expectations are consistent with expected PCE inflation below 2 percent.
- Downward forces on core inflation:
  - Well-anchored expectations, pass-through of commodity prices largely complete, slowing shelter prices, and growing slack.
- Upside inflation risks:
  - Potential cost pressures from rises in compensation, slower productivity growth, and uptick in oil prices.
- Fed stance assessed appropriate and consistent with soft landing; monetary policy would respond to significant unexpected weakening or tightening of financial conditions.
- Communication: quantifying Fed’s longer-term inflation objective could help anchor expectations; no collective FOMC view on an appropriate range reported.

### Funding the Current Account Deficit and External Imbalances
- Current account deficit stabilized at 6 percent of GDP in 2006.
- Continued easy funding reflects liquid and innovative U.S. bond markets; net financing has come almost entirely from fixed income instruments.
- At unchanged real exchange rates, the current account deficit projected to narrow only slightly.
- Real dollar depreciation since 2002: some 15 percent; staff CGER analysis: further real effective dollar depreciation of 10–30 percent would be required to eliminate misalignment relative to medium-term fundamentals.
- Net foreign asset position (baseline projections):
  - Net foreign asset position (percent): -19.9 (2002), -19.5 (2003), -19.6 (2004), -18.0 (2005), -19.2 (2006), -25.1 (2007), -30.0 (2008), -34.5 (2009), -38.7 (2010), -42.7 (2011), -46.5 (2012).
- Staff and officials view rebalancing as likely gradual given strong foreign demand for U.S. assets; abrupt adjustment possible but low probability.

### Fiscal Policy, Entitlements, and Long-Term Sustainability
- Short-run fiscal performance:
  - Unified federal balance (percent of FY GDP; staff projection): -2.6 (2005), -1.9 (2006), -1.4 (2007), -1.6 (2008), -2.0 (2009), -1.8 (2010), -1.7 (2011), -1.2 (2012).
  - Administration’s goal of halving the deficit by FY 2009 achieved three years early; FY 2007 deficit likely to move below 1½ percent of GDP.
- Risks to revenue buoyancy:
  - Outperformance since FY 2004 partly temporary; three-quarters attributable to high corporate profits and capital gains.
  - Staff project the deficit remaining above 1 percent of GDP through FY 2012.
- Entitlement challenges:
  - CBO projections imply net federal spending on Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security will more than double to some 17 percent of GDP a year by 2050 without reform.
  - Medicare Trustees estimate provider payment paths could increase projected long-term costs for physicians and outpatient services by 25–40 percent.
  - Staff strongly endorse linking Medicare premiums to income as a first step; broader measures needed to address underlying health cost drivers.
- Social Security:
  - Priority is building consensus on specific reform proposals; progressive indexation highlighted as promising.
- Tax reform:
  - Deductions for employers’ health insurance and mortgage interest account for 1¾ percent of GDP annually.
  - Tax system reform blueprint from 2005 Presidential panel proposes eliminating some deductions and better targeting others; staff suggest augmenting with higher energy taxes for environmental benefits.

### Public Debt and Sustainability Framework (selected exact figures)
- Public sector debt (general government net debt, percent of GDP): 38.7 (2002), 41.7 (2003), 43.5 (2004), 44.4 (2005), 44.2 (2006), 45.0 (2007), 45.9 (2008), 46.9 (2009), 47.7 (2010), 48.5 (2011), 48.7 (2012).
- Gross financing need (percent of GDP): 24.0 (2002), 25.2 (2003), 25.7 (2004), 24.1 (2005), 21.2 (2006), 20.9 (2007), 21.2 (2008), 21.7 (2009), 21.8 (2010), 21.9 (2011), 21.7 (2012).
- Gross financing need (billion U.S. dollars): 2,514.8 (2002), 2,763.7 (2003), 3,005.9 (2004), 3,007.3 (2005), 2,814.0 (2006), 2,897.1 (2007), 3,083.8 (2008), 3,303.6 (2009), 3,486.8 (2010), 3,687.3 (2011), 3,819.9 (2012).
- Public sector debt-to-revenue ratio (percent): 135.6 (2002), 149.3 (2003), 155.5 (2004), 152.9 (2005), 146.4 (2006), 148.4 (2007), 152.2 (2008), 157.2 (2009), 159.5 (2010), 162.8 (2011), 163.9 (2012).

### Sensitivity and Bound Tests (highlights)
- Net foreign asset sustainability bound-test figures (selected):
  - Baseline: -47 (Net foreign assets in percent of GDP).
  - Historical: -41.
  - Combined shock 2/: -49.
  - Real depreciation shock (one-time real depreciation of 30 percent in 2008): -39.
- Public debt bound-test figures (selected):
  - Historical: 49.
  - Baseline: 45.
  - Combined shock 2/: 54.
  - Contingent liabilities shock: 59.
  - One-time 30 percent depreciation scenario: 49 (box comparisons).

### Policy Recommendations and Programmatic Actions
- Monetary policy:
  - Maintain current stance consistent with a soft landing; remain alert to upside inflation surprises and rapid weakening of activity.
  - Consider clearer communication on longer-term inflation objective to anchor expectations.
- Financial regulation and supervision:
  - Focus prudential oversight on core commercial and investment banks given deposit insurance and discount window access.
  - Study options to streamline the fragmented regulatory system; increase use of general principles for rulemaking.
  - Strengthen consumer protection in mortgage lending, including attention to nonbank originators and state regulators.
  - Consider stricter capital requirements and limits on investment activities for government-sponsored enterprises.
  - Publish a Financial Stability Report to improve market understanding and interagency coordination.
- Fiscal and entitlement policy:
  - Sustain fiscal consolidation to support national saving and reduce the current account deficit; staff recommends a more ambitious medium-term consolidation.
  - Advance entitlement reform, with immediate priority on Medicare premium-income linkages and building consensus on Social Security reform (progressive indexation noted).
  - Reform the tax system by reducing and better targeting write-offs; consider measures to support private saving and environmental policies (e.g., higher energy taxes).
- Trade and labor policies:
  - Resist protectionism; support an ambitious Doha outcome including larger reductions in agricultural subsidies.
  - Provide support to workers temporarily displaced by trade through existing social safety nets.

### Recent Updates and Executive Board Assessment
- IMF staff representative (July 27, 2007) noted:
  - Core CPI inflation fell to 2.2 percent in June.
  - Consumption growth slowed; housing market weak; industrial production rose 0.5 percent in June; May export growth strong.
  - Federal regulators announced pilot cooperation with state regulators on mortgage compliance and agreed on a Basel II implementation strategy on July 20.
- Executive Board concluded 2007 Article IV Consultation:
  - Directors agreed prospects are favorable but spillovers from housing slowdown and subprime problems are material risks.
  - Monetary policy consistent with soft landing; Directors urged policies to support U.S. saving and endorsed free trade commitments.
  - Next Article IV consultation expected on standard 12-month cycle.

*Source: IMF Staff Report content unit _cr07264 (PDF chapter/section).*

### 1. The Subprime Shakeout ...............................................................................................

### 1. The Subprime Shakeout

### A. Overview
- The U.S. economy has cooled more than expected over the past year, but employment remains strong and growth abroad has picked up.
- Slowdown largely reflects a drag from residential investment as housing market activity has fallen rapidly; unexpected weakness in business investment and net exports, and an inventory correction, amplified the downturn in early 2007.
- Private consumption continued to grow robustly as solid growth in wage earnings minimized spillovers from housing; unemployment has remained extremely low; core inflation has only recently started to ease.
- The global environment remains favorable, with robust growth in the Euro area and Asia.
- Staff and officials regard the most likely scenario as a soft landing:
  - Gradual acceleration in final domestic demand growth in 2007 as housing market slowdown and associated drag from residential investment lessens.
  - Consumption decelerates mildly.
  - Business fixed investment recovers from its temporary—and largely unexplained—weakness.
  - Net exports rebound on strong foreign demand.
  - Growth returns gradually to its potential of almost 3 percent by mid-2008; a widening output gap contributes to reducing core inflation to below 2 percent.
- Risks to the outlook:
  - Year-on-year growth likely to remain for some time uncomfortably close to the 2 percent “stall speed” associated with past recessions.
  - Subprime mortgage difficulties could extend the housing downturn, slowing housing wealth and weakening consumption.
  - Financial conditions could tighten if lax underwriting standards prove more widespread and systemic.
  - With output close to potential, low unemployment, elevated commodities prices, and falling productivity growth, cost pressures could boost inflation.

### B. Financial Conditions and Developments
- Supportive financial conditions are assumed to continue under the baseline soft-landing forecast, despite emergence of subprime problems.
- Rising subprime delinquencies led to a jump in spreads on higher-risk mortgage-backed securities, with limited contagion outside the near prime (“Alt-A”) segment; many specialized subprime originators have failed.
- Long-term yields and spreads have risen on stronger growth expectations and associated inflationary concerns; despite modest volatility, financing conditions remain easy and spreads low by historical standards.
- Structural evolution of the financial sector:
  - Income of commercial and investment banks increasingly derives from bundling and servicing securitized assets (ABSs) and collateralized debt/loan obligations (CDOs/CLOs) rather than holding loans.
  - System composition: (i) profitable, well-capitalized core relatively protected from credit risks; (ii) innovative, lightly-regulated periphery including specialized originators and hedge funds; (iii) wider transfer and diversification of credit risk via securitized assets and credit derivatives.
- Incentive problems from the “originate to distribute” model:
  - Remuneration via fees and limited long-term balance sheet exposure can reduce incentives to maintain loan quality.
  - Strong investor appetite for higher-yielding CDOs/CLOs boosted demand for higher-risk loans as structured products became more complex.
  - Rating agencies and investors underestimated weakening lending standards and their 2005–06 impact.
- Parallels in other market segments:
  - Leveraged buyouts funded through CLOs show eased covenants in underlying loans.
  - Staff analysis: an unexpected 1 percentage point increase in corporate paper spreads would reduce real GDP by almost ½ percentage point over one year.
  - Officials noted rising corporate indebtedness in leveraged buyouts and easing loan covenants as a concern but emphasized the strength of corporate and financial sector balance sheets.

### Box 1 — The Subprime Shakeout (summary)
- Size:
  - Origination of subprime loans increased substantially in 2005-06, reaching about 20 percent of all new mortgages.
  - At end-2006 subprime loans probably made up 12-15 percent of outstanding U.S. mortgages, with near-prime (“Alt-A”) constituting another 10 percent.
  - Lending standards were sharply reduced, so many 2006 borrowers would need substantial house price appreciation to refinance when rates reset.
- Impact thus far:
  - Early payment defaults and delinquencies on recent subprime adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) vintages have risen sharply; total foreclosures almost doubled in the year to May 2007.
  - Spreads on lower-rated tranches of ABSs and CDOs backed by such mortgages widened dramatically in H1 2007.
  - Most specialized subprime originators have gone bankrupt, been sold, or closed to new business.
  - Some deterioration in credit risk indicators of affected investment banks, but losses from subprime exposures have generally been hedged or overshadowed by profit growth elsewhere.
  - Majority of losses appear to lie with holders of the riskier tranches of ABS and CDOs exposed to 2006 loans.
  - Despite sharply tightening lending standards, issuance of ABSs backed by subprime loans is continuing, albeit down from 2006.
  - Little evidence thus far of spillovers to delinquencies on prime mortgages or other consumer credit; spreads on assets backed by prime mortgages, auto loans, and credit card debt remain low.
- Baseline forecast:
  - Subprime delinquencies expected to rise further, especially as majority of hybrid ARM resets to higher interest rates are due late 2007 and early 2008.
  - Estimated additional $43 billion in interest costs in 2007 is small relative to total interest costs or consumption.
  - Rising foreclosures likely to lengthen the housing cycle and cause hardship in specific localities and minority communities.
- Risks and policy reactions:
  - If subprime troubles dent broader consumer confidence, consumption could be disproportionately affected.
  - Tightening lending standards could be exacerbated if Congress, federal regulators, or the States enact severe anti-predatory lending rules.
  - Current focus is on encouraging loan servicers to modify conditions to enable subprime borrowers to stay in their homes.

### C. Housing and Household Spending
- Drag from residential investment:
  - Residential investment declined rapidly, subtracting about 1 percentage point from growth since spring 2006.
  - Housing starts fell below trend; inventory stabilized; builders cut prices; share of residential investment in GDP moved toward historical averages.
  - The drag on growth should moderate, though subprime shakeout, foreclosures, and tighter lending could further delay housing recovery.
  - Officials viewed current sub- and near-prime problems as manageable because distress is concentrated in areas with weak economies and in recent adjustable-rate subprime mortgages.
- Private consumption:
  - Consumption grew at a robust 3¼ percent in 2006 despite a weaker housing market as household saving remained negative.
  - Indicators remained solid into Q2 2007 despite high gasoline prices, supported by steady labor market, continuing income growth, and low long-term interest rates.
  - Rising equity prices maintained a near-record household wealth-to-income ratio despite drag from slowing house prices.
  - Staff and officials agreed consumption continued to be above its long-term equilibrium value and its growth would likely moderate as slower house price appreciation reduces the wealth-income ratio and allows modest recovery in household saving.
- Risks of spillovers to personal spending:
  - Tighter mortgage lending standards and higher mortgage rates could add pressure on household finances already affected by slowing housing wealth.
  - Officials viewed tighter lending as largely confined to sub- and near-prime borrowers, who account for a relatively small part of aggregate consumption.
  - The housing market would be a significant risk for consumption if slower activity undermined employment and income growth.

### D. Key Staff Projections (United States: Medium-Term Projections)
- National production and income (Percent change from previous period, unless otherwise indicated)
  - Real GDP: 3.3 (2006), 2.0 (2007), 2.8 (2008), 3.0 (2009), 3.0 (2010), 2.9 (2011), 2.9 (2012)
  - Total domestic demand: 3.2 (2006), 1.7 (2007), 2.6 (2008), 3.0 (2009), 3.0 (2010), 3.0 (2011), 2.9 (2012)
  - Private final consumption: 3.2 (2006), 3.2 (2007), 2.6 (2008), 2.7 (2009), 2.8 (2010), 2.7 (2011), 2.8 (2012)
  - Nonresidential fixed investment: 7.2 (2006), 3.2 (2007), 5.9 (2008), 6.3 (2009), 6.2 (2010), 6.2 (2011), 6.2 (2012)
  - Residential investment: -4.2 (2006), -13.8 (2007), -2.0 (2008), 2.2 (2009), 2.0 (2010), 2.0 (2011), 2.0 (2012)
  - Net exports (contribution to growth): 0.0 (2006), 0.2 (2007), 0.0 (2008), -0.1 (2009), -0.2 (2010), -0.2 (2011), -0.2 (2012)
  - Unemployment rate (percent): 4.6 (2006), 4.8 (2007), 5.0 (2008), 4.9 (2009), 4.8 (2010), 4.8 (2011), 4.8 (2012)
  - CPI inflation: 3.2 (2006), 2.6 (2007), 2.8 (2008), 2.5 (2009), 2.4 (2010), 2.4 (2011), 2.4 (2012)
  - Unified federal balance (percent of GDP; fiscal year): -1.9 (2006), -1.4 (2007), -1.6 (2008), -2.0 (2009), -1.8 (2010), -1.7 (2011), -1.1 (2012)
  - Current account balance (percent of GDP): -6.1 (2006), -6.0 (2007), -6.0 (2008), -5.9 (2009), -5.9 (2010), -5.8 (2011), -5.8 (2012)
- Memorandum items:
  - Output gap (percent of potential GDP): 0.3 (2006), -0.7 (2007), -0.8 (2008), -0.6 (2009), -0.4 (2010), -0.2 (2011), 0.0 (2012)
  - Partner country growth: 3.3 (2006), 3.0 (2007), 3.0 (2008), 2.9 (2009), 2.9 (2010), 2.8 (2011), 2.8 (2012)
  - Oil prices (APSP, $/Barrel): 64.3 (2006), 63.8 (2007), 68.8 (2008), 68.5 (2009), 66.8 (2010), 66.0 (2011), 65.5 (2012)

*Prepared by IMF staff team led by R. Teja with T. Bayoumi, T. Helbling, R. Balakrishnan, K. Krajnyák, K. Mathai (WHD), A. Bhatia, P. Mills (MCM), and J.-J. Hallaert (PDR).*

### 11.      Business fixed investment is projected to recover from recent weakness as strong

### _cr07264 - 11.      Business fixed investment is projected to recover from recent weakness as strong

### Business fixed investment: recent weakness and projected recovery
- After expanding solidly during 2003–06, spending on fixed investment slowed rapidly beginning in the last quarter of 2006.
- Recent leading indicators suggest a revival.
- The deceleration exceeded what fundamentals and temporary factors would explain; temporary factors cited include problems in the automobile and construction sectors and the impact of tighter 2007 emission limits on truck purchases.
- Officials noted:
  - Business contacts remained upbeat.
  - Corporate balance sheets were strong, reflecting payoffs from cost containment used to restructure through mergers, return equity to shareholders, and reduce leverage to well below pre-2001 recession levels despite leveraged buyouts by private equity funds.

### Uncertainty and risks to investment
- Officials emphasized that the underlying causes of the weakness were not fully understood, so the anticipated recovery was not assured.
- Views on productivity and implications for investment:
  - Officials saw much of the recent productivity slowdown as cyclical and were confident underlying productivity growth would remain solid on continued strong IT investment.
  - Most analysts, the staff, and the authorities had marked down medium-term growth prospects after data revisions suggesting slower historical productivity growth.
  - If slowing productivity implied a further reduction in potential growth, lower expected future income could reduce support for domestic demand, including business investment.
- Financing risk:
  - Staff expressed concern that financing conditions could tighten unexpectedly.
  - The rise in long-term bond yields, volatility, and spreads in June/July 2007 illustrates the potential for a reversal to less supportive financing conditions.

### Inflation outlook
- Core personal consumption expenditure (PCE) inflation fell to 1.9 percent (year-on-year) in May.
- Most measures of inflation expectations are consistent with expected PCE inflation of below 2 percent.
- Factors expected to draw core measures down:
  - Well-anchored inflation expectations.
  - Less pressure from commodity prices (pass-through largely complete).
  - Slowing shelter prices as the housing market cools (catch up of rents to past house price increases has been an important recent driver of core inflation).
  - Growing economic slack, to a lesser extent.
- Risks to inflation are slightly to the upside:
  - Potential cost pressures from recent rises in compensation, slower productivity growth, and the uptick in oil prices.
  - High profit margins provide a cushion against pass-through, but the tight labor market could yield accelerating unit labor costs and lead to inflationary pressure.

### Funding the U.S. current account deficit
- Continued easy funding reflects liquid and innovative U.S. bond markets; net financing has come almost entirely from fixed income instruments.
- Contributing factors to ready demand:
  - Emerging market inflows.
  - Lower home bias and a global switch toward buying private bonds.
  - The U.S. represents over half the global market for private bonds and dominates issuance of securitized assets.
- Stylized facts and projections:
  - At unchanged real exchange rates, the current account deficit is projected to narrow only slightly.
  - The deficit stabilized at 6 percent of GDP in 2006.
  - A stronger nonoil trade balance (of some ¼ percent of GDP) partly offset the impact of higher oil prices and lower net investment income.
  - Exports are expected to improve on strong global demand (an upside to the forecast), but without further exchange rate changes the improvement in the nonoil balance would remain modest under the soft landing scenario as stronger U.S. activity raises imports.
  - Falling income balance would also limit medium-term improvement in the current account deficit.
- Net foreign asset position and exchange rate considerations:
  - Real dollar depreciation of some 15 percent since 2002 has had only a limited impact on the trade balance.
  - Massive valuation gains have maintained U.S. net foreign liabilities at under 20 percent of GDP in recent years.
  - Staff CGER analysis: further real effective dollar depreciation of 10–30 percent would be required to eliminate the misalignment relative to medium-term macroeconomic fundamentals.
  - Even accounting for capital market fundamentals and attractiveness of U.S. financial assets, inflows will likely diminish over time as portfolio demand is satisfied, implying a lower long-term value for the dollar.

### Policy discussions: overarching focus
- Discussions centered on mitigating risks to U.S. and global macroeconomic stability and growth:
  - Calibrating monetary policy for a soft landing.
  - Improving financial market regulation.
  - Ensuring long-term fiscal sustainability, with emphasis on reforming unsustainable entitlement programs, particularly health care.

### Monetary policy
- Current stance assessed as appropriate and consistent with a soft landing and gradual moderation of inflation.
- The Fed stopped tightening in June 2006 despite still uncomfortably high headline inflation.
- The current federal funds rate is 5¼ percent, described as “mildly restrictive.”
- Effects and expectations:
  - The stance has led to a welcome reduction in core inflation as growth has fallen below trend.
  - Markets had diverged from Fed expectations on policy easing, but more recently market expectations moved in line with Fed views; rate cuts are no longer anticipated in 2007.
- Fed concerns:
  - Officials emphasized upside inflation surprises as the FOMC’s dominant policy concern under a “risk management approach.”
  - Monetary policy would respond to further significant unexpected weakening of the economy or tightening of financial conditions.
- Communications:
  - Quantifying the Fed’s longer-term inflation objective might help anchor expectations.
  - No collective FOMC view on an appropriate range for inflation was reported.
  - A commission led by Vice Chairman Kohn was discussing possible improvements to the Fed’s communication strategy; changes would be introduced gradually.

### Ensuring a robust financial system
- Financial system soundness:
  - Core commercial and investment banks are in a sound financial position; systemic risks appear low.
  - Profitability and capital adequacy of the banking system are high by international standards.
  - For large bank holding companies (LCBGs), reduced interest margins have been offset by rising fee income and near record-low defaults; market measures of default risk remained benign despite a recent uptick following subprime difficulties.
- Prudential oversight:
  - Federal prudential oversight rightly focuses on depository institutions and systemically important investment banks because depository institutions uniquely benefit from deposit insurance and access to the Fed’s discount window.
  - In other areas, officials argued market discipline is the better regulator of risk.
- Financial innovation and regulatory challenges:
  - Systemic risks from tail events:
    - While risk has been spread, the impact of an extremely adverse market outcome may have risen due to increased leverage and reliance on liquid markets in newer derivatives and asset-backed securities.
    - A sudden rise in risk aversion could uncover vulnerabilities, illiquidity in newer markets, and major losses in asset values.
  - Managing counterparty risks:
    - Officials argued private markets and core institutions are better placed than regulators to manage exposures to highly leveraged hedge funds via market discipline, investor due diligence, and systematic risk management.
    - Staff were concerned about limits to due diligence given limited hedge fund disclosure, robustness of risk management systems to cross-market shocks, and potential consumer protection issues as the investor base shifts.
  - Agency ratings:
    - Credit rating agencies play an increasingly important role in structuring complex products, raising potential conflicts of interest and concerns about investor understanding and rating responsiveness.
    - The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act aimed at limiting conflicts and increasing competition; detailed regulations to implement the Act were still being finalized.
  - Consumer protection:
    - Fed officials are examining whether regulations implementing the Truth in Lending Act could be modified to address predatory lending concerns, including by nonbanks not covered by federal regulator guidance.
    - Staff suggested federal legislation might be needed to improve consistency of enforcement given the role of state-registered nonbanks in originating mortgages.

*IMF staff report excerpt (chapter and figures as provided in source content).*

### 26.      A fragmented regulatory system hampers the response to these challenges. Staff

### 26.      A fragmented regulatory system hampers the response to these challenges. Staff

### Fragmentation of the regulatory system and desired direction
- Staff emphasized disadvantages of a complex system of overlapping regulatory oversight: potential delays in responding to important prudential matters (example areas: guidance on hybrid subprime mortgages; implementation of the Basel II framework).
- Officials acknowledged the regulatory structure reflected a complex history and noted it supports greater deliberation and specialization among regulators.
- Looking forward objective: move to a more risk-based approach to regulation guided by overarching principles (as recommended by the President’s Working Group) to increase consistency across regulators and flexibility in responding to innovation.

### Government studies and reform options
- The Treasury announced it will study options to streamline the current financial regulatory system.
- Staff pointed to Government Accountability Office (GAO) work that developed reform options, including the merger of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodities and Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) where responsibilities overlapped.
- Observers noted rationalization could involve difficulties, partly reflecting the current structure of Congressional oversight of federal agencies.

### Staff-supported regulatory reforms and communication
- Staff reiterated support for proposals to improve regulatory effectiveness (Table 1). These included:
  - Instituting a national insurance charter (to reduce compliance costs with state-by-state regulation).
  - Reforming oversight of government-sponsored housing enterprises (to limit systemic risks from their portfolios).
  - Modifying the industrial loan company charter (to avoid deposit-taking without consolidated supervision).
- Staff suggested publishing a Financial Stability Report could further improve communication with market participants.

### Competitiveness, regulatory cost, and market structure concerns
- Administration emphasized safeguarding competitiveness of U.S. financial markets (Figure 11).
- Concerns highlighted:
  - Regulatory cost and complexity.
  - Litigiousness in U.S. financial markets given existing tort procedures.
  - Vulnerability of the highly-concentrated audit industry, where firms are currently required to be structured as unlimited private partnerships rather than limited liability companies.
- Staff welcomed initiatives to lower regulatory cost:
  - SEC rules making it easier for foreign companies to deregister from U.S. exchanges.
  - Clearer guidance on Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 (company internal financial controls) to lower compliance costs, particularly for small firms.
  - SEC consideration of recognition of some foreign regulators and international accounting standards to improve domestic and international market efficiency.

### Innovation and global market share
- U.S. financial markets remain highly innovative, supporting capital inflows and long-term growth.
- Officials noted some loss of market share is to be expected with capital market development abroad; initiatives to support market competitiveness seen as preemptive to keep U.S. markets globally preeminent.

### Financial Sector Assessment Program timing
- The proposed Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) will start in late 2009.
- Officials explained need to formulate new rules to implement the Basel II framework, which was already behind schedule, precludes an earlier start date.

### External imbalances and international spillovers
- Staff underlined importance of U.S. financial market conditions and soundness to global activity.
- Desk analysis following the latest World Economic Outlook finds significant spillovers from U.S. activity to other countries operate mainly through financial markets (rather than trade channels), and with little reverse causation.
- As recessions have a markedly greater impact on U.S. financial conditions than mid-cycle slowdowns, these results help explain why U.S. recessions have historically had more-than-proportional effects on foreign activity.

Box 2 — Size and sources of U.S. spillovers abroad (summary findings)
- Methodology: Vector autoregressions using real GDP growth for four regions (United States, the euro area, Japan, and other industrial countries); disturbances to a group of small industrial countries used as proxy for global shocks; added real net exports, commodity prices, and financial variables to study sources.
- Findings:
  - Shocks to the United States have significant implications for growth in all other regions. The spillovers are roughly ¼ to ½ as large as the disturbance in U.S. growth, with the impact building gradually over a two year horizon.
  - The finding is robust to alternative orderings of the regions; only spillovers to the rest of the world show noticeable variation due to lingering contemporaneous correlation between U.S. and global shocks.
  - The United States responds to global disturbances but is relatively unaffected by shocks from the euro area or Japan.
  - U.S. spillovers to foreign output are largely transmitted through financial channels; trade and commodity prices explain a limited amount of spillovers. Financial variables explain the majority of growth linkages.
  - These results support the World Economic Outlook finding that the impact of U.S. growth on the rest of the world is higher in recessions than mid-cycle slowdowns because U.S. financial conditions typically tighten rapidly in the run-up to recessions.

### Risks of abrupt adjustment of imbalances
- While a disorderly resolution of global imbalances remains a low probability event, the costs would be extremely high.
- Staff and officials agreed the rebalancing of U.S. demand from foreign to domestic goods was likely to occur gradually given strong foreign demand for U.S. assets.
- Staff observed a more abrupt adjustment was possible and would be highly damaging if it involved a flight from dollar assets that led to broader financial market disruption.
- Officials noted event studies suggest even an abrupt exchange rate adjustment need not imply disorderly markets if macroeconomic policies were sound, but acknowledged uniqueness of a large deficit in the country at the center of the international monetary system might limit comparisons.

### Policies to address external imbalances
- Staff welcomed the Administration’s focus on policies to support national savings and stressed role of fiscal consolidation in reducing the current account deficit.
- Commitment reaffirmed as part of shared responsibility of key members to address global imbalances in the context of the Multilateral Consultation (MC), which would lower risks of a disorderly resolution of global imbalances (Table 2).
- Officials noted:
  - U.S. fiscal deficit had improved much faster than expected during the past two years.
  - Obstacles to automatic enrollment in defined-contribution pension plans had been eliminated.
  - Proposals to enhance tax incentives for household savings had been presented in the latest budget.
  - The MC had been useful in reaching shared technical understandings among participants and engagement with them.

### Trade openness and support for displaced workers
- Authorities restated commitment to resisting rising protectionism.
- Staff underscored importance of maintaining an open trading system and offering a larger reduction in the ceiling of U.S. agricultural subsidies to catalyze an ambitious outcome to the Doha Round.
- Staff suggested greater support to those temporarily dislocated by rising imports could help ameliorate impact of trade on workers and help resist pressure for higher tariffs.
- Officials emphasized Administration’s “absolute commitment” to openness and progress in the Doha Round and confidence that the President’s Trade Promotion Authority (which expired on July 1) could be renewed if needed.
- Officials did not see a case for expanding specific support for workers displaced by trade separate from the regular social safety net given difficulties of identifying reasons for job loss.

### Achieving fiscal sustainability — recent fiscal performance
- Short-run fiscal developments favorable (Figure 12).
- Administration’s goal of halving the deficit by FY 2009 was achieved three years ahead of schedule, with the unified deficit falling below 2 percent of GDP in FY 2006.
- FY 2007 deficit likely to significantly outperform expectations and move below 1½ percent of GDP.
- Success reflects revenue buoyancy (as profits and capital gains surged) and lower-than-budgeted expenditures.

United States: Budget Projections (fiscal years; in percent of GDP) — selected table entries preserved exactly
- FY 2008 Budget projection:
  - Unified balance: -2.6 -1.9 -1.8 -1.6 -1.2 -0.6 -0.3 0.3
  - Primary balance: -1.1 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.6 1.2 1.4 1.9
  - Unified balance exc. social security: -4.0 -3.3 -3.2 -3.0 -2.6 -2.0 -1.8 -1.1
  - Debt held by the public: 37.4 37.0 36.9 36.7 36.0 34.8 33.4 31.5
- Staff Projection 1/:
  - Unified balance: -2.6 -1.9 -1.4 -1.6 -2.0 -1.8 -1.7 -1.2
  - Primary balance: -1.1 -0.2 0.4 0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5
  - Unified balance exc. social security: -4.0 -3.3 -2.8 -3.0 -3.5 -3.2 -3.2 -2.6
  - Debt held by the public: 37.4 37.1 36.9 37.0 37.4 37.5 37.5 37.1
- 1/ Staff projections are based on the Administration's budget adjusted for: differences in macroeconomic projections; staff estimates of the cost of ongoing operations in Iraq; some additional non-defense discretionary expenditure; additional Medicare spending; and continued AMT relief beyond FY 2008. PRAs are also assumed not to be introduced.

### Risks to revenue buoyancy and medium-term deficit outlook
- Staff cautioned strength of revenues could be partly temporary.
- Outperformance since FY 2004 largely reflected unexpected revenue buoyancy, three-quarters attributable to high corporate profits and capital gains revenues, with much of remainder explained by rising inequality.
- Given risks to growth and apparent slowing of profit growth, persistence of revenue buoyancy into FY 2008 is uncertain.
- Administration aims to balance the budget by FY 2012 while making permanent the 2001/03 tax cuts, but staff judged achieving this goal will be difficult.
- Officials emphasized spending restraint as key to achieving target while preserving benefits of lower tax rates.
- Congress’s approach differs: less spending compression while allowing most of the 2001/03 tax cuts to expire (extension of the tax cuts lowers revenue in the baseline by some 1 percent of GDP from FY 2011).
- Neither set of projections fully accounts for war costs or Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) relief beyond FY 2008 (costed at around ½ percent of GDP annually).
- Staff project the deficit remaining above 1 percent of GDP through FY 2012.

### Entitlement reform and long-term sustainability
- Entitlement reform is vital to long-term budget sustainability; early action would reduce cost of needed adjustment (Figure G).
- Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections imply that under current policies, net federal spending on Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security as a ratio to GDP will more than double to some 17 percent of GDP a year by 2050, driven by health spending.
- Officials emphasized Administration’s reform proposals had been held back by limited political support.
- Staff and officials agreed including analysis of long-term sustainability in budget documents would help increase awareness of rising costs of public health and pension programs.

### Medicare and Medicaid reform prospects and health cost drivers
- Administration proposed reductions in Medicare spending by further linking contributions to income and reducing provider payments.
- Staff strongly endorsed budgetary proposals on contributions as an important step.
- Staff noted difficulty in lowering provider payments given cuts already required in Medicare legislation are regularly overturned.
- Medicare Trustees estimated a more realistic path for payments would increase projected long-term costs for physicians and outpatient services by 25–40 percent.
- In Medicaid, main option is reducing long-term care costs—around half of national Medicaid spending—through better targeting of services.
- Medicare and Medicaid cannot be sustainably reformed without broader measures to improve effectiveness of medical spending (Figure 13).
- CBO staff emphasized rapidly increasing health care costs are a more important driver of future entitlement spending costs than aging.
- Treasury officials noted the problem is multifaceted and requires a range of measures: more appropriate price signals; improved pay-for-performance schemes; better use of information technology; enhanced information for consumers and doctors.
- Staff and officials agreed further analysis, preferably coordinated in the public sector, is needed to better understand underlying health cost drivers and achieve greater consensus on reform options.

### Tax bias toward employer-provided coverage and budget proposals
- Latest budget proposals aim to eliminate the tax bias toward employer-provided coverage.
- Replacing the uncapped tax break for employer-provided health insurance with a standard deduction for all would reduce incentives for “gold plated” schemes and complement earlier tax incentives for high-deductible coverage.
- Staff observed gains might be limited because most medical spending stems from chronic and catastrophic cases and emphasized importance of strengthening the individual insurance market.
- Officials responded Administration is allowing states to redirect some federal funds to support experiments to broaden coverage, providing insights about efficacy of different approaches.

*IMF staff report excerpt.*

### 43.      With Social Security cost drivers and reform options well understood, the priority is

### 43.      With Social Security cost drivers and reform options well understood, the priority is achieving consensus on specific proposals.

### Social Security and entitlement reform
- Priority: develop consensus on specific Social Security reform proposals; progressive indexation is highlighted as a promising approach (benefits for the wealthy slowed gradually while those for the poor are protected).  
- Staff view: Social Security underlying costs and reform options are already well understood; emphasis on moving from analysis to political consensus.

### Fiscal consolidation and medium-term targets
- Recommendation: A more ambitious medium-term fiscal consolidation would better prepare for rising entitlement costs and help reduce the current account deficit.  
- Staff analysis: Even with slowed medical inflation and substantial entitlement reform, long-term fiscal sustainability would require a more stringent fiscal target (for instance, balancing the budget excluding the Social Security surplus).  
- Expected effect: Such a stance would put debt on a clearly declining path and offer room to maneuver in responding to long-term challenges.  
- Political stance: Officials view budget balance by FY 2012 as appropriately ambitious and question the relevance of further adjustment given long-term entitlement pressures.  
- Quantified implication: The implied structural improvement of slightly over ½ percent of GDP a year is achievable without significant economic disruption.

### Spending restraint and revenue considerations
- Finding: Spending restraint is critical to deficit reduction; revenue increases may also need to be considered given low nonsecurity discretionary spending relative to GDP.  
- Trade-offs: The incentive benefits of the 2001/03 tax cuts are acknowledged but partly offset by crowding out through higher government debt and real interest rates.

### Tax system reform
- Diagnosis: The tax system needs reform due to extensive exemptions and high marginal tax rates; income tax expenditures are over one-third of revenues.  
- Specific figures: Deductions for employers’ health insurance and mortgage interest alone account for 1¾ percent of GDP annually.  
- Blueprint: The 2005 Presidential panel on tax reform proposes eliminating some deductions (state and local tax payments) and better targeting others (mortgage interest relief), while supporting personal saving.  
- Augmentation: This blueprint could be usefully augmented by higher energy taxes, which would also yield environmental benefits.  
- Political constraint: Officials note Administration interest in improving tax efficiency but limited political support; Administration energy policy emphasizes greater use of biofuels.

### Staff appraisal: growth, inflation, and monetary policy
- Baseline scenario: Most likely outcome is a soft landing as growth recovers and inflation falls, with activity picking up as housing drag dissipates, business investment revives, and higher foreign growth supports net exports.  
- Risks to baseline:
  - Consumption could be weaker given ongoing housing market slowdown.
  - Benign financial market conditions could tighten.
  - Decline in core inflation may not materialize if rising oil and commodity prices and a tight labor market feed through to prices.
- Monetary policy: Current policy is consistent with a soft landing and can be adjusted flexibly; with inflation above the Fed’s comfort level and unemployment low, the FOMC should maintain well-anchored inflation expectations while remaining alert to rapid weakening of employment and activity in a downturn.

### Financial innovation, stability, and regulatory challenges
- Positive role: Financial innovation and stability have underpinned U.S. economic success and funding of the current account deficit; innovation has helped disperse risk and attracted capital inflows.  
- Emerging challenges:
  - Rapid innovation makes risk assessment more difficult amid benign market conditions, encouraging risk taking and lower lending standards.
  - Tightening financial conditions could expose unanticipated risk concentrations and links across markets.
  - Supervisory priority: ensure risk management systems are robust across markets, especially core exposures to hedge funds and other private pools of capital.
  - Consumer protection: subprime mortgage problems highlight the need for consistent federal consumer protection without unduly constraining innovation.
- Regulatory structure:
  - Multiple federal and state regulators slow responses; increased use of general principles could ease interagency coordination.
  - Support for studying rationalizing the regulatory structure, building on options discussed by the GAO.
  - Other measures to improve effectiveness: instituting a national insurance charter, reforming oversight of government-sponsored housing enterprises, modifying the industrial loan company charter.
- Competitiveness measures: Reducing compliance burdens (parts of Sarbanes-Oxley), easing delisting for foreign companies, considering recognition of international accounting standards for foreign firms, and allowing mutual recognition of regulatory regimes.

### External imbalances, trade, and protectionism
- Risk assessment: Disorderly resolution of global imbalances is low probability but high cost; rebalancing is likely gradual given strong demand for U.S. financial assets, but shocks could trigger abrupt adjustments with severe financial market disruption.  
- Policy priorities:
  - Ensure U.S. financial markets remain sound and innovative.
  - Support U.S. saving, in particular by further reducing the fiscal deficit (as agreed in the Multilateral Consultation).
- Trade policy: Authorities’ commitment to free trade is welcomed; a more ambitious agenda for liberalizing agriculture could support a positive Doha outcome.  
- Distributional concern: Globalization creates winners and losers; consider policies to aid workers temporarily dislocated by rising imports to help reduce protectionist sentiment.

### Specific program recommendations on health and Social Security
- Medicare and Medicaid:
  - Staff strongly endorse the Administration’s proposal to strengthen the link between premiums and income as a first step to contain Medicare budget costs, while noting further reforms will be needed.
  - Removing the tax bias for employer-sponsored health coverage could help reduce U.S. health care costs but may need to be complemented by measures to bolster the individual insurance market.
  - More fundamental reform is necessary; additional work needed on underlying medical cost drivers and policy options.
- Social Security:
  - For Social Security, where costs and reform options are well understood, the immediate priority is building consensus on direction; progressive indexation is a promising approach.

*Source: IMF Staff Country Report content unit _cr07264 (PDF chapter/section).*

### 59.      It is expected that the next Article IV consultation with the United States will be

### _cr07264 - 59.      It is expected that the next Article IV consultation with the United States will be 

### Financial markets: international perspective and competitiveness
- U.S. financial markets have widened their edge in direct finance, supported by a large institutional investor base.
- The U.S. has dominant private debt markets and equity markets, a massive advantage in securitization, and a large investment banking sector.
- U.S. share of world assets under management and issuance of securitized instruments have shown large absolute values (charts reported through 2006).
- The U.S. is increasing its net financial service export earnings; the U.K. dominates the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market.
- U.S. share of the world's largest Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) has slumped while Europe has re-established a lead in foreign equity dealing.

### Housing market and linkages to real activity and financial markets
- Residential construction activity is sharply lower; the downturn in construction should help reduce inventory.
- Price growth and home equity withdrawal decelerated sharply in 2006, and turnover fell.
- Housing starts, permits, and completions (million units at annual rate) and measures of months' supply at current pace of sales are shown across 1978–2006 series (figures reported).
- Spreads have surged on higher-risk securities backed by subprime mortgages; net percentage of banks tightening mortgage standards rose through 2006.
- Securitized mortgages as a share of mortgages outstanding (percent) are higher in the United States than in Canada and Australia; U.S. mortgage-backed securities as share of global bond market (percent) are presented.
- Residential real estate in large banks' portfolios (percent of total assets) and spreads on derivatives on mortgage-backed securities (basis points) are presented with BBB- and AAA series through 2006–2007.

### Corporate sector, investment, and financial positions
- Business confidence and orders for durable goods have started to recover, but business investment remains soft; weakness evident in spending on transportation and industrial equipment.
- Corporate profits: recent robust growth is expected to slow (charts show corporate profits y/y percent change across countries).
- Strong profitability has generated internal funds exceeding investment needs; overall corporate leverage remains low though LBO leverage ratio is rising.
- Gross loans growth (y/y percent change) and delinquency rates (percent) indicate commercial and industrial loan growth remains strong while delinquencies are still falling.
- Net equity issuance and net debt issuance for nonfarm nonfinancial corporations (billion U.S. dollars, annualized) and corporate bond spreads (basis points) for investment grade and high-yield are presented through 2007.
- Measures of default risk (five-year credit default swap spread, basis points) remain benign through 2007.

### Inflation, labor market, and risks
- Risks to inflation are modestly to the upside on supply risks; measures of inflation expectations remain contained.
- Core inflation appears to be decelerating and remains benign outside the surge in the cost of shelter.
- Average hourly earnings (y/y percent change) and corporate profits (percent of GDP) series shown; differential between 10-year nominal Treasury and TIPS and 1-year ahead inflation from Livingston Survey are presented.
- Unit labor costs have leveled off even though productivity growth has slowed.
- Employment growth has recovered, though until recently it was weak compared to past recoveries. Payroll employment (y/y percent change) comparisons include current, 1990/91, and average cycle 1970-1982.
- Employee compensation as a share of national income (percent) series are shown across 1970–2005.
- Productivity (y/y percent change) and unit labor costs (y/y percent change) for nonfinancial corporations and nonfarm business sector reported.

### External developments and international position
- Net imports of oil accounted for some of the recent rise in the trade deficit; real export growth has recently exceeded real import growth.
- The U.S. current account deficit mirrors surpluses in Emerging Asia and among oil exporters; at current exchange rates, the deficit will raise U.S. indebtedness.
- Current account balance (percent of World GDP) projections through 2011 shown for Emerging Asia, Oil Exporters, Euro Area, Japan, United States.
- Impact of valuation changes on net foreign assets (percent of GDP) shows that massive valuation gains so far have prevented rises in the net debt ratio, largely reflecting capital gains on U.S. foreign assets.
- Net foreign asset position and net foreign liabilities-to-exports ratios are presented with historical and projected series; baseline net foreign asset position moves from -19.9 (2002) to -46.5 (2012) in the projections table (Table of NFA dynamics).

### Market expectations of exchange rates and tail risks
- Overall, the probability that markets assign to a disorderly dollar adjustment appears low.
- Interest rate differentials favor dollar assets against euro and yen but are offset by modest expected depreciation of the dollar.
- One-year-ahead risk premium (percent, twelve-month moving average) and one-year interest rate differentials (percent) presented across currencies; tail-risk relative prices in FX markets shown through 2007.
- Consensus forecast of Dollar/Euro and Yen/Dollar exchange rate in one year series are shown for May 2007 and September 2006.

### Fiscal position, health care, and long-run government size
- Unified federal budget deficit declined to 1.9 percent of GDP in FY 2006; deficit reduction proceeded faster than expected, but pace of consolidation is likely to slow.
- Federal government revenue and expenditure (percent of GDP) and staff forecasts are shown; revenue buoyancy from strong corporate profits, capital gains, and incomes of the wealthy may not last.
- FY 2008 budget targets eliminating the budget deficit by 2012; FY 2008 budget proposals include limits on Congressional earmarks and authority for the President to exercise a budget line-item veto.
- Staff-adjusted FY 2008 unified balance projections: -2.6 (2005), -1.9 (2006), -1.4 (2007), -1.6 (2008), -2.0 (2009), -1.8 (2010), -1.7 (2011), -1.2 (2012) (percent of GDP) with unified balance (billion dollars) shown as -318, -248, -188, -231, -307, -283, -287, -200 respectively (Table 7).
- Health care spending is high in the United States compared to other countries while overall health outcomes are unimpressive; share of uninsured households continues to grow as employer coverage erodes.
- Health expenditure (percent of GDP), out-of-pocket spending (percent of total health spending), private health insurance coverage (percent) and life expectancy at birth (years) series are presented.

### IMF staff policy advice and assessments (Table 1 and Table 2 highlights)
- Trade policy and foreign aid:
  - Concern: U.S. leadership in advancing global trade liberalization and proliferation of U.S. preferential trade agreements could undermine multilateral trade unless agreements include open-access clauses and simple rules of origin.
  - Staff view: U.S. bilateral free trade agreements complement multilateral negotiations.
  - Official development assistance (ODA) as percent of GDP is lower in the U.S. than in most other industrial countries; staff recommendation: U.S. ODA should be increased, in line with G-8 commitments.
  - Authorities’ position: The U.S. is steadily increasing aid; overall assistance including remittances and private capital flows is higher.
- Financial policy and regulation:
  - Concern: Investment portfolios of government-sponsored housing enterprises (GSEs) may pose systemic risks.
  - Staff recommendation: Impose stricter capital requirements on GSEs and measures to restore focus on securitization of conforming mortgages, including limits on investment activities.
  - Authorities’ position: Legislation activity (H.R. 1427, “Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of 2007") was passed by the House Financial Services Committee in March 2007; gives a new regulator power to restrict GSE investment portfolios but does not require this.
  - Concern: Supervisory level-playing field for industrial loan companies (ILCs); owners of ILCs are not subject to consolidated supervision under the Bank Holding Company Act.
  - Staff recommendation: All bank owners should be subject to the same consolidated supervision provisions.
  - Authorities’ position: FDIC imposed a moratorium on applications for deposit insurance by ILCs until January 2008; regulatory views differ about supervising nonfinancial corporate owners of ILCs.
  - Concern: Regulation of the insurance sector is entirely state-based with little federal oversight.
  - Staff recommendation: Establish a single, unified regulator given systemic importance of insurance and risks from state-based regulation.
  - Authorities’ position: Administration has suggested need for a stronger federal role in insurance regulation.
  - Concern: Absence of a financial stability report (FSR).
  - Staff recommendation: Publication of an FSR could improve markets' understanding of U.S. financial sector risks and facilitate greater regulatory coordination.
  - Authorities’ position: The Fed does not believe the value added of an FSR outweighs resource costs.
- Pensions and savings:
  - Concern: Adequacy of savings for retirement could be improved; many defined-benefit (DB) plans remain underfunded and weak incentives hamper enrollment in defined-contribution (DC) plans.
  - Staff recommendations: Reduce tax disincentives to overfunding DB plans; PBGC should set risk-based premia; facilitate 'automatic' enrollment in employer-sponsored DC plans.
  - Authorities’ position: The Pension Protection Act of 2006 implemented many of these suggestions.
- AML/CFT:
  - Staff view: AML/CFT regime strengthened significantly since 1997 but areas remain for tighter compliance with FATF recommendations, including customer due diligence, corporate ownership information availability, and extending AML/CFT requirements to certain designated nonfinancial businesses and professions.
  - Authorities’ position: September 2006 AML/CFT ROSC noted strong overall progress and satisfactory compliance on enhanced due diligence for correspondent banking relationships and requirements for money remittance services.

### Key macroeconomic projections and indicators (selected exact figures from projections)
- Real GDP (annual percent change): 3.2 (2005), 3.3 (2006), 2.0 (2007), 2.8 (2008), 3.0 (2009), 3.0 (2010), 2.9 (2011), 2.9 (2012) (Table 3 and projection tables).
- CPI inflation (y/y percent): 3.4 (2005), 3.2 (2006), 2.6 (2007), 2.5 (2008), 2.4 (2009), 2.4 (2010), 2.3 (2011), 2.5 (2012) (Table 3, Table 7).
- Unemployment rate (percent): 5.1 (2005), 4.6 (2006), 4.8 (2007), 5.0 (2008), 4.9 (2009), 4.8 (2010), 4.9 (2011), 5.0 (2012) (Table 3).
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): -6.1 (2005), -6.1 (2006), -6.0 (2007), -6.0 (2008), -5.9 (2009), -5.9 (2010), -5.8 (2011), -5.8 (2012) (Table 5 summary).
- Central government balance (percent of FY GDP, staff-adjusted): -2.6 (2005), -1.9 (2006), -1.4 (2007), -1.6 (2008), -2.0 (2009), -1.8 (2010), -1.7 (2011), -1.2 (2012) (Table 7).
- General government balance (percent of CY GDP): -3.7 (2005), -2.3 (2006), -2.1 (2007), -2.3 (2008), -2.6 (2009), -2.4 (2010), -2.4 (2011), -1.9 (2012) (Table 7).
- Net foreign asset position, baseline (percent of World GDP or relevant metric from projections table): -19.9 (2002), -19.5 (2003), -19.6 (2004), -18.0 (2005), -19.2 (2006), projected -25.1 (2007), -30.0 (2008), -34.5 (2009), -38.7 (2010), -42.7 (2011), -46.5 (2012) (NFA dynamics table).
- Net foreign liabilities-to-exports ratio (in percent): -214.2 (1999), -210.3 (2000), -198.3 (2001), -174.5 (2002), -175.7 (2003), -221.5 (2006), projected -257.9 (2007), -291.2 (2008), -322.1 (2009), -349.3 (2010), -373.2 (2011) (NFA dynamics table).

*International Monetary Fund, staff report content as provided in the source document.*

### Appendix Table 1. United States: Net Foreign

### Appendix Table 1. United States: Net Foreign Asset Position Sustainability Framework, 2002–2012

### Baseline public sector debt and projections
- Public sector debt (general government net debt) 2002–2012 (in percent of GDP):
  - 2002: 38.7
  - 2003: 41.7
  - 2004: 43.5
  - 2005: 44.4
  - 2006: 44.2
  - 2007: 45.0
  - 2008: 45.9
  - 2009: 46.9
  - 2010: 47.7
  - 2011: 48.5
  - 2012: 48.7
- Debt-stabilizing primary deficit 9/: 0.1

- Change in public sector debt (percent of GDP), 2002–2012:
  - 2002: 2.9
  - 2003: 3.0
  - 2004: 1.8
  - 2005: 0.9
  - 2006: -0.2
  - 2007: 0.8
  - 2008: 0.9
  - 2009: 1.0
  - 2010: 0.8
  - 2011: 0.8
  - 2012: 0.3

- Gross financing need 6/ (in percent of GDP), 2002–2012:
  - 2002: 24.0
  - 2003: 25.2
  - 2004: 25.7
  - 2005: 24.1
  - 2006: 21.2
  - 2007: 20.9
  - 2008: 21.2
  - 2009: 21.7
  - 2010: 21.8
  - 2011: 21.9
  - 2012: 21.7

- Gross financing need 6/ (in billions of U.S. dollars), 2002–2012:
  - 2002: 2514.8
  - 2003: 2763.7
  - 2004: 3005.9
  - 2005: 3007.3
  - 2006: 2814.0
  - 2007: 2897.1
  - 2008: 3083.8
  - 2009: 3303.6
  - 2010: 3486.8
  - 2011: 3687.3
  - 2012: 3819.9

### Identified debt-creating flows and fiscal components
- Identified debt-creating flows (4+7+12), percent of GDP, 2002–2012:
  - 2002: 1.6
  - 2003: 2.2
  - 2004: 1.1
  - 2005: 0.3
  - 2006: -1.2
  - 2007: -0.6
  - 2008: -0.6
  - 2009: -0.4
  - 2010: -0.6
  - 2011: -0.6
  - 2012: -1.1

- Primary deficit (percent of GDP), 2002–2012:
  - 2002: 0.8
  - 2003: 2.1
  - 2004: 1.9
  - 2005: 0.9
  - 2006: -0.6
  - 2007: -0.9
  - 2008: -0.7
  - 2009: -0.5
  - 2010: -0.6
  - 2011: -0.6
  - 2012: -1.1

- Revenue and grants (percent of GDP), 2002–2012:
  - 2002: 28.6
  - 2003: 28.0
  - 2004: 28.0
  - 2005: 29.0
  - 2006: 30.2
  - 2007: 30.3
  - 2008: 30.2
  - 2009: 29.8
  - 2010: 29.9
  - 2011: 29.8
  - 2012: 29.7

- Primary (noninterest) expenditure (percent of GDP), 2002–2012:
  - 2002: 29.4
  - 2003: 30.0
  - 2004: 29.8
  - 2005: 29.9
  - 2006: 29.6
  - 2007: 29.5
  - 2008: 29.4
  - 2009: 29.3
  - 2010: 29.3
  - 2011: 29.1
  - 2012: 28.6

- Automatic debt dynamics 2/ (percent of GDP), 2002–2012:
  - 2002: 0.8
  - 2003: 0.1
  - 2004: -0.8
  - 2005: -0.6
  - 2006: -0.6
  - 2007: 0.2
  - 2008: 0.2
  - 2009: 0.1
  - 2010: 0.0
  - 2011: 0.0
  - 2012: 0.1

- Contribution from interest rate/growth differential 3/ (percent of GDP), 2002–2012:
  - 2002: 0.8
  - 2003: 0.1
  - 2004: -0.8
  - 2005: -0.6
  - 2006: -0.6
  - 2007: 0.2
  - 2008: 0.2
  - 2009: 0.1
  - 2010: 0.0
  - 2011: 0.0
  - 2012: 0.1

- Of which contribution from real interest rate (percent of GDP), 2002–2012:
  - 2002: 1.4
  - 2003: 1.1
  - 2004: 0.7
  - 2005: 0.7
  - 2006: 0.8
  - 2007: 1.0
  - 2008: 1.4
  - 2009: 1.4
  - 2010: 1.4
  - 2011: 1.4
  - 2012: 1.4

- Of which contribution from real GDP growth (percent of GDP), 2002–2012:
  - 2002: -0.6
  - 2003: -0.9
  - 2004: -1.5
  - 2005: -1.3
  - 2006: -1.4
  - 2007: -0.8
  - 2008: -1.2
  - 2009: -1.3
  - 2010: -1.3
  - 2011: -1.3
  - 2012: -1.3

- Contribution from exchange rate depreciation 4/: 0.0 for 2002–2012 (table entries show 0.0 or ellipses where appropriate)
- Other identified debt-creating flows (percent of GDP), 2002–2012: 0.0
- Privatization receipts (negative): 0.0 (table shows 0.0 entries)
- Recognition of implicit or contingent liabilities: 0.0 for 2002–2012
- Other (specify, e.g. bank recapitalization): 0.0 for 2002–2012

- Residual, including asset changes (2-3) 5/ (percent of GDP), 2002–2012:
  - 2002: 1.3
  - 2003: 0.7
  - 2004: 0.7
  - 2005: 0.6
  - 2006: 1.0
  - 2007: 1.4
  - 2008: 1.4
  - 2009: 1.4
  - 2010: 1.4
  - 2011: 1.4
  - 2012: 1.4

- Public sector debt-to-revenue ratio 1/ (percent), 2002–2012:
  - 2002: 135.6
  - 2003: 149.3
  - 2004: 155.5
  - 2005: 152.9
  - 2006: 146.4
  - 2007: 148.4
  - 2008: 152.2
  - 2009: 157.2
  - 2010: 159.5
  - 2011: 162.8
  - 2012: 163.9

### Scenarios and sensitivity tests
- Scenario with key variables at their historical averages 7/ (selected entries shown in table):
  - 2006: 45.0
  - 2007: 45.0
  - 2008: 44.9
  - 2009: 44.9
  - 2010: 44.8
  - 2011: 44.6
  - (table shows additional values with 0.2 in a cell)

- Scenario with no policy change (constant primary balance) in 2006–2011 (selected entries shown):
  - 2006: 45.0
  - 2007: 47.3
  - 2008: 48.8
  - 2009: 50.1
  - 2010: 51.5
  - 2011: 52.8
  - (table shows 0.8 in a cell)

### Key macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions underlying baseline
- Real GDP growth (in percent), 2002–2012:
  - 2002: 1.6
  - 2003: 2.5
  - 2004: 3.9
  - 2005: 3.2
  - 2006: 3.3
  - 2007: 2.0
  - 2008: 2.8
  - 2009: 3.0
  - 2010: 3.0
  - 2011: 2.9
  - 2012: 2.9

- Average nominal interest rate on public debt (in percent) 8/, 2002–2012:
  - 2002: 5.8
  - 2003: 5.1
  - 2004: 4.8
  - 2005: 4.9
  - 2006: 4.9
  - 2007: 5.0
  - 2008: 5.2
  - 2009: 5.2
  - 2010: 5.1
  - 2011: 5.0
  - 2012: 5.0

- Average real interest rate (nominal rate minus change in GDP deflator, in percent), 2002–2012:
  - 2002: 4.0
  - 2003: 3.0
  - 2004: 1.9
  - 2005: 1.9
  - 2006: 2.0
  - 2007: 2.5
  - 2008: 3.2
  - 2009: 3.2
  - 2010: 3.2
  - 2011: 3.1
  - 2012: 3.1

- Nominal appreciation (increase in US dollar value of local currency, in percent): 0.0 (table entries show 0.0 or ellipses where appropriate)

- Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent) (table formatting indicates):
  - entries appearing as: 1.7 2.1 2.8 3.0 2.9 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 (preserved as presented)

- Growth of real primary spending (deflated by GDP deflator, in percent), 2002–2012:
  - 2002: 6.2
  - 2003: 4.9
  - 2004: 3.2
  - 2005: 3.4
  - 2006: 2.4
  - 2007: 1.5
  - 2008: 2.6
  - 2009: 2.7
  - 2010: 2.7
  - 2011: 2.5
  - 2012: 0.9

- Primary deficit (repeated from above for emphasis), 2002–2012:
  - 2002: 0.8
  - 2003: 2.1
  - 2004: 1.9
  - 2005: 0.9
  - 2006: -0.6
  - 2007: -0.9
  - 2008: -0.7
  - 2009: -0.5
  - 2010: -0.6
  - 2011: -0.6
  - 2012: -1.1

- Notes on formulas and definitions (as presented):
  - 1/ General government net debt.
  - 2/ Derived as [(r - π(1+g) - g + αε(1+r))/(1+g+π+gπ)] times previous period debt ratio, with r = interest rate; π = growth rate of GDP deflator; g = real GDP growth rate; α = share of foreign-currency denominated debt; and ε = nominal exchange rate depreciation (measured by increase in local currency value of U.S. dollar).
  - 3/ The real interest rate contribution is derived from the denominator in footnote 2/ as r - π(1+g) and the real growth contribution as -g.
  - 4/ The exchange rate contribution is derived from the numerator in footnote 2/ as αε(1+r).
  - 5/ For projections, this line includes exchange rate changes.
  - 6/ Defined as public sector deficit, plus amortization of medium and long-term public sector debt, plus short-term debt at end of previous period.
  - 7/ The key variables include real GDP growth; real interest rate; and primary balance in percent of GDP.
  - 8/ Derived as nominal interest expenditure divided by previous period gross debt stock.
  - 9/ Assumes that key variables (real GDP growth, real interest rate, and other identified debt-creating flows) remain at the level of the last projection year.

*Source: Appendix Table 1, "_cr07264 - Appendix Table 1. United States: Net Foreign" (IMF staff report content provided).*

### Appendix Figure and Tables: Sensitivity and Bound Tests (Net Foreign Asset & Public Debt Sustainability)

### Net foreign asset sustainability: bound tests (Appendix Figure 1)
- Graphical tests and scenarios summarized in figure captions (numeric highlights preserved as shown):
  - Baseline: -47 (Net foreign assets in percent of GDP)
  - Historical: -41
  - Current account shock: -47 (baseline) vs. -60, -50, -40, -30, -20, -10 (axis labels)
  - Combined shock 2/: -49 (presented)
  - Real depreciation shock 3/ (one-time real depreciation of 30 percent occurs in 2008): -39
- Notes:
  - Shaded areas represent actual data.
  - Individual shocks are permanent one-half standard deviation shocks.
  - Figures in the boxes represent average projections for the respective variables in the baseline and scenario being presented.
  - 2/ Permanent 1/4 standard deviation shocks applied to real interest rate, growth rate, and current account balance.
  - 3/ One-time real depreciation of 30 percent occurs in 2008.

### Public debt sustainability: bound tests (Appendix Figure 2)
- Graphical tests and scenarios summarized in figure captions (numeric highlights preserved as shown):
  - Baseline and historical scenarios:
    - Historical: 49
    - Baseline: 45 (and other axis values 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60)
  - Combined shock 2/: 54 (combined shock)
  - Real depreciation and contingent liabilities shocks 3/:
    - Contingent liabilities shock: 59
    - 30 percent depreciation: shown against baseline: 49
  - Primary balance shock and no policy change scenario:
    - Baseline: 3.2 (growth or other baseline values shown)
    - Scenario: 3.9 / -0.7 / 2.3 (various scenario box entries shown in figure captions)
    - Historical: 3.7 / 1.6 / 3.2 (historical box entries)
- Notes:
  - Shaded areas represent actual data.
  - Individual shocks are permanent one-half standard deviation shocks.
  - 2/ Permanent 1/4 standard deviation shocks applied to real interest rate, growth rate, and primary balance.
  - 3/ One-time real depreciation of 30 percent and 10 percent of GDP shock to contingent liabilities occur in 2008, with real depreciation defined as nominal depreciation (measured by percentage fall in dollar value of local currency) minus domestic inflation (based on GDP deflator).

*Source: Appendix Figure 1 and Appendix Figure 2, "_cr07264 - Appendix Table 1. United States: Net Foreign" (IMF staff report content provided).*

### Annex I: United States — Fund Relations (as of April 30, 2007)
- Membership status: Joined 12/27/45; Article VIII
- Quota and Fund holdings:
  - Quota (SDR Million): 37,149.30 (100.0 percent)
  - Fund holdings of currency: 34,161.26 (92.0 percent)
  - Reserve position in Fund: 2,987.48 (8.0 percent)
- SDR Department:
  - Net cumulative allocation: 4,899.53 (100.0 percent)
  - Holdings: 5,924.53 (120.9 percent)
- Outstanding Purchases and Loans: None
- Financial Arrangements: None
- Projected Obligations to Fund: None
- Exchange rate arrangements: The exchange rate of the U.S. dollar floats independently and is determined freely in the foreign exchange market.
- Payments restrictions: The United States maintains restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions to specified countries and has notified the Fund under Decision No. 144–(52/51); additional exchange restrictions and notifications noted (including March 2007 notifications EBD/07/34, 3/19/07).

*Source: Annex I, "_cr07264 - Appendix Table 1. United States: Net Foreign" (IMF staff report content provided).*

### Annex II: Statistical Issues (as of June 15, 2007)
- Comprehensive economic data are available on a timely basis; quality, coverage, periodicity, and timeliness are adequate for surveillance.
- Coverage of international capital flows in external sector statistics is being improved, with June 2007 releases of BOP and IIP data on financial derivatives.
- The United States has subscribed to the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) and its metadata are posted on the Dissemination Standard Bulletin Board (DSBB).

- Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance (date of latest observation / date received / frequency of data / frequency of reporting / frequency of publication — as presented):
  - Exchange rates: same day / same day / D / D / D
  - International reserve assets and reserve liabilities of the monetary authorities1: Jun. 18 / Jun. 11 / W / W / W
  - Reserve/base money: May 23 / Jun. 7 / B / W / W
  - Broad money: May 28 / Jun. 7 / W / W / W
  - Central bank balance sheet: Jun.12 / Q / Q / Q
  - Interest rates2: Same day / Same day / D / D / D
  - Consumer price index: Apr. 2007 / May 15 / M / M / M
  - Revenue, expenditure, balance and composition of financing3 — general government4: 2007 Q1 / Jun. 7 / Q / Q / Q
  - Revenue, expenditure, balance and composition of financing3 — central government: Apr. 2007 / May 10 / M / M / M
  - Stocks of central government and central government-guaranteed debt: Apr. 2007 / May 10 / M / M / M
  - External current account balance: 2006 Q4 / Mar. 14 / Q / Q / Q
  - Exports and imports of goods and services: Apr. 2007 / Jun. 8 / M / M / M
  - GDP/GNP: 2007 Q1 / May 31 / Q / Q / Q
  - Gross External Debt5: 2007 Q1 / Jun. 7 / Q / Q / Q

- Footnotes (as presented):
  - 1 Includes reserve assets pledged or otherwise encumbered as well as net derivative positions.
  - 2 Both market-based and officially-determined, including discount rates, money market rates, rates on treasury bills, notes and bonds.
  - 3 Foreign, domestic bank, and domestic nonbank financing.
  - 4 The general government consists of the central government (budgetary funds, extra budgetary funds, and social security funds) and state and local governments.
  - 5 Including currency and maturity composition.
  - 6 Daily (D), Weekly (W), Biweekly (B), Monthly (M), Quarterly (Q), Annually (A); NA: Not Available.

*Source: Annex II, "_cr07264 - Appendix Table 1. United States: Net Foreign" (IMF staff report content provided).*

### Statement by the IMF Staff Representative (July 27, 2007)
- Purpose: Reports on information available since the staff report was issued; does not alter the staff appraisal.
- Federal Reserve Monetary Policy Report (MPR) to Congress, July 18–19 (Chairman Bernanke):
  - Chairman cautioned that some recent easing in core inflation could be transitory.
  - Expected core inflation to fall below 2 percent on a sustainable basis by 2008.
  - Indicated economic growth is likely to pick up modestly, from 2¼–2½ percent this year to 2½–2¾ percent in 2008 (both Q4 on Q4).
- Administration Mid-Session Review of the budget:
  - Projected FY 2007 deficit marked down to 1½ percent of GDP.
  - Projected future deficits raised modestly due to higher anticipated spending, mainly on Medicare/Medicaid.
  - Changes not large enough to warrant revisions to the Staff Report data.
- Regulatory responses to subprime mortgage market difficulties:
  - Regulators taking steps to strengthen consumer protection in mortgage lending.
  - On July 17, federal regulators announced a pilot project to cooperate with state regulators to check compliance with consumer protection regulations by (1) non-depository affiliates of depository institutions and (2) state-licensed mortgage lenders and brokers issuing subprime mortgages.
  - This follows issuance of final guidance requiring depository institutions to tighten lending standards to subprime adjustable rate mortgages.
  - On July 20, federal regulators announced an agreed strategy on Basel II implementation; agreement resolves major outstanding issues and should be followed by finalized rules relatively soon.
- Recent data releases (as of statement):
  - Core CPI inflation fell to 2.2 percent in June.
  - Consumption growth has slowed and the housing market remains weak.
  - Industrial production increased by 0.5 percent in June.
  - May export growth was strong.
  - The flash second quarter GDP release is due the morning of the Board discussion.

*Source: Statement by the IMF Staff Representative, July 27, 2007 (content provided).*

### 6. While subprime mortgage spreads continue to widen, financial market

### _cr07264 - 6. While subprime mortgage spreads continue to widen, financial market

### Overview
- The U.S. economy has cooled more than expected over the past year, but employment remains strong and growth abroad has picked up.
- The slowdown has largely reflected a drag from residential investment as the housing market has weakened substantially.
- Unexpected weakness in business investment and net exports, as well as an inventory correction, amplified the downturn in early 2007.
- Private consumption has continued to grow robustly as solid employment and wage growth have minimized spillovers from housing; unemployment has remained extremely low; core inflation has only recently started to ease.
- The global environment remains favorable, with robust growth in the euro area and Asia.

### Outlook and Risks
- Most likely scenario: a soft landing with growth picking up during 2007 as the housing drag dissipates, business investment recovers, and net exports rebound on strong foreign demand; core inflation should ease as the output gap widens.
- Key downside risks:
  - Growth is close to the “stall speed” associated with past recessions.
  - Subprime mortgage difficulties could extend the housing downturn, weaken consumption, and tighten financial conditions.
  - With output close to potential, unemployment low, commodities prices elevated, and productivity growth falling, cost pressures could boost inflation.
- Financial conditions: although high-yield corporate and investment bank credit spreads have widened, they remain at historically low levels; U.S. equity markets have touched record highs.

### Financial Innovation, Stability, and Regulatory Challenges
- Financial innovation and stability have been critical to U.S. economic success, attracting capital inflows and easing financing of the current account deficit.
- Shift to an “originate-to-distribute” model and growth of derivative markets have helped disperse risk but made vulnerabilities harder to assess.
- New instruments have created new regulatory challenges and complicated risk assessment amid higher risk taking and deteriorating lending standards in some sectors.
- Recent subprime mortgage problems highlight the need for:
  - Robust risk management systems.
  - Consistent consumer protection, without undue constraints on innovation.
- Directors’ views on regulation:
  - Focus prudential oversight on core commercial and investment banks.
  - Support authorities’ plan to review options for streamlining the financial regulatory system.
  - Support increased use of general principles to guide rule making and initiatives to rationalize the regulatory structure.
  - Welcome initiatives to lower regulatory costs and increase competitiveness (including guidance reducing Sarbanes-Oxley compliance burden on smaller firms, new rules easing deregistration for foreign companies, and consideration of recognizing some foreign regulatory regimes and international accounting standards).

### External Sector and Exchange Rate
- The current account deficit stabilized at 6 percent of GDP in 2006, with a stronger nonoil trade balance partly offset by higher oil prices and lower net investment income.
- At unchanged real exchange rates, the current account deficit is expected to narrow only slightly, implying continued accumulation of U.S. net foreign liabilities.
- Staff assessment: the dollar appears to be overvalued relative to its longer-term value in real effective terms; further real depreciation would be required over time to realign with fundamentals and could contribute to rebalancing demand and asset portfolios, though adjustment would likely be gradual given continued capital inflows.
- Some Directors found the evidence for dollar overvaluation unconvincing.
- While a disorderly resolution of global imbalances is unlikely, a disruption in U.S. financial markets would lower domestic and foreign demand via financial market spillovers.
- Directors emphasized implementing policies to support U.S. saving agreed in the Fund’s Multilateral Consultation.

### Fiscal Policy and Entitlement Reform
- Short-run fiscal developments: the Administration’s goal of halving the deficit by FY 2009 was achieved three years ahead of time, largely due to surging revenues.
- Administration and Congress endorsed a target of balancing the budget by FY 2012, but agreement on how to achieve it (including war costs and Alternative Minimum Tax relief) has not been reached.
- Key long-run challenge: entitlement reform—without reform, federal spending on Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid is set to increase sharply, threatening long-run fiscal sustainability.
- Directors’ recommendations and observations:
  - Commend recent fiscal performance and the intention to balance the budget by FY 2012, but more effort is needed to forge consensus on achieving balance.
  - Welcome proposals to contain Medicare costs by linking premiums and income, but note sustainability requires more fundamental reform of the high-cost health system.
  - Urge authorities to develop a consensus on Social Security reform.
  - A tighter medium-term target would offer greater room to address long-term fiscal pressures and contribute to current account adjustment.
  - A number of Directors supported balancing the budget excluding the Social Security surplus.
  - Revenue increases might be needed; a number of Directors viewed that higher taxation of energy consumption should be considered.
  - Emphasize the need to overhaul the complex tax system by reducing and better targeting write-offs while further shielding saving from income taxes.

### Executive Board Assessment
- Directors agreed with the staff appraisal: prospects are favorable but spillovers from the housing market slowdown and subprime mortgage problems cannot be overlooked.
- Monetary policy was considered consistent with a soft landing; Directors commended the Federal Reserve for emphasizing well-anchored inflation expectations and saw scope for flexibility in balancing inflation risks with concerns about activity.
- Directors stressed the importance of sound and innovative U.S. financial markets and urged adoption of policies to support U.S. saving.
- Directors recognized the authorities’ commitment to free trade and urged a more ambitious agenda to achieve a positive outcome to the Doha Round.
- It is expected that the next Article IV consultation with the United States will be held on the standard 12-month cycle.

### Selected Economic Indicators (annual change in percent, unless otherwise noted)
- Real GDP: 2000: 3.7; 2001: 0.8; 2002: 1.6; 2003: 2.5; 2004: 3.9; 2005: 3.2; 2006: 3.3
- Net exports (contribution to growth): 2000: -0.9; 2001: -0.2; 2002: -0.7; 2003: -0.4; 2004: -0.7; 2005: -0.3; 2006: 0.0
- Total domestic demand: 2000: 4.4; 2001: 0.9; 2002: 2.2; 2003: 2.8; 2004: 4.4; 2005: 3.3; 2006: 3.2
- Final domestic demand: 2000: 4.5; 2001: 1.8; 2002: 1.8; 2003: 2.8; 2004: 4.0; 2005: 3.6; 2006: 2.9
  - Private final consumption: 2000: 4.7; 2001: 2.5; 2002: 2.7; 2003: 2.8; 2004: 3.9; 2005: 3.5; 2006: 3.2
  - Public consumption expenditure: 2000: 1.7; 2001: 3.1; 2002: 4.3; 2003: 2.5; 2004: 2.1; 2005: 0.9; 2006: 1.6
  - Gross fixed domestic investment: 2000: 6.1; 2001: -1.7; 2002: -3.5; 2003: 3.2; 2004: 6.1; 2005: 6.4; 2006: 3.1
    - Private: 2000: 6.5; 2001: -3.0; 2002: -5.2; 2003: 3.4; 2004: 7.3; 2005: 7.5; 2006: 2.9
    - Public: 2000: 3.6; 2001: 4.9; 2002: 5.1; 2003: 2.2; 2004: 0.5; 2005: 1.1; 2006: 4.1
  - Change in business inventories (contribution to growth): 2000: -0.1; 2001: -0.9; 2002: 0.4; 2003: 0.0; 2004: 0.4; 2005: -0.3; 2006: 0.2
- GDP in current prices: 2000: 5.9; 2001: 3.2; 2002: 3.4; 2003: 4.7; 2004: 6.9; 2005: 6.3; 2006: 6.3
- Unemployment rate (percent): 2000: 4.0; 2001: 4.7; 2002: 5.8; 2003: 6.0; 2004: 5.5; 2005: 5.1; 2006: 4.7
- CPI inflation: 2000: 3.4; 2001: 2.8; 2002: 1.6; 2003: 2.3; 2004: 2.7; 2005: 3.4; 2006: 3.2
- GDP deflator: 2000: 2.2; 2001: 2.4; 2002: 1.7; 2003: 2.1; 2004: 2.8; 2005: 3.0; 2006: 2.9
- Unified federal balance (billions of dollars): 2000: 236; 2001: 128; 2002: -158; 2003: -378; 2004: -413; 2005: -318; 2006: -248
  - In percent of FY GDP: 2000: 2.4; 2001: 1.3; 2002: -1.5; 2003: -3.5; 2004: -3.6; 2005: -2.6; 2006: -1.9
- General government balance (NIPA, billions of dollars): 2000: 159; 2001: -39.3; 2002: -397; 2003: -530; 2004: -533; 2005: -456; 2006: -299
  - In percent of CY GDP: 2000: 1.6; 2001: -0.4; 2002: -3.8; 2003: -4.8; 2004: -4.6; 2005: -3.7; 2006: -2.3
- Current account balance (billions of dollars): 2000: -417; 2001: -385; 2002: -460; 2003: -522; 2004: -640; 2005: -755; 2006: -811
  - In percent of GDP: 2000: -4.3; 2001: -3.8; 2002: -4.4; 2003: -4.8; 2004: -5.5; 2005: -6.1; 2006: -6.1
- Merchandise trade balance (billions of dollars): 2000: -455; 2001: -430; 2002: -485; 2003: -551; 2004: -670; 2005: -787; 2006: -838
  - In percent of GDP: 2000: -4.6; 2001: -4.2; 2002: -4.6; 2003: -5.0; 2004: -5.7; 2005: -6.3; 2006: -6.3
- Invisibles (billions of dollars): 2000: 37.3; 2001: 44.8; 2002: 25.3; 2003: 28.8; 2004: 29.4; 2005: 32.3; 2006: 26.8
  - In percent of GDP: 2000: 0.4; 2001: 0.4; 2002: 0.2; 2003: 0.3; 2004: 0.3; 2005: 0.3; 2006: 0.2
- Gross national saving (share of GDP): 2000: 18.0; 2001: 16.4; 2002: 14.2; 2003: 13.3; 2004: 13.2; 2005: 12.9; 2006: 13.9
- Gross domestic investment (share of GDP): 2000: 20.8; 2001: 19.1; 2002: 18.4; 2003: 18.4; 2004: 19.3; 2005: 19.7; 2006: 20.0

*Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 07/92 — IMF Executive Board Concludes 2007 Article IV Consultation with the United States (August 1, 2007).*

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