## _cr07385

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### A. Introduction and context
- Vietnam became the 150th member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on January 11, 2007.
- 1993–2006 performance highlights:
  - Trade openness (exports + imports/GDP) more than doubled.
  - Export market share more than quadrupled.
  - Real GDP increased on average by 7½ percent a year.
  - Poverty has fallen sharply.
- Chapter purpose: assess how WTO accession will influence Vietnam’s global integration and effects on regional and world economies; Sectional structure noted (terms of accession, partial equilibrium simulation, overview of effects, conclusions). Model details in Annex I.

### B. Vietnam’s principal WTO commitments (tariffs, services, other)
- Tariff commitments (selected exact figures preserved):
  - Textiles: MFN average tariff reduced to 13.5 percent from 36.4 percent; textiles = 16.3 percent of exports (as of August 2007).
  - Import duties on textile raw materials reduced to 10−15 percent from previously applied MFN rate of 40−50 percent; approximately 80 percent of textile sector’s raw materials are imported.
  - Footwear: more modest tariff reductions; subsidies to these industries removed.
  - Table highlights (as presented in source):
    - Simple average MFN Rates 2006: 17.3; WTO Bound Rates: 17.2; Final WTO Implementation: 13.4 up to 12 years.
    - Agricultural products MFN 2006: 25.7; WTO Bound Rates: 27.3; Final WTO: 21.7 up to 5 years.
    - Nonagricultural products MFN 2006: 16.3; WTO Bound Rates: 15.8; Final WTO: 12.2 up to 12 years.
    - Textiles and clothing MFN 2006: 36.4; WTO Bound Rates: 13.6; Final WTO: 13.5 upon accession.
    - Footwear MFN 2006: 43.9; WTO Bound Rates: 35.8; Final WTO: 27.2 upon accession.
    - Cars and other motor vehicles MFN 2006: 55.5; WTO Bound Rates: 84.8; Final WTO: 58.7 up to 12 years.
    - Most new cars MFN 2006: 90.0; WTO Bound Rates: 100.0; Final WTO: 70.0 up to 7 years.
    - Motorbikes MFN 2006: 90.0; WTO Bound Rates: 100.0; Final WTO: 74.3 up to 12 years.
    - Machinery/Electrical MFN 2006: 8.2; WTO Bound Rates: 10.8; Final WTO: 8.1 up to 5 years.
    - Minimum tariff: 0 0 0
    - Maximum tariff agricultural products: 100 100–150 85–135
    - Maximum tariff nonagricultural products: 90–100 100 75–100
    - Number of lines: 11,088 10,444 10,444
- Observations on applied vs bound rates and government actions:
  - Bound rates often significantly exceed applied rates as of late 2006; commitments do not always require immediate applied-rate changes for some items.
  - Government actions in 2007:
    - Decision 70/2007 reduced tariffs on most new cars to 70 percent (WTO final bound rate to be applied by 2014).
    - Decision 69/2007 temporarily reduced tariffs on certain food products and construction materials below WTO commitments.
    - Tariffs on certain cosmetics and refrigerators, sewing machines, air conditioners, and fans reduced from 40 percent to 30 percent.
- Services, financial sector, insurance, distribution (selected commitments and thresholds):
  - Financial sector entry thresholds: foreign-owned banks allowed if parent institution total assets > US$10 billion (for 100 percent subsidiary) or > US$20 billion (for branch).
  - Five-year transitional restriction (lifted in January 2011) limiting foreign bank branches’ acceptance of dong deposits from Vietnamese nationals without preexisting credit relationships, capped by ratio of branch’s legal paid-in capital.
  - Foreign securities companies: representative offices and joint ventures allowed; foreign entity may hold up to 49 percent of total capital; capital limit abolished after five years; scope expansion to asset management and settlement/clearing services.
  - Insurance: 100 percent foreign-invested companies permitted upon accession; foreign-invested insurers allowed to provide compulsory insurance from January 1, 2008; branches after 5 years can provide life insurance services.
  - Distribution sector: 49 percent foreign capital limit to be reduced by January 1, 2008 and abolished in 2009; most restrictions lifted completely by 2010.
  - Health sector minimum capital requirements: US$20 million for a hospital, US$2 million for a policlinic unit, US$200,000 for a specialty unit.
- Box 1 (subsidies, trading rights, privatization, standards, export restrictions):
  - Amber Box support up to about 4 trillion Vietnamese dong (currently about US$246 million) in addition to de minimis up to 10 percent of value of domestic agricultural production; Green Box support unlimited.
  - Export controls maintained on some sensitive products (rice, certain wood products, minerals) applied in conformity with WTO agreements.
  - WTO rules compliance: customs valuation, rules of origin, preshipment inspections, antidumping safeguards, subsidies, TRIMs to be complied with as of accession; TRIPS to be complied with from date of accession.

### C. Partial equilibrium simulation model — methodology and calibration
- Model purpose: simulate welfare impact on Vietnam of tariff reductions resulting from WTO commitments.
- Data and calibration:
  - Disaggregated dataset with commodity-level imports and tariff data at the four-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS).
  - Ten-digit tariff rates of MFN tariffs and WTO commitments converted into four-digit rates to match import data.
  - Model calibrated so that in base year 2006 the implicit import tariff revenues derived from the model equal actual receipts from import duties.
  - Compliance rate coefficient included to reconcile MFN tariff application to actual budget-reported import duty receipts (acknowledging exemptions, export-processing zones, etc.).
  - Model base year for simulation: 2006.
- Simulation methodology (welfare decomposition and scenarios):
  - Welfare gains computed year by year for 2007–19 using WTO commitment schedule as sum of:
    - change in aggregate consumer surplus, and
    - change in total tariff revenues.
  - Each component decomposed into tariff reductions on:
    - trade among ASEAN members (intra-ASEAN), and
    - trade with non-ASEAN partners (rest of the world).
  - Induced import effects simulated using estimated import-demand function; induced increase smaller than projected total import growth driven by GDP, investment, FDI, other macro variables.
  - Two scenarios simulated:
    - Scenario 1: MFN tariffs apply to all imports (ASEAN and non-ASEAN). Upper bound of welfare gains.
    - Scenario 2: ASEAN imports subject to CEPT preferential rates; all other imports subject to MFN rates. Lower bound of welfare gains.

### D. Simulation results — key quantitative findings (exact figures preserved)
- Overall: increase in consumer surplus substantially exceeds decline in tariff revenues, yielding significant net welfare gain.
- Scenario 1 (MFN on all imports) — projected annual changes (relative to 2006):
  - Change in welfare: 784 (2007), 1,508 (2012), 1,614 (2019).
  - Change in consumer surplus: 1,056 (2007), 2,159 (2012), 2,310 (2019).
  - Change in tariff revenues: -272 (2007), -651 (2012), -696 (2019).
  - Change in tariff revenues (percentage change): -14.5 (2007), -24.8 (2012), -25.4 (2019).
  - Change in imports (percentage change): 2.9 (2007), 5.1 (2012), 5.2 (2019).
  - Memorandum items (in percent of GDP):
    - Change in consumer surplus: 1.5 (2007), 1.7 (2012), 0.9 (2019).
    - Change in tariff revenues: -0.4 (2007), -0.5 (2012), -0.3 (2019).
    - Change in welfare: 1.1 (2007), 1.2 (2012), 0.7 (2019).
- Scenario 2 (CEPT on ASEAN imports, MFN on others) — projected annual changes (relative to 2006):
  - Change in welfare: 774 (2007), 1,292 (2012), 1,376 (2019).
  - Change in consumer surplus: 986 (2007), 1,771 (2012), 1,888 (2019).
  - Change in tariff revenues: -213 (2007), -480 (2012), -512 (2019).
  - Change in tariff revenues (percentage change): -12.5 (2007), -21.7 (2012), -22.3 (2019).
  - Change in imports (percentage change): 2.3 (2007), 3.9 (2012), 4.0 (2019).
  - Memorandum items (in percent of GDP):
    - Change in consumer surplus: 1.4 (2007), 1.4 (2012), 0.8 (2019).
    - Change in tariff revenues: -0.3 (2007), -0.4 (2012), -0.2 (2019).
    - Change in welfare: 1.1 (2007), 1.0 (2012), 0.6 (2019).
- Interpretation (verbatim numeric interpretations):
  - Under Scenario 1, annual consumer gains from cheaper imports projected at US$1 billion (1.5 percent of GDP) in 2007, rise to US$2.2 billion (1.7 percent of GDP) by 2012, and level off at about US$2.3 billion (0.9 percent of GDP) in 2019.
  - Under Scenario 1, annual import tariff revenues projected to fall by about US$300 million (0.4 percent of GDP) in 2007, by US$650 million (0.5 percent of GDP) by 2012, and level off at around US$700 million from 2013 onwards.
  - Scenario 2 yields slightly lower changes in annual welfare, consumer surplus, and tariff revenues than Scenario 1 because CEPT rates for intra-ASEAN trade are much lower than MFN rates.
- Caveats (exact source points):
  - Results assume no tariff lines are increased beyond the 2006 rates; if some tariffs rise while others fall, net welfare effects may be ambiguous.
  - Partial equilibrium framework does not capture potential gains from increased productive efficiency; a general equilibrium analysis would be required to quantify those effects.

### E. Implementation, timing, and broader trade-related policy implications
- Bound versus applied rates: bound rates are maximum legal ceilings; applied rates often lower, giving Vietnam flexibility to raise tariffs while meeting WTO commitments.
- Timeline highlights:
  - Many decreases in bound rates to occur by 2012; some final rates to be implemented up to 12 years; specific sectoral phase-outs and limits scheduled up to 2014 or 2019 (as noted in tariff table).
- Dynamic productivity and macro effects (selected exact points):
  - Economies-of-scale effects could be large, notably benefiting textile industry now able to compete quota-free.
  - WTO accession bolstered the investment climate; FDI approvals reached a record US$10 billion in 2006.
  - Inflation note: inflation was 8.8 percent year-on-year in September 2007.
  - Initial tariff reductions depress import duty receipts, but import growth and expanding exports should temper effect over time; balance of payments should remain strong if exports and FDI continue to grow.
- Trade policy recommendation (exact wording preserved):
  - Authorities should abstain from increasing any tariffs beyond 2006 rates, even if allowed under WTO commitments.

### F. Financial sector and services reform recommendations linked to WTO accession
- Urgency for market-oriented banking reforms (e.g., equitization of main SOCBs) to prepare for stronger foreign bank competition.
- Address adjustment costs:
  - Heavily protected industries and SOEs (notably auto assembly and motorbike plants) require significant reforms.
  - Short-run mitigation: retraining programs and social safety nets.
  - Authorities should resist financially supporting nonviable industries (through fiscal incentives or directed lending) as such support could be very costly.
- Monitoring and compliance:
  - Vietnam will remain on a list of “non-market economies” for up to 12 years, complicating defense against antidumping measures; U.S. market monitoring imposed on certain apparel imports.

---

### II. The 2006–2007 stock market boom: developments, risks, and policy response

#### Recent developments and market metrics (exact figures)
- VN Index performance:
  - Rose by 281 percent between end-2005 and end-February 2007; declined around 20 percent in subsequent months.
  - As of September 10, 2007, VN index about triple its end-2005 level.
  - VN Index rose by 144½ percent in 2006, and by another 56 percent in first two months of 2007 (total 281 percent since end-2005).
- Listings and capitalization:
  - Number of listed companies increased from 41 at end-2005 to 110 as of July 2007 (or from 50 to 200 for both HCMC and Hanoi combined).
  - Market capitalization rose from US$0.6 billion (1 percent of GDP) at end-2005 to a peak of some US$23 billion (34 percent of GDP) by end-February 2007.
  - Daily trading volumes rose from average US$10 million in January 2006 to about US$70 million in late February/early March 2007; later averaged around US$30 million in July–August.
- Valuation metrics:
  - Average PE ratio for largest companies (representing more than 80 percent of market capitalization) fell from an average of 53 in January–March to around 32 as of late-August.
  - Hanoi stock exchange (HASTC) index surged by 377 percent between end-2005 and March 19, 2007, and has since declined by about 45 percent.

#### External and domestic drivers (exact figures)
- Portfolio inflows and foreign participation:
  - Officially recorded portfolio investment inflows estimated to have doubled from US$0.9 billion in 2005 to US$1.9 billion in 2006 (3.1 percent of GDP).
  - Share of foreign investors in daily trading increased from average 10 percent in mid-2006 to above 20 percent during first 7 months of 2007.
  - Foreign holdings reached 33 percent of market capitalization in HCMC and 13 percent in Hanoi by end-July.
  - International vehicles for portfolio investment reportedly hold some US$5-6 billion, of which US$3–4 billion still waiting to be invested.
- Domestic bank exposure and lending:
  - Share-collateralized bank lending increased sharply since late 2006.
  - About half of share-related lending appears to have been extended by non-SOCBs.
  - Non-SOCBs accounted for less than 30 percent of total banking system credit as of end-2005.
  - Non-SOCBs’ lending expanded in 2006 at an annual rate of around 50 percent.
  - Some small joint-stock banks reported exposures in stock market-related lending in the range of 30–40 percent of their total loans.
  - SOCBs may be indirectly exposed via interbank credit to joint stock banks.

#### Risks and potential consequences
- Continued bank lending for stock purchases plus surging portfolio inflows could:
  - Lead to revival of boom.
  - Increase banking system exposure to stock market risk.
  - Raise likelihood of major stock market correction.
- Potential consequences of a correction:
  - Threaten solvency of weakly-capitalized banks with large exposures.
  - Banks’ efforts to curb exposures could cause sharp contraction of credit to the stock market, exacerbating a sell-off.
- Data and transparency concerns:
  - Earnings data for many companies remain sketchy; accounting and transparency practices uneven.

#### Policy response to date (exact measures and dates)
- SBV Decision 03/2007 (issued January 19): new regulations on bank capital adequacy, liquidity ratios, lending and investment limits; restrict new bank lending for stock purchases; risk weight of securities-related loans raised from "100 to 150 percent"; credit institutions given "one year" to conform.
- Implementing regulations of the securities law (issued January 19): strengthened supervision, disclosure requirements, stiffer penalties, corporate governance requirements.
- Prime Minister letter (January 29): instructed improved monitoring and enforcement, and SBV to consider amendments to tighten controls on capital inflows/repatriation.
- SBV Directive 03 (May 28, 2007): limits banks’ total securities-related credit exposures to "less than 3 percent of their total loan portfolio."
- Implementation guidelines (June 2007):
  - Deadline for compliance for banks exceeding 3 percent cap: "December 31, 2007."
  - Banks required to report by "July 10" total outstanding securities-related credit exposures as of "end-June, 2007"; monthly reporting thereafter.
  - SBV supervision to monitor banks with exposures exceeding "10 percent of total loans."
- Monetary and reserve developments:
  - Gross official reserves increased by "US$7.5 billion" or "more than 10 percent of GDP" between end-2006 and mid-2007.
  - Reserve money growth around "34 percent (y/y) as of May 2007."
  - Total annual credit growth "35 percent (y/y) by end-May 2007."
  - For non-SOCBs, annual credit growth rose from "51 percent (y/y) as of end-2006 to close to 70 percent (y/y) as of end-May 2007."
  - Inflation rose from "6.6 percent (y/y) as of end-2006 to 8.6 percent (y/y) as of August 2007."
  - SBV doubled reserve requirements in June to "a range of 4 to 10 percent."
  - Exchange rate band widened on "January 2, 2007" from "±0.25 percent to ±0.5 percent"; dong appreciated by "0.3 percent" vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar during first six weeks of 2007 then reversed.

#### Policy recommendations (regulatory, supervisory, monetary, fiscal — selected exact points)
- Regulatory and prudential framework:
  - Allow only banks with strong credit and market risk management to extend credit for share purchases; impose corrective action on banks lacking adequate controls.
  - Consider regulatory caps on loan-to-value ratios, maturities in share-secured loans and repurchase agreements; aggregate exposure limits (e.g., May 2007 cap).
  - Institute/enforce minimum standards for foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk; revisit prudential rules on foreign-currency exposure.
  - Strengthen oversight of foreign-currency lending to borrowers without foreign-currency income.
  - Shift bank regulation toward risk management focus; upgrade SBV capacities.
  - Review stock market regulations: circuit-breakers and settlement without roll-over.
- Supervisory actions and contingency planning:
  - Reassess bank exposures to stock market risk; measure capital at risk, profit at risk, liquidity at risk.
  - Conduct stress tests and on-site examinations; design/enforce corrective measures (additional capital, liquidity, reduction of exposures).
  - Prepare contingency plans including review of bank insolvency framework (deposit insurance), measures to facilitate mergers/absorptions of weak banks, and assessment of potential need for public resources.
- Monetary and exchange rate policy:
  - Tighten monetary policy further to rein in credit growth and contain demand pressures.
  - Continue accumulating reserves while current account deficit remains restrained and financed by private capital inflows.
  - Ensure SBV issues sufficient own bills to absorb excess liquidity; note OMO rates increased after reserve requirement doubling but interbank rates remain low.
  - Introduce greater two-way flexibility in the dong to help market better price risk; allow exchange rate to depreciate somewhat faster than in recent years in event of reversal of portfolio inflows.
- Fiscal, debt management, and securities market use:
  - Fiscal policy to contain external current account deficit and protect medium-term debt sustainability.
  - Accelerate consolidated control over new external borrowing by government, SOEs, and SOCBs (Decree 134).
  - Use securities market to expedite equitization of SOEs and SOCBs and meet SEDP "2006–10" investment needs cost-effectively.
  - Foreign investor interest in dong-denominated fixed-rate bonds could allow government and SOEs to raise capital at reduced cost.
- Market transparency and enforcement:
  - Step up transparency and enforcement; maintain strict listing requirements; ensure disclosure consistent with international practices; strengthen penalties against insider trading.
- Capital controls:
  - Effectiveness and costs must be carefully weighed; broad controls may be more effective but have adverse side-effects; narrowly-targeted controls are difficult to administer and evade.
  - If capital controls unavoidable, implement in most cost-effective way and only as temporary breathing space paired with other policy adjustments.

---

### III. Capital flows and controls — Annex II summary (exact points)
- Main observations on controls and instruments:
  - Unremunerated reserve requirements (URRs): can squeeze liquidity immediately; usually effective only short period; enforcement costly and circumvention possible.
  - Chile example: 20 percent URR on foreign borrowing in 1991; empirical studies conclude effectiveness quite limited with mixed evidence.
  - Market-based controls: minimum maintenance periods for nonresident capital; differential taxation on inflows—advantages/disadvantages noted.
  - Administrative controls: comprehensive coverage required; reinstatement of temporary controls on short-term inflows through banks could give some relief but trade-offs include reduced banking competitiveness and off-shore shift.
  - Tightening borrowing from abroad by SOEs and SOCBs should be considered on fiscal and debt sustainability grounds.
  - Cross-country examples indicate controls rarely fully effective and can be evaded; country experiences (Thailand 2007, central/eastern Europe) highlighted limitations.

---

### IV. Public investment, crowding out vs crowding in — empirical evidence and policy
- Investment trends 1996–2006 (exact series preserved):
  - Share of total investment (public, private domestic, FDI) for 1996–2006:
    - Public investment (percent of total investment): 49.1, 49.4, 55.5, 58.7, 59.1, 59.8, 56.3, 54.0, 53.6, 52.2, 50.1
    - Private domestic investment (percent of total investment): 24.9, 22.6, 23.7, 24.0, 22.9, 22.6, 22.6, 29.7, 30.9, 32.1, 33.6
    - FDI (percent of total investment): 26.0, 28.0, 20.8, 17.3, 18.0, 17.6, 17.5, 16.3, 15.5, 15.7, 16.3
  - Investment as percent of GDP (1996–2006):
    - Total investment: 32.1, 34.6, 32.4, 32.8, 34.2, 35.4, 37.2, 37.8, 38.4, 40.0, 40.0
    - Public investment: 15.8, 17.1, 18.0, 19.2, 20.2, 21.2, 20.9, 20.4, 20.6, 20.9, 20.0
    - Private domestic investment: 8.0, 7.8, 7.7, 7.9, 7.8, 8.0, 9.7, 11.2, 11.9, 12.8, 13.4
    - FDI: 8.3, 9.7, 6.7, 5.7, 6.2, 6.2, 6.5, 6.2, 6.0, 6.3, 6.5
  - New FDI approvals rose to a record US$10 billion in 2006.
- Domestic credit and public debt (selected exact figures)
  - Domestic credit (billions of dong, 1996–2006): 55,322; 66,809; 81,027; 115,682; 155,236; 191,204; 239,921; 316,872; 434,571; 585,559; 730,330
  - Credit to state-owned enterprises (billions of dong, 1996–2006): 26,809; 30,980; 38,077; 54,336; 69,918; 79,745; 89,500; 97,800; 97,807; 181,300; 218,500
  - Credit to the rest of the economy (billions of dong, 1996–2006): 24,085; 31,429; 34,573; 58,394; 85,802; 109,358; 141,578; 198,937; 322,239; 371,798; 475,334
  - Domestic credit as percent of GDP (1996–2006): 20.3, 21.3, 22.4, 28.9, 35.1, 39.7, 44.8, 51.7, 60.8, 69.9, 75.6
  - Broad money (M2 as percent of GDP, 1996–2006): 23.8, 26.0, 28.4, 40.1, 50.5, 58.1, 61.4, 67.0, 74.4, 82.4, 95.5
  - Net foreign assets of banking system (percent of GDP): 5.2, 6.7, 8.6, 15.3, 21.7, 24.4, 21.9, 21.4, 20.4, 22.8, 29.8
  - Public debt (percent of GDP, 2000–2006): 33.0, 36.0, 38.2, 41.0, 42.7, 43.9, 43.7
  - Domestic public debt (percent of GDP, 2002–2006): 5.1, 6.2, 10.1, 13.7, 15.4, 17.4, 18.7
- Empirical approach and SVAR estimation (period 1994Q1–2006Q4)
  - Model variables: real per capita public investment (GI), FDI, private domestic investment (PI), GDP; VAR specified with 5 lags; estimated in levels.
  - Key SVAR coefficient estimates (as presented):
    - 1 FDIGI α: 0.75   p-value 0.00
    - 2 GIFDI χ: 1.29   p-value 0.00
    - 3 GIPI φ: 0.00   p-value 0.99
    - 3 FDIPI δ: 0.22   p-value 0.13
    - 4 FDIGDP γ: 0.05   p-value 0.74
    - 4 GIGDP λ: 0.06   p-value 0.72
    - 4 PIGDP λ: 0.06   p-value 0.72
- Empirical findings (verbatim numeric statements):
  - "Public investment seems to have crowded in FDI both in the short and medium terms."
    - "A one percent positive shock to public investment is estimated to lead to a concurrent significant increase in FDI by 1.29 percent."
    - Impulse response: positive impact on FDI for two and a half years before subsiding.
  - "Conversely, a positive shock to FDI, independent of public investment, is estimated to lead to increased public investment."
    - "A 1 percent independent positive shock to FDI is estimated to lead to a statistically significant increase in public investment by 0.75 percent."
    - Accumulated impulse response positive for two years after shock.
  - "Increased public investment does not appear to have any significant impact on private domestic investment based on estimation over the entire sample period (1994–2006)."
    - Possible evolving relationship: crowding out in first half of period, crowding in more recently.
  - "An increase in FDI surprisingly is estimated to lead to a lagged decline in private domestic investment."
    - Contemporaneous response of private domestic investment to a 1 percent independent positive shock in FDI is positive but not statistically significant; accumulated impulse response indicates a lagged negative reaction.
  - Responses of GDP to 1 percent independent shocks in FDI, government, and private investment are small "(0.05–0.06 percent)" and statistically insignificant.
- Caveats and data limitations:
  - Weak quality of some data; quarterly interpolation may affect robustness.
  - Impulse response functions given greater weight than point estimates for later horizons.
- Policy conclusions and recommendations (verbatim substance):
  - "Public investment has absorbed a large share of the Vietnamese economy’s domestic saving since the mid-1990s, but the available data do not provide any clear evidence of a crowding out effect on private domestic investment, and there are strong indications that public investment has helped crowd in FDI."
  - Recommended policies:
    - Continue sound macroeconomic policies and market-oriented reforms to allow banking system to meet growing credit demand without inflation/balance-of-payments pressures.
    - Continue investing in essential public infrastructure, especially where little scope for commercially viable private investment.
    - Remove remaining regulatory constraints that hamper private investment.
    - Recent legal reforms cited: Unified Enterprise Law, Common Investment Law, Decree 78/2007/ND-CP dated May 11, 2007 on BOT/BTO/BT models to expand private investment scope in infrastructure.

### V. Final assessment and conclusions (exact key points)
- WTO accession:
  - Short- and medium-term: important welfare gains from WTO- and AFTA-related tariff reductions expected to accrue.
  - Long run: significant dynamic gains from higher productivity and larger FDI likely to materialize.
  - Net assessment: net benefits from deepening integration with the global economy are likely to be substantial.
  - Revenue losses following WTO accession call for stepped up efforts to bolster non-oil revenues, especially in the first few years after accession.
  - WTO accession is not a panacea; some domestic industries may suffer initially and reforms, safety nets, and macro stability are required.
- Financial stability and stock market:
  - Authorities’ policy response to the boom broadly appropriate, but additional measures may be required to:
    - further tighten prudential controls on banks’ stock-market related and foreign exchange risks;
    - proactively deal with banks whose soundness may be threatened by such exposures;
    - further strengthen enforcement of securities market regulations.
  - Additional macro policy efforts recommended: tighten monetary conditions, increase exchange rate flexibility, gear fiscal and external debt management to contain demand pressures, step up SOE and SOCB equitization while maintaining fiscal discipline.
- Capital controls:
  - If controls become unavoidable, implement in most cost-effective way; weigh benefits against likely costs; controls should provide breathing space and be temporary and well-designed if used.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpts from _cr07385 (https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/_cr07385.pdf).*

### References..............................................................................................................

### _cr07385 - References..............................................................................................................

### A. Introduction
- Vietnam became the 150th member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on January 11, 2007.
- Between 1993 and 2006:
  - Vietnam’s trade openness (the sum of exports and imports in relation to GDP) more than doubled.
  - Vietnam’s export market share more than quadrupled.
  - Real GDP increased on average by 7½ percent a year.
  - Poverty has fallen sharply.
- Purpose of chapter:
  - Assess how WTO accession will influence Vietnam’s global integration and effects on regional and world economies.
  - Structure: Section B (terms of accession), Section C (partial equilibrium simulation model on revenues and consumer welfare), Section D (general overview of effects), Section E (conclusions). Annex I provides model details.

### B. Vietnam’s Principal Commitments under the WTO
- Tariff commitments
  - Textiles: MFN average tariff reduced to 13.5 percent from 36.4 percent; textiles accounted for 16.3 percent of exports as of August 2007.
  - Tariff reductions on footwear were more modest; subsidies to these industries were removed.
  - Concurrent reduction of import duties on textile raw materials to 10−15 percent from previously applied MFN rate of 40−50 percent; approximately 80 percent of textile sector’s raw materials are imported.
  - Table highlights (selected figures as presented):
    - Simple average MFN Rates 2006: 17.3; WTO Bound Rates: 17.2; Final WTO Implementation: 13.4 up to 12 years.
    - Agricultural products MFN 2006: 25.7; WTO Bound Rates: 27.3; Final WTO: 21.7 up to 5 years.
    - Nonagricultural products MFN 2006: 16.3; WTO Bound Rates: 15.8; Final WTO: 12.2 up to 12 years.
    - Textiles and clothing MFN 2006: 36.4; WTO Bound Rates: 13.6; Final WTO: 13.5 upon accession.
    - Footwear MFN 2006: 43.9; WTO Bound Rates: 35.8; Final WTO: 27.2 upon accession.
    - Cars and other motor vehicles MFN 2006: 55.5; WTO Bound Rates: 84.8; Final WTO: 58.7 up to 12 years.
    - Most new cars MFN 2006: 90.0; WTO Bound Rates: 100.0; Final WTO: 70.0 up to 7 years.
    - Motorbikes MFN 2006: 90.0; WTO Bound Rates: 100.0; Final WTO: 74.3 up to 12 years.
    - Machinery/Electrical MFN 2006: 8.2; WTO Bound Rates: 10.8; Final WTO: 8.1 up to 5 years.
    - Minimum tariff: 0 0 0
    - Maximum tariff agricultural products: 100 100–150 85–135
    - Maximum tariff nonagricultural products: 90–100 100 75–100
    - Number of lines: 11,088 10,444 10,444
  - Observations:
    - WTO commitments do not require immediate changes in tariffs for some items (automobiles, motorbikes, electrical equipment) because bound rates significantly exceed applied rates until late 2006.
    - Government actions in 2007 (Decision 70/2007 and Decision 69/2007) advanced reductions on certain items:
      - Tariffs on most new cars reduced to 70 percent (WTO final bound rate to be applied by 2014).
      - Tariffs on certain cosmetics products and refrigerators, sewing machines, air conditioners, and fans reduced from 40 percent to 30 percent.
      - Temporary reductions on certain food products and construction materials below WTO commitments.
- Other commitments and sectoral access
  - Commitments to reduce trade-distorting subsidies, establish foreign companies’ trading rights, and comply with WTO rules on trade in goods.
  - Financial sector:
    - As of April 2007, foreign credit institutions allowed to establish fully (100 percent) foreign-owned banks subject to parent institution total assets > US$10 billion at end of prior year.
    - Branches of foreign commercial banks allowed only if parent bank had total assets > US$20 billion at end of prior year.
    - Five-year transitional restriction (lifted in January 2011) limiting foreign bank branches’ acceptance of dong deposits from Vietnamese nationals without preexisting credit relationships, capped by ratio of branch’s legal paid-in capital.
    - As of July 2007, at least two or three reputable foreign banks reportedly submitted applications for fully foreign-owned subsidiaries.
    - Foreign securities companies upon accession allowed representative offices and joint ventures with local partner; foreign entity allowed to hold up to 49 percent of total capital; capital limit abolished after five years, expansion of scope to include asset management and settlement and clearing services.
  - Insurance:
    - Upon accession, foreign insurance companies allowed to set up 100 percent foreign-invested companies.
    - Foreign-invested insurance companies allowed to provide compulsory insurance from January 1, 2008, and to set up branches that after 5 years can provide life insurance services.
  - Distribution sector:
    - Opened to foreign companies in joint ventures with Vietnamese partner allowed in most activities, with current 49 percent foreign capital limit to be reduced by January 1, 2008 and abolished in 2009.
    - Foreign-invested distribution companies allowed wholesale and retail of all legally imported and domestically produced products except specified items; most restrictions to be lifted completely by 2010.
  - Services commitments (selected highlights from Box 2):
    - Architectural and engineering: 100 percent foreign-invested enterprises limited to providing services to foreign-invested enterprises for two years.
    - Advertising/market research: upon accession joint ventures with foreign share ≤ 51 percent; from January 1, 2009, no limitation.
    - Courier services: foreign ownership in joint ventures limited to 51 percent within first five years; fully foreign-invested enterprises permitted thereafter.
    - Construction: for two years fully foreign-invested enterprises may serve only foreign-invested enterprises and foreign-funded projects.
    - Motion picture production and distribution: allowed only as business cooperation contracts or joint ventures; foreign capital ≤ 51 percent.
    - Education: upon accession only joint ventures; from January 1, 2009, fully foreign-invested entities permitted; foreign teachers must have at least five years of teaching experience and qualifications recognized by competent authorities.
    - Health: fully foreign-invested hospitals and joint ventures allowed; minimum capital: US$20 million for a hospital, US$2 million for a policlinic unit, US$200,000 for a specialty unit.
    - Environment: joint ventures with foreign capital ≤ 51 percent allowed for four years; refuse collection restrictions specified.
    - Tourism: hotel services restrictions for eight years in relation to investment in hotel construction/renovation/acquisition; travel agencies: joint ventures allowed with no foreign capital limit; tour guides in foreign-invested enterprises must be Vietnamese citizens.
    - Road transport: upon accession foreign suppliers may provide services through business cooperation contracts or joint ventures with foreign capital up to 49 percent; after three years joint ventures with foreign capital up to 51 percent may provide freight transport services with all drivers Vietnamese citizens.
    - Marine transport: two years from accession joint ventures with foreign capital ≤ 4 percent allowed for certain services; upon accession joint ventures up to 51 percent allowed to handle port services; after five years fully foreign-invested enterprises permitted.
    - Maritime auxiliary services, air transport, and other services have staged liberalization timetables detailed in Box 2.
  - Box 1 highlights (other aspects):
    - Subsidies: abstain from subsidizing agricultural exports; allowed "Amber Box" measures up to about 4 trillion Vietnamese dong (currently about US$246 million) in addition to de minimis up to 10 percent of value of domestic agricultural production; Green Box support unlimited; trade-distorting subsidies on nonagricultural goods must be removed; investment preferences to export producers before accession may be maintained up to five years except on textiles and garments.
    - Trading rights: from accession foreign firms/individuals have same export/import rights as Vietnamese except items subject to state trading and a few sensitive items; no minimum capital requirement; rice transition period up to 2011.
    - Privatization/equitization: reform of SOEs to be handled transparently with annual reports to WTO on equitization plan and status.
    - Pricing/price controls: Vietnam will comply with WTO agreements and notify WTO of price control actions.
    - Excise duties: agreed to simplify within three years by applying single rates for all forms of beer and for spirits with 20 percent alcohol or more.
    - Quantitative restrictions: quotas, bans, and other restrictions to be abolished upon accession, including import bans on cigarettes, cigars, and used vehicles.
    - WTO rules compliance: customs valuation, rules of origin, preshipment inspections, antidumping safeguards, subsidies, TRIMs to be complied with as of accession (with noted exceptions).
    - Export restrictions: export controls maintained on some sensitive products (rice, certain wood products, minerals) applied in conformity with WTO agreements.
    - Standards and intellectual property: agreed to apply international standards on technical barriers to trade and sanitary/phytosanitary measures immediately; agreed to comply with TRIPS from date of accession.

### C. The Impact of WTO Accession on Welfare: Partial Equilibrium Model
- Model purpose: simulate welfare impact on Vietnam of tariff reductions resulting from WTO commitments.
- Data and calibration:
  - Uses disaggregated dataset with commodity-level imports and tariff data at the four-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS).
  - Ten-digit tariff rates of MFN tariffs and WTO commitments converted into four-digit rates to match import data.
  - Model calibrated so that in base year 2006 the implicit import tariff revenues derived from the model equal actual receipts from import duties.
  - Model includes a compliance rate coefficient so that applying 2006 MFN tariff rates to actual imports at four-digit HS yields the same implicit import revenues as actual budget-reported import duty receipts (acknowledging actual tariff revenues are much lower than implicit import revenues because of exemptions, export-processing zones, etc.).
- Annex I contains greater detail on the simulation model used.

### D. Observations on Implementation and Timing
- Bound versus applied rates:
  - Bound rates are maximum legal ceilings; in practice currently applied rates are often lower than bound rates, giving Vietnam flexibility to raise tariffs while meeting WTO commitments.
- Government actions cited:
  - Decision 70/2007 advanced reductions in import tariffs for a number of items to curb inflationary pressures.
  - Decision 69/2007 temporarily reduced tariffs on certain food products and construction materials below WTO commitments; these temporary reductions likely to be rescinded once inflation abates.
- Timeline highlights:
  - Many decreases in bound rates to occur by 2012; some specific final rates to be implemented up to 12 years for certain categories; specific sectoral phase-outs and limits scheduled between accession and up to 2014 or 2019 as noted in the tariff table.

### E. Key Quantitative and Policy Points Extracted
- Exact numeric policy and schedule items preserved from source:
  - Vietnam became WTO member on January 11, 2007.
  - Textiles: tariff reduced to 13.5 percent from 36.4 percent; textiles = 16.3 percent of exports (as of August 2007).
  - Import duty on textile raw materials: reduced to 10−15 percent from 40−50 percent.
  - Average bound tariff and sectoral figures as listed in table (e.g., Simple average final WTO 13.4 up to 12 years; Most new cars final WTO 70.0 up to 7 years; Motorbikes final WTO 74.3 up to 12 years).
  - Subsidy allowance: Amber Box up to about 4 trillion Vietnamese dong (currently about US$246 million) plus de minimis up to 10 percent of value of domestic agricultural production.
  - Financial sector asset thresholds for foreign bank entry: US$10 billion and US$20 billion parent institution total assets conditions.
  - Minimum capital requirements in health sector: US$20 million for a hospital, US$2 million for a policlinic unit, US$200,000 for a specialty unit.
  - Number of tariff lines: 11,088 (2006 MFN), 10,444 (WTO Bound and Final).
  - Model base year for simulation: 2006.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/_cr07385.pdf*

### 12.      The welfare effects of WTO accession are calculated year by year during the

### _cr07385 - 12.      The welfare effects of WTO accession are calculated year by year during the

### Simulation methodology
- Welfare gains are computed year by year for the period 2007–19 using the WTO commitment schedule as the sum of:
  - the change in aggregate consumer surplus, and
  - the change in total tariff revenues.
- Each component is decomposed into effects from tariff reductions on:
  - trade among ASEAN members (intra-ASEAN), and
  - trade with non-ASEAN partners (rest of the world).
- The model simulates the induced effect on imports based on an estimated import-demand function; this induced increase in imports from tariff reductions is smaller than projected total import growth driven by GDP, domestic investment, FDI, and other macro variables.
- Two scenarios are simulated (short-run and long-run for each):
  - Scenario 1: MFN tariffs apply to all imports (ASEAN and non-ASEAN). Provides an upper bound of welfare gains because MFN rates are generally much higher than CEPT rates.
  - Scenario 2: ASEAN imports are subject to CEPT preferential rates; all other imports are subject to MFN rates. Provides a lower bound of welfare gains given limited de facto use of AFTA preferences.

### Results of the simulations — key findings
- Overall conclusion: the increase in consumer surplus substantially exceeds the decline in tariff revenues, yielding a significant net welfare gain.
- Scenario 1 (MFN on all imports) — projected annual changes (relative to 2006):
  - Change in welfare: 784 (2007), 1,508 (2012), 1,614 (2019).
  - Change in consumer surplus: 1,056 (2007), 2,159 (2012), 2,310 (2019).
  - Change in tariff revenues: -272 (2007), -651 (2012), -696 (2019).
  - Change in tariff revenues (percentage change): -14.5 (2007), -24.8 (2012), -25.4 (2019).
  - Change in imports (percentage change): 2.9 (2007), 5.1 (2012), 5.2 (2019).
  - Memorandum items (in percent of GDP):
    - Change in consumer surplus: 1.5 (2007), 1.7 (2012), 0.9 (2019).
    - Change in tariff revenues: -0.4 (2007), -0.5 (2012), -0.3 (2019).
    - Change in welfare: 1.1 (2007), 1.2 (2012), 0.7 (2019).
- Scenario 2 (CEPT on ASEAN imports, MFN on others) — projected annual changes (relative to 2006):
  - Change in welfare: 774 (2007), 1,292 (2012), 1,376 (2019).
  - Change in consumer surplus: 986 (2007), 1,771 (2012), 1,888 (2019).
  - Change in tariff revenues: -213 (2007), -480 (2012), -512 (2019).
  - Change in tariff revenues (percentage change): -12.5 (2007), -21.7 (2012), -22.3 (2019).
  - Change in imports (percentage change): 2.3 (2007), 3.9 (2012), 4.0 (2019).
  - Memorandum items (in percent of GDP):
    - Change in consumer surplus: 1.4 (2007), 1.4 (2012), 0.8 (2019).
    - Change in tariff revenues: -0.3 (2007), -0.4 (2012), -0.2 (2019).
    - Change in welfare: 1.1 (2007), 1.0 (2012), 0.6 (2019).
- Interpretation:
  - Under Scenario 1, annual consumer gains from cheaper imports are projected at US$1 billion (1.5 percent of GDP) in 2007, rise to US$2.2 billion (1.7 percent of GDP) by 2012, and level off at about US$2.3 billion (0.9 percent of GDP) in 2019.
  - Under Scenario 1, annual import tariff revenues are projected to fall by about US$300 million (0.4 percent of GDP) in 2007, by US$650 million (0.5 percent of GDP) by 2012, and level off at around US$700 million from 2013 onwards.
  - Scenario 2 yields slightly lower changes in annual welfare, consumer surplus, and tariff revenues than Scenario 1 because CEPT rates for intra-ASEAN trade are much lower than MFN rates.
- Caveats:
  - Results assume no tariff lines are increased beyond the 2006 rates. If some tariffs rise while others fall, net welfare effects may be ambiguous in a disaggregated framework.
  - The partial equilibrium framework does not capture potential gains from increased productive efficiency; a general equilibrium analysis would be required to quantify those effects.

### A more general overview — productivity and macro effects
- Potential dynamic productivity gains:
  - Economies-of-scale effects from improved access to foreign markets could be large, notably benefiting the textile industry now able to compete quota-free.
  - Increased competition from imports and foreign-invested enterprises can raise productivity but may reduce producer surplus in import-competing sectors; cheaper imported inputs can raise productivity via learning, variety, or quality effects.
  - Productivity gains may also follow nontariff, market-friendly reforms introduced in the WTO accession context (e.g., Unified Enterprise Law, Common Investment Law, harmonized trading rights).
  - WTO accession has bolstered the investment climate; FDI approvals reached a record US$10 billion in 2006.
- Macroeconomic implications:
  - Initial reduction in import tariffs will depress import duty receipts, but import growth and expanding exports should temper the effect over time; overall balance of payments should remain strong if exports and FDI continue to grow.
  - Greater access to cheaper imports should help contain inflation (noting inflation was 8.8 percent year-on-year in September 2007).
  - Accelerated tariff reductions could help offset inflationary effects of planned increases in key administered prices.

### Policy implications and recommendations
- To secure the positive net welfare effects:
  - Authorities should abstain from increasing any tariffs beyond 2006 rates, even if allowed under WTO commitments.
- Addressing adjustment costs:
  - Heavily protected industries and SOEs (notably auto assembly and motorbike plants) will require significant reforms to remain viable.
  - Financial sector and service sectors face challenges; SOCBs will face stronger competition from foreign banks — urgency for market-oriented banking reforms (e.g., equitization of main SOCBs).
  - In the short run, measures to mitigate adverse effects on disadvantaged sectors should include adequate retraining programs and social safety nets.
  - Authorities should resist financially supporting nonviable industries (through fiscal incentives or directed lending) as such support could be very costly.
- Monitoring and compliance:
  - Vietnam will remain on a list of “non-market economies” for up to 12 years, making it more difficult to guard against antidumping measures; in the U.S. market a monitoring system was imposed on certain apparel imports.

### Regional and global impact
- Implications for other economies:
  - Newly industrialized economies (NIEs) that are major FDI sources in Vietnam are likely to gain, as they have different export product mixes.
  - Major exporters of textiles and garments (Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka) could face increased competition from Vietnamese products in EU and U.S. markets.
  - ASEAN-4 countries may face pressure to move toward higher value-added production as Vietnam diversifies into manufacturing including low-end electronics.
- Vietnam’s role in regional production networks:
  - Vietnam is increasingly a destination for relocation within Asia (“China plus one” strategy); Japanese, Korean, Hong Kong SAR, and Taiwan POC firms have relocated some operations to Vietnam.
  - Reduction of Vietnam’s MFN tariffs can further integrate Vietnam into regional supply chains and spur Vietnamese imports and exports within the region, enhancing its appeal to foreign investors, including in IT.

*Sources: WTO, author's estimates, and UN Comtrade Data.*

### 26.      Industrialized countries outside Asia can also be expected to gain from

### _cr07385 - 26.      Industrialized countries outside Asia can also be expected to gain from

### Gains to industrialized countries from Vietnam’s integration
- Industrial country exports of technology-intensive manufactures are expected to improve as Vietnam seeks to upgrade its productive capacity and build up its infrastructure.
- Advanced countries could benefit from the opening up of Vietnam’s services sector, in particular financial services.
- Vietnam’s relatively low wages and highly educated population have made it an appealing destination for investment by some multinational corporations.
- Example of observed investment trend:
  - A U.S. technology giant announced intentions to build its largest chip assembly and testing plant in Vietnam (early this year).
- Expected continuing trends in investment and production:
  - High tech sectors and related services, such as computer hardware, telecommunications equipment, and energy-related machinery.
- Welfare gains for consumers in major purchaser markets:
  - Consumers in the United States, the European Union, and Japan—major net purchasers of textiles, footwear, and other low-cost manufactures from Vietnam—should reap increasing gains in welfare from integration of Vietnam’s low-cost labor force into the global economy.

### Conclusion on WTO accession and broader integration
- Membership in the WTO should confer significant benefits on the Vietnamese economy through multiple channels:
  - Welfare gains for consumers with access to more affordable and better quality products.
  - Increasing access to foreign markets for exporters.
  - Efficiency gains resulting from faster implementation of domestic reforms.
- Timing of gains:
  - Short run and medium term: Important welfare gains from WTO- and AFTA-related tariff reductions are expected to accrue.
  - Long run: Significant dynamic gains arising from higher productivity and larger FDI are likely to materialize.
- Caveats and policy implications:
  - WTO accession is not a panacea.
  - Revenue losses following WTO accession call for stepped up efforts to bolster non-oil revenues, especially in the first few years after accession.
  - Some domestic industries may suffer initially from removal of protection.
  - To limit dislocations and meet global competition challenges, Vietnam will need to:
    - Expedite reforms in state-dominated sectors.
    - Institute appropriate safety nets.
  - Other challenges beyond trade liberalization include maintaining macroeconomic stability in the presence of increasing financial integration.
- Net assessment:
  - The net benefits from deepening integration with the global economy are likely to be substantial.

### Annex I — The Impact of WTO Accession on Vietnam’s Welfare: Partial Equilibrium Model (summary)
- Core decomposition of welfare change following full implementation of WTO and AFTA commitments:
  - ΔW = ΔW_WTO + ΔW_ASEAN
  - ΔW_WTO comprises changes in tariff revenues (ΔTR_WTO) and consumer surplus (ΔCS_WTO) due to new MFN/WTO-mandated tariffs applied to non-ASEAN members.
  - ΔW_ASEAN comprises changes in tariff revenues (ΔT_ASEAN) and consumer surplus (ΔCS_ASEAN) due to implementation of AFTA commitments.
- Key modeling assumptions:
  - Products imported from ASEAN members are imperfect substitutes for products traded with the rest of the world.
  - World markets are perfectly competitive.
  - Within each group (ASEAN and rest of the world) products traded are perfectly homogeneous.
  - The model does not take into account producer surplus; it assumes imperfect substitution across goods as in Dixit-Stiglitz (1977).
- Import demand specification for commodity i:
  - M_i = A_i [(1 + t) P_w]^{-η}, where P_w is normalized to 1, t is the MFN tariff, η is the price elasticity of import demand, and A_i is calibrated from estimated elasticities and actual import data.
- Post-WTO tariff change parameter:
  - The initial MFN tariff t_i^I changes to t_i^F = α · t_i^I, where α varies across products.
- Changes in imports after WTO adoption:
  - ΔM_WTO = M_F_WTO − M_I_WTO = A terms with elasticity η reflecting t changes (equation 3).
  - Symmetric expression for ASEAN imports (equation 3’).
- Change in tariff revenues:
  - ΔTR_WTO is derived from initial and final tariff revenue expressions using import and tariff definitions (equations and substitutions shown).
- Change in consumer surplus:
  - ΔCS_WTO expressed as the integral of the import demand function between new and old domestic import prices (equation 5), with a symmetric ΔCS_ASEAN (equation 5’).
  - The Harberger triangle (area ABC) represents the net welfare effect after subtracting revenue losses (rectangle AC τ_F τ_I).
- Calibration details:
  - Demand parameter A_i is calibrated using estimated η from Hoekman, Ng, and Olarreaga (2002) and Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2004); UN trade data at the four-digit Harmonized System level; and MFN tariff schedules and WTO commitments provided by Vietnamese authorities.

### II. The 2006–2007 stock market boom in Vietnam: policy response and challenges ahead — Recent developments and risks
- Overview of the boom and subsequent consolidation:
  - The Ho Chi Minh City Stock Market Price (VN) Index rose by 281 percent between end-2005 and end-February 2007, then declined by around 20 percent in subsequent months.
  - As of September 10, 2007, the VN index was about triple its end-2005 level.
- Drivers and market changes:
  - VN Index rose by 144½ percent in 2006, and by another 56 percent in the first two months of 2007 (total increase of 281 percent since end-2005).
  - Number of listed companies increased from 41 at end-2005 to 110 as of July 2007 (or from 50 to 200 for both HCMC and Hanoi combined).
  - Many new listings occurred in the last two months of 2006 as firms sought to benefit from tax incentives expiring by year end.
- Market capitalization and trading volumes:
  - Total market capitalization rose from US$0.6 billion (1 percent of GDP) at end-2005 to a peak of some US$23 billion (34 percent of GDP) by end-February 2007.
  - Daily stock trading volumes increased from an average of US$10 million in January 2006 to about US$70 million in late February and early March 2007.
- Concerns and regulatory context:
  - Worries about overvaluation—PE ratios in many large listed companies were out of line with projected earnings and growth.
  - Risks included lack of transparency, weak regulatory controls, herd behavior among some large foreign investors and less-informed local individual investors.
  - Authorities were concerned a rapid reversal of portfolio inflows could cause severe investor losses and threaten financial and social stability.
  - Authorities introduced prudential measures to discourage credit-financed speculative investment in shares and to improve securities market regulation; they ultimately abstained from introducing capital inflow controls.
- Correction and remaining valuation concerns:
  - By September 10, 2007, the VN index was down by about 20 percent from its late-February peak, but still up by about 23 percent from end-2006.
  - Daily value of stock transactions decreased from averages of US$60–70 million in February–March to around US$30 million in July–August.
  - The average PE ratio (based on current earnings) for the largest companies (representing more than 80 percent of total market capitalization) fell from an average of 53 in January–March to around 32 as of late-August.
  - The Hanoi stock exchange (HASTC) index surged by 377 percent between end-2005 and March 19, 2007, and has since declined by about 45 percent.
- Policy orientation:
  - The chapter reviews causes of the boom, policy measures taken, risks associated with a possible bubble, authorities’ policy response, IMF staff advice, and remaining challenges and recommendations going forward.

*Source: IMF staff discussion in _cr07385 (excerpts provided).*

### 34.      Aside from the already-mentioned concerns that arise in connection with

### _cr07385 - 34.      Aside from the already-mentioned concerns that arise in connection with

### External factors driving the stock market boom
- Officially recorded portfolio investment inflows into Vietnam are estimated to have doubled from US$0.9 billion in 2005 to US$1.9 billion in 2006 (3.1 percent of GDP).
- Share of foreign investors in daily stock trading increased from an average of 10 percent in mid 2006 to above 20 percent during the first 7 months of 2007.
- Foreign holdings reached 33 percent of market capitalization in HCMC and 13 percent in Hanoi by end-July.
- International vehicles for portfolio investment in Vietnam reportedly hold some US$ 5-6 billion, of which US$3–4 billion is still waiting to be invested.
- Drivers cited:
  - Ample global liquidity and a search for yield.
  - Vietnam’s strong macroeconomic performance and positive signal from WTO accession.
  - Perception of Vietnam as a vehicle for portfolio diversification.
- Note: Official portfolio inflow figures exclude foreign inflows recorded under other foreign exchange transactions (e.g., workers remittances).

### Domestic factors contributing to price increases and risk
- Local investors shifted assets from foreign currency holdings and domestic bank deposits to stocks.
- Increased leveraged investment in stocks and investment on behalf of relatives living abroad reported.
- Banking system involvement:
  - Both direct investment in shares and lending for stock purchases have been important channels.
  - Share-collateralized bank lending reportedly increased sharply since late 2006.
- Composition of bank exposure:
  - About half of share-related lending appears to have been extended by non-SOCBs (i.e., joint stock banks and foreign bank branches).
  - Non-SOCBs accounted for less than 30 percent of total banking system credit as of end-2005.
  - Non-SOCBs’ lending expanded in 2006 at an annual rate of around 50 percent.
  - Some small joint-stock banks reported exposures in stock market-related lending in the range of 30-40 percent of their total loans.
  - SOCBs may be indirectly exposed through large amounts of interbank credit to joint stock banks.
  - Cross-holdings of shares among banks and lending to securities company affiliates are additional potential channels of risk.

### Implications for stock valuations
- Improving fundamentals likely account for a significant portion of increased investor interest and valuations:
  - Market-oriented reforms and WTO accession.
  - Sustained high growth of exports, GDP, and corporate profits.
  - Improved transparency from moves toward international accounting standards and the beginning of earnings reporting by many companies.
- Data and transparency limitations:
  - Earnings data for many Vietnamese companies remain sketchy; accounting and transparency practices remain highly uneven.
  - In the absence of reliable data, valuation approaches reportedly used by some investors include extrapolations from other emerging markets and two-stage growth models (rapid initial growth followed by normal dividend streams), both of which may be liable to overvaluation.
- Valuation metrics reported:
  - Vietnam: 53.6 3/ (Largest 30 listed companies in HCMC and Hanoi stock exchanges, average for Jan.–Feb. 2007) and 32.4 4/ (Based on data as of August 9, 2007) — average PE ratios presented in the source table.
  - The average PE ratio for the largest companies (representing more than 80 percent of total market capitalization) has remained above 30.
- Historical context:
  - Many Asian markets have experienced spells of rapid price increases followed by rapid (partial) rewinds; none maintained a high average PE over an extended period.

### Evolution of foreign and local investor contributions (phases Dec 2006–July 2007)
- Four phases identified:
  - Period 1: Dec 1, 2006–Feb 27, 2007 — Net foreign buy dominantly contributed to rapid price increase.
  - Period 2: Feb 28–Apr 24, 2007 — Local investors became more dominant; foreign investors switched to a net sell position.
  - Period 3: Apr 25–May 23, 2007 — Net foreign buy fully dominated the price increase.
  - Period 4: May 24–July 31, 2007 — Foreign investors maintained a persistent net buy position even during price decline.
- Observed behaviors:
  - Foreign investors generally maintained a “net-buy” position on an aggregate basis, except during a brief period in February–March 2007.
  - The recovery in Period 3 appears to have been fully driven by foreign investors, with local investors largely on the sidelines.
  - Local investors’ lower market participation in recent months may reflect new prudential controls on banks’ securities-related lending and tightening credit and liquidity constraints, prompting net sales by highly-leveraged local investors.
  - Local investors may also have diverted purchases to shares issued at face value to existing local shareholders only (issues not captured in official trading data); the number of such shares issued by listed companies rose by more than 10 percent in the last 5 months (as reported in the source).

### Risks associated with the stock market boom
- Continued bank lending for stock purchases plus surging portfolio inflows could:
  - Lead to a revival of the stock market boom.
  - Increase banking system exposure to stock market risk.
  - Raise the likelihood of a major stock market correction.
- Potential consequences of a correction:
  - Threaten solvency of weakly-capitalized banks with large exposures to stock market risk.
  - Banks’ efforts to curb exposures could lead to a sharp contraction of credit to the stock market, exacerbating a sell-off.
- Specific domestic market risks noted:
  - Large exposures of some commercial banks to stock market-related credit that could amplify costs of a sudden reversal of capital flows.
  - Inside trading or inappropriate practices among banks and their securities company affiliates could undermine confidence and the long-run prospects for capital market development.

*Sources: Datastream; and IMF staff calculations.*

### 45.      A related concern is that the combined effects of recent market-cooling

### _cr07385 - 45.      A related concern is that the combined effects of recent market-cooling

### Concerns about IPOs and stock market boom
- Combined effects of recent market-cooling measures and investor fears of a market bust may undermine prospects for planned IPOs for SOEs and SOCBs.
- Boom in stock prices earlier in 2007 provided motive to accelerate IPOs to take advantage of favorable market conditions and help alleviate excess demand for stocks.
- Authorities have been reconsidering their IPO timetable on a case-by-case basis to avoid a slump in prices from an overly large increase in the supply of new issues.

### External position, reserves, and risks from a stock market bubble
- Vietnam’s external position described as "basically sound."
- Current account in 2006 recorded the smallest deficit in many years: "less than 0.4 percent of GDP."
- Gross official reserves increased sharply in early 2007, reaching "some US$19 billion (3½ months of next year’s imports of goods and services) as of May 2007."
- Reserves indicators: "around 28 percent of M2 and 145 percent of foreign exchange deposits in the domestic banking system."
- Projection: external current account is projected to revert to larger deficits in the years ahead as import demand picks up with sustained rapid increases in income and investment.
- Risk: A significantly wider current account deficit could compound foreign exchange market pressures in the event of a sudden stop and/or reversal of capital inflows, especially if accompanied by a stock market crash.
- Footnote on capital flight mechanism: due to restrictions on capital outflows by residents, capital flight would likely take the form of "massive deposit withdrawals from the banking system, and conversion into hard currency and precious metals, rather than direct remittance of foreign currency deposits."

### Effects of large portfolio inflows on monetary and exchange rate policy
- Even with continued upward stock prices, large portfolio inflows could complicate monetary and exchange rate policies, given Vietnam’s relatively small economy.
- Policy dilemmas noted:
  - Massive intervention could be difficult to sterilize, fueling continuing credit growth and rising inflation.
  - A more flexible exchange rate policy could produce considerable upward pressure on the dong.
- Concern: Real effective exchange rate "currently seems to be in line with fundamentals"; a large appreciation amid a widening current account deficit could impair competitiveness and threaten external stability.
- Expectation effects: Expectations of currency appreciation could encourage inflows of short-term speculative capital while discouraging some long-term investors, increasing balance of payments vulnerability.

### Prudential and regulatory measures taken (Policy Response to Date)
- SBV Decision 03/2007 (issued January 19) introduced new regulations on bank capital adequacy, liquidity ratios, and lending and investment limits, restricting new bank lending for stock purchases:
  - Credit institutions are not allowed to extend credit to their securities company affiliates nor grant unsecured loans financing investment or trade in securities.
  - Risk weight of securities-related loans raised from "100 to 150 percent."
  - Credit institutions given "one year" to fully conform with new restrictions.
- Implementing regulations of the securities law (issued January 19) strengthened supervision: disclosure requirements, stiffer penalties, and corporate governance requirements for securities companies and fund management companies.
- SSC issued official letters to securities companies and investment fund managers requesting information and requiring re-registration of representative offices of foreign investment funds; tightened enforcement of market transparency and asked listed companies to improve timely and accurate information provision.
- Prime Minister letter (January 29) instructed Ministry of Finance, SSC, and SBV to:
  - Improve monitoring of stock market-related activities of foreign investors and commercial banks;
  - Tighten enforcement of existing market regulations;
  - Improve dissemination of information on stock market investment risks.
  - SBV instructed to consider amendments to implementing regulations of the foreign exchange control ordinance to tighten controls on capital inflows and/or repatriation of capital by foreign investors.
- SBV Directive 03 (May 28, 2007) limits banks’ total securities-related credit exposures to "less than 3 percent of their total loan portfolio."
- Implementation guidelines issued in June 2007 included:
  - Deadline for compliance for banks exceeding 3 percent cap: "December 31, 2007."
  - Definition of securities-related credit exposures includes: (i) all loans to and discounts of securities from securities companies; and (ii) all loans and discounts (collateralized or not) financing the purchase of securities.
  - Banks required to submit reports to SBV by "July 10" indicating total outstanding securities-related credit exposures as of "end-June, 2007" and measures to comply with the 3 percent cap by end-2007; monthly reporting thereafter.
  - SBV banking supervision department to exercise strict monitoring over any banks with total securities-related exposures exceeding "10 percent of total loans."
- Observations as of June 2007:
  - Some joint-stock banks’ exposures reportedly "well above the 3 percent cap."
  - SOCBs reportedly "well below the cap"; but full utilization by SOCBs could increase aggregate credit to the stock market.
  - The 3 percent cap does not seem to cover off-balance sheet exposures (e.g., guarantees) and other indirect financing methods.

### Monetary and exchange rate measures and outcomes (Policy Response to Date)
- Gross official reserves increased by "US$7.5 billion" or "more than 10 percent of GDP" between end-2006 and mid-2007.
- Reserve money growth picked up to "around 34 percent (y/y) as of May 2007."
- Total annual credit growth rose to "35 percent (y/y) by end-May 2007."
- For non-SOCBs, annual credit growth increased from "51 percent (y/y) as of end-2006 to close to 70 percent (y/y) as of end-May 2007."
- Inflation rose from "6.6 percent (y/y) as of end-2006 to 8.6 percent (y/y) as of August 2007," partly due to supply-side food price shocks.
- SBV doubled reserve requirements on bank deposits in June to "a range of 4 to 10 percent."
- Interbank rates remained low, indicating further measures may be necessary.
- Exchange rate flexibility steps:
  - On "January 2, 2007" SBV widened trading band of the dong versus the U.S. dollar from "±0.25 percent to ±0.5 percent" around its daily reference rate.
  - Dong allowed to appreciate by "0.3 percent" vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar during the first six weeks of 2007; this appreciation was subsequently more than reversed.

### Policy recommendations — Regulatory and prudential framework
- Allow only banks with strong credit and market risk management and well-trained staff to extend credit for share purchases or take other stock-market-related risks; banks lacking adequate controls should face prompt corrective action and penalties.
- If SBV lacks expertise to assess banks’ stock-market risk controls, consider further limiting or prohibiting such operations via regulatory caps on:
  - Loan-to-value ratios and maturities in share-secured loans and repurchase agreements;
  - Exposure to a single customer (recognizing circumvention risks);
  - Aggregate exposure as a percentage of total loans or equity (e.g., the May 2007 cap).
- The higher the uncertainty or market volatility, the more stringent regulatory limits should be; if a boom re-emerges, combine tighter aggregate exposure limits with provisions and/or capital charges on uncovered exposures.
- Institute and enforce minimum standards and procedures for managing foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, and liquidity risk; revisit and upgrade prudential rules on exposure to foreign-currency risks (e.g., open position limits).
- Strengthen oversight of foreign-currency lending to borrowers without foreign-currency income despite lifting of the interest rate ceiling on foreign-currency deposits.
- Review regulations on measuring and controlling liquidity and maturity mismatches.
- In the longer term, shift bank regulation and supervision toward risk management focus rather than risk exposure limits; upgrade capacities of SBV regulators and supervised banks in risk identification, measurement, monitoring, and control.
- Review stock market regulations to ensure exchanges have built-in controls on price movements, such as circuit-breakers and settlement without roll-over.

### Policy recommendations — Supervisory actions and contingency planning
- Reassess bank exposures to stock market risk on an ongoing basis and prepare supervisory action plans:
  - Measure all exposures of each bank to stock market risk; identify banks whose aggregate exposures represent a significant percentage of assessed effective equity, and estimate "capital at risk and/or profit at risk, as well as 'liquidity at risk'."
  - Conduct stress tests on such banks using realistic scenarios linked to possible stock market correction; identify banks vulnerable to insolvency and/or illiquidity.
  - Conduct thorough on-site examinations for banks with high exposure; design and enforce corrective measures (e.g., require additional capital and/or liquidity, reduction of exposures, reduction of related lending, improvement of risk management); apply special supervisory procedures according to risk level.
  - Prepare contingency plans, potentially including: (i) review of legal and institutional framework for bank insolvencies (including deposit insurance) and needed amendments; (ii) measures to facilitate merger or absorption of weak banks by stronger banks in a timely and orderly way; and (iii) assessment of potential need for, and availability of, public resources.

### Policy recommendations — Monetary and exchange rate policy
- Tighten monetary policy further to rein in credit growth and contain demand pressures.
- Continue policy of accumulating sufficient reserves while current account deficit remains restrained and financed by private capital inflows, to meet balance of payments needs in case of reversal of portfolio inflows.
- Ensure SBV issues sufficient amounts of its own bills to absorb excess bank liquidity; note OMO rates increased somewhat after reserve requirement doubling but have since declined and interbank rates remain very low.
- Introduce greater two-way flexibility in the dong to help the market better price risk:
  - Given sustained export strength, a moderate appreciation should not seriously threaten competitiveness and would increase downside risks for foreign investors.
  - In event of reversal of portfolio inflows, allow exchange rate to depreciate somewhat faster than in recent years to ease reserve pressure.

### Policy recommendations — Fiscal, debt management, and use of securities market
- Fiscal policy should help contain the external current account deficit and protect medium-term debt sustainability.
- Securities and public sector debt issues likely to absorb a significant share of ongoing capital inflows; avoid erosion of fiscal discipline due to apparent easing of financing constraints from booming securities market.
- Accelerate implementation of a consolidated system of control over new external borrowing by government, SOEs, and SOCBs (Decree 134).
- Use securities market opportunities to expedite equitization of SOEs and SOCBs and meet investment requirements of the Socio-Economic Development Program (SEDP) for "2006–10" cost-effectively.
- Foreign investor interest in dong-denominated fixed-rate Vietnamese bonds could allow government and SOEs to raise capital at reduced cost while limiting interest rate and exchange rate exposure.
- Successful placement of dong-denominated SOE bond in foreign markets in "late-2006 and early-2007" cited as evidence of bond market potential.

### Policy recommendations — Market transparency and enforcement
- Step up efforts to improve market transparency and enforcement of stock market transaction regulations to protect market integrity and credibility as a medium-term finance source.
- Maintain strict listing requirements; ensure listed companies meet disclosure requirements consistent with international practices; strengthen safeguards and penalties against insider trading.

### Policy recommendations — Possible role of capital controls
- Effectiveness and benefits of capital controls need careful weighing against likely costs.
- Broader-range capital controls generally expected to be more effective; narrowly-targeted controls are more difficult to administer and can be evaded.
- Broad capital controls may have severe short-run adverse side-effects by hampering activities authorities wish to encourage (e.g., trade financing and FDI).
- Difficulties in predicting impact on market confidence mean controls could inadvertently precipitate the sharp downturn they aim to prevent.
- Re-introduction of controls soon after WTO accession and accompanying exchange system liberalization could tarnish Vietnam’s track record of commitment to deeper international integration.

*IMF staff report content.*

### 63.      If capital controls were to become unavoidable, the authorities would be well-

### If capital controls were to become unavoidable, the authorities would be well-advised to implement them in the most cost effective way.

### Conclusion on financial stability and policy stance
- The Vietnamese stock market has gone through a phase of consolidation since early 2007, but there is still prima facie evidence of overvaluation of some stocks.
- The authorities’ policy response to date has been broadly appropriate.
- There remains a risk that stock market volatility could have spill-over effects on the rest of the financial system.
- Additional measures may be required to:
  - further tighten prudential controls on banks’ stock-market related and foreign exchange rate risks;
  - proactively deal with banks whose soundness may be threatened by exposure to such risks; and
  - further strengthen enforcement of securities market regulations.
- Additional macroeconomic policy efforts recommended:
  - intensify recent efforts to tighten monetary conditions and increase exchange rate flexibility;
  - gear fiscal and external debt management policies to containing demand pressures and protecting medium-term debt sustainability;
  - step up implementation of SOE and SOCB equitization programs while not eroding fiscal discipline;
  - improve the maturity and currency composition of government debt.
- While capital controls have been used elsewhere to stem capital inflows, the benefits must be weighed carefully against likely costs.

### General observations on capital controls (Annex II)
- Main objectives of capital controls: increase independence of monetary policy, alleviate pressures on exchange rates, and/or avert a crisis by putting a wedge between rates of return on domestic and foreign assets.
- The Fund does not generally favor or advocate the use of capital controls.
- Experience shows:
  - controls might succeed temporarily but are never the first-best option;
  - controls are unlikely to be effective for any extended period of time and are likely to be distortionary;
  - in countries capable of enforcing controls and lacking sophisticated markets, controls might add to the cost of doing certain cross-border transactions and could in principle induce a premium that discourages flows, but effectiveness usually erodes over time.
- Controls should be applied only to provide breathing space to allow for other policy adjustment and not introduced unless other policy measures have been identified.
- Effectiveness is difficult to gauge before implementation; market reactions depend on whether measures are perceived as well-thought out, temporary, and accompanied by other steps.
- Enforcement costs for authorized agents, the central bank, and market participants should be considered.
- Capital controls often send the wrong signal about economic health and pose implementation and circumvention problems, including governance problems/rent-seeking.
- Degree of circumvention depends on market sophistication; even in rudimentary economies, large incentives may produce circumvention (e.g., over-invoicing and under-invoicing).

### Possible specific measures to curb large inflows
- Two main types of measures:
  - (i) Market-based controls
  - (ii) Administrative controls

- (i) Market-based controls

  - a) Unremunerated reserve requirements (URRs)
    - Description: URRs constitute an indirect taxation of cross-border flows under which residents and/or nonresidents have to deposit a non-interest bearing deposit with the central bank as a given percentage of the inflow. Usually enforced through domestic banks placing reserves at the central bank.
    - Advantages:
      - Liquidity is immediately squeezed.
      - Distortion of cross-border foreign exchange flows is across the board.
      - URRs on short-term inflows could temporarily alleviate upward pressure on the exchange rate.
    - Disadvantages:
      - URRs are usually effective only for a short period of time, especially where circumvention with derivative transactions is relatively easy.
      - To make circumvention more difficult, complicated rules might be necessary whose cost of enforcement can be large (example: Russia’s complex system between 2004 and 2006).
      - URRs usually affect a wide range of capital account transactions; countries need to ensure legitimate flows (e.g., bona fide current account and FDI transactions) are protected and allowed to take place on a timely basis.

  - Box 1 — Chile’s experience with an Unremunerated Reserve Requirement on Capital Flows
    - Chile introduced a 20 percent URR on foreign borrowing in 1991.
    - URR holding periods: up to 90 days for 90-day credits; to maturity for 90-day to one-year credits; and for 1 year for credits of more than 1 year.
    - Coverage expanded to include foreign currency deposits (1992) and potentially speculative FDI (1996); rate raised to 30 percent in 1992.
    - URR was accompanied by:
      - prudent fiscal policy;
      - measures to enhance the financial system’s prudential framework;
      - restrictive regulatory framework for international transactions;
      - repatriation and surrender requirements, prudential measures, minimum stay requirements for FDI and portfolio investments, extensive reporting requirements (all capital inflows and outflows channeled through formal foreign exchange market and subject to reporting).
    - Most empirical studies conclude Chile’s URR effectiveness was quite limited:
      - some evidence URR increased domestic interest rates;
      - weaker evidence URR altered composition of capital flows in favor of medium- and long-term inflows;
      - mixed and weak evidence URR reduced magnitude of capital inflows;
      - no evidence URR affected level of the real exchange rate.
    - Empirical assessments face constraints: limited balance of payments classifications, interlinkages with other policies, and changing objectives over time.

  - b) Other market-based controls
    - Minimum maintenance period for nonresident capital:
      - Requires nonresidents to keep proceeds from investment within the country for a set time period.
      - Advantage: selectivity affecting mainly short-term volatile flows.
      - Disadvantages: significant administrative burdens, circumvention may become easy as inflows diversify; in Vietnam such a control might not stem inflows if longer-term outlook remains positive.
    - Differential rates of taxation on capital inflows:
      - Authorities could levy a tax to discourage inflows.
      - Advantages/disadvantages similar to other market-based measures; tax measures must be harmonized with other taxes (capital gains, profit taxes).

- (ii) Administrative controls

  - a) Administrative controls on short-term inflows:
    - To be effective, should be comprehensive and cover all short-term transactions, except trade credits, normal short-term banking facilities as defined in Article XXX of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, and inter-enterprise loans.
    - Vietnam has eliminated restrictions on short-term external borrowing by banks; such borrowing has not been a concern as banks accumulated large amounts of net foreign assets over the last two years.
    - If a surge in short-term inflows occurs, a reinstatement of temporary controls on short-term inflows through banks—coupled with proper prudential rules (strengthened collateral rules and on exposures to foreign exchange rate risk)—could give some relief.
    - Trade-off: domestic banking system might become less competitive and some business might shift off-shore while controls remain in place.

  - b) Tightening administrative controls on borrowing from abroad by SOEs and SOCBs:
    - Considerable area for tightening where borrowers may lack creditworthiness but benefit from government guarantees.
    - Should be considered primarily on fiscal and debt sustainability grounds; could also moderate capital inflows.

  - Other possible administrative distinctions:
    - Differential treatment of deposit accounts held by nonresidents (differences in reserve requirements, liquid asset requirements, interest rate controls — e.g., in Thailand, no interest may be paid for the short-term deposits of nonresidents).
    - Asymmetric open position limits (e.g., in the Philippines where only the overbought position is limited and the limit is very low).
    - Such measures are rarely used and effectiveness is difficult to gauge; main reason for rarity is ease of circumvention (e.g., using a resident company owned by the nonresident to place deposits) and potential distortion of bona fide prudential rules leading to financial system risks.

### Cross-country observations and country examples
- Thailand (2007): It is too early to assess effects of measures to control inflows; market participants commented measures were awkwardly implemented and ineffective in reducing appreciation pressure. The Thai baht rose by 3.6 percent against the U.S. dollar in 2007; sharp drop in stock prices after measures was transitory.
- Central and eastern European EU member countries: obligation vis-à-vis the EU not to implement capital controls except in crisis circumstances. Their experience shows measures aimed at curtailing capital inflows to limit credit growth have generally not been effective.

*Prepared by staff of the MCM; content drawn from Annex II and related conclusions in the source document.*

### 68.      In principle, public investment can either crowd out or crowd in private

### _cr07385 - 68.      In principle, public investment can either crowd out or crowd in private

### Crowding out: channels and mechanisms
- Public investment can crowd out private investment through three channels:
  - In economies operating at full employment, public investment financed by taxes or domestic borrowing uses scarce resources that could have otherwise been available for private investment.
  - Increased government spending financed through borrowing from the domestic banking system or through the issuance of bonds on the domestic capital market can lead to a reduction in the availability of credit for the private sector and/or an increase in domestic interest rates, which discourages private investment.
  - Restrictive laws or regulations may effectively reserve some sectors for public investment, where private investment could have been more productive.
- Empirical literature examples cited for crowding out: Aschauer (1989a,b), Ghali (1998), Voss (2002); Mitra (2006) finds crowding out in India.

### Crowding in: channels and mechanisms
- Public investment can crowd in private investment when it generates positive externalities for the private sector:
  - Improved physical infrastructure (transportation and communication networks, power and other public utilities) can reduce production costs.
  - Enhanced quality and supply of the labor force via health and education services, worker training programs.
  - In economies operating below capacity, increased aggregate demand from public investment can spur private investment.
- Empirical literature examples cited for crowding in: Agenor (2000), Belloc and Vertova (2006), Pereira (2001a,b).

### Empirical approach in the chapter
- The chapter develops an empirical test to assess whether Vietnam’s public investment has been associated with crowding out or crowding in.
- The test is based on the estimation of a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model to examine interactions between:
  - Public investment
  - Private domestic investment
  - FDI
- Chapter organization (as described): Section B — background on investment trends, debt, and domestic credit; Section C — formal empirical analysis and results; Section D — conclusions.

### Background: trends in investment and growth (1996–2006)
- Aggregate and growth context:
  - Real GDP growth exceeded 8 percent in 2005–06.
  - Total investment fell to 32 percent of GDP in 1998–99 and recovered to 40 percent of GDP by 2006.
- Structure of investment (share of total investment, 1996–2006 excerpted where provided):
  - Public investment: 49.1, 49.4, 55.5, 58.7, 59.1, 59.8, 56.3, 54.0, 53.6, 52.2, 50.1 (percent of total investment for 1996–2006)
  - Private domestic investment: 24.9, 22.6, 23.7, 24.0, 22.9, 22.6, 22.6, 29.7, 30.9, 32.1, 33.6 (percent of total investment for 1996–2006)
  - FDI: 26.0, 28.0, 20.8, 17.3, 18.0, 17.6, 17.5, 16.3, 15.5, 15.7, 16.3 (percent of total investment for 1996–2006)
- Investment as percent of GDP (1996–2006 excerpt):
  - Total investment: 32.1, 34.6, 32.4, 32.8, 34.2, 35.4, 37.2, 37.8, 38.4, 40.0, 40.0 (percent of GDP)
  - Public investment: 15.8, 17.1, 18.0, 19.2, 20.2, 21.2, 20.9, 20.4, 20.6, 20.9, 20.0 (percent of GDP)
  - Private domestic investment: 8.0, 7.8, 7.7, 7.9, 7.8, 8.0, 9.7, 11.2, 11.9, 12.8, 13.4 (percent of GDP)
  - FDI: 8.3, 9.7, 6.7, 5.7, 6.2, 6.2, 6.5, 6.2, 6.0, 6.3, 6.5 (percent of GDP)
- Key composition changes and dynamics:
  - Private investment share fell sharply to around 40 percent in the late 1990s; public investment share rose to 60 percent, then public and private shares became about equal in 2006.
  - Private domestic investment surged from around 8 percent of GDP in 1996–2001 to 13½ percent of GDP in 2006.
  - FDI fell from almost 10 percent of GDP in 1997 to 5¾ percent of GDP in 1999, then leveled off at 6 to 6½ percent of GDP.
  - The foreign-invested sector’s share of GDP rose from 7½ percent in 1996 to 17 percent in 2006.
  - The foreign-invested sector recorded annual growth rates well in excess of 10 percent; public sector and private domestic sector growth were more subdued.
  - FIEs’ share of total exports (including oil) rose from 4 percent in 1995 to more than 50 percent in recent years.
  - New FDI approvals rose to a record US$10 billion in 2006 (as reported).

### Public investment composition and financing
- Public investment components:
  - Investment financed through the budget.
  - State credits: projects funded off-budget through issuance of investment bonds and government on-lending through the Vietnam Development Bank (VDB).
  - Investment by SOEs in which the government retains a majority stake.
- Total public investment rose from less than 16 percent of GDP in 1996 to 20 percent of GDP in 2006.
- Major public investment areas: roads, bridges, power plants, water and sanitation, schools, irrigation, and other rural infrastructure.
- Share of transport infrastructure increased from about 30 percent in the second half of the 1990s to over 40 percent in recent years.
- Financing shift: ODA important historically, growing portion recently funded through issuance of domestic government bonds; banking system important for financing SOEs.

### Domestic credit, public debt, and potential financial crowding out (1996–2006)
- Trends and summarized data from Table 2 (selected exact figures preserved):
  - Domestic credit (in billions of dong):
    - 1996: 55,322
    - 1997: 66,809
    - 1998: 81,027
    - 1999: 115,682
    - 2000: 155,236
    - 2001: 191,204
    - 2002: 239,921
    - 2003: 316,872
    - 2004: 434,571
    - 2005: 585,559
    - 2006: 730,330
  - Net credit to government (in billions of dong):
    - 1996: 4,428
    - 1997: 4,400
    - 1998: 8,377
    - 1999: 2,952
    - 2000: (484)
    - 2001: 2,102
    - 2002: 8,843
    - 2003: 20,135
    - 2004: 14,526
    - 2005: 32,461
    - 2006: 36,496
  - Credit to state-owned enterprises (in billions of dong):
    - 1996: 26,809
    - 1997: 30,980
    - 1998: 38,077
    - 1999: 54,336
    - 2000: 69,918
    - 2001: 79,745
    - 2002: 89,500
    - 2003: 97,800
    - 2004: 97,807
    - 2005: 181,300
    - 2006: 218,500
  - Credit to the rest of the economy (in billions of dong):
    - 1996: 24,085
    - 1997: 31,429
    - 1998: 34,573
    - 1999: 58,394
    - 2000: 85,802
    - 2001: 109,358
    - 2002: 141,578
    - 2003: 198,937
    - 2004: 322,239
    - 2005: 371,798
    - 2006: 475,334
- Domestic credit as percent of GDP (1996–2006 excerpt):
  - Domestic credit: 20.3, 21.3, 22.4, 28.9, 35.1, 39.7, 44.8, 51.7, 60.8, 69.9, 75.6 (percent of GDP)
  - Net credit to government: 1.6, 1.4, 2.3, 0.7, -0.1, 0.4, 1.7, 3.3, 2.0, 3.9, 3.8 (percent of GDP)
  - Credit to state-owned enterprises: 9.9, 9.9, 10.5, 13.6, 15.8, 16.6, 16.7, 15.9, 13.7, 21.6, 22.6 (percent of GDP)
  - Credit to the rest of the economy: 8.9, 10.0, 9.6, 14.6, 19.4, 22.7, 26.4, 32.4, 45.0, 44.4, 49.2 (percent of GDP)
- Share of domestic credit (1996–2006 excerpt):
  - Net credit to government: 8.0, 6.6, 10.3, 2.6, -0.3, 1.1, 3.7, 6.4, 3.3, 5.5, 5.0 (percent share of domestic credit)
  - Credit to state-owned enterprises: 48.5, 46.4, 47.0, 47.0, 45.0, 41.7, 37.3, 30.9, 22.5, 31.0, 29.9 (percent share of domestic credit)
  - Credit to the rest of the economy: 43.5, 47.0, 42.7, 50.5, 55.3, 57.2, 59.0, 62.8, 74.2, 63.5, 65.1 (percent share of domestic credit)
- Memorandum items (percent of GDP, selected):
  - Net foreign assets of the banking system: 5.2, 6.7, 8.6, 15.3, 21.7, 24.4, 21.9, 21.4, 20.4, 22.8, 29.8 (1996–2006)
  - Broad money (M2): 23.8, 26.0, 28.4, 40.1, 50.5, 58.1, 61.4, 67.0, 74.4, 82.4, 95.5 (1996–2006)
  - Currency in circulation: 8.3, 8.0, 7.5, 10.3, 11.8, 13.8, 13.9, 14.8, 15.3, 15.7, 16.4 (percent of GDP)
  - Commercial bank deposits: 15.5, 18.0, 20.9, 29.8, 38.6, 44.4, 47.6, 52.3, 59.2, 66.8, 79.1 (percent of GDP)
  - Net domestic assets: 18.5, 19.3, 19.7, 24.8, 28.8, 33.7, 39.5, 45.6, 54.0, 59.6, 65.7 (percent of GDP)
  - Public debt (percent of GDP, 2000–2006 series shown): 33.0, 36.0, 38.2, 41.0, 42.7, 43.9, 43.7
  - Public debt — Domestic (percent of GDP, 2002–2006 shown): 5.1, 6.2, 10.1, 13.7, 15.4, 17.4, 18.7
  - Public debt — External (percent of GDP, 2000–2006 shown): 27.9, 29.8, 28.1, 27.3, 27.3, 26.6, 25.0
- Observations on financing and crowding out risk:
  - Banking system’s net credit to government declined to near-zero in 2000–01, then rose to around 4 percent of GDP in 2005–06.
  - Total stock of domestic public debt (including debt held by banks) rose from 5 percent of GDP in 2000 to 18½ percent of GDP in 2006.
  - Bank credit to SOEs rose from about 10 percent of GDP in 1996 to 22½ percent of GDP in 2006.
  - Bank credit to the nonstate sector rose from 9 percent of GDP in 1996 to 49 percent of GDP in 2006.
  - Broad money surged from around 25 percent of GDP in 1996–97 to 95 percent of GDP in 2006.
  - Net foreign assets of banks rose from 5 percent of GDP in 1996 to 30 percent of GDP in 2006.
  - With bank deposits growing faster than bank lending, banks were under no pressure to increase interest rates, reducing the risk of crowding out via higher rates.

### Assessment and ambiguity on crowding out in Vietnam
- The data do not provide clear indications of financial crowding out of private domestic investment in recent years.
- Factors mitigating crowding out risk:
  - Rapid growth of domestic savings and monetization allowed simultaneous sharp increases in credit to state and nonstate sectors.
  - Declining inflation and a more stable macroeconomic environment encouraged higher bank deposits and build-up of bank net foreign assets.
- Counterpoints and qualifications:
  - It remains possible that some rising demand for private sector credit remained unfulfilled because government and SOEs continued to borrow heavily on domestic markets.
  - Anecdotal evidence: many Vietnamese private businesses consider limited access to bank financing a major constraint on growth.
  - Risk and prudential considerations may limit expansion of lending to the private sector even where banks hold idle liquidity.

*Italic: Source — IMF staff chapter text from _cr07385 - 68. In principle, public investment can either crowd out or crowd in private investment_.*

### 79.      Another mechanism through which public investment might have discouraged

### _cr07385 - 79.      Another mechanism through which public investment might have discouraged

### Ex ante crowding out: mechanism and context
- Ex ante crowding out occurs when the government prohibits private investment in protected sectors reserved for SOEs or effectively pre-empts private investors by undertaking projects that might otherwise have been commercially viable for private investors.
- In Vietnam, laws that have in the past limited foreign participation in telecommunications and transportation (AsDB 2006) are cited as possible examples.
- Foreign investor representatives in recent Business Forums have indicated willingness to expand investment in sectors still dominated by public investment once existing legal and regulatory hurdles are removed.
- The text notes it is difficult to assess the empirical relevance of ex ante crowding out at the aggregate level.

### Empirical approach to detect crowding in/out
- A preliminary visual approach: plotting growth rates of public and private investment components to examine co-movements. Observation: private domestic investment and FDI appear to have moved broadly in line with public investment during the latter half of the period; no obvious pattern in the earlier part.
- More rigorous approach: structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) techniques based on Mitra (2006) to assess reactions over time of private domestic investment and FDI to an increase in public investment, accounting for contemporaneous and lagged effects.
- Model estimated for the period 1994Q1–2006Q4 on natural logarithms of public investment (GI), FDI, private domestic investment (PI), and GDP, all in real per capita terms; data seasonally adjusted. Some quarterly series interpolated using quadratic methods.
- VAR specified with 5 lags based on the likelihood ratio test; model estimated in levels (variables contain unit roots of order I (1) but weak cointegration was found).

### SVAR structure (as specified)
- Structural equations (symbolically):
  - GIFDIGI: α = + ...
  - FDIGIFDI: χ = + ...
  - PIGIFDIPI: φ δ = + +
  - GDPFDIGIPIGDP: γ λ = + + +
  (Notation in source preserved as presented.)
- Interpretation: an increase in the overall shock to FDI, u_FDI_t, in response to an independent shock to public investment, e_GI_t, would suggest crowding in of FDI by public investment (χ > 0).
- Model intended to capture complementarity between public investment and FDI, interrelationships between private and public investment, and spillovers from FDI to private investment. A GDP shock does not concurrently impact public investment, FDI, or private investment (assumption: takes more than one quarter to measure unanticipated changes in GDP and formulate adjustment).

### SVAR coefficient estimation results (as presented)
- Independent shocks (coefficient estimates and p-values):
  - 1 FDIGI α: 0.75   p-value 0.00
  - 2 GIFDI χ: 1.29   p-value 0.00
  - 3 GIPI φ: 0.00   p-value 0.99
- Overall shocks (coefficient estimates and p-values):
  - 3 FDIPI δ: 0.22   p-value 0.13
  - 4 FDIGDP γ: 0.05   p-value 0.74
  - 4 GIGDP λ: 0.06   p-value 0.72
  - 4 PIGDP λ: 0.06   p-value 0.72
- Note: GI = public investment; PI = private investment. (Source: IMF staff calculations.)

### Key empirical findings (verbatim and exact numeric statements from text)
- "Public investment seems to have crowded in FDI both in the short and medium terms."
  - "A one percent positive shock to public investment is estimated to lead to a concurrent significant increase in FDI by 1.29 percent."
  - The impulse response function shows a positive impact on FDI for two and a half years before the effect gradually subsides.
- "Conversely, a positive shock to FDI, independent of public investment, is estimated to lead to increased public investment."
  - "A 1 percent independent positive shock to FDI is estimated to lead to a statistically significant increase in public investment by 0.75 percent."
  - The accumulated impulse response indicates a positive effect that lasts for two years after the public investment policy shock.
- "Increased public investment does not appear to have any significant impact on private domestic investment based on estimation over the entire sample period (1994–2006)."
  - The text notes a possible evolving relationship: "possible crowding out during the first half of the period followed by crowding in during more recent years."
  - Suggestion: further tests splitting the sample and applying data sorted by major types of private investment could help once better-quality data are available.
- "An increase in FDI surprisingly is estimated to lead to a lagged decline in private domestic investment."
  - "The contemporaneous response of private domestic investment to a 1 percent independent positive shock in FDI is of the expected positive sign but is not statistically significant."
  - "The accumulated impulse response function indicates a lagged negative reaction."
  - Interpretation offered: spillover effects of FDI tend to benefit large-scale private domestic businesses, whereas much of Vietnam's private domestic investment over the period consisted of small-scale businesses unlikely to absorb such spillovers.
- "Increases in public investment, FDI, and private investment are not estimated to have led to contemporaneous increases in GDP."
  - Responses of GDP to a 1 percent independent shock in FDI, and in government and private investment, are of the correct sign but small "(0.05–0.06 percent)" and statistically insignificant.
  - Impulse response functions remain close to zero; long lags in GDP responsiveness may partly explain this.

### Caveats on data and interpretation
- Given relatively weak quality of some available data, qualitative results of impulse response functions should be given greater weight than quantitative results; impulse response functions expected to be more accurate for the first few quarters than for later quarters.
- Some quarterly series were interpolated using quadratic methods, which may have reduced robustness of the estimates.
- Johansen approach finds weak cointegration; model estimated in levels despite unit roots.

### Conclusions and policy recommendations (verbatim substance)
- "Public investment has absorbed a large share of the Vietnamese economy’s domestic saving since the mid-1990s, but the available data do not provide any clear evidence of a crowding out effect on private domestic investment, and there are strong indications that public investment has helped crowd in FDI."
- Policy implications and recommendations:
  - Continue to pursue broadly sound macroeconomic policies and market-oriented reforms to allow the banking system to meet growing demand for credit by public and private sectors without pressures on inflation or the balance of payments.
  - Continue to invest in essential public infrastructure, especially in sectors with little scope for commercially viable private investment.
  - Remove remaining regulatory constraints that may hamper investment in projects of interest to domestic or foreign private investors.
  - The government has enacted the Unified Enterprise Law, the Common Investment Law, and Decree 78/2007/ND-CP dated May 11, 2007 on investments under BOT, BTO and BT models—expanding scope for private investment in infrastructure to include roads, bridges, tunnels, railways, airports, seaports, water treatment facilities, power plants, and power transmission lines.
  - "The opening up of these key sectors should make it easier for Vietnam to capitalize on the positive investment climate created by WTO accession, while facilitating the maintenance of medium-term debt sustainability, and helping to ensure that the private sector will have sufficient incentives and financial resources to continue to thrive in an environment of growing global competition."

*Source: IMF staff calculations and text from the provided chapter.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/_cr07385.pdf_
