## Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes for the FATF 40 Recommendations for Anti-Money Laundering and 9 Special Recommendations Combating the Financing of Terrorism (Content unit: _cr0770)

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### Overview and scope
- Prepared by the Financial Action Task Force; provides a summary of the AML/CFT measures in place in Spain, the level of compliance with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations, and recommendations to strengthen the AML/CFT system.
- Coverage date: measures in place in Spain as of September 2005 (the date of the on-site visit); more recent developments (including laws in force from January 2006) were also taken into consideration.
- The views have been agreed by the FATF and Spain, but do not necessarily reflect the views of the Boards of the IMF or World Bank.

### Major findings on legal framework and offences
- Money laundering
  - Criminalised through Article 301 of the Spanish Penal Code (PC).
  - Spain has adopted an "all-crimes approach" to criminalisation of money laundering (all crimes (delitos) in the Penal Code could constitute a predicate offence).
  - Article 301 PC requires knowledge of the unlawful origin of the property.
  - It is not necessary that a person be convicted of a predicate offence or that the prior act be under judicial proceedings to prove proceeds of crime.
  - Concerns:
    - Article 301 PC wording does not explicitly set out that “possession or use” of proceeds also constitutes money laundering, nor an open-ended list of ways of handling proceeds to cover possession or use to the full extent required by the Vienna and Palermo Conventions.
    - Uncertainty remains about the extent to which "self-laundering" is covered; Article 301 PC is silent and there are no examples of convictions for self-laundering, though one Spanish Supreme Court judgment suggests some alternatives in Article 301 PC could apply to perpetrators of the predicate offence.
    - Spain should ensure national law allows for holding legal persons criminally liable for money laundering; currently a legal person may be subject to administrative fines or other sanctions if responsible natural persons are found guilty.
- Terrorist financing (TF)
  - Criminalisation is "largely in line with international standards" (in particular the Terrorist Financing Convention) but does not cover all requirements of Special Recommendation II.
  - Shortfalls identified (TF offences may not adequately cover):
    - Acts by an individual terrorist (not related to a terrorist group).
    - Collection of funds under certain circumstances.
    - Providing and collecting funds with the unlawful intention that they should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, by an individual terrorist (for any purpose).
    - Providing and collecting funds directly to carry out a terrorist act.
    - Providing and collecting funds to legitimate activities run by a terrorist organisation or an individual terrorist.
  - Recommendation: Spain should carry out a critical and comprehensive review of offences contributing to FATF requirements and consider legislative adjustments.

### Confiscation, freezing, and implementation of UN/EC measures
- Confiscation and seizure framework "measures up well to the FATF standards"; Recommendation 3 requirements are met as to the legal framework.
- Freezing of terrorist-related funds
  - Obligation under S/RES/1267(1999) implemented through Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002; Annex I corresponds to the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee list and is regularly updated.
  - Obligation under S/RES/1373(2001) implemented through Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001.
  - Law 12/2003 offers possibility of freezing any type of financial flow to prevent funds being used to commit terrorist actions.
  - Deficiencies noted:
    - Judicial freezing orders under Spanish law do not seem to fulfil S/RES/1373(2001)/Special Recommendation III requirements to the full extent (judicial freezing ordered with a view to securing claims for damages/compensation rather than preventive scope).
    - Shortcomings in examining and giving effect to freezing mechanisms initiated under other jurisdictions.
    - Lack of evidence of a clear, efficient procedure to ensure prompt determination of reasonable grounds to initiate freezing and subsequent freezing without delay.
    - Need to promulgate the announced Royal Decree to implement and enforce Law 12/2003 and provide additional guidance to financial institutions and other persons/entities holding targeted funds or assets.
    - Spain should establish and make publicly known procedures for de-listing and unfreezing in appropriate cases.

### SEPBLAC (Spanish FIU): structure, activity, and operational issues
- SEPBLAC established in 1993; member of the Egmont Group since 1995.
- Functions: receiving, analysing and disseminating information; also performs supervisory functions.
- STR statistics and dissemination
  - Total STRs received: around 1,000 in 2001 and 2,500 in 2004.
  - In 2004 SEPBLAC sent:
    - 57 reports to the national court;
    - 52 to the anti-narcotics public prosecutor’s office;
    - 204 to the anti-corruption public prosecutor’s office;
    - 866 to the Policía Nacional (National Police);
    - 320 to the Guardia Civil (Civil Guard).
- Internal structure includes two police units (Guardia Civil and National Police) and customs personnel; SEPBLAC receives funding from the Bank of Spain to create systems and procedures and actively exchanges information with other FIUs.
- Operational concerns
  - Quality of SEPBLAC’s analysis broadly commented on by investigating authorities.
  - Guardia Civil, National Police and the anticorruption prosecutor consider they receive too many reports and many are inadequate to start investigations.
  - Recommendation: police or law enforcement units should participate more actively in deciding what reports to dispatch and the criteria to do so.
  - Reservations about SEPBLAC’s economic independence vis-à-vis the Bank of Spain.
  - SEPBLAC’s supervisory activities may negatively impact effectiveness of its FIU functions.

### Preventive measures — financial institutions: legal framework and gaps
- Primary laws and decrees:
  - Law N o 19/1993 of 28 December on certain measures for the prevention of money laundering (Law 19/1993).
  - Royal Decree N o 925/1995 (RD 925/1995) of 9 June (amended in January 2005).
  - Law N o 12/2003 of 21 May (Law 12/2003).
- Observations and deficiencies
  - Law 19/1993 contains customer identification and other AML obligations but "does not directly refer to the fight against terrorist financing," which is contained in separate Law 12/2003. "The connection between the two laws should be made more explicit."
  - The Spanish AML/CFT system "is not based on risk assessments in the manner contemplated in the revised FATF 40 Recommendations."
  - CDD regime is insufficient to meet all subtleties of Recommendation 5; not extended to the risk related to terrorist financing; inadequate requirements to ascertain the beneficial owner; obligations on ongoing due diligence and keeping CDD information up-to-date "are not sufficiently clear and do not impose direct obligations as asked for in Recommendation 5."
  - Measures for higher risk situations "are incomplete."
  - Spain should address whether financial institutions may apply simplified or reduced CDD measures and "should issue appropriate guidance to that effect."
  - Financial institutions "should not be permitted to open accounts, commence business relations or perform transactions when adequate CDD has not been conducted."
  - Spain "has not adopted rules governing the CDD treatment of existing customers on the basis of materiality and risk."
  - Recommendations 6 and 7 "have not been adequately implemented."
  - Regarding Recommendation 8, regulation addresses non face-to-face relationships for establishing customer relationships but "does not extend this requirement to non-face to face transactions (linked to ongoing due diligence)."
  - "There is no clear general guidance regarding emerging technological developments."
- Reliance on third parties
  - Neither the law nor the Royal Decree specifically deal with relying on third parties to conduct due diligence.
  - There is a requirement that "responsibility for CDD always stays with the financial institution." Recommendation 9 "is therefore not applicable."
- Wire transfers and SR VII
  - Spain "complies with the requirements of Recommendation 10."
  - Requirements in RD 925/1995 related to wire transfers entered into force in January 2006 and "seem to be in line with the requirements set out in SR VII."
  - Implementation and effectiveness could not be assessed due to their recent coming into force.
  - Recommendations 10 and 21 are fully observed.
- Reporting obligation and STRs
  - Attempted transactions "should be clearly and directly subject to the reporting obligation."
  - Legal framework appears generally adequate, but concerns:
    - Relatively low numbers of STRs, especially from outside the banking system.
    - A large number of STRs filed by a small number of financial institutions.
  - SEPBLAC relies heavily on prevention efforts; its resources "are inadequate to ensure a proper implementation of the reporting obligation through AML/CFT supervision."
  - The scope of Spanish ML/TF offences "is not quite broad enough" and negatively impacts the scope of the reporting obligation.
  - Recommendations 14 and 19 are fully observed.
  - "There is not sufficient AML/CFT guidance available, and SEPBLAC does not deliver sufficient specific feedback to reporting entities especially on the status of STRs and the outcome of specific cases."
- Internal procedures and hiring standards
  - Financial institutions are obligated to establish internal procedures and policies to prevent money laundering, meeting most FATF requirements.
  - "Reporting financial institutions should be obliged to establish screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring employees."
  - Careful attention needed for proper internal procedures by all financial institutions.
- Foreign branches and correspondent banking
  - Requirements to ensure foreign branches and subsidiaries observe AML/CFT measures "largely comply with the FATF standard."
  - There is no legally binding prohibition on financial institutions to enter into or continue correspondent banking relationship with shell banks, nor any obligation to determine whether a respondent financial institution in a foreign country permits its accounts to be used by shell banks.
- Licensing and background checks
  - Procedures for licensing financial institutions "appear adequate to prevent criminals from gaining control or significant influence."
  - Criminal background checks are made at licensing; afterward it is essentially left to financial institutions as changes occur to the Board or senior management.
  - The Bank of Spain must approve new appointments, and this process includes review of qualifications and administrative sanctions.
  - Spain "should clarify what specific requirements and expectations are of financial institutions and whether the financial institutions or the Bank of Spain is responsible for doing background checks on new directors and new officers (changes after initial incorporation)."
- Supervision and inspections
  - SEPBLAC is directly responsible for AML/CFT supervision for a large number of regulated financial institutions.
  - In 2004 the total number of regulated financial institutions was 6,520.
  - SEPBLAC conducted 14 inspections of regulated financial institutions in 2004.
  - SEPBLAC has signed MOUs with the Bank of Spain, the National Securities Market Commission and the Directorate General of Insurance and Pension Funds.
  - There is a "fairly significant gap between the volume of inspections being done by the financial supervisors and the resulting information on these which reaches SEPBLAC."
  - Spain "should take steps to review its supervisory regime and better co-ordinate the inspection of reporting entities to increase the number of inspections."
  - Limited results of the reporting obligation by money remitters "raise some serious concerns about the effectiveness of the implementation of the FATF standards in this sector."
- Sanctions
  - There is a system of sanctions in place (implemented by the Treasury, not the supervisor itself).
  - Due to limited SEPBLAC access to overall compliance data, it is "impossible to measure the effectiveness of the sanctions regime (element relating to effectiveness)."

### Preventive measures — designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs)
- Law 19/1993 has imposed AML obligations on most categories of DNFBPs since April 2005.
- No discrete sector for trust and company service providers has been identified; AML/CFT obligations apply if persons offering these services fall into identified categories.
- Main deficiencies for DNFBPs mirror those for financial institutions: weaknesses in Recommendations 5, 6, and 8-11.
- Requirements on beneficial ownership identification and additional identification/KYC rules "should apply to DNFBPs to the full extent."
- Ratings for Recommendations 12 and 16 reflect concerns about scope of application and effective implementation.
- SEPBLAC has limited staff and technical resources for DNFBP inspections; "there is no effective AML/CFT supervision in place."
- DNFBPs "generally recognise that they do not have enough guidance as far as AML/CFT requirements are concerned."
- Regarding Recommendation 20, Spain "has not yet taken steps to encourage the development and use of modern and secure techniques for conducting financial transactions that are less vulnerable to money laundering."

### Identified ML/TF typologies and trends
- Money laundering techniques identified:
  - Use of term deposits;
  - Transfers abroad through accounts of Spanish limited companies supposedly involved in importing goods;
  - Transactions through corporate networks;
  - Use of bridging accounts;
  - Organised VAT fraud schemes;
  - Use of cash deposits and withdrawals and exchange of currency for high denomination notes;
  - Underground banking operations between Spain and Morocco related to hashish trafficking and smuggling (recurrent trend).
- Methods identified for financing terrorism:
  - Funds masked as donations to finance projects of a non-profit organisation (ETA, Islamic terrorism);
  - Creation of groups of companies involved in publishing, printing and distribution of books, magazines and newspapers used as conduit for depositing funds obtained through coercion (extortion, kidnapping, etc.);
  - Fraudulent collection of subsidies, tax returns, etc.;
  - Creation of cultural associations by representatives of terrorist organisations to facilitate opening of current accounts and to serve as cover for control of goods and services;
  - Use of alternative remittance system transfers.

### Law enforcement, prosecution and investigative powers
- Spain has a comprehensive network of law enforcement and prosecution authorities; largely in compliance with Recommendation 27.
- Key agencies
  - Guardia Civil and National Police responsible for fighting crime, including ML/FT.
  - Drug and Money Laundering Special Prosecutor’s Office acts before the National Court in crimes of drug smuggling and money laundering by organised groups affecting more than one region.
  - Special Public Prosecutor’s Office for the Repression of Economic Crimes Related with Corruption competent for crimes including crimes against the Treasury, smuggling, embezzlement of public funds, fraud and extortion, bribery, crimes of political favour-peddling and voluntary bankruptcy; obtained new responsibilities in prosecution of money laundering and organised crime cases in 2004.
- Investigative powers
  - Authorities have comprehensive powers to compel production of, obtain access to, search premises for, and seize any documents needed during investigations, and a broad range of special investigative techniques.
  - Process for obtaining account files (through SEPBLAC) at certain stages of police investigation can be lengthy, raising questions about effectiveness.
- Effectiveness and resources
  - Relatively low number of prosecutions/convictions for money laundering; available figures only reflect serious cases handled by specialised prosecution offices.
  - Lack of comprehensive statistics (number of initiated AML/CFT investigations; percentage of total investigations completed; comprehensive statistics on prosecutions and convictions relating to ML and TF) limits assessment of effectiveness.
  - Expertise within the Drug and Money Laundering Special Prosecutor’s Office could be diversified; more skills in economics would be an asset.
  - Prosecutors’ offices generally cite resources as their main difficulty.

### Key statistics and figures (preserved exactly)
- Measures in place as of September 2005 (date of the on-site visit).
- Laws/regulations cited:
  - Law No 19/1993 of 28 September;
  - Royal Decree No 925/1995 of 9 June;
  - Law No 12/2003 of 21 May;
  - Article 301 PC;
  - Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002;
  - Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001;
  - S/RES/1267(1999);
  - S/RES/1373(2001).
- STRs received by SEPBLAC:
  - around 1,000 in 2001;
  - 2,500 in 2004.
- SEPBLAC dissemination in 2004:
  - 57 reports to the national court;
  - 52 to the anti-narcotics public prosecutor’s office;
  - 204 to the anti-corruption public prosecutor’s office;
  - 866 to the Policía Nacional (National Police);
  - 320 to the Guardia Civil (Civil Guard).

### Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions and TF (shortfalls)
- Spain has not fully implemented the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions since:
  - (1) it has issued very little guidance to financial institutions and other persons/entities that may be holding targeted funds/assets;
  - (2) it has not established or made clear and publicly known the necessary procedures for de-listing and unfreezing in appropriate cases;
  - (3) because the scope of the terrorist financing offence is not quite broad enough, it would be unable to freeze the assets of a person who provides or collects funds with the unlawful intention that they should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, by an individual terrorist.

### Mutual legal assistance (MLA), extradition, and cross-border cooperation
- Mutual legal assistance
  - Spanish authorities are able to provide a wide range of mutual legal assistance.
  - Spain provides mutual legal assistance on the basis of reciprocity without also requiring a bi-lateral or multilateral treaty.
  - Statistics suggest efficiency in practical application has improved over the last years and is now generally good.
  - Recommendation: Spain should consider how the average time for processing request for mutual legal assistance, in particular from countries outside the European Union, could be further reduced.
- Extradition
  - Both ML and TF are extraditable offences.
  - Extradition can occur pursuant to Spain’s multilateral and bilateral extradition agreements or the principle of reciprocity where there is no agreement.
  - Spain does not oppose extradition of its own nationals on a general basis, as long as the requesting State also agrees to extradite its nationals (based on reciprocity).
  - Where the requirement of dual criminality applies, it is interpreted broadly.

### SEPBLAC information exchange and supervisory coordination
- Information exchange
  - SEPBLAC’s capacity to exchange information with foreign counterparts appears to be satisfactory.
  - In information exchanges SEPBLAC is governed by the criteria of the Egmont Group or by the Collaboration Agreements signed with 22 countries.
  - SEPBLAC has no restriction on information exchange of a tax nature.
  - Financial institutions or DNFBPs cannot invoke confidentiality or secrecy restrictions when responding to requests from SEPBLAC, except for public notaries, lawyers and solicitors, who may assert legal professional privilege.
- Restrictions on supervisors and coordination issues
  - Financial supervisors are not authorised to share information related to money laundering or terrorist financing with foreign counterparts; they refer such requests to SEPBLAC.
  - SEPBLAC does not deal directly with foreign supervisors to reply to requests related to AML/CFT supervision, making it difficult to conclude that cooperation mechanisms ensure a rapid, constructive and effective exchange of information.

### Data gaps and recommended statistics to maintain
- Spain should maintain more comprehensive data in the following areas:
  - (1) number of ML/TF investigations, prosecutions and convictions;
  - (2) data on the amounts of property frozen, seized and confiscated relating to money laundering, terrorist financing and criminal proceeds;
  - (3) number of STRs filed on cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments;
  - (4) statistics on whether the request for mutual legal assistance was granted or refused and on how much time was required to respond;
  - (5) number of requests for extradition for ML/TF cases and figures on whether the request was granted or refused and how much time was required to respond;
  - (6) number of formal requests made or received by SEPBLAC in distinguishing between the requests that were granted or refused; and
  - (7) number of spontaneous referrals made by SEPBLAC to foreign authorities.

### FATF Recommendations — Ratings and key factors underlying ratings (selected highlights)
- Legal systems
  - 1. ML offence — LC
  - 2. ML offence – mental element and corporate liability — LC
  - 3. Confiscation and provisional measures — LC
- Preventive measures (selected)
  - 4. Secrecy laws consistent with the Recommendations — C
  - 5. Customer due diligence — PC
  - 6. Politically exposed persons — NC
  - 7. Correspondent banking — NC
  - 8. New technologies & non face-to-face business — PC
  - 10. Record keeping — C
  - 11. Unusual transactions — C
  - 12. DNFBP – R.5, 6, 8-11 — PC
  - 13. Suspicious transaction reporting — LC
  - 14. Protection & no tipping-off — C
  - 15. Internal controls, compliance & audit — LC
  - 16. DNFBP – R.13-15 & 21 — PC
  - 17. Sanctions — LC
  - 18. Shell banks — PC
  - 19. Other forms of reporting — C
  - 20. Other NFBP & secure transaction techniques — LC
  - 21. Special attention for higher risk countries — C
  - 22. Foreign branches & subsidiaries — LC
  - 23. Regulation, supervision and monitoring — PC
  - 24. DNFBP - regulation, supervision and monitoring — NC
  - 25. Guidelines & Feedback — PC
- Institutional and other measures
  - 26. The FIU — LC
  - 27. Law enforcement authorities — LC
  - 28. Powers of competent authorities — LC
  - 29. Supervisors — PC

### Special Recommendations — summary of factors underlying ratings (selected)
- SR I Implement UN instruments — PC
  - Spain has issued very little guidance to financial institutions and other persons/entities that may be holding targeted funds/assets; has not established or made clear and publicly known procedures for de-listing and unfreezing; TF offence scope not broad enough to criminalise collecting of funds as defined in the Terrorist Financing Convention.
- SR II Criminalise terrorist financing — LC
  - Penal Code does not provide for an offence of terrorist financing in the form of providing or collecting funds with the unlawful intention that they should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, by an individual terrorist for any purpose; TF offences do not properly cover provision/collection of funds to legitimate activities run by a terrorist organisation.
- SR III Freeze and confiscate terrorist assets — LC
  - Law 12/2003, although in force, has yet to be practically implemented; scope of EC Regulations does not fully cover SR III terms; little guidance issued to financial institutions; no clear de-listing/unfreezing procedures publicly known.
- SR IV Suspicious transaction reporting — LC
  - Attempted transactions are not directly subject to the reporting obligation; concerns about effectiveness of reporting system.
- SR VI AML requirements for money/value transfer services — LC
  - Difficulties in implementing AML/CFT measures in this sector raise serious concerns about effectiveness.
- SR VII Wire transfer rules — LC
  - Recent adoption of relevant requirements; implementation and effectiveness could not be assessed.
- SR VIII Non-profit organisations — LC
  - Insufficient basis to assess effectiveness of measures in place.
- SR IX Cross Border Declaration & Disclosure — LC
  - The declaration system as currently implemented raises some issues of effectiveness.

### Recommended Action Plan — priority measures (selected)
- Legal System and Related Institutional Measures
  - Clearly set out that the “possession or use” of proceeds of crime constitutes money laundering to the full extent required by the Vienna and the Palermo Conventions.
  - Clarify national law with respect to self-laundering; preferably enact legislation allowing for prosecuting and convicting the perpetrator of a predicate offence who launders proceeds.
  - Make sure national law would allow for holding legal persons criminally liable for ML.
  - Ensure TF offences cover providing and collecting funds with unlawful intention or in knowledge they will be used by an individual terrorist; cover direct provision/collection to carry out terrorist acts; extend TF offences to funds for legitimate activities run by terrorist organisations or individual terrorists.
  - Enact the announced Royal Decree regulating the implementation and enforcement of Law 12/2003; provide guidance to financial institutions and other persons/entities holding targeted funds; establish and make publicly known procedures for de-listing and unfreezing.
  - SEPBLAC and law enforcement should develop mechanisms to enhance partnership and collaboration on ML/TF cases.
  - Law enforcement authorities should be able to measure results of their AML/CFT efforts (improved statistics).
- Preventive Measures — Financial Institutions
  - Extend all CDD requirements to clearly reflect risk related to terrorist financing; define identification of beneficial ownership as per FATF; extend to legal arrangements.
  - Clarify and impose direct obligations regarding ongoing due diligence and keeping CDD information up-to-date.
  - Complete measures for higher risk situations; address simplified or reduced CDD and issue guidance.
  - Adopt clear/direct requirements when financial institutions fail to satisfactorily complete CDD (including refusal to establish or continue business).
  - Adopt rules governing CDD treatment of existing customers on the basis of materiality and risk.
  - Adopt specific measures concerning non face-to-face business transactions and require policies to deal with misuse of technological developments.
  - Prohibit financial institutions from entering or continuing correspondent banking relationships with shell banks; require verification that respondent institutions do not permit use by shell banks.
  - Increase SEPBLAC capacity and consider a separately-identifiable SEPBLAC budget and changes to appointment mechanism for director.
- Preventive Measures — DNFBPs
  - Apply CDD, beneficial ownership identification and KYC requirements to DNFBPs fully.
  - Ensure SEPBLAC guarantees adequate supervision for DNFBPs; address internet casinos.
  - Develop sectoral, practical guidance and raise AML/CFT awareness within DNFBPs.
- National and International co-operation and statistics
  - Improve interagency co-operation mechanisms.
  - Maintain comprehensive statistics on:
    - (1) number of ML/TF investigations, prosecutions and convictions;
    - (2) data on the amounts of property frozen, seized and confiscated relating to money laundering, terrorist financing and criminal proceeds;
    - (3) number of STRs filed on cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments;
    - (4) statistics on whether the request for mutual legal assistance was granted or refused and on how much time was required to respond;
    - (5) number of requests for extradition for ML/TF cases and figures on whether the request was granted or refused and how much time was required to respond;
    - (6) number of formal requests made or received by SEPBLAC in distinguishing between the requests that were granted or refused; and
    - (7) number of spontaneous referrals made by SEPBLAC to foreign authorities.
- Resources and training
  - SEPBLAC should have its resources increased to a large extent to permit it carry out its supervisory functions.
  - Spain should consider increasing the economic independence of SEPBLAC vis-à-vis the Bank of Spain.
  - Spain should consider allocating additional resources to prosecution authorities.

*This report was prepared by the Financial Action Task Force and summarises AML/CFT measures in Spain as of September 2005.*

### 1. This Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes for the FATF 40 Recommendations for

### 1. This Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes for the FATF 40 Recommendations for Anti-Money Laundering and 9 Special Recommendations Combating the Financing of Terrorism

### Overview and scope
- Prepared by the Financial Action Task Force; provides a summary of the AML/CFT measures in place in Spain, the level of compliance with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations, and recommendations to strengthen the AML/CFT system.
- Coverage date: measures in place in Spain as of September 2005 (the date of the on-site visit); more recent developments (including laws in force from January 2006) were also taken into consideration.
- The views have been agreed by the FATF and Spain, but do not necessarily reflect the views of the Boards of the IMF or World Bank.

### Major findings on legal framework and offences
- Spanish legal framework for combating money laundering and terrorist financing is described as "generally comprehensive."
- Money laundering:
  - Criminalised through Article 301 of the Spanish Penal Code (PC).
  - Offences are broad in scope and, according to Spanish prosecutors, "easy to apply."
  - Article 301 PC requires knowledge of the unlawful origin of the property.
  - Spain has adopted an "all-crimes approach" to criminalisation of money laundering (all crimes (delitos) in the Penal Code could constitute a predicate offence).
  - It is not necessary that a person be convicted of a predicate offence or that the prior act be under judicial proceedings to prove proceeds of crime.
  - Concerns noted:
    - Article 301 PC wording does not explicitly set out that “possession or use” of proceeds also constitutes money laundering, nor an open-ended list of ways of handling proceeds to cover possession or use to the full extent required by the Vienna and Palermo Conventions.
    - Uncertainty remains about the extent to which "self-laundering" is covered; Article 301 PC is silent and there are no examples of convictions for self-laundering, though one Spanish Supreme Court judgment suggests some alternatives in Article 301 PC could apply to perpetrators of the predicate offence.
    - Spain should ensure national law allows for holding legal persons criminally liable for money laundering; currently a legal person may be subject to administrative fines or other sanctions if responsible natural persons are found guilty.
- Terrorist financing (TF):
  - Criminalisation is "largely in line with international standards" (in particular the Terrorist Financing Convention) but does not cover all requirements of Special Recommendation II.
  - Shortfalls identified: TF offences may not adequately cover:
    - Acts by an individual terrorist (not related to a terrorist group).
    - Collection of funds under certain circumstances.
    - Providing and collecting funds with the unlawful intention that they should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, by an individual terrorist (for any purpose).
    - Providing and collecting funds directly to carry out a terrorist act.
    - Providing and collecting funds to legitimate activities run by a terrorist organisation or an individual terrorist.
  - Recommendation: Spain should carry out a critical and comprehensive review of offences contributing to FATF requirements and consider legislative adjustments.

### Confiscation, freezing, and implementation of UN/EC measures
- Confiscation and seizure framework "measures up well to the FATF standards"; Recommendation 3 requirements are met as to the legal framework.
- Freezing of terrorist-related funds:
  - Obligation under S/RES/1267(1999) implemented through Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002; Annex I corresponds to the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee list and is regularly updated.
  - Obligation under S/RES/1373(2001) implemented through Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001.
  - Law 12/2003 offers possibility of freezing any type of financial flow to prevent funds being used to commit terrorist actions.
  - Deficiencies noted:
    - Judicial freezing orders under Spanish law do not seem to fulfil S/RES/1373(2001)/Special Recommendation III requirements to the full extent (judicial freezing ordered with a view to securing claims for damages/compensation rather than preventive scope).
    - Shortcomings in examining and giving effect to freezing mechanisms initiated under other jurisdictions.
    - Lack of evidence of a clear, efficient procedure to ensure prompt determination of reasonable grounds to initiate freezing and subsequent freezing without delay.
    - Need to promulgate the announced Royal Decree to implement and enforce Law 12/2003 and provide additional guidance to financial institutions and other persons/entities holding targeted funds or assets.
    - Spain should establish and make publicly known procedures for de-listing and unfreezing in appropriate cases.

### SEPBLAC (Spanish FIU): structure, activity, and operational issues
- SEPBLAC established in 1993; member of the Egmont Group since 1995.
- Functions: receiving, analysing and disseminating information; also performs supervisory functions.
- STR statistics and dissemination:
  - Total STRs received: around 1,000 in 2001 and 2,500 in 2004.
  - In 2004 SEPBLAC sent:
    - 57 reports to the national court,
    - 52 to the anti-narcotics public prosecutor’s office,
    - 204 to the anti-corruption public prosecutor’s office,
    - 866 to the Policía Nacional (National Police),
    - 320 to the Guardia Civil (Civil Guard).
- Internal structure includes two police units (Guardia Civil and National Police) and customs personnel; SEPBLAC receives funding from the Bank of Spain to create systems and procedures and actively exchanges information with other FIUs.
- Operational concerns:
  - Quality of SEPBLAC’s analysis broadly commented on by investigating authorities.
  - Guardia Civil, National Police and the anticorruption prosecutor consider they receive too many reports and many are inadequate to start investigations.
  - Recommendation: police or law enforcement units should participate more actively in deciding what reports to dispatch and the criteria to do so.
  - Reservations about SEPBLAC’s economic independence vis-à-vis the Bank of Spain.
  - SEPBLAC’s supervisory activities may negatively impact effectiveness of its FIU functions.

### Preventive measures, customer due diligence, and DNFBPs
- Preventive legal framework: Law No 19/1993 of 28 September; Royal Decree No 925/1995 of 9 June; Law No 12/2003 of 21 May (introduced CFT prevention and freezing).
- Laws deal with customer identification and other AML/CFT obligations and apply to a broad range of financial institutions.
- Deficiencies:
  - Customer due diligence (CDD) regime is insufficient to meet all subtleties of FATF requirements.
  - CFT legislation does not explicitly extend CDD to the risk associated with terrorist financing.
  - Requirements for determining the beneficial owner are inadequate.
  - Monitoring of implementation of AML/CFT measures by DNFBPs must be improved.
- DNFBPs:
  - From April 2005 a range of DNFBPs became subject to Law 19/1993: casinos, real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones, legal advisors, external accountants and auditors, notaries, lawyers and court representatives in certain circumstances, as well as other activities (such as trade in art works and antiques).
  - Spain is in the process of further reviewing legislation to implement the Third EU Money Laundering Directive.

### Identified ML/TF typologies and trends
- Money laundering techniques identified by Spanish competent authorities:
  - Use of term deposits;
  - Transfers abroad through accounts of Spanish limited companies supposedly involved in importing goods;
  - Transactions through corporate networks;
  - Use of bridging accounts;
  - Organised VAT fraud schemes;
  - Use of cash deposits and withdrawals and exchange of currency for high denomination notes;
  - Underground banking operations between Spain and Morocco related to hashish trafficking and smuggling (recurrent trend).
- Methods identified for financing terrorism:
  - Funds masked as donations to finance projects of a non-profit organisation (ETA, Islamic terrorism);
  - Creation of groups of companies involved in publishing, printing and distribution of books, magazines and newspapers used as conduit for depositing funds obtained through coercion (extortion, kidnapping, etc.);
  - Fraudulent collection of subsidies, tax returns, etc.;
  - Creation of cultural associations by representatives of terrorist organisations to facilitate opening of current accounts and to serve as cover for control of goods and services;
  - Use of alternative remittance system transfers.

### Law enforcement, prosecution and investigative powers
- Spain has a comprehensive network of law enforcement and prosecution authorities; largely in compliance with Recommendation 27.
- Key agencies:
  - Guardia Civil and National Police responsible for fighting crime, including ML/FT.
  - Drug and Money Laundering Special Prosecutor’s Office acts before the National Court in crimes of drug smuggling and money laundering by organised groups affecting more than one region.
  - Special Public Prosecutor’s Office for the Repression of Economic Crimes Related with Corruption competent for crimes including crimes against the Treasury, smuggling, embezzlement of public funds, fraud and extortion, bribery, crimes of political favour-peddling and voluntary bankruptcy; obtained new responsibilities in prosecution of money laundering and organised crime cases in 2004.
- Investigative powers:
  - Authorities have comprehensive powers to compel production of, obtain access to, search premises for, and seize any documents needed during investigations, and a broad range of special investigative techniques.
  - Process for obtaining account files (through SEPBLAC) at certain stages of police investigation can be lengthy, raising questions about effectiveness.
- Effectiveness and resources:
  - Relatively low number of prosecutions/convictions for money laundering; available figures only reflect serious cases handled by specialised prosecution offices.
  - Lack of comprehensive statistics (number of initiated AML/CFT investigations; percentage of total investigations completed; comprehensive statistics on prosecutions and convictions relating to ML and TF) limits assessment of effectiveness.
  - Expertise within the Drug and Money Laundering Special Prosecutor’s Office could be diversified; more skills in economics would be an asset.
  - Prosecutors’ offices generally cite resources as their main difficulty.

### Key statistics and figures (preserved exactly as in source)
- Measures in place as of September 2005 (date of the on-site visit).
- Laws/regulations cited:
  - Law No 19/1993 of 28 September;
  - Royal Decree No 925/1995 of 9 June;
  - Law No 12/2003 of 21 May;
  - Article 301 PC;
  - Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002;
  - Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001;
  - S/RES/1267(1999);
  - S/RES/1373(2001).
- STRs received by SEPBLAC:
  - around 1,000 in 2001;
  - 2,500 in 2004.
- SEPBLAC dissemination in 2004:
  - 57 reports to the national court;
  - 52 to the anti-narcotics public prosecutor’s office;
  - 204 to the anti-corruption public prosecutor’s office;
  - 866 to the Policía Nacional (National Police);
  - 320 to the Guardia Civil (Civil Guard).

*This report was prepared by the Financial Action Task Force and summarises AML/CFT measures in Spain as of September 2005.*

### 21. Spain  has  a  currency  monitoring  system  which  requires  individuals  and  companies  to  declare

### _cr0770 - 21. Spain has a currency monitoring system which requires individuals and companies to declare

### Currency monitoring system — design and shortcomings
- Spain has a currency monitoring system which requires individuals and companies to declare the amount, origin and destination of incoming and outgoing funds.
- With the adoption of the Special Recommendation IX, the system has been re-directed towards preventing money laundering.
- The current declaration form:
  - "seems to be more aimed at currency controls and does not seem very useful for AML or CFT purposes."
  - The introduction of a new declaration form "should facilitate the implementation of the declaration system for AML/CFT purposes."
- The applicable ministerial order and the law are silent on methods to inform people about their obligation to report the transportation of cash or monetary instruments above a certain threshold, which "raises a real issue of effectiveness of the measures in place."
- The adoption and implementation of a new regulation "should introduce useful mechanisms" to address notification and effectiveness.
- The possibility of stopping or restraining currency or monetary instruments "does not explicitly exist where there is a suspicion of terrorist financing."
- It "seems that asset forfeiture provisions do not apply to persons who are smuggling cash or monetary instruments that are related to money laundering or terrorist financing."
- The sanctions regime "seems appropriate and to give valuable results."
- Specific issues related to physical cross-border transportation of cash arise with regard to the cities of Ceuta and Melilla; no further information was provided by the Spanish authorities.

### Preventive measures — financial institutions: legal framework and gaps
- Primary laws and decrees:
  - Law N o 19/1993 of 28 December on certain measures for the prevention of money laundering (Law 19/1993).
  - Royal Decree N o 925/1995 (RD 925/1995) of 9 June (amended in January 2005).
  - Law N o 12/2003 of 21 May (Law 12/2003).
- Observations:
  - Law 19/1993 contains customer identification and other AML obligations but "does not directly refer to the fight against terrorist financing," which is contained in separate Law 12/2003. "The connection between the two laws should be made more explicit."
  - The Spanish AML/CFT system "is not based on risk assessments in the manner contemplated in the revised FATF 40 Recommendations."
  - RD 925/1995 takes into account different risk situations, such as non face-to-face business.
- Customer due diligence (CDD):
  - Spain "has implemented customer due diligence (CDD) requirements although the current regime is insufficient to meet all subtleties of Recommendation 5."
  - The current requirements "are not extended to the risk related to terrorist financing."
  - There are "inadequate requirements to ascertain the beneficial owner."
  - Obligations on ongoing due diligence and keeping CDD information up-to-date "are not sufficiently clear and do not impose direct obligations as asked for in Recommendation 5."
  - Measures for higher risk situations "are incomplete."
  - Spain should address whether financial institutions may apply simplified or reduced CDD measures and "should issue appropriate guidance to that effect."
  - Financial institutions "should not be permitted to open accounts, commence business relations or perform transactions when adequate CDD has not been conducted."
  - Spain "has not adopted rules governing the CDD treatment of existing customers on the basis of materiality and risk."
  - Recommendations 6 and 7 "have not been adequately implemented."
  - Regarding Recommendation 8, regulation addresses non-face-to-face relationships for establishing customer relationships but "does not extend this requirement to non-face to face transactions (linked to ongoing due diligence)."
  - "There is no clear general guidance regarding emerging technological developments."
- Reliance on third parties:
  - Neither the law nor the Royal Decree specifically deal with relying on third parties to conduct due diligence.
  - There is a requirement that "responsibility for CDD always stays with the financial institution." Recommendation 9 "is therefore not applicable."
- Confidentiality and information exchange:
  - Spanish statutes dealing with a duty of confidentiality "allow for exceptions that prevent the secrecy laws from hindering the implementation of the FATF Recommendations."
- Wire transfers and SR VII:
  - Spain "complies with the requirements of Recommendation 10."
  - Requirements in RD 925/1995 related to wire transfers entered into force in January 2006 and "seem to be in line with the requirements set out in SR VII."
  - Implementation and effectiveness could not be assessed due to their recent coming into force.
  - Recommendations 10 and 21 are fully observed.
- Reporting obligation and STRs:
  - Attempted transactions "should be clearly and directly subject to the reporting obligation."
  - Legal framework appears generally adequate, but the evaluation team expressed concerns about:
    - Relatively low numbers of STRs, especially from outside the banking system.
    - A large number of STRs filed by a small number of financial institutions.
  - SEPBLAC relies heavily on prevention efforts; its resources "are inadequate to ensure a proper implementation of the reporting obligation through AML/CFT supervision."
  - The scope of Spanish ML/TF offences "is not quite broad enough" and negatively impacts the scope of the reporting obligation.
  - Recommendations 14 and 19 are fully observed.
  - "There is not sufficient AML/CFT guidance available, and SEPBLAC does not deliver sufficient specific feedback to reporting entities especially on the status of STRs and the outcome of specific cases."
- Internal procedures and hiring standards:
  - Financial institutions are obligated to establish internal procedures and policies to prevent money laundering, meeting most FATF requirements.
  - "Reporting financial institutions should be obliged to establish screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring employees."
  - Careful attention needed for proper internal procedures by all financial institutions.
- Foreign branches and correspondent banking:
  - Requirements to ensure foreign branches and subsidiaries observe AML/CFT measures "largely comply with the FATF standard."
  - Authorities indicate broad interpretation of Law 19/1993 allows them to ensure adequate compliance; however, "shortcomings regarding the supervisor’s ability to ensure AML/CFT compliance raise questions on whether this broad interpretation is indeed systematically applied."
  - Spain should add provisions clarifying that higher standards must apply when AML/CFT requirements of home and host countries differ.
  - "There is no legally binding prohibition on financial institutions to enter into or continue correspondent banking relationship with shell banks, nor is there any obligation on financial institutions to determine whether a respondent financial institution in a foreign country permits its accounts to be used by shell banks."
- Licensing and background checks:
  - Procedures for licensing financial institutions "appear adequate to prevent criminals from gaining control or significant influence."
  - Criminal background checks are made at licensing; afterward it is essentially left to financial institutions as changes occur to the Board or senior management.
  - The Bank of Spain must approve new appointments, and this process includes review of qualifications and administrative sanctions.
  - Spain "should clarify what specific requirements and expectations are of financial institutions and whether the financial institutions or the Bank of Spain is responsible for doing background checks on new directors and new officers (changes after initial incorporation)."
- Supervision and inspections:
  - SEPBLAC is directly responsible for AML/CFT supervision for a large number of regulated financial institutions.
  - In 2004 the total number of regulated financial institutions was 6,520.
  - SEPBLAC conducted 14 inspections of regulated financial institutions in 2004.
  - SEPBLAC has signed MOUs with the Bank of Spain, the National Securities Market Commission and the Directorate General of Insurance and Pension Funds.
  - AML/CFT supervision programmes by financial regulators provide additional comfort, and the requirement to notify SEPBLAC of compliance breaches is an additional strength.
  - There is a "fairly significant gap between the volume of inspections being done by the financial supervisors and the resulting information on these which reaches SEPBLAC."
  - Spain "should take steps to review its supervisory regime and better co-ordinate the inspection of reporting entities to increase the number of inspections."
  - Competent authorities are encouraged to review adequacy of resources dedicated to supervision and "take the appropriate steps to make the inspection programme as effective as possible."
  - Limited results of the reporting obligation by money remitters "raise some serious concerns about the effectiveness of the implementation of the FATF standards in this sector."
- Sanctions:
  - There is a system of sanctions in place (implemented by the Treasury, not the supervisor itself).
  - Due to limited SEPBLAC access to overall compliance data, it is "impossible to measure the effectiveness of the sanctions regime (element relating to effectiveness)."

### Preventive measures — designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs)
- Law 19/1993 has imposed AML obligations on most categories of DNFBPs since April 2005.
- No discrete sector for trust and company service providers has been identified; AML/CFT obligations apply if persons offering these services fall into identified categories.
- Lawyers and other regulated professionals may offer services equivalent to independent trust and company services providers and are subject to AML/CFT obligations.
- Main deficiencies for DNFBPs mirror those for financial institutions: weaknesses in Recommendations 5, 6, and 8-11.
- Requirements on beneficial ownership identification and additional identification/KYC rules "should apply to DNFBPs to the full extent."
- Ratings for Recommendations 12 and 16 reflect concerns about scope of application and effective implementation.
- The evaluation team believed effectiveness could be improved by developing effective monitoring of FATF standards implementation by DNFBPs and by working with professional associations to improve awareness and overcome reluctance to apply AML/CFT requirements.
- SEPBLAC has limited staff and technical resources for DNFBP inspections; "there is no effective AML/CFT supervision in place."
- DNFBPs "generally recognise that they do not have enough guidance as far as AML/CFT requirements are concerned."
- Regarding Recommendation 20, Spain "has not yet taken steps to encourage the development and use of modern and secure techniques for conducting financial transactions that are less vulnerable to money laundering."

### Legal persons, arrangements and non-profit organisations (NPOs)
- Beneficial ownership and legal persons:
  - Spanish law "does not lay down any explicit obligation on legal persons ... to know or to disclose information about the beneficial ownership of that company as that term is defined in the glossary to the Methodology."
  - There is "no registry that maintains information on beneficial ownership in this sense."
  - Spanish law "does not require adequate transparency concerning beneficial ownership and control of legal persons," making it "difficult and sometimes quite cumbersome" for competent authorities to obtain necessary information.
  - Where information is obtained through investigative and other powers, competent authorities may produce disclosure of immediate owners, but must "resort to continuing up the chain, one link at a time."
  - Doubts exist as to whether obtained information is "adequate, accurate and up to date."
- Bearer shares:
  - "Bearer shares are still in use in Spain" though their importance has decreased.
  - Use of paper-format bearer shares has decreased; since 1998 "it is impossible to prove ownership by mere possession of a certificate."
  - Difficulties in ensuring timely access to adequate, accurate and current information on beneficial ownership persist for legal persons using bearer shares as well as those not using such shares.
- Trusts and legal arrangements:
  - Spanish law "does not recognise the legal concept of a trust, including trusts created in other countries."
  - Spanish authorities indicate there are no other legal arrangements of similar nature meeting the FATF definition of a "legal arrangement."
  - Spanish lawyers sometimes handle trusts located abroad and, when doing so, "are subject to the same legal regime ... including the obligations with regard to customer identification, record keeping, STR reporting, etc."
- Non-profit organisations (NPOs):
  - The NPO sector in Spain is basically made up of associations and foundations.
  - Spain "has over the last few years reviewed the adequacy of its legal framework relating to non-profit organisations that could be abused for the financing of terrorism and has put several measures in place to prevent such abuse."
  - There are doubts as to whether existing rules are fully implemented.
  - Spain "should give further consideration to implementing other specific measures from the Best Practices Paper on SR VIII or other measures to ensure that funds or other assets collected by or transferred through non-profit organisations are not diverted to support the activities of terrorist organisations."

### National and international co-operation
- Domestic coordination:
  - Planning, co-ordination and implementation of anti-money laundering policy in Spain are carried out through the Commission for the Prevention of Money Laundering.
  - A significant part of domestic co-operation takes place through this mechanism; these efforts "could be further reinforced to achieve more effective bilateral interagency co-operation."
- International conventions and implementation gaps:
  - Spain signed the Palermo Convention and its Protocols on the 13 December 2000 and ratified on 1 March 2003.
  - The Vienna Convention was ratified on 11 November 1990.
  - Spain signed the 1999 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of the Terrorism on 8 January 2001, and it was ratified on 1 April 2002.
  - Spain "has not fully implemented the Vienna Convention and the Palermo Convention ('possession or use', self-laundering)."
  - Spain "has not fully implemented the Terrorist Financing Convention in that it has not criminalised the collecting of funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out terrorist acts (as that term is defined in the relevant Article of the Convention)."
  - There are doubts as to whether Article 2(3) is fully implemented insofar as Article 576 PC "does not fully cover the criminal acts set out in the Conventions listed in the Annex to the Terrorist Financing Convention."
  - Shortcomings in effective CDD requirements under Spanish law demonstrate that Article 18(1)(b) of the Terrorist Financing Convention "has not – to the full extent – been properly implemented."

*Source: _cr0770 - 21. Spain has a currency monitoring system which requires individuals and companies to declare*

### 42. Spain has not fully implemented the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions since: (1) it has

### _cr0770 - 42. Spain has not fully implemented the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions since: (1) it has

### Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions and terrorist financing (TF)
- Spain has not fully implemented the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions since:
  - (1) it has issued  very  little  guidance  to  financial  institutions  and  other  persons/entities  that  may  be  holding  targeted  funds/assets;
  - (2) it has not established or made clear and publicly known the necessary procedures for de-listing and unfreezing in appropriate cases; and
  - (3) because the scope of the terrorist financing offence is not quite broad enough, it would be unable to freeze the assets of a person who provides or collects funds with the unlawful intention that they should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, by an individual terrorist.

### Mutual legal assistance (MLA), extradition, and cross-border cooperation
- Mutual legal assistance
  - Spanish authorities are able to provide a wide range of mutual legal assistance.
  - Proper application of treaties combined with Spain’s being a party to a significant number of treaties on mutual legal assistance provides a solid basic legal framework.
  - Spain provides mutual legal assistance on the basis of reciprocity without also requiring a bi-lateral or multilateral treaty; if a request is received from a country with which Spain has no treaty, the requesting State’s ability and willingness to render mutual legal assistance to Spain to the same extent (reciprocity) is assumed without any further need for guarantees.
  - Statistics suggest efficiency in practical application has improved over the last years and is now generally good.
  - Recommendation (without effect on compliance rating): Spain should consider how the average time for processing request for mutual legal assistance, in particular from countries outside the European Union, could be further reduced.
- Extradition
  - Both ML and TF are extraditable offences.
  - Extradition can occur pursuant to Spain’s multilateral and bilateral extradition agreements or the principle of reciprocity where there is no agreement.
  - Spain does not oppose extradition of its own nationals on a general basis, as long as the requesting State also agrees to extradite its nationals (based on reciprocity).
  - Where the requirement of dual criminality applies, it is interpreted broadly: the offence need not be described in exactly the same way under the requesting country’s laws, as long as the activity is punishable under Spanish law.

### SEPBLAC (FIU) information exchange and supervisory coordination
- Information exchange
  - SEPBLAC’s capacity to exchange information with foreign counterparts appears to be satisfactory.
  - Exchanges are not made subject to disproportionate or unduly restrictive conditions; a range of mechanisms or channels can be used to co-operate with other countries.
  - In information exchanges SEPBLAC is governed by the criteria of the Egmont Group or by the Collaboration Agreements signed with 22 countries.
  - Information exchanged by SEPBLAC with other FIUs is not subject to restrictions of any kind; the fundamental criterion is reciprocity.
  - SEPBLAC has no restriction on information exchange of a tax nature.
  - Financial institutions or DNFBPs cannot invoke confidentiality or secrecy restrictions when responding to requests from SEPBLAC, except for public notaries, lawyers and solicitors, who may assert legal professional privilege.
- Restrictions on supervisors and coordination issues
  - Financial supervisors are not authorised to share information related to money laundering or terrorist financing with foreign counterparts; they refer such requests to SEPBLAC.
  - SEPBLAC does not deal directly with foreign supervisors to reply to requests related to AML/CFT supervision, making it difficult to conclude that cooperation mechanisms ensure a rapid, constructive and effective exchange of information.

### Statistics, data gaps, and recommended improvements
- Spain should maintain more comprehensive data in the following areas:
  - (1) number of ML/TF investigations, prosecutions and convictions;
  - (2) data on the amounts of property frozen, seized and confiscated relating to money laundering, terrorist financing and criminal proceeds;
  - (3) number of STRs filed on cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments;
  - (4) statistics on whether the request for mutual legal assistance was granted or refused and on how much time was required to respond;
  - (5) number of requests for extradition for ML/TF cases and figures on whether the request was granted or refused and how much time was required to respond;
  - (6) number of formal requests made or received by SEPBLAC in distinguishing between the requests that were granted or refused; and
  - (7) number of spontaneous referrals made by SEPBLAC to foreign authorities.

### FATF Recommendations — Ratings and key factors underlying ratings
- Legal systems
  - 1. ML offence — LC
    - A few of the relevant requirements laid down in the Vienna and Palermo Conventions have not been implemented to the full extent (the “possession or use” of proceeds of crime).
    - Although Spanish law does seem open to prosecution for self-laundering, the extent to which self-laundering would be covered by the Spanish money laundering offences remains somewhat unclear, and there are no examples of any convictions for self-laundering.
    - As the statistics provided are in no way comprehensive, effectiveness is difficult to assess more precisely. However, the statistics that are available do suggest some doubts as to the effectiveness in the practical application of the ML offences in Spain.
  - 2. ML offence – mental element and corporate liability — LC
    - Spanish law foresees a broad range of sanctions that can be applied to legal persons, but legal persons cannot be sentenced for a crime and thus held criminally liable.
    - A lack of statistics on sanctions actually imposed on natural and legal persons means that effectiveness cannot be properly assessed.
  - 3. Confiscation and provisional measures — LC
    - The effectiveness of the freezing, seizure and confiscation regime could only be partially assessed based on the information available.
- Preventive measures (selected Recommendations)
  - 4. Secrecy laws consistent with the Recommendations — C
    - Recommendation 4 is fully met.
  - 5. Customer due diligence — PC
    - When CDD is required: there is no direct obligation to undertake CDD measures when financial institutions have doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data.
    - Required CDD measures: (1) the current provisions do not set out requirements in relation to the verification of identification data for natural persons or for legal entities (except the verification of information related to the nature of the business); (2) no specific provisions have been adopted for legal arrangements (especially for trusts).
    - Identification of beneficial owners: financial institutions are left with very general and imprecise requirements (this raises the issue of effective implementation of the requirement).
    - Ongoing Due Diligence: there is no clear or direct obligation in the Royal Decree requiring financial institutions to ensure that documents, data or information collected under the CDD process is kept up-to-date and relevant.
    - Risk: (1) RD 925/1995 is silent on the type of additional identification and “know-your-customer” measures to be taken by financial institutions when facing a higher risk transaction or customer (this raises the issue of effective implementation of the requirement); (2) with regard to low risk situations, the current exemptions mean that, rather than reduced or simplified CDD measures, no CDD measures apply whatsoever for these cases. This appears to be an overly broad exemption from CDD requirements although Article 5 of RD 925/1995 (special examination of certain transactions) is fully applicable to these situations; (3) there is no direct or clear provision setting out that the current exemptions are not acceptable whenever there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing.
    - Failure to satisfactorily complete CDD: there is no legislation that requires reporting financial institutions to refuse to establish a customer relationship or carry out a transaction if customer identification (including beneficial owner identification) cannot be carried out or if identification documents believed to be incorrect cannot be verified although Spanish authorities explained that it is understood in the formulation of Law 19/1993 (Article 3.1) that failure to carry out the mandatory identification process must have the consequence that the customer relation will be refused. Further, there is no requirement to terminate an existing business relationship. Finally, there is no requirement for financial institutions to consider making a STR when the institution is unable to satisfactorily complete CDD.
    - Existing customers: there are no specific legal or regulatory measures in place as to how reporting entities should apply CDD measures to their existing pool of customers although Article 5 of RD 925/1995 (special examination of certain transactions) is fully applicable in these circumstances.
  - 6. Politically exposed persons — NC
    - Spain has not implemented adequate AML/CFT measures concerning the establishment of customer relationships with politically exposed persons (PEPs).
  - 7. Correspondent banking — NC
    - Spain has not implemented adequate AML/CFT measures concerning establishment of cross-border correspondent banking relationships.
  - 8. New technologies & non face-to-face business — PC
    - Spain has no specific regulation concerning non-face to face business transactions.
    - There is no general requirement that financial institutions have policies in place to deal with the misuse of technological developments.
  - 9. Third parties and introducers — N/A
    - Although financial institutions may rely on outside agencies to perform CDD for them, this is only done in the context of outsourcing agreements that must be performed under contract and thus this falls outside the scope of Recommendation 9.
  - 10. Record keeping — C
    - Recommendation 10 is fully met.
  - 11. Unusual transactions — C
    - Recommendation 11 is fully met.
  - 12. DNFBP – R.5, 6, 8-11 — PC
    - The same concerns in the implementation of Recommendation 5 apply equally to reporting financial institutions and reporting non-financial businesses and professions.
    - Spain has not implemented adequate AML/CFT measures concerning Recommendation 6 that are applicable to reporting non-financial businesses and professions.
    - Spain has some regulation in place that addresses the issue of non-face to face relationships (when establishing customer relationships) but that does not extend to non-face to face transactions and there is no clear general guidance regarding emerging technological developments (Recommendation 8).
    - With regard to Recommendation 10, there are some concerns with regard to the implementation of the record keeping obligation by casinos.
    - More generally, the implementation of the FATF requirements (both ML and TF) by DNFBPs raises very serious concerns.
  - 13. Suspicious transaction reporting — LC
    - Attempted transactions are not directly subject to the reporting obligation.
    - Concerns about effectiveness of the reporting system: legal framework appears generally adequate, but relative low numbers of STRs, especially outside the banking system, and a large number of STRs filed by a small number of financial institutions.
    - SEPBLAC relies too much on prevention efforts in the absence of fully adequate supervision in the AML/CFT area.
    - Because the scope of the Spanish ML offences is not quite broad enough, there is a corresponding negative impact on the scope of the reporting obligation.
    - Because the scope of the Spanish TF offences is not quite broad enough, there is a corresponding negative impact on the scope of the reporting obligation.
  - 14. Protection & no tipping-off — C
    - Recommendation 14 is fully met.
  - 15. Internal controls, compliance & audit — LC
    - No legal obligation on reporting financial institutions (other than credit institutions to a certain extent) to establish screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring employees.
    - Concerns about effective implementation of internal controls; lack of proper supervision raises concerns about general level of implementation of internal procedures in Spanish financial institutions.
  - 16. DNFBP – R.13-15 & 21 — PC
    - Same deficiencies in implementation of Recommendations 13 and 15 apply to reporting financial institutions and reporting DNFBPs.
    - Calls for more guidance voiced by all sectors during on-site visit raise preliminary concerns about effectiveness of implementation for Recommendation 16.
  - 17. Sanctions — LC
    - System of sanctions in place, but relatively low volume of compliance monitoring carried out by SEPBLAC and articulation between administrative and criminal sanctions makes it difficult to measure effectiveness of sanctions.
  - 18. Shell banks — PC
    - No legally binding prohibition on financial institutions entering into or continuing correspondent banking relationships with shell banks; no obligation to satisfy themselves that a respondent financial institution does not permit its accounts to be used by shell banks.
  - 19. Other forms of reporting — C
    - Recommendation 19 is fully met.
  - 20. Other NFBP & secure transaction techniques — LC
    - Spain has not been taking steps to encourage development and use of modern and secure techniques for conducting financial transactions that are less vulnerable to money laundering.
  - 21. Special attention for higher risk countries — C
    - Recommendation 21 is fully met.
  - 22. Foreign branches & subsidiaries — LC
    - Concerns as to how effectively measures regarding foreign branches and subsidiaries of Spanish institutions have been implemented, in particular regarding obligation to ensure measures implemented by foreign branches and subsidiaries are consistent with Spanish requirements and FATF standards to extent permitted by the host country.
  - 23. Regulation, supervision and monitoring — PC
    - Key financial supervision (insurance companies, credit co-operatives and stock brokerage firms and to a lesser extent credit institutions) is producing a low number of reports on AML/CFT issues to transmit to SEPBLAC; compliance with FATF standards is not being adequately measured.
    - Very limited resources of SEPBLAC with regard to AML/CFT issues may negatively influence effectiveness of overall AML/CFT supervision.
    - Specific requirements for background checks on new directors and new officers after initial incorporation should be clarified.
  - 24. DNFBP - regulation, supervision and monitoring — NC
    - There is no proper supervision or monitoring for AML/CFT requirements in place for DNFBPs.
    - Spain has not taken any measures vis-à-vis Internet casinos.
  - 25. Guidelines & Feedback — PC
    - Need for more specific, timely and systematic feedback to reporting entities especially the status of STRs and the outcome of specific cases.
    - Lack of sector-specific AML/CFT guidance.
    - Insufficient guidelines related to AML/CFT issues are available to DNFBPs.
    - Absence of proper guidance in the CFT area may jeopardise practical application of the Spanish CFT system and may hamper efficiency of the system in place.

- Institutional and other measures
  - 26. The FIU — LC
    - Some question on the quality of the reports produced by SEPBLAC from a law enforcement perspective [issue of effectiveness].
  - 27. Law enforcement authorities — LC
    - Due especially to the lack of statistics, it is not possible to assess whether law enforcement and prosecution authorities effectively perform their functions [issue of effectiveness].
  - 28. Powers of competent authorities — LC
    - The process by which Spanish police forces can have access to account files is not effective [issue of effectiveness].
  - 29. Supervisors — PC
    - Number of on-site supervisory visits that result in inspection reports on compliance with AML/CFT requirements is low given the number of regulated financial institutions; raises concerns in terms of effectiveness of supervision regime.

*International Monetary Fund — country report content unit _cr0770*

### 30. Resources, integrity and

### 30. Resources, integrity and training

### Key findings (PC)
- Considering the large number of entities that SEPBLAC is responsible for supervising, its number of staff is inadequate. (See Sections 2.5, paras. 214-221 & 228 and 3.10, para. 515).
- The analysis staff of SEPBLAC is distracted from its main functions due to supervision tasks (See Section 2.5, paras. 214-221 & 228 and 3.10, para. 515).
- The economic independence of SEPBLAC is called into question since it has no autonomous budget and its director is appointed by the Bank of Spain (See Section 2.5, paras. 214-221 & 227 and 3.10, para. 516).
- Insufficient resources are allocated to prosecution authorities (See Section 2.6, para. 302).

### 31. National co-operation

### Key finding (LC)
- Although formal co-operation may take place, there is still room for improvement in more effective interagency co-operation.

### 32. Statistics

### Key findings (PC)
- Spain has not conducted a proper review of its AML/CFT regime (See Section 6.1, para. 621).
- There are no comprehensive statistics on money laundering investigations, prosecutions and convictions (See Section 2.1, para. 111).
- There are no comprehensive statistics on terrorist financing investigations, prosecutions and convictions (See Section 2.2, para. 127).
- There are very limited statistics on the number of cases and the amounts of property frozen seized and confiscated relating to money laundering, terrorist financing and criminal proceeds (See Sections 2.3, para. 140-143; 2.4, para. 192 and 2.6, para. 299).
- Spain does not collect statistics on whether the request for mutual legal assistance was granted or refused and on how much time was required to respond (See Section 6.3, para. 658).
- Spain does not collect statistics on the number of requests for extradition for ML/TF cases and does not collect data on whether the request was granted or refused and how much time was required to respond (See Section 6.4, para. 674).
- Spain does maintain statistics on the number of formal requests made or received by SEPBLAC without distinguishing between the requests that were granted or refused (See Section 6.5, para. 691).
- No figures are available on the number of spontaneous referrals made by SEPBLAC to foreign authorities (See Section 6.5, para. 691).

### 33. Legal persons – beneficial owners

### Key findings (PC)
- Spanish law, although requiring transparency with respect to immediate ownership, does not require adequate transparency concerning beneficial ownership and control of legal persons.
- There are similar doubts also about the availability of adequate, accurate and current information on beneficial ownership and control of legal persons using bearer shares.
- Access to information on beneficial ownership and control of legal persons, when there is access to such information, is often not timely.

### 34. Legal arrangements – beneficial owners

### Applicability (NA)
- Recommendation 34 is not applicable in the Spanish context.

### International Co-operation (Sections 35–40 and Special Recommendations)

### 35. Conventions (LC)
- Implementation of the Palermo and Vienna Conventions: Although Spanish law may cover much of Article 3(1)(c)(1) of the Vienna Convention and Articles 6(1)(b)(i) and 6(2)(e) of the Palermo Convention (“possession or use”, self-laundering), Spain has not implemented these requirements to the full extent.
- Implementation of the Terrorist Financing Convention: Spain has not fully implemented Article 2(1) which – in connection with Article 2(3) – criminalises not only the provision of funds for terrorist acts but also the mere collection of funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out terrorist acts (as that term is defined in the said Article of the Convention) – regardless of whether an actual terrorist offence is carried out or not. To the extent that Articles 2(1) and 2(3) of the Terrorist Financing Convention are not fully implemented, the same would seem to apply correspondingly with respect to Articles 2(4) and 2(5) on accessory offences. The shortcomings in effective CDD requirements under Spanish law demonstrate that Article 18(1)(b) of the Terrorist Financing Convention has not – to the full extent – been properly implemented.

### 36. Mutual legal assistance (MLA) (C)
- Recommendation 36 is fully met.

### 37. Dual criminality (C)
- Recommendation 37 is fully met.

### 38. MLA on confiscation and freezing (C)
- Recommendation 38 is fully met.

### 39. Extradition (C)
- Recommendation 39 is fully met.

### 40. Other forms of co-operation (LC)
- With regard to the exchange of information with foreign supervisors, there are some doubts about the effectiveness of the mechanisms in place.

### Special Recommendations — Summary of factors underlying ratings

### SR I Implement UN instruments (PC)
- Spain has not fully implemented the relevant Resolutions because: (1) Spain has issued very little guidance to financial institutions and other persons/entities that may be holding targeted funds/assets, which raises issues of effectiveness of the freezing mechanisms in operation in Spain; (2) Spain has not established or made clear and publicly known the necessary procedures for de-listing and unfreezing in appropriate cases; (3) the obligation to criminalise the collection of funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts is not covered to the full extent; (4) the definition of funds in the EC Regulations is not quite broad enough; and (5) the EU freezing mechanisms are not applicable to EU internals and the new domestic legal framework in Spain – which could fill the gap in the scope of application of the EU mechanisms – has yet to be fully implemented in practice.
- Implementation of the Terrorist Financing Convention: Spain has not fully implemented Article 2(1) in connection with Article 2(3) which criminalises not only of the provision of funds for terrorist acts but also of merely collecting funds with the intention that they should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out terrorist acts – regardless of whether an actual terrorist offence is carried out. To the extent that Articles 2(1) and 2(3) of the Terrorist Financing Convention are not fully implemented, the same would seem to apply correspondingly with respect to Articles 2(4) and 2(5) on accessory offences. The shortcomings in effective CDD requirements under Spanish law demonstrate that Article 18(1)(b) of the Terrorist Financing Convention has not – to the full extent – been properly implemented.

### SR II Criminalise terrorist financing (LC)
- The Penal Code does not provide for an offence of terrorist financing in the form of providing or collecting funds with the unlawful intention that they should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, by an individual terrorist for any purpose.
- TF offences under Spanish law do not seem to properly cover providing or collecting funds to legitimate activities run by a terrorist organisation (or by an individual terrorist; cf. also above).
- The Spanish TF offences do not properly cover terrorist financing in the form of providing or collecting funds directly in order for them to be used to carry out a terrorist act.
- The relevant offences are predicate offences for ML but some shortcomings in the scope of the Spanish TF offences (as set out above) may raise an issue of effectiveness in this respect.
- Spanish law foresees a broad range of sanctions that can be applied to legal persons also for TF, but legal persons cannot be sentenced and thus held criminally liable.
- A lack of more comprehensive statistics on prosecutions, convictions and sanctions imposed on natural and legal persons means that effectiveness cannot be fully assessed.

### SR III Freeze and confiscate terrorist assets (LC)
- With regard to national mechanisms for considering requests for freezing from other countries and for freezing funds of EU internals, Law 12/2003, although in force, has yet to be practically implemented.
- The scope of the freezing measures under the two definition of funds in the EC Regulations (881/2002 and 2580/2001) does not fully cover the terms in SR III – the requirement of being applicable to the funds or other assets owned or controlled wholly or jointly, directly or indirectly, by the persons concerned, etc. and to funds or other assets derived or generated from funds or other assets owned or controlled by such persons – and, with respect to measures under Regulation 881/2002, the freezing of funds should apply not only to funds held by the designated natural or legal persons but also to the funds controlled by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction.
- Spain has issued very little guidance to financial institutions and other persons/entities that may be holding targeted funds/assets.
- Spain has not established or made clear and publicly known the necessary procedures for de-listing and unfreezing in appropriate cases.
- Because the scope of the terrorist financing offences is not quite broad enough, Spain would be unable to freeze the assets of, inter alia, a person who collects funds directly in order for the funds to be used to carry out a terrorist act.
- The effectiveness of the freezing, seizure and confiscation regime cannot be satisfactorily assessed based on the information available.

### SR IV Suspicious transaction reporting (LC)
- Attempted transactions are not directly subject to the reporting obligation.
- Because the scope of the Spanish TF offences is not quite broad enough, there is a corresponding negative impact on the scope of the reporting obligation.
- There are some concerns about the effectiveness of the reporting system.

### SR V International co-operation (LC)
- With regard to the exchange of information with foreign supervisors, there are some doubts about the effectiveness of the mechanisms in place (in relation with Rec. 40).

### SR VI AML requirements for money/value transfer services (LC)
- The current difficulties in implementing AML/CFT measures (including the limited results of the reporting obligation) in this sector raise some serious concerns about the effectiveness of the implementation of the FATF standards.

### SR VII Wire transfer rules (LC)
- Due to the recent adoption of relevant requirements in the Spanish legal framework, the implementation and effectiveness of implementation of these new requirements could not be assessed by the evaluation team;
- The evaluation team expressed some concern on Spain’s capacity to establish – under the current AML/CFT supervision regime – a proper monitoring of compliance of financial institutions with the new requirements.

### SR VIII Non-profit organisations (LC)
- There is insufficient basis upon which to assess the efficiency of the measures in place [issue of effectiveness].

### SR IX Cross Border Declaration & Disclosure (LC)
- The declaration system as currently implemented raises some issues of effectiveness.

### Table 2: Recommended Action Plan to Improve the AML/CFT System

### 1. General
- (No specific entries in supplied excerpt.)

### 2. Legal System and Related Institutional Measures

Criminalisation of Money Laundering (R.1 & 2)
- It should be clearly set out that the “possession or use” of proceeds of crime constitutes money laundering to the full extent required by the Vienna and the Palermo Conventions.
- Spain should clarify the legal situation in its national law with respect to self-laundering, preferably by enacting legislation clearly allowing for prosecuting and convicting the perpetrator of a predicate offence, who goes on to launder the proceeds, for money laundering as well as for the predicate offence itself.
- Spain should make sure that its national law would allow for holding legal persons criminally liable for ML.
- Further training measures may also be appropriate, such as providing additional training to judges for the purpose of enhancing their ability to manage the complexities of a money laundering case.

Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing (SR II)
- Spain should ensure that there are offences properly covering terrorist financing in the forms of providing and collecting funds with the unlawful intention that they should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, by an individual terrorist (for any purpose).
- Spain should ensure that TF offences cover the direct provision or collection of funds in order to carry out a terrorist act.
- Spain should ensure that TF offences extend to the provision of funds to and collection of funds for legitimate activities run by a terrorist organisation or an individual terrorist.

Confiscation, freezing and seizing of proceeds of crime (R.3)
- The statistics and other information provided on the practical application of the relevant mechanisms are such that they do not provide any sufficient basis for giving concrete, specific recommendations on possible improvement or for commenting more specifically on the potential for such possible improvement.

Freezing of funds used for terrorist financing (SR III)
- Spain should take the necessary steps to ensure the full practical and efficient application of the legal framework laid down in Law 12/2003, in particular through enacting the announced Royal Decree regulating the implementation and enforcement of the law.
- Competent authorities should provide additional guidance to financial institutions and other persons or entities that may be holding targeted funds or other assets.
- Spain should also establish and make clear and publicly known the necessary procedures for de-listing and unfreezing in appropriate cases.

The Financial Intelligence Unit and its functions (R.26 & 30) / Law enforcement, prosecution and other competent authorities (R.27 & 28)
- SEPBLAC and the law enforcement authorities should develop mechanisms to enhance their partnership and capacity to collaborate when dealing with ML/TF cases.
- Law enforcement authorities should be able to measure the results of their efforts in the AML/CFT area (see recommendations in relation to statistics).

### 3. Preventive Measures – Financial Institutions

Customer due diligence, including enhanced or reduced measures (R.5 to 8)

Recommendation 5
- All Customer Due Diligence requirements should be extended to clearly reflect the risk related to terrorist financing.
- The identification of beneficial ownership as defined by the FATF Recommendations should be clearly defined to ensure a proper implementation by the reporting parties that should fully and systematically carry out this identification. These measures should be extended to legal arrangements.
- Requirements in relation to ongoing due diligence and the obligation for financial institutions to ensure that documents, data or information collected under the CDD process is kept up-to-date and relevant should be clarified and impose direct obligations as asked for in Recommendation 5.
- With regard to higher risk situations, measures in place should be completed. Spain should also address whether or not financial institutions should be permitted to apply simplified or reduced CDD measures, and issue appropriate guidance.
- Clear and direct requirements should be adopted when financial institutions fail to satisfactorily complete CDD.
- Spain should adopt rules governing the CDD treatment of existing customers on the basis of materiality and risk.

Recommendation 6
- Clear and direct obligations as defined in Recommendation 6 should be expressively adopted.

Recommendation 7
- Spain should fully implement this Recommendation.

Recommendation 8
- Spain should adopt specific measures concerning non face-to-face business transactions.
- Spain should adopt a general requirement to deal with the misuse of technological developments.

Third parties and introduced business (R.9)
- No recommended action.

Financial institution secrecy or confidentiality (R.4)
- No recommended action.

Record keeping and wire transfer rules (R.10 & SR VII)

Recommendation 10
- No recommended action.

Special Recommendation VII
- Spain should ensure an adequate implementation of the existing requirements.

Monitoring of transactions and relationships (R.11 & 21)
- No recommended action.

Suspicious transaction reports and other reporting (R.13-14, 19, 25 & SR IV)

Recommendation 13 and Special Recommendation IV
- Attempted transactions should be clearly and directly subject to the reporting obligation.
- SEPBLAC should ensure that banks and non-bank financial institutions comply with their reporting obligations (see recommended actions in relation to supervision).

Recommendations 14 and 19
- No recommended action.

Recommendation 25
- Spain should favour the adoption of more specific, timely and systematic feedback to reporting entities.

Cross Border declaration or disclosure (SR IX)
- Spain should facilitate the implementation of the declaration system more specifically tailored to AML/CFT purposes to ensure the full effectiveness of the measures in place.

Internal controls, compliance, audit and foreign branches (R.15 & 22)

Recommendation 15
- Reporting financial institutions (other than credit institutions) should be obliged to establish screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring employees.
- Comparable procedures currently applicable to directors, managers or similar executives of credit institutions should be extended to other employees.
- Careful attention should be paid to the implementation of proper internal procedures by all financial institutions.

Recommendation 22
- Spain should consider implementing a more direct obligation to require financial institutions to ensure that their foreign branches and subsidiaries observe AML/CFT measures consistent with Spanish requirements and the FATF Recommendations.
- Spain should adopt provisions to clarify that the higher standards have to be applied in the event that the AML/CFT requirements of the home and host countries differ.

Shell banks (R.18)
- Spain should prohibit financial institutions from entering into or continuing correspondent banking relationship with shell banks.
- There should be an obligation on financial institutions to determine that a respondent financial institution in a foreign country is not permitting its accounts to be used by shell banks.

The supervisory and oversight system - competent authorities and SROs

Role, functions, duties and powers (including sanctions) (R.23, 30, 29, 17 & 25)

Recommendation 17
- Spain should ensure that the sanctions regime in place is adequately implemented and fully effective.

Recommendations 23 and 29
- Spain should take steps to review its supervisory regime and better co-ordinate the inspection of reporting entities to increase the number of these controls.
- Specific requirements for doing background checks on new directors and new officers in the situation of changes after initial incorporation should be clarified.

Recommendation 30
- Spain should consider increasing the capacity (especially the staff dedicated to this task) of SEPBLAC to carry out its supervision functions.
- Spain should consider striking a separately-identifiable SEPBLAC budget based on SEPBLAC’s strategic priorities.
- Spain should give some consideration to change the mechanism to appoint the director of SEPBLAC.

Money value transfer services (SR VI)
- Spain should ensure that the measures in place are adequately implemented and fully effective.

*Source: _cr0770 - 30. Resources, integrity and training (excerpt).*

### 4. Preventive Measures –Non-Financial Businesses and Professions

### 4. Preventive Measures –Non-Financial Businesses and Professions

### Customer due diligence and record-keeping (R.12)
- Applying Recommendation 5
  - All Customer Due Diligence requirements should be extended to clearly reflect the risk related to terrorist financing.
  - The requirement to identify beneficial ownership should be fully applicable to DNFBPs as well as the obligation to carry out additional identification/know-your-customer rules.
  - Requirements in relation to ongoing due diligence and the obligation for DNFBPs to ensure that documents, data or information collected under the CDD process is kept up-to-date and relevant should be clarified and impose direct obligations as asked for in Recommendation 5.
  - With regard to higher risk situations, measures in place should be completed. Spain should also address whether or not DNFBPs should be permitted to apply simplified or reduced CDD measures, and issue appropriate guidance.
  - Clear and direct requirements should be adopted when DNFBPs fail to satisfactorily complete CDD.
  - Spain should adopt rules governing the CDD treatment of existing customers on the basis of materiality and risk.
- Applying Recommendation 6
  - Clear and direct obligations as defined in Recommendation 6 should be expressively adopted.
- Applying Recommendation 8
  - Spain should adopt specific measures concerning non-face to face business transactions.
  - Spain should adopt a general requirement to deal with the misuse of technological developments.
- Applying Recommendation 10
  - Spain should ensure that the measures in place are adequately implemented in the gambling sector.
- Effectiveness
  - Spain should ensure that the measures in place are adequately implemented and fully effective.

### Suspicious transaction reporting (R.16)
- Applying Recommendation 13
  - Attempted transactions should be clearly and directly subject to the reporting obligation;
  - SEPBLAC should ensure that all DNFBPs comply with their reporting obligations (see recommended actions in relation to supervision).
- Applying Recommendations 14 & 15
  - No recommended action.
- Applying Recommendation 21
  - No recommended action.

### Regulation, supervision and monitoring (R.24-25)
- Recommendation 24
  - SEPBLAC should guarantee that all DNFBPs are adequately supervised for AML/CFT purposes;
  - Spain should be aware of issues relating to the illicit operation of internet casinos in Spain, and should be prepared to address these problems.
- Recommendation 25
  - Spain should develop further its effort to raise AML/CFT awareness within the DNFBPs, especially through sectoral and very practical guidelines (especially in the CFT area).

### Other designated non-financial businesses and professions (R.20)
- Spain should take measures to encourage the development and use of modern and secure techniques for conducting financial transactions that are less vulnerable to money laundering.

### 5. Legal Persons and Arrangements & Non-Profit Organisations

### Legal Persons – Access to beneficial ownership and control information (R.33)
- It is recommended that Spain review its commercial, corporate and other laws with a view to taking measures to provide adequate transparency with respect to beneficial ownership.

### Legal Arrangements – Access to beneficial ownership and control information (R.34)
- N/A

### Non-profit organisations (SR VIII)
- Spain should ensure that the measures in place are adequately implemented and fully effective.
- Spain should adopt new mechanisms to properly and fully implement the requirements under SR VIII as identified in its Interpretative Note.
- Spain should give further consideration to implementing other specific measures from the Best Practices Paper to SR VIII or other measures to ensure that funds or other assets collected by or transferred through non-profit organisations are not diverted to support the activities of terrorist organisations.

### 6. National and International Co-operation

### National co-operation and co-ordination (R.31)
- Spain should develop mechanisms to improve the current interagency co-operation.

### The Conventions and UN Special Resolutions (R.35 & SR I)
- Recommendation 35
  - Implementation of the Palermo and Vienna Conventions: Spain should fully implement Article 3(1)(c)(1) of the Vienna Convention and Articles 6(1)(b)(i) and 6(2)(e) of the Palermo Convention (“possession or use”, self-laundering).
  - Implementation of the Terrorist Financing Convention: Spain should fully implement Article 2(1) that criminalises not only of the provision of funds for terrorist acts but also of merely collecting funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out terrorist acts (as that term is defined in the said Article of the Convention). Spain should fully implement Article 2(3) and Article 18(1) of the same Convention.
- Special Recommendation I
  - Implementation of Security Council Resolutions. (1) Spain should issue guidance to financial institutions and other persons/entities that may be holding targeted funds/assets; (2) Spain should make clear and publicly known the necessary procedures for de-listing and unfreezing in appropriate cases and (3) Spain should adopt measures that allow freezing the assets of a person who provides or collects funds with the unlawful intention that they should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, by an individual terrorist.

### Mutual Legal Assistance (R.36-38, SR V)
- Recommendations 36, 37 & 38
  - Spain should give consideration to how the average time for processing request for mutual legal assistance, in particular from countries outside the European Union, could be further reduced.
- Special Recommendation V
  - No recommendation action in this context.

### Extradition (R.39, 37, SR V)
- Recommendations 37 & 39
  - Spain should consider how it might further reduce the average time for handling extradition requests, in particular from countries outside the European Union.
- Special Recommendation V
  - No recommendation action in this context.

### Other Forms of Co-operation (R.40, SR V)
- Recommendation 40
  - Spain should take appropriate measures to address the issue of exchanging information with foreign counterparts in the supervision area and for AML purposes.
- Special Recommendation V
  - Spain should take appropriate measures to address the issue of exchanging information with foreign counterparts in the supervision area and for CFT purposes.

### 7. Resources and Statistics

### Resources of Competent Authorities (R.30)
- SEPBLAC should have its resources increased to a large extent to permit it carry out its supervisory functions .
- Spain should consider increasing the economic independence of SEPBLAC vis-à-vis the Bank of Spain.
- Spain should consider allocating additional resources to prosecution authorities.

### Statistics (R.32)
- Spain should also conduct a comprehensive review of its AML/CFT regime in order to identify the weaknesses and shortcomings that need to be addressed.
- Spain should maintain more statistics in the following areas:
  - (1) number of ML/TF investigations, prosecutions and convictions;
  - (2) data on the amounts of property frozen, seized and confiscated relating to money laundering, terrorist financing and criminal proceeds;
  - (3) number of STRs filed on cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments;
  - (4) statistics on whether the request for mutual legal assistance was granted or refused and on how much time was required to respond;
  - (5) number of requests for extradition for ML/TF cases and figures on whether the request was granted or refused and how much time was required to respond;
  - (6) number of formal requests made or received by SEPBLAC in distinguishing between the requests that were granted or refused and
  - (7) number of spontaneous referrals made by SEPBLAC to foreign authorities.

*Source: _cr0770 - 4. Preventive Measures –Non-Financial Businesses and Professions*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/_cr0770.pdf_
