## _cr08322

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [_cr08322](https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/_cr08322.pdf)

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---

### Preface — scope and structure
- Document organized into: Executive Summary; 1 General; 2 Legal System and Related Institutional Measures; 3 Preventive Measures—Financial Institutions; 4 Preventive Measures—Designated Non‑Financial Businesses and Professions; 5 Legal Persons And Arrangements And Non‑Profit Organizations; 6 National And International Co‑Operation; 7 Other Issues; plus Tables, Figures, Statistical Tables, Annexes.
- Methodology and mission:
  - Based on the FATF Forty Recommendations 2003 and Nine Special Recommendations 2001 as amended; AML/CFT assessment Methodology 2004 updated February 2007.
  - On‑site mission: February 4, 2007 to February 20, 2007; materials supplied by authorities and subsequent verifiable information considered.
  - Produced by IMF as part of the Financial Sector Assessment Program and for MENAFATF/FATF assessment processes.
- Assessment team: Nadim Kyriakos‑Saad (LEG, team leader), Nadine Schwarz, Francisco Figueroa, Emmanuel Mathias (LEG); Chady El Khoury (Special Investigation Commission, Lebanon).

### Country and economic context — selected facts and statistics
- Area: 11,521 square kilometers.
- Land border with Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: 60 km.
- Population: 838,000 (mid‑2007) vs 744,000 (2004).
- Capital concentration: more than 45 percent live in Doha and suburbs.
- Foreign workers: 52 percent of total population; about 89 percent of labor force.
- Literacy rate: 89 percent; life expectancy: 74 years.
- Oil and gas: account for 62 percent of GDP and 65 percent of state revenues.
- Liquefied gas production: reached 30 million tons in 2007; expected to increase to 77 million tons by 2012.
- Nominal GDP per capita expected: US$70,000 in 2007.
- 2006: real GDP growth over 7 percent; current account surplus US$ 9.5 billion.
- Finance, insurance and real estate sector contribution: around 8 percent in 2006.
- Planned investments over next six years: over US$130 billion.
- Exchange peg: QR3.64: US$1.
- Consumer price inflation: above 6 percent every year since 2004.
- World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (2005) — Qatar Ranking vs GCC Average Ranking:
  - Voice and Accountability: 151 / 161
  - Political Stability: 55 / 98
  - Government Effectiveness: 64 / 77
  - Regulatory Quality: 82 / 76
  - Rule of Law: 42 / 64
  - Control of Corruption: 45 / 52

### Legal framework — criminalization of money laundering (R.1 & 2)
Findings
- Money laundering criminalized by Law No. (28) of 2002 (AML Law) as amended by Decree Law No. (21) of 2003.
- Text covers many material elements but mental element limits offense to acts with intention of “hiding the real sources of the funds and show[ing] that their source is legal”; may not clearly extend to concealing or disguising location, disposition, movement, or ownership.
- Predicate offenses listed in Article 2 are limited to:
  - drugs and dangerous psychotropic substances;
  - forgery, counterfeiting and imitation of notes and coins;
  - illegal trafficking in weapons, ammunitions and explosives;
  - terrorist crimes;
  - extortion and looting;
  - crimes related to environment protection;
  - trafficking in women and children.
- Practical impact: public prosecutor received six potential ML cases (2002–2006) and abandoned five because underlying offense not listed under Article 2.
- Enforcement experience: AML Law largely untested; one prosecution under AML Law in 2006 was abandoned when funds found legitimate.
- Sanctions: Article 13 prescribes imprisonment of no more than seven years and a fine between fifty thousand Qatari Riyals and no more than the value of funds subject of the crime; professional non‑reporting punished by imprisonment up to three years and fine up to ten thousand Qatari Riyals.
- Ratings: R.1 — PC; R.2 — LC.

Recommendations (paragraphs 162–163)
- Amend AML Law to broaden mental element to cover conceal/disguise of source, nature, location, disposition, movement, ownership or rights with respect to proceeds, or delete intended purpose.
- Criminalize and add specified FATF predicate categories (list preserved in source) to Article 2.
- Ensure predicate offenses extend extraterritorially when dual criminality exists.
- Provide in‑depth training to law enforcement on AML Law and typologies.
- Specifically mention terrorist financing as a predicate for ML for clarity.

### Criminalization of terrorist financing (SR.II)
Findings
- CT Law No. (3) of 2004 criminalizes terrorist financing under Article 4 but:
  - Offense linked to “terrorist group or organization” and does not extend to financing of individual terrorists or financing for a terrorist act absent link to a group.
  - Motive requirement under CT Law excludes some acts covered by ICSFT Article 2 para.1(a) (example: unlawful seizure of an aircraft with no intention to terrorize).
  - Sanctions for TF: life imprisonment for core provisions.
- Practical enforcement: no prosecutions for terrorist financing; eight prosecutions related to terrorist activities in 2006 but none for TF.
- Rating: SR.II — PC.

Recommendations (summary)
- Amend CT Law to cover acts in Article 2 para.1(a) of ICSFT and to criminalize provision/collection of funds directly/indirectly for terrorist acts or individual terrorists.
- Ensure investigations/prosecutions cover financing and provide training.

### Confiscation, freezing, provisional measures and UNSCR implementation (R.3 & SR.III)
Findings
- Confiscation framework under AML Law: mandatory confiscation of instrumentalities, proceeds and returns of crime (Article 13); definitions broad; no ML convictions so Article 13 untested.
- Provisional freezing (Article 12 AML Law): Governor of QCB can order freezing for up to ten days; Public Prosecutor can renew for up to three months; further extension by Supreme Criminal Court — Governor initiates freezing in practice.
- Shortcomings on UNSCR implementation and SR.III:
  - No procedure or legal basis adopted to implement SR.III (UNSCR 1267 consolidated list dissemination and mandatory freezing).
  - Interdepartmental committee mandate does not cover UNSCR 1373; no authority designated to designate terrorists; no formal mandatory freezing mechanism for UNSCR 1267/1373.
  - Case example: a person designated under UNSCR 1267 reportedly received safe harbor; no freezing action taken.
- Ratings: R.3 — LC; SR.III — NC.

Recommendations (selected)
- Reconsider role of Governor of QCB in provisional measures; consider granting initial freeze/seize powers to public prosecutors or FIU.
- Designate authority for UNSCR 1373 analysis and for receiving/disseminating UNSCR 1267 updates.
- Establish legal basis and mandatory freezing orders and dissemination mechanisms; procedures for de‑listing and for authorizing basic expenses (UNSCR 1452); procedures to challenge freezing measures.

### Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) — functions, capacity, and shortcomings (R.26)
Findings and statistics
- FIU established by Administrative Order No. 1 of 2004; operational status October 16, 2004; Egmont Group member July 2005.
- Legal basis concerns: Administrative Order inconsistent with AML Law provisions (AML Law gives powers to NAMLC coordinator); Administrative Order issued by president of NAMLC lacked legal power — legal basis unclear.
- FIU functions: receive STRs and other information, analyze and disseminate to law enforcement/PPO, exchange information with foreign FIUs per Egmont.
- Operational shortcomings:
  - FIU not empowered to request additional information from DNFBPs.
  - Does not issue written guidance to reporting entities.
  - STR analysis quality insufficient; insufficient protection of information; no periodic review of effectiveness.
  - FIU staff: 10 full‑time staff; only one analyst on STR monitoring; analysis budget small — analysis QR 200,000 out of QR 12,386,000 (1.6 percent).
- STR intake (exact figures from Table 9):
  - Total STR and other relevant information received (2002–2006): 265 (by year: 2002: 39; 2003: 43; 2004: 44; 2005: 67; 2006: 72).
  - STRs from Banks — Total: 80 (2002: 8; 2003: 11; 2004: 13; 2005: 21; 2006: 27).
  - STRs from Exchange Houses — Total: 90 (2002: 31; 2003: 22; 2004: 7; 2005: 14; 2006: 16).
  - FIU has forwarded only one case to the PPO; no STRs related to terrorist financing received.
- Ratings: R.26 — LC.

Recommendations (selected)
- Provide FIU with a sound legal basis consistent with AML Law.
- Grant FIU power to request information from DNFBPs.
- Improve STR guidance, analysis capacity, access to CRS and registers, statistics and periodic effectiveness reviews; publish annual reports, typologies and trends.
- Increase FIU resources for analysis and staff training.

### Investigations, prosecutions, competent authorities, and resources (R.27, R.28, R.30)
Findings
- Investigative authorities: ECPD (MOI) — primary ML investigations; PPO; State Security Bureau (SSB) — CFT investigations; Customs.
- ECPD ML investigations 2004–2006: total cases 82 (all from STRs) — all concluded funds legitimate; Table of ECPD investigations shows totals by year: 2004: 18; 2005: 40; 2006: 24.
- PPO received only one ML case from FIU (no offense established).
- Investigative capacity and resourcing insufficient: ECPD has nine full‑time officers (three full time in Fighting ML Unit); PPO 145 members but specialist skills lacking; customs ~1,350 officers but lack of electronic database and trained staff.
- Powers: law enforcement may compel production of documents, search and seize (CPC), telephone tapping with authorization; FIU head granted capacity of judicial police officer for AML investigations by Resolution (1) of 2005.
- Training gaps: prosecutors, judges, customs, law enforcement need further specialized training on ML/TF typologies and investigative techniques.
- Ratings: R.27 — PC; R.28 — C; R.30 — PC.

Recommendations
- Maintain statistics on amounts seized/confiscated and counts of ML/TF investigations, prosecutions, judgments.
- Provide specialized training; adopt proactive investigation/prosecution approaches.

### Cross‑border currency controls (SR.IX)
Findings
- Declaration regime inconsistent and not implemented: Declaration system adopted 2005, replaced by disclosure system in 2006; threshold never set; system neither implemented nor effective.
- Disclosure system gaps: does not extend to outgoing transportation, containerized cargo, mail; no power for customs to restrain based on false disclosure; no notification mechanism to FIU; no sanctions for false disclosure.
- Rating: SR.IX — NC.

Recommendations
- Adopt coherent disclosure regulation applying to incoming and outgoing movements, containerized cargo and mail; empower customs to stop/restrain cash for reasonable time; enhance exchange with FIU and create customs database.

### Preventive measures — domestic financial institutions vs QFC (R.5–R.11, R.10, SR.VII, SR.VI)
Domestic sector findings (QCB/DSM/MEC supervision)
- Domestic sector treated as “on‑shore domestic” and separate from QFC.
- AML Law and CT Law do not set out CDD, KYC or core preventive obligations in primary/secondary law; preventive obligations mostly in QCB Instructions, DSM Decision No. 16/3, MEC Circulars which vary in enforceability.
- Main gaps (domestic sector):
  - No explicit prohibition on anonymous or fictitious accounts in statutory law.
  - No explicit legal requirement to identify and verify beneficial owners or persons acting on behalf of customers.
  - No comprehensive timing rules for CDD; insufficient guidance on enhanced due diligence and politically exposed persons (PEPs).
  - Record‑keeping requirement exceeds FATF period but not established by law; wire transfer originator information retention and transmission rules lacking.
  - STR obligation vague, does not explicitly cover attempted transactions or transactions linked to terrorism; insurance and securities sectors produced no STRs in practice.
  - Internal controls, compliance, audit and staffing requirements incomplete — limited access rights, inadequate internal audit independence, no screening requirements for employees.
  - Supervision: QCB has powers but AML/CFT inspections limited and non risk‑based; no AML/CFT sanctions imposed in practice by supervisors.
- QCB Instructions specifics:
  - CDD thresholds: Paragraph 1.3 requires due diligence for transactions exceeding 100,000 Qatari Riyals; QCB guidance and DSM Decision provide similar but incomplete requirements.
- Wire transfers: no requirement in domestic framework that originator information remains with transfer through payment chain; no risk‑based procedures for beneficiary institutions handling incomplete originator information.
- Ratings summary for domestic sector:
  - R.5 — NC; R.6 — NC; R.7 — NC; R.8 — PC; R.10 — PC; SR.VII — NC; R.11 — PC; R.21 — NC; R.15 — PC; R.22 — PC; R.18 — PC; R.17 — NC; R.23 — PC; R.25 — PC; R.29 — PC; SR.VI — PC.

QFC findings (QFC AML Regulations No. 3 of 2005 and QFCRA AML Rulebook)
- QFC framework drafted to align with FATF standards and adopts risk‑based approach; Rulebook Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 provide detailed CDD, PEP, correspondent banking, non‑face‑to‑face and enhanced due diligence guidance.
- Shortcomings in QFC framework identified:
  - Rule 3.9 broad exemption for authorized firms / regulated financial sector firms from FATF countries from full verification without documented risk assessment.
  - No requirement to consider making an STR when unable to complete CDD.
  - No requirement for senior management approval to continue relationship where customer becomes PEP.
  - No explicit requirement to establish source of funds for PEPs and beneficial owners identified as PEPs.
  - Correspondent banking: lack of requirement to gather sufficient information on respondent institution’s reputation, supervision quality and past ML/TF regulatory action; lack of documented responsibilities between correspondents.
  - Trust regulations do not ensure competent authorities have timely/accurate information on express trusts (settlor, trustee, beneficiaries).
  - Few QFC firms were operational at mission date; effectiveness not yet tested.

Recommendations (selected)
- Domestic sector: legislate/enforce comprehensive CDD, beneficial ownership, timing, enhanced due diligence, PEP requirements; set record retention in law; require originator information to remain with transfers; ensure STR obligation covers attempted transactions and terrorist financing.
- QFC: remove broad Rule 3.9 exemption or require documented risk assessment; require consideration of STRs when CDD cannot be completed; require senior management approval and source of funds checks for PEPs; strengthen correspondent banking due diligence and documentation; ensure trust CDD and information access for competent authorities.

### Designated Non‑Financial Businesses & Professions (DNFBPs) — scope, supervision and STRs (R.12, R.16, R.24–25)
Findings
- All DNFBPs present except casinos (prohibited) and notaries (government officials).
- Domestic DNFBP legal framework weak: MEC Circulars and MOJ Resolution exist but are non‑binding or incomplete; obligations on CDD, record keeping, STRs, internal controls, PEPs, payment technologies, introduced business, and unusual transactions not set in law/regulation with enforceable sanctions.
- Supervision: Except for precious metals dealers supervised by QCB, no designated competent authority or SRO for DNFBPs; QFC DNFBPs are supervised by QFCRA but QFC regime too new to test effectiveness.
- Specific sector notes:
  - Real estate: 970 companies registered; foreigners recently allowed to buy property in some areas — potential ML risk.
  - Dealers in precious metals: 22 shops selling gold and 197 jewelers licensed by MEC; 19 exchange houses (QCB‑licensed) may act as wholesalers for jewelers.
  - Lawyers: Law No. 23 of 2006 organizes lawyers; Resolution No. 108 of 2006 imposes reporting obligations for specific activities but legal privilege and enforceability issues exist.
  - Accountants: regulated by Law No. 30 of 2004; Circular No.3 applies but non‑binding in some respects.
  - TCSPs: presence noted though not formally registered as TCSPs; lawyers/accountants/private companies may provide trust and company services.
- STRs and legal privilege:
  - STR obligations for DNFBPs not established in primary/secondary law; ministerial decisions inconsistent and do not unambiguously overcome legal privilege for lawyers; no STRs from DNFBPs recorded.
- Ratings:
  - R.12 — NC; R.16 — NC; R.24 — PC; R.25 — NC; R.20 — PC.

Recommendations (selected)
- Enact primary/secondary legislation to set enforceable CDD, record keeping, STR and internal control obligations for DNFBPs with sanctions.
- Establish designated competent authority(ies) with resources and powers to supervise DNFBPs (consider unified supervisor for DNFBPs except MOJ for lawyers).
- Clarify legal privilege to permit reporting by lawyers when performing R.16 activities; refine QFC privilege treatment.
- Ensure FIU issues guidance and feedback to DNFBPs; enable FIU to receive STRs from DNFBPs and to request further information.

### Legal persons, arrangements, trusts, bearer shares, registers (R.33 & R.34)
Findings
- Domestic company registration: Law No. 5 of 2002 (amended by Law No. 16 of 2006) — seven company types; bearer shares explicitly prohibited (Commercial Companies Law Article cited).
- MEC commercial register collects ownership and control information; QCB has direct electronic link to central register; recommendation to provide FIU and DSM direct electronic access for timeliness.
- QFC CRO: register provides ownership, management and principal representative details online free of charge.
- Trusts:
  - Domestic law does not provide for trusts; QFC Regulation No.12 (February 26/28, 2007) enables creation of QFC trusts (express, charitable, non‑charitable, foreign trusts).
  - Trust Regulations lack requirements to obtain/verify/retain settlor/trustee/beneficiary information; no registration of trusts in QFC; competent authorities lack timely access to trust beneficial ownership information.
- Ratings: R.33 — LC; R.34 — PC.

Recommendations
- Provide FIU and DSM electronic link to commercial register.
- QFC: review CDD and Trust Regulations to ensure competent authorities can access adequate, accurate, timely information on settlors, trustees and beneficiaries; consider registration/licensing/reporting for QFC trusts.

### Non‑Profit Organizations (SR.VIII)
Findings
- Domestic NPOs regulated by Law 12 of 2004 and Law 13 of 2004; QACA (Qatari Authority for Charitable Activities) supervises charities.
- Resolution No. 17 of 2006 imposes comprehensive requirements: record keeping for at least fifteen years, verification of beneficiaries, prior approval for international activities, reporting suspicious transactions to FIU, on‑site inspections conducted.
- Implementation issues:
  - Resolution 17 obligations sometimes impractical (e.g., verify every donor even for small donations); practice relies on name/address/phone except above QR.100,000 threshold.
  - FIU legal basis to receive and analyze NPO STRs unclear due to Administrative Order inconsistency with AML Law.
- QFC charitable trusts:
  - QFC Trust Regulations allow charitable trusts without registration/licensing/reporting; FIU and QACA cannot effectively gather information or respond to international requests regarding QFC charitable trusts.
- Ratings: SR.VIII — LC.

Recommendations
- Revise Resolution 17 to set realistic identification thresholds and clarify QACA‑FIU roles.
- Extend QACA supervision to avoid exemptions; systematize on‑site inspection of international projects; revise QFC Trust Regulations and Laws 12/13 to ensure QFC charitable trusts fall within supervision and reporting obligations consistent with SR.VIII.

### National and international cooperation, conventions, mutual legal assistance, extradition (R.31–R.40, R.35, R.36–R.39, SR.V)
Findings
- Domestic coordination: NAMLC (National Anti‑Money Laundering Committee) and NCT (National Committee for Fighting Terrorism) exist; membership gaps — QFC, DSM, and PPO not full members; coordination on UNSCR 1267 implementation unaddressed.
- Conventions:
  - Vienna Convention ratified (May 4, 1990).
  - Palermo Convention not ratified at assessment time.
  - ICSFT (1999) not ratified; Council of Ministers approved accession subject to reservations (October 11, 2007 decision noted).
- Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) and extradition:
  - CPC and AML Law provide MLA powers but strict dual criminality requirement and limited list of AML predicate offenses constrain assistance.
  - Banking secrecy requires QCB Governor authorization or court order for bank records; procedural mechanisms exist but dual criminality often applied strictly.
  - Extradition: money laundering and TF extraditable but extradition of Qatari nationals not permitted; case example of refusal to extradite UNSCR 1267‑designated individual.
- Ratings summary:
  - R.31 — LC; R.35 — PC; R.36 — LC; R.37 — PC; R.38 — PC; R.39 — LC; R.40 — PC.
  - SR.I — NC; SR.V — NC.

Recommendations (selected)
- Formalize inclusion of QFC, DSM, and PPO in national committees; enhance coordination on UNSCRs 1267/1373.
- Ratify and implement Palermo Convention and ICSFT; fully implement UNSCR 1267 and 1373.
- Amend MLA/extradition framework to reduce dual criminality barriers for non‑intrusive measures, ensure timely handling, specify measures for freezing/seizing/confiscation and property of corresponding value; maintain MLA/extradition statistics.

### Supervisors, inspections, powers, sanctions and fit‑and‑proper (R.17, R.23, R.29, R.30)
Findings
- QCB, DSM, MEC and QFCRA powers vary:
  - QCB: licensing and AML/CFT supervisory power (recently adopted risk‑based supervision November 2006; only one bank inspection under new approach implemented).
  - DSM: supervisory powers for brokerage firms; Decision 16/3 enforceable as “other enforceable means”.
  - MEC: de facto supervisor for insurance sector but lacks legal basis for AML/CFT supervision; Circulars non‑enforceable.
  - QFCRA/QFC: strong enforcement powers under FSR Part 8/9; MOUs with overseas regulators; QFC supervision framework robust but untested in many respects.
- Sanctions and enforcement record:
  - QCB imposed 79 financial fines (2004–2006) for prudential violations; no AML/CFT sanctions imposed by QCB, DSM or MEC during assessment period.
  - QFCRA powers available but no disciplinary actions yet taken for AML breaches at time of mission.
- Fit‑and‑proper and controlled functions: QFCRA INDI and FSR provide thorough fit‑and‑proper and controlled functions approval process.
- Ratings: R.17 — NC; R.23 — PC; R.29 — PC; R.30 — PC.

Recommendations
- Strengthen MEC legal basis for AML/CFT supervision; expand range and proportionality of supervisory sanctions; ensure AML/CFT inspections are risk‑based and comprehensive; enforce internal audit independence and compliance officer access rights; require screening/hiring standards.

### Money or value transfer services (SR.VI)
Findings
- QCB supervises exchange houses (MVT services); MVTs subject to QCB Instructions and AML Law obligations.
- Informal MVTs anecdotal but unverified; risk of unlicensed operators operating without adequate supervision.
- Ratings: SR.VI — PC.

Recommendations
- Investigate potential informal MVT networks; apply targeted supervision/regulation to MVTs; address related CDD/wire transfer/written record shortcomings.

### Statistics, recordkeeping, customs and training
Findings
- Customs do not use an electronic database to keep statistics on crimes and trafficking (para. 280).
- Customs retain passenger and shipment records in hard copy; no online access by other agencies or FIU.
- Lack of comprehensive statistics across agencies hampers assessment of effectiveness: R.32 — NC.
- Training: specialist skills training lacking across law enforcement, prosecution, FIU, supervisors and other competent authorities.
Recommendations
- Develop integrated electronic statistical systems; enhance customs databases and information sharing with FIU; implement comprehensive training programs.

### Key numerical items and programmatic facts (preserve exact figures)
- FIU budgets: 2004: 1,173,280 / 325,911; 2005: 5,537,000 / 1,538,055; 2006: 11,142,500 / 3,095,138; 2007: 12,386,000 / 3,440,555. Analysis budget QR 200,000/12,386,000 = 1.6 percent.
- Domestic financial institutions (excluding QFC):
  - 17 banks (9 Qatari, 8 foreign).
  - 3 investment companies.
  - 19 exchange houses.
  - 1 finance company.
  - 8 insurance companies.
  - 7 brokerage firms.
- Total banking assets (2005): QR 127,934 million (approximately US $35,147 million) — 83 percent of GDP.
- Largest three banks: approximately 68 percent of total banking assets.
- STRs and other relevant information received by FIU (2002–2006) total: 265 (2002: 39; 2003: 43; 2004: 44; 2005: 67; 2006: 72).
- ECPD ML investigations (2004–2006) totals by year: 2004: 18; 2005: 40; 2006: 24.
- Total prosecutions (2006): 33 for bribery and embezzlement; 249 for drug‑related crimes; 16 for counterfeiting of currency; other detailed prosecution breakdowns provided in source tables.
- Currency in circulation increased by more than 60 percent from 2002 to 2005; 500 riyals denomination accounts for more than 77 percent of total value (circulation composition noted).

### Consolidated recommended action plan — selected priorities (excerpts)
- Amend AML Law to broaden ML offense and extend predicate offenses per FATF list; ensure extraterritoriality with dual criminality; train law enforcement.
- Amend CT Law to align TF offense with ICSFT and to criminalize provision/collection of funds for terrorists/terrorist acts including individual terrorists; ensure TF prosecutions pursued.
- Establish legal basis, powers and independence for FIU; grant FIU authority to request DNFBP information; improve STR guidance, analysis, feedback and resourcing.
- Establish mandatory UNSCR 1267/1373 freezing mechanism, designate authority for designations and dissemination, include QFC/DSM/PPO in national committees, issues procedures for de‑listing, basic expenses and judicial review.
- Enact comprehensive preventive measures by law/regulation for domestic financial institutions and DNFBPs (CDD, beneficial ownership, PEPs, enhanced due diligence, record retention, wire transfer rules, STRs including attempted transactions and terrorist financing).
- Strengthen supervision and sanction frameworks (QCB/DSM/MEC) and ensure risk‑based inspections; ensure capacity and training for law enforcement, prosecutors, customs and supervisors.
- Improve MLA/extradition frameworks to minimize dual‑criminality barriers for non‑intrusive cooperation, ensure timely MLA/extradition handling and maintain statistics.
- Secure timelier access for FIU and DSM to commercial register (direct electronic link); reform QFC Trust Regulations to require registration/licensing/reporting of QFC trusts and provide timely access to settlor/trustee/beneficiary information.
- For charities, revise Resolution 17 thresholds, clarify QACA‑FIU roles, systematize on‑site inspection of international projects and extend oversight to QFC charitable trusts.

### Other issues and Authorities’ response
- Authorities acknowledged assessment, stressed low levels of predicate offenses, no evidence of significant ML, commitment to strengthen AML/CFT framework.
- Initiatives underway or planned per authorities:
  - Drafting new AML/CFT Law to extend ML and TF scope and align with FATF 40+9;
  - Implementing AML/CFT measures across supervisors and DNFBP oversight enhancements;
  - Steps to accede to Palermo Convention and ICSFT;
  - Creating Central Committee on Training and enhancing FIU legal foundation and inter‑agency cooperation;
  - Developing comprehensive statistics.

*Source: IMF assessment report excerpt — _cr08322 (excerpts and tables as provided in the source)._

### Preface ................................................................................................................

### _cr08322 - Preface

### Scope and structure of the document
- The document is organized into major sections and chapters covering Qatar’s AML/CFT framework, including:
  - Executive Summary
  - 1 General
  - 2 Legal System and Related Institutional Measures
  - 3 Preventive Measures—Financial Institutions
  - 4 Preventive Measures—Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions
  - 5 Legal Persons And Arrangements And Non-Profit Organizations
  - 6 National And International Co-Operation
  - 7 Other Issues

### Chapter 1 — General (contents)
- 1.1 General Information on Qatar
- 1.2 General Situation of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism
- 1.3 Overview of the Financial Sector
- 1.4 Overview of the DNFBP Sector
- 1.5 Overview of Commercial Laws and Mechanisms Governing Legal Persons and Arrangements
- 1.6 Overview of Strategy to Prevent Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

### Chapter 2 — Legal System and Related Institutional Measures (contents and subsections)
- 2.1 Criminalization of Money Laundering (R.1 & 2)
  - 2.1.1 Description and Analysis
  - 2.1.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 2.1.3 Compliance with Recommendations 1 & 2
- 2.2 Criminalization of Terrorist Financing (SR.II)
  - 2.2.1 Description and Analysis
  - 2.2.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 2.2.3 Compliance with Special Recommendation II
- 2.3 Confiscation, freezing, and seizing of proceeds of crime (R.3)
  - 2.3.1 Description and Analysis
  - 2.3.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 2.3.3 Compliance with Recommendation 3
- 2.4 Freezing of Funds Used for Terrorist Financing (SR.III)
  - 2.4.1 Description and Analysis
  - 2.4.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 2.4.3 Compliance with Special Recommendation III
- 2.5 The Financial Intelligence Unit and its Functions (R.26)
  - 2.5.1 Description and Analysis
  - 2.5.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 2.5.3 Compliance with Recommendation 26
- 2.6 Law enforcement, prosecution and other competent authorities—the framework for the investigation and prosecution of offenses, and for confiscation and freezing (R.27, and 28)
  - 2.6.1 Description and Analysis
  - 2.6.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 2.6.3 Compliance with Recommendations 27 and 28
- 2.7 Cross Border Declaration or Disclosure (SR.IX)
  - 2.7.1 Description and Analysis
  - 2.7.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 2.7.3 Compliance with Special Recommendation IX

### Chapter 3 — Preventive Measures—Financial Institutions (contents and subsections)
- 3.1 General
- 3.2 Risk of Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing
- 3.3 Customer due diligence, including enhanced or reduced measures (R.5 to 8)
  - 3.3.1 Description and Analysis
  - 3.3.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 3.3.3 Compliance with Recommendations 5 to 8
- 3.4 Third parties and introduced business (R.9)
  - 3.4.1 Recommendations and Comments
  - 3.4.2 Compliance with Recommendation 9
- 3.5 Financial Institution Secrecy or Confidentiality (R.4)
  - 3.5.1 Description and Analysis
  - 3.5.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 3.5.3 Compliance with Recommendation 4
- 3.6 Record-Keeping and Wire Transfer Rules (R.10 & SR.VII)
  - 3.6.1 Description and Analysis
  - 3.6.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 3.6.3 Compliance with Recommendation 10 and Special Recommendation VII
- 3.7 Monitoring of Transactions and Relationships (R.11 & 21)
  - 3.7.1 Description and Analysis
  - 3.7.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 3.7.3 Compliance with Recommendations 11 and 21
- 3.8 Suspicious transaction reports and other reporting (R.13-14, 19, 25 & SR.IV)
  - 3.8.1 Description and Analysis
  - 3.8.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 3.8.3 Compliance with Recommendations 13, 14, 19 and 25 (criteria 25.2), and Special Recommendation IV
- 3.9 Internal controls, compliance, audit and foreign branches (R.15 & 22)
  - 3.9.1 Recommendations and Comments
  - 3.9.2 Compliance with Recommendations 15 & 22
- 3.10 Shell banks (R.18)
  - 3.10.1 Description and Analysis
  - 3.10.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 3.10.3 Compliance with Recommendation 18
- 3.11 The supervisory and oversight system - competent authorities and SROs. Role, functions, duties and powers (including sanctions) (R. 17, 23, 25 & 29)
  - 3.11.1 Description and Analysis
  - 3.11.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 3.11.3 Compliance with Recommendations 17, 23, 25 & 29
- 3.12 Money or Value Transfer Services (SR.VI)
  - 3.12.1 Description and Analysis (summary)
  - 3.12.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 3.12.3 Compliance with Special Recommendation VI

### Chapter 4 — Preventive Measures—DNFBPs (contents and subsections)
- 4.1 Customer due diligence and record-keeping (R.12) (applying R.5, 6, and 8 to 11)
  - 4.1.1 Description and Analysis
  - 4.1.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 4.1.3 Compliance with Recommendation 12
- 4.2 Suspicious transaction reporting (R.16) (applying R.13 to 15 & 21)
  - 4.2.1 Description and Analysis
  - 4.2.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 4.2.3 Compliance with Recommendation 16
- 4.3 Regulation, supervision and monitoring (R.24-25)
  - 4.3.1 Description and Analysis
  - 4.3.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 4.3.3 Compliance with Recommendations 24 & 25 (criteria 25.1, DNFBP)
- 4.4 Other Non-Financial Businesses And Professions & Modern-Secure Transaction Techniques (R.20)
  - 4.4.1 Description and Analysis
  - 4.4.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 4.4.3 Compliance with Recommendation 20

### Chapter 5 — Legal Persons, Arrangements and NPOs (contents and subsections)
- 5.1 Legal Persons—Access to beneficial ownership and control information (R.33)
  - 5.1.1 Description and Analysis
  - 5.1.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 5.1.3 Compliance with Recommendations 33
- 5.2 Legal Arrangements—Access to beneficial ownership and control information (R.34)
  - 5.2.1 Description and Analysis
  - 5.2.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 5.2.3 Compliance with Recommendations 34
- 5.3 Non-profit organisations (SR.VIII)
  - 5.3.1 Description and Analysis
  - 5.3.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 5.3.3 Compliance with Special Recommendation VIII

### Chapter 6 — National And International Co-Operation (contents and subsections)
- 6.1 National co-operation and coordination (R.31)
  - 6.1.1 Description and Analysis
  - 6.1.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 6.1.3 Compliance with Recommendation 31
- 6.2 The Conventions and UN Special Resolutions (R.35 & SR.I)
  - 6.2.1 Description and Analysis
  - 6.2.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 6.2.3 Compliance with Recommendation 35 and Special Recommendation I
- 6.3 Mutual Legal Assistance (R.36-38, SR.V)
  - 6.3.1 Description and Analysis
  - 6.3.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 6.3.3 Compliance with Recommendations 36 to 38 and Special Recommendation V
- 6.4 Extradition (R.37, 39, SR.V)
  - 6.4.1 Description and Analysis
  - 6.4.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 6.4.3 Compliance with Recommendations 37 & 39, and Special Recommendation V
- 6.5 Other Forms of International Co-operation (R.40 & SR.V)
  - 6.5.1 Description and Analysis
  - 6.5.2 Recommendations and Comments
  - 6.5.3 Compliance with Recommendation 40 and Special Recommendation V

### Chapter 7 — Other Issues
- 7.1 Resources and statistics

### Tables, figures, statistical tables, and annexes (listed items and exact numbering)
- Tables
  - 1. Ratings of Compliance with FATF Recommendations
  - 2. Recommended Action Plan to Improve the AML/CFT System
- Figures
  - 1. Information flows to and from the FIU
  - 2. FIU Organizational Structure
  - 3. Structure of the Economic Crimes Prevention Unit
  - 4. Structure of the Criminal Investigation Department
  - 5. Organization Chart of the Qatar Central Bank
  - 6. DSM Organization Chart
  - 7. MEC Organizational Structure
  - 8. Diagram of the QFC Structure
  - 9. Diagram of the QFCRA Structure
- Statistical Tables
  - 1. World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators1 - 2005
  - 2. Financial Institutions and Supervisory Authority—Domestic Sector
  - 3. Professions Engaged in Trust and Company Services
  - 4. Licensing and AML supervision process of the DNFBPs
  - 5. Number of Companies Registered in the Domestic Sector
  - 6. ML Investigations Conducted by the ECPD
  - 7. Prosecutions Conducted in 2006
  - 8. Budget of the FIU
  - 9. STR and Other Relevant Information Received by the FIU
  - 10. Monitoring System of DNFBPs
- Annexes
  - 1. Authorities’ Response to the Assessment
  - 2. Details of all bodies met on the on-site mission—Ministries, other Government Authorities or Bodies, Private Sector Representative, and others
  - 3. List of all laws, regulations and other material received
  - 4. Copies of key laws, regulations and other measures

### Acronyms included in the Preface
- AML/CFT - Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism
- BL - Banking Law
- BCP - Basel Core Principles
- CC - Criminal Code
- CCL - Commercial Companies Law
- CDD - Customer Due Diligence
- CPC - Criminal Procedure Code
- CRO - Companies Registration Office
- CRS - Central Reports System
- CSP - Company Service Provider
- CT - Combating Terrorism
- DNFBP - Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions
- DSM - Doha Securities Market Committee
- ECPD - Economic Crimes Prevention Division
- FATF - Financial Action Task Force
- FI - Financial Institution
- FIU - Financial Intelligence Unit
- FSAP - Financial Sector Assessment Program
- FSR - Financial Services Regulations
- FSRB - FATF-Style Regional Body
- FT - Financing of Terrorism
- GCC - Gulf Cooperation Council
- GDCP - General Directorate for Customs and Ports
- IAIS - International Association of Insurance Supervisors
- ICSFT - International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing
- KYC - Know Your Customer/Client
- LEG - Legal Department of the IMF
- LLC - Limited Liability Company
- LLP - Limited Liability Partnership
- MEC - Ministry of Economy and Commerce
- MENAFATF - Middle East & North Africa Financial Action Task Force
- MOFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- MOU - Memorandum of Understanding
- MOJ - Ministry of Justice
- MOI - Ministry of Interior
- ML - Money Laundering
- MLA - Mutual Legal Assistance
- MLRO - Money Laundering Reporting Officer
- NAMLC - National Anti-Money Laundering Committee
- NCT - National Committee for Fighting Terrorism
- NPO - Nonprofit Organization
- PEP - Politically-Exposed Person
- PPO - Public Prosecutor’s Office
- QACA - Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities
- QCB - Qatar Central Bank
- QFC - Qatar Financial Center
- QFCA - Qatar Financial Center Authority
- QFCRA - Qatar Financial Center Regulatory Authority
- QFMA - Qatar Financial Markets Authority
- ROSC - Report on Observance of Standards and Codes
- SRO - Self-Regulatory Organization
- STR - Suspicious Transaction Report
- TCSP - Trust and Company Service Providers
- UN - United Nations Organization
- UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
- UNSC - United Nations Security Council
- UNSCR - United Nations Security Council Resolution

*Preface (page numbering and structure as provided in the source).*

### 1.      This assessment of the anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism

### This assessment of the anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) regime of the State of Qatar

### Methodology, scope, and mission
- Based on the Forty Recommendations 2003 and the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing 2001 of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as amended.
- Prepared using the AML/CFT assessment Methodology 2004, as updated in February 2007.
- Materials considered: all materials supplied by the authorities, information obtained on site during the visit from February 4, 2007 to February 20, 2007, and other verifiable information subsequently provided by the authorities.
- Meetings held with officials and representatives of all relevant government agencies and the private sector; list of bodies met set out in Annex 1 to the detailed assessment report.
- Produced by the IMF as part of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) of the State of Qatar and the assessment processes of the MENAFATF and the FATF.

### Assessment team
- Team composition: Nadim Kyriakos-Saad (LEG, team leader), Nadine Schwarz, Francisco Figueroa, Emmanuel Mathias (all LEG); and Chady El Khoury (Special Investigation Commission, Lebanon).
- Mr. El Khoury joined LEG in September 2007.
- Team reviewed institutional framework, relevant AML/CFT laws, regulations, guidelines and other requirements, regulatory and other systems to deter and punish money laundering (ML) and the financing of terrorism (FT) through financial institutions and Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBP).
- Team examined capacity, implementation, and effectiveness of systems.

### Report purpose and outcomes
- Summarizes AML/CFT measures in place in the State of Qatar at the time of the mission or shortly thereafter.
- Describes and analyzes measures; sets out State of Qatar’s levels of compliance with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations (see Table 1) and provides recommendations to strengthen the system (see Table 2).
- Presented to MENAFATF and FATF and adopted by these organizations at plenary meetings of April 2008 and June 2008.

### Acknowledgements
- Gratitude expressed to Qatari authorities, notably: Governor of the Central Bank, H.E. Abdullah Saud Al-Thani; deputy Governor Fahad Faisal Al-Thani; head of the FIU, Ahmed Bin Eid Al-Thani, and staff.

### Legal systems and related institutional measures — criminalization of ML and FT
- Money laundering criminalized under Article 2 of Law No. (28) of 2002 (the AML Law) as amended through Decree Law No. (21) of 2003.
  - Offense covers many material and mental elements set out in the Vienna and Palermo Conventions but does not extend to acts aimed at concealing or disguising the location, disposition, movement, or ownership of funds.
  - Scope narrowed by adoption of a list of predicate crimes which includes only some FATF categories: crimes of drugs and dangerous psychotropic substances; forgery, counterfeiting and imitation of notes and coins; illegal trafficking in weapons, ammunitions and explosives; terrorist crimes (which includes terrorist financing); and extortion and looting.
- Money laundering offense applies to any type of property derived directly or indirectly from crime, including assets of any kind.
- Prior conviction for the predicate offense does not appear to be necessary to establish proceeds.
- No fundamental principle prohibiting courts from applying ML offense to person who committed the predicate crime; “self laundering” may be prosecuted.
- AML Law explicitly provides for both personal and corporate liability for money laundering.
- General dispositions of the Criminal Code criminalize ancillary offenses consistent with the standard.
- Sanctions under AML Law and Criminal Code are proportionate and dissuasive.
- At time of assessment, AML framework had not been tested before the courts: some investigations; only one prosecution initiated under the AML Law and subsequently abandoned when funds were found legitimate.

- Terrorist financing criminalized under Article 4 of Law No. (3) of 2004 on Combating Terrorism (CT Law), but with limitations:
  - Applies to all “terrorist crimes” covering all offenses listed in the standard, except unlawful seizure of an aircraft carried out with no intention to terrorize, cause harm, death or material damage and with no political motive.
  - Offense refers to collection or provision of “material or financial assistance” covering all funds mentioned under the standard, regardless of source.
  - Does not require funds to have been used to carry out or attempt a terrorist act or be linked with a terrorist act, but requires linkage with a terrorist group or organization; does not extend to collection/provision for terrorist individuals or for a terrorist act.
  - Terrorist financing sanctioned by life imprisonment and is listed among predicate crimes to money laundering.
  - Action taken to investigate terrorist acts in Qatar but no measures taken to investigate their funding.

### Confiscation, freezing, and implementation of UNSCRs
- Qatar adopted comprehensive confiscation, freezing, and seizing framework under the AML Law enabling removal of assets linked with ML offense or its predicate.
  - Confiscation is mandatory and must be applied even when not requested by prosecutors.
  - Provisional measures taken in some instances (all related to freezing of bank accounts); no confiscation ordered because no ML charges brought before courts.
- Similar broad confiscation measures under CT Law; no statute of limitation applies to confiscation and other sanctions in CT Law.
- Shortcomings vis-à-vis Special Recommendation III and UNSCR implementation:
  - No procedure adopted in application of Special Recommendation III.
  - Interdepartmental committee established to coordinate implementation of UNSCR 1267 and international conventions on terrorism, but mandate does not cover UNSCR 1373.
  - No authority granted powers to designate terrorists; no legal basis for freezing under relevant UNSCR.
  - In practice, some UN designations under UNSCR 1267 were disseminated to banks and institutions supervised by QCB and QCFRA, but others were not; dissemination process limited and infrequent.
  - On one occasion, authorities appeared to offer safe harbor to a person designated under UNSCR 1267; no actions taken with respect to that person’s funds and other assets.

### Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)
- FIU established pursuant to Administrative Order No. 1 of 2004 by the President of the National Anti-Money Laundering Committee (NAMLC).
  - Structurally an autonomous component of NAMLC housed, at time of assessment, in the QCB.
  - FIU mission: receive suspicious transaction reports (STR) and other information related to ML/TF operations, carry out analysis, and disseminate STRs and other information regarding potential ML or TF transactions.
  - FIU received operational status on October 16, 2004 and was recognized as an Egmont Group member in July 2005.
- Main shortcomings of FIU:
  - Administrative order appears inconsistent with provisions of AML Law that gave such powers to the coordinator of NAMLC.
  - FIU does not have power to request additional information from DNFBPs.
  - FIU does not issue sufficient guidance to reporting entities on filing STRs.
  - Quality of STR analysis needs improving.
  - FIU does not adequately protect information received.
  - FIU does not conduct periodic review of effectiveness of its systems to combat ML and FT.

### Investigations, prosecutions, and resources
- Qatar separates authorities in charge of investigations and legal authorities in charge of judgment of criminal offenses.
- Competent authorities designated to investigate and prosecute ML and TF offenses.
- Investigative responsibilities primarily with four authorities:
  - (i) Economic Crimes Prevention Division (ECPD) within the Ministry of Interior (MOI);
  - (ii) the PPO;
  - (iii) the State Security Bureau (SSB);
  - (iv) the Customs.
- Competent authorities able to obtain documents and information for investigations, prosecutions, and related actions.
- Various agencies do not appear sufficiently structured, funded, and resourced to effectively carry out functions.
- Law enforcement and prosecution personnel would benefit from more frequent and in-depth training.

### Cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments
- Inconsistency in measures to detect cross-border transportation:
  - Declaration system adopted in 2005; replaced by a disclosure system in 2006.
  - Some provisions in initial regulation amended to reflect change; other provisions were not.
  - Current system is neither implemented nor effective.

### Preventive measures — Financial institutions (domestic sector and QFC)
- Qatari financial system: “dual on-shore financial sector” with two sectors:
  - Domestic – financial institutions under QCB, MEC and DSM supervision.
  - QFC established in 2005 includes international financial services firms.
- All financial institutions and other non-financial entities in domestic sector and QFC subject to obligations imposed by AML Law and CT Law.
  - These laws do not deal with customer identification and due diligence measures nor introduce other basic AML/CFT obligations that should be set out in primary or secondary regulation.
- Domestic sector preventive measures fall short of addressing a vast majority of customer due diligence elements of the international standard; insufficient to meet all requirements of Recommendation 5.
  - Current obligations do not prohibit opening of anonymous accounts or accounts in fictitious names.
  - No direct requirements to determine whether a person is acting on behalf of the customer nor to identify and verify the beneficial owner.
  - Requirements for keeping customer documentation up-to-date are inadequate.
  - Requirements for enhanced due diligence for higher-risk categories are incomplete.
  - No measures addressing politically-exposed persons (PEPs) and cross-border correspondent relationships.
  - No provisions covering risk associated with new or developing technologies.
- No explicit domestic legal/regulatory provisions addressing financial institutions relying on intermediaries or third parties to perform customer due diligence elements.
  - No explicit requirement that ultimate responsibility for customer identification and verification remain with financial institution accepting the relationship.
- Financial secrecy:
  - No legal impediments that could inhibit implementation of FATF Recommendations.
  - Mechanisms exist for confidentiality of financial information and access by competent authorities.
- Record-keeping/retention:
  - Period established significantly exceeds FATF requirements but requirement is not established by law as required by the standard.
  - Additional guidance needed to specify when retention period starts.
  - No specific domestic requirements addressing documentation for wire transfers.
- Reporting and monitoring obligations:
  - Current requirements to pay special attention to complex, unusual large transactions and unusual patterns do not fully comply with the standard.
  - Same applies to requirements for business relationships and transactions with persons from countries non-compliant or insufficiently compliant with FATF Recommendations.
  - Obligation to report suspicious transactions is insufficient: does not deal with transactions linked to terrorism, attempted transactions, or transactions that may involve tax matters.
  - In practice, effectiveness of reporting system should be improved; no reports made by insurance and securities sectors.
  - Mechanism for providing guidance to financial institutions is inadequate due to lack of established guidelines and appropriate feedback from competent authorities.
- Internal controls and compliance:
  - Domestic sector financial institutions required to establish internal programs and controls, but requirements inadequate regarding:
    - timely and unrestricted access to all customer information by compliance office and staff;
    - adequately resourced and independent internal audit;
    - screening procedures for hiring employees.
  - Obligations insufficient to address all requirements of the standard.
  - No provisions requiring insurance and securities institutions to apply higher standard to branches and subsidiaries abroad, to extent laws and regulations permit.
- Shell banks and physical presence:
  - Measures to prevent establishment of shell banks exist to a certain extent but fall short of explicitly requiring physical presence encompassing “mind and management.”
  - No measures to prevent financial institutions dealing with shell banks.
- Supervision and enforcement:
  - Domestic supervisory authorities, except insurance supervisor, given adequate authority and powers to supervise institutions and ensure compliance with existing AML/CFT laws and regulations.
  - In practice, inspections of AML/CFT matters were inadequate given limitations in scope and non-risk-based inspections.
  - None of supervisory authorities has imposed sanctions on institutions supervised for AML/CFT non-compliance.
- Money transfer systems:
  - Operate in Qatar and fall under QCB supervision for AML/CFT matters.
  - Informal money transfer system appears to operate without adequate supervision and monitoring of unlicensed operators.
- QFC (international financial institutions) framework:
  - Obligations established by QFC Regulation No. 3 of 2005 (AML Regulations) and Anti-Money Laundering Rulebook.
  - Legal and regulatory AML/CFT framework adopted by QFC appears in line with FATF standard, but recent establishment and limited number of firms made effectiveness difficult to evaluate.
  - Shortcomings where QFC authorities need additional oversight:
    - i) Financial institutions not required to conduct due diligence measures if potential customer is from a FATF country.
    - ii) No requirement to consider making a STR when institutions cannot complete due diligence process.
    - iii) No requirement for senior management approval to continue relationship where customer is or becomes a PEP.
    - iv) No requirements to establish source of funds of customers and beneficial owners identified as PEPs.
    - Correspondent banking shortcomings:
      - Lack of requirements to gather sufficient information about respondent institution’s reputation and quality of supervision, including whether subject to ML/TF regulatory action.
      - Lack of requirement to document respective responsibilities of each institution.
    - No requirements obliging institutions relying on introducers/third parties to ensure those are regulated and supervised and meet FATF application conditions.
    - No requirements for institutions to examine background and purpose of unusual transactions and set forth findings in writing and make them available to competent authorities for at least five years.
    - No measures to ensure QFC authority to apply counter-measures where a country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies FATF Recommendations.

### Preventive measures — Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs)
- Domestic sector lacks legal framework setting out basic obligations for DNFBPs on customer due diligence, record keeping and STRs.
- Importance highlighted due to rapid growth in precious stones, precious metals and real estate sectors which may create ML or FT opportunities.
- Recent possibility offered to foreigners to buy property in some designated areas in Qatar constitutes major development expected to change structure and functioning of real estate sector.

*Source: IMF assessment report excerpt.*

### 31.      All DNFBPs are present in the country except casinos that are prohibited and notaries that are

### _cr08322 - 31.      All DNFBPs are present in the country except casinos that are prohibited and notaries that are

### DNFBPs presence and AML/CFT legal framework
- All DNFBPs are present in the country except casinos that are prohibited and notaries that are government officials.
- Circulars on AML/CFT have been issued by the MEC and the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), but they do not address all the requirements concerning:
  - customer due diligence,
  - record keeping,
  - STR-related obligations,
  - internal controls,
  - special attention to countries that do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations.
- Obligations not set out in law, regulations, or by other enforceable means include obligations on:
  - PEPs,
  - payment technologies,
  - introduced business,
  - unusual transactions.

### Supervision, regulation, and guidance for DNFBPs
- Except for precious metals dealers supervised by the QCB, there is no designated competent authority responsible for monitoring and ensuring compliance of DNFBPs with AML/CFT requirements and no self-regulatory organization (SRO).
- The current AML/CFT circulars do not set out enforceable requirements with sanctions for non compliance.
- No specific guidance or feedback has been provided by the FIU or other competent authorities to DNFBPs.
- DNFBPs in the QFC have been informed of the AML/CFT requirements by the QFCRA, but there is no evidence of effective implementation of those regulations.
- The QFC was recently established and only a few DNFBPs were operating at the time of the visit.
- There does not appear to be:
  - a clear strategy and sufficient human resources for the supervision of the sector over the longer term,
  - specific guidance or feedback to DNFBPs,
  - effective monitoring processes (weaknesses identified).

### QFC-specific activities, regulations, and supervision
- Activities permitted to be conducted in the QFC: lawyers, accountants, and trust and company service providers are the only ones permitted.
- QFC Law provides for dealing in precious metals as a permitted activity, but the QFC Financial Services Regulations do not identify dealing in precious metals as a regulated activity; therefore it may not be conducted in the QFC.
- Buying or selling real estate may be performed on an ancillary basis.
- Firms licensed by the QFCA and that are relevant persons are subject to the same AML/CFT requirements as authorized financial institutions and are supervised, in respect of AML/CFT, by the QFCRA.
- The regulations that apply are the same as the ones for financial institutions and key findings on the legal framework are identical.
- The framework of the legal privilege should be refined in order not to prevent a lawyer from reporting suspicious information when providing services to companies and trusts.
- QFC trust regulations do not set out measures that would enable the competent authorities to have adequate, timely, and accurate information on express trusts, including information on the settlor, trustee, and beneficiaries.

### Risk assessment and extension of AML/CFT obligations
- The Qatari authorities have not conducted an assessment of the risk of professions other than DNFBPs of being misused for ML or FT.
- The current approach taken by the MEC with its Circular No. 2 covers all companies operating in Qatar on an indiscriminate basis.
- The QFC has developed a risk-based approach in assessing the possibility of requiring other non regulated professions to comply with AML/CFT obligations.
- QFC authorities have decided to apply the AML Regulations and AML rulebook to a broader range of activities than those conducted by DNFBPs, such as tax and consulting services.

### Cash reliance, payment systems, and monetary union risks
- The economy is still heavily reliant on cash and the currency in circulation increased by more than 60 percent from 2002 to 2005.
- The authorities, other than the DSM, did not provide any information on measures taken to encourage the development and use of modern and secure techniques for conducting financial transactions that are less vulnerable to ML.
- No assessment has been performed of the risks associated with the currency changeover following the Gulf monetary union planned for 2010.

### Legal persons, arrangements, and NPOs
- Domestic company registration governed by Law No. 5 of 2002 amended by Law No. 16 of 2006; allows creation of:
  - joint partnership companies,
  - simple partnership companies,
  - joint-venture companies,
  - shareholding companies,
  - limited share partnership companies,
  - limited liability companies and holding companies.
- Qatari legislation does not provide for the creation of trusts or other similar legal arrangements.
- At the time of the assessment, there was no information available to the assessors that would indicate that the private sector holds funds under foreign trusts and/or provides other trust services.
- Relevant information on ownership and control of legal entities is collected and maintained by the register of commerce.
- All relevant authorities currently have access to that information, either through powers granted to law enforcement agencies, or, in the case of the QCB, through a direct electronic link to the central register.
- Establishing such a link for the FIU and DSM would enhance further the timeliness of their access to the relevant information.
- To operate in or from the QFC, a firm must be registered by the QFC Companies Registration Office (CRO) as a limited liability company (LLC) or limited liability partnership (LLP) or registered as a branch of a foreign LLC or LLP licensed by the QFCA and, in case of regulated activities, authorized by the QFCRA.
- The QFCA has issued Regulation No.12 on February 26, 2007 that provides for the creation of trusts under QFC laws.
- Firms conducting activities in the QFC must be incorporated in the CRO. The register provides through the website details of ownership, management, registered office, principal representatives, etc.
- Measures adopted in the domestic sector to prevent the abuse of nonprofit organizations (NPO) go beyond the requirements of the relevant FATF Recommendations.
- The Qatari Authority for Charitable Organizations appears to ensure effective implementation of the requirements in place.
- The comprehensive regulations in place do not appear to have had an adverse impact on donations as the total turnover of the sector is constantly growing.
- Within the QFC, charitable trusts are not required to be registered and are not subject to supervision.

### National and international cooperation
- Two platforms established for formal domestic cooperation and coordination:
  - the NAMLC for the fight against money laundering,
  - the NCT for the fight against terrorism.
- All relevant authorities are members of both committees, except the QFC, DSM, and public prosecutor’s office.
- Coordination and cooperation appear effective on both the policy and operational levels but could be enhanced further by inclusion of the QFC, DSM and, if necessary, the public prosecutor’s office in both committees.
- Coordination with these three authorities does take place in practice, but occurs in a second stage (after committee meetings), creating a time gap and removing direct participation in discussions.
- Coordination on implementation of UNSCR 1373 is partly ensured through the NCT Committee, but coordination on implementation of UNSCR 1267 currently remains unaddressed.
- Qatar has ratified and partially implemented the Vienna Convention, but has not ratified the Palermo Convention, nor the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
- The AML Law and the Criminal procedure code enable Qatari authorities to take a broad range of measures upon request of another country, including freezing, seizing, and confiscation of property linked with a money laundering offense.
- Mutual legal assistance framework falls short of the standard because:
  - authorities make a strict application of the dual criminality requirement, even for non-coercive measures,
  - the money laundering offense only applies to a limited number of predicate offenses.
- International cooperation in the fight against terrorist financing is not specifically addressed and appears governed by general dispositions of the criminal procedure code.
- Qatar has concluded a number of bilateral agreements with other States to enhance cooperation in the fight against terrorism and its financing, but these agreements are not very specific.
- Framework shortcomings primarily result from the limited scope of the terrorist financing offense and a strict application of the dual criminality requirements including for less intrusive measures.
- Both money laundering and terrorist financing are extraditable offenses.
- Extradition in general does not appear to be subject to unduly restrictive conditions.
- Extradition of Qatari nationals is not possible and it is unclear whether the authorities would prosecute and sentence Qatari nationals in lieu of the requesting State.
- In one instance, the Qatari government refused to extradite a person designated in application of UNSCR 1267 and to cooperate with the requesting State in any other way.

### Other issues and capacity constraints
- Allocation of resources to AML/CFT appears to be uneven, particularly in view of the rapid development and diversification of the economy.
- Professional standards, including those related to confidentiality, are not fully developed.
- There is a lack of specialist skills training in law enforcement authorities, including prosecution agencies, FIU, supervisors and other competent authorities involved in combating ML/FT.
- The competent authorities have yet to develop comprehensive statistics.

### General country and economic context (selected facts)
- Qatar covers an area of 11,521 square kilometers.
- Shares a 60 km land border with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
- Population estimated at 838,000 inhabitants in mid-2007 compared to 744,000 inhabitants in 2004.
- More than 45 percent live in the capital, Doha City, and its suburbs.
- Foreign workers comprise 52 percent of the total population and make up about 89 percent of the total labor force.
- Population literacy rate of 89 percent and life expectancy averages 74 years.
- Oil and gas account for 62 percent of the GDP and 65 percent of the state revenues.
- Qatar’s production of liquefied gas reached 30 million tons in 2007 and is expected to increase to 77 million tons by 2012.
- Nominal GDP per capita was expected to reach US$70,000 in 2007.
- In 2006, real GDP growth was over 7 percent and the current account surplus reached US$ 9.5 billion.
- The non-oil and gas sector accounts for less than 40 percent of the GDP.
- Finance, insurance and real estate sector contributed around 8 percent in 2006.
- Over the next six years, over US$130 billion in investments are planned in the emirate.
- Qatar riyal is pegged to the U.S. dollar at QR3.64: US$1, with a consumer price inflation above 6 percent every year since 2004.
- In 2005, main export destinations: Japan, South Korea, and Singapore; main import sources: France, Japan and the United States.
- World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (2005) — Qatar Ranking vs GCC Average Ranking:
  - Voice and Accountability: 151 / 161
  - Political Stability: 55 / 98
  - Government Effectiveness: 64 / 77
  - Regulatory Quality: 82 / 76
  - Rule of Law: 42 / 64
  - Control of Corruption: 45 / 52

### Money laundering situation and typologies
- The AML Law dispositions remain untested by the courts.
- One prosecution was conducted on the basis of the AML Law in 2006, but was subsequently abandoned when it was established that the source of the funds was legitimate.
- The Qatari FIU classifies STRs according to their typologies. Three main typologies identified:
  - the transfer of large amounts of money abroad through exchange houses,
  - the deposit of large amounts of money in an account in a manner that is not proportional to the individual's monthly income,
  - the inflow of financial remittances from abroad through a bank from an unknown source.
- While there is currently no evidence of significant ML in the country, Qatar’s financial sector was, between 2002 and 2006, the fastest growing of the GCC region in terms of banking sector assets.
- Qatar is now, after the UAE, the most financially developed economy in the region and has the highest banking sector assets per inhabitant.
- The development of the financial sector is associated with a boom in the real estate sector and the precious stones and metals trade, which create potential vulnerabilities to ML.

*Source: _cr08322 - 31.      All DNFBPs are present in the country except casinos that are prohibited and notaries that are*

### 60.      The level of predicate offenses appears very low in Qatar in comparison to other countries.

### 60.      The level of predicate offenses appears very low in Qatar in comparison to other countries.

### Crime levels and comparative statistics
- Total crimes recorded in Qatar were 9.9 per 1,000 populations compared to an average of 33.7 per 1,000 for the 92 countries surveyed.
- Prisoners account for 1 percent of the population in Qatar compared to 1.51 percent for the average of countries surveyed.
- Qatar was not specifically mentioned in the UN International Narcotic Control Board and UN World Drug 2006 reports.
- Qatar was reported in several sources to rank among the less corrupted countries in the region.
- Qatar was listed as a ‘medium’ human trafficking destination country by the UN in the 2006 report on human trafficking.

### Predicate and proceeds-generating crime prosecutions (Public Prosecutor’s Office statistics)
- Total prosecutions in 2006:
  - 33 prosecutions for bribery and embezzlement.
  - 249 prosecutions for drug-related crimes.
    - Alcohol trafficking is included in “drug-related crimes.”
    - Two-thirds of the drug-related prosecutions are related to the possession of drugs (including alcohol).
  - 16 prosecutions for counterfeiting of currency and trafficking of counterfeited currency.
- Other proceeds-generating crimes mentioned: credit card fraud, corruption, piracy of goods, insider trading, and market manipulation.
- Authorities are unaware of the presence of serious organized or transnational crime in the country.

### Terrorist financing and terrorist activities
- No prosecution has ever been led on terrorist financing.
- The FIU has not received any suspicious transaction report (STR) related to terrorist financing so far.
- No major terrorist activity has been recorded in the country.
- Notable less serious terrorist activity:
  - A suicide car bombing directed against UK interests and claimed by an Islamic group took place in 2005.
- Terrorism-related prosecutions in 2006:
  - Eight prosecutions related to terrorist activities.
    - Four cases involved the constitution of a group intending to commit terrorist acts against the State of Qatar.
    - Other cases included manufacturing of and training in explosives, possession of arms, and hijacking.

### Overview of the financial sector (summary)
- Qatar has adopted an open economy policy and attracted significant foreign investments to sectors such as real estate and securities.
- Qatar has adopted a number of AML/CFT control policies.
- The Qatari financial system is comprised of two sectors:
  - Domestic sector: financial institutions under QCB, MEC, and DSM supervision.
  - QFC (established in 2005): includes international financial services firms.

### Domestic financial sector structure and size
- Composition (domestic sector, excluding QFC): banks (including Islamic banks), investment companies, exchange houses, finance companies, insurance companies, and brokerage firms.
- Number of institutions:
  - 17 banks (9 Qatari, 8 foreign).
  - 3 investment companies.
  - 19 exchange houses.
  - 1 finance company.
  - 8 insurance companies.
  - 7 brokerage firms.
- Total assets of banking institutions (2005): QR 127,934 million (approximately US $35,147 million) or 83 percent of GDP.
- The largest three banks in Qatar accounted for approximately 68 percent of total banking assets.
- No other financial information for the DSM and the MEC was provided by the authorities.

### Domestic sector: supervisory responsibilities by institution type
- Banks: QCB — Acceptance of deposits, granting credit facilities, discount, purchase or sale of negotiable instruments, trading in foreign exchange instruments and precious metals, issuance of checks and other payment instruments, issuance of bond, liabilities and any other activities specified by a decision from the QCB.
- Investment Companies: QCB — Investment on behalf of third parties, mediation, public underwriting organization, preservation services, contribution in share issuance and other securities services, advice regarding capital markets, management of investment funds, trading in money instruments and foreign exchange and precious metals, and other activities decided by the QCB.
- Exchange Houses: QCB — Changing and trading in different currencies and travelers’ checks, ingots of precious metals, issuance and acceptance of remittances from licensed correspondents.
- Finance Companies: QCB — Granting credits or any specialized lending activities decided by the QCB.
- Brokerage Companies: DSM — Engaging in offering, selling, buying or otherwise dealing or trading in securities.
- Insurance Companies: MEC — Insurance coverage against accidents and fire, marine and land insurance, health insurance and others.

### Qatar Financial Centre (QFC)
- Established in 2005 under Law No. 7 of 2005.
- The QFC is not an offshore center.
- Features:
  - Companies licensed by the QFC can operate in local and other currencies.
  - The QFC allows for 100 percent ownership by foreign companies and all profits can be remitted outside Qatar.
  - The QFC is currently a tax free zone until April 2008.
  - Article 17 of the QFC Law provides that after April 2008, Regulations may provide for the imposition, administration, and collection of all kinds of taxes and duties within the QFC and to set levels and methods of calculation and provide exemptions.
- QFC institutions implementing legal and regulatory system:
  - QFC Regulatory Authority (QFCRA) — unitary financial services regulator of the QFC.
  - QFC Authority (QFCA) — responsible for commercial strategy of the QFC and supervising unregulated activities.
  - Appeals Body — independent body to hear appeals against Regulatory Authority decisions.
  - Tribunal (Civil and Commercial Court) — solves disputes related to QFC activities.
  - CRO — responsible for incorporation and registration of companies and other entities in the QFC.
- QFCRA responsibilities:
  - Authorization of firms seeking to conduct Regulated Activities in the QFC.
  - Ongoing supervision to ensure compliance with QFC requirements, including AML/CFT requirements.
  - Power to discipline firms and individuals failing to comply with QFC requirements.
- Permitted activities and regulatory distinction:
  - Regulated Activities (Schedule 3 of the QFC Law) include (i) financial business, banking business and investment business (including Islamic and electronic banking); (ii) insurance and reinsurance; (iii) money market, stock exchange and commodity market business; (iv) money and asset management, investment fund business, project and corporate finance, Islamic banking; (v) funds administration, fund advisory and fiduciary business; (vi) pension fund business and credit companies; (vii) insurance broking, stock broking and other financial brokerage business; (viii) financial agency, corporate finance, investment advice and investment services; (ix) financial custodian services and acting as legal trustees.
  - Firms conducting Regulated Activities require a license from the QFC Authority and authorization from the QFCRA.
  - Firms conducting solely Non Regulated Activities only need a license from the QFC Authority.
  - Non-Regulated Activities (Schedule 3 of the QFC Law) include (i) ship broking and shipping agents; (ii) classification services and investment grading; (iii) company headquarters, management offices and treasury operations; (iv) professional services including audit, accounting, tax, consulting, and legal services; (v) holding companies and trusts administration; (vi) provision, formation, operation and administration of companies.
- Relevant persons within the QFC include providers of auditing, accounting, tax consulting, legal, notarization services; providers of trust services; providers of company services.
- Any financial institution conducting financial activities in or from the QFC must be authorized by the QFCRA.
- As of the mission date, there were 12 firms authorized and regulated by the QFCRA.
- Although the majority of regulated institutions have been authorized, only two have commenced operations.

### Overview of the DNFBP sector
- Casinos:
  - Gambling is prohibited in Qatar and sanctioned under Article 275 of the Penal code.
  - Article 274 of the Penal code defines gambling as “any game in which the probability of gain and loss depends on luck and not on controlled factors and each party agrees to give the amount of money, in case of loss, to the winning party”.
  - Camel and horse race prizes are not considered gambling because there is no betting on a winning party.
  - Casinos or gambling are not included in activities permitted in the QFC according to Schedule 3 of the QFC Law No. 7 of 2005.
- Real Estate Agents:
  - 970 companies acting in the real estate sector registered at the Qatari Chamber of Commerce.
  - Real estate agents are licensed and monitored by the MEC and must be authorized by the real estate registration department of the MOJ.
  - Buying or selling real estate is not included in activities permitted in the QFC but may be performed on an ancillary basis by professionals performing other activities.
  - The possibility for foreigners to buy property in some designated areas is a major development that may increase risk of abuse by criminal elements unless measures are taken.
- Dealers in precious metals and stones:
  - 22 shops selling gold and 197 jewelers, all licensed and supervised by the MEC.
  - 19 exchange houses licensed and supervised by the QCB are permitted to engage in purchase or sale of precious metals and gold bullions; exchange houses may act as wholesalers for jewelers.
  - Schedule 3 of the QFC Law provides for dealing in precious metals as a permitted activity which, subject to QFC Regulations, shall be regulated activities.
  - QFC Financial Services Regulations do not identify dealing in precious metals as a regulated activity despite the Law’s possibility; dealing in precious stones is not identified as a permitted activity in the QFC. Consequently, neither dealing in precious metals nor dealing in precious stones can be conducted in the QFC.
- Lawyers:
  - Approved by the lawyer’s registration committee and organized pursuant to Law No. 23 of 2006 on Lawyers.
  - No bar association; an association of lawyers exists with voluntary but wide membership.
  - Branches of international law firms may be authorized to work in Qatar; staff constituted of lawyers and legal advisers.
  - Only Qatari citizens may be lawyers; foreign citizens may act as legal advisers.
  - Division of disciplinary cases at the MOJ applies sanctions to the legal profession.
  - Eight firms licensed by the QFCA provide legal services.
- Notaries:
  - Notaries are civil servants working for the MOJ; nine notaries are working in the MOJ.
  - Schedule 3 of the QFC Law does not list notaries as a permitted activity in the QFC; the FATF-defined profession of notary does not apply in Qatar.
- Accountants:
  - Registered and monitored pursuant to law No. 30 of 2004 by the legal affairs department of the MEC.
  - Article 5 of Law No. 30 of 2004 defines an accountant’s scope of work.
  - Providing professional services including audit and accounting is a permitted activity in the QFC.
  - Two firms licensed by the QFCA to conduct auditing and accounting services in the QFC.
- Trust and company service providers (TCSP):
  - TCSPs are not registered as an identified business or profession.
  - Authorities were not aware of TCSP presence, but the mission found several recently established.
  - Lawyers, accountants, and private companies may provide trust and company services.
  - TCSPs and accountants are subject to monitoring of the MEC.
  - Lawyers and legal advisers are subject to sanctions by the division of disciplinary cases of the MOJ.
  - All activities performed by TCSPs are permitted under Part 2 of Schedule 3 of the QFC Law and are not activities regulated by the QFCRA, other than in respect of AML/CFT requirements.
- Summary table of professions engaged in trust and company services (selected entries):
  - Acting as a formation agent of legal persons: Lawyers and Accountants (domestic sector) — Non-regulated activity (QFC).
  - Acting as (or arranging for) a director/secretary/partner or similar position: Lawyers — Non-regulated activity (QFC).
  - Providing a registered office, business address or accommodation: Companies and Lawyers (domestic sector) — Non-regulated activity (QFC).
  - Acting as (or arranging for) a trustee of an express trust: Lawyers (domestic sector) — Non-regulated activity (QFC).
  - Acting as (or arranging for) a nominee shareholder: Lawyers (domestic sector) — Non-regulated activity (QFC).
- Licensing and AML supervision process of DNFBPs (summary):
  - Real estate agents: Licensing/Authorization — MEC; Supervision or Monitoring/Sanction — MEC, MOJ.
  - Dealers in precious stones: Licensing/Authorization — MEC; Supervision or Monitoring/Sanction — MEC.
  - Dealers in precious metals: Licensing/Authorization — QCB; Supervision or Monitoring/Sanction — QCB.
  - Lawyers: Licensing/Authorization — Lawyer’s registration committee (MOJ); Supervision or Monitoring/Sanction — Division of disciplinary cases (MOJ); QFCA/QFCRA (in respect of AML/CFT requirements).
  - Legal advisers: Licensing/Authorization — MOJ (Authorization of a foreign law firm and its staff); Supervision or Monitoring/Sanction — Division of disciplinary cases (MOJ).
  - Accountants: Licensing/Authorization — MEC; Supervision or Monitoring/Sanction — MEC; QFCA/QFCRA (in respect of AML/CFT requirements).
  - Trust and company service providers: Licensing/Authorization — MEC; Supervision or Monitoring/Sanction — MEC; QFCA/QFCRA (in respect of AML/CFT requirements).

### Overview of commercial laws and mechanisms governing legal persons and arrangements
- Domestic sector:
  - Commerce regulated by the Commercial Companies Law (CCL) No. (5) of 2002 amended by Law No. (16) of year 2006.
  - Companies are created under the CCL on the basis of a Memorandum of Agreement which must contain company name, address, names of partners/promoters, object (activities to be conducted), and capital.
  - The CCL provides for seven types of companies:
    - (i) partnership company;
    - (ii) limited partnership;
    - (iii) particular partnership;
    - (iv) joint-stock company;
    - (v) limited partnership by shares;
    - (vi) limited liability company; and
    - (vi) individual company.

*Source: _cr08322 - 60.      The level of predicate offenses appears very low in Qatar in comparison to other countries.*

### 88.      Bearer shares: Bearer shares are explicitly prohibited in Qatar pursuant to the CCL. The MEC,

### _cr08322 - 88.      Bearer shares: Bearer shares are explicitly prohibited in Qatar pursuant to the CCL. The MEC,

### Corporate ownership, registration, and bearer shares
- Bearer shares: "Bearer shares are explicitly prohibited in Qatar pursuant to the CCL. The MEC, which is in charge of the corporate registry, indicates however that it does not allow companies to issue these instruments."
- Beneficial Right Owner: "In undertaking its due diligence, the MEC requires applicants to produce personal identification documents and evidence of beneficial ownership."
- Registration of companies in Qatar:
  - "The MEC is responsible for the registration of all business in Qatar. Businesses are required to be registered in the commercial registry."
  - "MEC reports that, in practice, businesses are registered prior to commencing operations and taking up occupation of premises."
  - "This makes the ministry an important first line of defense in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing."
- Trusts in domestic sector: "The Qatari legislation does not provide for the creation of trusts or other similar legal arrangements. At the time of the assessment, there was no information available that would indicate that the private sector holds funds under foreign trusts and/or provides other trust services."

### Table: Number of Companies Registered in the Domestic Sector (as reported)
- Type of register  Number Nature of company
- Main                                                197Partnership
- Affiliate276Partnership
- Main                                                  39Limited                                                  Partnership                                                  
- Affiliate121Limited Partnership 
- Main                                           11,325Joint-stock                                           compan
- y 
- Affiliate12,476Joint-stock compan
- y 
- Main                                                389Forei
- gn Company
- Affiliate15Foreign Company
- Main                                                    4Individual Company 
- Main                                                    2Holdin
- g
- Main                                             9,861Foreign Company
- Affiliate10,560Foreign Company
- Main 47Partnership limited by shares 
- Affiliate45Partnership limited b
- y shares 
- 45,357 
- Source: MEC, February 2007.

### Qatar Financial Centre (QFC), trusts, and public registers
- QFC establishment and purpose: "The QFC was established in 2005. It aims to provide a financial and business center to attract international financial services institutions and multinational corporations wishing to participate in Qatar’s growing economy"
- Legal basis for entities in QFC:
  - "Article 11 of the QFC Law provides that corporations, individuals, businesses and other entities may be approved, authorized or licensed to incorporate or establish in the QFC and to carry out permitted activities in or from the QFC."
  - "Article 27 of the Financial Services Regulations (FSR) provides that an application for authorization to conduct regulated activities in the QFC may be made by a body corporate; a partnership; or an unincorporated association"
  - "Article 19 of the QFC Authority Regulations provides that the same type of entities may apply for a license to conduct permitted activities in the QFC."
- QFCRA Public Registers:
  - "The QFCRA Public Registers are a public record of previous and current authorized firms, approved individuals or Waiver and Modification Notices"
  - "The Public Registers are provided online to enable users to conduct searches and print information. The following QFC Authority Public Registers are also maintained on the QFC Website: (i) licensed Firms; (ii) Companies Registration Office and (iii) approved auditors."
- Trusts in QFC:
  - "The QFCA has issued Regulation No. 12, dated February 28, 2007, which enables the creation of trusts under the QFC laws (the QFC trusts)."
  - The regulation defines trusts as “a right, enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property to which another person holds the legal title” and is applicable to express trusts, charitable trusts, non-charitable trusts and trusts created pursuant to law or judgment that requires the trust to be administered in the manner of an express trust.
  - "There is no registration of trusts in the QFC."

### Overview of strategy to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing
- AML/CFT strategies and priorities:
  - "The Qatari authorities are very conscious of the potential reputational risk to Qatar posed by money laundering and the financing of terrorism."
  - "Domestic cooperation on AML/CFT issues is facilitated by the NAMLC. Nevertheless, there is currently no overall government policy on AML/CFT matters."
- National Anti-Money Laundering Committee (NAMLC):
  - "It is the competent government authority in charge of drawing the AML/CFT policy of the State of Qatar."
  - Established in 2002 under the presidency of the Deputy Governor of the QCB.
  - Composition (per Article 8 of the AML Law): two representatives of the MOI (including the director of the General Administration of Passports (Vice President of the NAMLC)), a representative of the Ministries of Civil Service Affairs and Housing, MEC, Finance and Justice, as well as an additional representative of the QCB and of the Customs and Ports General Authority. "Although not specified in the AML Law, the State Security Bureau (which is an independent body that reports directly to the Emir) is also represented in the NAMLC."
  - Statutory functions (Art. 9 of the AML Law): prepare, adopt, and follow-up implementation of AML plans and programs; ensure coordination among competent entities to implement legislation and agreements related to AML; follow international ML trends; propose necessary measures; prepare reports, statistics and data on AML efforts.
- Coordination committees for the fight against terrorism:
  - First coordination committee established January 2002 to coordinate implementation of UN resolutions on the fight against terrorism (originally UNSCR 1373).
  - Replaced in 2007 by National Committee for Fighting Terrorism (NCT) by decision of the Council of Ministers dated March 26, 2007.
  - NCT composition includes MOI, Qatar Armed Forces, State Security Bureau, Internal Security Force, Ministry of Civil Service and Housing Affairs, Ministry of Finance, MEC, MOJ, Ministry of Endowment and Islamic Affairs, General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, QCB, General Authority of Customs and Ports, and Qatar Chambers of Commerce and Industry.
  - NCT main functions: make plans and programs to fight terrorism; coordinate national efforts in implementation of obligations arising from UNSCR 1373; take action to implement obligations in international conventions against terrorism to which Qatar is a party.
  - "The implementation of other relevant UN resolutions, and in particular of UNSCR 1267 and its successor resolutions, does not fall within the remit of the new NCT and is currently unaddressed."

### Law enforcement, criminal justice, and operational agencies
- MOI and ECPD:
  - "According to Article 20 of the AML Law, the Minister of Interior, in coordination with the Governor of the QCB and on the basis of a proposal by the NAMLC, shall issue the executive resolutions of the provisions of this law."
  - "The ECPD is the department within the MOI in charge of ML investigations."
  - ECPD regulated by Resolution No. 29 of 2004 issued by the MOI on July 28, 2004; affiliated with director of criminal investigation department; specialized in ML, e-crimes, counterfeiting, and falsification of currency.
- Other operational agencies:
  - Department of International Cooperation (MOI): handles police information exchange, conference participation, implementation of international resolutions, and cooperation with regional/international organizations.
  - SSB: "It is an independent body established in 2003 that reports directly to the Emir. The SSB is in charge of the investigation into terrorism and financing of terrorism offenses."
  - General Directorate for Customs and Ports (GDCP): "monitoring the movement of currency at borders (land, ports, and airports)."
  - FIU: "The Qatari FIU is an administrative unit established pursuant to Resolution 1 of 2004 issued on August 8, 2004 on 'the creation of the Financial Information Unit and the approval of its organizational structure' by the President of the NAMLC."
  - "The AML Law gives the coordinator of the NAMLC the competence to receive reports related to suspicions of money laundering crimes from the competent parties and taking the legal measures pertaining to them and to follow up on the measures of tracking, collecting information, and investigations carried out by the competent parties."

### Financial sector bodies and oversight
- QCB:
  - "The QCB establishes the licensing requirements for banks, investment companies, finance companies and exchange houses."
  - "The Governor of the QCB has the power to freeze accounts, assets, and properties suspected of or linked to money laundering offenses."
  - "The Deputy Governor of the QCB is the president of the NAMLC. The QCB also houses the FIU."
  - "Access to all information covered by the banking secrecy requires a prior authorization of the Governor of the QCB, except to those institutions authorized and operating out of the QFC, where their own banking secrecy requirements apply."
- DSM: "The commission is the supervisor for the brokerage companies within the Doha Securities Market."
- QFCA and QFCRA:
  - QFCA: "responsible for developing the commercial strategy of the QFC and establishing relationships with the global financial community. It proposes regulations for enactment by the MEC. The QFCA is responsible for the licensing process of firms conducting non regulated activities in the QFC."
  - QFCRA: "the unitary financial services regulator of the QFC. It is responsible for the authorization of firms seeking to conduct Regulated Activities in the QFC and for the ongoing supervision of those firms to ensure they remain in compliance with the various QFC requirements, including regulating licensed firms in respect to AML/CFT requirements."
  - "The QFCRA as an independent body has power to discipline those firms and individuals that fail to comply with QFC requirements. The QFCRA is also able to propose regulations for enactment by the minister of economy and commerce."

### Non-Profit Organizations
- QACA: "This organization was created in 2004. It is the authorizing and supervisory authority for the charities in the domestic sector."

### Approach concerning risk and supervisory practices
- Overall risk approach:
  - "Qatar has not adopted an overall risk-based approach to its AML or CFT framework and the authorities have not conducted an overall assessment of the ML and TF risks that exist in Qatar."
  - "The current AML/CFT legal and supervisory framework has, therefore, been developed without considering ML/FT risks."
- Domestic supervisory authorities:
  - "In the domestic sector, the QCB is the only supervisory authority that has adopted a risk-based approach to both prudential and AML/CFT supervision which was at a very early stage of implementation at the time of the on-site visit. The new approach had been implemented only once."
  - "Supervisory authorities like the DSM and the MEC have not established a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision."
  - "There are no reduced or simplified customer due diligence measures in place for financial institutions in the domestic sector."
- QFC approach:
  - "The QFC AML Regulations have been drafted in accordance with a risk-based approach and proportionate anti-money laundering systems and controls."
  - "Article 15 of the QFC AML Regulations specifically requires that a relevant person must ensure that it adequately addresses the specific money laundering risks which it faces taking into account the vulnerabilities of its products, services, and customers."
  - "Enhanced due diligence is required for higher-risk areas of money laundering as detailed in Appendix 2 of the AML Rulebook."

### Progress since last mutual evaluation and main historical deficiencies
- Previous evaluation: "Qatar underwent a mutual evaluation by the FATF/GCC in 2001. The evaluation team visited Qatar from May 21–23, 2001."
- Main deficiencies identified in the Mutual Evaluation Report:
  - Legislation: "There was no specific money laundering offense in the Qatari Penal Code." Confiscation and provisional measures inadequate. Article 43 of the Narcotic Drugs Law No. 9 of 1987 limited to narcotics-related funding. QCB was the only authority with power to freeze or seize funds or property.
  - Financial sector: AML measures were essentially based on QCB Circular No. 33 of 1999. Customer identification provisions deficient regarding agents acting on behalf of others. Department of Commercial Affairs of MEC had some AML measures for insurance and securities, but securities measures were less comprehensive than QCB regulations.
  - Reporting of STRs: QCB reporting requirement weak — required reporting only when institution detected "crime or money laundering attempts rather than suspicions of money laundering." Reporting chain configuration was a potential weakness: QCB received the report and passed it to the MOI, adding a layer that did not improve efficiency.
- International cooperation deficiencies: "Extradition for money laundering was not possible and the Qatari authorities were not permitted to honor foreign requests for imposition of provisional measures against funds or property located in Qatar. Authorities were also not allowed to provide information on suspicious transactions to foreign requesters."
- Subsequent legal changes: "Since last evaluation, several laws and regulations have been amended or enacted, in particular the AML Law and the CT Law which also incriminates, to a certain extent the financing of terrorism."
- Assessment of progress relative to stronger standards: "However, the FATF standard has undergone significant changes since Qatar was last assessed and the AML Law was enacted. Moreover, the FATF standard now requires that key measures be contained in laws, regulations, or other enforceable instruments and that the effective implementation of the measures in place also be assessed. Accordingly, the progress made by the authorities since the last assessment has been over-shadowed in many areas by the stricter requirements of the new standard."

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/_cr08322.pdf*

### 2.1 Criminalization of Money Laundering (R.1 & 2)

### 2.1 Criminalization of Money Laundering (R.1 & 2)

### Description and analysis
- Qatar criminalized money laundering in 2002 with the adoption of Law (28) of 2002 (the AML Law).
- The AML Law was amended in 2003 through Decree Law (21) of 2003 to include terrorist crimes in the list of predicate offenses.
- The provisions of the AML Law remain untested by the courts. One prosecution was conducted on the basis of the AML Law in 2006 but was subsequently abandoned when it was established that the source of the funds was legitimate.
- The text of the law is at times vague in both the original Arabic version and the English translation (for example, the exact scope of the ML offense).
- There is no explanatory note or legislative practice of providing guidance that would assist in understanding the ratio legis of the AML Law.
- Because the courts have not applied the AML Law, there is no case law to clarify the possibilities and boundaries in money laundering prosecutions and trials.

### Criminalization — Physical and material elements of the offense (c. 1.1)
- Qatar ratified the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the Vienna Convention) on May 4, 1990.
- Illicit traffic in narcotic drugs was criminalized through Law (9) of 1987 (as amended by Law (7) of 1998 and subsequent laws); the latest amendment limited the illicit drug trafficking offense to “dangerous” drugs and this was reflected in the AML Law.
- Qatar had not ratified the 2001 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention) at the time of assessment, but the ratification process was underway.
- Organized crime, domestic and/or transnational, is not an offense under Qatari legislation unless its purpose is to commit a terrorist crime (Articles 3 and 7 of the Law (3) of 2004 on combating terrorism).

- The English version of Article 2 of the AML Law (as amended by Article 1 of Decree Law (21) of 2003) provides (verbatim):
  - “he who commits any of the following acts shall commit a money laundering crime: Any person who earns, possesses, disposes of, manages, exchanges, deposits, adds, invests, transports, or transfers funds obtained from the crimes of drugs and dangerous psychotropic substance; extortion and looting; forgery, counterfeiting and imitation of notes and coins; illegal trafficking in weapons, ammunitions and explosives; crimes related to environment protection; or the crimes of trafficking in women and children; or the crimes considered by law as terrorist crimes, with the intention of hiding the real sources of the funds and show that their source is legal. Any employee in the financial institutions who receives cash amounts or securities, transfers or employs such amounts in financial or banking transactions, knowing or having a reason to believe that such amounts resulted from one of the crimes stipulated in the previous paragraph.”

- By listing acts such as “earns, possesses, disposes of, manages, exchanges, deposits, adds, invests, transports, or transfers funds obtained from the predicate crimes,” the law covers a broad range of material elements.
- The mental element narrows application: the offense applies only to acts conducted with the intention of “hiding the real sources of the funds and show[ing] that their source” is legitimate.
  - This formulation may not clearly extend to acts aimed at concealing or disguising the location, disposition, movement, or ownership of funds, nor to acts intended solely to help a person evade criminal liability for the predicate offense, unless those acts also serve to conceal the illegitimate source.
  - Consequently, the scope of the money laundering offense is too limited to address all aspects covered in the Vienna and Palermo Conventions.
- It is unclear whether the limitation is intentional or a result of drafting; discussions with law enforcement were inconclusive and revealed limited understanding of Vienna and Palermo requirements. There is a risk authorities would apply Article 2 stricto sensu.

### Laundered property and proving proceeds (c. 1.2 and c. 1.2.1)
- Article 2 of the AML Law refers to “proceeds” of the listed predicate crimes; Article 1 defines “proceeds” as “any funds or property earned directly or indirectly by committing one of the crimes stipulated in this law.”
- The English translation contains a slight inconsistency: Article 2 refers to “funds obtained from” the listed predicate crimes, while Article 1 defines “proceeds” and not “funds obtained from crime.” The original Arabic version is more precise; Arabic being the only official language in Qatar, the Arabic version prevails.
- The definition is broad enough to cover all types of property listed in the Vienna and Palermo Conventions.
- Authorities (particularly public prosecution) interpret “proceeds” as covering all assets derived directly or indirectly from crime, including corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to or interest in such assets.
- Article 11 of the AML Law permits investigation of a money laundering offense independently from the investigation of the predicate offense.
- Public prosecutors and judges indicated that while investigations may be conducted separately, a clear link must be established at prosecution between the two crimes.
  - Authorities maintain a conviction for money laundering is possible even without a prior conviction for the predicate offense and that circumstantial evidence that assets have been criminally acquired would be sufficient.

### Scope of predicate offenses (c. 1.3)
- Qatar adopted a list approach by enumerating predicate offenses in Article 2 of the AML Law (as amended in 2003). The list contains only seven predicates and does not cover all categories designated in the FATF Glossary.
- The predicate offenses listed and their legal bases:
  - Crimes of drugs and dangerous psychotropic substances: Law No. 9 of 1987 (as amended by Law (7) of 1998).
    - The term “dangerous” was added to exclude medicinal substances containing some amount of “drugs.”
  - Forgery, counterfeiting and imitation of notes and coins: Article 218–226 of the Criminal Code.
    - Standard sanctions vary between five and fifteen years of imprisonment and a fine but may go up to life imprisonment if the offense resulted in a reduction of the national currency rate.
  - Illegal trafficking in weapons, ammunitions, and explosives: Articles 38–54 of Law (14) of 1999 on weapons, ammunition, and explosives.
    - Sanctions range from several months imprisonment and a fine to several years of imprisonment and a fine.
  - Terrorist crimes: Article 1 and following of Law No. 3 of 2004 on Combating Terrorism (CT Law).
    - According to the authorities, the notion of “terrorist crimes” under Article 2 of the AML Law covers all crimes listed in the CT Law, including the terrorist financing offense of Article 4 of the CT Law.
  - Extortion and looting: Article 352 of the Criminal Code.
    - The basic sanction is imprisonment for up to three years.
  - In addition, Article 2 mentions crimes related to the protection of the environment and trafficking in women and children, but neither conduct is criminalized under Qatari laws (see below).

- The choice of predicate offenses appears arbitrary and does not reflect all main proceeds-generating crimes occurring in Qatar.
  - Authorities reported the most frequent proceeds-generating crimes include drug trafficking, credit card fraud and corruption, counterfeiting of currency and counterfeiting and piracy of goods, insider trading and market manipulation.
  - Article 2 covers drug trafficking and counterfeiting of currency, but does not cover fraud, corruption, counterfeiting and piracy of goods, insider trading and market manipulation.
- The limited list had practical consequences: the public prosecutor’s office received six potential money laundering cases from 2002 to 2006 but had to abandon five of them because the underlying offense was not listed under Article 2 of the AML Law.
- Article 2’s inclusion of “crimes related to environment protection” and “trafficking in women and children” is ineffective without clear criminalization and definitions of those conducts under Qatari law.
- FATF-designated categories not included in the Qatari AML framework (enumerated in the source):
  - (i) murder and grievous bodily injury;
  - (ii) participation in an organized criminal group and racketeering;
  - (iii) trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling;
  - (iv) sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation of children;
  - (v) illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods;
  - (vi) corruption and bribery;
  - (vii) fraud;
  - (viii) counterfeiting (other than that of currency) and piracy of products;
  - (ix) environmental crime;
  - (x) kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking;
  - (xi) robbery or theft;
  - (xii) smuggling;
  - (xiii) forgery;
  - (xiv) piracy; and
  - (xv) insider trading and market manipulation.

- The limited list prevents Qatari authorities from prosecuting and sanctioning money laundering cases to the extent required by the standard.

### Extraterritorially committed predicate offenses (c. 1.5)
- Qatari courts maintain jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad in specified circumstances (unless a person was already convicted or acquitted for the same facts by a foreign state): when the crime occurred partially or totally in Qatar; when a crime was committed in Qatar but occurred partially or totally outside Qatar and is criminalized in both countries; when the crime was directed against the internal or external security of the State of Qatar; in case of falsification and imitation of Qatari official documents, seals, marks, stamps and currency; and when a person committed or participated in drug trafficking, trafficking of human beings, piracy or international terrorism (Articles 16, 17 and 18 of the Criminal Code).
- Consequently, crimes other than those directed against the security of the State, falsification of official documents and currency, possession or promotion of falsified documents and currency, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, piracy and international terrorism must occur at least partially in Qatar for jurisdiction to exist.
- Authorities have no jurisdiction over predicate offenses that were entirely committed in another country, even if there is dual criminality.
- In the absence of dual criminality on the predicate offense, money laundering charges cannot be brought before Qatari courts. Given the limited list of predicate offenses under Qatari law, this severely limits the ability to investigate and prosecute money laundering cases.

### Laundering one’s own illicit funds (self-laundering) (c. 1.6)
- The AML Law does not distinguish self-laundering from third-party laundering.
- There appears to be no constitutional or fundamental principle of Qatari law that would preclude application of the money laundering offense to the person who committed the predicate crime.
- Public prosecutor’s office and courts maintain that self-laundering may be prosecuted to the same extent as third-party laundering.
- In the absence of specific impediments to prosecute self-laundering, this approach is fully in line with the standard.

### Ancillary offenses (c. 1.7)
- The Criminal Code comprehensively addresses ancillary offenses by providing several forms of participation applicable to all crimes, including money laundering.
  - “Comitter” (Article 38) includes the person who conducted one or all acts constituting the crime; provided assistance in the execution of the crime and was present at the moment of the crime; or “used other persons by any means to execute” the crime.
  - “Participant” (Article 39) is whoever “prompted another person to commit” a crime and had a direct effect on its commission; “agreed with another person to commit the crime which was carried out on the basis of this agreement”; intentionally gave the perpetrator “a weapon, machines, or anything else used in committing the crime”; or helped in any other way to prepare, facilitate or complete the crime.
  - According to authorities, conspiracy and counseling are covered respectively by the notions of “agreement to commit a crime” and “help in any other way.”
  - A recent amendment to the Criminal Code provides that, unless a specific law mentions otherwise (which the AML Law does not), participants in a crime are subject to the same penalties as the main authors of the crime (Article 40 of the Criminal Code).
- Article 3 of the AML Law specifically provides that any person who, by virtue of his professional position, obtains information related to a money laundering crime and does not take the legal measures prescribed by the law commits a “crime related to the money laundering crime.”
- Attempt to commit a felony or misdemeanor is an offense (Article 28 of the Criminal Code).
  - A felony is defined as a crime punished by death, life imprisonment, or a maximum imprisonment sentence of more than three years (Article 22).
  - A misdemeanor is a crime punished by a maximum imprisonment sentence of three years at the most and/or a fine of no more than one thousand Riyals (Article 23).
  - Sanctions for attempt to commit a felony: life imprisonment when the penalty of the crime is a death sentence; imprisonment for a period between five and fifteen years, if the penalty for the completed crime is life imprisonment; and imprisonment for not more than half the imprisonment sentence applicable to the completed crime (Article 29).
  - The law specifies cases where the attempt to commit a misdemeanor is sanctioned as well as the applicable penalty (Article 30).
  - Mere intention to commit a felony or misdemeanor is not sanctioned (Article 28).

*Source: _cr08322 - 2.1 Criminalization of Money Laundering (R.1 & 2)*

### 150.      The provisions of the Criminal Code on the attempt and the various levels of participation are

### _cr08322 - 150.      The provisions of the Criminal Code on the attempt and the various levels of participation are

### Coverage of attempt and participation
- The provisions of the Criminal Code on the attempt and the various levels of participation are sufficiently broad to cover all the aspects required by the standard and to ensure that all persons involved in a money laundering crime may be prosecuted. (Paragraph 150)

### Dual criminality for underlying offenses (Additional Element c.1.8)
- The Criminal Code requires dual criminality for the underlying offenses in all cases (Articles 16 and 18 of the Criminal Code).
- Consequently, the money laundering offense does not apply when the proceeds derive from a conduct that occurred in another country if it is not an offense in the other country, even if it would have constituted a money laundering offense had the predicate crime occurred in Qatar. (Paragraph 151)

### Liability of natural persons (c. 2.1)
- The money laundering offense applies to natural persons who intentionally engage in money laundering activities.
- The Criminal Code defines moral elements:
  - Intent: the will of the committer to commit an act or abstain therefrom, in order to produce the result which is subject to penalty.
  - Fault: available when the result sanctioned by the law “happens because of the fault of the committer, whether this error was due to negligence, carelessness, [lack of caution], rashness or non-complying with the law of the lists”.
  - “The committer shall be asked for the crime whether committed on purpose or by error, if the law [did not] stipulate the intent openly” (Article 32 of the Criminal Code).
- Interpretation and practice:
  - The wording suggests that, where Article 2 of the AML Law specifically refers to the intention of concealing the source of funds, the “fault”, or recklessness, would not be sanctioned.
  - Explanations from the on-site visit indicate that, regardless of wording, only actual knowledge is sanctioned and it does not extend to dolus eventualis.
  - This narrower mental element is not required by the standard; the assessment concludes the Qatari Criminal Code and AML Law are in line with the standard on this point. (Paragraph 152)

### Mental element and evidential inference (c. 2.2)
- Pursuant to Article 232 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the principle of free evaluation of the evidence applies.
- The prosecution does not have to bear the burden of demonstrating actual knowledge; judges may freely appreciate the evidence and may infer the mental element of the offense from objective factual circumstances. (Paragraph 153)

### Liability of legal persons (c. 2.3 and c. 2.4)
- Legal persons may be held liable for crimes committed by their representatives, managers and agents acting in their name (Article 37 of the Criminal Code).
- Article 14 of the AML Law explicitly extends criminal liability for money laundering to legal persons:
  - The legal person “shall be fined an amount not less than the value of the instrumentalities, returns and proceeds of the crime”.
  - An order may be issued to cancel or suspend the legal person’s license.
- Article 14 has not been tested in courts for ML, but legal entities have been sanctioned for other crimes under the Criminal Code, indicating practical familiarity with corporate liability. (Paragraph 154)
- Article 14 specifies that sanctioning the legal entity does not prevent sanctioning the individual who committed the crime; parallel administrative or civil sanctions against the corporate entity may also be applied. (Paragraph 155)

### Sanctions for money laundering (c. 2.5)
- Article 13 of the AML Law prescribes:
  - Imprisonment of no more than seven years.
  - A fine of no less than fifty thousand Qatari Riyals (approximately US$13,700) and no more than the value of funds, subject of the crime.
- Same sanctions apply to participants in a money laundering offense.
- Professional obligations: a person who obtains information related to a money laundering crime by virtue of his profession and does not take the legal measures prescribed by the AML Law shall be punished by:
  - Imprisonment of no more than three years.
  - A fine of no more than ten thousand Qatari Riyals (Articles 3 and 13 of the AML Law).
- Aggravating factors:
  - Sanctions shall be doubled if the crime is committed by two or more persons acting in collaboration as well as in case of recidivism.
  - A person is considered a recidivist if he or she commits a similar crime “within five years before the end of term of the sanction or before the prescription of this sanction.”
- The law requires confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of the crime, without prejudice to rights of bona fide third parties.
- Assessment: The sanctions appear to be dissuasive and proportionate. (Paragraph 156)

### Effectiveness and statistics (2004–2006) — ML investigations by the ECPD (Paragraphs 157–158)
- Between 2004 and 2006, a total of 82 investigations into potential ML cases were led by the ECPD. All cases resulted from STRs. In all cases, investigations indicated the origin of the funds was legitimate.
- Table 6. ML Investigations Conducted by the ECPD — Reporting entity and case description; Number of cases (Banks 2004 2005 2006; Exchange Houses; Outlets; Other methods)
  - Banks:
    - 1. Inflow of large financial remittances which are transferred abroad after dividing them into small amounts. — 1, - , -
    - 2. Transfer of large amounts of money abroad through the bank without knowing their source — 1, - , -
    - 3. Deposit of large amounts of money in the account in a manner that is not proportional to the individual's monthly income — 9, 10, 9
    - 4. Inflow of financial remittances from abroad through the bank without knowing their source — 1, 5, 4
  - Exchange Houses:
    - 5. Transfer of large amounts of money abroad through Exchange Houses — 5, 20, 8
    - 6. Inflow of financial remittances from abroad through Exchange Houses — - , - , 1
  - Outlets:
    - 7. Seizure of large amounts of money possessed by people trying to leave the country — - , 4, 1
  - Other methods:
    - 8. Request the opening of an account at the Bank in order to transfer large amounts of money — 1, - , -
    - 9. Attempting to convince someone of receiving the remittance and transferring it again — - , 1, 1
  - Total — 18, 40, 24
- The PPO led one inquiry into an ML case but established no money laundering activity and closed the case. The prosecution received five further potential ML cases but was unable to start an inquiry because the underlying crimes were not listed as predicate offenses under Article 2 of the AML Law. (Paragraphs 158–159)

### Prosecutions in 2006 (Paragraph 159 — Table 7 excerpts)
- Selected prosecution data for 2006 (as presented):
  - Bribery, Embezzlement - Total: 33   
    - Money Laundering — 1 — Nolle prosequi
    - Bribery — 4; 6; 2 — Nolle prosequi; Transfer to Criminal courts; In process
    - Embezzlement of Public funds — 6; 5; 6 — Nolle prosequi; Transfer to Criminal courts; In process
    - Embezzlement & Bribery — 1; 1 — Nolle prosequi; Transfer to Criminal courts; In process
    - Breach of Contract — 1 — In process
  - Environmental Crimes - Total: 370
    - Passing in restricted places — 15 — Nolle prosequi
    - Throwing litters — 88 — Transfer to Criminal courts
    - Hunting in public places — 267 — In process
  - Drugs - Total: 249
    - Possession — 166 — Transfer to Criminal courts
    - Trafficking — 83 — Transfer to Criminal courts
  - Explosives: Total: 1; Suspect unknown — 4
    - (Footnote: The notion of “drugs” includes alcohol trafficking in these statistics.)
  - Offense against the security of the State: Total: 8
    - Terrorist Act: Explosives — 1 — In process
    - Manufacturing explosives and training someone to use it — 1 — In process
    - Constitution of a group intending to commit terrorist acts against the State of Qatar — 3; 1 — In process; Incrimination: 10 years of imprisonment
    - Possession of arms intending to commit terrorist act — 1 — Incrimination: 2 years
    - Unlawful seizure of an aircraft — 1 — In court
  - Illegal possession of Guns and weapons – Total 22 — Total: 6; 12; 4 — Nolle prosequi; Transfer to Criminal courts; In process
  - Traffic of Counterfeited currency – Total 11 — Total: 5; 1; 5 — Nolle prosequi; Transfer; In process
  - Counterfeited currency – Total 5 — Total: 3; 1; 1 — Nolle prosequi; Transfer; In process
- No similar statistics were provided for previous years. The assessment team was informed that the (unsuccessful) prosecution for money laundering indicated above was the only one led so far. Consequently, despite the ML offense being in force since 2002 and the occurrence of several predicate offenses, no money laundering charges have been brought before the courts. (Paragraphs 160–161)

### Assessment of effectiveness and capacity constraints (Paragraph 161)
- Explanatory factors for low investigations/prosecutions:
  - The ML offense only applies to a limited number of predicate offenses.
  - In some investigations, the source of funds was legitimate.
  - Law enforcement authorities lack sufficient understanding of money laundering typologies and of the AML Law to use available tools fully, a common feature in jurisdictions with recent AML/CFT systems.

### Recommendations and comments (Paragraphs 162–163)
- The AML Law provides basic elements of the ML offense but suffers major shortcomings, notably the limited number of predicate offenses, and does not enable fully effective prosecution.
- Authorities are recommended to:
  - Amend the AML Law to clarify and extend the scope of the money laundering offense to cover all intentional acts aiming to conceal or disguise not only the source of the funds but also the true nature, location, disposition, movement, or ownership of or rights with respect to proceeds of crime. This could be achieved either by clearly specifying the purpose in the AML or by deleting altogether the intended purpose.
  - Criminalize, where necessary, the following conducts and add them to the list of predicate offenses in the AML Law: participation in an organized (non terrorist) criminal group and racketeering; trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling; sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation of children; illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods; corruption and bribery; fraud; counterfeiting and piracy of products; environmental crime; murder, grievous bodily injury; kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking; robbery or theft; smuggling; forgery; piracy; and insider trading and market manipulation.
  - Ensure that predicate offenses for money laundering all extend to conduct that occurred in another country when there is dual criminality.
  - Provide in-depth training to law enforcement agencies on the AML Law and on money laundering trends and typologies, as well as training on investigations into and prosecutions of money laundering offenses.
  - Although authorities maintain that the terrorist financing offense is covered by the notion of the “terrorist crimes” in Article 2 of the AML Law, for clarity it is recommended to specifically mention the terrorist financing offense in the list of predicate offenses. (Paragraphs 162–163)

### Compliance with Recommendations 1 & 2 — Ratings (Paragraph 163)
- R.1 — PC
  - Factors underlying rating:
    - The mental element of the ML offense does not cover acts conducted with a view to conceal the true nature, location, disposition, movement, or ownership of or rights with respect to proceeds.
    - The list of predicate offenses is incomplete with only seven of the FATF designated categories of offenses being covered.
    - With a few exceptions, the authorities have no jurisdiction over predicate offenses that were entirely committed in another country, even if there is dual criminality.
    - Lack of evidence on the effectiveness of the law.
- R.2 — LC
  - Factors underlying rating:
    - Lack of evidence on the effectiveness of the law.

### Criminalization of Terrorist Financing (SR.II) — description and analysis (Paragraphs 164–170)
- Legislative measure:
  - Qatar issued the CT Law in 2004.
- Criminalization of Financing of Terrorism (c. II.1):
  - Article 1 of the CT Law provides an extensive definition of terrorist crimes (English translation noted as imprecise in one respect).
  - The definition is broad enough to cover all forms of terrorist acts pursuant to the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT) Article 2 para. 1 (b).
  - However, the motive required under the law is not in line with the treaties mentioned in Article 2 para. 1 (a) of the ICSFT (example: unlawful seizure of an aircraft with no intention to terrorize, cause harm, death or material damage and with no political motives would not be considered a terrorist act under the CT Law). (Paragraph 165)
- Treaty ratification:
  - With the exception of the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, all UN Conventions and Protocols against terrorism have been ratified by Qatar, and relevant acts criminalized. (Paragraph 166)
- CT Law sanctions:
  - Articles 2 to 13 establish sanctions applicable to terrorist acts listed in Article 1 and to various forms of participation or assistance. (Paragraph 167)
  - Footnote: The sanctions range from ten years of imprisonment to the death penalty; death penalty applies in cases resulting in death and in all cases where a weapon was used. Sanctions for assistance range from five years to life imprisonment.
- Article 4 (terrorist financing offense):
  - Summarized key elements (highlights by assessment team):
    - Any person who supplies weapons or explosives to a group or organization formed with a view to commit a terrorist crime shall be punished with life imprisonment.
    - The same sanction applies to any person who supplies such groups in full knowledge of their purpose with weapons, ammunitions, technical information, material or financial assistance, information, tasks or machines, or anyone who sends supplies to such groups or collects financial assistance for them, or offers a shelter, a place to meet or other facilities to their members. (Paragraph 168)
  - The terrorist financing offense is linked to terrorist acts defined under Article 1 and therefore shares the same shortcomings: it would not apply to acts mentioned in Article 2 para. 1 (a) of the ICSFT when the motive set out in Article 1 of the CT has not been established. (Paragraph 169)
- Criterion II.1 (a):
  - The law does not specify whether the provision and collection of financial assistance and money must be direct and/or indirect. This suggests the means by which funds are provided or collected is irrelevant and that both direct and indirect provision and collection are covered. Authorities share this view. (Paragraph 170)

*Source: _cr08322 - 150.*

### 171.      While the law specifically mentions terrorist groups and organizations, it does not extend the

### _cr08322 - 171.      While the law specifically mentions terrorist groups and organizations, it does not extend the

### Coverage and scope of the terrorist financing (TF) offense
- The CT Law specifically mentions terrorist groups and organizations but does not extend the terrorist financing offense to the collection and provision of funds to individual terrorists and for terrorist acts (¶171).
- The CT Law does not define “material or financial assistance” and no explanatory note or case law provides further guidance (¶172).
- Assessment team conclusion: the notion of “material and financial assistance” is sufficiently broad to cover all the funds as defined in the ICSFT (including “assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronics or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including but not limited to bank credits, travelers checks, bank checks, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit”) (¶172).
- The law does not reference the source (legitimate or illegitimate) of the “financial assistance”; absence of such reference indicates no limitation and that the offense covers collection/provision whether from legitimate or illegitimate source (¶173).
- The TF offense does not require that the funds were actually used to carry out or attempt a terrorist act, or be linked to a specific terrorist act (¶174).

### Attempt, participation, jurisdiction, and mental element
- Attempt to commit TF: not specifically addressed in CT Law but punishable under general Criminal Code dispositions; financial support and other acts under Article 4 of CT Law constitute felonies (Article 21 of the Criminal Code); attempts punishable by imprisonment for a period between five to fifteen years (Article 29 of the Criminal Code) (¶175).
- Participation/organization/contribution to TF: not specifically addressed in CT Law but punishable under general Criminal Code Articles 38, 39 and 40 (¶176).
- Jurisdiction: CT Law does not specify extraterritorial application for TF authors not in same country as assisted organization or where acts occurred; Criminal Code Articles 16 and 17 explicitly apply to anyone who committed or participated in a crime outside Qatar against “the internal and external security” of the State of Qatar and to anyone who, although in Qatar, committed or participated in “international terrorism” abroad — satisfying the standard on this point (¶178).
- Mental element: CT Law requires supplying financial assistance to a terrorist group or organization knowing its purpose beforehand (Article 4) — an intentional element; for TF proceedings, the principle of free appreciation of the evidence applies and intent may be inferred from objective factual circumstances (¶179).

### Liability of legal persons and sanctions
- Liability of legal persons: not specified in CT Law, but Article 37 of the Criminal Code envisages criminal liability of legal persons applicable to those that collect or provide financial support to terrorist groups, without precluding parallel civil or administrative proceedings (¶180).
- Sanctions: sanction for persons who collect or provide material and/or financial assistance to terrorist groups or organizations is life imprisonment (Article 4 of the CT Law) (¶181).
- Exemption from penalties: perpetrator of “a crime” (including TF per authorities) may be exempted from all penalties if they inform competent authorities before beginning execution of the crime (Article 14 of CT Law) — applicable when information is sufficiently comprehensive and timely; exemption may also be possible if informer enables arrest of other perpetrators (Article 14) (¶181).
- No reduction of sanction solely on basis of mercy: sanction may not be reduced solely because circumstances or personal situation call for mercy (Article 92 of the Criminal Code) (¶181).
- Confiscation related to TF: law allows confiscation of “the seized things, assets, weapons and machines resulting from or used in or that could be used in” a terrorist act (Article 15 of the CT Law); no statute of limitations applies to offenses and penalties in CT Law (¶181).

### Effectiveness, case experience, and human-rights balance
- Shortcomings flagged:
  - Coverage of terrorist acts not sufficiently broad to align fully with standard (example: unlawful seizure of an aircraft not considered a terrorist act absent intent to cause harm, death, terror or damage) (¶182).
  - Notion of terrorist groups or organizations is limited.
  - Law does not cover collection/provision of funds when there is no link to a terrorist group or organization (¶182).
- Practical enforcement:
  - In 2006, eight prosecutions were being or had been conducted for various forms of terrorist crimes, but none related to financing of terrorism (¶183).
  - Police confirmed no investigation has been conducted since or before 2006 on the basis of Article 4 of the CT Law (¶183).
  - These facts indicate law enforcement tend to disregard financing of terrorist acts and organizations and that precise scope/limitations of TF offense remain untested by the courts (¶183).
- Tension with protections for “freedom-fighters”:
  - Qatari Constitution Article 7 states foreign policy “shall support the right of peoples to self-determination”; Qatar is party to the 1998 Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism which excludes struggle for liberation and self-determination from definition of terrorism (¶184).
  - Case example: authorities refused to extradite a Chechen rebel who had an Interpol arrest warrant from 2001 and was designated by the UN Security Council 1267 Committee in June 2003; no UNSC 1267 measures were taken with respect to this individual; from June 2003 designation until the individual’s death in February 2004, authorities provided safe harbor and acted in violation of UNSC Resolution 1267 (¶184–47).
  - Recommendation that authorities reconsider how to balance effective fight against terrorism and financing with protection of peoples’ right to self-determination, recognizing UNSCR 1267 designations afford no discretion (¶184).

### Recommendations specific to TF (2.2.2) and SR.II compliance
- Recommended legislative and operational actions:
  - Amend the CT Law to ensure acts covered by Article 2 Paragraph 1 (a) of the ICSFT are criminalized in line with the conventions and that provision or collection of funds with the intention they be used, in full or in part, to commit any acts in Article 2 Paragraph 1 (a) of the ICSFT are considered terrorist acts even when the motive in Article 1 of CT Law is not established.
  - Amend the CT Law to ensure TF offense is considered committed by any person who by any means, directly or indirectly, willfully, provides or collects funds, or attempts to do so, with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used in full or in part to carry out a terrorist act; or by an individual terrorist.
  - Ensure investigations and prosecutions for terrorist crimes also cover financing of these crimes.
  - Provide training to all relevant authorities on the fight against TF (¶185).
- Compliance rating and factors (2.2.3):
  - SR.II: PC
  - Underlying factors:
    - Offense applies to all terrorist acts listed in Art. 2 para. 1 (b) of the ICSFT but motive required in CT Law is not in line with treaties referenced in Art. 2 para.1 (a).
    - Provision/collection of funds to individual terrorists and/or for terrorist acts are not covered by the offense.
    - Lack of overall effectiveness: no investigations or prosecutions have been conducted despite several investigations/prosecutions for other terrorist crimes (¶2.2.3 summary).

### Confiscation, freezing, and seizing of proceeds (R.3)
- Confiscation framework (¶186–188):
  - AML Law: “in all cases, and without prejudice to the rights of the other bona fide parties, the court shall order the confiscation of the instrumentalities, proceeds and returns of the crime” (Article 13 paragraph 6).
  - Definitions: instrumentalities = “everything used or intended to be used for committing the money laundering crime”; proceeds and returns = “any funds or property earned directly or indirectly by committing one of the crimes stipulated in this law” (Article 1 of the AML Law) (¶186).
  - Authorities state definitions cover all assets linked with ML or predicate, whether movable or immovable, including income, profits, interests, and other benefits from crime; only limitation is protection of third parties in good faith (¶186).
  - Confiscation of instrumentalities of the predicate crime covered by Article 76 of the Criminal Code for “things” that result from, or have been used in or intended to be used in commission of a felony or misdemeanor (applies to drug-related crimes, illegal trafficking in weapons, forgery, counterfeiting, and terrorist crimes) (¶186).
  - Confiscation is mandatory and must be ordered by courts even if not requested by prosecutor (¶186).
  - No money laundering charges have been brought to court; Article 13 remains untested, though authorities have experience confiscating proceeds/instrumentalities of other crimes (¶187).
  - Article 13 allows confiscation of “proceeds and returns of the crime” in all cases and without prejudice to rights of bona fide parties (¶188).

- Provisional measures / freezing (¶189–193):
  - Criminal Procedure Code sets general precautionary framework (Article 126–145) but AML Law supersedes with specific provisional measures for suspected ML (¶189).
  - Article 12 of AML Law (as amended by Decree Law (21) of 2003):
    - Governor of QCB may order freezing of funds or property when concerns they might be disposed of, for a period not to exceed ten days.
    - Governor must notify Public Prosecutor within three days, otherwise order deemed null.
    - Public Prosecutor entitled to cancel order or renew it for a maximum period of three months.
    - Further extension possible only through order from Supreme Criminal Court at request of Public Prosecutor; renewal can be made for same period(s) until criminal case settled by final judgment (¶189).
  - Procedure applies regardless of nature of property; for bank-held funds, Governor sends letter to all banks ordering freeze of specific person's accounts, usually at FIU request; facts giving rise to freezing are kept within FIU and governor’s office, only name provided to banks to ensure confidentiality (¶190).
  - For non-fund property, Governor would notify relevant authority (e.g., real estate registry, registry of commerce) though this has not been tested; only a few freezing orders have been issued and they all referred to bank accounts (¶190).
  - Governor is sole initiator of freezing or seizing measures under AML Law in all cases, including when property held by persons/institutions under other supervisory bodies (e.g., QFCRA) — because Article 12 measures are criminal in nature (¶191).
  - Ex parte practice: no legal provision requires initial freezing/seizing to be without prior notice, but in practice all freezing/seizing measures are taken ex parte (¶192).
  - Identification and tracing powers: Criminal Procedure Code Articles 27–36 define investigation officers and powers; Resolution (1) of 2005 granted head of FIU capacity of judicial police officer for AML investigations; investigative powers include inspections, witness hearings, searches, seizing correspondence, wire tapping, summons/arrest, etc.; access to bank secrecy requires court order, which authorities say is straightforward and not unduly delayed (¶193).

*Italic line: Source: _cr08322 - 171.      While the law specifically mentions terrorist groups and organizations, it does not extend the*

### 194.      Protection of Bona Fide Third Parties (c. 3.5): Article 13 of the AML Law provides that any

### Protection of Bona Fide Third Parties (c. 3.5)

### Protection of bona fide third parties and contestation
- Article 13 of the AML Law provides that any confiscation measures must be taken “without prejudice to the rights of the bona fide parties.”
- Authorities state that if a confiscation measure nevertheless infringes these rights, the bona fide third party may challenge the confiscation order before the ordinary courts of appeal.

### Power to void actions (c. 3.6)
- Article 16 of the AML Law: “without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties, the contract in which one of the parties or all of them know or have reason to believe that the objective of the contract is to prevent the confiscation of the instrumentalities, revenues or proceeds related to the money laundering crime, shall be deemed null and void.”
- Non-contractual actions intended to avoid recovery of property of criminal origin may be defeated by the general confiscation measures described in the AML framework.

### Additional elements and burden of proof (Rec. 3; c. 3.7)
- No specific provisions exist for:
  - Confiscation of assets from organizations principally criminal in nature;
  - Civil forfeiture;
  - Confiscation of Property which reverses Burden of Proof.
- There are no specific provisions dealing with confiscation of criminal organizations, civil forfeiture, or reversal of the burden of proof.

### Recommendations and comments (2.3.2)
- Assessors’ conclusions:
  - Overall, the AML Law and the Criminal Procedure Code enable authorities to confiscate all assets linked to a money laundering crime.
  - Provisional measures under the AML Law are issued by a supervisory body, which may be inconsistent with their criminal nature.
  - It may be more appropriate to grant initial freeze/seize powers to public prosecutors or the FIU rather than to the Governor of the QCB.
  - Very few provisional measures have been taken under Article 12 of the AML Law; no confiscation measures ordered in a trial for money laundering were identified.
  - Lack of comprehensive statistical information on provisional and confiscation measures hampers assessment of effectiveness.

- Specific recommendations:
  - Reconsider the role of the Governor of the QCB in the application of provisional measures under the AML Law.
  - Maintain comprehensive statistics on the freezing, seizing, and confiscation measures ordered.

### Compliance with Recommendation 3 (2.3.3)
- Rating: R.3 LC
- Underlying factor: Lack of evidence of the effectiveness of the AML confiscation framework.

---

### Freezing of Funds Used for Terrorist Financing (SR.III)

### SR.III standards and institutional arrangements (2.4.1)
- SR.III expectation: laws/procedures to freeze without delay funds and assets of persons designated pursuant to UNSCR 1267 and 1373; provisional measures to prevent dealing/transfer/disposal; designate a specific authority responsible for receiving and disseminating UNSCR lists and requests.
- Timeline of committees:
  - January 16, 2002: Council of Ministers established an interdepartmental Coordination Committee for UNSCR 1373 implementation (later extended to other UN counterterrorism resolutions).
  - March 26, 2007: Coordination Committee replaced by National Committee for Fighting Terrorism (NCT) with mandate to implement UNSCR 1373 and international conventions against terrorism; implementation of other relevant UNSCR (notably UNSCR 1267) was not included.

### Composition and powers of NCT
- NCT members include representatives from: MOI, Qatar Armed Forces, State Security Bureau, Internal Security Force, Ministry of Civil Service and Housing Affairs, Ministry of Finance, MEC, MOJ, Ministry of Endowment and Islamic Affairs, General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, QCB, General Authority of Customs and Ports, and Qatar Chambers of Commerce and Industry.
- MOFA is not a permanent member but is usually invited.
- QFC is not a permanent member.
- NCT chaired by MOI representative; meetings every two weeks or more often.
- Article 6 of decision: NCT may request information pertaining to its functions from any authority.

### Shortcomings in freezing mechanism for UNSCR 1267 and 1373 (c. III.1–III.3)
- From 2002–March 2007, UNSCR 1267 lists and UNSCR 1373 notifications were sent to MOFA then to Coordination Committee; updates were forwarded to some private sector entities in limited instances.
- QCB occasionally sent consolidated lists to domestic banks with a request to freeze accounts and inform QCB within 3 days in case of a positive match.
- QFCRA sent a few emails to QFC institutions linking to UNSC website requesting checks; unclear whether DSM and other authorities forwarded designations.
- The 2002 decision did not grant the Coordination Committee authority to designate terrorists or to issue freezing orders; no specific legal basis for freezing orders existed.
- The 2007 decision establishing NCT is silent on UNSCR 1267; NCT is not empowered to designate terrorists or issue freezing orders; no legal basis or clear mechanisms to ensure freezing of funds and assets without delay outside criminal proceedings.
- No alternative mechanism was created after abolition of prior mechanism that handled reception and dissemination of UNSCR 1267 updates.
- Conclusion: no mechanism in place dealing with implementation of UNSCR 1267 and no legal basis to require freezing of assets as set out under SR III.

### Domestic regulatory measures and limitations
- 2006 QCB AML/CFT instructions require supervised banks/financial institutions to freeze funds/assets belonging to terrorists/persons financing terrorism “according to court judgments or instructions issued by the Governor [of the QCB]” (Article 8 paragraph 3). Limitations:
  - Instructions enforceable only within QCB’s purview; do not apply to institutions acting in or from the QFC.
  - No court judgment passed on this issue; no further instructions listing names published; requirement currently an “empty shell.”
- Other potentially relevant provisions (but limited in scope):
  - Article 21 of the CT Law: Public prosecutor may provisionally order accused to stop disposing/managing assets when sufficient evidence on seriousness exists; applies only when criminal proceedings initiated; may extend to spouse or minor children if assets “were possessed from him.”
  - Article 12 of the AML Law (as amended by Decree Law No. (21) of 2001): Governor of QCB may freeze “funds or properties” for ten days when concerns exist the owner might dispose of them; Public Prosecutor and Supreme Criminal Court can extend freezing order; applies only when suspicions of money laundering, not terrorist financing.
  - Article 126 of the Criminal Procedure Code enables Public Prosecutor to freeze assets under certain circumstances; applies only within criminal proceedings for crimes other than terrorist financing (and money laundering).

### Overall finding on SR.III implementation
- There are no effective laws and regulations in place in Qatar to freeze terrorist funds or other assets without delay and without prior notice in accordance with UNSCR 1267 and 1373.

### Communication, coverage, and operational experience
- QFC and DSM are not members of the Coordination Committee and therefore are not immediately and directly informed of Committee actions; QFC reports it is informed of NCT decisions in practice but not necessarily simultaneously; communication with DSM not documented.
- Case examples and procedural gaps:
  - Authorities provided safe harbor to a foreign individual designated by UNSC 1267 Committee in June 2003 from an unknown date until the individual’s death in February 2004; no action taken to trace and freeze that individual’s assets.
  - Coordination Committee historically examined actions initiated under other countries’ freezing mechanisms and could request more detailed information from initiating States; no clear standards on required detail or reasonable grounds for forwarding names.
  - Due to absence of clear freezing orders, reporting entities are not demonstrably requested to freeze funds/assets owned or controlled by designated persons, or funds derived from those persons (c. III.4).
  - Some updates to UNSCR 1267 consolidated list were disseminated to private sector, but authorities failed to establish dissemination for all updates and for all requests made by other countries (c. III.5).
  - No freezing mechanism in place; consequently no guidance provided to financial institutions or other relevant holders of targeted funds/assets (c. III.6).
  - No publicly-known procedures for considering de-listing requests and for unfreezing funds of de-listed persons (c. III.7).
  - One “false positive” case: a bank account frozen after a positive match to UNSCR 1267 was later unfrozen when investigation revealed a homonym; authorities ordered lift of freezing measures. This demonstrates capacity to investigate, freeze and unfreeze funds, but does not confirm timeliness of action (c. III.8).
  - No publicly-known procedures to unfreeze, in a timely manner, funds/assets of persons inadvertently affected by freezing mechanisms.
  - No procedures in place to authorize access to frozen funds/assets necessary for basic expenses in accordance with UNSCR 1452; no requests recorded in the “false positive” case (c. III.9).
  - No procedures for persons/entities to challenge freezing measures (c. III.10).

### Freezing, seizing and confiscation in terrorist cases (c. III.11–III.12)
- Article 21 of the CT Law: Public Prosecutor may temporarily order accused to stop disposing/managing assets if enough evidence of gravity exists; may extend to spouse or minor children if established to be assigned to them through accusations.
- Article 15 of the CT Law allows confiscation of “the seized things, assets, weapons and machines resulting from or used in or that could be used in” a terrorist act. “Things” not defined; authorities state term is broadly used to cover “anything that might be used or becomes the proceeds of any terrorism or terrorism financing crime.”
- Protection of rights of third parties:
  - CT Law requires consideration of rights of bona fide parties before ordering confiscation (Article 15).
  - Criminal Procedure Code provisions for bona fide parties:
    - Article 127: “any concerned person may appeal against the issued order of the said prohibition … to the criminal court within six months from the date of issuance or notification, whichever is later. The court must decide on the appeal, within a period not exceeding thirty days from the report date.”
    - Article 128: “the General Prosecutor may cancel or amend the prohibition order, unless the order is issued by the court or the case is referred to it.”
    - Article 129: “the competent court may, upon considering the case, on its own or on the basis of the general prosecution request or the concerned persons, decide the cancellation or amendment of the prohibition issued order.”

*Source: _cr08322 - 194.      Protection of Bona Fide Third Parties (c. 3.5): Article 13 of the AML Law provides that any*

### 225.      Enforcing the Obligations under SR III (c. III.13). Qatar has not implemented an appropriate

### _cr08322 - 225.      Enforcing the Obligations under SR III (c. III.13). Qatar has not implemented an appropriate

### Enforcing the Obligations under SR III (summary of deficiencies)
- Qatar has not implemented an appropriate legal mechanism to freeze assets in accordance with SR III and has not established measures to monitor compliance with the obligations under SR III. (paragraph 225)
- None of the measures set out in the FATF Best Practice Paper for SR III have been implemented and no procedure has been adopted to authorize access to funds and other assets that have been frozen to cover necessary basic expenses. (paragraph 226)

### Recommendations and institutional comments (paragraphs 227–228)
- The Council of Ministers’ decision to establish a Coordination Committee was timely; the current NCT is useful but could be improved by inclusion of:
  - QFC and other authorities such as the public prosecutor’s office and the supervisory authority for capital markets. (paragraph 227)
- The legal and operational framework lacks a mechanism to implement UNSCR 1267 and does not provide for a formal and mandatory freezing mechanism. The framework should be expanded by legal measures to enable designation of suspected terrorists and freezing of assets in compliance with UNSCR 1267 and 1373. (paragraph 227)

- The authorities are recommended to: (paragraph 228)
  - Designate an authority responsible for analyzing requests made under UNSCR 1373 and for the designation of terrorists.
  - Designate an authority responsible for receiving and disseminating updates to the consolidated list established pursuant to UNSCR 1267.
  - Include the QFC and consider including the PPO and the DSM in the NCT.
  - Establish the necessary legal basis for the issuance by a competent authority of mandatory freezing orders of funds or other assets owned or controlled by designated persons, terrorists and those who finance terrorism or terrorist organizations, as well as funds or other assets that are derived or generated from funds or other assets owned or controlled by these same persons and entities.
  - Establish an effective mechanism for dissemination of UNSCR 1267 lists and actions taken under UNSCR 1373 to financial institutions and DNFBPs immediately upon receipt of the lists and upon taking decisions under UNSCR 1373.
  - Provide guidance to financial institutions and DNFBPs regarding their obligations in taking action in the freezing mechanisms.
  - Issue effective and publicly-known procedures for considering de-listing requests and unfreezing the funds and other assets of de-listed persons or entities in a timely manner.
  - Issue effective and publicly-known procedures for unfreezing in a timely manner the funds and other assets of persons or entities inadvertently affected by the freezing mechanisms upon verification that that person or entity is not the designated person.
  - Issue appropriate procedures for determining upon request the funds needed to cover basic expenses and for authorizing access to the funds or other assets frozen pursuant to UNSCR 1267 and that have been determined to be necessary to cover basic expenses.
  - Establish the legal basis for ordering the necessary provisional measures.
  - Establish appropriate procedures for challenging the freezing measures before the courts.
  - Define the funds and other assets that may be confiscated in a manner consistent with the international standard.
  - Establish an effective mechanism to monitor compliance with the relevant laws and regulations governing the freezing mechanisms under UNSCR 1267 and 1373.

### Compliance with Special Recommendation III (paragraphs 2.4.3)
- Rating: SR.III        NC
- Factors underlying rating:
  - No coordination mechanism in place for the implementation of UNSCR 1267.
  - There is no authority responsible for the designations, disseminations and no legal basis for the freezing/seizing orders.
  - With the exception of the protection of the rights of bona fide third parties, none of the measures provided under SR III have been adopted.
  - No funds have been frozen under UNSCR 1267, despite the presence in Qatar for several months of a person designated by the UNSCR 1267 Committee, or under UNSCR 1373.

### The Financial Intelligence Unit and its Functions (R.26) — Description and analysis (paragraphs 229–250)
- Legal basis and establishment:
  - Article 10 of the AML Law assigns the coordinator of NAMLC competence to receive reports related to suspicion of money laundering crimes; Article 20 provides that the minister of interior, in coordination with the Governor of QCB, shall, based on a proposal by the NAMLC, issue the executive resolutions of the provisions of the AML Law.
  - In 2004 the President of NAMLC issued Administrative Order No. 1 of 2004 to establish the FIU; the Administrative Order describes powers, functions, and structure of the FIU. In practice the FIU operates on the basis of the Administrative Order. However, the president of NAMLC did not have the power to issue such Administrative Order and therefore it has no legal basis. The Administrative Order is inconsistent with the AML Law which gave the coordinator of NAMLC the power to receive, analyze, and disseminate STRs. (paragraphs 229–230)
  - The FIU became operational on October 16, 2004 and functions as an administrative unit with a mandate covering fighting money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. (paragraph 230)

- Powers and responsibilities under the Administrative Order (paragraph 231):
  - receiving suspicious transaction reports related to money laundering and terrorism financing directly from all concerned entities in Qatar (including all financial and non financial institutions and law enforcement agencies);
  - analyzing suspicious transaction reports and taking appropriate decisions thereon;
  - filing suspicious transaction reports proved not to be suspicious and forwarding the ones it deems suspicious to law enforcement agencies and the Public Prosecution. The unit may request further information from all law enforcement agencies regarding suspicious transaction reports;
  - exchanging information with counterpart financial intelligence units and international bodies and organizations, in accordance with the provisions of the AML Law and its amendments and the principles of exchanging information issued by the Egmont Group.

- Operational practices and limitations:
  - The FIU serves as a national centre for analyzing STRs by monitoring STRs submitted, conducting database checks and disseminating them to the PPO as necessary. The FIU sometimes requests additional information from databases (real estate registration, authentication register, financial instruments register) but does not do so in all cases where it would be necessary. Apart from a few cases, the FIU has not requested additional information from reporting entities and the ECPD. The FIU is not, in practice, using the Central Reports System (CRS). (paragraph 232)
  - A standard form for STRs has been developed and transmitted to reporting entities; the FIU encourages use of this form but accepts STRs in other forms. (paragraph 234)
  - The FIU has provided informal “verbal” guidance to financial institutions, DNFBPs, and NPOs but has not issued written guidelines. The absence of written guidance precludes a common understanding of reporting requirements. (paragraph 235)

- Access to information and databases (paragraphs 236–237, 238):
  - FIU staff access: FIU’s own database includes all information related to STRs and an electronic archive of correspondence and documents.
  - Article 3 of the Administrative Order permits the FIU to request further investigations from law enforcement agencies regarding information contained in STRs. The FIU cooperates with the ECPD to benefit from administrative or law enforcement information. The ECPD accesses MOI databases including personal details of citizens and residents, car numbers and owners, their sale and export, companies and institutions systems and activities, register of entering and leaving the country, visa system, telephone numbers, and the geographical locations guideline of the ministry. The Criminal records department is part of the MOI and can be accessed by the ECPD. (paragraph 236)
  - FIU is developing links to other databases: QCB-developed link with the commercial register to be accessible to FIU in the near future; a secure online submission system is being developed and should become operational in the near future. The CRS enables direct access to customer accounts including movement and transactional information, but the FIU is not using CRS and accounts of financial institutions in the QFC will not be accessible through CRS. Article 8(6) of the AML Regulations requires relevant persons to ensure their MLRO acts as point of contact and to respond promptly to FIU requests. (paragraph 237)
  - Article 6 of the Administrative Order empowers the FIU to ask financial institutions whether they conducted transactions with a person subject of an STR or to request additional information/documentation; however the FIU is not empowered to make such requests to DNFBPs. In practice the FIU has requested additional information from reporting entities within the domestic sector but not from financial institutions operating in QFC. (paragraph 238)

- Dissemination, case handling and outcomes (paragraph 239):
  - The FIU is empowered to forward STRs to law enforcement agencies and the PPO pursuant to Article 3 of the Administrative Order.
  - To date, the FIU has not determined objective criteria for dissemination; the head of the FIU decides to file or disseminate cases to the PPO.
  - Practice: forward cases still deemed suspicious after analysis to the PPO who then continues judicial investigation or commences criminal proceedings.
  - Only one money laundering case was deemed suspicious and forwarded to the Public Prosecutor who determined there was no basis to proceed further.
  - No STRs regarding terrorist financing have been disseminated to the PPO. (paragraph 239)

- Operational independence and protection of information (paragraphs 240–242):
  - Article 1 of the Administrative Order provides the legal basis for FIU operational independence; however the inconsistency between the Administrative Order and the AML Law may undermine FIU independence. (paragraph 240)
  - Article 2 states the president of NAMLC shall issue a decree nominating the head of the unit and approving organizational structure and financial budget. With the exception of freezing orders, in practice the head of the FIU has a broad range of competencies ensuring operational independence and autonomy. (paragraph 241)
  - Authorities consider FIU information protected under Article 5 of the AML Law, Law (33) of 2006 (confidentiality of banking transactions), and Article 332 of the Penal Code. The assessment team views these provisions as uncertain and insufficient to protect FIU-held information. STRs and related information are entered into the database without a log history to record all queries made by FIU employees. Authorities state only FIU staff and relevant IT department staff are permitted access. (paragraph 242)

- Reporting, international engagement and resources (paragraphs 243–249):
  - The FIU has not released statistics, trends analysis, or typologies concerning its activities. An annual report was published in 2006 consisting of the AML/CFT laws and regulations in force in Qatar. The FIU manages its own website containing information on AML/CFT regulations and the 40+9 FATF recommendations. (paragraph 243)
  - The FIU was recognized as an Egmont Group member in July 2005 and has joined the Egmont IT Working Group. (paragraph 244)
  - Pursuant to Article 3 of the Administrative Order, the FIU should exchange information with foreign FIUs according to Egmont principles. The FIU requested information from other FIUs in 4 cases, one through the Egmont Secure Web. The FIU did not sign bilateral or multilateral MOUs with foreign FIUs. The FIU received only two requests from foreign counterparts. (paragraph 245)
  - Staffing: The FIU has 10 full-time staff: head of the Unit, 1 Analyst, 1 researcher, 2 IT/analysis specialists, 2 for secretariat services, 2 for administrative support, one part-time legal advisor and 2 part-time IT experts. (paragraph 246)
  - Structure: three specialized operational divisions: Analysis and Dissemination Division; Studies and Follow-up Division; I.T. and International Cooperation Division. (paragraph 247)
  - The FIU currently has one staff (head of the financial analysis and dissemination division) in charge of monitoring STRs, conducting database checks and analysis and disseminating STRs as necessary. (paragraph 248)

- FIU budget and resource allocation (Table and paragraph 249):
  - Budget (Qatari Riyals / US$):
    - 2004: 1,173,280 / 325,911
    - 2005: 5,537,000 / 1,538,055
    - 2006: 11,142,500 / 3,095,138
    - 2007: 12,386,000 / 3,440,555
  - 2007 Budget provisions include:
    - 100,000 Riyals: subscription in Reuters, Telerate, Swift and press agencies;
    - 50.000 Riyals: connection to internet;
    - 50,000 Riyals: development of electronic archive.
  - The amounts assigned for analysis represent only 1.6 percent of the FIU budget (QR 200,000/12,386,000). (paragraph 249)

- Overall assessment of FIU capacity (paragraph 250):
  - The FIU does not appear to have the appropriate level of human resources to properly undertake its functions.
  - Resources allocated to STR analysis are insufficient and do not reflect the importance of that function.

*Source: _cr08322 - 225. Enforcing the Obligations under SR III (c. III.13). Qatar has not implemented an appropriate*

### 251.      Integrity of FIU Authorities (c. 30.2). All FIU incoming employees undergo background checks

### _cr08322 - 251.      Integrity of FIU Authorities (c. 30.2). All FIU incoming employees undergo background checks

### Integrity of FIU Authorities (c. 30.2)
- All FIU incoming employees undergo background checks and a security clearance which includes criminal record checks and interviews to ensure that the appropriate security measures are in place to maintain the integrity of the FIU operations.

### Training for FIU Staff (c. 30.3)
- Some staff have received training and have provided some training for private sector entities as well as the concerned authorities.
- Additional specialized and practical in-depth training would be highly beneficial.

### STRs Statistics and Recordkeeping (applying R.32 to FIU)
- The FIU keeps an electronic database (and a manual database), which stores the STRs received by the FIU since October 2004, the date the FIU became operational. It classifies them by entities sending the information.
- The total number of STRs and other information sent by concerned authorities in the database from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2006 is 266.
- Before the FIU became operational, STRs were filed with a specialized department at QCB.
- Table 9: STR and Other Relevant Information Received by the FIU (selected figures extracted exactly as presented)
  - Internal — Banks: 2002: 8; 2003: 11; 2004: 13; 2005: 21; 2006: 27; Total: 80
  - Internal — Exchange Houses: 2002: 31; 2003: 22; 2004: 7; 2005: 14; 2006: 16; Total: 90
  - Internal — MOI: 2002: 3; 2003: 23; 2004: 10; 2005: 23; 2006: 59
  - Internal — QCB: 2002: 7; 2004: 8; Total: 15
  - Internal — DSM: 2005: 6; Total: 6
  - Internal — SSB: 2004: 1; 2005: 2; 2006: 3
  - Internal — Customs: 2005: 1; Total: 1
  - Internal — Post Office: 2002: 2; 2003: 2
  - Internal — Individual: 2005: 1; Total: 1
  - Internal — Real Estate Register: 2004: 1; 2006: 1
  - Internal — Brokerage Firms: 2003: 4; 2004: 4
  - External — FIU: 2004: 1; 2005: 2; Total: 3
  - Total by year: 2002: 39; 2003: 43; 2004: 44; 2005: 67; 2006: 72; Total: 265
  - Total of STR received from Financial Institutions and DNFBPs: 2002: 39; 2003: 33; 2004: 20; 2005: 35; 2006: 43; Total: 170 (approximately 80 STR received by the FIU since its establishment)
- The FIU receives ML and TF related information from other sources that are considered an STR and recorded as such.
- No statistics are kept on the number of referrals made by the FIU to national authorities.
- Only one case was transmitted to the PPO.
- The FIU has not received any STR related to FT.
- The FIU requested information from other FIUs in 4 cases, one of them through the Egmont Secure Web.
- The FIU does not review periodically the effectiveness of the system to combat ML and FT.

### Recommendations and Comments (numbered list condensed into bullets)
- Address the legal basis that established the FIU as a national centre for receiving, analyzing and disseminating disclosures of STRs and other relevant information concerning suspected ML or FT activities; FIU should be grounded on a sound legal basis.
- Ensure that the QFCRA removes the third point from the letters disseminated to DNFBPs that includes the obligation to notify QFCRA of any suspicion of ML notwithstanding that an STR has not been made to the local FIU.
- Ensure that the FIU provides financial institutions and other reporting parties with guidance regarding the manner of reporting, including the procedures to be followed when reporting.
- Ensure that the FIU:
  - (i) enhances the depth and quality of its STRs analysis, in particular by accessing the CRS and requesting on a regular basis additional information from reporting entities and the ECPD;
  - (ii) uses, when necessary, the CRS, the link to the commercial register developed by the QCB, the real estate register and all available databases to enhance its STR analysis;
  - (iii) undertakes a study focusing specifically on the risks of ML and FT associated with certain businesses.
- Ensure that the FIU establishes mechanisms for cooperation with regulators, supervisors, reporting entities and law enforcement authorities to optimize its analysis and establishes an information flow that protects confidentiality while enhancing its analysis capacity.
- Grant the FIU the power to ask the DNFBPs whether they have had transactions with a person who was the subject of an STR, or to demand additional information from them.
- Ensure that the FIU periodically reviews the effectiveness of the system to combat ML and FT and improves its collection of statistics.
- Ensure that the FIU publishes periodically annual reports, typologies and trends of ML/FT.
- Ensure that the FIU provides additional specialized and practical in-depth training to its employees covering, for example, the scope of predicate offenses, analysis and investigation techniques and familiarization with prosecution of ML/FT techniques.

### Compliance with Recommendation 26 — Rating: LC
- Summary of factors relevant to s.2.5 underlying overall rating:
  - Absence of a clear legal basis for establishing the FIU and providing it with its powers and functions.
  - Absence of a legal basis to request additional information from DNFBPs.
  - Poor quality of and insufficient resources allocated to STRs analysis.
  - No guidance on filing STRs has been issued by the FIU.
  - Inadequate protection of information and premises.
  - No periodic review of system’s effectiveness in combating ML and FT.

### Law enforcement, prosecution and other competent authorities — framework for investigation and prosecution, confiscation and freezing (R.27, and 28)
- Designation of Authorities ML/FT investigations (c. 27.1):
  - Investigation officers are: (i) Members of the PPO; (ii) Members of the Police Force; (iii) Members of the SSB; (iv) Members of Customs; and (v) the head of the FIU with respect to any crimes committed under the AML Law.
  - Authorities in charge of AML/CFT investigations operate independently and are mainly the responsibility of four separate authorities: (i) the ECPD within the MOI; (ii) the General Prosecutor; (iii) the SSB; and (iv) the customs.
  - Investigation officers are subject to the Public Prosecutor’s supervision with respect to criminal investigations (Article 8 of CPC).
- ECPD and Fighting Money Laundering Unit:
  - Work of the ECPD regulated by Resolution No.(29) of 2004, issued by the MOI on July 28, 2004.
  - ECPD is affiliated to the director of the criminal investigation department; specialized in investigations of ML, e-crimes and counterfeiting and falsification of currency; responsible to investigate crimes concerning the protection of copyright and neighboring rights.
  - The Fighting Money Laundering Unit is the designated law enforcement agency for AML investigations; CFT investigations are the sole responsibility of the SSB.
  - The ECPD receives requests for information from the FIU, carries out investigations to identify suspects' transactions, relations, commercial activities, real estate properties and persons dealing with the suspect; notifies the FIU of investigation findings and refers suspects to the PPO if ML offense or attempt is established.
- PPO:
  - Headed by the General Prosecutor; functions and jurisdiction regulated by law No.(10) of 2002 that established the PPO.
  - PPO consists of 145 members.
  - At time of assessment, the PPO had received, investigated one case of ML forwarded by the FIU.
- SSB:
  - Established pursuant to No. 5 of 2003; direct reporting line to the Emir.
  - Powers regarding investigation into ML/TF set out in Article 2 of Law No.5 of 2003 with multiple mandates including combating activities harmful to the economy of the State and its revenues.
  - Under Article 3 of Law No. (5) of 2003, SSB has authority of surveillance and investigation through different technical and professional means; discretion to decide whether to investigate cases depending on seriousness.
  - A copy of all STRs and related documents is usually sent by the FIU to the SSB to perform investigations about suspects.
  - Since the SSB has the exclusive authority over any other law enforcement authority, conflicts of authorities and overlap in investigations may arise.
- Customs:
  - Law No. (40) of 2002 regulates work of customs; powers include stopping people and goods at the border, checking, searching, and seizing restricted and prohibited goods.

### Investigative powers and special techniques
- Ability to Postpone / Waive Arrest of Suspects or Seizure of Property (c. 27.2):
  - Postponing arrests or seizures for investigative and identification of suspects is considered within the investigation officer’s police powers, although not supported by any formal legal text.
  - The PPO uses discretionary power to undertake action to arrest a suspect, to seize property or to postpone such actions.
- Telephone tapping and other techniques (c. 27.3 & c. 27.4):
  - Telephone tapping of conversations occurring in private places allowed pursuant to Article 77 of the CPC for specified crimes; conducted by members of the PPO based on a written order by the Public Prosecutor, otherwise by a judge of competent court of first instance.
  - Measure must not exceed a period of thirty days and is renewable for similar periods.
  - ECPD and SSB report regular use of telephone tapping in investigations; technologies used include listening devices, cameras, computer verification and e-mail tracking.
- Specialized investigation groups & multinational cooperation (c. 27.5):
  - To date, authorities have not considered putting in place specialized investigation groups or conducting multi-national cooperative investigations.
- Review of ML & FT trends (c. 27.6):
  - ML methods, techniques and trends are not reviewed by law enforcement authorities on a regular, interagency basis.
  - No analysis or studies are conducted or disseminated.

### Powers to compel evidence and witness statements (R.28)
- Ability to Compel Production of and Searches for Documents and Information (c. 28.1):
  - According to Article 75-77 of the CPC, law enforcement agencies have powers to compel production of documents, search persons or premises and seize and obtain documents when written permission is obtained from the PPO.
  - The SSB can demand information in writing from any person or party; it has powers to carry out investigations and collect evidence about crimes that fall under its powers or submitted by the Emir (Article 6 of the SSB Law).
  - Law enforcement authorities have full powers to compel production of bank account records, account files, business correspondence, and other records held or maintained by financial institutions and other businesses or persons.
  - The FIU is capable of obtaining transaction records and identification data through the CDD process from financial institutions.
  - The CRS that enables direct access to customer’s accounts, transactional information, and all personal information received through CDD should be available to the FIU’s access in the future.
- Power to Take Witnesses’ Statement (c. 28.2):
  - Article 84 of the CPC provides that PPO shall hear witnesses’ statements to establish or facilitate establishment of the crime and attribute the crime to the suspect.
  - Article 3 of Law No.(5) of 2003 provides that the SSB shall have the authority of the police force as defined in the CPC.
  - Therefore, both the PPO and the SSB have the power to take witnesses’ statements in ML/FT cases.

### Adequacy of Resources and Integrity for Competent Authorities
- Adequacy of Resources to Law Enforcement (c. 30.1):
  - The budget of the ECPD is decided by the minister of internal affairs.
  - Currently, nine full time officers work at the ECPD.
  - Three of them are appointed for full time job at the fighting ML Unit and six officers from other units can assist if necessary.
  - If the AML Law is modified to include all “designated categories of offenses” the current staff at the ML Unit would not be able to deal with all requests for information forwarded from the FIU.
  - The number of staff at the PPO seems to be sufficient but the level of specialized qualification/expertise does not appear to be adequate.
  - Although the SSB indicated that they had adequate staff, the number was not revealed for national security reasons.
  - The Customs Authority numbers approximately 1,350 officers.
- Integrity of Competent Authorities (c. 30.2):
  - Article (11) of the Police Law (23) of 1993: officers shall be appointed as per an Emiri Resolution, at the suggestion of the Minister of Interior.
  - Article (12): officers should have a good conduct and good reputation; No judgment should have been rendered against them in a dishonorable crime or integrity crime, unless rehabilitated; they should not have been dismissed from public service pursuant to a final disciplinary judgment due to serious violations; they should not be affiliated to any political party and should have graduated from a recognized police college or institute.
  - According to Article 28 of the CPC, the PPO may request that a disciplinary action be taken against officers without prejudice to the right to initiate a criminal prosecution.
  - Prosecutors are appointed by the Emir and are subject to the legal profession disciplinary rules.

### Training for Competent Authorities (c. 30.3 & c. 30.4)
- ECPD:
  - Members were selected after personal interviews, an integrity check, and were provided with AML/CFT training sessions.
- Prosecutors:
  - Have taken part in several training sessions related to fighting terrorism, money laundering and corruption.
  - PPO did not provide adequate and relevant training such as the scope of predicate offenses, ML and FT typologies, and techniques to investigate and prosecute these offenses.
- SSB:
  - Conduct frequent internal training programs and has also received training from foreign intelligence agencies.
- Customs:
  - Each customs officer receives 10 hours of training on AML matters when appointed as inspector.
  - Nevertheless, the lack of trained customs officials constitutes a serious handicap.
- Judges:
  - Judges do not benefit from any special training or any educational programs concerning AML/CFT matters.

### Law enforcement statistics (applying R.32)
- The ECPD keeps statistics on ML suspicious cases transmitted by the FIU.
- The PPO received only one case from the FIU where it considered that no offense was committed.
- No confiscations have been pronounced in ML/FT cases.
- Annual statistics are kept on some crimes and judicial actions, but provided statistics did not contain information on the amount of seized and confiscated criminal proceeds.

*Source: _cr08322 - 251.      Integrity of FIU Authorities (c. 30.2). All FIU incoming employees undergo background checks*

### 280.      The customs do not use an electronic database to keep all statistics on crimes and trafficking.

### _cr08322 - 280.      The customs do not use an electronic database to keep all statistics on crimes and trafficking.

### Key findings on statistics, investigations, and customs information systems
- "The customs do not use an electronic database to keep all statistics on crimes and trafficking. Therefore, the statistical and analytical tools are not available." (para. 280)
- Investigative and prosecutorial authorities "need to focus more on investigating and prosecuting of ML offence and not just on the predicate offenses." (para. 281)
- "Considering the lack of comprehensive statistics (especially the number of investigations initiated in AML/CFT area and the percentage of total investigations solved), it is not possible to assess whether law enforcement and prosecution authorities effectively perform their functions." (para. 281)
- Customs retain passenger and shipments records in hard copy; "There is no online access to this information by other law enforcement authorities or the FIU." (para. 301)
- Only one case was transmitted to the FIU in 2006 through the representative of customs in NAMLC. (para. 293, para. 299)

### Recommendations to improve statistics, training, and investigative focus
- Ensure that law enforcement authorities keep statistics on:
  - "the amount of criminal proceeds seized and confiscated" and
  - "the number of ML/TF investigations, prosecutions, and judgments to measure the effectiveness and competence of the AML/CFT system." (para. 282)
- "Provide additional specialized and practical training to law enforcement and prosecution personnel as well as to police officers and customs agents on the fight against ML/FT." Training should cover:
  - "the scope of predicate offenses, ML and FT typologies, investigation techniques and familiarization with prosecution of ML/FT techniques and the use of information technology and other areas relevant to the execution of the law enforcement staff functions." (para. 282)
- "Take a more proactive approach to investigating and prosecuting ML/FT." (para. 282)

### Cross-border currency controls (SR.IX) — description and deficiencies
- Monitoring responsibilities and legal framework:
  - "The General Directorate for Customs and Ports (GDCP) is responsible for monitoring the national territory and borders of Qatar." (para. 283)
  - Article 1 of Law No. 40 of 2002 (Customs Law) grants GDCP enforcement authority. (para. 283)
- Inconsistencies and implementation failures in declaration/disclosure regime:
  - Administrative Circular No. 40 of 2001; Resolution 5-2005 (declaration); Resolution 37-2006 (disclosure) create inconsistent wording where "some provisions mention 'declaration' while others mention 'disclosure'." (para. 284)
  - "The threshold for declaration was never set and, in practice, the system was never implemented." (para. 285)
  - Resolution 37-2006's disclosure system "does not extend to the shipment of currency through containerized cargo and mailing of currency or bearer negotiable instruments." (para. 286)
  - The system "applies to incoming transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments and does not extend to outgoing transportation." (para. 287)
- Practical shortcomings in customs powers and procedures:
  - Customs "may stop or restrain the currency or bearer negotiable instruments only in case of suspicion of both money laundering and terrorist financing" and "do not appear to have any power to stop or restrain in cases of false disclosure." (para. 291)
  - "To date, no currency was retained by the customs authorities based on suspicion." (para. 291)
  - Resolution 5-2005 amended by Resolution 37-2006 is "silent with regard to the retention of the amount of currency or bearer negotiable instruments and of the identification data of the bearer(s)." (para. 292)
  - Circular No. 40-2001 provides that customs declarations "shall be kept for a period of at least five years but it is not implemented in practice." (para. 292)
- Information sharing and safeguards:
  - "There does not appear to be a system in place whereby the FIU is notified about suspicious cross-border transportation incidents or disclosure information directly available to the FIU." (para. 293)
  - "An ongoing coordination and cooperation among customs authorities, other law enforcement authorities and the FIU to implement the general policy set by the NAMLC is in place. Nevertheless, no policies or procedures related to the implementation of SRIX were adopted or implemented to date." (para. 294)
  - Customs have "a special division in charge of exchanging information and reports" and informants stated "Qatari customs authorities engage in exchanges of information and reports about suspicious transactions and other aspects related to customs with other countries" but assessors "could not verify whether such international cooperation is effective in place." (para. 295)
  - "The customs officials do not appear to have any power to sanction for making false disclosure." (para. 296)
  - It "could not be verified that in practice the names of travelers are checked against the various UN terrorist lists." (para. 297)
  - "Qatar does not appear to have a formal system in place for its customs services to notify their counterparts in other countries of unusual cross-border movements of gold, precious metals or precious stones." (para. 298)
  - "There are no special mechanisms for safeguarding such information or information related to cross-border transactions." (para. 299)

### SR.IX recommendations and required legal/regulatory changes
- Adopt a national strategic approach to detect physical cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments and amend Resolution 37-2006 to provide a clear legal basis for a disclosure system. The internally consistent regulation should reflect:
  - The system should "apply to both incoming and outgoing transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments and extend to the shipment of currency through containerized cargo and mailing of currency or bearer negotiable instruments." (para. 302)
  - "Article 6 of Resolution 5-2005 should be amended to give the power to customs to request and obtain further information from the carrier with regard to the origin of the currency or bearer negotiable instruments and their intended use in case of suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing." (para. 302)
  - "Customs should be able to stop or restrain cash or bearer negotiable instruments for a reasonable time in order to ascertain whether evidence of money laundering or terrorist financing may be found, where there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing; or where there is a false declaration or false disclosure." (para. 302)
  - "Enhance exchange of information between the customs and the FIU and create a database at the customs to record all declared data related to currencies and bearer financial instruments." (para. 302)

### Compliance ratings and factors
- R.27 — PC
  - "Overall, investigation and prosecution authorities do not appear to adequately pursue money laundering cases."
  - "Shortage in evidence of effectiveness of law enforcement authorities and lack of statistics."
  - "Lack of implementation of laws and use of law enforcement techniques in support of ML/FT investigations across various law enforcement agencies."
  - "Inadequate AML/CFT training." (section 2.6.3)
- R.28 — C
  - "This Recommendation is fully met." (section 2.6.3)
- SR.IX — NC
  - "Absence of implementation of the disclosure system for cross-border transportation of cash and bearer negotiable instruments."
  - "Lack of retention of records."
  - "Lack of trained customs officials."
  - "Lack of clear sanctions for false disclosure, failure to disclose, or cross-border transportation for money laundering and financing of terrorism purposes."
  - "Lack of clear safeguards to ensure proper use of disclosed information."
  - "Insufficient statistics upon which to assess the effectiveness of the measures in place." (section 2.7.3)

### Preventive measures — supervisory context (selected points relevant to data and enforcement)
- The Qatari financial system comprises a "Domestic sector" and the QFC; the Domestic sector includes "17 banks, 3 investment companies, 19 exchanges houses, and 1 finance company (under the QCB); 8 insurance companies (under the MEC); and 7 brokerage firms (under the DSM)." The QFC had "12 firms registered" with "only 2 firms... operational" at mission date. (para. 303)
- Under the AML Law, "financial institutions are defined as 'any companies or institutions licensed to carry out banking or financial businesses such as banks, exchange bureaux, investment companies, finance companies, insurance companies, companies or professionals carrying out financial services, brokers of shares and securities, or any similar individuals or entities.'" The definition "does not cover the full range of financial institutions listed in the FATF Glossary" and excludes specified activities such as "financial leasing, issuance of traveler’s checks and money orders, safekeeping and administration of cash or liquid securities on behalf of other persons and participation in securities issues and the provision of financial services related to such issues." (para. 304)
- QCB issued "Instructions of Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing" (QCB AML/CFT Instructions) in 2006 requiring, among other things, that banking and financial institutions: "know their customers; develop AML/CFT programs including training; pay attention to extraordinary, complex, and large transactions; report suspicious transactions; avoid tipping off customers; maintain documents for at least 15 years; and freeze funds or assets suspected or linked to money laundering and terrorism financing." (para. 306)
- DSM Decision No. (16/3) of 2005 requires brokerage firms to: "verify the customer’s identity and conduct due diligence; report cash transactions exceeding the established threshold; maintain documentation for at least 15 years and avail this information to the DSM, the FIU, and judicial authorities; establish internal restrictions, procedures, and rules to detect and report suspicious transactions; establish supervisory procedures and training programs; appoint a money laundering reporting (liaison) officer; and avoid tipping off." (para. 308)

*Source: _cr08322 - 280.      The customs do not use an electronic database to keep all statistics on crimes and trafficking.*

### 309.      Enforceability of the DSM Decision 16/3. It may not be considered as “law and regulation”

### _cr08322 - 309.      Enforceability of the DSM Decision 16/3. It may not be considered as “law and regulation”

### Enforceability of DSM Decision 16/3 and DSM legal powers
- The DSM Decision 16/3 "may not be considered as 'law and regulation' because, like the QCB Instructions, it has not been issued by the executive body."
- Article 15 of the Decision refers to the sanctions mentioned under the AML Law (i.e. sanctions for money laundering activities and for “tipping-off”).
- Authorities informed the assessment team that Article 15 is not a limitative disposition and that noncompliance with the Decision’s requirements would be sanctioned under the general sanctioning powers granted to the DSM in Article 20 of the DSM Law.
- Issued pursuant to the powers given under the DSM Law, and drafted in mandatory terms, with sanctions for noncompliance, the DSM Decision constitutes “other enforceable means” for the purpose of this assessment.

### MEC (Ministry of Economy and Commerce) role and Circular No. (1) of 2007
- The MEC "has not legal basis to conduct AML/CFT supervision."
- The MEC is acting as de facto supervisor for AML requirements and has issued AML measures in Circular No. (1) of 2007.
- Circular No. (1) of 2007 “requires” insurance companies to:
  - identify the customers and conduct due diligence;
  - pay special attention to unusual transactions or companies in countries that do not apply or insufficiently apply the provisions;
  - maintain documentation for at least five years;
  - establish policies and plans to combat money laundering and terrorist financing including supervisory measures and training;
  - appoint a money laundering reporting (follow-up) officer;
  - report suspicious transactions to the FIU; and
  - prohibition of tipping off.
- The measures listed in the Circular are not enforceable; they "do not constitute law or regulation and cannot be considered as 'other enforceable means' for the purpose of this assessment."

### QFC legal and supervisory framework (QFC Law, QFCA, QFCRA)
- Article 3 of Law No. (7) of 2005 (the QFC Law) provides that the business of operating the QFC should be managed in accordance with its objectives in Article 5 by the QFC Authority (QFCA).
- The QFCA should have an independent legal personality and full capacity to act and have financial and administrative independence from the State.
- Article 8 of the QFC Law establishes the QFC Regulatory Authority (QFCRA) for regulating, licensing, and supervising banking, financial and insurance-related businesses carried on in or from the QFC.
- The QFCRA is the only QFC body with powers to regulate, license, and supervise activities listed under Schedule 3 of the QFC Law.
- The QFC Authority, the QFC Regulatory Authority, and the QFC Appeals Body can prepare and submit regulations or amendments to the MEC, including on “prohibition of money laundering and other financial improprieties” (Articles 9 and Schedule 2, paragraph 8 of the QFC Law).
- Criminal laws (including the AML Law) of the State of Qatar apply within the QFC; civil laws, rules, and regulations of the State of Qatar also apply except where QFC Regulations exclude or conflict, in which case QFC Regulations prevail (Article 18 of the QFC Law).

### QFC AML Regulations and Rulebook — enforceability and nature
- In September 2005, the Minister of Economy and Commerce enacted the QFC Anti-Money Laundering Regulations (QFC Regulation No. (3) of 2005) under Article 9 of the QFC Law.
  - These Regulations set out measures that are mandatory for all persons and institutions acting in or from the QFC.
  - Pursuant to Schedule 2 of the QFC Financial Services Regulations, duties relating to monitoring, supervision, investigation, enforcement and oversight of AML regulations are vested in the QFCRA.
  - Noncompliance with QFC AML Regulations may be sanctioned by the QFCRA by any disciplinary measures listed in Part 9 of QFC Regulations No. (1) (QFC Financial Services Regulations).
- Enforceability assessment:
  - The QFC Regulations were enacted by a Minister member of the Council of Ministers and forwarded to the entire Council.
  - They are drafted in mandatory terms, carry sanctions for noncompliance, and reference relevant laws (such as the QFC law) and the QFC’s powers to issue AML regulations.
  - Therefore, the QFC AML Regulations may be considered as secondary legislation for the purpose of this assessment.
  - At the time of the assessment, none of the measures in the regulations had been enforced because most persons and institutions acting in or from the QFC were still setting up business; none of the QFCRA’s decisions had been brought before the QFC Appeal Body.
- In October 2005, the QFCRA issued the Anti-Money Laundering Rulebook (AML Rulebook) under Paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 of the QFC Financial Services Regulations.
  - The Rulebook “extends and clarifies the provisions of the AML Regulations.”
  - The Rulebook contains rules (mandatory) and guidance (non-mandatory).
  - Noncompliance with mandatory provisions would entail application of disciplinary sanctions listed in Part 9 of the QFC Financial Services Regulations; non-compliance with guidance is not enforceable.
  - Appendix 1 of the Rulebook is ambiguous: although many measures appear under the sub-title “Guidance,” Rule 3.8.4 refers to Appendix 1 measures as “rules” which financial institutions “must comply” with; assessors consider the full list in Appendix 1 to constitute “other enforceable means.”
  - The QFC AML Rulebook had not been enforced at the time of the assessment due to the recent establishment of financial institutions within the QFC.
  - QFC Regulations and Rulebook may not contradict the AML Law but may go beyond it, subjecting QFC businesses to more stringent measures than domestic counterparts.

### Risk of Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing (ML/TF) — overall assessment
- The AML Law does not require that actions taken by financial institutions take into account the degree of ML/TF risk as required by the FATF Recommendations.
- Authorities have not conducted an assessment of potential ML/TF risks affecting the Qatari financial system and/or institutions within the system.
- Existing AML/CFT legal and supervisory frameworks have been developed without considering ML/FT risk level.

Domestic sector
- The QCB (supervisor of banks, exchange houses, finance companies, and investment companies) is the only domestic supervisory authority that recently adopted a risk-based approach to supervision for prudential and AML/CFT matters.
- The new supervisory approach was adopted in November 2006 and had been implemented only once during a bank inspection that had not yet concluded as of the mission visit; the mission could not conclude on the effectiveness of QCB’s risk-based approach.
- The DSM is the competent authority for supervision of securities brokerage firms and intermediaries as empowered by Law 14.
- The MEC, supervising insurance companies on a de facto basis, does not have a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision.

QFC sector
- The QFCRA adopted a risk-based approach to supervision of authorized firms for both prudential and AML/CFT matters.
- QFCRA’s risk-based supervisory approach focuses on risk management measures identifying, assessing, and mitigating risks, including AML/CFT.
- QFCRA methodology includes two broad categories:
  - Business Risks, broken into: financial soundness, business strategy, market and operational, and organization and regulation.
  - Control Structure Risks, broken into: clients, conflicts management, management and control, financial crime, and human and technical resources.
- Risk assessment process:
  - Considers nature and size of an authorized firm’s business and internal structures against specified risks.
  - Assesses and prioritizes each identified risk based on probability and impact on QFCRA objectives.
  - Assigns each authorized firm an aggregate risk classification of low, medium, or high.
  - Risk assessment is undertaken during initial authorization, shortly after authorization, and ongoing during on-site visits.

### Customer Due Diligence (CDD) — description and analysis (R.5 to 8)
- The AML Law is "completely silent with respect to customer identification and the customer due diligence process."
- Except for the QFC Regulations, no other primary or secondary legislation addresses core obligations relating to customer identification.
- Preventive measures issued by QCB, DSM, MEC, and QFCRA include some FATF elements; only QCB and QFC measures are enforceable.
- Level of guidance varies by supervisory authority; some guidance is detailed, other guidance is too general or vague.

Prohibition of anonymous accounts (c. 5.1)
- Domestic sector: No legal or regulatory provision explicitly prohibits opening anonymous accounts or accounts in fictitious names.
- QCB Instructions include customer identification requirements that could effectively prohibit anonymous or fictitious accounts:
  - To open an account, financial institutions must require core documents: the customer's residence/work permit and personal identification number.
  - The residence/work permit is issued by the MOI to every foreigner residing in Qatar.
  - The personal identification number is issued by the MOI to both foreigners and Qatari citizens.
  - Other documents include salary and introduction letters from the customer’s employer; all documents need certification by governmental authorities in Qatar.
  - All financial institutions must record the identification card number or personal identification number mentioned on the birth certificate as the only proof of personal identity for all bank transactions and must not accept any other identification document.
  - DSM Decision 16/3 covers similar account opening aspects under Article 6, with Article 7 providing that a securities account should not be opened if the customer fails to satisfy or provide the information required in Article 6.
  - QCB and DSM authorities indicated financial institutions are required to comply with the account opening requirements described above.
  - Officials from financial institutions visited indicated their institutions do not open anonymous accounts or accounts in fictitious names.

QFC
- Article 12 of the QFC AML Regulations explicitly prohibits firms within the QFC from establishing or keeping anonymous accounts or accounts in false names.
- Neither the QFC AML Regulations nor the QFC AML Rulebook have a specific provision prohibiting a relevant person from establishing or keeping numbered accounts.
- "Relevant person" is defined to include persons carrying on regulated activities and persons providing professional services of audit, accounting, tax consulting, legal and notarization; provision, formation, operation and administration of trusts and similar arrangements; and company services including provision, formation, operation and management of companies.
- Regulated activities (Schedule 3 of the QFC Law) include a detailed list of financial, banking, insurance, market, fund, pension, brokerage, advisory, and custodian activities.
- Article 9 of the QFC AML Regulations imposes strict obligations on all relevant persons to establish and verify customer identity; detailed procedures are set out in Appendix 1 of the QFC AML Rulebook.
- All relevant persons must follow Appendix 1 procedures to establish and verify the true identity of any customer, "regardless of whether the account is named or numbered."
- Failure to comply with the Regulations and Appendix 1 of the Rulebook may be punished by the QFCRA using powers in the Financial Services Regulations, including monitoring, supervision, investigation, enforcement, and sanctions.

When is CDD required (c. 5.2)
- AML Law does not address CDD requirements.
- Domestic sector: No other law or regulation applies; obligation to identify customers is not established by primary or secondary legislation as required by the standard.
  - The obligation is established by QCB Instructions and DSM Decision, which are considered "other enforceable means" for this assessment.
- QCB 2006 Instructions on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing:
  - Establish obligation on banking and financial institutions under QCB supervision to conduct due diligence when opening an account.
  - Paragraph 1 requires for natural persons that institutions check customer identity or identity of representatives by reviewing identification cards and keeping personal data when entering into deals, transactions, or providing services, especially when opening accounts, contracting facilities contracts, financial transfers, or managing funds in portfolios, shares in mutual funds, leasing trust funds, or any other banking and financial services.
  - For legal (“juridical”) persons, institutions should check name and legal status and articles of incorporation and executive regulations, verify soundness of information in documents; and in case of suspicion about personal identification or original country or official offices of customers who open accounts, or transactions made through other customers if there are doubts about delegated persons.
  - Paragraph 1.3 requires due diligence for any banking transaction particularly those that exceed 100,000 Qatari Riyals in the various banking activities that can be used for money laundering.
  - Paragraph 1.3 further requires due diligence for any other banking and financial transactions suspected to be used in terrorism financing, "regardless of the amount."

*Italic: Source — _cr08322 - 309.      Enforceability of the DSM Decision 16/3. It may not be considered as “law and regulation”*

### 332.      Additional guidance for opening personal deposit accounts is provided to banks and financial

### _cr08322 - 332.      Additional guidance for opening personal deposit accounts is provided to banks and financial

### Scope of customer due diligence (CDD) requirements (paras. 332–336, 343–353, 353–362)
- QCB Instructions (Chapter Three, Second section) require institutions to complete and maintain the information, contracts and documents for all types of personal deposit accounts for residents in Qatar or the non-residents (para. 332).
- DSM Decision No. 16/3 (Article 6) “requires” customer due diligence when opening financial securities accounts; particulars of identity of the customer, his agent or their representatives should be recorded and verified; customers should submit copies of required documentation whenever an amendment is made; a securities account should not be opened if the customer fails to satisfy or provide the documentation or information required (para. 333).
- MEC Circular No. (1) of 2007 requires insurance companies to conduct CDD for natural persons before executing any financial transaction and for legal persons before and during any insurance transaction, but provides limited guidance and is non-enforceable (para. 334).
- QFC Article 9 requires a relevant person to establish and verify identity of any customer, including the beneficial owner, at the time of establishment of the relationship and prior to any transactions being undertaken (para. 336).
- Section 3.8 of the QFC AML Rulebook requires firms to comply with customer identification requirements set out in Appendix 1; these are described as extensive and including independent source documents, data, and other relevant identification data (para. 353).
- Article 9(11) of the QFC AML Regulation requires prompt obtaining of all appropriate documentation where a relevant person realizes it lacks sufficient information or develops concerns about accuracy of customer identification (para. 340).

### Identified shortcomings and consistency with FATF standards (paras. 335–342, 347, 357)
- Banking, financial institutions, brokerage firms and insurance companies fall short of including measures to conduct CDD:
  - when carrying out occasional transactions above a designated threshold both single or multiple operations;
  - when carrying out occasional transactions that are wire transfers;
  - when there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing;
  - when the financial institution has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data (para. 335).
- The timing requirements for CDD in the domestic framework are assessed as inadequate and not in line with the standard (para. 335).
- QFC Rule 3.9 contains a broad exemption from customer identification when the customer is an Authorized firm or a relevant person in the QFC or a regulated financial sector firm from a FATF Country; this broad exemption does not appear to be consistent with FATF Recommendation 5 because:
  - no evidence was shown that a risk-sensitive assessment of such customers or FATF countries had been conducted to determine compliance and level of implementation (para. 337).
- The broad exemption in the QFC AML Regulations results in the QFC Regulation only partially meeting the standard on this point (para. 342).
- Domestic legal framework deficiencies:
  - many CDD requirements are not set in primary or secondary legislation (para. 347, 357).
  - MEC Circular No. 1 is non-mandatory and lacks enforceability and specific required identification data (para. 352, 357).

### Identification and verification requirements for natural persons (paras. 344–346, 348–349, 352)
- QCB Instructions require for natural persons obtaining:
  - (i) identification cards and personal data;
  - (ii) customer’s full name as mentioned in the passport or the personal identification card for residents and Qatari citizens;
  - (iii) passport or personal identification card number and its validity date;
  - (iv) nationality;
  - (v) place and date of birth;
  - (vi) profession and work place;
  - (vii) place of residence;
  - (viii) postal address;
  - (ix) customer’s signature or thumb print plus the identifier’s signature as in signature form;
  - (x) name and address of the sponsor or the work entity for residents in Qatar; and
  - (xi) copies of registers and signature and delegating letters from the account owner (para. 345).
- DSM Decision No. 16/3 requires brokerage firms to obtain for a natural person or agent:
  - (i) full name;
  - (ii) full address;
  - (iii) nationality;
  - (iv) profession; and
  - (v) complete details of identity card or passport (para. 348).
- DSM Article 8 requires brokerage firms to verify by reference to a valid official identity document the identity and address of the natural person and attach a copy to the application (para. 349).
- MEC Circular No. 1 calls for due diligence based on obtaining an official ID document and registration of all ID details before executing any financial transaction with a natural person, but is not mandatory (para. 352).

### Identification and verification requirements for legal persons and arrangements (paras. 346, 350–361, 354–356, 358–362)
- QCB Instructions require documentation supporting corporate name and legal status; articles of incorporation; customer’s name and legal status; institution/company’s articles of incorporation and executive regulations; and customer’s legal status stated in the institution/company’s articles of incorporation and executive regulations (para. 346).
- DSM Decision No. 16/3 requires brokerage firms to obtain for legal persons:
  - (i) name;
  - (ii) legal form;
  - (iii) commercial registration;
  - (iv) objectives;
  - (v) address of main office and branch, if any;
  - (vi) particulars of the shareholders and main founders of the company;
  - (vii) names of members of the Board of Directors;
  - (viii) name and address of the legal representative of the company and details of his identity;
  - (ix) names of the persons authorized to sign on behalf of the legal person and specimens of their signatures; and
  - (x) the memorandum and articles of incorporation authenticated by the concerned authority in the state (para. 350).
- Verification measures for legal persons under DSM include:
  - verifying existence, legal status and continuation of business via official incorporation and licensing documents;
  - recommendation to verify authorization of persons acting on behalf of the company and verification of the real owner;
  - requirements for opening bank accounts outside Qatar include attestation by banks, chambers of commerce or notary public outside Qatar and legalization by Qatar Embassy and MOFA or other approved authority (para. 351).
- QFC Appendix 1 (Section A 1.2) requires verification of identity and authority of persons acting on behalf of legal persons or arrangements, including:
  - for public registered companies: obtaining a list of authorized signatories or satisfactory evidence of authority;
  - for private companies, unincorporated businesses, partnerships, clubs, cooperatives, charitable, social, or professional societies: identify authorized signatories and obtain necessary documentation to establish and verify identities of signatories (para. 358).
- QFC verification of legal status documents:
  - public registered company: (i) certificate of incorporation or extract from relevant register or an enquiry search via a company enquiry agent; (ii) the latest reports and accounts; and (iii) satisfactory evidence that individuals representing the company have necessary signing authority (para. 359).
  - private corporate entity: required documents include (i) registered corporate name and any trading names used; (ii) complete current registered address and any separate principal trading addresses, including all relevant details with regards to country of residence; (iii) telephone, fax number and email address; (iv) date and place of incorporation; (v) corporate registration number; (vi) fiscal residence; (vii) business activity; (viii) regulatory body, if applicable; (ix) name and address of group, if applicable; (x) legal form; (xi) name of the external auditor; (xii) information regarding the nature and level of the business to be conducted; (xiii) information regarding the origin of the funds; and (xiv) information regarding the source of wealth or income (para. 360).
- QFC also requires recording name, country of residence, nationality of directors or partners and obtaining certified copies of lists of authorized signatories and relevant board resolutions; for unincorporated businesses or partnerships a latest annual report and accounts and certified copy of partnership deed; for clubs/cooperatives/charities a certified copy of the constitution (para. 361).
- The QFC CDD requirements for legal persons or legal arrangements are described as extensive and in line with the standard (para. 362).
- Domestic gaps: there is no requirement in law (primary or secondary) to verify that a person purporting to act on behalf of the customer is so authorized (para. 354). QCB Instructions contain related obligations but fall short of providing guidance on how information should be verified and validated (paras. 355–356).

### Identification of beneficial owners (paras. 363–364)
- No requirement in law or regulation in the domestic sector to identify the beneficial owner and to take reasonable measures to verify the identity of the beneficial owner using relevant and reliable information (para. 363).
- QCB Instructions (Paragraph 1.2.2) oblige financial institutions to determine whether the customer is acting on behalf of another person and, if so, to obtain sufficient information to verify the identity of that other person and of the beneficial owner (para. 364).

*Source: IMF country report excerpts (paras. 332–364).*

### 365.      The DSM authorities indicated that in practice, securities brokerage firms are documenting and

### _cr08322 - 365.      The DSM authorities indicated that in practice, securities brokerage firms are documenting and verifying the identity of the person acting on behalf of the customer.

### Customer identification and beneficial ownership — Domestic authorities (QCB, DSM, MEC)
- Securities brokerage firms: DSM authorities indicated that in practice, securities brokerage firms are documenting and verifying the identity of the person acting on behalf of the customer, but "there was no evidence to support the legal basis of this practice."
- QCB requirements: There is no specific obligation imposed by the QCB on financial institutions to take reasonable measures to understand the ownership and control structure of the customer or to determine who are the natural persons that ultimately own or control the customer. The current requirement focuses on obtaining, checking and verifying the customer’s name, legal status, and the institution/company’s articles of incorporation. "No further guidance is provided to instruct financial institutions."
- DSM Decision 16/3, Article 6: Calls on brokerage firms to identify particulars of shareholders and main founders, name and address of the legal representative and details of his identity, names of persons authorized to sign on behalf of the legal person and specimens of their signatures; "however, it does not address control structure of the customer and determining who are the natural persons that ultimately own or control the customer." DSM authorities indicated that in practice brokerage firms document and verify control structure over a legal person, but "there was no evidence to support the legal basis of this practice."
- MEC guidance for insurance companies: MEC has a general guidance to verify the actual status of the company representative’s authorization by checking official documents and verifying the identity of the real owner, but it "is not mandatory" and "does not call on the insurance companies to take reasonable measures to understand the ownership and control structure of the customer or to determine who are the natural persons that ultimately own or control the customer." Conclusion: "none of the measures examined comply with the standard as they are not set out in law or regulation (and are incomplete)."

### QFC framework — customer identification, ownership, and control
- Article 9 of the QFC AML Regulations: Sets out primary customer identification requirements, including for beneficial owners. Article 9(1) provides that a relevant person must establish and verify the identity of any customer with or for whom the relevant person acts or proposes to act.
- Article 9(4): Requires determining whether the customer is acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another person.
- Article 9(5): Requires establishment and verification of the identity of both the customer and any other relevant person on whose behalf the customer is acting or appears to be acting; "This includes verification of the Beneficial Owner of the person and/or relevant funds which may be the subject of a Transaction to be considered."
- Rule 3.8.1 (QFC AML Rulebook): Requires a statement from a prospective customer whether the customer is or is not acting as principal; if acting on behalf of a third party, requires a written statement confirming that from the parties (including any Beneficial Owner, if different).
- Appendix 1 (A1.2.1 (11)) customer identification detailed documentary requirements:
  - (i) certified copy of the Articles of association or statutes;
  - (ii) certified copy of either the certificate of incorporation or the trade register entry and any trading license including renewal date;
  - (iii) latest annual report, audited and published, if applicable;
  - (iv) certified copies of the identification documentation of the authorized signatories;
  - (v) certified copies of the list of authorized signatories specifying who is authorized to act on behalf of the customer account and of the board resolution authorizing the signatories to operate the account;
  - (vi) certified copies of the identification documentation of the authorized signatories;
  - (vii) names, country of residence, nationality of directors or partners and of the members of the governing body;
  - (viii) list of the main shareholders holding more than 5 percent of the issued capital; and
  - (ix) identification evidence of those shareholders with interests of 10% or more in the capital of the company.
- Public registered companies: A certified copy of the latest report and accounts required; Paragraph 9 under rule A 1.2.1 states a relevant person need not verify identity of individual shareholders or directors of a company listed on a designated exchange.
- Private corporate entities: Paragraph 11 under rule 1.2.1 paragraph 11 h) requires a list of all shareholders holding more than 5 percent of the issued share capital; identification evidence is required for shareholders holding more than 10 percent.
- Unincorporated businesses or partnerships: Paragraph 29 i) of rule 1.2.1 requires verification of the identity of all controllers and/or partners.
- Trusts, nominees and fiduciaries: Paragraph 6 a) of rule 1.2.2 pf Appendix 1 requires identification of any settlor, trustee, or principal controller with power to remove the trustee, the identity of the beneficial owner; certified copy of the trust deed; and documentary evidence of appointment of current trustees.
- Clubs, cooperatives, charities, or professional societies: Rule 1.2.7 requires identification of principal signatories and controllers in accordance with customer identification requirements for private individuals.
- Supra-national organizations, governmental departments, local authorities: Rule 1.2.5 requires steps to verify legal standing, ownership, principal address, certified copy of resolution or other document authorizing account opening or transaction, and evidence the official has authority to act. "The QFC framework fully meets the standard on this point."

### Purpose and nature of business relationship (c. 5.6)
- Domestic sector: Paragraph 2 of the QCB Instructions requires banking and financial institutions to obtain information on the purpose of opening any account, but "there is no explicit requirement to obtain information on the intended nature of the business relationship as well." No requirements for DSM- or MEC-supervised institutions. Conclusion: "the Qatari domestic framework falls short of the standard on this point."
- QFC: Rule 1.1.1 of Appendix 1 requires obtaining and verifying:
  - personal details: "true full name or names used and the current permanent address";
  - nature and level of business: information regarding the nature of the business the customer expects to undertake, any expected or predictable pattern of transactions, including "the purpose and reason for opening the account or establishing the business relationship, the anticipated level and nature of the activity that is to be undertaken and the various relationships of signatories to the account (if any) and details of any underlying beneficial owners";
  - origin of funds: identify how all the payments are to be made, from where, and by whom and ensure that all payments are recorded to provide an audit trail;
  - source of wealth: "establish a source of wealth or income, including how the funds were acquired, to assess whether the actual transaction pattern is consistent with the expected transaction pattern and whether this constitutes any grounds for suspicion on money laundering."
- "The QFC framework fully meets the standard on this point."

### Ongoing due diligence on business relationship (c. 5.7; 5.7.1 & 5.7.2)
- Domestic sector: "There are no specific legal or regulatory requirements imposed by the QCB, the MEC, and the DSM for financial institutions to conduct ongoing due diligence on the business relationship." Conclusion: "the Qatari domestic framework falls short of the standard on this point."
- QFC requirements:
  - Rule 3.8.2: relevant person required to undertake a periodic review to ensure customer identity documentation is accurate and up to date.
  - Rule 3.8.3: periodic review required when: (i) the relevant person changes its Know-Your-Customer documentation requirements; (ii) a significant transaction with the customer is expected to take place; (iii) there is a material change in the business relationship with the customer; or (iv) there is a material change in the nature or ownership of the customer.
  - Article 3.1.1 (D): requires satisfactory Know Your Customer Requirements to identify users of services, principal beneficial owners and origin of funds; procedures include knowing nature of customer business and being alert to abnormal transactions.
  - Appendix 1 rule 1.1.1 (c) and (d): require identification of how payments are made, recorded, and establishing source of wealth/income to assess consistency with expected patterns and grounds for suspicion.
  - Article 15 (6): requires establishment and maintenance of policies, procedures, systems, and controls to monitor for and detect suspicious transactions.
  - Article 16: when making payments on behalf of a customer to another financial institution via electronic payment and message systems, must include the customer’s name, address, and either an account number or a unique reference number in the payment instruction.
  - Article 9 (10): requires that information and documentation concerning a customer’s identity remains accurate and up to date.
  - Rule 3.8.4: requires adoption of a risk-based approach for customer identification and verification.
  - "The QFC framework fully meets the standard on this point."

### Risk and enhanced due diligence (c. 5.8)
- Domestic sector:
  - Paragraph 3 of the QCB Instructions: requires enhanced due diligence by obtaining additional information when opening accounts for non-residents, including a letter of introduction or recommendation from reputable banks or financial institutions overseas, authentication of the account opening application signed by the customer, and that financial institutions and banks be well known.
  - "There are no other legal, regulatory or other enforceable obligations to perform enhanced due diligence measures for higher-risk categories of customer, business relationship, or transaction." "Under the current AML/CFT regulatory regime, there is no distinction between low- and high-risk customers, business relationships, or transactions." Conclusion: "The Qatari domestic framework, therefore, clearly falls short of the standard on this point."
- QFC:
  - Appendix 1 requires a risk-based approach to customer identification; risk assessment regarding the customer should be recorded in the customer file and does not release obligation to identify and obtain evidence to Regulatory Authority’s satisfaction; in cases of doubt a stricter approach should be adopted.
  - Enhanced due diligence for Nonresident customers: relevant persons must ensure dealing with an existing person under Rule 1.2.1; address verification via identification card issued by the MOI required to determine residency.
  - Appendix 2, paragraph 7: QFCRA requires consideration of additional "Know your Customer" and monitoring procedures where customers are located in countries:
    (1) without adequate anti-money laundering strategies;
    (2) where cash is the normal medium of exchange;
    (3) which have a politically unstable regime with high levels of private or public sector corruption;
    (4) which are known to be drug producing or drug transit countries; or
    (5) which have been classified as countries with inadequacies in their anti money laundering regulations.
  - Appendix A2.1 paragraph 8: examples of enhanced due diligence measures for high-risk customers include:
    - requiring additional documentary evidence;
    - taking supplementary measures to verify or certify the documents supplied;
    - requiring that any initial transaction is carried out through an account opened in the customer’s name with a credit or financial institution subject to the AML Regulations and Rules or regulated in a FATF Country;
    - performing direct mailing (registered mail) of account opening documentation to the named customer at an independently verified address;
    - establishing telephone contact with a customer prior to opening the account on an independently verified home or business number or a “welcome call” to the customer utilizing a minimum of two pieces of personal security information that have previously been provided during the setting up of the account;
    - obtaining a local legal opinion on the ability of the customer to open an account and transact business with the relevant person; local counsel should also conduct a local company search (if applicable);
    - obtaining an introduction certificate from another regulated financial institution in accordance with procedures set out above; and
    - an initial deposit check drawn on a personal account in the customers name at a bank in a FATF Country.
  - Private banking: "The QFC AML Regulations and AML Rulebook do not make any separate provision for private banking." Firms undertaking private banking are subject to the same customer identification requirements as described under criteria 5.2 to 5.7.
  - Legal persons & arrangements such as trusts: standard customer identification requirements apply; specific guidance requires:
    - identity of any settlor, the trustee and any principal controller who has the power to remove the trustee as well as the identity of the beneficial owner;
    - a certified copy of the trust deed; and
    - documentary evidence of the appointment of the current trustees.
  - Rule A1.2.3: relevant person must use best endeavors to be advised about any changes concerning individuals who have control over the funds and concerning beneficial owners.
  - Rule A1.2.4: where an identified trustee, principal controller, or beneficial owner is to be replaced, the identity of the new person "must be verified before they are allowed to exercise control over the funds."
  - Nominee shareholders or bearer shares: "There is no requirement under the QFC AML Regulations preventing a relevant person from entering into a customer relationship with a corporate entity with nominee shareholders or shares in bearer form." An overriding requirement remains to identify and verify the beneficial owner, but "there was no information provided to evidence how a relevant person would perform enhanced due diligence when establishing a business relationship with companies that have nominee shareholders or shares in bearer form."

*Source: _cr08322 - 365.      The DSM authorities indicated that in practice, securities brokerage firms are documenting and verifying the identity of the person acting on behalf of the customer.*

### 400.      Risk—Application of Simplified/Reduced CDD Measures when appropriate (c. 5.9).

### _cr08322 - 400.      Risk—Application of Simplified/Reduced CDD Measures when appropriate (c. 5.9).

### Domestic sector — simplified/reduced CDD measures
- Financial institutions are not permitted to apply reduced or simplified customer due diligence measures when establishing accounts and/or relationships.
- QCB Instructions (Section 1/1), DSM Decision (16/3) and MEC Circular No. 1 require verification before establishing business relationships, but identification of beneficial owners remains unaddressed in all three texts.
- The Qatari domestic framework is assessed as falling short of the standard on timing of verification (c. 5.13) and related points where requirements are non-binding or incomplete.

### QFC framework — general approach to risk-based and simplified measures
- The QFC AML Regulations have been drafted in accordance with a risk-based approach and proportionate anti money laundering systems and controls.
- Article 15 requires a relevant person to adequately address the specific money laundering risks it faces, taking into account vulnerabilities of its products, services and customers.
- The QFC AML Regulations and Rulebook set out limited prescribed circumstances where a relevant person is not required to carry out full independent verification of a customer.

### Reliance on group/qualified introductions (Article 11, Rule 3.9.1, Rule 3.11.1)
- Article 11 permits a relevant person to rely on identity verification performed by another member of the relevant person’s group provided:
  - the identity of the Customer has been verified by the other member of the relevant person’s Group in a manner consistent with these Articles or equivalent international standards applying in FATF Countries;
  - no exception from identification obligations has been applied in the original identification process; and
  - a statement written in English is received from the introducing member confirming that:
    - the Customer has been identified in accordance with the relevant standards under 1 and 2 above;
    - any identification evidence can be accessed by the relevant person without delay; and
    - that the identification evidence is kept for at least six years.
- Ultimately, if a relevant person is not satisfied that the customer has been identified in a manner consistent with the Articles of the Regulations, the relevant person must perform the verification process itself.
- Rule 3.9.1 (and Rule 3.11.1) provides that a relevant person is not required to establish the identity of a customer if the customer is:
  - an authorized firm or another relevant person; or
  - a regulated financial sector firm from a FATF country.
- For Rule 3.9.1(1)(B), a firm is considered from a FATF country if its entire operations are subject to regulation, including money laundering, by:
  - an overseas Regulator in a FATF Country;
  - another relevant authority in a FATF Country; or
  - a subsidiary of a firm referred to above provided that the law which applies to the parent entity ensures that the subsidiary also observes the same provisions.
- A relevant person is not required to establish the beneficial ownership of a customer and relevant funds if the relevant person’s customer falls within Rule 3.9.1(1).
- Section A1.2 (Establishing Identity-Identification Procedures) does not require identification of individual shareholders of corporate entities listed on a Designated Exchange or directors of a listed company.
- Assessment: The QFC framework partially meets the standard on reliance/exemptions because of the broad exemption granted to authorized firms/other relevant persons or regulated financial sector firms from a FATF country without requiring a risk assessment of those customers or evaluation of their countries.

### Simplification/reduction of CDD for overseas residents (c. 5.10)
- Domestic sector: Criterion does not apply — no provisions allow QCB/DSM/MEC supervised financial institutions to conduct reduced or simplified CDD for customers residing in another country; all customers undergo the same degree of CDD regardless of country of origin.
- QFC: Rule 3.9.1 permits non-verification of identity for authorized firms/other relevant persons or regulated financial sector firms from FATF countries (see rules and conditions above).
- Article 11 allows outsourcing of technical aspects of customer identification to a qualified professional and reliance on group introductions subject to conditions; if not satisfied, the relevant person must perform verification itself.
- Rule 3.11.1 designates authorized firms/other relevant persons or regulated financial sector firms from FATF countries as qualified professionals and requires cooperation agreements for outsourcing tasks to be carried out in accordance with AML Regulations and Rulebook.
- Assessment: The QFC framework partially meets the standard on this point due to the broad exemption without customer/country risk assessment.

### Simplified CDD excluded when ML/TF suspicion or high risk exists (c. 5.11)
- Domestic sector: Criterion does not apply because simplified CDD measures are not permitted.
- QFC: Rule 3.9.1 (4) confirms simplified CDD is not permitted when a relevant person either knows or suspects, or has reasonable grounds to know or suspect, that a customer or a person on whose behalf he is acting is engaged in money laundering.
- Assessment: The QFC framework meets the standard on this point.

### Risk-based application and guidance (c. 5.12)
- Domestic sector: Criterion does not apply — CDD on a risk-sensitive basis is not permitted; all customers receive the same degree of CDD.
- QFC: Article 15 permits adoption of a risk-based approach to CDD and provides for guidance by the Regulatory Authority; Appendix 2 of the QFC AML Rulebook provides detailed guidance including developing measures for:
  - High risk products, services, customers or geographies;
  - Enhanced customer monitoring;
  - Corporate structures such as limited companies, offshore trusts, special purpose vehicles and nominee arrangements;
  - Politically exposed persons;
  - Suspicious transactions and transaction monitoring.
- Assessment: The QFC framework meets the standard on this point.

### Timing of verification of identity — general and exceptional rules (c. 5.13; c.5.14 & 5.14.1)
- Domestic sector:
  - QCB Instructions (Section 1/1) and DSM Decision (16/3) require verification before establishing a business relationship.
  - MEC Circular No. 1 provides similar language but is not legally binding.
  - Beneficial owner identification remains unaddressed.
  - Assessment: Qatari domestic framework clearly falls short of the standard on timing and exceptional circumstances.
- QFC:
  - Article 9(1) requires establishment and verification of customer identity.
  - Article 9(5) extends identity verification to beneficial owners.
  - Article 9(6) requires verification prior to commencement of the business relationship and before any transaction is effected.
  - Article 9(7) allows entering into an insurance contract before proper identification only if controls ensure money received is not passed on until identification requirements are met.
  - Article 9(8) requires discontinuation of activity and termination of any understanding if customer does not supply evidence permitting compliance.
  - Assessment: QFC framework meets the standard on timing and treatment of specific exceptional circumstances.

### Failure to complete CDD — before and after commencing the business relationship (c. 5.15; c. 5.16)
- Domestic sector:
  - QCB and MEC do not address consequences of failure to complete CDD.
  - DSM Article 7 states a securities account should not be opened if customer fails to satisfy Article 6 requirements, but DSM does not require institutions to consider making a suspicious transaction report.
  - Assessment: Qatari domestic framework clearly falls short of the standard on these points.
- QFC:
  - Article 9(8) requires that if a relevant person is unable to comply with the CDD requirements it must not open an account for the customer.
  - If unable to comply with CDD after commencing a relationship, the relevant person must immediately terminate the relationship.
  - For Article 9(7) insurance exemption, controls must ensure money is not passed on until identification requirements are met; otherwise the account must not be opened.
  - No legal or regulatory requirement exists for relevant persons to consider making a suspicious transaction report when unable to comply with CDD.
  - Assessment: QFC framework only partially meets the standard on both c. 5.15 and c. 5.16 because it does not require consideration of suspicious transaction reporting when CDD cannot be completed.

### Existing customers — ongoing CDD requirements (c. 5.17)
- Domestic sector:
  - Article 19, paragraph 19/8 of the QCB Instructions advises financial institutions should adopt programs for updating customer personal information, papers, and documents.
  - No requirements under DSM and MEC to apply CDD to existing customers on the basis of materiality and risk or to conduct due diligence at appropriate times.
  - Assessment: Qatari domestic framework clearly falls short of the standard on this point.
- QFC:
  - Article 9(11) requires prompt obtaining of appropriate material to verify identity if a relevant person lacks sufficient information or develops concerns about accuracy.
  - Rule 3.8.2 obliges periodic review to ensure customer identity documentation is accurate and up-to-date.
  - Rule 3.8.3 specifies circumstances when a specific review is necessary, including change in CDD requirements, a significant transaction, a material change in the business relationship, or a material change in beneficial ownership.
  - Note: QFC was recently established and there are no accounts pre-dating the regulations.
  - Assessment: QFC framework meets the standard on this point.

### Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) — identification, risk management, source of wealth/funds, ongoing monitoring (c.6.1–c.6.4)
- National AML Law 28 of (2002) does not address PEPs.
- Domestic sector: No measures in place for financial institutions supervised by QCB, DSM, MEC addressing essential PEP criteria (c.6.1 to c.6.4): determining PEP status; senior management approval for establishing relationships; measures to establish source of wealth/source of funds; enhanced ongoing monitoring.
- QFC:
  - Article 15 requires systems and controls to determine whether a Customer is a Politically Exposed Person.
  - Article 19 defines PEPs as “natural persons who may constitute a reputational risk and who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions, such as Heads of State or of government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial or military officials, senior executives of state owner corporations, important political party officials; and close family members or close associates of any of those persons.” This definition is in line with the standard.
  - QFC Rule 2.1.1 in Appendix 2 requires, when dealing with PEPs:
    - an analysis of any complex structures, for example involving trusts or multiple jurisdictions;
    - appropriate measures to establish the source of wealth;
    - the development of a profile of expected activity for the business relationship to provide a basis for transaction and account monitoring;
    - Senior management approval for the account opening; and
    - regular oversight of the relationship with a Politically Exposed Person by senior management.
  - QFCRA officials stated that the reference to complex structures implies firms must identify beneficial owners, not merely the apparent owner.
  - The requirements fall short with respect to establishing the source of funds of customers and beneficial owners identified as PEPs.
  - Appendix 2 Section 2.1 (10) states that risk can be reduced by detailed KYC investigations at the beginning of a relationship and on an ongoing basis where the relationship involves a PEP; Relevant Persons should develop enhanced scrutiny and monitoring practices.
  - The QFCRA AML Regulation and AML Rulebook do not specifically require senior management approval to continue a business relationship where a customer already accepted is subsequently found to be, or subsequently becomes, a PEP.

*Source: _cr08322 - 400.      Risk—Application of Simplified/Reduced CDD Measures when appropriate (c. 5.9).*

### 435.      The definition of PEPs provided by Article 19 of the QFC Regulations is not limited to foreign

### _cr08322 - 435.      The definition of PEPs provided by Article 19 of the QFC Regulations is not limited to foreign

### Definition of PEPs
- Article 19 of the QFC Regulations covers persons who hold prominent public functions in Qatar (domestic PEPs) as well as foreign PEPs.

### Cross-Border Correspondent Accounts and Similar Relationships
- Domestic sector (QCB, DSM, MEC):  
  - No specific measures established addressing essential criteria c.7.1 to c.7.5 for establishment of cross-border correspondent banking or other similar relationships.
  - DSM: brokerage houses operate domestically only; international transactions/orders must be conducted through a bank (HSBC Global Custodian services). No evidence that insurance firms maintain cross-border correspondent accounts.
- QFC (Article 12 of the QFC AML Regulations):  
  - “Prior to establishing a business relationship an Authorised Firm must establish and verify its Correspondent Banks identity by obtaining sufficient and satisfactory evidence of the identity”.
  - Identity of the customer with or for whom a relevant person acts or proposes to act should be established and verified pursuant to Article 9 of the AML Regulations.
  - An Authorised Firm that establishes, operates, or maintains a correspondent account must ensure arrangements to:  
    - conduct due diligence in respect of opening of a correspondent account including measures to identify: ownership and management structure; major business activities and customer base; location; intended purpose of the correspondent account;  
    - ensure that the correspondent banking client has verified the identity of, and performed on-going due diligence on its customers having direct access to the correspondent account and can provide customer due diligence information upon request; and  
    - monitor transactions processed through a correspondent account to detect and report any suspicion of money laundering.  
  - Prohibitions: an Authorized Firm must not: a) establish a correspondent banking relationship with a shell bank; b) establish or keep anonymous account or accounts in false names; or c) maintain a nominee account held in the name of one person but controlled by or held for the benefit of another person whose identity has not been disclosed to the Authorized Firm.
- QFCRA AML Rulebook (Rule 3.12):  
  - Requires relevant persons to verify if secrecy or data protection laws in the respondent institution’s country prevent access to relevant data; to have arrangements ensuring adequate due diligence and identification measures with regard to the business relationship; and to conduct regular reviews of relationships with correspondent banks.
- Further Rulebook guidance:  
  - Specific care to assess AML arrangements of correspondent banking clients and qualified professionals relating to customer identification, transaction monitoring, terrorist financing, and other relevant elements; verify compliance with same or equivalent AML requirements; obtain information on applicable laws and regulations; ensure correspondent banking client does not use the relevant person’s products/services to engage with shell banks; obtain information on distribution networks and delegation of duties if applicable; senior management approval required before establishing new correspondent banking relationships; guard against business partners who permit their account to be used by shell banks.
- Gap: QFC AML Regulations and AML Rulebook do not specifically require gathering sufficient information about a respondent institution to fully understand reputation and quality of supervision, including whether it has been subject to a money laundering or terrorist financing investigation or regulatory action; nor to document respective AML/CFT responsibilities of each institution.

### Misuse of New Technology for ML/FT and Non-Face-to-Face Relationships
- Domestic sector (QCB, DSM, MEC):  
  - No specific measures addressing essential criteria c.8.1 to c.8.2.1 on money laundering threats from new or developing technologies.
  - QCB Instructions address technology developments focused on relationship between QCB and financial institutions (call centers, maintenance of banking electronic equipment, replacement of ATM/Debit/Credit Cards).
  - Authorities stated account opening/establishing relationships over the internet is not allowed due to a physical presence requirement, but could not provide documentation of legal basis for the physical presence requirement.
  - DSM: only trading orders allowed through the internet after proper identification; new accounts opened at DSM ground level (client’s service counter).
- DSM account opening requirements:  
  - For individuals: Fill out new investor’s application form to get an investor’s identification number; submit copy of valid passport; copy of power of attorney (if needed); copy of court decision or guardianship order (if guardian); copy of birth certificate if buying/selling on behalf of minors (under 18).  
  - For companies/entities: Fill out new investor’s application form to get an investor’s identification number; submit copy of valid commercial registration document showing authorized persons including their signatures; original authorization signature letter issued by the company for opening an account with DSM.
- QFC (Article 15 (3) of the QFC AML Regulations):  
  - A relevant person must be aware of any money laundering risks that may arise from new or developing technologies that may favor anonymity and take measures to prevent their use for money laundering.
- QFC AML Rulebook Appendix 2 (Section A.2.1):  
  - Relevant person should take specific and adequate measures to compensate for higher ML risks from products/services such as non-face-to-face business relationships or transactions (email, telephone, Internet, internet-based products).
- Guidance on risk assessments (Appendix 2 to QC AML Handbook, Paragraph 2.1.2):  
  - Relevant person should take specific and adequate measures for higher risk from: non-face-to-face business relationships or Transactions (email, telephone, Internet); internet-based products; correspondent banking relationships; customers from FATF “Non Cooperative Countries and Territories” and higher-risk countries; Politically Exposed Persons.
  - Recommended intensified monitoring measures may include: requiring additional documentary evidence; taking supplementary measures to verify/certify documents; requiring initial transaction via account opened in customer’s name at institution subject to AMLR and AML Regulation or regulated in a FATF Country; performing direct mailing (registered mail) of account opening documentation to independently verified address with return acknowledgment without alteration; establishing telephone contact prior to opening account on independently verified number or a “welcome call” using minimum of two pieces of personal identity security information previously provided; obtaining local legal opinion and local company search; obtaining introduction certificate from another regulated financial institution; initial deposit check drawn on a personal account in the customer’s name at a bank in a FATF country.

### Recommendations and Required Legal/Regulatory Reforms
- Domestic sector: recommend that Qatari authorities prohibit, through law or regulation, anonymous accounts or accounts in fictitious names; and establish, through law or regulation, clear requirements for financial institutions to:  
  - Undertake customer due diligence (CDD) measures when: carrying out occasional transactions above the applicable designated threshold (including single operation or several linked operations); carrying out occasional transactions that are wire transfers in the circumstances covered by the Interpretative Note to SR VII; there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, regardless of exemptions or thresholds; the financial institution has doubts about veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data.  
  - Identify the customer (permanent or occasional, natural or legal persons or legal arrangements) and verify identity using reliable, independent source documents, data or information (identification data) following examples set out in the General Guide to Account Opening and Customer Identification issued by the Basel Committee’s Working Group on Cross Border Banking.  
  - Verify for customers that are legal persons or legal arrangements that any person purporting to act on behalf of the customer is so authorized, and identify and verify that person.  
  - Identify the beneficial owner and take reasonable measures to verify identity of the beneficial owner using relevant information or data obtained from a reliable source so that the financial institution is satisfied it knows who the beneficial owner is.  
  - Determine whether the customer is acting on behalf of another person and take reasonable steps to obtain sufficient identification data to verify that other person.  
  - Conduct ongoing due diligence on the business relationship.
- Further recommended obligations (law, regulation, or other enforceable means):  
  - Obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship.  
  - Perform enhanced due diligence for higher risk categories of customer, business relationships, or transactions.  
  - Reject opening an account when unable to comply with CDD requirements and consider making a suspicious report.  
  - Apply CDD measures on existing customers on the basis of materiality and risk and conduct due diligence at appropriate times.  
  - Have appropriate risk management systems to determine whether the customer is a politically-exposed person; obtain senior management approval for establishing business relationships with such customers; take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds; conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship.  
  - Establish requirements for financial institutions to have measures in place for establishing cross-border correspondent banking and other similar relationships.  
  - Require measures including policies and procedures designed to prevent and protect financial institutions from ML/TF threats that may arise from new or developing technologies or specific CDD measures for non-face-to-face business relationships or transactions.
- QFC authorities should strengthen the AML Regulation and Rulebook by requiring relevant persons to:  
  - Remove the broad exception to customer identification requirements contained in Rule 3.9 of the Rulebook by implementing a process for conducting a risk sensitive assessment of customers and FATF countries where such customers are located to determine compliance with and the level of implementation of Rec. 5.  
  - Require institutions to consider making a suspicious transaction report when unable to complete CDD measures, including when the business relationship has already commenced and the institution is not able to conduct required CDD measures.  
  - Take reasonable measures to establish the source of funds of customers and beneficial owners identified as PEPs and obtain senior management approval to continue the business relationship where a customer has been accepted and the customer or beneficial owner is subsequently found to be, or subsequently becomes a PEP.  
  - Incorporate obligation to gather sufficient information about a respondent institution to fully understand reputation and quality of supervision, including whether it has been subject to a money laundering or terrorist financing investigation or regulatory action; and to document respective AML/CFT responsibilities of each institution.

### Assessment, Ratings, and Key Shortcomings
- Summary conclusions (3.3.3 Compliance with Recommendations 5 to 8):  
  - R.5 — NC  
    - Domestic sector lacks explicit legal obligations for: prohibiting anonymous accounts or accounts in fictitious names; CDD processes when carrying out occasional transactions above applicable designated threshold; CDD for occasional wire transfers in circumstances covered by Interpretative Note to SR VII; CDD when suspicion of ML/TF regardless of exemptions or thresholds; CDD when institution has doubts about previously obtained identification data; identifying and verifying customers (natural/legal/legal arrangements); verifying persons acting on behalf of customers for legal persons or arrangements; identifying beneficial owners and taking reasonable measures to verify identity; determining whether customer acts on behalf of another and obtaining identification data; conducting ongoing due diligence; obtaining information on purpose and intended nature of business relationship; performing enhanced due diligence for higher risk categories; rejecting account opening when unable to comply with CDD and considering suspicious transaction report; applying CDD on existing customers based on materiality and risk.  
    - QFC: lacks measures to identify all customers regardless of exception in Rule 3.9; lacks requirement to consider making suspicious transaction report when unable to complete CDD measures.  
  - R.6 — NC  
    - Lack of measures for institutions supervised by QCB, DSM, MEC regarding CDD procedures for politically exposed persons.  
    - Lack of QFCRA AML Regulation (and Rulebook) requirements for relevant persons to obtain senior management approval to continue business relationships where a customer or beneficial owner is found to be or becomes a PEP, and to take reasonable measures to establish the source of funds of customers and beneficial owners identified as PEPs.  
  - R.7 — NC  
    - Lack of measures for institutions supervised by QCB, DSM, MEC dealing with establishment of cross-border correspondent banking or other similar relationships.  
    - Lack of QFC AML Regulations and Rulebook requirements for relevant persons to gather sufficient information about a respondent institution to understand fully reputation and quality of supervision, including whether it has been subject to an ML/TF investigation or regulatory action; and to document respective AML/CFT responsibilities of each institution.  
  - R.8 — PC  
    - Lack of requirements on institutions supervised by QCB, DSM, MEC to establish adequate policies and procedures designed to prevent and protect institutions from ML/TF threats from new or developing technologies or specific CDD measures for non-face-to-face business relationships or transactions.

*Italic: Extracted from the content unit provided.*

### 3.4 Third parties and introduced business (R.9)

### 3.4 Third parties and introduced business (R.9)

### Domestic sector: reliance on intermediaries and final responsibility for CDD
- There are no requirements (or prohibitions) for banks and financial institutions with respect to reliance on intermediaries or other third parties to perform some of the elements of the CDD process.
- There is no measure in place that would ensure that the final responsibility for CDD measures remains with the financial institution opening/initiating the relationship.
- Supervisory authorities indicated that under the current regime, financial institutions are required to conduct their own due diligence, but the authorities were not able to provide the legal basis for this requirement.
- Meetings with officials from financial institutions revealed that all due diligence process is performed by the institution establishing the business relationship and that at this time, no intermediaries or other third parties are conducting elements of the CDD process.

### QFC: Article 11 of the QFC AML Regulations (requirement to immediately obtain certain CDD elements from third parties, c.9.1)
- When a customer is introduced by another member of the relevant person’s group, a relevant person need not re-identify the customer, provided that:
  - A. the identity of the customer has been verified by the other member of the relevant person’s group in a manner consistent with the articles or equivalent international standards applicable to FATF countries;
  - B. no exception from identification obligations has been applied in the original identification process; and
  - C. a statement written in the English language is received from the introducing member of the relevant person’s group confirming that:
    - I. the customer has been identified in accordance with the relevant standards under (A) and (B);
    - II. any identification evidence can be accessed by the relevant person without delay; and
    - III. that the identification evidence is kept for at least six years.

### Availability of identification data from third parties and ultimate responsibility for CDD (c.9.2 and c.9.5)
- Article 11 states that if a relevant person is not satisfied that the customer has been identified in a manner consistent with the articles; the relevant person must perform the verification process itself.
- Where customer identification records are kept by the relevant person or other persons outside the state, a relevant person must take reasonable steps to ensure that the records are held in a manner consistent with the articles.
- A relevant person must verify if there are secrecy or data protection legislation that would restrict access without delay to such data by the relevant person, the QFC Authority, the Regulatory Authority, the FIU, or the law enforcement agencies of Qatar.
- Where such legislation exists, the relevant person must obtain without delay certified copies of the relevant identification evidence and keep these copies in a jurisdiction which allows access by all the persons.

### Regulation and supervision of third parties (applying R.23, R.24 & R.29, c.9.3 and c.9.4)
- The QFC AML Regulations permit financial institutions to rely on intermediaries or other third parties to perform elements of the CDD process or to introduce business, but there are inconsistencies with the FATF requirements:
  - No specific measures to evaluate the quality of supervision of the third party.
  - No indication that in determining which countries the third party that meets the conditions can be based, the competent authorities have taken into account information available on whether those countries adequately apply the FATF Recommendations.
- The exemption for not re-identifying the customer if identity was previously verified by other members of the relevant person’s group in a manner consistent with the QFCRA requirements or equivalent international standards applying in FATF countries is too broad:
  - There is no requirement for relevant persons to evaluate the adequacy of the CDD measures and process conducted by the introducing party.
  - There is no requirement to ensure the quality of supervision of the third party.

### Recommendations and Comments
- The authorities are recommended to:
  - Introduce provisions/measures in the event that financial institutions supervised by the QCB, DSM, and MEC rely on intermediaries or other third parties to perform some of the elements of the CDD process.
  - Specify that the final responsibility for CDD measures remains with the financial institution opening/initiating the relationship.
- The QFCRA is recommended to:
  - Require a relevant person to evaluate the quality of supervision of the third party;
  - Determine in which countries the third party that meets the conditions can be based;
  - Take into account information available on whether those countries adequately apply the FATF Recommendations; and
  - Abolish or re-evaluate the broad customer identification exemption granted when a customer is a member of the relevant person’s group or equivalent international standards are applied in FATF countries, with a view to establish the risk and the conditions for implementing this waiver.

### Compliance with Recommendation 9 — Rating and factors underlying rating
- R.9 — NC
- Summary of factors underlying rating:
  - Lack of legal or regulatory requirements when there is no prohibition imposed by the QCB, the DSM, and the MEC for banking and financial institutions to rely on intermediaries or other third parties to perform some of the elements of the CDD process.
  - Lack of specific measures imposed by the QFCRA to require relevant persons to evaluate the quality of supervision of the third party; and to determine in which countries the third party that meets the conditions can be based taking into account information available on whether those countries adequately apply the FATF Recommendations.
  - Broad CDD exemption provided by the QFCRA when a customer is a member of the relevant person’s group or equivalent international standards are applied in FATF countries.

*Source: _cr08322 - 3.4 Third parties and introduced business (R.9)*

### 478.      Section 1 of the QCB Instructions require the banking and financial institutions to ascertain the

### _cr08322 - 478.      Section 1 of the QCB Instructions require the banking and financial institutions to ascertain the

### Customer identification and recordkeeping (QCB Instructions; Section 1 and Section 2)
- Section 1 requires banking and financial institutions to ascertain the identity of the customers or those who represent them on the basis of official identity documents and register of these identities when making any deals or transactions, or providing services especially when opening account, contracting facilities contracts, financial transfers or managing their funds, whether in portfolios, shares in mutual funds, leasing trusts funds, or any other businesses and banking and financial services. (Paragraph 478)
- Section 2 obliges institutions to obtain and maintain information including: name, nationality, identity, and address; confirmation documents and mails used for all transferred funds, internally and externally. (Paragraph 479)
- QCB Instructions require measures to control transfers lacking related information about the two parties (name, address, account number, etc.) and call on financial institutions to exercise caution because of potential money laundering or terrorist financing risk. (Paragraph 479)

### Wire transfer originator information and maintenance (SR.VII; QFC Article 16(1))
- QFC: Article 16(1) (Transfer of Funds) of the QFC AML Regulations requires that where a relevant person is a financial institution and makes a payment on behalf of a customer to another financial institution using an electronic payment and message system, it must include the customer’s name, address and either an account number or a unique reference number in the payment instruction. This applies regardless of whether the transfer is domestic or cross-border. (Paragraphs 480, 483)
- QFC Rulebook guidance (paragraph 17 / 3.17 paragraph 1) conveys that originator information should remain with the payment instruction through the payment chain and that relevant persons should monitor and conduct enhanced scrutiny of suspicious activities including incoming fund transfers without complete originator information (name, address, and account number or unique reference number). (Paragraphs 480, 483)
- There is no de minimis threshold under the current QFC framework; QFCRA officials confirmed necessary information is requested and obtained for all wire transfers regardless of the amount. (Paragraph 480)
- Domestic sector: the regulatory framework for wire transfers is limited to obtaining basic information on originator and beneficiary(ies); no distinction between domestic and international transfers; no established threshold for Recommendation application; no requirement that originator information remain with the transfer through the payment chain; no requirement for beneficiary institutions to adopt effective risk-based procedures for handling transfers lacking complete originator information. (Paragraphs 481, 481)

### Industry practice for SWIFT transfers
- Financial institutions indicated international wire transfers follow SWIFT documentation procedures; transfers received without adequate information are returned to the sending institution. SWIFT documentation procedures require: SWIFT transaction number, transaction date, transaction amount, name, address, beneficiary(ies), details of the payment, intermediary institution, if applicable, receiving institution, and other details or payment instructions. (Paragraph 482)

### Risk-based procedures, monitoring, and oversight (SR.VII.5 & c.VII.6)
- Domestic sector: no measures require financial institutions to adopt effective risk-based procedures for identifying and handling wire transfers not accompanied by complete originator information. (Paragraphs 484, 486)
- QFC: Rulebook 3.17 paragraph 2 and Appendix A.2.2 paragraph 8 advise enhanced scrutiny and examination of transfers lacking complete originator information and that transactions warranting suspicion should be considered for reporting to the FIU and the Regulatory Authority. (Paragraph 485)
- Monitoring: Domestic sector — no measures require financial institutions to effectively monitor compliance with SR.VII requirements. (Paragraph 486)
- QFC supervision: as of the mission date, two financial institutions were operating within the QFC; QFCRA will conduct on-site visits as part of supervisory cycle to determine compliance with AML Law, AML Regulations and AML Rulebook; QFCRA has been monitoring progress and conducting risk assessments for the firms operating. (Paragraph 487)

### Sanctions and enforcement (R.17 / c.VII.7)
- Domestic sector: only the courts and the QCB may issue sanctions for noncompliance with prohibition of tipping-off and other enforceable AML/CFT measures set out in QCB AML/CFT instructions and DSM decisions. Identified weaknesses: no sanctions for non-banking financial sector other than tipping-off; in banking sector QCB’s only available sanction is revocation of license under Article 58 of the QCB law (last resort). (Paragraph 488)
- QFC enforcement: under Part 9 of the FSR, QFCRA may take a range of civil disciplinary and enforcement actions including:
  - public censure (Article 58 of Part 9 of the FSR);
  - financial penalties (Article 59 of the FSR);
  - imposition of prohibitions and restrictions including prohibiting an authorized firm or approved individual from entering into specified transactions or performing specified functions (Article 62 of Part 9 of the FSR);
  - obtaining injunctions (Article 63 of Part 9 of the FSR);
  - withdrawal of the license of a relevant person. (Paragraph 489)

### Monitoring of transactions and relationships (R.11 & R.21)
- QCB Instructions (Paragraph 12) require special attention to unusual, complex or large deals and “extraordinary deals” lacking visible financial targets or legal purpose; institutions must examine background and purpose, record results of examination and notify the FIU. (Paragraph 493)
- Paragraph 1.3 requires banks to check any banking transaction that exceeds 100,000 Qatari Riyals in various banking activities; also requires checking any banking and financial transactions suspected to be used in terrorist financing regardless of amount. (Paragraph 494)
- Paragraph 13 requires special attention to business relations and transactions with entities from countries that do not or insufficiently restrict these instructions; banks must report background and purpose to senior management. (Paragraph 495)
- Paragraph 19.3 sets out staged procedures: first stage – ordinary daily transactions; second stage – extraordinary transactions undertaken for the first time or frequently; third stage – when extraordinary operations are turned into suspicious transactions of money laundering or terrorism financing. Compliance officers gather information and perform preliminary analysis. (Paragraph 495)
- Paragraph 19.6 requires banks to keep records for extraordinary transactions made for the first time or frequently and for suspicious transactions, regardless of decision taken; authorities indicated records should be maintained at least for 15 years, which aligns with recordkeeping requirements. (Paragraph 495)
- Paragraphs 8.1–8.3: detection and follow-up actions for extraordinary transactions are drafted inconsistently; 8.1 uses discretionary language ("may" ask the customer to complete a document), 8.2 requires FIU notification if the customer does not respond, and 8.3 requires freezing of funds/assets in accordance with court judgments or instructions issued by the governor—however, no further measures have been taken to implement freezing in accordance with UNSCR 1267 and 1373 and private sector was not informed of names to be frozen. (Paragraphs 496–497)

### Gaps identified in domestic and DSM/MEC frameworks
- QCB Instructions fall short of requiring financial institutions to keep findings available for competent authorities and auditors. (Paragraph 498)
- Measures by DSM and MEC to require their financial institutions to:
  - (i) pay special attention to complex, unusual large transactions or unusual patterns having no apparent economic or lawful purpose;
  - (ii) examine background and purpose and set forth findings in writing; and
  - (iii) keep such findings available for competent authorities and auditors for at least five years
  do not clearly and adequately address the Recommendation. (Paragraph 499)
- Decision No. 16/3 of the DSM requires companies and brokerage firms to verify transactions that exceed QR. 100,000 or equivalent in foreign currency to ensure they are not exploited in money laundering or terrorist financing; no clarity on whether this threshold equates to large, unusual large or complex transactions and no guidance on verification process. (Paragraph 500)

### Recommendations (Domestic sector and QFC)
- Domestic sector recommendations to Qatari authorities: (Paragraph 490)
  - Set the record retention/recordkeeping requirement in primary or secondary legislation for financial institutions under the DSM and MEC.
  - Provide additional guidance to financial institutions under the QCB and DSM with specific instructions as to when the record retention/keeping requirement starts, i.e., following the termination of an account or business relationship or longer if requested by a competent authority.
  - Require banks to ensure that:
    - (i) all originator information that accompanies a wire transfer is transmitted with the transfer by each intermediary and beneficiary financial institution in the payment chain;
    - (ii) when technical limitations prevent full originator information accompanying a cross-border wire transfer from being transmitted with a related domestic wire transfer, to keep a record for five years of all the information received from the ordering financial institution.
  - Require banks to adopt effective risk-based procedures for identifying and handling wire transfers that are not accompanied by complete originator information. The lack of complete originator information may be considered a factor in assessing whether they are required to be reported to the financial intelligence unit or other competent authorities. In some cases, the beneficiary financial institution should consider restricting or even terminating its business relationship with financial institutions that fail to meet the SR.VII standard.
  - Establish a mechanism to monitor effectively the compliance of financial institutions with rules and regulations implementing SR.VII.
  - Ensure that sanctions (in line with R.17) also apply in relation to the obligations under SR.VII.
- QFC recommendations to the QFCRA: (Paragraph 492)
  - Ensure that non-routine batched transactions are not batched where this would increase the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing.
  - Establish explicit measures to ensure that beneficiary financial institutions adopt effective risk-based procedures for identifying and handling wire transfers that are not accompanied by complete originator information.
- Assessment summary: (Paragraph 3.6.3)
  - R.10: PC — Domestic sector: Record keeping requirement not established by primary or secondary legislation by DSM and MEC.
  - SR.VII: NC — Lack of specific measures imposed by the QCB on financial institutions to address all requirements of SR.VII; Lack of requirements imposed by the QFCRA on relevant persons to ensure that beneficiary financial institutions adopt effective risk-based procedures for identifying and handling wire transfers not accompanied by complete originator information. (Paragraphs 491, 3.6.3)

*Source: _cr08322 - 478.      Section 1 of the QCB Instructions require the banking and financial institutions to ascertain the — extracted content*

### 501.      The MEC, under Circular 1 of 2007, Section 2.4 provides a vague and broad reference to giving

### _cr08322 - 501.      The MEC, under Circular 1 of 2007, Section 2.4 provides a vague and broad reference to giving

### Legal and regulatory guidance for insurance and MEC Circular 1 of 2007
- Circular 1 of 2007, Section 2.4: provides a vague and broad reference to giving special attention to the valuable and common insurance transactions and identifying their purposes.
- The Circular is not legally binding and there is no further guidance that would clarify the text of the Circular.
- Section 6 (Supervisory Measures and Training) of Circular No. 1 of 2007: insurance companies are “required” to set policies and plans to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism including giving particular attention to insurance transactions concluded with persons or companies in countries that do not apply or insufficiently apply the Recommendations.
  - In such cases, the purpose of those operations should be examined and all necessary measures should be taken to verify the presence of the insurance premises and determine the insurance value.
  - Domestic and foreign branches of companies should equally observe those instructions.
- Despite these prescriptions, the Circular remains non‑legally binding.

### QFCRA / QFC AML framework: policies, suspicious indicators, and obligations
- Article 15 of the QFCRA AML Regulations:
  - relevant persons must have in place policies, procedures, systems and controls that adequately take into account any money laundering risks and vulnerabilities of its products, services, and customers.
  - relevant persons must assess risks in relation to money laundering and perform enhanced due diligence investigation for higher-risk products, services, and customers having regard to guidance issued by the QFCRA.
- QFCRA AML Rulebook Appendix A2.2: requires effective “Know Your Customer” arrangements to provide the basis for recognizing unusual and suspicious transactions.
  - A suspicious transaction will often be one that is inconsistent with the customer’s known legitimate transactions, or with the normal business activities for that type of account or customer.
  - Key to recognizing “suspicions” is knowing enough about the customer and the customer’s normal expected activities to recognize when a transaction is abnormal.
- QFCRA Rulebook examples of circumstances that might give rise to suspicion (Article references consolidated across QFCRA guidance):
  - Transactions which have no apparent purpose and which make no obvious economic sense.
  - Transactions requested by a customer without reasonable explanation, which are out of the ordinary range of services normally requested or are outside the experience of a relevant person in relation to a particular customer.
  - The size or pattern of transactions, without reasonable explanation, is out of line with any pattern that has previously emerged.
  - A customer refuses to provide the information requested without reasonable explanation.
  - A customer who has just entered into a customer relationship used the relationship for a single transaction or for only a very short period of time.
  - An extensive use of offshore accounts, companies or structures in circumstances where the customer’s economic needs do not support such requirements.
  - Unnecessary routing of funds through third party accounts.
  - Unusual transactions without an apparently profitable motive.
- Article 13 of the QFCRA AML Regulations (reporting):
  - establishes internal and external reporting requirements addressing unusual and suspicious transactions.
  - Article 13.7: when the MLRO receives an internal report on an unusual or suspicious transaction he/she must investigate the circumstances, including where necessary accessing any relevant “Know Your Client” information; determine whether in accordance with the AML Law No.(28) of 2002 an external suspicious transaction report must be made to the FIU; if required, to make such report to the FIU.
  - Article 13.8: requires the MLRO to document the steps taken to investigate the circumstance and where no external STR is made to record reasons why no such report was made.
  - All relevant details of any internal and external suspicious transaction report must be kept for at least six years from the date on which the report was made.

### Domestic supervisory instructions, STR obligations, and DSM / QCB guidance
- Article 6 of the AML Law: financial institutions obligated to “provide the competent entity with a detailed report on transactions [they carry] out whose nature or purpose is suspicious.” The law does not address reporting of suspicions of terrorist financing.
- Qatari FIU: established as a central independent unit located in the QCB through Administrative Order No. 1/2004 of August 31, 2004.
- QCB Instructions (Articles 1, 10, 11):
  - require financial institutions under QCB supervision to notify the FIU of any suspicious transaction, including attempted.
  - define “suspicious transactions” as extraordinary banking and financial transactions which the bank suspects or has justified reason to suspect are linked or related to money laundering, financing of terrorism, terrorist actions, or for terrorism organizations.
  - define “extraordinary banking operations” as major transactions and banking and financial transactions that do not match the customer’s income, the nature of his activity, the patterns of his previous transactions within the bank, or that are suspiciously repeated or lack clear financial or legitimate purposes.
  - Sections 10 and 11: if the bank discovers any suspicious operation, the compliance office should notify the FIU immediately using a specific form.
  - Failure to report, alert or assist persons related to money laundering or terrorism financing may expose employees to legal and financial consequences.
- DSM Decision No. (16/3), Article 9:
  - on discovery of any abnormal financial transaction, the company or brokerage firm may require the customer to complete documents and submit justifications for the abnormal transactions, provided procedures are applied within usual procedures without drawing the customer’s attention that such procedures relate to AML/CFT.
  - Article 9 is assessed as far too vague to be useful in practice.

### Special attention to countries not sufficiently applying FATF Recommendations (R.21 family)
- Domestic (QCB, DSM, MEC):
  - Article 13 of the QCB Instructions: banks and financial institutions must pay special attention to business relations and transactions with companies and financial institutions from countries that apply no obligation to comply with the Recommendations, particularly if no clear financial objectives are shown; reasons and purposes should be examined and reported to senior management.
  - Current framework does not require considering countries that insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations.
  - Article 19.11 and 19.12 of the QCB Instructions: institutions should use all possible means for supervising extraordinary transactions, including supervisory reports, list of non-cooperative countries, suspect investigation programs, and monitor international recent developments and measures issued by FATF, IMF, IBRD, Basel Committee, and other international organizations.
  - DSM and MEC do not have measures to ensure financial institutions are advised of concerns about weaknesses in other countries’ AML/CFT systems.
  - No explicit requirement to make findings available to competent authorities and auditors.
  - DSM officials: no measures/requirements established for brokerage houses because domestic market orders for Qatari citizens must be pre-funded; international market orders/payments go through another bank (HSBC Global Custodian services); DSM and brokerage houses rely on banks to monitor relationships with persons in countries not applying FATF.
- MEC Circular No. 1 of 2007, Section 6: insurance companies “required” to give particular attention to insurance transactions with persons/companies in countries that do not apply or insufficiently apply the Recommendations; however, Circular is not legally binding.
- QFC (QFCRA):
  - Article 14 of the QFCRA AML Regulations: relevant persons must obtain and properly use any relevant findings issued by the government of the State of Qatar; the QCB or the National Anti Money Laundering Committee or the FIU; FATF; the QFC Authority; the QFC Regulatory Authority; or the Gulf Co‑operation Council.
    - “Relevant findings” include conclusions that arrangements for restraining money laundering in a particular country are materially deficient compared with internationally accepted standards, or findings concerning named persons, groups, organizations, or entities where a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing exists.
  - Rule 3.15.1: relevant persons must pay special attention to transactions or relationships with persons, including beneficial owners, located in such countries/jurisdictions.
  - Rule 3.15.2: where transactions/relationships involve jurisdictions identified as deficient or subject to advisory notices, relevant persons must be aware of the background to the assessments and consider those circumstances for introduced business, payments from existing customers, or inter-bank transactions from correspondent banking clients.
  - Rule 3.15.3: transactions with counterparties in jurisdictions relieved from special scrutiny may nevertheless require higher than normal attention; the Regulatory Authority may publish Qatar, FATF or other findings; Regulatory Authority expects relevant persons to take steps to acquire relevant information from available sources.
  - QFCRA arrangements: receives UN Security Council lists and distributes them to relevant QFC firms; encourages checks against customer databases and monitoring.
  - QFCRA encourages relevant persons to assess countries carrying highest risks and to analyze transactions from countries/jurisdictions known to be a source of terrorist financing (QFC Rulebook, paragraph 3.15.3.4).
  - QFCRA may require relevant persons to take special measures it prescribes where the Regulatory Authority believes money laundering risk to the QFC exists.
- Gaps:
  - No measures in QFC to explicitly require examination, as far as possible, of background and purpose of transactions with no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, or to maintain written findings available to competent authorities.
  - No indication that QCB, DSM, MEC, and QFCRA have authority to apply counter-measures when a country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies FATF Recommendations.

### Identified shortcomings and recommendations (from 3.7.2)
- Major shortcomings:
  - Existing AML/CFT regulatory framework lacks requirements for financial institutions to pay special attention to all complex, unusual large transactions, and all unusual patterns of transactions with no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose; framework does not provide for appropriate measures.
- Domestic sector recommendations (QCB, DSM, MEC):
  - QCB is recommended to establish a clear requirement for banking and financial institutions to make the findings on the examination of complex, unusual large transactions or unusual patterns of transactions also available to auditors.
  - DSM and the MEC are recommended to establish formal requirements for financial institutions to:
    - (i) pay special attention to all complex, unusual large transactions, or unusual patterns of transactions, that have no apparent or visible economic or lawful purpose;
    - (ii) examine as far as possible the background and purpose of such transactions and to set forth their finding in writing; and
    - (iii) keep such finding available for competent authorities and auditors for at least five years.
  - DSM is also recommended to provide guidance indicating whether transactions exceeding QR. 100,000 or the equivalent in foreign currency should be considered large, unusual large or complex.
- QFC recommendation:
  - QFC authorities are recommended to establish a specific requirement for relevant persons to make the findings on the examination of complex, unusual large transactions or unusual patters of transactions available to the competent authorities and auditors.
- With respect to Recommendation 21:
  - DSM and the MEC are recommended to establish measures to:
    - ensure that financial institutions are advised of concerns about weaknesses in the AML/CFT systems of other countries; and
    - require them to make findings available to competent authorities and auditors.
  - DSM should establish a regulatory obligation on financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with persons from or in countries which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations.
  - The QCB, the DSM, the MEC and the QFCRA should have the authority to apply counter-measures to address instances where a country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies the FATF Recommendations.

### Compliance ratings and factors underlying ratings (3.7.3)
- R.11 — PC
  - Lack of requirements imposed by the QCB to make the findings of examinations of complex and unusual transactions available to auditors.
  - Lack of requirements imposed by the DSM and the MEC on financial institutions to pay special attention to all unusual large transactions or unusual patterns of transactions that have no apparent or visible economic or lawful purpose; to examine as far as possible the background and purpose of such transaction and set forth their findings in writing; and to maintain them for at least five years.
  - Lack of specific requirements imposed by the QFCRA to make the findings of examinations of complex and unusual transactions available to competent authorities and auditors.
- R.21 — NC
  - Lack of requirements imposed by the DSM and the MEC on financial institutions to pay special attention to business relationships and transactions with persons from or in countries which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations.
  - Lack of apparent authority at the QCB, the DSM, the MEC and the QFCRA to apply counter-measures to address instances where a country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies the FATF Recommendations.

*Source: _cr08322 - 501.      The MEC, under Circular 1 of 2007, Section 2.4 provides a vague and broad reference to giving*

### 530.      The MEC Circular also calls for some form of reporting , but, it does not rest on a sound legal

### _cr08322 - 530.      The MEC Circular also calls for some form of reporting , but, it does not rest on a sound legal

### Reporting framework and legal basis
- The MEC Circular calls for urgent notification to the FIU of any suspect transaction and that suspicious transaction forms should be delivered to the Unit by hand, or sent by fax or e-mail or any appropriate means and should be deemed confidential (¶530).
- The MEC Circular does not rest on a sound legal basis and the measures that it sets out are not enforceable; it would not be effective in practice because it does not provide sufficient coverage of the reporting system (¶530, ¶541).
- The DSM and the MEC have not yet established the obligation or requirement for financial institutions to also report attempted transactions to the FIU (¶535).
- There is no obligation imposed by primary or secondary legislation to report suspicious transactions related or linked to terrorist financing (¶536).

### QFC AML Regulations: reporting duties and scope
- Article 13(1) of the QFC AML Regulations requires a relevant person to have appropriate arrangements in place to ensure that whenever any employee, acting in the ordinary course of his employment, either knows or suspects; or has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting that a person is engaged in money laundering or conduct relating to the financing of terrorism, that employee must promptly make an internal STR to the relevant person’s Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO) (¶531).
- Article 13(2) requires policies and procedures to ensure disciplinary action can be taken against any employee who fails to make such a report (¶534).
- Article 13(7) requires the MLRO, on receipt of an internal STR, to:
  - investigate the circumstances without delay, including accessing any relevant “Know Your Client” information;
  - determine whether in accordance with the AML Law a corresponding external STR must be made to the FIU;
  - if required, make such an external report to the FIU; and
  - where an external report is made to the FIU, notify the Regulatory Authority and include general details of the report (¶534).
- The reporting requirement in Article 13(1) also applies to suspicions of terrorist financing (which remains undefined) (¶539).
- Article 13(11) establishes that the MLRO or other employee of a relevant person is not liable to proceedings; subject to liability; nor in breach of any duty merely by reason of the making of an external STR to the FIU if such STR is made in good faith (¶546).

### Definition of Money Laundering under QFC (Article 19)
- Article 19 defines Money laundering as: “The following conduct when committed intentionally:
  - a) any act which constitutes an offence under Article 2 of Law (28) of 2002 on Anti Money Laundering (as amended by virtue of Decree-Law No. (21) of 2003 - O.G. 11/2003);
  - b) any act which involves Criminal Property and which act constitutes an offense under the Articles of Law No. (11) of 2004 (Penal Code);
  - c) any act which finances the commission of an offence under the Articles of Law No. (3) of 2004 (Combating Terrorism);
  - d) the conversion or transfer of Property, knowing that such property is derived from Criminal Conduct or from an act of participation in such conduct, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the Property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such conduct to evade the legal consequences of his action;
  - e) the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of Property, knowing that such Property is derived from Criminal Conduct or from an act of participation in such conduct;
  - f) the acquisition, possession or use of Property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such Property was derived from Criminal Conduct or from an act of participation in such conduct;
  - g) the provision or collection of lawful Property, by any means, with the intention that it should be used or in the knowledge that it is to be used, in full or in part, for terrorism;
  - h) any act which constitutes participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempts or incitement to commit an offence specified in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) or an act specified in paragraph (d), (e), (f) or (g); or
  - i) any act which constitutes aiding, abetting, facilitating, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence specified in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) or an act specified in paragraph (d), (e), (f) or (g).” (¶533)
- Criminal Property is defined as:
  - 1) “Property that constitutes a person's benefit from criminal conduct or represents such a benefit (in whole or part and whether directly or indirectly) if the alleged offender knows or suspects that it constitutes or represents such a benefit; and
  - (2) for these purposes it is immaterial:
    - (a) who carried out the conduct;
    - (b) who benefited from it; and
    - (c) when the conduct occurred.” (¶533)

### Protections for reporters and confidentiality
- Domestic sector protections:
  - Article 5 of the AML Law No. (28) of 2002 provides that in the enforcement of this Law, provisions related to the secrecy of banking transactions shall not apply to the chairman, members of the board of directors and employees of the financial institution, unless where it is proved that the disclosure was meant to harm the owner of the transaction (¶542).
  - Section 5/4 of the QCB Instructions: banking and financial institutions or a reporting employee shall bear no responsibility after reporting on suspicious transactions, whether the suspicions were confirmed or not, as long as it was a bona fide reporting (¶543).
  - Article 9 of the DSM Decision No. (16/3) 2005: entities subject to the reporting provision should not be deemed to be contradictory to confidentiality laws and should not result in any responsibility on the notifying entity or its employees (¶544).
  - MEC’s Circular No.1 of 2007, Second Section, paragraph 4: reporting of suspicious transactions is not regarded as a breach of the secrecy of the transactions and it should not entail any kind of liability on the company or its employees (non-binding) (¶545).
- QFC protections:
  - Article 13(11) of the QFCRA AML Regulations: MLRO or other employee is not liable merely by reason of making an external STR to the FIU if made in good faith; authorized firms must ensure employees are aware of these issues during the “Know Your Customer” process (¶546).
- Gap identified:
  - Measures in place do not address requirements for ensuring that the names and personal details of staff of financial institutions that make STRs are kept confidential by the FIU (¶552).

### Prohibition against tipping-off
- Article 4 of the AML Law No. 28 of 2002 establishes the obligation for employees of the financial institution not to inform their customers about the actions taken against them related to combating money laundering; violation is sanctioned by imprisonment and a fine (¶547).
- Section 6 of the QCB Instructions establishes the obligation for all banking and financial institutions, their managers, employees, and staff not to warn their customers when any of their activities raises a suspicion (¶548).
- Article 9 of the DSM Decision No. (16/3) 2005: entities subject to the Decision shall not warn their customers on their suspected transactions but should subject these transactions to more verification and precautionary measures (¶549).
- Paragraph 5 of MEC’s Circular No. 1 of 2007 provides that the company and its employees should not warn the customer about any suspicion on the transactions; the circular is not legally binding or enforceable (¶550).
- QFC: Section 3.14 of the QFCRA AML Rulebook permits a relevant person to choose not to pursue the “Know Your Customer” process and instead file an STR where performing the process would tip-off a customer; guidance reiterates Article 4 of the AML Law prohibitions (¶551).

### Reporting of currency transactions above a threshold (cash transaction reporting)
- The FIU sent a letter (study) to NAMLC via the Vice Governor of the QCB addressing establishment of a currency transaction reporting system; the study presents three issues:
  - 1) Qatar has a cash-based society which, in the views of the FIU, would make establishing such a system difficult;
  - 2) the additional burden that such a system would put on the FIU and its limited resources;
  - 3) the current measures imposed by the QCB on financial institutions to limit cash transactions.
  - The study considers disadvantages of a cash transaction reporting system in a limited way and overlooks advantages; assessors encourage a more in-depth feasibility study (¶553).
- QCB internal cash recording requirements:
  - Section 1/3 of the Instructions requires banking and financial institutions to check and record any banking transaction that exceeds QR. 100,000 in various activities (assignments of right, currency exchange, opening letters of credit, account deposits, any kind of investment, or other bank activities) (¶554).
  - All institutions required to check any other banking and financial transactions suspected or linked to terrorism financing regardless of the amount (¶554).
  - Requirement does not extend to reporting the transaction(s) to the QCB (¶554).
- Exchange houses:
  - Internal recording requirement threshold for exchange houses was recently lowered by a QCB Circular to currency transactions that exceeds QR. 35,000; copy requested but not provided, reasons for reduction not determined (¶555).
- Further guidance to financial institutions recommends controlled internal reporting systems capable of generating reports on:
  - current accounts movements and balances;
  - assignment of right reports;
  - movements and balances reports of correspondent accounts;
  - large transaction reports;
  - reports of transactions in small amounts.
  - The large transactions report should contain all transactions that exceed QR.100,000 (¶556).
- Compliance and verification:
  - Cash recording requirements impose only maintenance of information, not reporting to QCB; compliance verified through periodic on-site inspections (¶557).
- DSM Decision No. (16/3) of 2005:
  - Article 9: companies and brokerage firms that receive cash transactions in an amount that does not exceed QR.30,000 or the equivalent in foreign currency need to notify the Market on a prescribed form; separate cash recording requirement requires verification and recording in books for transactions above QR.100,000 (¶558).
  - Neither Market Committee authorities nor brokerage firms could explain purpose for two different thresholds (¶558).
- Insurance companies:
  - There is no cash recording or reporting requirement in place for insurance companies (¶559).
- Information sharing with FIU:
  - Although banks and financial institutions seem to be complying with recording requirements and in some instances reporting cash transactions to their respective supervision and control authorities, this information is not shared with the FIU to complement the FIU’s financial intelligence analysis, trends, and typologies exercises (¶560).
  - For securities firms, current practice is for institutions to forward these reports directly to the FIU (¶560).
- QFC position:
  - QFCRA officials indicated that until a national central agency is created and the obligation to report is established by law or regulation, firms under its supervision will not be required to report cash transactions (¶561).
- Status:
  - The reporting of currency transactions above a threshold is currently under consideration by the Qatari authorities (¶562).

### Guidelines for financial institutions on STRs and suspicious activity
- QCB guidelines:
  - Chapter 2 of the QCB Instructions provides guidelines to assist banking and financial institutions (exchange houses, investment companies and finance companies) in detecting and monitoring suspicious customer behavior and requires all departments to use the guidelines and future amendments to enhance employees’ AML/CFT knowledge (¶563).
  - Guidelines give an overview of money laundering stages and provide lists of transactions that may be deemed suspicious, classified per category such as “money laundering using cash”, “money laundering using banking accounts”, “money laundering using financial institutions related to investment activities”, and “money laundering through international activities” (¶563).
  - Instruction 19/12 requires monitoring international recent developments and measures, particularly those related to recommendations and instructions issued by the FATF, the IMF, the IBRD, the Basel Committee, and other international organizations (¶564).
- Gaps:
  - No guidelines have been established by the DSM or the MEC for securities and insurance firms, respectively (¶565).
- QFCRA guidance:
  - The QFCRA has supplemented the AML Regulations with the AML Rulebook to extend and clarify AML Regulations and provide detailed regulatory guidance (¶566).
  - QFCRA Rule A.2.2 lists circumstances that might give rise to suspicion or reasonable grounds, including:
    - Transactions which have no apparent purpose and which make no obvious economic sense;
    - Transactions requested by a customer without reasonable explanation, which are out of the ordinary range of services normally requested or are outside the experience of a relevant person in relation to a particular customer;
    - The size and pattern of transactions, without reasonable explanation, is out of line with any pattern that has previously emerged;
    - A customer refuses to provide the information requested without reasonable explanation;
    - A customer who has just entered into a customer relationship used the relationship for a single transaction or for only a very short period of time;
    - An extensive use of offshore accounts, companies or structures in circumstances where the customer’s economic needs do not support such requirements;
    - Unnecessary routing of funds through third party accounts; or
    - Unusual transactions without an apparent profitable motive (¶567).
  - Article 14 of the QFCRA AML Regulations requires relevant persons to obtain and make proper use of relevant findings issued by government departments in the state; the Central Bank of Qatar or the NAMLC or the FIU; the FATF; the QFC Authority; QFC Regulatory Authority; or the Gulf-Cooperation Council (¶568).
- Limitation noted:
  - The QFCRA guidelines on money laundering and terrorist financing techniques and trends appear to be limited to those listed in Rule A.2.2 (¶569).

*Source: Excerpt from PDF content unit _cr08322 - 530.*

### 570.      QFCRA officials indicated that since the QFC became operational no suspicious transaction

### _cr08322 - 570.      QFCRA officials indicated that since the QFC became operational no suspicious transaction

### STR reporting and feedback to reporting institutions
- QFCRA officials indicated that since the QFC became operational no suspicious transaction report has been reported to the FIU.
- Feedback to Financial Institutions with respect to STR and other reporting (c.25.2):
  - Private sector stakeholders indicated that the only communication between the FIU and their respective institutions takes place when a STR is submitted to the FIU and receipt of the STR is acknowledged.
  - Feedback also takes place during periodic meetings hosted by the FIU.

### Recommendations and identified shortcomings (3.8.2)
- The current requirement set out in the AML Law to report transactions that may be linked to money laundering activities is too vague with respect to the DSM and MEC to be effective.
- The money laundering offence covers only a few predicate offences, which further limits the scope of the reporting requirement.
- There is no reporting requirement set out in primary or secondary legislation with respect to terrorist financing — identified as a major shortcoming.

- Authorities are recommended to:
  - Establish, in primary or secondary legislation, the requirement for all financial institutions to report to the FIU transactions, including attempted transactions, when a financial institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that the funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related or linked to terrorist financing, terrorist acts or terrorist organisations or those who finance terrorism.
  - Ensure the protection of financial institutions under the supervision of the DSM and MEC, and their staff from liability for filing STR and prohibit “tipping off” in the insurance sector.
  - Consider re-assessing the study conducted with respect to Rec. 19 to provide for a more comprehensive analysis and details as to how the decision to establish or not the cash reporting system was achieved.
  - Ensure that competent authorities, and particularly the FIU, provide guidance to assist financial institutions on AML/CFT issues covered under the FATF recommendations, including, at a minimum, a description of ML and FT techniques and methods; and any additional measures that these institutions could take to ensure that their AML/CFT procedures are effective.
  - Establish communication standards and a mechanism for providing feedback to reporting institutions including general and specific or case-by-case feedback.
  - Consider reviewing the guidance provided by the FATF Best Practice Guidelines on Providing Feedback to Reporting Financial Institutions and Other Persons.

### Compliance with Recommendations (3.8.3) — Ratings and factors
- R.13 — PC
  - Vague requirement to report transactions is to vague with respect to the DSM and MEC and limited scope of reporting in light of the limited list of predicate offenses.
  - Obligation to report transactions linked to terrorist financing, terrorist acts or organizations or those who finance terrorism not established by primary or secondary legislation.
  - Obligation to report transactions, including attempted transactions, not established by primary or secondary legislation.
  - Lack of requirement to report regardless of whether transactions are thought to involve tax matters.
- R.14 — LC
  - Lack of legal basis to support protection from STR reporting and tipping off in the insurance sector.
- R.19 — C
- R.25 — PC
  - Lack of guidelines established by the DSM and the MEC for the securities and insurance sectors, respectively.
  - Lack of adequate and appropriate feedback from competent authorities.
  - Limited guidelines on AML/CFT issues provided by the QFCRA to relevant persons.
- SR.IV — NC
  - Requirement to report suspicious transactions related or linked to terrorist financing not imposed by primary or secondary legislation.

### Internal controls, compliance, audit and training (R.15 & 22) — overview of requirements and gaps
- QCB Instructions (Paragraph 5) require banking and financial institutions to adopt programs to combat money laundering and financing of terrorism including:
  - developing and applying internal control policies and systems;
  - appointing qualified employees at the senior management levels;
  - arranging continuous training programs for the employees and the staff to inform them of the latest issues regarding money laundering and the financing of terrorism and other suspicious operations.
- QCB Instructions (Paragraph 19) require banks to:
  - Set general strategy for combating money laundering and terrorism financing, based on the set of policies which must be applied in that field, provided that it is issued in both languages, Arabic and English.
  - Set a manual for the executive procedures that all the bank’s departments and branches must comply with.
  - Implement staged procedures to manage financial and banking operations and classifying them into suspicious and non-suspicious ones, including:
    - (i) first stage: includes ordinary financial and banking operations implemented daily for bank’s customers;
    - (ii) second stage: includes extraordinary operations which happen either for the first time or repeatedly;
    - (iii) third stage: the stage in which the extraordinary operations are turned into suspicious operations of money laundering or terrorism financing, achieved by gathering information and documents and making preliminary analysis for the case by compliance officer and his team.
  - Keep an integral database of customer accounts and their banking dealings through using computer and through the original documents and papers.
  - Hire a compliance officer and assign a specialized team to assist.
  - Develop training programs and extend participation of bank’s personnel and officials.
  - Set a program for upgrading customer identities, papers and documents.
  - Set a quick and direct mechanism for enabling the compliance officer to notify/report suspicious operations.
  - Use all possible means for supervising extraordinary operations and deals (supervisory reports, lists of non cooperative countries, lists of persons and bodies pursued internationally, program for identifying suspects).
  - Keep records of other suspicious operations (such as forgery, falsification, fraud and others).
  - Implement measures for combating money laundering and terrorism financing during and after implementing the banking transactions in a manner consistent with the customers’ risk profile.

- QCB Instructions (Chapter 7, Section 10) guidance:
  - Grants the compliance officer necessary independence and access rights to all areas and information.
  - Compliance officer must comply with laws and instructions, file reports on deficiencies and corrective actions, serve as point of contact for compliance matters, and liaise with the QCB supervision department.

- DSM Decision 16/3 (2005) Article 9 requires entities to have AML/CFT programs including:
  - development and application of internal supervisory systems;
  - appointment of qualified personnel at the administration level;
  - organization of continuous training programs;
  - appointment of liaison officers for notification of money laundering and financing of terrorism offences to the FIU and sending copies of the STR to the liaison officers of the Market.

- MEC Circular No. (1) of 2007 (not legally binding) calls on insurance companies to:
  - set policies and plans to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism, including internal supervisory measures and controls;
  - organize training sessions for employees;
  - appoint a follow-up officer to verify implementation and to notify the FIU immediately when suspicious transactions are identified.

### Identified deficiencies in internal controls, audit and staffing
- QCB has issued enforceable measures, but there are marked inconsistencies in content and scope of required procedures for CDD, record retention, detection of unusual and suspicious transactions, and reporting obligations.
- Banking and financial institutions under QCB supervision are required to have an audit function and internal auditors must review compliance officer activities; internal audit is often outsourced.
- Screening and approval procedures for individuals are applied by the QCB for senior management candidates but do not extend to all employees; no clear requirement for institutions to have screening procedures for hiring employees.
- External auditors are required to review AML/CFT instructions and notify the FIU of any suspicious transactions, but the mission was informed that current auditors/auditing firms do not assess adequacy of internal control systems and policies with respect to AML/CFT.
- As such, requirements do not fully address the obligation to maintain an adequately resourced and independent audit function (internal audit requirement is lacking) to test compliance with procedures, policies and controls, and to put in place screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring employees.
- DSM Decision falls short by not requiring institutions to:
  - grant timely and unrestricted access to the compliance officer and his/her staff to customer identification data and other CDD information;
  - maintain an adequately resourced and independent audit function to test compliance with the law, decisions, and other enforcement measures.
- MEC’s Circular No. (91) of 2007 lacks a legal basis for requiring financial institutions to establish and maintain internal policies and controls to prevent ML and FT; therefore its measures cannot constitute “other enforceable means” for the purposes of this assessment.
- The only enforceable AML/CFT requirements are set out in:
  - the AML Law (as amended in 2003),
  - the QCB 2006 AML/CFT Instructions,
  - the DMS 2005 Decision (16/3).

### QFC-specific requirements (QFCRA and QFCRA AML Regulations)
- Article 6 of the QFCRA AML Regulations requires a relevant person to:
  - (1) establish and maintain effective anti money laundering policies, procedures, systems and controls;
  - (2) set up and operate arrangements, including the appointment of an Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO) in accordance with the responsibilities and duties of the MLRO;
  - (3) take reasonable steps to ensure that its employees comply with the relevant requirements of its anti money laundering policies, procedures, systems and controls;
  - (4) review the effectiveness of its anti money laundering policies, procedures, systems and controls at least annually;
  - (5) ensure that its anti money laundering policies, procedures, systems and controls apply to any branch or subsidiary operating in another jurisdiction.
  - If another jurisdiction’s laws or regulations prevent or inhibit a relevant person from complying with the AML Law or with the regulations, the relevant person must promptly inform the QFCRA in writing.
  - Effectiveness of these requirements is yet to be tested as the QFC is still relatively new.

- Article 9 sets out customer identification requirements.
- Article 10 sets out documents retention and record policy expectations.
- Article 13 sets out internal and external reporting requirements for reporting suspicious transactions.
- Article 17 requires arrangements to ensure all employees receive training and are aware of laws, regulations, and the relevant person’s AML policies, procedures, systems and controls.

- Article 6(2), Article 8 and related provisions require appointment and duties of MLRO and deputy MLRO; MLRO must:
  - be of sufficient seniority to act on his own authority;
  - have direct access to senior management;
  - have sufficient resources and, if necessary, an appropriate number of appropriately trained employees;
  - have unrestricted access to information about the financial and business circumstances of a customer or any person on whose behalf the customer is or has been acting;
  - have unrestricted access to relevant information about features of transactions.

- MLRO responsibilities include:
  - establishing and maintaining anti money laundering policies, procedures, systems and controls and compliance with AML legislation and regulation applicable in the QFC;
  - day-to-day operations for compliance;
  - receiving internal STRs and taking appropriate action;
  - making, in accordance with the AML Law, external STRs to the FIU and notifying the Regulatory Authority, as required;
  - acting as point of contact for the FIU, other competent Qatar authorities and the Regulatory Authority;
  - responding promptly to requests for information by the FIU, the QFC Authority, the Regulatory Authority or other competent State authorities;
  - receiving and acting upon findings;
  - establishing and maintaining an appropriate AML training program and adequate awareness arrangements;
  - making annual reports to senior management on compliance matters.

- MLRO reporting requirements:
  - The MLRO must report at least annually to the senior management of the relevant person on compliance with applicable AML laws including Articles, Rules and Regulations; the quality of the relevant person’s AML policies, procedures, systems and controls; any findings and how they were taken into account; any internal STRs made by staff and action taken including grounds for all decisions; any external STRs made and action taken including grounds for decisions; results of the review of effectiveness of AML policies, procedures, systems and controls; and any other relevant matters related to money laundering as it concerns the relevant person’s business.

*Source: _cr08322 - 570.      QFCRA officials indicated that since the QFC became operational no suspicious transaction*

### 588.      A relevant person must ensure that its senior management promptly assesses the report provided

### _cr08322 - 588.      A relevant person must ensure that its senior management promptly assesses the report provided

### Senior management assessment of MLRO reports
- A relevant person must ensure that its senior management promptly assesses the report provided by the MLRO, take action, as required subsequent to the findings of the report, in order to resolve any identified deficiencies and make a record of their assessment and the action taken.
- The report provided by the MLRO and the records of the assessment and actions must be documented in writing.
- A complete copy of each document must be provided to the Regulatory Authority promptly.

### Testing for compliance, internal audit and review scope (Rule 3.3 5 of QFCRA AML Rulebook)
- Testing must be undertaken by the internal audit or compliance oversight function or by a competent firm of independent auditors or compliance professionals.
- The relevant person must ensure that the review process covers at least the following (taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of the business):
  - a sample testing of “Know Your Customer” arrangements;
  - an analysis of all STRs to highlight any area where procedures or training may need to be enhanced;
  - a review of the nature and frequency of the dialogue between the senior management with the MLRO (if applicable) to ensure that their responsibility for implementing and maintaining adequate controls is satisfactory.

### Staff awareness and training requirements (Article 17 of QFC AML Regulation)
- A relevant person must have arrangements to provide regular information and training to all employees covering:
  - the identity and responsibilities of the relevant person’s MLRO and his deputy;
  - applicable legislation relating to anti money laundering;
  - the potential effect on the relevant person, its employees and its customers of breaches of applicable legislation relating to money laundering;
  - the relevant person’s anti money laundering policies, procedures, systems and controls and any changes to these;
  - money laundering risks, trends and techniques;
  - the types of activity that may constitute suspicious activity in the context of the business in which an employee is engaged that may warrant an internal STRs;
  - the relevant person’s arrangements regarding the making of an internal STR;
  - the use of findings; and
  - their individual responsibilities under the relevant person’s arrangements made under these Regulations, including those for obtaining sufficient evidence of identity and recognising  and reporting knowledge or suspicion of money laundering.
- Training requirements:
  - Requirements should be brought to the attention of new employees and remain available to all employees.
  - Anti money laundering training must be up-to-date with money laundering trends and techniques.
  - Training must be appropriately tailored to the relevant person’s different activities, services, customers and indicate any different levels of money laundering risk and vulnerabilities.
  - All employees must receive anti money laundering training.
  - Training sessions must be conducted with sufficient frequency to ensure that within any period of 24 months it is provided to all employees.
  - All relevant details of the training must be recorded, including dates when the training was given, the nature of the training, and the names of the employees who received the training.
  - These records must be kept for at least six years from the date on which the training was given.

### Employee screening procedures (c.15.4) and sectoral requirements
- Domestic sector:
  - There are no legal or regulatory requirements for banking and financial institutions under the QCB and MEC to put in place screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring employees.
  - Private sector firms have developed internal mechanisms including criminal background checks (conducted through the MOI) and verifications from previous employers.
- DSM Internal Regulations (Article 59 and Article 60):
  - Licensing and screening requirements for securities brokers and their employees include: i) be a Qatari national; ii) enjoy full legal capacity; iii) not have been convicted for a criminal offence or sentenced for issuing a cheque without provision; iv) have adequate bank balance unless rehabilitated; v) have at least secondary school qualifications or equivalent; vi) have good conduct and reputation; vii) devoted to the business and not working for another securities broker; viii) able to fulfill any other conditions published by the market.
  - Persons nominated shall not be Chairman, member of the board of Directors or employees of a company whose shares are traded in the Market.
  - Approval and delivery of the professional card is subject to successfully qualifying an examination regarding professional awareness; the Market determines subjects, regulation and procedures of such examination.
- QFC:
  - Rule 4.6.1: every authorized firm must have systems and controls to satisfy itself of the suitability of anyone who acts for it.
  - Rule 4.6.2: the firm must ensure staff are fit and proper, appropriately trained, and trained in the legislation applicable to the QFC.
  - Financial Services Regulations: Controlled Functions conducted only by Approved Individuals (Article 41); Controlled Functions include Senior Executives, Directors, Finance Officers, MLRO, and Senior Management.
  - Rule 4.3.1: guidance on assessing honesty, integrity and reputation — the Authorized Firm should consider whether the individual has ever:
    - been convicted or found guilty of offenses relating to fraud, theft, false accounting, serious tax offenses, dishonesty, money laundering, market manipulation, insider dealing or any other financial sector crimes;
    - been refused entry to, been dismissed from, or requested to resign from any profession, position of trust or fiduciary office;
    - been refused, restricted in, or had suspended, the right to carry on any business or trade requiring specific license, registration or authority;
    - been disqualified by a court from acting as a Director or in any other management capacity;
    - been censured, criticized, suspended, expelled, fined or subject of investigation by any Overseas Regulator or equivalent body;
    - resigned or been required to resign from any such body;
    - been a Director, Partner or involved in management where the entity was wound up, put into liquidation, ceased trading, placed in receivership or administration or negotiated a settlement with creditors while involved or within one year of that association ending;
    - been subject to conviction or adverse finding for fraud, misconduct, wrongful trading or other misconduct;
    - been involved in management of an entity investigated under companies or other legislation for malpractice or misconduct;
    - been subject of disciplinary procedures by a government body, agency or self regulatory body;
    - been the subject of a formal complaint in connection with financial services or ancillary services relating to integrity, competence or financial soundness;
    - contravened any provision of financial services rules, legislation, code of practice or principle or other ethical standards as defined by any Overseas Regulator;
    - whether the Approved Individual has been candid and truthful in all dealings with the Regulatory Authority.
  - Rule 4.4.1: competence and capability considerations include securing appropriate examination passes and competence assessments and capability to perform functions.
  - Rule 4.5.1: financial soundness considerations include whether the individual is able to meet his debts as they fall due and whether the individual has been adjudged bankrupt or subject to bankruptcy-related orders or failures to satisfy a judgment debt within the last 10 years.

### Additional elements on compliance functions and independence (c.15.5)
- Domestic sector:
  - QCB instructions Chapter 7, Section 10 requires banks to appoint an officer or establish a unit responsible for following up implementation of QCB laws and instructions, accountable directly to the board of directors.
  - Section 10.2 grants the compliance officer necessary independence and access rights to all areas of the institution and information they may hold.
  - Article 9 of the DSM decision addresses appointment of qualified personnel at the administration level but falls short of indicating the ability to act independently and to report above the compliance officer’s next reporting level or the board of directors.
  - Section 3 of MEC’s circular addresses appointment of a follow up officer charged mainly with verification of implementation, but falls short of addressing independence and reporting to higher management; MEC’s circular is not enforceable.

### MLRO appointment, seniority, resources and reporting (QFC Articles 6(2), 8 and 8(7))
- Article 6(2): a relevant person must set up and operate arrangements including the appointment of a MLRO.
- Article 8: a relevant person must appoint an individual to act as its MLRO and operate arrangements that ensure the relevant person and the MLRO comply with obligations of these Regulations.
- MLRO must be of sufficient seniority to:
  - act on his own authority;
  - have direct access to senior management of the relevant person;
  - have sufficient resources including, if necessary, an appropriate number of appropriately trained employees to assist in duties in an effective, objective and independent manner;
  - have unrestricted access to information about the financial and business circumstances of a customer or any person on whose behalf the customer is or has been acting;
  - have unrestricted access to relevant information about the features of transactions the relevant person has entered or may contemplate entering into with or for the customer or that person.
- Under Article 8(7) of the QFC Regulations the MLRO must report at least annually to the senior management of the relevant person.

### Application of AML/CFT measures to foreign branches & subsidiaries (c.22.1, 22.1.1, 22.1.2, c.22.2, c.22.3)
- Domestic sector:
  - Section 14 of the QCB AML/CFT Instructions requires banking and financial institutions to demand from their branches and subsidiaries operating abroad to comply with the QCB Instructions, as much as with the laws of the host country, as permitted, especially if those branches and subsidiaries operate in countries which do not totally or partially comply with the recommendations.
  - If laws in host countries hamper application of the rule, institutions must report to the FIU at the QCB.
  - Shortcomings:
    - The requirement falls short because it does not explicitly require branches and subsidiaries to apply the higher standard, to the extent that local laws and regulations permit.
    - The requirement to inform the FIU does not seem adequate given that the regulatory authority with responsibility over banking and financial institutions compliance is the QCB; the FIU should be contacted with matters dealing with suspicious transactions.
- DSM and MEC:
  - Authorities stated there are no branches or subsidiaries operating abroad; therefore no provisions/measures have been established for financial institutions regulated by these entities to ensure foreign branches/subsidiaries observe AML/CFT measures consistent with home country and FATF Recommendations.
- QFC:
  - Article 6(5) requires relevant persons to ensure AML policies, procedures, systems and controls apply to any branch or subsidiary operating in another jurisdiction.
  - Article 6(6) requires prompt written notification to the Regulatory Authority if another jurisdiction’s laws prevent or inhibit compliance with Law No. 28 of 2002 on Anti Money Laundering or with the regulations.
  - Rule 3.3.6 guidance: Regulatory Authority may impose restrictions, including preventing operation of a branch or subsidiary in that jurisdiction, if laws prevent compliance.
  - QFCRA imposes a periodic review requirement to verify branches or subsidiaries in another jurisdiction comply with AML Law and AML Regulation obligations.
- Additional element (c.22.3) – Domestic sector:
  - QCB, DSM, and MEC have not established measures to ensure financial institutions consistently apply CDD measures at the group level.
  - QFC: Rule 3.9.1 allows an exception — a relevant person is not required to establish the identity of a customer pursuant to Article 9(1) if the customer is: an authorized firm or another relevant person; or a regulated financial sector firm from a FATF country.

### Recommendations (3.9.1)
- Domestic sector: authorities are recommended to:
  - Set out clear requirements for all financial institutions to establish and maintain internal procedures, policies, and controls so that the same requirements apply uniformly to policies and controls addressing customer due diligence, record retention, detection of unusual and suspicious transactions and the reporting obligation.
  - Strengthen the QCB requirement to ensure that the staff supporting the designated AML/CFT compliance officer has timely and unrestricted access to customer information data and other customer due diligence information, transaction records, and other relevant information.
  - Impose a similar requirement on financial institutions that are regulated by the DSM and MEC.
  - Require all financial institutions to ensure that the scope of the internal audit function (or outsourcing of this function) includes AML/CFT reviews/audits and an overall assessment of the financial institutions’ adequacy of the internal control systems and policies with respect to AML/CFT.
  - Require financial institutions under the supervision of the DSM and MEC to maintain an adequately resourced and independent audit function to test compliance with the procedures, policies and controls.
  - Require banking and financial institutions under the supervision of the QCB and MEC to put screening procedures in place to ensure high standards when hiring employees.
- QCB is further recommended to expand existing measures to establish an explicit obligation for financial institutions to apply the higher AML/CFT standard, to the extent that local laws and regulations permit.
- Authorities should set out provisions for financial institutions under the control of the DSM and MEC in the event that foreign branches and subsidiaries are established to ensure:
  - these institutions observe AML/CFT measures consistent with home country requirements and the FATF Recommendations, to the extent that local laws and regulations permit;
  - particular attention is paid to branches and subsidiaries in countries which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations;
  - where minimum AML/CFT requirements of the home and host countries differ, the higher standard is applied, to the extent that local laws and regulations permit.

### Compliance with Recommendations 15 & 22 — Rating Summary
- R.15          PC
  - Factors underlying rating:
    - Inconsistencies with respect to QCB and DSM requirements and MEC non-binding measures for financial institutions to comply with the same requirements including adequate procedures, policies and controls for customer due diligence, record retention, detection of unusual and suspicious transactions and the reporting obligation.
    - Lack of specific QCB requirement to provide timely and unrestricted access to all customer information to the staff supporting the compliance officer.
    - Lack of specific DSM and MEC requirement to provide timely and unrestricted access to all customer information to the compliance officer as well as his/her staff.
    - Lack of DSM and MEC requirement for internal audit function to assess the adequacy of internal control systems and policies with respect to AML/CFT and to maintain an adequately resourced and independent audit function.
    - Lack of legal or regulatory requirements imposed by QCB, DSM and MEC for financial institutions to put in place screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring employees.
- R.22          PC
  - Factors underlying rating:
    - Lack of obligation imposed by the QCB on financial institutions with branches and subsidiaries to apply the higher standard, to the extent that local laws and regulations permit.
    - No legal or regulatory requirements established by the DSM and MEC for financial institutions to comply with the provisions of this recommendation.

*Source: _cr08322 - 588.      A relevant person must ensure that its senior management promptly assesses the report provided*

### 3.10 Shell banks (R.18)

### 3.10 Shell banks (R.18)

### 3.10.1 Description and Analysis

- Prohibition of Establishment of Shell Banks (c.18.1):
  - Domestic sector: "There are no explicit provisions in the law or regulations or other enforceable means that would explicitly prohibit the establishment of shells banks in Qatar."
  - QCB licensing requirements (Chapter 11, Article 52 to 59 of QCB law of 2006) may partially prevent establishment of shell banks because an applicant must "have been established as a joint-stock company pursuant to the Law No 33 of 2002 on Commercial Companies (Article 52 of the QCB Law)."
  - Article 3 of the Law on Commercial Companies provides: "every company established in Qatar shall be of a Qatari nationality with its headquarters in Qatar".
  - No further measures define headquarters or require physical presence that would encompass the meaningful "mind and management" of the company, and "there are no indications that the QCB ensures itself of the applicant’s physical presence in Qatar."
  - Continued operations of shell banks established under previous laws: "it has not been established that the physical presence was required under the legal framework that applied before the enactment of the 2002 law on commercial companies."

- QFC framework and physical presence:
  - QFC Companies Regulations:
    - Article 14—Limited Liability Companies (LLC)—conveys that an LLC may be incorporated in the QFC.
    - Article 17(1)—Incorporation of a Limited Liability Company—permits one or more persons to apply for incorporation by signing and filing with the Companies Registration Office (CRO) an incorporation document together with the prescribed fee.
    - Article 17(2)(C) requires the incorporation document to set out or attach "the address of the registered office of the LLC, which should be in the QFC."
    - Article 42—Situation of registered office—requires that once incorporated in the QFC, a limited liability company "must have a registered office in the QFC and carry on business from that office unless the QFC Authority permits such business activity to be carried on at or from another place within the QFC."
    - Therefore "a bank must be authorized by the QFC Regulatory Authority to have a physical presence in the QFC."
  - Individuals Rulebook (INDI) Rule 2.2.1 (A)—Additional Requirements for specific Controlled Functions—states that "the senior executive function must be carried out by an individual who in the case of a local firm is ordinarily resident in the State."
  - QFC specifics: Rule 2.2.2 requires a person carrying on the MLRO function to be a resident in Qatar.

- Prohibition of Correspondent Banking with Shell Banks (c.18.2) and Requirement to Satisfy Respondent Financial Institutions Prohibit of Use of Accounts by Shell Banks (c.18.3):
  - Domestic sector: "There are no measures in place that would effectively prevent the financial institutions from entering into, or continuing correspondent banking relationships with shell banks."
  - "There are no requirements on the financial institutions to satisfy themselves that respondent financial institutions in a foreign country do not permit their accounts to be used by shell banks."
  - QFC: Article 12(3) of the QFCRA AML Regulation prohibits authorized firms from:
    - "establishing a correspondent banking relationship with a shell bank;"
    - "establishing or keeping anonymous accounts or accounts in false names or maintaining a nominee account which is held in the name of one person, but controlled by or held for the benefit of another person whose identity has not been disclosed to the authorized firm."
  - QFCRA Rule 3.12 requires relevant persons to:
    - "take specific care while assessing the anti money laundering arrangements of correspondent banking clients and, if applicable, other qualified professionals relating to customer identification, transaction monitoring, terrorist financing and other relevant elements and to verify that these business partners comply with the same or equivalent anti money laundering requirements as the relevant person."
    - "ensure that a correspondent banking client does not use the relevant person’s products and services to engage in business with shell banks."
    - "have arrangements to guard against establishing a business relationship with business partners who permit their accounts to be used by shell banks."
  - Reiteration: Article 42 of the QFC Companies Regulations and QFCRA authorization requirements emphasize registered office and presence in the QFC; Rule 2.2.1 and Rule 2.2.2 require residence in Qatar for senior executives and MLROs respectively.

### 3.10.2 Recommendations and Comments

- The authorities are recommended to:
  - Amend the QCB licensing requirements with a view to clearly prevent the establishment of shell banks in Qatar;
  - Prohibit banks from entering into or continuing correspondent relationships with shell banks; and
  - Require financial institutions to satisfy themselves that respondent financial institutions in a foreign country do not permit their accounts to be used by shell banks.

### 3.10.3 Compliance with Recommendation 18

- Rating: R.18 — PC
- Summary of factors underlying rating:
  - "Measures in place in the domestic sector are not sufficient to effectively prohibit the establishment of shell banks and do not prevent domestic banks from having dealings with foreign shell banks."

*Source: 3.10 Shell banks (R.18) — extracted from the provided content unit.*

### 636.      Independent reviews are conducted by the Regulatory Authority to verify information provided

### 636.      Independent reviews are conducted by the Regulatory Authority to verify information provided

### Fit and proper assessments and controlled functions
- Independent reviews are conducted by the Regulatory Authority to verify information provided by the applicant and additional checks are undertaken using Integrascreen, Bankers Almanac and other on-line sources.
- Prior to authorization, the QFCRA considers several aspects in determining whether individuals are fit and proper to be authorized.
- Part 7 of the QFC FSR provides detailed provisions for the approval of persons performing controlled functions.
- Definition: A controlled function is a function which involves:
  - the exercise of significant influence over the conduct of the firm’s affairs in relation to Regulated Activities;
  - dealing directly with clients or customers in relation to Regulated Activities; or
  - dealing with the property of clients or customers;
  - and is specified as a Controlled Function in Rules issued by the Regulatory Authority from time to time.
- Examples of controlled functions include: Senior Executives, Directors, Finance Officers, MLRO, and Senior Management, among others.
- Article 41 of the QFC FSR requires the Authorized Firms to ensure that no individual acting for the Authorized Firm or a contractor of the Authorized Firm performs a controlled function for that Authorized Firm unless the individual is approved by the Regulatory Authority as an Approved Individual.

### Assessment of honesty, integrity and reputation (Rule 4.3.1; INDI Appendix A.1.1)
- Under Appendix A.1.1 of the INDI Rulebook, the Authorized Firm should consider whether the individual has ever:
  - been convicted or found guilty of any offenses relating to fraud, theft, false accounting, serious tax offenses, dishonesty, money laundering, market manipulation, insider dealing or any other financial sector crimes;
  - been refused entry to, been dismissed from, or requested to resign from any profession, position of trust or fiduciary office whether or not remunerated;
  - been refused, restricted in, or had suspended, the right to carry on any business or trade for which specific license, registration or other authority is required;
  - been disqualified by a court from acting as a Director or in any other management capacity of any Company, Partnership or other legal entity;
  - been censured, criticized, suspended, expelled, fined or been the subject of any investigation, intervention or disciplinary proceedings by any Overseas Regulator or equivalent body;
  - resigned or been required to resign from any such body;
  - been a Director, Partner or otherwise involved in the management of a Company, Partnership or other related entity in any jurisdiction where either whilst involved or within one year of that association ending the entity has been wound up, put into liquidation, ceased trading, placed in receivership or administration or negotiated a settlement with creditors;
  - been subject to any conviction or adverse finding of any court for fraud, misconduct, wrongful trading or other misconduct;
  - been involved in the management of a Company, Partnership or other legal entity which has been subject to an investigation under companies or other such legislation for malpractice or misconduct;
  - been the subject of disciplinary procedures by a government body, agency or other self regulatory body or organization;
  - the subject of a formal complaint in connection with financial services or ancillary services which relates to his/her integrity, competence or financial soundness;
  - contravened any provision of financial services rules, legislation, code of practice or principle or other ethical standards as defined by any Overseas Regulator or similar such body; and
  - whether the Approved Individual has been candid and truthful in all his dealings with the Regulatory Authority.

### Competence and capability (Rule 4.4.1)
- An authorized firm should consider among other relevant things:
  - the securing of appropriate examination passes and competence assessments; and
  - whether the individual is capable of performing functions which the Authorized Firm or applicant employs or intends to employ him to perform.

### Financial soundness of individuals (Rule 4.5.1)
- An Authorized Firm should consider relevant aspects like:
  - whether the individual is able to meet his debts as they fall due; and
  - whether the individual has been adjudged bankrupt, been the subject of a receiving or administration order, had a bankruptcy petition served on him, had his estate sequestrated, entered into a deed of arrangement (or any contract in relation to a failure to pay due debts) in favor of his creditors or, within the last 10 years, has failed to satisfy a judgment debt under a court order, whether in the State or elsewhere.

### Licensing and monitoring of value transfer/exchange services
- Domestic sector: Under Article 5 paragraph 2 of the QCB Law 33, the QCB is responsible for the licensing as well as AML/CFT regulation and supervision of exchange houses (which include money transfer services and money/currency changing).
- Instructions issued by the QCB address the obligations and responsibilities of the value transfer/exchange services with respect to effectively implementing the AML/CFT laws and regulations.
- QFC: Money or value transfer services or money or currency changing services are not one the permitted activities listed in Schedule 3 of the QFC law. Consequently, they cannot be undertaken in or from the QFC.

### Powers and effectiveness of supervisors (AML/CFT inspections and access to records)
- Powers referenced: Power of Supervisors to Monitor AML/CFT Requirements (c.29.1); Authority to conduct AML/CFT inspections by Supervisors (c.29.2); Power for Supervisors to Compel Production of Records (c.29.3 & 29.3.1); Powers of Enforcement & Sanction (c.29.4).
- Domestic sector observations:
  - Current supervision of financial institutions is mostly targeted towards prudential matters and does not sufficiently address AML/CFT issues.
  - The QCB is empowered to conduct AML/CFT supervision under Article 5, paragraph 12 of the QCB law and Article 71 of Law No. (330 of 2006 (QCB) empowers the QCB to inspection financial institutions.
  - Article 71 requires financial institutions and their branches and the subordinate companies inside or outside the State, and the representation bureaus to provide inspectors/supervisors with all information they require and allow access to all records, accounts and document they require.
  - Secrecy of information shall not be a protest against the inspectors/supervisors responsible for conducting inspections; access to information is not predicated on the need to require a court order.
  - As of the mission date, banking and financial institutions had been subject to limited on-site AML/CFT inspections as part of the prudential visits.
  - QCB inspection program includes inspecting all Qatari banks every year and if possible, some of the foreign branches and subsidiaries ensuring that all banks are covered within a 24 months period.
  - Currently, the QCB does not conduct targeted AML/CFT inspections; the AML/CFT component is included as part of the global on-site inspection activities.
  - Review findings: AML/CFT coverage was low; reports reflect AML/CFT matters only when shortcomings have been identified and otherwise contain no reference to AML/CFT procedures performed.
  - The scope of AML/CFT inspections, reporting practices and frequency of on-site visits do not appear to be in-depth nor risk-driven.
- QCB risk-based supervision:
  - In November 2006, the QCB adopted a risk-based approach to supervision both prudential and on AML/CFT.
  - New examination manuals and risk-based inspection procedures have been developed for banks, investment companies, finance companies and exchange houses, including risk management matrices, templates to assign risk profiles and detailed verification procedures.
  - As of the mission date, the QCB had implemented the new supervisory approach and methodology during one bank inspection only and was in the process of reviewing the work of the inspectors and drafting the report of examination.
  - Given the recent adoption, additional time is needed to test the effectiveness of the new supervisory approach.
- DSM (securities market) inspection powers and practice:
  - Article 12 of the DSM Law empowers the DSM to inspect and review the records of brokers and intermediaries and their books and all transactions records, to check and audit the activities of the departments in charge of issuing securities in the public companies listed in the Exchange, and securities portfolios managed by any registered member in the market.
  - All data and information requested by the inspection and audit team is required to be available, accessible and treated with high confidentiality.
  - If the entity is a licensed bank, the DSM coordinates with the QCB and is allowed to conduct joint inspections.
  - DSM officials indicated that, in practice, all entities were inspected and audited annually; during annual visits the AML/CFT component was reviewed with emphasis on three activities: compliance with the requirements of Decision 16/3; review of suspicious transactions reported; and review of cash transactions recorded and reported to the FIU.
  - Inspections were discontinued at the end of 2006, in preparation for the integration of the DMS into the Qatar Financial Monetary Authority.
  - Meetings revealed the level and frequency of AML/CFT inspections has been minimal; DSM visits mostly target prudential matters and only pay particular attention to the three areas above.
  - To date no sanctions have been imposed on financial institutions for non-compliance (DSM).

### Sanctions, enforcement powers and proportionality
- QCB sanctions:
  - Article 58, paragraph 1 of the QCB Law empowers the QCB to revoke a financial institution’s license as a sanction for violations of the provision of this law, as well as, violations to the provisions of decisions and instructions.
  - Article 105 provides that the QCB or the Committee shall impose fines on the financial institutions not exceeding (5,000) Five Thousand Qatari Riyals, daily, for violations of the law of the Bank and its instructions according to the decision of the Bank.
  - The “Committee” refers to the Banking Committee established under Article 60 of Law 33 and comprised by a chair – one of the Vice President of the Court of Appeal, nominated by the Supreme Council of Justice; the Deputy Governor of the QCB; and one of the qualified and experienced banking experts.
  - QCB Instructions (Part 9) provide a listing of sanctions (fines) but all are directly related to prudential matters and not to AML/CFT issues.
  - The only sanctions available for non-compliance with the (two) preventive measures in the AML instructions are revocation of the license and a daily monetary fine as described above; this is noted as not proportionate in all cases.
  - In practice no sanction has been imposed by the QCB for non-compliance with AML/CFT requirements.
- DSM sanctions:
  - Article 20 of the DSM Law requires establishment of a disciplinary committee to hear cases against brokers, intermediaries and listed companies for breaches.
  - The disciplinary committee composition: headed by a judge selected by the MOJ upon suggestion of the President of the Courts of Justice, and composed of two other members selected among the members of the Market commission.
  - Sanctions to be applied by the disciplinary committee include: blame, warning, confiscating fully or partially of the Bank deposit; stopping dealing in a specific securities, or stopping a broker or an intermediary from conducting business for a period not more than four months; and withdraw membership.
  - In practice no sanction has been imposed by these authorities for non-compliance with AML/CFT requirements.
- MEC and insurance sector:
  - The MEC appears to be the de facto supervisor for AML/CFT matters with respect to the insurance sector and to date has only issued guidance to financial institutions under its responsibility.
  - In practice no sanction has been imposed by the authorities for non-compliance with AML/CFT requirements.
- AML Law sanctions and limitations:
  - AML Law: Article 4 prohibits “tipping-off” and Article 6 addresses reporting requirements.
  - Non-compliance with Article 4 is punishable by imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year and a fine of not more than QR. 3,000.
  - These penalties shall be doubled if the crime is committed in collaboration with one person or more as well as in the case of repetition (i.e. if the accused person has committed a similar crime within a period of five years after having served the penalty for the original offense).
  - The AML Law does not provide a sanction for failure to report suspicious transactions.
  - The AML Law and the sanction for tipping-off are enforceable in both the domestic sector and the QFC; however, the law provides for criminal sanctions which may only be issued by a criminal court.
  - This implies supervisory authorities that detect a case of tipping-off should seize the public prosecutor’s office, but none of the relevant texts provides this.

### QFC / QFCRA supervisory framework and powers
- QFC law and QFC FSR set out the QFCRA’s role in regulation of financial services in the QFC.
- The QFC AML Regulations (enacted in September 2005) designate the QFCRA as the sole supervisory authority responsible for ensuring compliance with the Regulations.
- The QFCRA is given extensive powers to investigate and take disciplinary actions under the FSR.
- October 2005: QFCRA issued its AML Rulebook providing further requirements and guidance.
- The AML Regulations include a regime for the approval of individuals performing certain controlled functions and set out QFCRA’s powers in respect of investigations, enforcement and discipline.
- Under Part 8 – Supervision and Investigation, the QFCRA has the power to require persons in the QFC to obtain documents and information; to enter the premises of any person in the QFC at any time for inspecting and copying information or documents stored in any form on such premises; and to require production of a report by a nominated person on any matter about which the QFCRA has required or could require provision of information or documents.
- Part 8, Article 48(3) grants inspection powers not predicated on the need to obtain a court order.
- Conclusion: A framework has been implemented to ensure adequate supervisory measures and tools are available to the QFC/QFCRA, but as the QFC and QFCRA are still relatively new, the effectiveness of the policies and programs are yet to be tested.

*Source: _cr08322 - 636.      Independent reviews are conducted by the Regulatory Authority to verify information provided*

### 659.      Meetings with QCB officials revealed that between 2004 and 2006, the QCB imposed 79

### _cr08322 - 659.      Meetings with QCB officials revealed that between 2004 and 2006, the QCB imposed 79

### Enforcement actions and sanctions — findings
- Between 2004 and 2006, the QCB imposed 79 financial fines ranging from QR. 1,500 to QR. 4.7 million, all involving violations of prudential instructions.
- QCB non-monetary sanctions used: enforcing cease and desist orders, removing directors and officers, placing a financial institution under administration.
- No sanction has been imposed by the QCB for non-compliance with AML/CFT requirements. Possible explanations in the assessors’ views:
  - QCB had only been granted powers to supervise AML/CFT issues a few months before the onsite visit.
  - QCB may not put sufficient focus on supervision of AML/CFT issues.
- DSM (Disciplinary securities market) disciplinary framework (Article 20 of the DSM Law):
  - Disciplinary committee to hear cases against brokers, intermediaries, and listed companies for breaches of law, bylaws, market decisions, fair functioning, and business ethics.
  - Committee composition: headed by a judge selected by MOJ upon suggestion of the President of the Courts of Justice; two other members selected among Market Commission members.
  - Sanctions the committee should apply: blame, warning, confiscating fully or partially of the Bank deposit; stopping dealing in specific securities; stopping a broker or intermediary from conducting business for a period not more than four months; withdraw membership.
  - Committee can impose financial sanctions up to a maximum of two million Qatari Riyals, but there is no clear mechanism to ensure a broad range and proportionality of financial sanctions.
  - In practice, no sanction has been imposed by the DSM for non-compliance with AML/CFT requirements.
- MEC: meetings revealed no penalties/sanctions imposed for non-compliance with AML.
- QFC / QFCRA: Part 9 of the FSR sets out disciplinary and enforcement actions the QFCRA may take, including:
  - publicly censure (Article 58);
  - financial penalties (amounts not specified; Article 59);
  - appointment of managers (Article 60);
  - undertakings (Article 61);
  - prohibition of certain activities or obligation to act in a certain way (Article 62);
  - commence proceedings before the Tribunal to seek enforcement or disciplinary redress (Articles 63, 64 and 65), including injunctions, orders for winding up or appointment of administrators.
- None of the QFCRA sanctions had been issued at the time of the assessment; effectiveness of the regime for sanctioning non-compliance with AML Law, QFCRA AML Regulations, and QFCRA AML Rulebook could not be tested.

### Supervisory responsibilities, resources, and training — findings
- QCB Department of Banking Supervision responsibilities (selection preserved verbatim):
  - Inspects FIs and verifies their compliance with the provisions and terms of the Law and Regulations issued by QCB;
  - Obtains necessary information and data from FIs to verify compliance with QCB’s instructions;
  - Proposes the issuance of necessary instructions, regulations and directives to organize the activities of FIs;
  - Studies violations committed by FIs and propose the appropriate fines in this regard;
  - Proposes issuing and renewing FIs’ licenses;
  - Supervises any FI liquidation;
  - Studies the banking risks through on-site and off-site inspections; and
  - Fulfills any other function that falls within, related to, or implied by the nature of work at the department.
- As of the mission date, the Department of Banking Supervision had a staff of 14 supervisors assigned to on-site inspections.
- Training on AML/CFT matters has been coordinated mainly by the FIU; QCB staff participated in local and regional AML/CFT workshops, but a specific listing of courses and workshops attended in the last 12 months was not available.
- DSM organization and staffing:
  - DSM staff comprised approximately 100 individuals, with 7 assigned to inspections of brokerage firms.
  - No training information was available for review, although officials indicated AML/CFT training had taken place during 2005 and 2006.
- MEC organization:
  - Commercial Affairs Department responsible for licensing insurance companies, but officials were unsure whether AML/CFT fell within their scope of supervision.
  - Training information on AML/CFT matters was not available for review.
  - Mission was not able to discuss with MEC staff the licensing procedures and practices governing insurance companies; individuals responsible were not available during the mission.
- QFCRA / QFC governance and staffing:
  - QFCRA is a body corporate with financial and administrative autonomy; supervisory and investigative/enforcement arms staffed by personnel recruited internationally.
  - State of Qatar required under Article 8(4) to provide adequate funding directly to the Regulatory Authority; funding provided on annual basis directly from the State of Qatar.
  - Board removal conditions preserved verbatim: 1) becomes incapable through ill health of performing his duties; 2) becomes bankrupt; 3) is convicted of a criminal offense or is guilty of serious misconduct; and 4) funding being provided on annual basis directly from the State of Qatar.
  - QFCRA recruited an experienced anti money laundering specialist responsible for staff training and for ensuring understanding of AML framework within QFC and State of Qatar.
- Information requested to evaluate competent authorities’ financial and human resources, statistics on licenses (applications, granted, refused), supervisory inspection programs/plans, and sanctions imposed by type and institution was not readily available to the mission.

### Money or Value Transfer Services (SR.VI) — findings
- QCB is responsible for licensing, regulation and supervision of MVT service operators, which operate under exchange houses (Article 5 paragraph 2 of the QCB Law No. 33).
- Article 52: “no person shall use the term “bank” or logo of a bank or a finance or an investment company or an exchange office or any other financial institutions in the documents, correspondences, advertisements or any other means before obtaining the license from the QCB. Also practicing of works and activities provided for in the Law is prohibited unless it is licensed”.
- MVTs are subject to AML Law obligations and QCB Instructions that require MVTs to:
  - Identify the customers;
  - Report suspicious transactions to the FIU;
  - Report cash transactions greater that QR. 1000,000 (a recent Circular was issued reducing the reporting threshold to QR. 35,000);
  - Maintain records for 15 years;
  - Establish policies, procedures and internal controls to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing;
  - Pay attention to companies and financial institutions from countries that do not apply or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations;
  - Pay attention to complex and large transactions; and
  - Appoint a compliance office responsible for AML/CFT matters.
- Customer identification: MVTs required to identify the direct customer executing the transaction; QCB inspectors verify service operator/agent lists maintained by exchange houses during on-site visits.
- Settlement practices: MVTs batch outgoing transfer requests at end of day and use bank accounts to conduct transfers; settlements disbursed through banking institutions and other MVT service providers where relationships exist.
- Historical enforcement: during 1999 and 2000, QCB used powers to sanction exchange companies for non-compliance with customer identification requirements; penalties ranged from QR. 5,000 to QR. 10,000. QCB temporarily closed an exchange company conducting transactions through an unauthorized business and removed company officials; the company re-opened after validation of adequate controls. In 2005 QCB issued three enforcement actions against exchange houses; in 2006 only one enforcement action was issued. None of these was related to non-compliance with AML/CFT requirements.
- Anecdotal evidence of an informal money/value transfer system operating within Qatar used by communities in services and construction sectors to send funds abroad due to high costs, time delays, and lack of extensive receiving-country financial networks; QCB officials indicated they are not aware of any informal MVT system in Qatar.
- Assessment: shortcomings (inadequate customer identification and due diligence measures, lack of requirements for wire transfers, lack of sanctions for noncompliance, lack of effective risk-based supervision and regulation) do not provide an adequate framework for dealing with informal value transfer services/unlicensed operators.
- QFC: Money or value transfer services is not a permitted activity under the QFC law; Special Recommendation VI is not applicable to the QFC.

### Preventive measures for DNFBPs — findings
- Casinos prohibited; notaries are government officials and do not fall in FATF DNFBP definition.
- Other DNFBPs present: Real estate agents, dealers in precious metals, dealers in precious stones, lawyers and legal advisers, accountants and TCSP.
- AML Law does not apply AML/CFT requirements to DNFBPs in terms of customer due diligence, record-keeping and monitoring.
- MEC circular No.2 of 2007 (January 17, 2007) requests all companies to identify clients, verify transactions, keep records, establish internal monitoring and training; MEC circular No.3 of 2007 applies same requirements to auditing offices. MOJ resolution No.108 of 2006 applies to lawyers and law offices; legal advisers are not covered.
- Dealers of precious metals acting as exchange houses are included in the scope of the AML Law and subject to QCB instructions.
- MEC and MOJ circulars are not considered enforceable means.

### Recommendations (extracted verbatim)
- Domestic sector: the authorities are recommended to:
  - Establish the legal basis for AML/CFT supervision of the financial institutions currently regulated by the MEC.
  - Strengthen the QCB, DSM and MEC overall AML/CFT supervision and develop formal examination procedures for AML/CFT matters.
  - Re-evaluate the adequacy of the penalties regime, in particular with respect to the criminal sanction for tipping-off provided in the AML Law, and provide the domestic supervisory authorities with an adequate range of sanctions.
- Money or Value Transfer Services — recommendations:
  - Investigate the possibility of an informal MVT system operating in Qatar and consider effective measures for monitoring these activities, if identified.
  - Address the shortcomings identified in recommendations 4-11, 13-15, and 21-23, as applicable to this recommendation.

### Compliance ratings and summary of factors (selection)
- R.17          NC
  - Inadequate penalties, in particular with respect to the criminal sanction for tipping-off provided in the AML Law.
  - Inadequate sanction regime with respect to the severity of the sanction that the QCB and DSM may issue. Absence of legal framework for sanctions in the insurance sector.
  - No penalties/sanctions imposed by QCB, DSM, and MEC related to AML/CFT.
- R.23          PC
  - No licensing procedures available for review for insurance companies licensed by the MEC.
  - No designated entity responsible for AML/CFT supervision for domestic insurance sector.
- R.25          PC
  - Lack of guidelines established by the DSM and the MEC for the securities and insurance sectors, respectively.
  - Lack of adequate and appropriate feedback from competent authorities.
  - Limited guidelines on AML/CFT issues provided by the QFCRA to relevant persons.
- R.29          PC
  - Lack of adequate MEC supervisory authority/powers for AML/CFT matters in insurance sector.
  - Lack of AML/CFT inspections of insurance companies to monitor compliance.
- SR.VI         PC
  - Potential informal money/value transfer system operating in Qatar without effective monitoring.
  - Number of shortcomings identified in other recommendations related to CDD, sanctions, supervision and regulation.

*Source: _cr08322 - 659.      Meetings with QCB officials revealed that between 2004 and 2006, the QCB imposed 79*

### 690.      CDD Measures for DNFBPs in set circumstances (applying c. 5.1-5.18 in R. 5 to DNFBP) (c.

### 690.      CDD Measures for DNFBPs in set circumstances (applying c. 5.1-5.18 in R. 5 to DNFBP) (c.12.1)

### CDD requirements and gaps for specific DNFBP sectors
- Real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones and TCSP:
  - No specific AML/CFT regulation covering these businesses and professions.
  - Must comply with Circular No.2 of 2007 requiring all companies to identify every natural person or his representative based on an official ID document before executing any financial transaction.
  - For a legal person, Circular No.2 of 2007 requests identification of the customer based on the commercial register and the license details, verification of the actual status of the company representative’s authorization on the basis of the official documents, and verifying the identity of the real owner.
  - Shortcomings identified:
    - Circular does not address all requirements concerning customer identification; it only refers to the financial transaction and does not address its preparation.
    - Requirement to identify the “real owner” is vague.
    - Does not require verification that the person purporting to act on behalf of the customer is so authorized, and does not require identification and verification of that person.
    - Does not request identification of the beneficial owner.
    - No conduct of due diligence on an ongoing basis.
    - No requirement to obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship.
    - No requirement for enhanced due diligence for higher risk categories of customer, business relationships or transactions.
    - No provision addressing failure to satisfactorily complete CDD or measures applicable to existing customers.
    - Scope appears excessively wide (covers all companies in Qatar, including grocery stores or restaurants), making it unenforceable.
    - Circular does not set out enforceable requirements with sanctions for non-compliance.

- Accountants:
  - Circular No. 3 of 2007 requests all accountants to identify any natural person (or his representative) on the basis of official ID documents and, for legal persons, identification based on the commercial register and license documents; identification may also be based on official documents of the company representative.
  - Due diligence procedures required at the beginning and during the relation with the customer including registering and maintaining copies of the identities.
  - Article 2.2.1 requests “the verification of the seriousness and safety” of all financial transactions and provides illustrative criteria (expenses, revenues, investments, cash collection or payment operations, incoming or outgoing drafts, sale, purchase, importation and exportation contracts, and other transactions).
  - Shortcomings identified:
    - Circular does not address CDD when preparing a transaction and only refers to financial transactions.
    - Requirement to identify the company representative of a legal person is vague and does not ask to verify authorization of the representative or to identify and verify that person.
    - Unclear whether identification requirements are cumulative when dealing with a company representative.
    - Does not request identification of the beneficial owner or ongoing due diligence.
    - No requirement to obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship.
    - Criteria of transactions to be verified pursuant to Article 2.1.1 are overly broad.
    - No requirement of enhanced due diligence for higher risk categories.
    - No provision regarding failure to satisfactorily complete CDD nor measures for existing customers.
    - Circular does not set out enforceable requirements with sanctions for non-compliance.

- Lawyers:
  - Resolution No. 108 of 2006 of the MOJ requires lawyers to verify the identity of their clients whether individuals or corporate bodies, verify transactions of the client, and verify the identity of the real client (if there are several parties to the case).
  - Relationship with the client must be documented by means of a contract and an authenticated power of attorney.
  - Shortcomings identified:
    - Resolution No. 108 of 2006 does not address all necessary requirements concerning customer identification.
    - Identification and verification provisions are not sufficient; do not require identification of the beneficial owner or conduct of due diligence on the business relationship, including on an ongoing basis.
    - No provision to obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship.
    - No requirement of enhanced due diligence for higher risk categories.
    - No provisions on timing of verification of identity, failure to satisfactorily complete CDD, or measures for existing customers.
    - Resolution does not appear enforceable; it does not set out enforceable requirements with sanctions for non-compliance. References to obligations and penalties in instruction 9 of the resolution relate to the AML Law and Law No. 23 of 2006 concerning the Advocacy Law, but the AML Law and the Advocacy Law do not envisage sanctions for non-compliance with Ministerial Resolutions. Instruction 10 does not provide for sanctions either.

### Application of other FATF criteria to DNFBPs
- PEPs, payment technologies and introduced business (applying R.6, R.8, R.9):
  - No mention in the AML Law, or in any regulations, on PEPs, payment technologies and introduced business for any DNFBPs.

### Record-keeping (applying R.10)
- Real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones and TCSP:
  - Article 1.3 of Circular No. 2 of 2007 (MEC) requires all companies should keep record of customers’ ID and financial transactions for a period of at least five years; competent authorities should have access to the records.
  - Circular No.2 of 2007 not consistently implemented by DNFBPs met during the visit.
  - Shortcomings:
    - Records required for five years following completion of the transaction, but no obligation to keep other documents (e.g., business correspondence) for a similar period.
    - No requirement to ensure that all information is available on a timely basis to domestic competent authorities.
    - Circular No.2 of 2007 not enforceable; does not set out sanctions for non-compliance.

- Accountants:
  - Article 3 of the second section of Circular No.3 of 2007 (MEC) requires auditing offices to keep records of contracts concluded with customers and due diligence documents for a period of five years; competent authorities should have access to the documents.
  - Shortcomings:
    - Wording of Article 3 is unclear; it refers to “all other document and records covered by the law” without specifying which law.
    - AML Law does not cover accountants.
    - No clear requirement to keep documents related to verification of the transaction or business correspondence.
    - No requirement to ensure timely availability of information to competent authorities.
    - Circular No.3 is not enforceable; does not set out sanctions for non-compliance.

- Lawyers:
  - Instruction 7 of Resolution No. 108 of 2006 requires lawyers and law firms to maintain an integrated database of all their business cases and relationships.
  - Shortcomings:
    - Types of documents to be recorded are not detailed and duration is not determined.
    - No provision for timely availability of information to domestic competent authorities upon appropriate authority.
    - Resolution No. 108 of 2006 is not enforceable.

### Unusual transactions (applying R.11)
- Real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones and TCSP:
  - Circular No. 2 of 2007 requests all companies to “verify the seriousness and safety of financial transactions especially those that have high value to guarantee the absence of suspicious transactions" and to “register the transactions in the registers provided in the Qatari law”.
  - Companies are prohibited to “conclude untrue financial transactions or execution of such transactions with fictitious persons”.
  - Shortcomings:
    - Elements on identification of transactions are too general and not compliant with R.11.
    - Scope not clearly defined; does not require paying special attention to all complex, unusual large transactions, or unusual patterns of transactions that have no apparent or visible economic or lawful purpose.
    - No information on elements to be examined or requirement to set forth findings in writing.
    - Reference to “registers provided in the Qatari law” is unclear; AML Law contains no such register reference.
    - No requirement to keep those records available for competent authorities and auditors for at least five years.
    - Enforcement is weak or non-existent; not enforceable.

- Accountants:
  - Article 2.2 of the second section of Circular No. 3 of 2007 requires auditing offices to “give further attention to the verification of valuable transactions and identify their purposes and the dealers”.
  - Shortcomings:
    - As with Circular No.2 of 2007, elements on identification of transactions are too general and not compliant with R.11.

- Lawyers:
  - No provision regarding unusual transactions in Resolution No. 108 of 2006.

### QFC (Qatar Financial Centre)
- DNFBPs registered in the QFC are relevant persons required to comply with the AML Regulations and the AML Rulebook (same regulations that apply to financial institutions registered in the QFC).
- Because the QFC is recent, there is no evidence of effective implementation of those regulations to the DNFBPs.

### Recommendations and Comments (section 4.1.2)
- Domestic sector:
  - Authorities should review the legal framework to set out in primary or secondary legislation the basic obligations on customer due diligence and record keeping for DNFBPs.
  - Scope of CDD and record-keeping requirements should be narrowed from all companies to DNFBPs to enable better supervision and enforcement.
  - If other non-financial businesses and professions pose a ML or TF risk, apply FATF recommendations following a risk analysis and not indiscriminately.
  - Introduce provisions regarding PEPs, payments technologies, unusual transactions and introduced business.
  - Review provisions on CDD and record-keeping to fully comply with the standard and to be enforceable.
- Implementation:
  - Authorities should effectively implement the requirements set out in Circular No. 2 of 2007 (MEC) and Resolution No. 108 of 2006 (MOJ).
- QFC:
  - QFC should address shortcomings identified in section 3 as they also apply to DNFBPs and ensure effective implementation of AML regulations.

### Compliance with Recommendation 12 (section 4.1.3)
- R.12 rating: NC
- Summary of factors relevant to s.4.1 underlying overall rating:
  - In the domestic sector:
    - Requirements on CDD and record-keeping are not set out in primary or secondary legislation.
    - No requirements on PEPs, payment technologies, introduced business and unusual transactions have been set out in law, regulation or other enforceable means.
    - Scope of professions currently covered is excessively wide.
    - Legal advisers are not covered.
    - Provisions on CDD and record-keeping are not sufficient and do not constitute enforceable requirements with sanctions for non-compliance.
    - No provisions regarding PEPs, payments technologies, and introduced business.
    - Requirements on unusual transactions are not sufficient and not enforceable for professions regulated by the MEC; no requirements for the legal professions.
    - Implementation is not effective.
  - In the QFC:
    - The regime is too new to be tested for effective implementation.

---

### 4.2 Suspicious transaction reporting (R.16) (applying R.13 to 15 & 21)

### Description and analysis — Domestic sector
- Suspicious transaction reporting framework:
  - Article 6 of the AML Law sets out the suspicious transaction reporting process but it only applies to financial institutions and not to DNFBPs.
  - Some administrative regulations require DNFBPs to report suspicious transactions:
    - Article 3.1 of administrative order No. 1 of 2004 establishing the FIU: FIU may receive suspicious transactions reports related to ML and FT from non-financial professions.
    - Article 2.3 of Circular No. 2 of 2007 (MEC): requires all companies in Qatar to report suspicious transactions to the FIU.
    - Article 5 of the second section of Circular No. 3 of 2007 (MEC): requires auditing offices to notify suspicious operations to the FIU.
    - Resolution No. 108 of 2006 (MOJ): obligates lawyers and law offices and companies to notify the FIU.
  - DNFBPs met during the onsite visit are generally not fully aware of their AML/CFT obligations; DNFBPs that are part of foreign groups are more aware of head office policies than domestic obligations.

- Obligation to make STRs to FIU (applying c. 13.1 to DNFBPs):
  - Article 6 of the AML Law: obligation to report suspicious transactions applies to financial institutions only.
  - Article 3 of the AML Law: “A person is considered to have committed a ML offense if he has information, due to his work, that is related to ML offense stipulated in the previous Article and does not take the procedures stated in the law”.
  - Article 3.1 of administrative order No. 1 of 2004: FIU may receive suspicious transactions reports related to ML and FT from non-financial professions.

- Real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones, TCSP and accountants:
  - Article 2.3 of Circular No. 2 of 2007 requires all companies in Qatar to report suspicious transactions to the FIU.
  - Article 5, second section, of Circular No. 3 concerning auditing offices requires notification to the FIU if ML/FT suspicious operations are identified during the auditing process.

- Lawyers:
  - Resolution No. 108 of 2006 obligates lawyers and law offices and companies to notify the FIU of “any suspicious commercial operation as soon as they discover any such suspicious transaction” using the form attached to the resolution.
  - Applies when they conclude on behalf or for the account of the customer any financial deal relating to:
    - Buying or selling of real estate properties;
    - Managing the funds, securities or other assets owned by the client;
    - Managing the bank accounts, savings or securities;
    - Organizing participations for the purpose of establishing, operating or managing of companies; and
    - Establishing, operating or managing material or corporate legal entities, in addition to the purchase or sale of entities.

- Legal privilege and its interaction with reporting:
  - Law 23 of 2006 Article 51: lawyer must preserve confidentiality of information and documents received from client.
  - Law 23 of 2006 Article 57: lawyer should not disclose information known because of the profession “if this is not aimed at preventing the perpetration of a crime or offense or reporting a crime that has taken place”.
  - Practitioners’ views:
    - Some lawyers consider filing an STR would breach confidentiality.
    - Others consider an STR necessary to avoid being treated as an accomplice in a potential ML or FT scheme.

- Shortcomings in ministerial decisions and practice:
  - Ministerial decisions do not cover all R.13 requirements and do not clearly address FT.
  - Do not cover proceeds of all offenses required to be included as predicate offenses under R.1; obligation to make an STR does not include attempted transactions.
  - Legal advisers not included in the scope of Resolution No. 108 of 2006.
  - Legal privilege in Law 23 of 2006 prevents lawyers from reporting suspicion on the basis of Resolution No. 108 of 2006 because Article 57 only enables disclosure in case of knowledge of a crime or offense under perpetration or that has taken place.
  - Circular of the MEC does not refer to supervision and sanction; sanctions provided by Resolution of the MOJ do not apply.
  - No STR had been transmitted to the FIU by DNFBPs at the time of the visit.

- FIU powers and DNFBPs:
  - Under current legal framework DNFBPs are not obliged to send STRs to the FIU and the FIU has no power to receive, analyze and disseminate those STRs (see section 2.8 (R.26)).

### STRs related to terrorism financing (applying c. 13.2)
- Shortcomings noted in the ML framework apply to STRs related to terrorism and its financing.
- Article 3.1 of administrative order No. 1 of 2004 establishes FIU may receive STRs related to FT from non-financial professions, but ministerial decisions do not clearly address FT.

### Reporting thresholds (applying c. 13.3 & IV.2)
- There is no reporting threshold for STRs in the AML Law or in the Ministerial decisions.

*Source: _cr08322 - 690.      CDD Measures for DNFBPs in set circumstances (applying c. 5.1-5.18 in R. 5 to DNFBP) (c.12.1) — extracted from the provided IMF content unit.*

### 718.      Making of ML and TF STRs Regardless of Possible Involvement of Tax Matters (applying

### _cr08322 - 718.      Making of ML and TF STRs Regardless of Possible Involvement of Tax Matters (applying

### STR obligations, scope and reporting protections
- AML Law does not apply to DNFBPs and Ministerial decisions do not prevent the requirement to report suspicious transactions from applying whether they are thought, among other things, to involve tax matters. (para. 718)
- Additional element—reporting of all criminal acts: AML Law does not apply to DNFBPs and Ministerial decisions do not cover the proceeds of all criminal acts. (para. 719)
- Protection for making STRs:
  - Article 2.3 of Circular No. 2 of 2007 of the MEC: STR is not regarded as a breach of secrecy and should not entail liability on the company or its employees. (para. 720)
  - Instruction 5 of Resolution 108 of 2006 of the MOJ: STR by Lawyers shall not be regarded as a breach of professional secrecy. (para. 720)
  - Section 2, Article 4 of Circular No. 3 of 2007 of the MEC: STRs notified by auditing offices to the FIU are not regarded as a breach of secrecy and should not entail liability on the company or its auditing office staff. (para. 720)
- Shortcomings:
  - Concept of good faith is not included for any DNFBPs concerning liability. (para. 721)
  - No legal or regulatory provisions to ensure names and personal details of staff who make STRs are kept confidential by the FIU. (para. 724)

### Tipping-off and related penalties
- Prohibition against tipping-off:
  - Article 2.4 of Circular No. 2 of 2007 of the MEC: company and employees should not warn the customer about any suspicion on the transactions. (para. 722)
  - Instruction 9 of Resolution 108 of 2006 of the MOJ: penalties imposed following provisions of the AML Law when employees of law offices alert clients. (para. 722)
  - Article 13 of the AML Law: behavior punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year and a fine not exceeding QR 3000. (para. 722)
  - Article 2.6 of Circular No. 3 of 2007 of the MEC: auditing office or its staff should not warn the customer about any suspicion. (para. 722)
- Implementation and legal gaps:
  - DNFBPs met by mission generally unaware of tipping-off requirement and no penalties have ever been imposed. (para. 722)
  - Requirements not in line with R.14: must apply to directors and officers; good faith not included; Circular No.2 of 2007 does not address prohibition on disclosing that information related to an STR is provided to the FIU. (para. 723)
  - Article 4 of the AML Law prohibits “workers at a financial establishment” from informing customers of measures taken; lawyers are not workers in a financial establishment and there is no reference to disclosure of an STR or related information—no legal basis for penalties on lawyers concerning tipping off. (para. 723)
  - Current requirements unenforceable in absence of STR obligation. (para. 723)

### Internal controls, compliance officers, audit and training for DNFBPs
- Internal controls to prevent ML and TF:
  - Article 2.2 of Circular No.2 of 2007 of the MEC: all companies must set policies and plans to combat economic offenses including internal supervisory measures and controls. (para. 725)
  - Resolution No. 108 of 2006 of the MOJ: law offices and firms required to lay down an internal system for combating ML/TF, implement effective internal control procedures, and follow up international developments. (para. 725)
  - Article 2.4 of Circular No.3 of 2007 of the MEC: auditing offices must set internal auditing policies. (para. 725)
- Gaps in implementation and scope:
  - No elements showing effective implementation of those provisions. (para. 726)
  - Circular No.2 of 2007 covers economic offenses broadly, not specifically ML and FT; no reference to scope of control, risk consideration, or internal procedures for lawyers. (para. 726)
  - No provisions requiring appropriate compliance management arrangements (e.g., designation of an AML/CFT compliance officer at management level). (para. 726)
  - No requirements for an independent audit function to test compliance (including sample testing) with internal procedures, policies and controls to prevent ML and TF. (para. 727)
- Employee training and screening:
  - Article 2.2 of Circular No.2 of 2007: obligation for all companies to organize training sessions for employees. (para. 728)
  - Article 2.4 of Circular No.3 of 2007: obligation for auditing offices to organize training programs for auditing staff. (para. 728)
  - No requirement of ongoing employee training concerning lawyers in Resolution No. 108 of 2006, only obligation to follow international developments per instruction 8. (para. 728)
  - No provisions requiring DNFBPs to implement screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring employees. (para. 729)
  - No provisions asking for AML/CFT compliance officer independence and reporting lines to senior management/board. (para. 730)

### FATF-related measures and cross-border risk focus (R.21)
- Special attention to countries not sufficiently applying FATF Recommendations:
  - Article 2.5 of Circular No.2 of 2007 of the MEC: all companies have “to give particular attention to the examination of financial relations and transactions concluded with countries that do not apply or insufficiently apply those provisions”. (para. 731)
  - Resolution No.108 of 2006: lawyers and law firms required to “give special attention to the business relations of persons or entities from countries that do not implement these provisions or whose implementation thereof is insufficient”. (para. 731)
  - No similar reference in Circular No. 3 of 2007 concerning accounting offices. (para. 731)
- Shortcomings:
  - Wording refers to ‘countries that do not implement these provisions’ rather than countries that do not or insufficiently apply the FATF recommendations, as requested by the standards. (para. 732)
  - No evidence of effective implementation; no information on measures to advise DNFBPs of AML/CFT weaknesses in other countries. (para. 732)
  - No requirement on actions to be performed in case of transactions with no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose with those countries. (para. 732)
  - No specific provisions to ensure examination of background of transactions with no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose and availability of written findings to assist competent authorities. (para. 733)
  - No indication that Qatari authorities have the power to apply counter-measures when a country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies FATF Recommendations. (para. 734)

### QFC (Qatar Financial Centre) regime for DNFBPs
- DNFBPs in the QFC considered “relevant persons” and must comply with AML Regulations and AML Rulebook; same regulations as financial institutions apply. (para. 735)
- Article 13 of QFC AML Regulations: reporting obligations do not apply where the “relevant person” is a professional legal adviser and knowledge/suspicion is based on information that came in privileged circumstances (legal advice, seeking legal advice, legal proceedings). Definition of "Professional legal adviser" includes any person who may come into possession of information in privileged circumstances. (para. 735)
- Concerns:
  - Current definition of privileged circumstances may prevent legal advisers licensed in the QFC from reporting information related to activities listed in R.13 (trust and company services). (para. 736)
  - No evidence of effective implementation of R.16 to DNFBPs; no STR has ever been sent to the FIU. (para. 736)
  - No legal basis for the FIU to receive and handle STRs from DNFBPs of the QFC. (para. 736)

### Recommendations and policy actions (section 4.2.2)
- Law amendments and enforcement:
  - Amend the law to require all relevant DNFBPs to report suspicious transactions to the FIU and to enable the FIU to receive, analyze and disseminate those reports. (para. 4.2.2 bullets)
  - Amendments should address shortcomings identified in section 3 regarding the STR mechanism for financial institutions, especially absence of requirements to report transactions linked to terrorism and absence of obligation to report attempted transactions not established by primary or secondary legislation. (para. 4.2.2 bullets)
- Domestic sector reforms:
  - Incorporate protection from liability and tipping off fully in the law. (para. 4.2.2 bullets)
  - Strengthen regulations concerning internal controls and countries that insufficiently apply FATF Recommendations. (para. 4.2.2 bullets)
  - Review scope of MEC Circular No. 2 of 2007 to address all relevant DNFBPs and other professions where ML/FT risk identified. (para. 4.2.2 bullets)
  - MOJ should review legal framework on legal privilege so lawyers can report when performing activities listed in R.16 even where only suspicion exists; Resolution of MOJ should also cover legal advisers. (para. 4.2.2 bullets)
  - Both regulations should be reviewed to set out sanctions for non-compliance. (para. 4.2.2 bullets)
  - AML/CFT compliance officer and appropriate staff should have timely access to customer identification data, other CDD information, transaction records, and other relevant information. (para. 4.2.2 bullets)
- QFC-specific recommendations:
  - Implement recommendations from section 3 concerning R.13, R.14, R.15 and R.21 for DNFBPs in QFC. (para. 4.2.2 bullets)
  - Ensure reporting requirement applies regardless of whether transactions are thought, among other things, to involve tax matters. (para. 4.2.2 bullets)
  - Refine legal privilege framework to avoid preventing a lawyer from reporting suspicious information handled when providing services to companies and trusts listed under R.16. (para. 4.2.2 bullets)

### Compliance with Recommendation 16 — summary (4.2.3)
- R.16 rating: NC (Not Compliant). (para. 4.2.3 header)
- Domestic sector key factors:
  - No STR obligations set out in primary or secondary legislation. (para. 4.2.3 bullets)
  - Ministerial regulations not implemented and not enforceable. (para. 4.2.3 bullets)
  - No adequate measures to prohibit a DNFBP from disclosing to third parties the information it provides to the FIU. (para. 4.2.3 bullets)
  - Provisions on internal controls and countries that insufficiently apply FATF recommendations are incomplete and not implemented. (para. 4.2.3 bullets)
  - Legal advisers are not subject to STR obligations. (para. 4.2.3 bullets)
  - Provisions on legal privilege of lawyers should be introduced. (para. 4.2.3 bullets)
- QFC key factor:
  - Provisions on the legal privilege of lawyers should be refined. (para. 4.2.3 bullets)

### Regulation, supervision and monitoring of DNFBPs (R.24-25) — overview and sectoral monitoring
- Institutional responsibilities:
  - MEC empowered to supervise companies (chapter 11 of Law No. 5 of 2002) and implement Law No.30 of 2004 on the organization of the profession of verifying and monitoring accounts. (para. 737)
  - MOJ exercises monitoring role over legal profession per Law on the Profession of Lawyer No.23 of 2006. (para. 737)
  - In the QFC, firms conducting authorized activities are supervised by QFCRA following same AML Regulations as financial institutions. (para. 737)
- Casinos:
  - No casino in Qatar because activity is prohibited; therefore no supervisory framework. (para. 738)
- General monitoring framework for other DNFBPs:
  - All companies must be registered in the commercial register held by the MEC; must obtain commercial authorization by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Agriculture; membership of Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry required. (para. 739)
  - Article 101 of Law No. 5 of 2002: annual submission of Chairman and Board members’ names, capacities, and nationalities to the Ministry; notify any changes as they occur. (para. 739)
  - Article 126: annual submission of financial statements before the General Assembly; company must be audited by an internal auditor who must submit a written report to the Ministry if unable to perform tasks. (para. 739)
  - Chapter 11 of Law No. 5 of 2002 empowers MEC to conduct general supervision but does not address AML/CFT supervision; authorized employees can inspect companies and examine accounts; penalties in Chapter 12 include fines, jail and liquidation. (para. 740)
- Implementation weaknesses:
  - Implementation of MEC monitoring/supervision weak or non-existent; unit in charge has only 5 staff; does not address AML/CFT; Circulars No.2 of 2007 and No.3 of 2007 not enforced; circulars provide no sanction. (para. 741)
  - Authorized MEC employees not empowered to perform on-site supervision other than control of accounts. (para. 741)
  - Except legal professions, all DNFBPs subject to MEC main supervision. (para. 741)

### Sector-specific monitoring findings
- Real Estate Agents:
  - Real estate agents must be authorized by real estate registration department of the MOJ. No specific AML/CFT obligations or supervision; no SRO. (para. 742)
  - MOJ issued Circular 13 of 2006 to Registration Department employees requiring listed officials to report suspicious cases directly to Manager of Department, who is empowered to send STRs to the FIU; Circular includes "Suspicion Report" form and names of persons authorized to report STRs. (para. 742)
  - Circular 13 of 2006 is an attempt to include real estate transactions in AML/CFT reporting system; however, no STR has ever been submitted to the FIU. MOJ lacks full view of financial transactions, beneficial ownership, and has only formal contact with buyers/sellers; registration department control cannot substitute for AML/CFT regulation and supervision of real estate agents. (para. 743)
- Dealers in Precious Metals:
  - Precious metals dealers must be registered in MEC commercial register. Public Qatari Authority for Specifications and Criteria controls quality; MOI gives authorization to sell gold. Exchange houses may engage in purchase/sale of precious metals and gold bullions; exchange houses licensed and supervised by the QCB. No SRO for dealers in precious metals. (para. 744)
  - Regulatory situation uncertain: QCB regulations indicate a business that buys or sells gold should be regulated by QCB but this does not appear to be the case for all businesses that buy or sell gold in Qatar. (para. 745)
- Dealers in Precious Stones:
  - No specific AML/CFT regulatory or supervisory framework; regulated by general rules applicable to all companies. (para. 746)
- Accountants:
  - MEC implements Law No.30 of 2004 on Organization of the Profession of Verifying and Monitoring Accounts. Legal accountant must obtain a license from the ‘Statutory Accountants’ Admission Committee’. Disciplinary board sanctions accountants who violate professional duties and may be seized by the Ministry voluntarily or upon complaint, including breaches of regulations under Law No. 30 of 2004. (para. 747)
  - A professional association of accountants was recently created in Qatar; membership is not mandatory and it has no self-regulatory powers. (para. 747)

*Source: _cr08322 - 718.*

### 748.      Compliance with the obligations created by the circular of the Minister of Economy and

### _cr08322 - 748.      Compliance with the obligations created by the circular of the Minister of Economy and Commerce No. 3 of 2007 on AML/CFT procedures

### DNFBP supervision and monitoring — domestic sector and QFC
- Circular of the Minister of Economy and Commerce No. 3 of 2007 on AML/CFT procedures may not be enforced by the disciplinary board because the circular does not provide any sanctions for non compliance and is not grounded in Law No. 30 of 2004.
- There is no specific regulatory or supervisory framework for trust and company service providers (TCSP). TCSPs are regulated by the general rules that apply to all companies.
- Authorities were unaware of the existence of TCSPs in Qatar, but evidence from domestic TCSP websites was confirmed by domestic lawyers and accountants.
- Lawyers:
  - MOJ exercises monitoring over the legal profession under the Law on the Profession of Lawyer No.23 of 2006.
  - Licensing of lawyers requires authorization by the Commission for the Admission of Attorneys.
  - Minister of Justice Resolution No. 108 of 2006 (November 2006) regarding AML/CFT procedures: instructions 9 and 10 subject lawyers and law firms to penalties and sanctions for non-compliance with the resolution.
  - There is no bar association; an association of lawyers exists with voluntary membership and no regulatory powers.
  - Department of Disciplinary Cases at the MOJ can investigate attorneys only at the request of the Committee for the Admission of Attorneys, any judge regarding acts towards the court, or at the request of stakeholders. No on-site supervision is possible without an external request.
  - References to obligations and penalties in instruction 9 of Resolution No. 108 of 2006 are only for observance of the AML Law and Law No. 23 of 2006; the AML Law and the Advocacy Law do not envisage sanctions for non-compliance with Ministerial Resolutions. Instruction 10 provides no specific sanctions or legal basis.
- Legal advisers (branches of international law firms):
  - Authorized by MOJ pursuant to a specific Resolution and subject to supervision by the department of disciplinary cases of the MOJ, but supervision does not include on-site inspections.
  - Resolution 108 of 2006 applies only to Lawyers; no legal basis for supervision of Legal advisers on AML/CFT requirements.
- QFC (Qatar Financial Centre):
  - Lawyers, accountants and TCSPs are the only DNFBPs permitted and may operate in or from the QFC.
  - QFC Law provides for dealing in precious metals as a permitted activity, but the QFC Financial Services Regulations do not identify dealing in precious metals as a regulated activity so this activity may not be conducted in or from the QFC.
  - Buying or selling real estate may only be performed on an ancillary basis.
  - Firms licensed by the QFCA and that are relevant persons are subject to the same AML/CFT requirements as authorized financial institutions and are supervised, in respect of AML/CFT, by the QFCRA.
  - QFCRA is empowered to impose sanctions on DNFBPs it supervises, in the same ways as for financial institutions; at the time of the assessment, no sanction had been pronounced against a DNFBP in the QFC. (Note: in March 2008, QFCRA informed the assessment team that it had recently conducted a number of supervision visits of DNFBPs.)

### Weaknesses, scope of supervision and guidance
- No clear strategy and insufficient human resources for the longer term supervision of the DNFBP sector.
- DNFBPs must submit their AML/CFT procedures and are made aware by the QFCRA of obligations under the QFC AML Regulations, but specificities of these activities are not addressed and no risk assessment of the sector has been performed.
- Weaknesses identified in the monitoring process, particularly concerning review of AML/CFT procedures during licensing.
- Except for the QFC and precious metals dealers supervised by the QCB, there is no designated competent authority responsible for monitoring and ensuring compliance of DNFBPs with AML/CFT requirements.
- For Lawyers, a mechanism of sanction exists but requires activation by an external party and there is no legal basis to sanction non-compliance with AML/CFT requirements.
- No SRO in the State of Qatar.
- Outside the QFC, no guidelines have been issued to assist DNFBPs in implementing and complying with AML/CFT requirements. No feedback has been provided by the FIU to DNFBPs.
- The AML Rulebook provides guidance common to all relevant persons, essentially in appendix 2 on risk assessment.
- No STRs from DNFBPs had been received; no specific or general feedback given by the FIU.

### Sanctions and legal penalties
- With the exception of Exchange houses dealing with precious metals and regulated by the QCB, no sanctions apply to DNFBPs for non-compliance with AML/CFT requirements in the domestic sector.
- Circulars No. 2 and 3 of 2007 of the MEC make no reference to sanctions. Resolution 108 of 2006 of the MOJ does not identify sanctions for non-compliance.
- Possible criminal sanction under Article 186 of the Criminal code:
  - Any person who knows about a crime or knows about an attempt to perpetrate a crime at a time when he can prevent its perpetration, and has unjustifiably abstained from reporting the crime to the competent authorities, shall be sanctioned by imprisonment for a period that does not exceed 3 years and a fine not exceeding 10,000 riyals, or by one of these two sanctions.
- AML Law, Article 3: “a person is considered to have committed a ML offense if that person has information, due to her work, that is related to a ML offense stipulated in the previous Article and does not take the procedures stated in the law”.
- Criminal sanctions cited are not relevant sanctions for a supervisor that has to ensure the compliance of a DNFBP with AML/CFT requirements.
- QFCRA can impose sanctions on DNFBPs it supervises as for financial institutions.

### Monitoring system summary (as presented)
- Table (text summary): supervisory arrangements and basis of AML/CFT requirements vary by DNFBP and include MEC circulars, MOJ Resolution 108 of 2006, QCB AML/CFT Regulations, QFC AML Regulations, QFCRA supervision, and licensing roles delegated to QFCRA by QFCA. (The table details DNFBP categories including Casinos, Real Estate Agents, Dealers in Precious Stones, Lawyers, Legal advisers, Notaries, Accountants, TCSP.)

### Recommendations (from source)
- Review the AML/CFT legal framework to introduce requirements and sanctions compliant with the standard, and introduce a supervisory framework.
- Establish a designated competent authority responsible for monitoring and ensuring compliance of each DNFBP with AML/CFT requirements in Qatar, with adequate powers and resources. Authorities may consider creating a unique supervisor for all DNFBPs (MOJ should be the only exception). The MOJ should implement a mechanism enabling supervision of the compliance of lawyers and legal advisers with AML/CFT requirements.
- Establish guidelines by the FIU and the QFCRA to specifically assist DNFBPs to implement and comply with AML/CFT requirements. FIU should provide feedback to DNFBPs on STRs received and general information on current techniques, methods and trends or sanitized examples of actual money laundering and FT cases.

### Ratings — compliance with Recommendations 24 & 25 and Recommendation 20
- R.24: PC
  - No supervision and no sanction for non-compliance with the AML/CFT requirements in the domestic sector for all DNFBPs present in the country.
  - The QFC regime is too new to be tested for effective implementation.
- R.25: NC
  - No specific guidelines have been issued to assist DNFBPs.
  - No feedback has been provided by the FIU.
- R.20: PC
  - No risk assessment has been conducted in the domestic sector.
  - Qatar has not taken meaningful steps to encourage the development of modern and secure techniques for conducting financial transactions that are less vulnerable to money laundering.

### Other non-financial businesses and professions; cash reliance and transaction techniques
- Circular No. 2 of 2007 of the MEC covers all companies operating in Qatar on an indiscriminate basis; this approach is not efficient and is not implemented because MEC has no power of supervision and sanction.
- QFC applies AML Regulations and AML Rulebook to a broader range of activities than DNFBPs (e.g., tax and consulting services), using a risk-based approach to require other non-regulated professions to comply where appropriate.
- Doha’s Securities Market Committee Decision No. 16/3 of 2005 limits cash payments to companies and brokerage firms to 30,000 riyals or equivalent; companies and brokerage firms shall notify the Market in case of any cash payment below this threshold. No reports have been submitted to the Market.
- Economy is strongly reliant on cash:
  - Highest bill denomination is 500 riyals.
  - From 2002 to 2005 the share of the 500 riyals denomination in total currency in circulation increased and now accounts for more than 77% of the total value.
  - The currency in circulation increased by more than 60% during the same time.
- Except for the DSM, authorities did not provide other information on measures to encourage modern and secure techniques for financial transactions less vulnerable to ML.

### Recommendations related to non-financial professions and transaction techniques
- Conduct a risk assessment for other non-financial professions to focus AML/CFT efforts on professions that pose ML or FT risk and move away from the indiscriminate approach in MEC Circular No. 2 of 2007.
- Introduce measures to reduce reliance on cash and assess risks associated with the currency changeover following the Gulf monetary union planned for 2010.

### Legal persons and access to beneficial ownership information (R.33)
- Legal persons types (per Law No.(5) of 2002 as amended by law No.(16) of 2006) include joint partnership companies, simple partnership companies, joint venture companies, shareholding companies, limited share partnership companies, limited liability companies, individual companies and holding companies.
- Registration requirements with MEC include provision of:
  - (i) name of company, purpose, headquarter, branches;
  - (ii) name of every partner, profession, title, surname when available, nationality, date and place of birth;
  - (iii) company capital, distribution and share commitments in cash, in kind, or rights;
  - (iv) date of establishment and duration;
  - (v) method of management and names of those authorized to sign and extent of their powers;
  - (vi) beginning and end of fiscal year;
  - (vii) procedure for distribution of profit and loss.
- Authorities state that commercial register must seek appropriate information on nominees and authorized representatives and ensure they do not act as “fronts”; identity of underlying beneficial owners should be obtained.
- Commercial register verifies information against valid identity documents at registration; law requires any change to be notified to the commercial register annually and approved by the authorities.
- Branches of foreign companies may register without local incorporation but at least 51% of the shares must be held by Qatari residents; branches must provide proof of commercial registration in country of origin, copy of company decision to establish a branch, Power of Attorney in favor of the resident, and a guarantee from parent company; all documents must be legalized.
- QFC:
  - Article 11 of the QFC Law: to operate in or from the QFC a firm must be (i) incorporated or registered with the QFC Companies Registration Office (CRO); (ii) licensed by the Qatar Financial Center Authority; and (iii) in the case of regulated activities, authorized by the QFCRA.
  - Applicant must demonstrate ability to comply with QFC standards; one submission to QFCRA coordinates process including licenses issued by the QFC Authority.
  - Authorized firms are supervised by the QFCRA which may take enforcement or disciplinary action for non-compliance.
  - CRO maintains a central register of all LLCs, LLPs and branches operating in or from the QFC; register provides details on ownership, management, registered office, principal representatives and is available free of charge to the public through the QFC Authority website.
- Access to information on beneficial owners:
  - Domestic sector: commercial register held by MEC is a central registration system where main ownership and control details are maintained. All information in the commercial register database is accessible to investigatory authorities. QCB developed a direct link with the commercial register enabling immediate access to all relevant ownership information; this link will also be made available to the FIU in the near future.
  - QFC: information on ownership and control of entities in the QFC is publicly available and immediately accessible to all relevant authorities on the QFCRA’s website.
- Prevention of misuse of bearer shares:
  - Domestic sector: Article 97, paragraph 2 of the Qatari Commercial Code stipulates shares of companies established in Qatar must be nominal; issuance of bearer shares is not permitted.
  - QFC: bearer shares are not recognized; Companies Regulations require each LLC to maintain a register of all members (Article 19 of the Regulation); a person must be included in the register to be a member and owner of shares.
- Access to commercial register by financial institutions:
  - Domestic sector: commercial register is not accessible via Internet to financial institutions, but information on beneficial owners can be retrieved from the commercial register premises.

*Source: _cr08322 - 748. Compliance with the obligations created by the circular of the Minister of Economy and Commerce No. 3 of 2007 on AML/CFT procedures (IMF assessment text).*

### 777.      QFC: The CRO, providing details on ownership, management, registered office, principal

### 799.      QFC. Concerning charitable trusts whose governing law is QFC law, there is no possible

### _cr08322 - 799. QFC. Concerning charitable trusts whose governing law is QFC law, there is no possible effective information gathering or investigation since there is no registration, licensing or reporting requirements.

### QFC charitable trusts — information gathering and investigative capacity
- For charitable trusts governed by QFC law there is "no possible effective information gathering or investigation" because "there is no registration, licensing or reporting requirements." (paragraph 799).
- The FIU "will not be able to respond to international requests for information about charitable trusts whose governing law is QFC law." (paragraph 801).
- The QFC "will not be in a position to answer these requests because there is no obligation for a charitable trust to be registered or licensed in the QFC." (paragraph 801).

### Capacity to respond to international requests about an NPO of concern
- Domestic arrangement: the authorities designated the FIU as the administrative point of contact for international requests about an NPO suspected of terrorist financing or other forms of terrorist support. (paragraph 800).
- The FIU "has ongoing relations with the QACA and information on a particular NPO can be transmitted promptly." (paragraph 800).
- Limitation: this capacity does not extend to QFC charitable trusts due to the absence of registration/licensing/reporting obligations under QFC law. (paragraphs 799, 801).

### Recommendations and comments on NPO/charities framework (domestic sector)
- Overall assessment: measures in the domestic sector "go beyond the requirements of the standards and appear to be effectively implemented." The sector's "total turnover" is "constantly growing" and "the high level of transparency appears indeed to have contributed to increase the trust of donors." (paragraph 802).
- Suggested actions for improvement (paragraph 802):
  - "Review Resolution 17 of 2006 to make the identification requirements more realistic and enforceable. The current working identification (name, address, phone number) should be maintained for all transactions but charities should be required to undertake full identification and verification above a particular threshold and/or when there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorism financing. This review should also clarify the role of the QACA-FIU team;"
  - "Review Law 13 of 2004 to suppress the possibility of exempting a charity from the QACA supervision;"
  - "Systematize on-site inspection of international projects to ensure that funds have been spent in a manner consistent with the purpose and objectives of the charities. A risk assessment of the projects could effectively enable the QACA to tailor the extent of such on-site inspection and the staffing of the mission."
- Additional measure (not required by the standards) recommended: "review the AML Law to empower the FIU to analyze and disseminate the STRs that the NPOs are currently required to file." (paragraph 803).

### Recommendations and comments on QFC framework and Trust Regulations
- Finding: "The Trust Regulations is not compliant with the requirements of SR VIII." The QFC framework "appears to be inconsistent with the domestic sector’s strict legal and regulatory framework, which does not provide the possibility for a QFC charitable trust to be domiciled in Qatar." (paragraph 804).
- Legal inconsistency details:
  - Law 12 of 2004 "defines private institutions and associations strictly and QFC charitable trusts are not captured by these definitions."
  - Law 13 of 2004 gives QACA power to control "the humane and charitable works done by the associations and the private institutions" (article 4.2) and to control "the process of grant collection legalized for the humane and charitable associations and private institutions, the individuals, and the other authorities that are designated by a decision issued by the Council of Ministers" (article 4.4). "This does not apply to the QFC charitable trusts." (paragraph 804).
  - "The current legal framework for charitable trusts in the QFC creates an opportunity to bypass regulations compliant with SR VIII in the legal framework of other jurisdictions." (paragraph 804).
- Recommended actions regarding QFC charitable trusts (paragraph 805):
  - "Revise Law 12 of 2004 with a view to broaden the definition of NPO in order to include the QFC charitable trusts."
  - "Revise Law 13 of 2004 with a view to enable QACA to regulate and monitor charitable trusts domiciled in Qatar."
  - "Revise the QFC Trust Regulations in order to comply with SR VIII, including in particular, to license or register QFC charitable trusts and provide for appropriate measures to sanction violations of oversight measures or rules by QFC charitable trusts."
  - "Promote effective supervision or monitoring of QFC charitable trusts. A memorandum of understanding between the QFCRA and the QACA could be contemplated to delineate the responsibilities of these bodies. The memorandum of understanding should also ensure that the authorities can effectively investigate and gather information on QFC charitable trusts, and enable them to respond to international requests for information about a QFC charitable trust of concern."

### Compliance with Special Recommendation VIII (SR.VIII)
- Rating: SR.VIII — LC. (section 5.3.3)
- Summary of factors underlying rating:
  - Domestic sector: "Recent enactment of Resolution 17 of 2006 does not allow to fully assess the effectiveness of supervision of the NPO sector20."
  - Domestic sector: "There is a regulatory possibility of exempting a charity from QACA supervision."
  - QFC: "The Trust Regulations creating charitable trusts is not compliant with SR VIII." (section 5.3.3)

### National cooperation and coordination (R.31) — mechanisms and analysis
- Two mechanisms for domestic cooperation in AML/CFT: the NAMLC and a Coordination Committee (replaced in 2007 by the NCT). (paragraph 806).
- NAMLC details:
  - Established under the presidency of the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank. Membership per Article 8 of the AML Law as amended by Decree Law No 21 of 2003 includes representatives of MOI (two representatives), Ministries of Civil Service Affairs and Housing, Economy and Commerce, Finance and Justice, QCB, and Customs and Ports general Authority. The State Security Bureau is also represented though not specified in the AML Law. (paragraph 807).
  - Statutory functions: prepare, adopt and follow-up AML plans/programs; ensure coordination amongst competent entities; follow international trends and propose measures; prepare reports, statistics and data on AML efforts (Article 9 of the AML Law). (paragraph 808).
  - NAMLC is chaired by the Deputy Governor of the QCB; Director of the MoI’s Immigration Department acts as deputy chairman; head of the FIU acts as coordinator. Full membership meets four times a year. NAMLC is empowered to issue its own regulation (Article 8 as amended by Decree Law No. 21 of 2003) and issued Resolution No.1 of 2004 establishing the FIU. (paragraphs 809–811).
  - Outreach: NAMLC representatives visited all ministries to raise AML/CFT awareness and provide guidance. (paragraph 811).
  - Membership gaps: NAMLC membership does not include the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the securities market regulator21 and the newly established QFC. The FIU head ensures regular dialogue with these authorities despite informal basis. It is recommended to formalize coordination and include these authorities in NAMLC. (paragraphs 812–812).
- Coordination Committee / NCT details:
  - Initial Coordination Committee established January 2002; replaced by the National Committee for Fighting Terrorism (NCT) pursuant to Council of Ministers’ decision of March 26, 2007. (paragraph 813).
  - Composition of Coordination Committee (2002–2007): representatives from Ministries of Civil Service Affairs and Housing, Finance, Economy and Commerce, Interior, Justice, Islamic Affairs department and Awqaf, QCB and Chamber of Commerce and Industry; MOFA usually invited. All members received UNSCR 1267 lists and requests under UNSCR 1373. (paragraph 814).
  - NCT composition: representatives from MOI, Qatar Armed Forces, State Security Bureau, Internal Security Force, Ministry of Civil Service and Housing Affairs, Ministry of Finance, MEC, MOJ, Ministry of Endowment and Islamic Affairs, General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, QCB, General Authority of Customs and Ports, Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry. (paragraph 814).
  - NCT main functions: make plans/programs to fight terrorism; coordinate national efforts to implement obligations from UNSCR 1373; take action to implement obligations in international conventions against terrorism to which Qatar is a party (Article 3 of the decision). Implementation of UNSCR 1267 and its successor resolutions "does not fall within the remit of the new NCT and is currently unaddressed." (paragraph 815).
  - Membership gaps: NCT does not include the PPO, the DSM and the QFC. The QFC receives 1267 updates and other requests via one of the NCT members, but inclusion in NCT membership is recommended to avoid delays. (paragraph 816).
- Conclusion on domestic coordination (paragraph 818):
  - "The two coordination committees, and NAMLC in particular, offer an appropriate framework for domestic cooperation amongst most of the relevant authorities on ML and TF issues, with the exception of coordination and implementation of UNSCR 1267. They would nevertheless benefit from an enlarged membership and, in the case of the NCT, focus as a matter of priority on enhancing the operational cooperation in the implementation of the UNSCRs."
- Consultation and statistics:
  - No mechanisms established for consultation between competent authorities and regulated institutions (c. 31.2). (paragraph 819).
  - "No comprehensive statistics are held in this respect." (paragraph 820).

### Recommendations and compliance for R.31
- Recommendations (paragraph 6.1.2):
  - "The authorities should formalize the cooperation with, the QFC, the securities market regulator and, if necessary, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and seek to include them in their efforts to develop and implement policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing."
  - "The authorities should ensure as a matter of priority enhanced cooperation in the implementation of UNSCRs 1267 and 1373 (and their successor resolutions)."
  - "Comprehensive statistics should be maintained."
- Compliance rating: R.31 — LC. Summary factors:
  - Mechanisms in place ensure effective cooperation amongst most relevant authorities but could be enhanced by including the QFC, the DSM and, if necessary, the PPO.
  - Coordination mechanism for implementation of UNSCR 1373 could be enhanced similarly.
  - "There is no mechanism for the implementation of the UNSCR 1267." (section 6.1.3)

### Conventions and UN Special Resolutions — selected observations (R.35 & SR.I)
- Vienna Convention:
  - Ratified by Decree No. 130 of 1990. Offenses related to production/manufacture/distribution etc. of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances criminalized through Law No. 9 of 1987 (as amended by Law No. 7 of 1998). Money laundering offense partially meets Palermo Convention requirements. Jurisdictional measures and controlled delivery provisions exist (Article 425 of the CPC). No measures taken with respect to commercial carriers, traffic by sea, use of mail in compliance with Articles 15, 17 and 19 of the Vienna Convention. (paragraph 821).
- Palermo Convention:
  - "The Palermo Convention has not been ratified by the State of Qatar and participation in an organized criminal group (Article 5 of the Convention) has not been criminalized." (paragraph 822).
  - Money laundering criminalized and AML measures adopted but not fully compliant with Articles 6 and 7 of the Palermo Convention. Legal persons may be subject to criminal liability only for money laundering, not for participation in an organized criminal group, corruption or obstruction of justice (non-compliance with Article 10). Sanctions for money laundering and failure to comply with preventive measures generally in line with Article 11. Mutual legal assistance, confiscation, seizure and extradition broadly meet required Articles except regarding organized crime. No measures for effective protection of witnesses and victims as required by Articles 24 and 25. In absence of criminalization of organized crime and lack of ratification, several Palermo Convention provisions are not applicable or have not been implemented. (paragraph 823).

*Italic: Excerpted content unit from IMF source document _cr08322.*

### 824.      Implementation of SFT Convention (Articles 2-18, c. 35.1 & c. I.1). The ICSFT has not been

### _cr08322 - 824. Implementation of SFT Convention (Articles 2-18, c. 35.1 & c. I.1)

### Implementation of International Conventions and UN Security Council Resolutions
- The ICSFT has not been ratified by the State of Qatar.
- By decision dated October 11, 2007, the Council of Ministers approved joining:
  - the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 1997; and
  - the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of terrorism of 1999,
  subject to reservations regarding referral to international arbitration and the International Court of Justice.
- Qatar has not yet signed the ICSFT; the Council of Ministers referred accession study to competent authorities (fourth report of the State of Qatar to the UN CTC, March 2006, S/2006/171).
- Terrorist financing has been criminalized but lacks the level of detail required to fully comply with ICSFT requirements.
- Other ICSFT requirements have been partially implemented via the AML Law and the CT Law (see cross-references to SR II, SR III, SR V for Articles 2-9 and 17-18).

- Qatar regularly informed the UNSC of counter-terrorism progress:
  - Report to UNSC 1267 Committee on August 18, 2003.
  - Reports to UNSC 1373 Committee on October 28, 2002; March 10, 2004; and March 17, 2006.
- An inter-ministerial committee, the NCT, was established to coordinate implementation of UNSCR 1373 but:
  - No legal measures ensure authorities may rely on an effective freezing mechanism.
  - The NCT does not address coordination in implementation of UNSCR 1267.

- Authorities reported none of the persons and legal entities listed under UNSCR 1267 identified in Qatar. One listed legal entity had a purported branch in Doha which appeared closed and had no bank accounts in Qatar.
- It appears that in at least one case authorities did not provide assistance required under UNSCR 1267 and offered safe harbor to a foreign national listed under UNSCR 1267, in violation of obligations under the resolution.

- Qatar is party to the 1998 Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism.

### Recommendations and Compliance (6.2.2 & 6.2.3)
- Authorities are encouraged to:
  - Take the necessary measures to fully implement the Vienna Convention;
  - Sign, become party to and fully implement the Palermo Convention;
  - Sign, become party to and fully implement the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing;
  - Take the necessary measures to comply with and fully implement UNSCR 1267 and 1373 (and their successor resolutions) as recommended under SR III.

- Rating summary of factors underlying rating:
  - R.35: PC
    - Qatar has partially implemented the Vienna Convention.
    - It has not ratified nor fully implemented the Palermo Convention and the 1999 ICST.
  - SR.I: NC
    - Qatar is not party to and has not implemented the ICST.
    - Qatar has not fully implemented UNSCR 1267 and 1373. Moreover, it acted in violation of UNSCR 1267 on one occasion.

### Mutual Legal Assistance (R.36-38, SR.V) — Description and Analysis
- Legal framework:
  - AML Law provides legal assistance, coordination, joint cooperation and extradition in money laundering investigations in accordance with international agreements concluded by the State of Qatar (Article 17 of the AML Law).
  - General mutual legal assistance framework set out in the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC; Book V) and applies to fight against money laundering.
- Law does not clearly define measures beyond extradition; Article 427 CPC refers to requests “to conduct an investigation through the Qatari judicial bodies”.
- Article 428 CPC requires rejection of requests when procedures sought are prohibited by law or conflict with principles of general order of Qatar.
- Subject to reciprocal agreement (Article 407 CPC), measures permitted under CPC may be taken on behalf of a foreign State, including:
  - production, search and seizure of information, documents, or evidence from financial institutions, or other natural or legal persons (Article 29 of the CPC);
    - production of banking records (including those held by QFC banks) requires authorization from the Governor of the QCB: neither the PPO nor the police may order a bank to provide information on a customer’s bank account;
  - taking of evidence or statements from persons (Article 34 of the CPC);
  - providing originals or copies of relevant documents and records as well as any other information and evidentiary items;
  - effecting service of judicial documents;
  - facilitating voluntary appearance of persons for information or testimony;
  - identification, freezing, seizure, or confiscation of assets laundered or intended to be laundered, proceeds of money laundering and assets used for or intended to be used to finance terrorist groups or organizations, instrumentalities of the money laundering offense, and assets of corresponding value (Article 12 and 13 of the AML Law; Article 15 and 21 of the CT Law).

- AML Law does not specifically address instrumentalities of the predicate offense; identification/freezing/seizure/confiscation of these instrumentalities would require separate MLA request based on predicate crime.

- Timeliness and effectiveness:
  - Authorities did not provide information enabling assessors to establish Qatar can provide assistance in a timely and effective manner.

- Conditions for rejection (Article 428 CPC):
  a. required procedures prohibited by law or conflict with general principles in Qatar;
  b. acts do not constitute a crime under Qatari law (unless defendant agrees, then measures may be undertaken);
  c. crime investigated is one for which extradition is not allowed under Qatari legislation (circumstances listed under Article 410 CPC).

- Dual criminality requirement:
  - Qatari authorities are not entitled to grant assistance in absence of dual criminality; a request will not be followed if the underlying crime of the money laundering offense is not one of the predicate offenses listed under Article 2 of the AML Law.
  - Combination of strict dual criminality requirement and limited list of predicate offenses under Article 2 greatly limits scope of assistance.

- Process efficiency:
  - Requests forwarded to PPO through diplomatic channels (Article 427 CPC); must state procedures sought and legal provisions, accompanied by relevant documents.
  - Public Prosecutor may refer request to competent judicial authority.
  - Law allows prompt action: “the actions that are warranted by necessity may be taken before reception of the request and its attachment” (Article 427 CPC).

- Fiscal matters:
  - Conditions for rejection (Article 428 CPC) do not encompass fiscal nature; MLA may be granted even when offense involves fiscal matters.

- Secrecy and confidentiality:
  - Banking secrecy applies to bank-customer relationship and covers any document or information received by banks.
  - Authorities may access relevant information provided Governor of the QCB agrees to lift banking secrecy or, if criminal proceedings initiated, competent court orders on request of public prosecutor.
  - If conditions for MLA are met, Governor and court cannot deny access to the information.
  - No other secrecy requirement may be opposed in other relevant sectors (domestic and QFC); authorities may access information held by insurance companies, exchange houses, DSM, QFC companies other than banks (where described process applies), and relevant DNFBPs (other than legal professional privilege).

- Availability of powers:
  - If conditions for MLA are met, powers of relevant authorities are available in response to requests.
  - No mechanism ensures direct cooperation between foreign judicial/law enforcement authorities and Qatari authorities other than through Interpol.

- CT Law and SR V:
  - CT Law does not specifically address international cooperation in fight against terrorism and its financing; CPC framework applies.
  - Identification, freezing, seizure, confiscation measures under Article 15 and 21 of the CT Law:
    - TF offense does not refer to terrorist acts nor to individual terrorists; freezing/seizing/confiscation measures could not be granted for terrorist funds other than those collected for or provided to a terrorist organization.
    - Scope of TF offense limited to financing of terrorist acts defined under CT Law in a way that does not fully comply with the standard; shortcomings restrict scope of assistance to other countries.

- Reciprocity and past conduct:
  - Authorities have signed a few reciprocal agreements to enable cooperation in fight against terrorism and its financing.
  - On one occasion authorities refused to cooperate in arrest of person designated by UNSC Committee pursuant to Resolution 1267.

- Principle of self-determination:
  - Protection of right of people to self-determination anchored in Qatari Constitution and may be considered a fundamental principle under Qatari law; invoked as obstacle to extradition in case of Interpol arrest warrant for person later designated by UNSC 1267 Committee.
  - It is unclear whether MLA requests other than extradition were made in that case; likely similar refusal would have occurred.

- Conclusion on UNSCR 1267:
  - Effective implementation of UNSCR 1267 is mandatory; UN member states have no discretion regarding designations under UNSCR 1267.
  - Interpretation by authorities in the cited case was inconsistent with mandatory implementation.

### Mutual Legal Assistance (R.36-38, SR.V) — Specific Issues and Shortcomings
- No information provided establishing Qatar can provide MLA in timely and effective manner; overall MLA framework not shown to be effectively implemented.
- No dispositions addressing multiple requests for MLA; no mechanism for direct cooperation with foreign counterparts other than Interpol.
- Dual criminality and reluctance:
  - Qatari authorities appear reluctant to accede to MLA requests when dual criminality not met, even for less intrusive and non-compulsory measures.
  - Unclear whether technical legal differences impact delivery of MLA.
- Provisional measures timeliness (c. 38.1):
  - Authorities may freeze, seize, confiscate on behalf of foreign jurisdiction the assets laundered or intended to be laundered, proceeds of money laundering, assets used for or intended to be used to finance terrorist groups or organizations, instrumentalities of money laundering offense, and assets of corresponding value (Article 12 and 13 AML Law as amended by Decree Law (21) of 2003; Article 15 and 21 CT Law).
  - Not entitled to take similar measures regarding instrumentalities of predicate offense unless separate request made.
  - Freezing, seizing, confiscation subject to dual criminality and could not be taken if predicate offense not criminalized in Qatar.
  - No legal requirement to respond to requests for freezing, seizing and confiscation in a timely fashion; no information provided on effective timing of responses.
- Property of corresponding value (c. 38.2):
  - Authorities do not seize, freeze or confiscate property of corresponding value when the object of the request is no longer available.
- Coordination of seizure/confiscation actions (c. 38.3):
  - No arrangements in place for coordination of seizure and confiscation actions with other countries.

*Source: _cr08322 - 824. Implementation of SFT Convention (Articles 2-18, c. 35.1 & c. I.1).*

### 857.      International Cooperation under SR V (applying c. 38.1-38.3 in R. 38, c. V.3). Tracing of

### International Cooperation under SR V (applying c. 38.1-38.3 in R. 38, c. V.3). Tracing of

### Mutual legal assistance, asset measures, and recognition of foreign orders
- Tracing of funds may be conducted under Article 20 of the CT Law, but it is unclear whether the public prosecutor may have access to financial records detained by banks or other financial institutions when acting on behalf of a foreign state. (857)
- Article 21 of the CT Law: public prosecutor may order provisional measures to prevent the accused from disposing of or managing assets if “sufficient information is available on the seriousness of the accusation.” Freezing orders “may encompass the assets of the spouse of the accused [and/or] his minor children “if these assets were in his possession.” The law does not define “assets” nor the required “level of seriousness,” and is silent on freezing at the request of a foreign state. (858)
- Article 15 of the CT Law provides for confiscation: “it shall be ruled to confiscate the seized things, assets, weapons and machinery resulting from or used in or could be used in one of the crimes to which the provisions of this law apply taking into consideration the rights of bona fide others”. Assets are not clearly defined, potentially complicating implementation. (859)
- Asset Forfeiture Fund (c. 38.4) and Sharing of Confiscated Assets (c. 38.5): authorities have not considered establishing an asset forfeiture fund nor sharing confiscated property between agencies. (860)
- Article 18 of the AML Law allows execution of final foreign decisions to confiscate instrumentalities, proceeds or returns related to money laundering, but enforcement is conditional on “the provisions of any agreements concluded or ratified by the State,” making an agreement a prerequisite. (861)
- Recognition and enforcement of foreign non-criminal confiscation orders in the fight against terrorist financing remain unaddressed. (862)
- No specific statistics are held regarding mutual legal assistance, asset forfeiture, or related measures. (863)

### Effectiveness and main limitations in mutual legal assistance
- General assessment: CPC enables a wide range of mutual legal assistance against money laundering, but practical limitations exist, notably regarding terrorist financing. (864)
- Key limiting factors:
  - CT Law does not address financing of terrorist acts and of individual terrorists; mutual legal assistance seems unlikely outside investigations against specific terrorist organizations. (864)
  - A strict dual criminality requirement combined with the limited list of predicate offenses under Article 2 of the AML Law greatly limits the scope of assistance. (864)
  - Dual criminality may impede provision of assistance even for less intrusive measures. (864)
- Further limitations due to absence of:
  - Clear mechanisms for freezing, seizing and confiscation on behalf of property of corresponding value. (865)
  - Arrangements for coordinating seizure and confiscation actions with other countries. (865)
- Other uncertainties: consequences of technical differences between Qatari law and requesting States’ laws are unclear. (866)
- No consideration given to concluding coordination arrangements or establishing asset-forfeiture funds or sharing mechanisms. (867)
- No statistics or evidence provided by authorities on requests received or responses given; extent and timeliness of use of mutual legal assistance tools remain unclear. (868)
- Anecdotal evidence: authorities did not collaborate in the fight against terrorism and its financing and refused to extradite a person designated by the UNSC as having links with Al Qaeda, Osama Ben Laden and/or the Talibans, in violation of UNSCR 1267. (868)

### Recommendations to enhance international cooperation (mutual legal assistance, assets)
- Specify in law the types of assistance that may be granted to cover:
  - the production, search and seizure of information, documents, or evidence from financial institutions, or other natural or legal persons;
  - the taking of evidence or statements from persons;
  - the provisional originals or copies of relevant documents and records as well as any other information and evidentiary items;
  - the service of judicial documents;
  - facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons for the purpose of providing information or testimony to the requesting country;
  - identification, freezing, seizure, or confiscation of assets laundered or intended to be laundered, the proceeds of money laundering and assets used for or intended to be used to finance terrorist acts, terrorist groups or organizations and terrorist individuals, as well as the instrumentalities of the money laundering offense and of the predicate offense, and assets of corresponding value. (869)
- Allow delivery of mutual legal assistance on non-intrusive measures even in the absence of dual criminality. (869)
- Ensure mutual legal assistance requests are dealt with in a timely manner and without undue delay. (869)
- Devise mechanisms to determine the best venue when defendants face prosecutions in more than one country. (869)
- Ensure technical differences between laws do not impede mutual legal assistance. (869)
- Conclude arrangements for coordination of seizure and confiscation actions with other countries. (869)
- Fully implement UNSCR 1267 and 1373 with respect to international cooperation. (869)
- Criminalize terrorist financing as recommended under SR II to enable the widest range of international cooperation in combating financing of terrorism. (869)
- Consider establishing a confiscated assets fund for law enforcement, health, education or other appropriate purposes. (869)
- Consider authorizing sharing of confiscated assets between law enforcement agencies that contributed to confiscation. (869)
- Maintain statistics of requests for mutual legal assistance and responses given. (869)

### Compliance ratings summary for R.36–R.38 and SR.V (section 6.3.3)
- R.36: LC
  - A broad range of mutual legal assistance may be granted but is undermined by strict dual criminality and limited list of predicate offenses.
  - No mechanisms to determine best venue when defendants face prosecutions in multiple countries.
  - No evidence mutual legal assistance is granted in practice or in a timely and effective way.
- R.37: PC
  - Authorities rely strongly on dual criminality even for less intrusive measures; the limited list of predicate offenses may considerably limit assistance scope.
- R.38: PC
  - Freezing, seizing and confiscation at the request of a foreign State are possible but limited and do not apply to property of corresponding value.
  - No evidence such measures have been taken on request of a foreign state in a timely and effective way.
  - No arrangements for coordination of seizure and confiscation with other countries.
  - No consideration of an asset forfeiture fund or sharing of confiscated assets.
- SR.V: NC
  - CPC provisions are too broad to ensure full compliance with the standard.
  - International cooperation limited by shortcomings in the terrorist financing offense.
  - Authorities did not provide assistance in the case of a foreign national designated by the UNSC Committee pursuant to Resolution 1267.

### Extradition: legal framework, practice, and limitations
- Dual criminality applies to extradition (see write-up under 39.1). (870)
- Money laundering is explicitly extraditable under the AML Law; procedure in Article 408 to 424 of the CPC. Extradition is subject to a reciprocity agreement per Article 407 of the CPC; Qatar has concluded one extradition agreement (with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). (871)
- Extradition eligibility requirements:
  - Crime must be punishable in both Qatar and the requesting jurisdiction by imprisonment of at least two years, or the person must have been sentenced to imprisonment of at least six months. (872)
  - The crime must have occurred within territory of requesting State or, if outside, be punishable under requesting State’s legislation. (872)
- In absence of dual criminality, extradition is not mandatory unless the person is a citizen of the requesting State or of another country “that applied the same penalty.” Authorities confirmed extradition would be rejected if the underlying offense is not listed in the AML law. (873)
- Article 410 grounds for refusal include:
  - person is Qatari national;
  - crime is a political crime or linked to a political crime, or person is a political refugee at time of application;
  - crime relates to violation of military duties;
  - serious reasons to believe request is to prosecute for considerations related to race, religion, nationality or political opinion;
  - person was previously tried for same crime and pronounced innocent or sentence implemented, or criminal lawsuit/punishment terminated or annulled with prescription, or amnesty granted;
  - Qatari law entitles trial in Qatar for the underlying crime. (874)
- Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (Qatar party) treats terrorism as not a political crime for extradition among signatories; outside the Convention, unclear if Qatar would refuse extradition of terrorists per second paragraph of Article 410. (875)
- Extradition of Qatari nationals is not allowed under CPC (Article 410). Law does not prescribe timeframe for submitting cases to Qatari courts when extradition refused on nationality or trial-in-Qatar grounds. Authorities reported Qatari nationals previously denied extradition were tried and convicted in Qatar; cooperation with requesting State on procedural/evidentiary aspects not documented. (876)
- No CPC requirement to examine extradition requests or conduct proceedings without delay. (877)
- No mechanisms for simplified extradition procedures. (878)
- CT Law does not address extradition; CPC Articles 408–424 apply to terrorism and terrorist financing with the same shortcomings. No evidence Qatar extradited anyone under terrorist financing provision. (879)
- Case example: Qatari authorities refused to extradite a foreign national qualified as a terrorist by the requesting State; the individual was added to UNSC 1267 list in June 2003 and was killed in Doha in February 2004. Assessment concludes Qatar unduly refused to extradite and acted in violation of obligations under UNSCR 1267. (880)
- No indication simplified extradition procedures apply for terrorist acts and terrorist financing. (881)
- No statistics provided on extradition requests. (882)
- Effectiveness notes:
  - Public Prosecutor’s office indicates Qatar extradited 29 individuals between 2004 and the on-site visit; none of the underlying convictions related to money laundering or terrorist financing. (883)
  - Extradition has occurred in absence of formal reciprocity agreements, suggesting less formal agreements can suffice. (883)
  - No information on time taken for extraditions, or on denied requests and grounds. (884)
  - Criminalization of money laundering does not fully meet the standard because the list of predicate offenses is incomplete; dual criminality requirement means extradition would be rejected if underlying offense not listed in AML Law. Recommendation: include all designated categories of predicate offenses in the AML Law. (885)
  - In one instance, principle of protection of the right for self-determination was cited as obstacle to extradite a UNSC-designated terrorist, in violation of UNSCR 1267. (886)

### Extradition recommendations (section 6.4.2)
- Extend the list of predicate offenses as noted under Recommendation 1 to permit extradition in all cases contemplated in the standard. (887)
- Ensure that when extradition relating to ML and TF is denied, the case is promptly submitted to relevant Qatari authorities for prosecution and that competent authorities cooperate with the requesting State on procedural and evidentiary aspects. (887)
- Clearly specify the procedure by which extradition for terrorist financing is possible, in line with SR V. (887)
- Establish a mechanism to ensure extradition requests and proceedings relating to ML and TF are handled without undue delay. (887)
- Fully implement UNSCRs dealing with the fight against terrorism and its financing. (887)
- Maintain statistics of extradition requests received and responses given. (887)

### Compliance ratings summary for R.37, R.39 and SR.V (section 6.4.3)
- R.39: LC
  - Dual criminality requirement may impede extradition where request relates to laundering of proceeds of a designated predicate offense not covered by the AML Law.
  - No specific provisions to allow extradition requests and proceedings relating to TF to be handled without undue delay.
  - No individuals charged with a money laundering offense have been extradited.
  - Statistical system is not comprehensive.
- R.37: NC
  - No indication that technical differences between laws of Qatar and requesting State would not impede extradition proceedings.
- SR.V: NC
  - No specific provisions to allow extradition requests and proceedings relating to TF to be handled without undue delay.
  - Authorities refused to extradite a foreign individual listed under UNSCR 1267.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/_cr08322.pdf*

### 6.5 Other Forms of International Co-operation (R.40 & SR.V)

### _cr08322 - 6.5 Other Forms of International Co-operation (R.40 & SR.V)

### 6.5.1 Description and Analysis — law enforcement cooperation and FIU
- Paragraph 888: Law enforcement cooperation
  - Law enforcement authorities in Qatar provide international cooperation through Interpol and direct police-to-police contact.
  - The department of international cooperation in the MOI receives and requests information from counterparts.
  - The SSB has exchanged information on TF with some foreign counterparts.

- Paragraph 889: FIU cooperation
  - Pursuant to Article 3 of the Administrative Order, the FIU can exchange information with other FIUs according to Egmont principles.
  - The authorities state the FIU takes account of the Egmont principles in practice when exchanging information.
  - The FIU requested information from other FIUs in 4 cases, one of them through the Egmont Secure Web.
  - Qatar’s FIU did not sign any bilateral or multilateral MOUs for cooperation with other foreign FIUs.
  - The FIU received only two requests from foreign counterparts.
  - The limited number of requests received and made indicates a modest level of exchange with foreign counterparts at this stage.

- Paragraph 890: Supervisors (domestic sector)
  - There are no legal or regulatory provisions in the QCB Law and DSM Law that allow these institutions to exchange information and cooperate with foreign counterparts.

- Paragraphs 891–894: QFC / QFCRA cooperation
  - Article 20 of the FSR grants power to engage in a wide range of cooperation with overseas regulators and international regulatory associations; allows QFCRA to request and provide assistance, and to enter into MOU, protocols or similar arrangements.
  - Paragraphs (3) and (4) of article 20 permit QFCRA to cooperate with and provide assistance to overseas regulators in exercising their functions or in connection with prevention or detection of financial crime.
  - QFCRA has an ongoing MOU program; established MOUs with:
    - Jersey Financial Services Commission
    - Central Bank of Bahrain
    - Central Bank of Jordan
  - MOUs provide mechanisms for exchanges of information; parties are subject to confidentiality provisions in their respective laws; information should be used only for lawful supervisory purposes and/or the purposes for which it was provided.
  - QFCRA developed close contacts with the Swiss Federal Banking Commission to assist one another in supervisory functions for cross-border establishments; MOU arrangements enable exchange of confidential information when required or upon request.
  - Authorities were in the process of seeking cooperative relationships with other overseas regulators including the Central Bank of UAE, the Central Bank of Bahrain (insurance) and the Central Bank of Lebanon.
  - For jurisdictions without an MOU, Article 46 of the FSR allows QFCRA to exercise disciplinary powers when it receives a request from an overseas regulator; Article 48 allows QFCRA to request overseas regulators to assist in requiring a person to produce information or documents.

- Paragraph 894: Statistics and record-keeping
  - Law enforcement authorities, the FIU and the supervisory authorities do not maintain statistics on the number of requests for assistance made or received nor on the treatment of such requests.

### 6.5.2 Recommendations and Comments
- Law enforcement agencies and the FIU should be more proactive in requesting information on ML/FT from their counterparts.
- QCB and DSM Laws should be amended to allow the QCB and DSM to provide the widest range of international cooperation with their foreign counterparts.
- Authorities should maintain statistics on the number of requests for assistance made or received by law enforcement authorities, the FIU, including whether the request was granted or refused.

### 6.5.3 Compliance with Recommendation 40 and Special Recommendation V — ratings and factors
- R.40 — PC
  - Lack of international engagement in active exchange of ML information.
  - Lack of overall effectiveness.
- SR.V — PC
  - Lack of sufficient international engagement in active exchange of FT information.
  - Lack of overall effectiveness of the exchange of information relating to the financing of terrorism.

*Source: _cr08322 - 6.5 Other Forms of International Co-operation (R.40 & SR.V)_*

### 27. Law enforcement

### _cr08322 - 27. Law enforcement

### Law enforcement authorities (R.27)
- Overall, investigation and prosecution authorities do not appear to adequately pursue money laundering cases.
- Shortage in evidence of effectiveness of law enforcement authorities and lack of statistics.
- Lack of implementation of laws and use of law enforcement techniques in support of ML/FT investigations across various law enforcement agencies.
- Inadequate AML/CFT training.

### Powers of competent authorities (R.28)
- Rating: C

### Supervisors (R.29)
- Rating: PC
- Lack of adequate MEC supervisory authority/powers for AML/CFT matters in insurance sector.
- Lack of AML/CFT inspections of insurance companies to monitor compliance.

### Resources, integrity, and training (R.30)
- Rating: PC
- Overall, the allocation of resources is uneven, particularly in view of the rapid development and diversification of the economy.
- Overall, professional standards, including confidentiality standards are not fully developed.
- Lack of specialist skills training in law enforcement authorities including prosecution agencies, FIU, supervisors and other competent authorities involved in combating ML/FT.

### National co-operation (R.31)
- Rating: LC
- Mechanisms exist to ensure effective cooperation and coordination amongst most relevant authorities in AML but could be enhanced by formally including the QFC, the DSM and, if necessary, the public prosecutor’s office.
- Coordination mechanism for implementation of UNSCR 1373 could be enhanced similarly.
- There is no mechanism for implementation of UNSCR 1267.

### Statistics (R.32)
- Rating: NC
- Competent authorities have yet to develop comprehensive statistics in all relevant areas of the fight against ML and TF (including statistics on domestic investigations, prosecutions, convictions and on international cooperation).

### Legal persons – beneficial owners (R.33)
- Rating: LC
- Domestic sector: timeliness of the FIU’s and DSM’s access to beneficial ownership and control information should be improved by establishing a direct electronic link to the commercial register database.

### Legal arrangements – beneficial owners (R.34)
- Rating: PC
- Absence of mechanisms to obtain, verify, or retain information on the beneficial ownership and control of trusts in a timely manner, and in particular with regard to the settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiaries of trusts.
- Absence of measures to enable the competent authorities to have adequate, timely and accurate information on trusts, including information on settlor, trustee and beneficiaries.

International Cooperation

### Conventions (R.35)
- Rating: PC
- Qatar has partially implemented the Vienna Convention.
- It has not ratified nor fully implemented the Palermo Convention and the 1999 ICST.

### Mutual legal assistance (MLA) (R.36)
- Rating: LC
- A broad range of mutual legal assistance may be granted but it is undermined by the application of strict dual criminality and the limited list of predicate offenses.
- No mechanisms to determine the best venue where defendants face prosecution in more than one country.
- No evidence that mutual legal assistance is granted in practice and, if so, that it is granted in a timely and effective way.

### Dual criminality (R.37)
- Rating: PC
- Authorities rely strongly on dual criminality even for less intrusive measures which, given the limited list of predicate offenses to money laundering under Qatari law, may considerably limit the scope of assistance.
- No indication that technical differences between Qatar law and requesting state law would not impede extradition proceedings.

### MLA on confiscation and freezing (R.38)
- Rating: PC
- Freezing, seizing and confiscation at the request of a foreign State are possible but limited and do not apply to property of corresponding value.
- No evidence such measures have been taken on request of a foreign State or that they were timely and effective.
- No arrangements for coordination of seizure and confiscation with other countries.
- Establishment of asset forfeiture fund and sharing of confiscated assets have not been considered.

### Extradition (R.39)
- Rating: LC
- Dual criminality requirement may impede extradition where the request relates to laundering of proceeds of a designated predicate offense not covered by the AML Law.
- No specific provisions to allow extradition requests and proceedings relating to TF to be handled without undue delay.
- No individuals charged with a money laundering offense have been extradited.
- Statistical system is not comprehensive.

### Other forms of co-operation (R.40)
- Rating: PC
- Lack of international engagement in active exchange of ML information.
- Lack of overall effectiveness.

Nine Special Recommendations

### SR.I Implement UN instruments
- Rating: NC
- Qatar is not party to and has not implemented the ICST.
- Qatar has not fully implemented the UNSCR 1267 and 1373. Moreover, it acted in violation of UNSCR 1267 on one occasion.

### SR.II Criminalize terrorist financing
- Rating: PC
- The offense applies to all terrorist acts listed in Art. 2 para. 1 (b) of the ISCFT but the motive required in the CT Law is not in line with all the treaties mentioned in Art. 2 para. 1 (b).
- The provision/collection of funds to individual terrorists and/or for terrorist acts are not covered by the offense.
- Lack of overall effectiveness: No investigations or prosecutions have been conducted despite the fact that several investigations and prosecutions have been/are being conducted for other terrorist crimes.

### SR.III Freeze and confiscate terrorist assets
- Rating: NC
- No coordination mechanism in place for the implementation of UNSCR 1267.
- No authority responsible for the designations, dissemination and no legal basis for freezing/seizing orders.
- With the exception of protection of bona fide third parties, none of the other SR III measures have been adopted.
- No funds have been frozen under UNSCR 1267, despite presence in Qatar for several months of a person designated by the UNSC 1267 Committee, or under UNSCR1373.

### SR.IV Suspicious transaction reporting
- Rating: NC
- Reporting requirement not imposed by primary or secondary legislation.

### SR.V International cooperation
- Rating: NC
- International cooperation limited by shortcomings in the terrorist financing offense.
- Authorities did not provide assistance in case of a foreign national designated by the UNSC Committee pursuant to Resolution 1267.
- General framework seems to provide for extradition of individuals charged with a TF offense in a way that broadly meets the standard, but:
  - No specific provisions to allow extradition requests and proceedings relating to TF to be handled without undue delay.
  - Authorities refused to extradite a foreign individual listed under UNSCR 1267.
- Lack of sufficient international engagement in active exchange of FT information.
- Provisions in the CPC are too broad to ensure full compliance with the standard.
- Lack of overall effectiveness of the exchange of information relating to the financing of terrorism.

### SR.VI AML/CFT requirements for money/value transfer services
- Rating: PC
- Potential informal money/value transfer system operating in Qatar without effective monitoring.
- Shortcomings identified in other recommendations related to CDD, sanctions, supervision and regulation.

### SR.VII Wire transfer rules
- Rating: NC
- Lack of specific measures imposed by the QCB on financial institutions to address all requirements of this recommendation.
- Lack of requirements imposed by the QFCRA on relevant persons to ensure beneficiary financial institutions adopt effective risk-based procedures for identifying and handling wire transfers not accompanied by complete originator information.

### SR.VIII Nonprofit organizations
- Rating: LC
- Domestic sector:
  - Recent enactment of Resolution 17 of 2006 does not allow full assessment of effectiveness of supervision of the NPO sector.
  - Regulatory possibility of exempting a charity from QACA supervision.
- QFC:
  - Trust Regulations creating charitable trusts is not compliant with SR VIII.

### SR.IX Cash Border Declaration & Disclosure
- Rating: NC
- Absence of implementation of the disclosure system for cross-border transportation of cash and bearer negotiable instruments.
- Lack of retention of records.
- Lack of trained customs officials.
- Lack of clear sanctions for false disclosure, failure to disclose, or cross-border transportation for ML and FT purposes.
- Lack of clear safeguards to ensure proper use of disclosed information.
- Insufficient statistics to assess effectiveness of measures in place.

Table 2. Recommended Action Plan to Improve the AML/CFT System (selected priorities)

- Criminalization of Money Laundering (R.1, 2, & 32)
  - Amend the AML Law to clarify and extend the scope of the money laundering offense to cover all intentional acts aiming to conceal or disguise source, true nature, location, disposition, movement, ownership of or rights with respect to proceeds of crime (by specifying the purpose or deleting the intended purpose).
  - Criminalize and add to the list of predicate offenses: participation in an organized (non terrorist) criminal group and racketeering; trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling; sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation of children; illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods; corruption and bribery; fraud; counterfeiting and piracy of products; environmental crime; murder, grievous bodily injury; kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking; robbery or theft; smuggling; forgery; piracy; and insider trading and market manipulation.
  - Ensure predicate offenses for money laundering extend to conduct that occurred in another country when there is dual criminality.
  - Provide in-depth training to law enforcement agencies on AML Law requirements and on money laundering trends and typologies, and on investigations and prosecutions of money laundering offenses.
  - Specifically mention the terrorist financing offense in the list of predicate offenses.

- Criminalization of Terrorist Financing (SR.II & R.32)
  - Amend the CT Law to ensure acts covered by Article 2 Paragraph 1 (a) of the ICSFT are criminalized in line with the conventions and that provision/collection of funds intended for terrorist acts are considered terrorist acts even when the CT Law motive is not established.
  - Amend the CT Law to criminalize any person who by any means, directly or indirectly, willfully, provides or collects funds, or attempts to do so, with intention or knowledge they are to be used, in full or in part, to carry out a terrorist act; or by an individual terrorist.
  - Ensure investigations and prosecutions for terrorist crimes also cover financing.
  - Provide training to all relevant authorities on the fight against TF.

- Confiscation, freezing, and seizing of proceeds of crime (R.3 & 32)
  - Reconsider the role of the Governor of the QCB in application of provisional measures under the AML Law.
  - Maintain comprehensive statistics on freezing, seizing and confiscation measures ordered.

- Freezing of funds used for terrorist financing (SR.III & R.32)
  - Designate an authority responsible for analyzing requests under UNSCR 1373 and for designation of terrorists.
  - Designate an authority responsible for receiving and disseminating updates to the consolidated list pursuant to UNSCR 1267.
  - Include the QFC and consider including the PPO and the DSM in the NCT.
  - Establish legal basis for mandatory freezing orders of funds/assets owned or controlled by designated persons, terrorists and those who finance terrorism, and derived/generated funds.
  - Establish effective mechanism for dissemination of UNSCR 1267 lists and actions under UNSCR 1373 to financial institutions and DNFBPs immediately upon reception and decision.
  - Provide guidance to financial institutions and DNFBPs regarding obligations in freezing mechanisms.
  - Issue effective and publicly-known procedures for considering de-listing requests and unfreezing funds/assets of de-listed persons or entities in a timely manner.
  - Issue procedures for unfreezing funds/assets of persons/entities inadvertently affected upon verification.
  - Issue procedures to determine funds needed to cover basic expenses and authorize access to funds/assets frozen pursuant to UNSCR 1267.
  - Establish legal basis for ordering necessary provisional measures.
  - Establish appropriate procedures for challenging freezing measures before courts.
  - Define funds and other assets that may be confiscated consistent with international standard.
  - Establish effective mechanism to monitor compliance with laws/regulations governing UNSCR 1267 and 1373 freezing mechanisms.

- The Financial Intelligence Unit and its functions (R.26, 30 & 32)
  - Address legal basis that established the FIU as national centre for receiving, analyzing and disseminating STRs and other relevant information concerning suspected ML or FT activities.
  - Ensure QFCRA removes the third point from letters to DNFBPs that includes obligation to notify QFCRA of any suspicion of ML notwithstanding that an STR has not been made to the local FIU.
  - Ensure FIU provides financial institutions and reporting parties with guidance regarding manner of reporting, including procedures when reporting.
  - Ensure the FIU:
    - Enhances depth and quality of STRs analysis, in particular by accessing the CRS and requesting on regular basis additional information from reporting entities and the ECPD;
    - Uses, when necessary, the CRS, the link to the commercial register developed by the QCB, the real estate register and all available databases to enhance STR analysis;
    - Undertakes a study focusing specifically on risks of ML and FT associated with certain businesses.
  - Ensure FIU establishes mechanisms for cooperation with regulators, supervisors, reporting entities and law enforcement to optimize analysis and establishes an information flow protecting confidentiality while enhancing analysis capacity.
  - Grant FIU the power to ask DNFBPs whether they have had transactions with a person who was subject of an STR, or to demand additional information from them.
  - Ensure FIU periodically reviews effectiveness of the system to combat ML and FT and improves collection of statistics.
  - Ensure FIU publishes periodically annual reports, typologies and trends of ML/FT.
  - Ensure FIU provides additional specialized and practical in-depth training to employees (scope of predicate offenses, analysis and investigation techniques, familiarization with prosecution of ML/FT techniques, and other relevant areas).

- Law enforcement, prosecution and other competent authorities (R.27, 28, 30 & 32)
  - Ensure law enforcement authorities keep statistics on amount of criminal proceeds seized and confiscated and on number of ML/TF investigations, prosecutions, and judgments to measure effectiveness of AML/CFT system.
  - Provide additional specialized and practical training to law enforcement and prosecution personnel as well as police officers and customs agents on fight against ML/FT (scope of predicate offenses, ML and FT typologies, investigation techniques, prosecution techniques, use of information technology).
  - Take a more proactive approach to investigating and prosecuting ML/FT.

- Cross Border Declaration or disclosure (SR IX)
  - Adopt national strategic approach to detect physical cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments and amend Resolution 37-2006 to provide clear legal basis for a disclosure system. Regulation should reflect:
    - System applies to both incoming and outgoing transportation and extends to shipment through containerized cargo and mailing of currency or bearer negotiable instruments.
    - Amend Article 6 of Resolution 5-2005 to give customs power to request and obtain further information from carrier regarding origin and intended use of currency or bearer negotiable instruments in case of suspicion of ML or TF.
    - Customs should be able to stop or restrain cash or bearer negotiable instruments for a reasonable time to ascertain whether evidence of ML or TF may be found, where there is suspicion of ML or TF; or where there is false declaration or false disclosure.
    - Enhance exchange of information between customs and the FIU and create a database at customs to record all declared data related to currencies and bearer financial instruments.

*Source: _cr08322 - 27. Law enforcement*

### 3. Preventive Measures–

### 3. Preventive Measures–

### Financial Institutions
- Customer due diligence, including enhanced or reduced measures (R.5–8)
  - Establish, through law or regulation, clear requirements for financial institutions to:
    - Undertake customer due diligence (CDD) measures when:
      - Carrying out occasional transactions above the applicable designated threshold, including situations where the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations that appear to be linked.
      - Carrying out occasional transactions that are wire transfers in the circumstances covered by the Interpretative Note to SR VII.
      - There is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, regardless of any exemptions or thresholds.
      - The financial institution has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data.
    - Identify the customer (whether permanent or occasional, and whether natural or legal persons or legal arrangements) and verify that customer’s identity using reliable, independent source documents, data or information (identification data) following the examples set out in the paper entitled General Guide to Account Opening and Customer Identification issued by the Basel Committee’s Working Group on Cross Border Banking.
    - Verify, for customers that are legal persons or legal arrangements, that any person purporting to act on behalf of the customer is so authorized, and identify and verify the identity of that person.
    - Identify the beneficial owner, and take reasonable measures to verify the identity of the beneficial owner using relevant information or data obtained from a reliable source such that the financial institution is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is.
    - Determine for all customers whether the customer is acting on behalf of another person, and take reasonable steps to obtain sufficient identification data to verify the identity of that other person.
    - Conduct ongoing due diligence on the business relationship.
  - Establish, through law, regulation, or other enforceable means, clear obligations/requirements for financial institutions to:
    - Obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship.
    - Perform enhanced due diligence for higher risk categories of customer, business relationships or transactions.
    - Reject opening an account when unable to comply with CDD requirements and to consider making a suspicious report.
    - Apply CDD measures on existing customers on the basis of materiality and risk and to conduct due diligence on such relationships at appropriate times.
    - Have appropriate risk management systems to determine whether the customer is a politically exposed person; obtain senior management approval for establishing business relationships with such customers; take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds; and conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship.
    - Establish requirements for financial institutions to have measures in place for establishing cross-border correspondent banking and other similar relationships.
    - Require financial institutions to establish measures including policies and procedures designed to prevent and protect the financial institutions from money laundering and terrorist financing threats that may arise from new or developing technologies or specific CDD measures that apply to non face-to-face business relationships or transactions.
  - QFC-specific measures:
    - Remove the broad exception to customer identification requirements contained in Rule 3.9 of the Rulebook by implementing a process for conducting a risk sensitive assessment of customers and FATF countries where such customers are located to determine compliance with and the level of implementation of Rec. 5.
    - Require institutions to consider making a suspicious transaction report when unable to complete CDD measures, including when the business relationship has already commenced and the institution is not able to conduct required CDD measures.
    - Take reasonable measures to establish the source of funds of customers and beneficial owners identified as PEPs and obtain senior management approval to continue the business relationship where a customer has been accepted and the customer or beneficial owner is subsequently found to be, or subsequently becomes a PEP.
    - Incorporate into the existing requirements the obligation to gather sufficient information about a respondent institution to understand fully the reputation and quality of supervision, including whether it has been subject to a money laundering or terrorist financing investigation or regulatory action; and to document the respective AML/CFT responsibilities of each institution.

- Third parties and introduced business (R.9)
  - Domestic sector:
    - Introduce provisions/measures in the event that financial institutions supervised by the QCB, DSM, and MEC rely on intermediaries or other third parties to perform some of the elements of the CDD process.
    - Specify that the final responsibility for CDD measures remains with the financial institution opening/initiating the relationship.
  - QFC:
    - Expand the requirements to include measures: to require a relevant person to evaluate that the third party is regulated and supervised; and determine in which countries the third party that meets the conditions can be based; and take into account information available on whether those countries adequately apply the FATF Recommendations.
    - Abolish or re-evaluate the broad customer identification exemption granted when a customer is a member of the relevant person’s group or equivalent international standards are applied in FATF countries with a view to establish the risk and the conditions for implementing this waiver.

- Financial institution secrecy or confidentiality (R.4)
  - Establish measures for the competent authorities to be able to share information between financial institutions.

- Record keeping and wire transfer rules (R.10 & SR.VII)
  - Domestic sector:
    - Set in primary or secondary legislation requirements for financial institutions under the DSM’s and MEC’s supervision.
    - Provide additional guidance to financial institutions the QCB’s and DSM’s supervision as to when the record retention/keeping requirement starts, that is, following the termination of an account or business relationship or longer if requested by a competent authority.
    - Require banks (i) to ensure that all originator information that accompanies a wire transfer is transmitted with the transfer by each intermediary and beneficiary financial institution in the payment chain; (ii) when technical limitations prevent full originator information accompanying a cross-border wire transfer from being transmitted with a related domestic wire transfer, to keep a record for five years of all the information received from the ordering financial information.
    - Require banks to adopt effective risk-based procedures for identifying and handling wire transfers that are not accompanied by complete originator information. The lack of complete originator information may be considered a factor in assessing whether they are thus required to be reported to the financial intelligence unit or other competent authorities. In some cases, the beneficiary financial institution should consider restricting or even terminating its business relationship with financial institutions that fail to meet the SR.VII standards.
    - Establish a mechanism to monitor effectively the compliance of financial institutions with rules and regulations implementing SR.VII.
    - Ensure that sanctions (in line with R.17) also apply in relation to the obligations under SR.VII.
  - QFC:
    - Ensure that non-routine batched transactions are not batched where this would increase the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing.
    - Establish explicit measures to ensure that beneficiary financial institutions adopt an effective risk-based procedures for identifying and handling wire transfers that are not accompanied by complete originator information.

- Monitoring of transactions and relationships (R.11 & 21)
  - Domestic sector:
    - Require banking and financial institutions under the QCB’s supervision to make the findings of examinations of complex and unusual transactions available to auditors.
    - Require financial institutions under the DSM’s and MEC’s supervision (i) to pay special attention to all complex, unusual large transactions, or unusual patterns of transactions, that have no apparent or visible economic or lawful purpose; (ii) to examine as far as possible the background and purpose of such transactions and to set forth their findings in writing; and (iii) to maintain them for competent authorities and auditors for at least five years.
    - Ensure that the DSM provides guidance indicating whether transactions exceeding QR. 100,000 or the equivalent in foreign currency should be considered large, unusual large or complex.
    - Ensure that the DSM establishes a legal or regulatory requirement for financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with persons form or in countries which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations.
    - Expand the requirement for financial institutions under the QCB’s supervision to pay attention to business relationships and transactions with persons from or in countries that insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations.
  - QFC:
    - Establish a specific requirement for relevant persons to make the findings of examinations of complex and unusual transactions available to competent authorities and auditors.
  - Both sectors:
    - Ensure that all the supervisory authorities may apply counter-measures to address instances where a country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies the FATF Recommendations.

- Suspicious transaction reports and other reporting (R.13, 14, 19, 25, & SR.IV)
  - Establish, in primary or secondary legislation, the requirement for all financial institutions to report to the FIU transactions, including attempted transactions, when a financial institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that the funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related or linked to terrorist financing, terrorist acts or terrorist organizations or those who finance terrorism.
  - Address the protection of financial institutions under the supervision of the DSM and MEC, and their staff from liability for filing suspicious transaction reports and prohibit “tipping off” in the insurance sector.
  - Consider re-assessing the study conducted with respect to Rec. 19 to provide for a more comprehensive analysis and details as to how the decision to establish or not the cash reporting system was achieved.
  - Provide guidance to assist financial institutions on AML/CFT issues covered under the FATF recommendations, including at a minimum a description of ML and FT techniques and methods, and any additional measures that these institutions could take to ensure that their AML/CFT procedures are effective.
  - Establish communication standards and a mechanism for providing feedback to reporting institutions including general and specific or case-by-case feedback.
  - Consider reviewing the guidance provided by the FATF Best Practice Guidelines on Providing Feedback to Reporting Financial Institutions and Other Persons.

- Internal controls, compliance, audit and foreign branches (R.15 & 22)
  - Set out clear requirements for all financial institutions to establish and maintain internal procedures, policies, and controls so that the same requirements apply uniformly to policies and controls addressing customer due diligence, record retention, detection of unusual and suspicious transactions and the reporting obligation.
  - Strengthen the QCB requirement to ensure that AML/CFT compliance officer has timely and unrestricted access to customer information data and other customer due diligence information, transaction records, and other relevant information.
  - Impose a similar requirement on the financial institutions that are regulated by the DSM and MEC.
  - Require all financial institutions to ensure that the scope of the internal audit function (or outsourcing of this function) includes AML/CFT reviews/audits and an overall assessment of the financial institutions’ adequacy of the internal control systems and policies with respect to AML/CFT.
  - Require financial institutions under the supervision of the DSM and MEC to maintain an adequately resourced and independent audit function to test compliance with the procedures, policies and controls.
  - Require banking and financial institutions to put screening procedures in place to ensure high standards when hiring employees.
  - Expand the existing QCB measures that establish an explicit obligation for financial institutions to apply the higher AML/CFT standard, to the extent that local laws and regulations permit.
  - Require foreign branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions under the supervision of the DSM and MEC to observe AML/CFT measures consistent with home country requirements and the FATF Recommendations, to the extent that local (i.e. host country) laws and regulations permit; require financial institutions to pay particular attention that this principle is observed with respect to their branches and subsidiaries in countries which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations; and where the minimum AML/CFT requirements of the home and host countries differ, to apply the higher standard, to the extent that local (i.e. host country) laws and regulations permit.

- Shell banks (R.18)
  - Domestic sector:
    - Amend the QCB licensing requirements with a view to clearly prevent the establishment of shell banks in Qatar.
    - Prohibit banks from entering into or continuing correspondent relationships with shell banks.
    - Require financial institutions to satisfy themselves that respondent financial institutions in a foreign country do not permit their accounts to be used by shell banks.

- The supervisory and oversight system–competent authorities and SROs
  - Role, functions, duties and powers (including sanctions) (R.23, 30, 29, 17, 25, & 32)
    - Establish the legal basis for AML/CFT supervision of the financial institutions currently regulated by the MEC.
    - Strengthen the QCB, DSM and MEC overall AML/CFT supervision and develop formal examination procedures for AML/CFT matters.
    - Re-evaluate the adequacy of the penalties regime, in particular with respect to the criminal sanction for tipping-off provided in the AML Law, and provide the domestic supervisory authorities with an adequate range of sanctions.

- Money value transfer services (SR.VI)
  - Investigate the possibility of an informal MVT system operating in Qatar and consider effective measures for monitoring these activities, if identified.
  - Address the shortcomings identified in recommendations 4-11, 13-15, and 21-23, as applicable to this recommendation.

### Nonfinancial Businesses and Professions
- Customer due diligence and record-keeping (R.12)
  - Set out in primary or secondary legislation the basic obligations on customer due diligence and record keeping for all DNFBPs.
  - Set out in law, regulation or by other enforceable means the obligations on PEPs, payment technologies, introduced business and unusual transactions.
  - Effectively implement Circular No. 2 of 2007 of the MEC, Resolution No. 108 of 2006 of the MOJ and QFC AML Regulations.

- Suspicious transaction reporting (R.16)
  - Set out STR obligations in primary or secondary legislation for all DNFBPs.
  - Review the provisions on legal privilege in order not to prevent lawyers and legal advisers from filing STRs.
  - Implement adequate measures to prohibit a DNFBP from disclosing information it provides to the FIU.
  - Implement provisions on internal controls and countries that insufficiently apply the FATF recommendations are incomplete and not implemented.
  - Refine the QFC framework regarding the legal privilege of lawyers.

- Regulation, supervision, monitoring, and sanctions (R.17, 24, & 25)
  - Re-evaluate the adequacy of the penalties regime, in particular with respect to the criminal sanction for tipping-off provided in the AML Law, and provide the domestic supervisory authorities with an adequate range of sanctions.
  - FIU and QFCRA: issue guidelines and provide specific feedback to DNFBPs.

- Other designated non-financial businesses and professions (R.20)
  - Conduct a risk assessment of the other businesses and professions in the domestic sector.
  - Take steps in order to reduce the reliance on cash.

### Legal Persons and Arrangements & Nonprofit Organizations
- Legal Persons–Access to beneficial ownership and control information (R.33)
  - Enhance the timeliness of the FIU’s and DSM’s access to the relevant information by providing both authorities with an electronic link to the register of commerce’s database.

- Legal Arrangements–Access to beneficial ownership and control information (R.34)
  - QFC:
    - Review the CDD requirements with respect to trusts to ensure that they are in conformity with the new Trust regulations.
    - Take measures that enable the competent authorities to have adequate, accurate and timely information on trusts created under QFC, including accurate, current and adequate information on the settlor, trustee and beneficiaries.

- Nonprofit organizations (SR.VIII)
  - Suppress the possibility of exempting a charity from QACA supervision.
  - Make the identification requirements more realistic and enforceable and clarify the role of the QACA-FIU work team.
  - Systematize on-site inspection of international projects.
  - Revise the QFC Trust Regulations No. 12, Law 12 of 2004 and Law 13 of 2004 to bring the charitable trust regime in compliance with SR VIII.
  - Promote effective supervision or monitoring of QFC charitable trusts.

### National and International Cooperation
- National cooperation and coordination (R.31 & 32)
  - Formalize the cooperation with, the QFC, the securities market regulator and, if necessary, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and seek to include them in their efforts to develop and implement policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.
  - Ensure as a matter of priority enhanced cooperation in the implementation of UNSCRs 1267 and 1373 (and their successor resolutions).
  - Maintain comprehensive statistics.

- The Conventions and UN Special Resolutions (R.35 & SR.I)
  - Take the necessary measures to fully implement the Vienna Convention.
  - Sign, become party to and fully implement the Palermo Convention.
  - Sign, become party to and fully implement the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing.
  - Take the necessary measures to comply with and fully implement UNSCR 1267 and 1373 (and their successor resolutions) as recommended under SR III.

- Mutual Legal Assistance (R.36, 37, 38, SR.V & 32)
  - Specify in the law the types of assistance that may be granted in such a way that it covers assistance of the following nature:
    - the production, search and seizure of information, documents, or evidence from financial institutions, or other natural or legal persons;
    - the taking of evidence or statements from persons;
    - the provisional originals or copies of relevant documents and records as well as any other information and evidentiary items;
    - the service of judicial documents;
    - facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons for the purpose of providing information or testimony to the requesting country; and
    - identification, freezing, seizure, or confiscation of assets laundered or intended to be laundered, the proceeds of money laundering and assets used for or intended to be used to finance terrorist acts, terrorist groups or organizations and terrorist individuals, as well as the instrumentalities of the money laundering offense and of the predicate offense, and assets of corresponding value.
  - Allow for the delivery of mutual legal assistance on non-intrusive measures even in the absence of dual criminality.
  - Ensure that the mutual legal assistance requests are dealt with in a timely manner and without undue delay.
  - Devise mechanisms that determine the best venue when defendants are subject to prosecutions in more than one country.
  - Ensure that technical differences in the laws in Qatar and in the requesting State do not impede the provision of mutual legal assistance.
  - Conclude arrangements where necessary for coordination of seizure and confiscation actions with other countries.
  - Fully implement the UNSCR 1267 and 1373 with respect to international cooperation.
  - Criminalize terrorist financing as recommended under SR II and ensure that the widest range of international cooperation may be granted in the fight against the financing of terrorism.
  - Consider establishing a confiscated assets funds into which all or portion of confiscated property will be deposited and will be used for law enforcement, health, education or other appropriate purposes.
  - Consider authorizing the sharing of confiscated assets between law enforcement agencies that have contributed to the confiscation of assets.
  - Maintain statistics of the requests for mutual legal assistance and the response given.

- Extradition (R. 39, 37, SR.V & R.32)
  - Extend the list of predicate offenses as noted under Recommendation 1 in order to be able to provide extradition in all the cases contemplated in the standard.
  - Ensure that, where extradition relating to ML and TF is denied, the case is submitted to the relevant Qatari authorities without undue delay in view of the prosecution of the offenses set forth in the request and that the competent authorities cooperate with the requesting state on procedural and evidentiary aspects.
  - Clearly specify the procedure by which extradition for terrorist financing is possible, in line with SR V.
  - Establish a mechanism that ensures that extradition requests and proceedings relating to ML and TF are handled without undue delay.
  - Fully implement the UNSCR dealing with the fight against terrorism and its financing.
  - Maintain statistics of requests for extradition received and responses given.

- Other Forms of Cooperation (R.40, SR.V & R.32)
  - Law enforcement agencies and the FIU should be more proactive in requesting information on ML/FT from their counterparts.
  - QCB and DSM Laws should be amended to allow the QCB and DSM to provide the widest range of international cooperation with their foreign counterparts.
  - Authorities should maintain statistics on the number of requests for assistance made or received by law enforcement authorities, the FIU, including whether the request was granted or refused.

*Source: _cr08322 - 3. Preventive Measures–*

### 7. Other Issues

### 7. Other Issues

### Other relevant AML/CFT measures or issues
- Authorities should allocate additional resources to competent authorities.
- Authorities should develop the professional standards, including confidentiality standards.
- Authorities should develop specialist skills training in law enforcement authorities including prosecution agencies, FIU, supervisors and other competent authorities involved in combating ML/FT.
- Competent authorities have yet to develop comprehensive statistics.

### Annex 1. Authorities’ Response to the Assessment — key points
- 1. The Qatari authorities acknowledge and appreciate the important contribution the Financial Action Task Force continues to make in the international fight against ML/TF and would also like to express their gratitude to the International Monetary Fund’s assessor team for its commitment and valuable contribution to Qatar’s ongoing AML/CFT efforts.
- 2. The government of Qatar is pleased that the Assessment report highlights the fact that there is currently no evidence of significant money laundering in Qatar, that the level of predicate offences is low compared to other countries and that Qatar ranks among the less corrupt countries in the region. The government also welcomes the acknowledgement in the Assessment report that the Qatari authorities are very conscious of the risks posed by money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
- 3. The Qatari authorities are acutely aware of the risks attendant on a rapidly growing financial sector and are committed to the continued development of a robust AML/CFT framework including the development of a legal and regulatory regime that will ensure ongoing high level compliance with the FATF 40 + 9 Recommendations.
- 4. Qatar places the highest importance on AML/CFT and has worked hard over the last few years to address ML/TF risks. The Qatari authorities are pleased that the Assessment demonstrates that the main deficiencies identified in Qatar’s 2002 Mutual Assessment Report have been addressed and that the country is continuing to make positive progress in the fight against ML/TF.
- 5. As part of this commitment, the Qatar government has decided to merge Qatar’s two financial services legal and regulatory regimes and to introduce a single financial services regulator that will oversee all financial institutions (with the Qatar Central Bank retaining a focus on core central bank functions including monetary policy and the operation of the payment systems). The decision to create a new single regulator will mean that all financial institutions in Qatar will be subject to the measures (including on AML/CFT) currently upheld by the QFC.
- 6. The Qatari authorities recognize the crucial role that the National Anti Money Laundering & Counter Terrorist Financing Committee and the FIU play in the fight against ML/TF and are continuing to implement new strategies to enhance their effectiveness, including establishing a strong legal foundation for the FIU, and strengthening cooperation between all Qatari authorities involved in AML/CFT.
- 7. A number of initiatives have already been undertaken or are under way to enhance Qatar’s AML/CFT framework, including:
  - Drafting a new Anti Money Laundering & Counter Terrorist Financing Law to extend the scope of the ML and the TF offences and to ensure full compliance with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations, relevant international conventions and UNSC resolutions;
  - Implementing AML/CFT measures by each of the supervisory authorities, including amendments to regulations and rulebooks, to enhance the preventive measures for all financial institutions and DNFBPs;
  - Taking steps to accede to the Palermo Convention and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT);
  - Creating a Central Committee on Training to implement a comprehensive AML/CFT training program for all financial institutions and authorities with AML/CFT responsibility; and
  - Establishing measures to ensure that law enforcement agencies, financial institutions, DNFBPs and other competent authorities involved in combating ML/TF prepare and maintain qualitative and comprehensive statistics related to combating ML/TF.
- 8. Qatar is genuinely pleased with the timing of this Assessment and sees it as complementing the development of its AML/CFT strategy. The Assessment has helped to clarify Qatar’s AML/CFT vision and each authority is committed to implementing measures to address the recommendations made by the assessors and ensuring ongoing compliance with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations and international standards.

### Annex 2. Details of all bodies met on the on-site mission — categories and selected entries
- 1. Association of commercial banks
- 2. Association(s) of Compliance Officers
- 3. Coordination Committee for the implementation if UNSCR 1373 and relevant authorities responsible for the implementation of the UNSC Resolutions
- 4. Customs & Ports General Authority
- 5. DNFBPs
  - a) Representatives from lawyers
  - b) Representatives from the real estate agents
  - c) Representatives from dealers in precious metals and precious stones
  - d) Representatives of accountants
- 6. Financial Institutions
  - a) Representative from the banking industry
    - i) Qatar National Bank
    - ii) International Bank of Qatar
    - iii) BNP Paribas (Foreign Bank Branch)
    - iv) First Investment
  - b) Representatives from Investment companies
    - i) First Investment
  - c) Representatives of the exchange houses
    - i) Gulf Exchange Co.
    - ii) Al Mana
  - d) Representatives from the insurance Companies
    - i) Arabian Insurance Co
  - e) Representatives of financial firms supervised by QFCA
    - i) Arab Jordan Investment Bank
  - f) Representatives of financial firms supervised by QFCA
    - i) United Gulf Financial Services Company LLC
  - g) Representatives from the Doha Securities Market
    - i) Delala Islamic
    - ii) Qatar Securities Company
    - iii) Qatar Insurance and Reinsurance Co
  - h) Representatives from alternative remittance systems
- 7. Financial Intelligence Unit
- 8. Law enforcement agencies
  - a) Prosecutor, judges
  - b) Police
- 9. Ministry of Civil Service & Housing
  - a) Qatari authority for charitable activities
  - b) Qatari Post
- 10. Ministry of Economy & Commerce
  - a) Commercial Affairs Department
- 11. Ministry of Finance
- 12. MOFA
- 13. MOI
  - a) Department of Prevention of Economic Crimes
- 14. Ministry of Municipal Affairs & Agriculture
- 15. MOJ
  - a) Prosecutor’s Office
  - b) Judges
- 16. National Committee on AML/CFT
- 17. Public Qatari Authority for Specification & Criteria
- 18. Qatar Chamber of Commerce & Industry
- 19. QCB
  - a) AML/CFT policy and supervision
  - b) Banking Supervision Department
  - c) Legal Affairs Department
- 20. Qatar Financial Centre Authority
- 21. Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority
- 22. State Security Bureau
- 23. Representatives from non-profit organizations
- 24. Doha Securities Market Committee

### Annex 3. List of all laws, regulations and other material received — highlights

I. Laws (selection)
- 1. Law No. 2 of 1962: regulation of General Monetary Policy in Qatar (Ar.)
- 5. Decree Law No. 15 of the year 1993 establishing Qatar Central Bank and amendments
- 18. Law No. 28 of 2002: Fighting Money Laundering (Ar.)
- 21. Decree Law No. 21 of 2003 amending some provisions of Law No. 28 of 2002 on Anti-Money Laundering
- 22. Law No. 3 of 2004: Combating Terrorism
- 23. Law No. 11 of 2004: Penal Code
- 33. Law No. 7 of 2005: On the Promulgation of Law for the Qatar Financial Center
- 36. Law No. 23 of 2006 Law of Lawyers.
- 37. Law No. 33 of the year 2006: Qatar Central Bank.

II. Ministerial Resolutions
- 1. Ministerial Resolution of the Minister of Finance, Economy and Trade No. (10) of 1999 issuing internal list of Qatar Financial Center Authority
- 2. Ministerial Resolution of the Minister of Justice No. (27) of 2000 amending provisions of decision No. (6) of 1994 establishing units in administrative departments in the MOJ and determining its competences. (Ar.)

III. Circulars, Decisions & Instructions — selected items
- Qatari Public Authority for Customs and Ports:
  - 1. Instructions of the Public Authority for Customs and Ports, Resolution of the Director General of the Public Authority for Customs and Ports No. (5) of 2005 concerning the procedures and rules for declaration and inspection of luggage and property accompanying travelers or belonging to them.
  - 2. Instructions issued by the customs Authority, Administrative Circular No. (40) year 2001 concerning Money Laundering and suspicious operations.
  - 3. Resolution of the Chairman of Customs and Ports General Authority No. (37) of 2006 amending Decision No. (5) of 2005 regarding the procedure of disclosure and principles of licensing and inspection of traveler’s accompanied luggage.
- QCB Instructions:
  - Chapter 6: Combating ML and FT
- Doha Securities Market Committee:
  - Decision No. (16/3) for the Year 2005 on the instructions concerning the procedures for the prohibition and combating of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism.
- Charities:
  - 1. Instruction issued by the Qatari Public Authority for Charitable Works circular No. 1 of 2005: controls for financial dealings and transfers with Charitable and Humanitarian bodies abroad.
  - 2. Resolution No. (17) of 2006 issuing the instructions related to the combating of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing- Qatar Authority for charitable works and the MOJ.
- MEC:
  - 1. Circular No. (1) of 2007 to insurance company issued by the MEC (ML instructions)
  - 2. Circular No. (2) of 2007 to all companies operating in the State of Qatar (ML instructions).
  - 3. Circular No. (3) of 2007 to all auditing offices operating in the State of Qatar (ML instructions).
- Lawyers and Legal Professions:
  - 1. Circular No. 13 of 2006 addressed by the MOJ-Real Estate Registration Department.
  - 2. Administrative Order No. 108 of 2006 – Minister of Justice, chairman of the Committee responsible of registering the Lawyers.
  - 3. AML/CFT instructions, MOJ addressed to Lawyers.

IV. Qatar Financial Centre Regulations — selected items
- 1. QFC Qatar Financial Center Law-Law No. (7) of 2005.
- 3. QFC Regulation No. (1) of 2005 - QFC Financial Services Regulations relating to the management, objectives, duties, functions, powers and constitution of the QFC Regulatory Authority- Ver1-May05.
- 11. QFC AML regulations- Ver1- Sep05.
- 12. QFC – Regulatory Authority – AML Rulebook- Ver1-Oct05.

### Annex 4. Copies of key laws, regulations and other measures — items listed
- I. Laws
  - 1. Law No. 28 of 2002: Fighting Money Laundering (Ar.)
  - 2. Decree Law No. 21 of 2003 amending some provisions of Law No. (28) of 2002 on Anti-Money Laundering
  - 3. Article 3 of Law No. 3 of 2004 on Combating Terrorism
- II. Decisions
  - 1. Administrative Decision No. 1 of year 2004: establishment of the FIU.

*Source: _cr08322 - 7. Other Issues.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/_cr08322.pdf_
