## This Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes for the FATF 40

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---

### Overview
- Prepared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) based on a mission from April 30 to May 15, 2007, using the 2004 Assessment Methodology.
- The Detailed Assessment Report (DAR) underlying this ROSC was adopted by the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) on November 6, 2007.
- Summarizes AML/CFT measures in Cape Verde, assesses compliance with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations, and contains recommendations to strengthen the AML/CFT system.
- Views expressed are those of the IMF mission team and do not necessarily reflect the views of the government of Cape Verde or the Executive Board of the IMF.

### Key Findings
- Cape Verde has taken measures to establish an AML framework but is less advanced on CFT.
- Scope for strengthening criminalization of money laundering; financing of terrorism not yet criminalized domestically.
- Institutional arrangements need significant strengthening; no unit fully meets FATF requirements for an effective financial intelligence unit (FIU).
- Bank of Cape Verde (BCV), as regulator, needs substantial review of its AML supervisory strategy.
- Significant differences exist between regulation and supervision of on-shore and off-shore financial institutions; offshore sector arrangements present vulnerabilities.
- Registrars lack capacity to provide timely beneficial ownership information.
- No specific review of Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) vulnerability to abuse for financing of terrorism.
- Legal and supervisory obligations to some Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) exist but are uneventfully implemented.
- Cooperation among government entities is modest and needs addressing.

### Legal Systems and Related Institutional Measures
- 2002 legislation expanded predicate offenses beyond illicit drug trafficking and criminalized money laundering consistent with the Vienna Convention’s material and subjective elements, but the range of predicate offenses falls short of FATF 40 Recommendations.
- No convictions for money laundering to date.
- Cape Verde has ratified the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism but has not criminalized financing of terrorism domestically in accordance with the convention.
- Comprehensive framework exists for freezing, seizing and confiscation of proceeds and instrumentalities of crimes, with provisions to protect bona fide third parties.
- Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) are filed with the judiciary police (JP), received by an internal unit SCITE, which:
  - Is not an operationally independent unit.
  - Lacks autonomy to decide dissemination to the public ministry.
  - Performs very limited financial analysis and treats STRs similarly to criminal investigations.
  - Does not have timely access to additional banking records or other confidential information.
- JP has general powers to obtain information and to carry out inspections/searches if authorized by a magistrate, but lacks resources and expertise for money laundering investigations.
- Cross-border currency declaration:
  - Persons entering must declare foreign currencies or bearer securities in excess of one million escudos (EUR 9,090).
  - Law does not apply to persons leaving Cape Verde and is silent on containerized cargo or mail.
  - Customs indicates it lacks power to stop or restrain falsely declared currency; system not yet implemented.

### Preventive Measures — Financial Institutions
- Preventive regime built on principal money laundering law and technical instructions (TIs) issued by the Bank of Cape Verde.
- TIs require specific identity documents for transactions in excess of one million escudos (EUR 9,090); below that threshold, a general obligation to identify the customer exists but acceptable identity documents are less certain.
- Customer Due Diligence (CDD) permits reliance on verifications by foreign institutions without a framework ensuring those institutions adequately apply FATF recommendations.
- Existing arrangements do not adequately address higher risk customers such as PEPs, correspondent banking relationships, and introduced business regimes.
- No requirement to apply Cape Verde requirements to foreign branches and subsidiaries.
- International financial institutions can operate without substantive physical presence in Cape Verde and potentially outside acceptable global consolidated supervision; some offshore regulatory arrangements are less rigorous than on-shore arrangements.
- Obligation to monitor transactions is limited to transactions suspected of being linked to predicate offenses currently covered by the money laundering legislation.
- Record retention periods meet legal requirements, but institutions appear unaware and lack documented record retention policies.
- Banco de Cabo Verde (BCV) supervises financial institutions; Auditor General of Capital Markets (AGMVM) is a unit within BCV.
  - Bank Supervision Department has issued AML regulations and undertaken AML inspections of domestic banks.
  - No clearly defined AML/CFT supervisory strategy.
  - No clear perspective on varying risk levels across institutions and lines of business.
  - Staff have varying degrees of basic AML supervision training and need a more systematic, focused training program.

### Preventive Measures — Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs)
- AML obligations extended to: gaming establishments, real estate or property brokerage, property buying for resale, and dealers in precious metals and stones, antiques, works of art and motor vehicles.
- Lawyers, notaries, accountants, and trust and company service providers are not covered by the legal framework.
- Ministry of Finance and Public Administration designated as regulator of DNFBPs but has not issued regulations or guidance for implementation; covered DNFBPs are generally unaware of obligations.
- Significant DNFBP activities: real estate agents and motor vehicle dealers.
  - Real estate market largely unregulated and informal except for large resort-like projects undertaken by large foreign and multinational agents whose principal clients are foreigners (mainly from the UK).
  - Law’s coverage of motor vehicle dealers is comprehensive and not limited to high-end vehicles.
- Approximately 120 lawyers licensed; supervised by Bar Association.
- Notaries are public officers employed by the Ministry of Justice; they authenticate real estate title deeds but do not receive purchase funds and do not perform designated FATF Recommendation 12 functions.
- Lawyers and notaries are well placed to detect suspicious transactions in real estate contracts but have no legal obligation to do so.

### Legal Persons, Arrangements, and Nonprofit Organizations
- Mandatory registration of all legal persons, associations, foundations and companies in the commercial registry.
- Records must include: company by-laws, names and identification of shareholders, name of legal person, object, place of incorporation, amount of capital, capital held by each shareholder, composition of management, and persons who can act on behalf of the company; changes must be registered.
- Commercial registry information is public, providing access to identification of any shareholder, but official registrars lack capacity to provide timely beneficial ownership information.
- Joint-stock companies can issue nominative and bearer shares; bearer shares are paper form and not subject to registration; holders identified at annual general meetings and when receiving dividends. Very few joint-stock companies and even fewer issuing bearer shares.
- Civil Code governs associations, foundations, unincorporated associations; registrars verify constitution legality and aims before registration.
- No specific measures taken to review NPO vulnerability to financing of terrorism; no outreach to NPO sector to raise awareness of financing of terrorism vulnerabilities.
- No demonstration that NPOs are obliged to maintain records and documents of operations for at least five years.
- No demonstration that sanctions apply to NPOs for failing to comply with laws and regulations.

### National and International Cooperation
- National cooperation framework weak. National Committee for Coordination on the Fight against Drugs, Organized Crime and Corruption (NCC) exists and brings together most relevant institutions but lacks strong and effective operational cooperation across all agencies.
- Some interaction exists between JP and Public Prosecutor’s office, but no governing mechanism to ensure structured, consistent cooperation.
- Little or no coordination between BCV and law enforcement agencies.
- Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) carried out via bilateral and multilateral treaties; Attorney General’s Office is central authority for MLA in judiciary matters and coordinates information gathering from the Public Ministry and criminal police.
- Criminal police can respond to foreign requests and investigate assets/products arising from money laundering committed abroad; can search, seize, and, if related to money laundering, initiate criminal proceedings and seize assets.
- No coordinating arrangements/mechanisms for cooperation on seizure and confiscation; uncertainty whether Cape Verde’s interpretation of dual criminality is flexible enough to overlook technical differences and not impede MLA.
- Extradition is legally possible only if:
  - The foreign court has jurisdiction for the trial and
  - The offense is punishable with a penalty of one year or more of imprisonment, under Article 88 of Decree-Law No. 6/1997 of May 5.
- Extradition prohibited where the requested country punishes the offense by death sentence or life imprisonment, or for offenses to physical integrity of the person; also prohibited for political grounds or offenses related to freedom of speech, under Article 90 of Decree-Law No. 6/1997 of May 5.
- No evidence authorities have cooperated internationally on financing of terrorism matters; absence of domestic criminalization of financing of terrorism and lack of clarity on dual criminality create doubt about ability to cooperate on financing of terrorism using existing MLA framework.

### Key Assessor Recommendations
- Strengthen framework for criminalization of money laundering to align with FATF 40 Recommendations.
- Criminalize financing of terrorism domestically in accordance with the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
- Establish an institutional arrangement that meets FATF requirements for an effective FIU, with operational independence, financial analysis capacity, and timely access to banking and confidential information.
- Substantially review and clarify BCV’s AML/CFT supervisory strategy, including risk differentiation across institutions and focused staff training.
- Address regulatory and supervisory disparities between on-shore and off-shore financial institutions; ensure global consolidated supervision and substantive presence requirements where appropriate.
- Improve capacity of official registrars to provide timely beneficial ownership information.
- Conduct a review of NPO vulnerabilities to financing of terrorism and undertake outreach to NPO sector; require NPOs to keep records for at least five years and apply sanctions for non-compliance.
- Implement and empower Customs and related mechanisms to enforce cross-border currency/bearer instrument declaration requirements, and clarify coverage for departures and shipments.
- Issue regulations/guidance for DNFBPs and raise awareness among covered DNFBPs of legal obligations.
- Strengthen national coordination mechanisms (NCC and inter-agency cooperation) and put in place structured mechanisms governing cooperation between JP, Public Prosecutor’s office, BCV, and other agencies.
- Clarify and, if necessary, adapt interpretation of dual criminality to facilitate mutual legal assistance, and enhance mechanisms for coordinated international cooperation on seizure/confiscation and extradition.

### Detailed Recommendations and Ratings (selected)
- R.1 – [PC]; R.2 – [LC]: Broaden ML offense scope; ensure ML conviction not contingent on predicate conviction.
- SR.II – [NC]: Criminalize terrorist financing in line with Article 2 of the UN Convention.
- R.26 – [NC]: Establish a full-fledged FIU; provide operational independence, resources, training, analysis capacity, information access, and authority to exchange information internationally.
- R.5–R.8 – [NC]: Strengthen CDD, remove one million escudos threshold in TIs, require verification of foreign institutions' AML/CFT standards.
- R.10 – [PC]; SR.VII – [NC]: Require five-year minimum record retention and improved wire transfer originator information rules.
- R.11 – [PC]; R.21 – [NC]: Require special attention to complex/large transactions and transactions involving countries not applying FATF Recommendations.
- R.13–R.14–R.19–R.25 – [NC]: Expand STR coverage to TF, prohibit tipping-off, consider CTRs, and provide supervisory feedback on STRs.
- R.18 – [NC]: Prohibit shell banks; ensure physical presence and consolidated supervision; amend Articles 12 and 44 of Law 12/2005.
- R.17 – [PC]; R.23 – [NC]; R.29 – [PC]: Amend laws to cover all financial activities, establish fit and proper criteria, widen BCV inspection powers, and provide BCV autonomy to impose administrative sanctions.

### Resources, Training and Statistics
- R.30 – [PC]; R.32 – [NC]:
  - Need for more training of investigators in specialized techniques.
  - SCITE and future FIU require training in financial analysis and production of financial intelligence.
  - BCV staff should receive additional AML supervisory training.
  - Customs officers need resources and training to monitor cross-border movement of currency and bearer negotiable instruments.
  - Commercial registry should be capable of providing accurate and timely information on registered legal persons and beneficial owners.
  - Establish data collection systems for prosecutions, convictions, penalties, freezing/seizing and confiscation, and ML/TF-related mutual legal assistance statistics.
  - Maintain records where a currency declaration exceeds the prescribed threshold, there is a false declaration, or there is a suspicion of ML or financing of terrorism.

### Authorities’ Response, Actions and Planned Measures
- IMF assessment and DAR:
  - In 2007 the IMF undertook an assessment of the AML/CFT system in Cape Verde; results recorded in a DAR which has been ratified by the country authorities but had not been updated a little more than a year later to incorporate the latest AML/CFT developments.
- Actions and legislation:
  - Cape Verde has ratified the main UN conventions on AML/CFT and approved Law No. 17/VI/2002 of December 16, 2002 which equips Cape Verde with a major AML/CFT framework.
  - Key efforts include the 2005 legislation on IFIs and BCV regulations to improve monitoring of banking and parabanking institutions.
  - Steps on combating financing of terrorism include adoption of international conventions, promulgation of the new Criminal Code, and publication of technical instructions by the BCV. Authorities recognize a need to further strengthen these actions, in particular through adoption of special legislation criminalizing the financing of terrorism.
- 2008–2009 priority actions (ad hoc commission plan):
  - Creation and establishment of a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), operational and preparing a formal request for membership of the Egmont Group.
  - Far-reaching reforms of Law No. 17/VI/2002 broadening its scope and aligning it with the provisions of the Palermo Convention (draft law examined by the Council of Ministers and submitted to the National Assembly).
  - Preparation of a Law criminalizing the Financing of Terrorism (draft law examined by the Council of Ministers and submitted to the National Assembly).
  - Review of the banking sector law (dating from 1996) to strengthen supervisory framework, harmonize banking secrecy requirements with exchange-of-information needs, and potentially unify prudential requirements (draft decree (dipoma) at an advanced stage; first version expected to be completed by end-December 2008).
  - Signing of memoranda of understanding between the BCV and foreign supervisors.
- Planned measures and assessments:
  - Plans in 2009 to regulate the designated nonfinancial activities and professions [Actividades e Profissões Não Financeiras Designadas (APNFD)] and to review and strengthen BCV’s technical instructions for the banking sector, and to prepare technical instructions for the insurance sector and the capital market.
  - At the request of Cape Verde authorities, the IMF in November 2008 embarked upon the first phase of an assessment of the stability of the financial sector in Cape Verde (FSAP); the second phase to be concluded in January 2009. Implementation of FSAP recommendations should help strengthen the framework for monitoring and supervising the financial sector.

*IMF mission team report based on mission of April 30 to May 15, 2007 and the 2004 Assessment Methodology; DAR adopted by GIABA on November 6, 2007.*

### 1.      This Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes for the FATF 40

### 1.      This Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes for the FATF 40

### Overview
- Prepared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) based on a mission from April 30 to May 15, 2007, using the 2004 Assessment Methodology.
- The Detailed Assessment Report (DAR) underlying this ROSC was adopted by the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) on November 6, 2007.
- The report summarizes AML/CFT measures in Cape Verde, assesses compliance with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations, and contains recommendations to strengthen the AML/CFT system.
- Views expressed are those of the IMF mission team and do not necessarily reflect the views of the government of Cape Verde or the Executive Board of the IMF.

### Key Findings
- Cape Verde has taken measures to establish an AML framework but is less advanced on CFT.
- Scope for strengthening criminalization of money laundering; financing of terrorism not yet criminalized domestically.
- Institutional arrangements need significant strengthening; no unit fully meets FATF requirements for an effective financial intelligence unit (FIU).
- Bank of Cape Verde (BCV), as regulator, needs substantial review of its AML supervisory strategy.
- Significant differences exist between regulation and supervision of on-shore and off-shore financial institutions; offshore sector arrangements present vulnerabilities.
- Registrars lack capacity to provide timely beneficial ownership information.
- No specific review of Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) vulnerability to abuse for financing of terrorism.
- Legal and supervisory obligations to some Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) exist but are uneventfully implemented.
- Cooperation among government entities is modest and needs addressing.

### Legal Systems and Related Institutional Measures
- 2002 legislation expanded predicate offenses beyond illicit drug trafficking and criminalized money laundering consistent with the Vienna Convention’s material and subjective elements, but the range of predicate offenses falls short of FATF 40 Recommendations.
- No convictions for money laundering to date.
- Cape Verde has ratified the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism but has not criminalized financing of terrorism domestically in accordance with the convention.
- Comprehensive framework exists for freezing, seizing and confiscation of proceeds and instrumentalities of crimes, with provisions to protect bona fide third parties.
- Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) are filed with the judiciary police (JP), received by an internal unit SCITE (Central Section for the Investigation of Trafficking of Stupefacients), which:
  - Is not an operationally independent unit.
  - Lacks autonomy to decide dissemination to the public ministry.
  - Performs very limited financial analysis and treats STRs similarly to criminal investigations.
  - Does not have timely access to additional banking records or other confidential information.
- JP has general powers to obtain information and to carry out inspections/searches if authorized by a magistrate, but lacks resources and expertise for money laundering investigations.
- Cross-border currency declaration: persons entering must declare foreign currencies or bearer securities in excess of one million escudos (EUR 9,090); law does not apply to persons leaving Cape Verde and is silent on containerized cargo or mail; Customs indicates it lacks power to stop or restrain falsely declared currency; system not yet implemented.

### Preventive Measures — Financial Institutions
- Preventive regime built on principal money laundering law and technical instructions (TIs) issued by the Bank of Cape Verde.
- TIs require specific identity documents for transactions in excess of one million escudos (EUR 9,090); below that threshold, a general obligation to identify the customer exists but acceptable identity documents are less certain.
- Customer Due Diligence (CDD) permits reliance on verifications by foreign institutions without a framework ensuring those institutions adequately apply FATF recommendations.
- Existing arrangements do not adequately address higher risk customers such as PEPs, correspondent banking relationships, and introduced business regimes.
- No requirement to apply Cape Verde requirements to foreign branches and subsidiaries.
- International financial institutions can operate without substantive physical presence in Cape Verde and potentially outside acceptable global consolidated supervision; some offshore regulatory arrangements are less rigorous than on-shore arrangements.
- Obligation to monitor transactions is limited to transactions suspected of being linked to predicate offenses currently covered by the money laundering legislation.
- Record retention periods meet legal requirements, but institutions appear unaware and lack documented record retention policies.
- Banco de Cabo Verde (BCV) supervises financial institutions; Auditor General of Capital Markets (AGMVM) is a unit within BCV.
  - Bank Supervision Department has issued AML regulations and undertaken AML inspections of domestic banks.
  - No clearly defined AML/CFT supervisory strategy.
  - No clear perspective on varying risk levels across institutions and lines of business.
  - Staff have varying degrees of basic AML supervision training and need a more systematic, focused training program.

### Preventive Measures — Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs)
- AML obligations extended to: gaming establishments, real estate or property brokerage, property buying for resale, and dealers in precious metals and stones, antiques, works of art and motor vehicles.
- Lawyers, notaries, accountants, and trust and company service providers are not covered by the legal framework.
- No gaming houses or casinos currently; potential future interest from foreign investors noted.
- No distinct trust and company service providers; authorities report no significant activity in sale of precious metals and stones, antiques and works of art.
- Ministry of Finance and Public Administration designated as regulator of DNFBPs but has not issued regulations or guidance for implementation; covered DNFBPs are generally unaware of obligations.
- Significant DNFBP activities: real estate agents and motor vehicle dealers.
  - Real estate market largely unregulated and informal except for large resort-like projects undertaken by large foreign and multinational agents whose principal clients are foreigners (mainly from the UK).
  - Law’s coverage of motor vehicle dealers is comprehensive and not limited to high-end vehicles.
- Approximately 120 lawyers licensed; supervised by Bar Association. Notaries are public officers employed by the Ministry of Justice; they authenticate real estate title deeds but do not receive purchase funds and do not perform designated FATF Recommendation 12 functions.
- Lawyers and notaries are well placed to detect suspicious transactions in real estate contracts but have no legal obligation to do so.

### Legal Persons and Arrangements & Non-Profit Organizations
- Mandatory registration of all legal persons, associations, foundations and companies in the commercial registry.
- Records must include: company by-laws, names and identification of shareholders, name of legal person, object, place of incorporation, amount of capital, capital held by each shareholder, composition of management, and persons who can act on behalf of the company; changes must be registered.
- Commercial registry information is public, providing access to identification of any shareholder, but official registrars lack capacity to provide timely beneficial ownership information.
- Joint-stock companies can issue nominative and bearer shares; bearer shares are paper form and not subject to registration; holders identified at annual general meetings and when receiving dividends. Very few joint-stock companies and even fewer issuing bearer shares.
- Civil Code governs associations, foundations, unincorporated associations; registrars verify constitution legality and aims before registration.
- No specific measures taken to review NPO vulnerability to financing of terrorism; no outreach to NPO sector to raise awareness of financing of terrorism vulnerabilities.
- No demonstration that NPOs are obliged to maintain records and documents of operations for at least five years.
- No demonstration that sanctions apply to NPOs for failing to comply with laws and regulations.

### National and International Cooperation
- National cooperation framework weak. National Committee for Coordination on the Fight against Drugs, Organized Crime and Corruption (NCC) exists and brings together most relevant institutions but lacks strong and effective operational cooperation across all agencies.
- Some interaction exists between JP and Public Prosecutor’s office, but no governing mechanism to ensure structured, consistent cooperation.
- Little or no coordination between BCV and law enforcement agencies.
- Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) carried out via bilateral and multilateral treaties; Attorney General’s Office is central authority for MLA in judiciary matters and coordinates information gathering from the Public Ministry and criminal police.
- Criminal police can respond to foreign requests and investigate assets/products arising from money laundering committed abroad; can search, seize, and, if related to money laundering, initiate criminal proceedings and seize assets.
- No coordinating arrangements/mechanisms for cooperation on seizure and confiscation; uncertainty whether Cape Verde’s interpretation of dual criminality is flexible enough to overlook technical differences and not impede MLA.
- Extradition is legally possible only if:
  - The foreign court has jurisdiction for the trial and
  - The offense is punishable with a penalty of one year or more of imprisonment, under Article 88 of Decree-Law No. 6/1997 of May 5.
- Extradition prohibited where the requested country punishes the offense by death sentence or life imprisonment, or for offenses to physical integrity of the person; also prohibited for political grounds or offenses related to freedom of speech, under Article 90 of Decree-Law No. 6/1997 of May 5.
- No evidence authorities have cooperated internationally on financing of terrorism matters; absence of domestic criminalization of financing of terrorism and lack of clarity on dual criminality create doubt about ability to cooperate on financing of terrorism using existing MLA framework.

### Key Assessor Recommendations (extracted from report findings)
- Strengthen framework for criminalization of money laundering to align with FATF 40 Recommendations.
- Criminalize financing of terrorism domestically in accordance with the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
- Establish an institutional arrangement that meets FATF requirements for an effective FIU, with operational independence, financial analysis capacity, and timely access to banking and confidential information.
- Substantially review and clarify BCV’s AML/CFT supervisory strategy, including risk differentiation across institutions and focused staff training.
- Address regulatory and supervisory disparities between on-shore and off-shore financial institutions; ensure global consolidated supervision and substantive presence requirements where appropriate.
- Improve capacity of official registrars to provide timely beneficial ownership information.
- Conduct a review of NPO vulnerabilities to financing of terrorism and undertake outreach to NPO sector; require NPOs to keep records for at least five years and apply sanctions for non-compliance.
- Implement and empower Customs and related mechanisms to enforce cross-border currency/bearer instrument declaration requirements, and clarify coverage for departures and shipments.
- Issue regulations/guidance for DNFBPs and raise awareness among covered DNFBPs of legal obligations.
- Strengthen national coordination mechanisms (NCC and inter-agency cooperation) and put in place structured mechanisms governing cooperation between JP, Public Prosecutor’s office, BCV, and other agencies.
- Clarify and, if necessary, adapt interpretation of dual criminality to facilitate mutual legal assistance, and enhance mechanisms for coordinated international cooperation on seizure/confiscation and extradition.

*IMF mission team report based on mission of April 30 to May 15, 2007 and the 2004 Assessment Methodology; DAR adopted by GIABA on November 6, 2007.*

### 1. Legal System and Related Institutional Measures

### 1. Legal System and Related Institutional Measures

### Criminalization of Money Laundering
- R.1 – [PC]
- R.2 – [LC]
- The scope of the ML offense should be broadened to encompass, at a minimum, a catalogue of offenses included in the list of “designated categories of offenses” referenced in Recommendation 1 and the Glossary to the FATF Recommendations.
- It should be clearly provided in law that a conviction for the predicate offense is not necessary before issuing a ML conviction in connection with that predicate offense.

### Criminalization of Terrorist Financing
- SR.II – [NC]
- The financing of terrorism should be expressly and autonomously criminalized in accordance with Article 2 of the UN Convention on the Suppression of the financing of terrorism.
- The law should consider that the financing of terrorism is a predicate offense for ML and ensure the offense is punishable even when terrorist acts have been carried out abroad or the organization functions outside the national territory, provided the terrorism suspect or the funds or goods related to the suspect are found in Cape Verde.

### Confiscation, Freezing, and Seizing of Proceeds of Crime
- R.3 – [LC]
- Authorities should implement a system that allows for the collection and maintenance of specific data on the freezing, seizure and confiscation of goods, property and values related to the underlying offense.

### Freezing of Funds Used for Terrorist Financing
- SR.III – [NC]
- Revise the system to ensure all situations referred in the UN Security Council Resolutions are immediately applicable and allow freezing and seizure of all funds, goods and property of any kind of suspects of terrorism, including individuals and those pertaining to a group or a terrorist organization.

### The Financial Intelligence Unit and its Functions
- R.26 – [NC]
- Amend the law to provide for the establishment of a full-fledged FIU in accordance with R.26.
- The FIU should centralize reception and administration of STRs, conduct specialized desk analysis, and forward resulting cases to the public ministry.
- Provide adequate operational independence, resources, training and sources of information to the FIU.
- Authorize the FIU to obtain additional information from reporting institutions with respect to STRs without initiating a police or judiciary inquiry and obtaining a court order.
- Authorize the FIU to exchange information with foreign counterparts and consider applying for membership in EGMONT.
- Revise Law 17 of 2002 to prevent Article 22 (4) from being interpreted as allowing accused persons in a trial to have access to the actual STR filed by a reporting institution; STRs should be treated as intelligence and not as evidence in court.
- The FIU should be authorized to provide reporting institutions with guidance regarding reporting and to cooperate with other government agencies.

### Law Enforcement, Prosecution and Other Competent Authorities
- R.27 – [PC]
- R.28 – [PC]
- Authorities should give adequate attention to the investigation of ML cases.
- Need for more specialized staff and use of specialized investigative techniques.
- Legislation criminalizing financing of terrorism should provide the mandate to law enforcement to investigate and prosecute financing of terrorism offenses.
- Make explicit the power to take down witnesses’ statements in relation to AML/CFT investigations.
- Extend powers of investigation and prosecution to offenses related to financing of terrorism.
- Judiciary police and the Public Prosecutor’s Office should consider establishing units specialized in investigation and prosecution of ML and financing of terrorism.

### Cross Border Declaration or Disclosure
- SR IX – [NC]
- Amend the law to cover both incoming and outgoing persons.
- Customs should establish a mechanism to monitor and enforce compliance with cross-border declarations.
- Maintain records of the amounts and identity data where a declaration is made, there is a false declaration or there is a suspicion of ML or financing of terrorism.
- Define powers so authorities may request and obtain this information.
- Provide powers to restrain currency found in breach of the obligation; amend the Law to provide for restraint of currency for purposes of determining whether it is related to ML/the financing of terrorism.
- Apply sanctions following a case of false declaration.

---

### 2. Preventive Measures: Financial Institutions

### Customer Due Diligence, Including Enhanced or Reduced Measures
- R.5 – [NC]
- R.6 – [NC]
- R.7 – [NC]
- R.8 – [NC]
- Require financial institutions to undertake CDD measures when there are doubts about the veracity of previously obtained information.
- Remove the threshold of one million escudos associated with the provisions of Chapters II {B}{1} of TIs 108 and 109.
- If foreign bank verification of identity is maintained, require that:
  - Financial institutions satisfy themselves that the foreign financial institution is regulated and supervised (in accordance with Recommendation 23, 24 and 29), and has measures in place to comply with the CDD requirements set out in R.5 and R.10.
  - Competent authorities take into account information on whether those countries adequately apply the FATF Recommendations when determining eligible third-party jurisdictions.
- Take measures to give effect to all other requirements of FATF Recommendations 5, 6, 7 and 8.

### Third Parties and Introduced Business
- R.9 – [NC]
- Apply current provisions for introduced business to all institutions and not just IFIs.
- Require that when relying on a third party for CDD elements, financial institutions obtain that copies of identification data and other relevant documentation will be made available upon request without delay.
- Require satisfaction that the third party is regulated and supervised in accordance with FATF Recommendations 23, 24, and 29 and can comply with CDD requirements in FATF Recommendations 5 and 10.

### Financial Institution Secrecy or Confidentiality
- R.4 – [PC]
- Review the secrecy regime applicable to IFIs and align with the regime for financial institutions generally, to avoid discouraging IFIs and employees from reporting suspicious transactions of ML and TF.

### Record Keeping and Wire Transfer Rules
- R.10 – [PC]
- SR.VII – [NC]
- Require financial institutions to maintain transaction records for at least five years following completion of the transaction or longer if requested by a competent authority on proper authority; applies whether account or business relationship is ongoing or terminated.
- Records should permit reconstruction of individual transactions to provide evidence for prosecution if necessary.
- Require maintenance of identification data, account files and business correspondence for at least five years following termination of the business relationship, or longer if requested by a competent authority on proper authority.
- Require availability of customer and transaction records and information on a timely basis to domestic competent authorities upon appropriate authority.
- BCV should issue regulations to ensure financial institutions include accurate and meaningful originator information (name, national identification number and account number) on all wire transfers and ensure information remains with the transfer through the payment chain.
- Regulations should require monitoring for, and enhanced scrutiny of, transfers lacking complete originator information.

### Monitoring of Transactions and Relationships
- R.11 – [PC]
- R.21 – [NC]
- Amend legal and regulatory provisions to explicitly require special attention to transactions and patterns that are unusually complex or large and without an apparent economic or visible lawful purpose.
- Require reporting institutions to leave a written record of their review process and findings.
- Require institutions to pay special attention to transactions from or to countries which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations; authorities should provide guidance on identifying such countries.
- Authorities should determine feasibility of counter-measures within current legal framework and make necessary amendments to apply them to countries that insufficiently apply FATF standards.

### Suspicious Transaction Reports and Other Reporting
- R.13 – [NC]
- R.14 – [NC]
- R.19 – [NC]
- R.25 – [NC]
- SR.IV – [NC]
- Recommendation 13:
  - Include financing of terrorism as an offense that must trigger an STR.
  - Make it mandatory to report any suspicion arising from attempted transactions.
  - Consider amending the definition of suspicious transactions to allow filing STRs with a lower degree of suspicion.
  - Make it mandatory for reporting institutions to notify the FIU, and not only the public ministry, when they suspend a transaction considered suspicious; clarify that all suspicious transactions should be reported to the same central authority.
- Recommendation 14:
  - Prohibit tipping-off the customer and any third party about a report being filed.
  - Revise system for mandatory suspension of all suspicious transactions to prevent alerting the customer; consider limiting suspension to exceptional cases such as “fear of flight of funds” and significant amounts.
- Recommendation 19:
  - Consider feasibility and utility of establishing a Cash Transaction Reports (CTR) system, taking into account resources and expected benefits; if adopted, set threshold in accordance with the economic context and average amounts of transaction types.
- Recommendation 25:
  - Supervisory and enforcement entities should provide feedback about suspicious transactions reported and guidelines on filing reports.

### Internal Controls, Compliance, Audit and Foreign Branches
- R.15 – [NC]
- R.22 – [NC]
- Require financial institutions to establish and maintain internal procedures, policies and controls covering CDD, record keeping, detection of unusual and suspicious transactions, and reporting obligations.
- Require development of compliance management arrangements, including appointment of an AML/CFT compliance officer at management level.
- Ensure AML/CFT compliance officer and appropriate staff have timely access to customer identification data, CDD information, transaction records and other relevant information.
- Require an adequately resourced and independent audit function to test compliance.
- Require ongoing employee training on AML/CFT laws, obligations, methods and trends.
- Require screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring employees.
- Require financial institutions to ensure foreign branches and subsidiaries observe AML/CFT measures consistent with home country requirements and FATF recommendations to the extent host country laws permit; where home and host minimum requirements differ, apply the higher standard to the extent permitted.
- Require informing home country supervisor when a foreign branch or subsidiary is unable to observe appropriate AML/CFT measures because prohibited by host country laws.

### Shell Banks
- R.18 – [NC]
- Cape Verde should not allow establishment or continued operation of shell banks.
- Amend Articles 12 and 44 of Law 12/2005 to ensure banks operating in Cape Verde have a physical presence (effective mind and management in Cape Verde) and are affiliated to a group subject to effective consolidated supervision.
- Prohibit financial institutions from entering into or continuing correspondent banking relationships with shell banks.
- Require financial institutions to satisfy themselves that respondent foreign institutions do not permit their accounts to be used by shell banks.

### Supervisory and Oversight System – Competent Authorities and SROs
- R.17 – [PC]
- R.23 – [NC]
- R.25 – [NC]
- R.29 – [PC]
- Amend Law 17/VI/2002 to ensure it covers all financial sector activities set out in the glossary to the FATF Recommendations.
- Establish uniform fit and proper criteria across all financial laws, applicable to shareholders, managers and directors; fully define “integrity” in each law.
- Amend Article 10 of Law 3/V/1996 to remove provision permitting licensees to issue bearer shares.
- Review regulatory arrangements for IFIs to bring them up to international standards and address identified weaknesses.
- BCV should undertake an AML/CFT risk assessment of financial institutions operating in Cape Verde and develop an appropriate regulatory and supervisory strategy.
- Recommendation 25: develop a comprehensive set of AML/CFT guidance for financial institutions.
- BCV, in coordination with the JP, should issue procedures, guidance and templates for filing STRs.
- Recommendation 29: widen BCV’s inspection powers in Law 12/2005 to be similar to powers in Law 3/V/1996; BCV should inspect branches of institutions operating in the domestic sector as well as IFIs.
- Update BCV inspection manual to include procedures and tools for AML supervision; provide BCV staff additional training on AML supervisory strategies and practices.
- Recommendation 17: give the BCV autonomy to impose administrative sanctions for breach of AML regulations; fully implement the AML Law including its sanctioning regime for any breach.
- Amend Law 17, 2002 to provide administrative sanctions for violations of all requirements of the law (currently breaches of Articles 18 and 21 lack corresponding penalty).

### Money Value Transfer Services
- SR.VI – [PC]

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### 3. Preventive Measures: Non-Financial Businesses and Professions

### Customer Due Diligence and Record-Keeping
- R.12 – [NC]
- Take necessary administrative and regulatory steps to implement the AML law with respect to DNFBPs and undertake outreach to these sectors.
- Expand scope of the AML law to include lawyers and accountants under the circumstances set out under Recommendation 12.
- Consider circumscribing preventive obligations of casinos and dealers in precious metals or stones to thresholds allowed by FATF Recommendation 12 and its Interpretative Note, or to lower thresholds according to risk evaluation.

### Suspicious Transaction Reporting
- R.16 – [NC]
- Require lawyers, notaries, solicitors and accountants to report suspicious transactions when they engage in activities described in FATF Recommendation 16.
- Expand the AML law to include notaries and registrars to allow filing of STRs under adequate protection against civil and criminal litigation when reporting in good faith.

### Regulation, Supervision, Monitoring, and Sanctions
- R.24 – [NC]
- R.25 – [NC]
- Recommendation 24:
  - Issue regulations by the ministry of finance to implement the law for DNFBPs, considering each sector’s characteristics.
  - Ministry of finance should carry out supervision of DNFBPs’ compliance with the AML law and be provided adequate training and resources.
  - Undertake risk assessments of DNFBP sectors to determine necessary supervision depth and characteristics, e.g., evaluate potential growth in CSP or casino markets and regulate accordingly.
- Recommendation 25:
  - Develop guidelines for DNFBPs on identifying suspicious operations in their activities and elevate awareness of ML/TF risks and regulatory obligations.

### Other Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions
- R.20 – [PC]
- Encourage development and use of modern and secure techniques for conducting financial transactions that create a disincentive for use of cash and are less vulnerable to ML.

*Source: _cr09114 - 1. Legal System and Related Institutional Measures*

### 4.   Legal Persons and Arrangements & Nonprofit Organizations

### 4.   Legal Persons and Arrangements & Nonprofit Organizations

### Legal Persons – Access to beneficial ownership and control information
- R.33 – [PC]
- Authorities should promote the interconnection of the registries offices in order to allow for comprehensive and effective public knowledge of the records on companies and legal persons and enhance the accessibility of the registered information.
- Authorities should collect, maintain and provide statistical data on:
  - the number of companies,
  - types of companies,
  - legal persons,
  - number of companies issuing shares and bearer shares,
  - extinction and liquidation of companies by public prosecutors.

### Legal Arrangements – Access to beneficial ownership and control information
- R.34 – [NA]

### Nonprofit organizations
- SR.VIII – [NC]
- Cape Verde should conduct a review of its NPO sector with the aim of verifying in depth, any vulnerability to the misuse of NPOs for TF and ML and institute the adequate measures to promote transparency, accountability and integrity in the management of NPOs.
- Measures recommended:
  - License or register NPOs.
  - Require NPOs to maintain records of transactions for a period of at least five years.
  - Designate domestic authorities charged with monitoring the activity of NPOs.
  - Put in place mechanisms to allow cooperation and exchange of information between domestic and international authorities regarding any forms of suspicious activities that may be linked to the financing of terrorism.

### National and International Cooperation
- National cooperation and coordination
  - R.31 – [LC]
  - Establish a national mechanism to ensure coordination and cooperation among agencies on AML/CFT issues.
  - The mandate and powers of the NCC set up under the Drugs Law could be extended for more effective focus on the implementation of the AML/CFT requirements.
- The Conventions and UN Special Resolutions
  - R.35 – [PC]
  - SR.I – [NC]
  - Authorities are encouraged to implement fully the provisions of the Vienna and the Palermo Conventions.
  - Implementation of the UN Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of terrorism should be a matter of priority.
  - Put in place procedures and mechanisms to implement UNSCRs 1267 and 1373.
- Mutual Legal Assistance
  - R.36 – [PC]; R.37 – [PC]; R.38 – [NC]; SR.V – [NC]
  - Laws and measures regarding freezing or confiscation of property related to ML and TF investigations should be strengthened to allow for expeditious response to foreign requests.
  - Consider setting up an Asset Forfeiture Fund and sharing of assets and property confiscated among countries which have participated, directly or indirectly, in the confiscation.
  - Extend powers of freezing, seizure and confiscation to assets related to financing of terrorism, which is not an autonomous offence in the legal system of Cape Verde.
- Extradition
  - R.39 – [PC]; R.37 – [PC]; SR.V – [NC]
  - Create expressly the financing of terrorism offense in accordance with the UN Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism Financing and consider this offense an extraditable one.
  - Ensure that even before financing of terrorism is criminalized, Cape Verde can extradite foreigners that have committed this offense in the requesting State.
  - Ensure nationals whose extradition has been requested for offenses committed abroad are subject to trial in Cape Verde in a manner comparable to similar domestic prosecutions for serious offenses.
- Other Forms of Cooperation
  - R.40 – [PC]; SR.V – [NC]
  - Develop cooperation mechanisms to facilitate competent authorities’ cooperation with other countries on ML and TF matters.
  - Implementation of the UN Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and relevant UNSCRs should allow cooperation possibilities on TF issues.
  - Develop channels for prompt exchange of information and conducting investigations on behalf of foreign counterparts.
  - Amend the law to allow cooperation among all Cape Verde competent authorities on matters related to ML.
  - Amend Laws 3/V/1996, 53/V/1998, and 52/F/1990 to provide clear gateways for supervisory cooperation.

### Other Issues — Resources & Statistics
- R.30 – [PC]; R.32 – [NC]
- Recommendation 30 — Training and resources
  - Need for more training of persons involved in the investigation of money laundering, particularly in the use of specialized investigative techniques.
  - The SCITE for the time being, and the future FIU, once it is created, require training on analysis of suspicious transactions, financial literacy and the production of financial intelligence.
  - BCV staff should receive additional training on AML supervisory strategies and practices.
  - Resources and training should be provided to customs officers for effective implementation of monitoring cross border movement of currency and bearer negotiable instruments.
  - The commercial registry should be capable of providing accurate and timely information on the status of registered legal persons, and the identity of their representatives, officers and beneficial owners.
- Recommendation 32 — Data collection and statistics
  - Establish a system of collecting data for cooperation and reviewing trends and the effectiveness of the system. Data should include information on prosecutions, convictions, penalties, freezing/seizing and confiscation.
  - Once the system for monitoring cross border movement of currency and bearer negotiable instruments is implemented, maintain records of amounts of cash and bearer negotiable instruments and identity data where:
    - a declaration exceeds the prescribed threshold,
    - there is a false declaration,
    - there is a suspicion of ML or financing of terrorism.
  - Collect and maintain statistics on the number of companies, types of companies, legal persons, number of companies issuing shares and bearer shares, and extinction and liquidation of companies by public prosecutors.
  - Maintain more detailed data to track progress and efficiency of investigations and prosecution related to ML and TF, and for analysis of trends in underlying criminality.
  - Establish a system for maintaining comprehensive statistics on mutual legal assistance regarding seizures, freezing and confiscation of assets, and extradition.

### Authorities’ Response
- IMF assessment and DAR
  - In 2007 the IMF undertook an assessment of the AML/CFT system in Cape Verde; results recorded in a DAR which has been ratified by the country authorities but had not been updated a little more than a year later to incorporate the latest AML/CFT developments.
- Actions and legislation
  - Cape Verde has ratified the main UN conventions on AML/CFT and approved Law No. 17/VI/2002 of December 16, 2002 which equips Cape Verde with a major AML/CFT framework.
  - Key efforts include the 2005 legislation on IFIs and BCV regulations to improve monitoring of banking and parabanking institutions.
  - Steps on combating financing of terrorism include adoption of international conventions, promulgation of the new Criminal Code, and publication of technical instructions by the BCV. Authorities recognize a need to further strengthen these actions, in particular through adoption of special legislation criminalizing the financing of terrorism.
- 2008–2009 priority actions (ad hoc commission plan)
  - Creation and establishment of a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), operational and preparing a formal request for membership of the Egmont Group.
  - Far-reaching reforms of Law No. 17/VI/2002 broadening its scope and aligning it with the provisions of the Palermo Convention (draft law examined by the Council of Ministers and submitted to the National Assembly).
  - Preparation of a Law criminalizing the Financing of Terrorism (draft law examined by the Council of Ministers and submitted to the National Assembly).
  - Review of the banking sector law (dating from 1996) to strengthen supervisory framework, harmonize banking secrecy requirements with exchange-of-information needs, and potentially unify prudential requirements (draft decree (dipoma) at an advanced stage; first version expected to be completed by end-December 2008).
  - Signing of memoranda of understanding between the BCV and foreign supervisors.
- Planned measures and assessments
  - Plans in 2009 to regulate the designated nonfinancial activities and professions [Actividades e Profissões Não Financeiras Designadas (APNFD)] and to review and strengthen BCV’s technical instructions for the banking sector, and to prepare technical instructions for the insurance sector and the capital market.
  - At the request of Cape Verde authorities, the IMF in November 2008 embarked upon the first phase of an assessment of the stability of the financial sector in Cape Verde (FSAP); the second phase to be concluded in January 2009. Implementation of FSAP recommendations should help strengthen the framework for monitoring and supervising the financial sector.

*Source: _cr09114 - 4.   Legal Persons and Arrangements & Nonprofit Organizations*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/_cr09114.pdf_
