## _cr09195 — Executive Summary

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---

### The Context
- Ireland entered the global financial turmoil with internal imbalances: overextension in construction and financial intermediation, loss of international competitiveness, rapid wage growth, and reliance on wholesale funding.
- Key policy priorities:
  - Restore healthy functionality of the financial sector.
  - Fiscal consolidation underpinned by rules and accountability to manage politically-sensitive trade-offs.
- Authorities’ actions taken or proposed:
  - Blanket guarantee to depositors and creditors.
  - Recapitalization of banks.
  - Access to ECB credit lines for liquidity.
  - Proposal to establish a National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) to separate good from bad assets—success contingent on a comprehensive and realistic assessment of impaired assets.
- Policy dilemma:
  - Financial support to banks adds to the fiscal burden.
  - Reducing fiscal deficits is needed for market credibility but deepens the economic contraction.
  - Expenditure reduction preferred to tax increases but must be prioritized to protect the vulnerable.

### The Economic Outlook
- Broad projection through 2010:
  - Cumulatively, GDP is projected to contract by 13½ percent through 2010.
- Growth and employment projections:
  - GDP declined by 2¼ percent in 2008.
  - Staff projects GDP will shrink by 8½ percent in 2009 and by a further 3 percent in 2010.
  - The Department of Finance projects a smaller contraction of 7¾ percent in 2009.
  - Private forecasters and the European Commission project a 2009 contraction of 9 percent.
  - Unemployment is expected to exceed 12 percent by end-2009 and reach 15½ percent in 2010.
- Potential growth and output gap:
  - Output was more than 7 percent above potential in mid-2007.
  - Staff estimates potential growth fell from a high of 6 percent a year at its peak to just under 3 percent a year when the crisis hit.
  - Staff projects potential growth to be pulled down further before rising back to the 2 percent range by 2014.
  - Authorities estimate potential growth at about 2½ percent and expect more bounce-back potential in 2011 and 2012.
- Inflation dynamics:
  - CPI-based inflation is projected to fall by more than 3 percent in 2009.
  - HICP-based inflation is projected to decline by 1½ percent in 2009 and by a ¼ percent in 2010.
  - Falling prices will aid competitiveness but raise real interest rates relative to the eurozone and may dampen the next cycle.
- Risks:
  - Systemic interaction among slowing growth, financial sector stress, and fiscal deterioration; larger-than-expected financial-sector distress could accelerate adverse feedbacks.
  - Vulnerability to global deleveraging, potential large losses from U.S. and U.K. exposures, and possible capital outflows as foreign banks retrench.

### Staff Appraisal (selected assessments)
- Euro membership provided safety: avoided currency pressures and benefited from ECB liquidity.
- Inability to use exchange-rate depreciation implies further wage reductions will be necessary to restore competitiveness.
- Authorities have acted with resolve; success depends on determined execution over several years, flexible policy instruments, and transparent benchmarks.

*Source: IMF staff report (Executive Summary).*

---

### Competitiveness and International Market Shares

### Key findings
- International market shares have declined with the rise in unit labor costs and fall in potential growth; decline evident since 2002 for Ireland’s major destinations.
- Services exports, particularly business services, performed better than goods but have begun to level off; short-run demand drops will weaken this source of growth.
- Weakening sterling versus the euro adversely affects Irish exports to the U.K. and third markets.
- Ireland has lost market share in global and eurozone FDI flows; Irish FDI shares have fallen faster.
- Ireland became the most expensive location in the eurozone, possibly excepting Luxembourg.
- Transformation toward high value-added production and services is ongoing but FDI flows are momentum-sensitive amid heightened competition.

### CGER assessment and macro balances
- CGER application indicates a competitiveness gap:
  - Actual real exchange rate is presently about 20 percent above its long-term average.
  - Equilibrium exchange rate (reflecting modest productivity gains) is about 5 percent above its long-term average.
  - Implied competitiveness gap: 15 percent.
- “Underlying” current account balance is calculated at about 4½ percent of GDP (as it was in 2008).
- Staff projects the current account deficit in 2014 at 1½ percent of GDP.
- Staff recommendation: use competition policy and the Competition Authority mandate to support price and wage adjustment.

---

### Financial Sector Stress, Exposures, and Interventions

### Financial vulnerabilities and exposures
- Domestic loan portfolio heavily concentrated in:
  - Residential mortgages, construction, real estate development, and commercial property.
- Residential mortgage servicing has held up but arrears are growing and will likely increase with rising unemployment.
- Some banks exposed to property and home mortgage lending in the U.K.
- Irish interest margins were low by international standards and pressured by declining lending rates.
- Profitability previously maintained through large lending volumes; reliance on wholesale funding increased as deposit growth did not keep up, reflected in a rise in the loan-to-deposit ratio.
- Market funding pressures compounded by lack of deposit growth during the downturn.
- Composition of private sector credit, December 2008 (In percent):
  - Construction: 5%
  - Residential Mortgages: 35%
  - Personal: 6%
  - Real Estate & Business Activities: 23%
  - Financial Intermediation: 19%
  - Other: 12%

### Government interventions, guarantees, and bank support
- Timeline and scale:
  - On September 30, 2008, following Lehman Brothers' failure, the government provided a blanket guarantee to depositors and creditors of six domestic banks.
    - The guarantee covered all retail and corporate deposits, interbank deposits, covered bonds (including asset covered securities), senior unsecured debt and dated subordinated debt.
    - The guarantee covered over 200 percent of Irish GDP.
  - Anglo Irish Bank was nationalized in January 2009.
  - On February 11, 2009, authorities announced the injection of €7.0 billion into Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Bank—totaling 4 percent of GDP.
  - April supplementary budget announced establishment of NAMA.
- Access to ECB facilities and capital injections helped banks obtain market funding; Central Bank advances show increased use of ECB facilities.

### Bank losses, NAMA design, and restructuring options
- Estimated losses:
  - Staff review suggests gross losses faced by banks through the end of 2010 could be about €35 billion, or about 20 percent of GDP.
- NAMA specifics:
  - NAMA is to purchase property-development assets with a book value of between €80 and €90 billion from guaranteed banks.
  - Total assets of the guaranteed banks are €440 billion.
  - Purchasing assets at less than book value will require further capital injections into some banks.
  - If well managed, NAMA's distressed assets could produce recovery value over time to offset initial fiscal outlays.
  - NAMA’s success is a precondition for a safe exit from the guarantee; poorly managed exits can be long-drawn and impair the financial sector and public finances.
- Price determination and risk-sharing:
  - Purchase prices determine extent of loss transfer to taxpayers.
  - Risk-sharing structures could include:
    - Sharing upside with bank shareholders if assets are sold at prices clearly lower than expected recovery value.
    - Government participation in upside of residual healthy banks.
  - Authorities open to refinements, including upfront risk-sharing and industry-wide levies or bank-specific ex post “claw back” provisions to recoup NAMA losses.
- Scope and flexibility advice:
  - NAMA legislation should not restrict focus solely to property-development loans; flexible authorization should permit dealing with other asset classes.
  - Piecemeal efforts could keep banks dependent on official support; broader legislative scope has merit.
- Nationalization:
  - Nationalization may be necessary for critically undercapitalized or insolvent banks and is complementary to NAMA.
  - Fund advice: “Insolvent institutions (with insufficient cash flows) should be closed, merged, or temporarily placed in public ownership until private sector solutions can be developed ...”
  - If nationalized, shareholders would be fully diluted; bad assets carved out and managed under NAMA; price discovery between government-owned entities could be less contentious and take longer.

### Financial-markets feedback and systemic risks
- Observed relationship:
  - As financial stocks fell relative to the overall market, sovereign bond spreads (over the German Bund) increased; especially acute in Ireland.
  - After nationalization of Anglo Irish in January 2009, financial stocks fell further and the spread on Irish sovereign bonds spiraled to about 250 basis points.
  - In recent weeks spreads moderated with easing global sentiment but remained elevated.
- Staff emphasis: financial sector vulnerability, public finances, and economic growth weaknesses could reinforce each other.

---

### NAMA: Pricing, Risk-Sharing, Design Flexibility, and Nationalization Option

### Pricing problem and risk-sharing
- Pricing distressed assets is complex and can delay transfers.
- Risk-sharing structures should be considered to:
  - Address pricing problems.
  - Create incentives for managing bad assets.
  - Guard against disproportionate taxpayer burden.

### Design and scope recommendations
- Incorporate flexibility in NAMA’s design.
- Initial focus on property-development loans may be appropriate, but legislative scope should allow inclusion of other asset classes as impairments evolve.
- Absent broader scope, banks may remain hobbled.

### Nationalization as option
- Temporary nationalization is the real option for economically insolvent banks.
- Under nationalization:
  - NAMA would continue managing bad assets.
  - Asset transfer pricing would become less contentious.
  - Nationalization could lead to mergers and sectoral restructuring.
- Safeguards if nationalization used:
  - Banks operated transparently on commercial objectives.
  - Subject to same capital requirements and supervisory oversight as private banks.
  - Clear exit strategy to return banks to private operation.

### Crisis prevention and supervisory measures
- Measures should follow evolving EU guidelines but be tailored domestically.
- Recommend a broader toolkit for speedy resolution, enhancements to deposit protection, intensified surveillance beyond the six guaranteed banks, safeguards against related-party lending, and continued development of macro-prudential supervision.

---

### Achieving Fiscal Credibility and Consolidation Strategy

### Fiscal position and near-term risks
- Fiscal consolidation has begun but requires sustained effort and political commitment.
- Given the collapse of revenues, the 2009 deficit could reach 12 percent of GDP.
- Structural deficit reached 12½ percent of GDP in 2008.
- Some revenues set aside in the National Pensions Reserve Fund (NPRF); NPRF being used for bank recapitalization.

### Consolidation timelines and projections
- Announced measures:
  - Revenue measures of about 1 percent of GDP in the October 2008 budget (bulk from a levy on personal incomes).
  - Expenditure savings of a further 1 percent of GDP announced in February 2009 (pension levy for public sector workers).
  - Supplementary budget unveiled on April 7 (Text Table 2).
- Authorities project deficits of 10¾ percent of GDP in 2009 and 2010, with a goal of reaching below 3 percent of GDP by 2013.
- Staff projects:
  - deficits of 11¾ percent of GDP in 2009 and 12¾ percent in 2010.
  - staff’s baseline deficit in 2013 would be 4 percent of GDP versus authorities’ target of 2½ percent of GDP.
  - a further plausible consolidation in 2014 would bring the deficit to 1½ percent of GDP.
- Over 2009-14, staff’s baseline implies:
  - primary expenditures reduced by 9½ percent of GDP;
  - revenue measures of about 3¾ percent of GDP offset further declines in property-related taxes;
  - overall revenues raised by about 2½ percent of GDP.
- Public debt projections:
  - staff consolidation path would stabilize public debt at over 80 percent of GDP by 2014;
  - authorities’ target: 77 percent of GDP by 2013.
- Financial support to banks implications:
  - If bank losses are about 20 percent of GDP (staff estimate), bank recapitalization needs could be around 12-15 percent of GDP; gross public debt could rise by about that much.

### Near-term financing and liquidity
- Financing needs projected at about €25 billion for 2009 and €22 billion for 2010.
- Issued bonds of about €12 billion since the start of the year.
- Authorities currently hold about €25 billion in cash balances plus about €15 billion in liquid assets in the NPRF.
- Authorities have used some NPRF resources for bank recapitalization.
- Through the guarantee, authorities will support rollover of banks’ short-term debt.

### April 2009 Supplementary Budget — Key Measures (Text Table 2 as presented)
- Revenue Tax: 1,007 0.6
- Personal income tax: 754 0.4
- VAT: -20.0
- Capital gains tax: 300.0
- Capital acquisitions tax: 310.0
- Stamp duties: 110 0.1
- Excise duties: 840.0
- Social contributions: 799 0.5
- Gross revenue yield: 1,806 1.1
- Negative impact of measures on activity: -577 -0.3
- Net revenue yield: 1,229 0.7
- Current expenditure: -886 -0.5
- Capital expenditure: -576 -0.3
- Total impact on fiscal balance: 2,691 1.6

### Consolidation priorities and policy recommendations
- International evidence suggests fiscal adjustment should focus on expenditure cuts.
- Recommended focus areas:
  - Current expenditure cuts over the medium term.
  - Better targeting of social welfare: move from universalism toward means testing or taxation of child benefits; consider earned income tax credits; index benefits to appropriate price baskets; consider nuanced minimum wage structure with age-related differentials.
  - Further reductions in public service wage bill likely necessary despite earlier measures:
    - An effective wage reduction of 7.5 percent was undertaken earlier via the pension levy; wage freeze in effect through 2010.
    - Public sector pay premium noted: in 2006, Economic and Social Research Institute concluded public sector pay premium was above 20 percent.
  - Review public service employment and scope/cost-effectiveness of government provision; greater efforts to obtain value for money.
  - Tax-side: broaden the base; limit tax reliefs (e.g., on mortgage interest); introduce property taxation (administrative challenges acknowledged); scope for raising social security contributions (noting impact on tax wedge); limits to raising VAT given already high rates.
  - Institutional support: use Commission on Taxation and Special Group of Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programs; consider a fiscal rule/statutory commitment to a medium-term objective close to structural balance; support with a medium-term expenditure framework and transparency mechanisms.

### Staff appraisal and risks
- Assessment:
  - The Irish economy is undergoing an unprecedented economic correction, with stress exceeding that of any other advanced economy and comparable to the most severe post-World War II episodes.
  - Banks face extensive losses and double-digit fiscal deficits over the next three years will imply a run-up in public debt.
  - Short-term dislocations coincide with a sharp decline in potential growth, implying a modest pace of recovery.
- Risks:
  - Significant downside risks; globally synchronized financial crises could deepen and prolong the downturn.
- Requirements:
  - Determined execution, clear communication, contingency planning, and transparent benchmarks will be needed given the formidable challenge and political sensitivities.

---

### Debt Outlook, Baseline Projections, and Scenarios

### Baseline public debt path (gross debt, percent of GDP)
- 2004: 29.4
- 2005: 27.3
- 2006: 24.7
- 2007: 24.8
- 2008: 43.2
- 2009: 59.9
- 2010: 75.0
- 2011: 83.7
- 2012: 86.0
- 2013: 84.8
- 2014: 82.2

### Change in public sector debt (percent of GDP)
- 2004: -1.6
- 2005: -2.2
- 2006: -2.6
- 2007: 0.1
- 2008: 18.5
- 2009: 16.7
- 2010: 15.1
- 2011: 8.7
- 2012: 2.3
- 2013: -1.1
- 2014: -2.7

### Gross financing need under baseline (percent of GDP)
- 2004: -1.4
- 2005: -1.5
- 2006: -2.9
- 2007: -0.2
- 2008: 7.1
- 2009: 11.8
- 2010: 12.7
- 2011: 9.4
- 2012: 6.7
- 2013: 3.9
- 2014: 1.4

### Baseline worst-case and alternative scenarios
- Worst-case "no policy change" (constant primary balance) scenario: debt ratio rises to 114 percent in 2014.
- No policy change public sector debt (percent of GDP) path:
  - 2009: 59.9; 2010: 74.8; 2011: 87.1; 2012: 96.1; 2013: 104.6; 2014: 114.2.
- Scenario with key variables at historical averages path (percent of GDP):
  - 2009: 59.9; 2010: 55.2; 2011: 50.8; 2012: 44.5; 2013: 38.6; 2014: 33.9.

### Fiscal balance and debt-creating flows (selected)
- Primary deficit (percent of GDP):
  - 2008: 6.1
  - 2009: 9.8
  - 2010: 10.0
  - 2011: 6.2
  - 2012: 3.1
  - 2013: 0.2
  - 2014: -2.3
- Revenue and grants (percent of GDP) series includes:
  - 2008: 32.9; 2009: 32.9; 2010: 32.7; 2011: 34.9; 2012: 35.2; 2013: 35.4; 2014: 35.4
- Primary (noninterest) expenditure (percent of GDP) series includes:
  - 2008: 39.0; 2009: 42.6; 2010: 42.6; 2011: 41.1; 2012: 38.3; 2013: 35.6; 2014: 33.1

### Key macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions underlying baseline
- Real GDP growth (percent): 2008: -2.3; 2009: -8.5; 2010: -3.0; 2011: 1.0; 2012: 2.3; 2013: 2.6; 2014: 2.6
- Average nominal interest rate on public debt (percent): 2009: 4.3; 2010: 4.4; 2011–2014: 4.4
- Average real interest rate (percent): 2009: 6.0; 2010: 5.4; 2011: 4.4; 2012: 4.3; 2013: 3.8; 2014: 3.5
- Inflation rate (GDP deflator, percent): 2008: -0.3; 2009: -1.7; 2010: -1.0; 2011: 0.0; 2012: 0.2; 2013: 0.7; 2014: 0.9

### External sustainability
- Net external position (excluding direct investment) was in balance in 2007; external debt sustainability does not seem to be an issue.
- Net external position including direct investment is in a moderate deficit given strong FDI inflows in the prior decade.
- Inward foreign direct investment earned about 21 percent on average during 2000-07.

---

### Balance of Payments Data and Surveillance Indicators

### Data compilation
- Quarterly balance of payments data compiled by the Central Statistics Office based on surveys and administrative data; aligned with BPM5.
- Historical data coverage from 1998 onward.
- Some discrepancies remain between national accounts and balance of payments exports/imports.

### Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance (as of May 6, 2009) — selected entries and dates
- Exchange Rates: Date of Latest Observation: 5/6/09; Frequency: D
- International Reserve Assets and Reserve Liabilities: Date of Latest Observation: March 2009; Frequency: M
- Reserve/Base Money: Date of Latest Observation: March 2009; Frequency: M
- Broad Money: Date of Latest Observation: March 2009; Frequency: M
- Central Bank Balance Sheet: Date of Latest Observation: March 2009; Frequency: M
- Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Banking System: Date of Latest Observation: March 2009; Frequency: M
- Interest Rates: Date of Latest Observation: 5/6/09; Frequency: D
- Consumer Price Index: Date of Latest Observation: March 2009; Frequency: M
- Revenue, Expenditure, Balance and Composition of Financing – General Government: Date of Latest Observation: 2008; Frequency: A
- GDP/GNP: Date of Latest Observation: Q4, 2008; Frequency: Q
- Gross External Debt: Date of Latest Observation: Q4, 2008; Frequency: Q

---

### Public Information Notice — Executive Board Conclusions (June 24, 2009)

### Executive Board summary of findings and recommendations
- Event: IMF Executive Board concluded the 2009 Article IV consultation with Ireland on June 15, 2009.
- Background findings:
  - Property bubble driven by easy credit; banks’ exposure to property lending soared; reliance on wholesale funding intensified.
  - Wages rose rapidly and international competitiveness was compromised.
  - 2007 GDP growth was 6 percent; growth decelerated in 2008 and further in 2009 after Lehman Brothers' failure.
  - Banking system stress concentrated in property development; wholesale funding tightened; bank stock prices fell sharply relative to overall index.
  - Fiscal position: general government deficit was 7 percent of GDP in 2008; structural deficit estimated at 12½ percent of GDP in 2008; gross public debt reached 43 percent of GDP.
- Executive Board assessment and recommendations:
  - Priorities: restore financial-sector health, ensure public finance sustainability, and enhance external competitiveness and medium-term growth potential.
  - Commended speed and scale of authorities’ response; noted need for sustained efforts over an extended period.
  - Financial sector recommendations:
    - Support restructuring efforts, including establishment of NAMA.
    - Emphasize adequate design and timely implementation of NAMA; consider risk-sharing structures for pricing distressed assets.
    - Give NAMA legal and operational flexibility to address all classes of distressed bank assets.
    - Consider restructuring options including greater equity interest by the government.
    - Strengthen supervisory framework with macro-prudential supervision blending systemic stability and stress management.
    - Intensify bank-by-bank surveillance beyond guaranteed banks and strengthen safeguards against related-party exposures.
    - Rigorous assessments of banks’ capital adequacy and strengthened home-host supervisory cooperation.
    - A special resolution regime would facilitate quicker, less disruptive resolutions.
  - Fiscal recommendations:
    - Welcome fiscal measures taken, including significant public sector wage cuts, and ambitious medium-term consolidation plans.
    - Large structural deficit, rising public debt, and fiscal burden from bank support require sustained adjustment over several years.
    - Emphasize consolidation composition, focus on expenditure reduction, possibly further public sector wage bill reduction.
    - Some Directors cautioned consolidation should not undermine efforts to arrest the downturn.
    - Recommend institutional framework: appropriate fiscal rule and medium-term expenditure plan detailing measures over full horizon.
    - Emphasize better targeting of benefits for the vulnerable, broadening the tax base without harming competitiveness restoration, and further pension reform.
    - A few Directors expressed concern about using NPRF resources for bank recapitalization.
  - Growth and competitiveness:
    - Growth hinges on restoring international competitiveness and reorienting toward high-productivity activities.
    - No nominal exchange rate adjustment scope; flexible product and labor markets are an asset.
    - Welcome authorities’ commitment to restore wage cost competitiveness and plans on infrastructure and R&D investment.
    - A few Directors cautioned that falling nominal wages could impair domestic demand and accelerate deflation.

### Ireland: Selected Economic Indicators (annual unless noted) — selected entries
- Real GDP (change in percent): 2007: 6.0; 2008: -2.3
- Unemployment rate (percent): 2007: 4.5; 2008: 6.1
- General government balance (percent of GDP): 2007: 0.2; 2008: -7.1
- Structural balance (percent of potential GDP): 2008: -12.5
- General government debt (percent of GDP): 2008: 43.2
- Real GDP growth (selected series): 2003: 4.5; 2004: 4.7; 2005: 6.4; 2006: 5.7
- HICP (percent): 2008: 3.1
- Current account (percent of GDP): 2008: -4.5
- Nominal and real effective rates: Nominal effective rate (1999Q1=100): 2008: 113.0; Real effective rate (CPI based, 1999Q1=100): 2008: 125.5

*International Monetary Fund — Public Information Notice No. 09/79 (June 24, 2009).*

---

*Source: IMF staff report content provided in the unit titled “_cr09195”.*

### Executive Summary

### _cr09195 - Executive Summary

### The Context
- Ireland entered the global financial turmoil with serious internal imbalances: overextension in construction and financial intermediation, loss of international competitiveness, rapid wage growth, and reliance on wholesale funding.
- Key policy priorities identified:
  - Decisive efforts to restore healthy functionality of the financial sector.
  - Fiscal consolidation underpinned by a structure of rules and accountability to manage politically-sensitive trade-offs.
- Authorities’ actions already taken or proposed:
  - Blanket guarantee to depositors and creditors.
  - Recapitalization of banks.
  - Access to ECB credit lines for liquidity.
  - Proposal to establish a National Asset Management Agency to separate good from bad assets—success contingent on a comprehensive and realistic assessment of impaired assets.
- Policy dilemma emphasized:
  - Financial support to banks adds to the fiscal burden.
  - Reducing fiscal deficits is needed for market credibility but deepens the economic contraction.
  - Expenditure reduction is preferred to tax increases but must be carefully prioritized to protect the vulnerable.

### The Economic Outlook

HICP- and CPI-based inflation and labor market developments are central to adjustment and competitiveness.

- Broad projection through 2010:
  - Cumulatively, GDP is projected to contract by 13½ percent through 2010, the largest among advanced economies.
- Growth and employment projections:
  - GDP declined by 2¼ percent in 2008.
  - Staff projects GDP will shrink by 8½ percent in 2009 and by a further 3 percent in 2010.
  - The Department of Finance projects a smaller contraction of 7¾ percent in 2009.
  - Private forecasters and the European Commission project a 2009 contraction of 9 percent.
  - Unemployment is expected to exceed 12 percent by end-2009 and reach 15½ percent in 2010.
  - Some discouraged workers will exit the labor force; employment and wage declines will depress consumption.
- Risks highlighted:
  - Significant systemic interaction among slowing growth, financial sector stress, and fiscal deterioration; larger-than-expected financial-sector distress could accelerate adverse feedbacks.
  - Vulnerability to global deleveraging, including potential large losses from U.S. and U.K. exposures and possible capital outflows as foreign banks retrench.
- Output gap and potential growth:
  - Irish output was more than 7 percent above potential in mid-2007.
  - Staff estimates potential growth fell from a high of 6 percent a year at its peak to just under 3 percent a year when the crisis hit.
  - Staff projects potential growth to be pulled down further in the immediate future before rising back to the 2 percent range by the close of the projection period in 2014.
  - Authorities estimate potential growth at about 2½ percent and expect more bounce-back potential in 2011 and 2012.
- Inflation dynamics:
  - CPI-based inflation is projected to fall by more than 3 percent in 2009.
  - HICP-based inflation is projected to decline by 1½ percent in 2009.
  - Staff expects HICP-based inflation to decline further by a ¼ percent in 2010.
  - Falling prices will aid competitiveness but raise real interest rates relative to the eurozone and may dampen the next cycle.

### Managing Financial Sector Stress
- Rapid bank restructuring is critical to reestablishing a healthy financial sector.
- Measures taken and proposed:
  - Blanket guarantee to depositors and creditors.
  - Recapitalization of banks.
  - ECB credit lines have provided valuable liquidity.
  - Proposed National Asset Management Agency to separate good from bad assets; success requires comprehensive and realistic assessment of impaired assets.
  - Authorities are advancing supportive regulatory and supervisory measures to manage current stress and lower future crisis risk.
- Policy emphasis:
  - Timely and comprehensive assessment of bank losses and impaired assets.
  - Swift restructuring and resolution measures to avoid prolonged financial-sector distress that would hinder recovery.

### Achieving Fiscal Credibility
- Fiscal position and near-term risks:
  - Fiscal consolidation has begun but requires sustained effort and political commitment.
  - Given the collapse of revenues, the 2009 deficit could reach 12 percent of GDP.
- Consolidation priorities:
  - Address sensitive expenditures, including the public wage bill and the scope of social welfare programs.
  - Tie consolidation to monitorable goals to enhance credibility.
  - Adopt a structure of rules and accountability to enable politically-sensitive trade-offs and to anchor multi-year consolidation.
- Trade-offs noted:
  - Fiscal support for banks increases public debt and fiscal vulnerabilities.
  - Deep consolidation is needed for market credibility but will deepen the economic contraction unless well-sequenced and prioritized.

### Staff Appraisal (selected assessments)
- Ireland’s membership in the eurozone has provided safety: avoided currency pressures and benefited from ECB liquidity.
- However, inability to use exchange-rate depreciation means further wage reductions will be necessary to restore competitiveness.
- The authorities have acted with resolve, but success depends on determined execution over several years, robust policy instruments providing flexibility, and transparent benchmarks to maintain discipline.

*Source: IMF staff report (Executive Summary).*

### 14.      International market shares have fallen sharply. Following several years of

### 14.      International market shares have fallen sharply. Following several years of

### Competitiveness and international market shares
- Ireland’s international market shares have declined with the rise in unit labor costs and fall in potential growth; this decline is evident since 2002 for all of Ireland’s major market destinations.
- Irish exports of services, particularly business services, have done better than exports of goods, but they have begun to level off; with the likely drop in demand in the short-run, another source of growth will weaken.
- The recent weakening of the sterling against the euro is perceived by the private sector and the authorities to have an adverse impact on Irish exports not just to the U.K. market but also in third markets.
- Ireland has lost market share in the global and eurozone flows of FDI; FDI inflows into the eurozone have tended to fall as a share of world FDI flows, and Irish FDI shares have fallen faster.
- In recent years, Ireland has become the most expensive location in the eurozone, with the possible exception of Luxembourg.
- The transformation from low-cost manufacturing to high value-added production and services is ongoing, but research shows FDI flows are highly influenced by recent momentum—heightened global competition for FDI makes Ireland’s task harder.

### CGER assessment and macro balances
- An application of the CGER methodology indicates Ireland faces a significant competitive disadvantage:
  - The actual real exchange rate is presently about 20 percent above its long-term average.
  - The equilibrium exchange rate (reflecting modest productivity gains) is about 5 percent above its long-term average.
  - This implies a competitiveness gap of 15 percent.
- The CGER-type measures are sensitive to estimates of the “underlying” current account balance and the elasticity of adjustment to the real effective exchange rate.
  - The “underlying” current account balance is calculated to be about 4½ percent of GDP (as it was in 2008).
- The authorities view recent nominal wage cuts as reflecting Irish labor market flexibility and a potential to recover competitiveness; staff agreed that sustained recent wage and price trends would improve competitiveness.
- Staff projection: the current account deficit in 2014 is projected at 1½ percent of GDP, significantly lower than the present “underlying” deficit, though higher than near balance expected in the short term because of severe demand compression.
- Staff recommendation: use competition policy and the mandate of the Competition Authority to support the process of price and wage adjustment.

### Financial sector stress: vulnerabilities and exposures
- Key features central to financial strains:
  - The domestic loan portfolio is heavily concentrated in residential mortgages, construction, real estate development, and commercial property; the sharp correction in property prices lies at the heart of bank losses.
  - Residential mortgage servicing has held up, but arrears have been growing and will likely increase as the unemployment rate rises.
  - Some Irish banks are exposed to risks from substantial property and home mortgage lending in the U.K.
  - Irish interest margins were low by international standards; margins have been under further pressure with the sharp decline in lending rates (especially for variable-rate mortgages).
  - In the past, profitability was maintained through large lending volumes; reliance on wholesale funding increased when domestic deposit growth did not keep up with lending targets, reflected in a rise of the loan-to-deposit ratio.
  - Market funding pressures have been compounded by lack of growth in deposits during the recent downturn.
- Composition of private sector credit, December 2008 (In percent):
  - Construction: 5%
  - Residential Mortgages: 35%
  - Personal: 6%
  - Real Estate & Business Activities: 23%
  - Financial Intermediation: 19%
  - Other: 12%

### Government interventions, guarantees, and bank support
- Timeline and scale:
  - On September 30, 2008, following the failure of Lehman Brothers, the government provided a blanket guarantee to the depositors and creditors of six domestic banks.
    - The guarantee covered all retail and corporate deposits, interbank deposits, covered bonds (including asset covered securities), senior unsecured debt and dated subordinated debt.
    - The guarantee covered over 200 percent of Irish GDP.
  - Anglo Irish Bank was nationalized in January 2009.
  - On February 11, 2009, the authorities announced the injection of €7.0 billion into the two largest banks—Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Bank—totaling 4 percent of GDP.
  - The authorities announced in the April supplementary budget the establishment of the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA).
- Access to ECB facilities and capital injections helped banks obtain market funding; advances from the Central Bank show increased use of ECB facilities in recent months.

### Bank losses, NAMA design, and restructuring options
- Estimated losses:
  - Staff’s review suggests gross losses faced by banks through the end of 2010 could be about €35 billion, or about 20 percent of GDP.
  - The authorities had not formally produced an aggregate estimate; they focused on restructuring property-development loans.
- NAMA specifics and implications:
  - NAMA is to purchase property-development assets with a book value of between €80 and €90 billion from banks supported by the government’s guarantee.
  - The total assets of the guaranteed banks are €440 billion.
  - Because assets will be purchased at less than book value, resulting losses will require further capital injections into some banks.
  - If well managed, distressed assets acquired by NAMA could produce a recovery value over time to compensate for initial fiscal outlays.
  - NAMA’s success is a precondition for a safe exit from the guarantee to creditors and depositors; poorly managed exits can be long-drawn and impair financial sector, public finances, and economic growth.
- Price determination, risk-sharing, and recoupment:
  - Prices at which assets are purchased will determine the extent to which bank losses are transferred to the taxpayer.
  - Risk-sharing structures could be explored:
    - If assets are sold at prices clearly lower than expected eventual recovery value, bank shareholders could be given a share in the upside.
    - The government could be given an opportunity to participate in the upside of the residual healthy bank.
  - Authorities remain open to refinements, including upfront risk-sharing structures.
  - Authorities are considering an industry-wide levy to recoup any losses suffered by NAMA; public discussion has included a bank-specific ex post “claw back” provision.
- Scope and flexibility:
  - Staff advised NAMA legislation should not restrict focus solely to property-development loans; a full scoping of likely distress and a flexible legislative authorization should permit NAMA to deal with further deterioration in bank balance sheets and other asset classes as the economy contracts and unemployment rises.
  - Authorities acknowledged that piecemeal efforts could keep banks dependent on official support and unable to resume normal functioning; they saw merit in legislative scope encompassing a broader range of loan types.
- Nationalization:
  - Staff noted nationalization could become necessary for critically undercapitalized or insolvent banks and should be seen as complementary to NAMA.
  - Recent Fund advice: “Insolvent institutions (with insufficient cash flows) should be closed, merged, or temporarily placed in public ownership until private sector solutions can be developed ... there have been numerous instances (for example, Japan, Sweden and the United States), where a period of public ownership has been used to cleanse balance sheets and pave the way to sales back to the private sector.”
  - If nationalized, shareholders would be fully diluted to protect the taxpayer; bad assets would be carved out and managed under the NAMA structure; price discovery between government-owned entities could be less contentious and take longer.

### Financial-markets feedback and systemic risks
- Relationship observed:
  - As financial stocks fell relative to the overall market, sovereign bond spreads (over the German Bund) increased; this relationship was especially acute in Ireland.
  - The relationship intensified after the nationalization of Anglo Irish in January 2009 when financial stocks fell further and the spread on Irish sovereign bonds spiraled to about 250 basis points.
  - In recent weeks, Irish sovereign spreads moderated with easing global sentiment but remained at elevated levels.
- Staff emphasized that financial sector vulnerability, public finances, and economic growth weaknesses could reinforce each other.

*Source: IMF staff report content provided in the unit titled "14.      International market shares have fallen sharply. Following several years of".*

### 26.      The authorities prefer that banks stay partly in private ownership to provide

### _cr09195 - 26.      The authorities prefer that banks stay partly in private ownership to provide

### Nationalization versus Private Ownership
- Authorities prefer banks remain partly in private ownership to provide continued market pricing of underlying assets.
- Authorities disagreed with staff’s view that pricing of bad assets would be easier under nationalization.
- Authorities concerned nationalization may generate negative sentiment with implications for operational integrity of banks.
- Staff position: nationalization would need:
  - a clear commitment to operate banks in a transparent manner on a commercial basis;
  - nationalized banks to be subject to the same capital requirements and supervisory oversight as non-nationalized banks;
  - a clear exit strategy to return banks to private operation.
- Authorities’ response to staff query regarding NAMA acquisition of “good” property-development assets: markets needed reassurance that this asset class was fully dealt with.

### Supporting Measures: Bank Resolution and Supervision
- Two broad categories of supportive crisis-prevention measures:
  - (a) a framework for bank resolution;
  - (b) enhancements to supervision.
- Special resolution tools and practices discussed:
  - Use of court-supervised insolvency proceedings for insolvent banks; special legislation used to nationalize Anglo Irish Bank (with government compensation to shareholders following a valuation assessment, if needed).
  - Exploration of a special bank resolution regime allowing quick transfer of assets and deposits (purchase-and-assumption) or establishment of a bridge bank.
  - Experience with Northern Rock led the U.K. to adopt a special resolution regime; enhanced deposit protection under EU guidelines would strengthen the safety net.
- Supervisory and regulatory initiatives underway:
  - Substantial staff additions to intensify bank-by-bank surveillance for systemic risks.
  - Establishment of a macro-prudential supervisory process blending systemic stability with stress management of individual institutions, in line with the de Larosière report.
  - Need for investment in early warning systems and identification of systemic risks, plus precautionary actions.
  - Safeguards to limit risks of related-party lending: requirement for disclosure of related-party exposures; suggested safeguards include lowering applicable limits, specifying non-favorable terms, and strict approval procedures.

### Achieving Fiscal Credibility: Overview and Context
- Pre-crisis structural weaknesses in public finances: lowered personal income tax rates and rapid expenditure growth (about the highest pace among OECD economies).
- Structural deficit reached 12½ percent of GDP in 2008 (Box 3).
- Some revenues set aside in the National Pensions Reserve Fund (NPRF); NPRF being used for bank recapitalization, diluting its role for long-term aging-population obligations.
- Regaining credible control over public finances requires multi-year steady consolidation, scaling back government activities, improving efficiency, and broadening the tax base while limiting impact on unit labor costs.

### Consolidation Objectives, Staff and Authorities’ Projections
- Timeline of measures:
  - Revenue measures of about 1 percent of GDP announced with original 2009 budget in October 2008 (bulk from a levy on personal incomes).
  - Expenditure savings of a further 1 percent of GDP announced in February 2009 (pension levy for public sector workers).
  - Supplementary budget unveiled on April 7 (Text Table 2).
- Authorities project deficits of 10¾ percent of GDP in 2009 and 2010, with a goal of reaching below 3 percent of GDP by 2013.
- Staff projects:
  - deficits of 11¾ percent of GDP in 2009 and 12¾ percent in 2010.
  - staff’s baseline deficit in 2013 would be 4 percent of GDP versus authorities’ target of 2½ percent of GDP in that year.
  - a further plausible consolidation in 2014 would bring the deficit to 1½ percent of GDP.
- Over 2009-14, staff’s baseline implies:
  - primary expenditures reduced by 9½ percent of GDP;
  - revenue measures of about 3¾ percent of GDP offset further declines in property-related taxes;
  - overall revenues raised by about 2½ percent of GDP.
- Public debt projections:
  - staff consolidation path would stabilize public debt at over 80 percent of GDP by 2014;
  - authorities’ target: 77 percent of GDP by 2013.
- Financial support to banks and implications for debt:
  - If bank losses are about 20 percent of GDP (staff estimate), bank recapitalization needs could be around 12-15 percent of GDP; gross public debt could rise by about that much.
  - Authorities and staff agree assets would be acquired against this debt and the consolidation approach would remain largely the same.

### Near-Term Financing Needs and Liquidity
- Financing needs projected at about €25 billion for 2009 and €22 billion for 2010.
- Issued bonds of about €12 billion since the start of the year.
- Authorities currently hold about €25 billion in cash balances plus about €15 billion in liquid assets in the NPRF.
- Authorities have used some NPRF resources for bank recapitalization.
- Through their guarantee, authorities will support rollover of banks’ short-term debt.

### Text Table 2. April 2009 Supplementary Budget: Key Measures (as presented)
- Revenue Tax: 1,007 0.6
- Personal income tax: 754 0.4
- VAT: -20.0
- Capital gains tax: 300.0
- Capital acquisitions tax: 310.0
- Stamp duties: 110 0.1
- Excise duties: 840.0
- Social contributions: 799 0.5
- Gross revenue yield: 1,806 1.1
- Negative impact of measures on activity: -577 -0.3
- Net revenue yield: 1,229 0.7
- Current expenditure: -886 -0.5
- Capital expenditure: -576 -0.3
- Total impact on fiscal balance: 2,691 1.6
- Source: Department of Finance.

### Consolidation Strategies and Policy Recommendations
- International evidence: fiscal adjustment should focus on expenditure cuts; episodes focused on expenditure cuts (wage bill and social transfers) tend to be better sustained and have sometimes been expansionary.
- Recommended focus areas:
  - Current expenditure cuts over the medium term.
  - Better targeting of social welfare: move away from universalism toward means testing or taxation of child benefits; consider earned income tax credits; index benefits to more appropriate price baskets; consider nuanced minimum wage structure with age-related differentials.
  - Further reductions in public service wage bill likely necessary despite recent measures:
    - An effective wage reduction of 7.5 percent was undertaken earlier via the pension levy; wage freeze in effect through 2010.
    - Public sector pay premium noted: in 2006, Economic and Social Research Institute concluded public sector pay premium was above 20 percent.
  - Review public service employment and evaluate scope/cost-effectiveness of government provision; greater efforts to obtain value for money.
  - Tax-side: broaden the base; limit tax reliefs (e.g., on mortgage interest); introduce property taxation (administrative challenges acknowledged); scope for raising social security contributions (noting impact on tax wedge); limits to raising VAT given already high rates.
  - Institutional support: use Commission on Taxation and Special Group of Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programs; consider a fiscal rule/statutory commitment to a medium-term objective close to structural balance; support with a medium-term expenditure framework and transparency mechanisms to review objectives.

### Staff Appraisal and Risks
- Assessment:
  - The Irish economy is undergoing an unprecedented economic correction, with stress exceeding that of any other advanced economy and comparable to the most severe post-World War II episodes.
  - Banks face extensive losses and double-digit fiscal deficits over the next three years will imply a run-up in public debt.
  - Short-term dislocations coincide with a sharp decline in potential growth, implying a modest pace of recovery.
- Risks:
  - Significant downside risks remain; financial crises generate deeper and more prolonged downturns, especially if globally synchronized.
  - Adverse global economic and financial events would be disruptive in a weakened Irish economy.
- Commendation and requirements:
  - Authorities have moved in the right direction on two fronts: proposed establishment of NAMA and a multi-year plan to contain the fiscal deficit.
  - Determined execution, clear communication of objectives, contingency planning, and transparent benchmarks will be needed given the formidable challenge and political sensitivities.

*Sources: Central Statistical Office; Department of Finance; and IMF staff calculations.*

### 47.      With regard to NAMA, risk-sharing structures should be considered to address

### _cr09195 - 47.      With regard to NAMA, risk-sharing structures should be considered to address

### NAMA: pricing problem and risk-sharing
- The pricing of distressed assets is complex and can slow down the transfer of assets from the troubled bank.
- Risk-sharing structures should be considered to:
  - Address the well-known pricing problem.
  - Create better incentives for managing the bad assets.
  - Guard against the risk that the taxpayer does not bear a disproportionate burden of the costs cleaning up the banks.

### Flexibility in NAMA’s design and scope
- It is particularly important to incorporate flexibility in NAMA’s design.
- Initial focus:
  - An early focus on removing property-development loans from the financial system may be appropriate.
- Future scope:
  - The economic downturn will cause impairment of other asset classes as the latest trends are already indicating.
  - The option of relieving banks of those additional assets within a year or so will continue the process of “cleaning” up the banks.
  - Absent that option, banks may remain hobbled.

### Nationalization as an option for economically insolvent banks
- Where a bank has been rendered economically insolvent, the only real option would be its temporary nationalization.
- Under nationalization:
  - NAMA would continue to act in its capacity as an agency managing bad assets.
  - Prices at which these assets are transferred would become less of an issue.
  - Nationalization could be used as a step towards mergers and sectoral restructuring.
- Necessary safeguards if nationalization is used:
  - Banks must be operated transparently, with commercial objectives.
  - They should receive the same regulatory and supervisory treatment as private banks.
  - A clear exit strategy to return the banks to private operation would be needed.

### Crisis prevention and supervisory measures (supporting NAMA and immediate tasks)
- Measures should be guided by evolving European Union guidelines but tailored to domestic circumstances.
- Recommended measures:
  - A broader tool kit would allow for more speedy resolution of banks. This would be supported by the authorities’ ongoing enhancements of the deposit protection program.
  - Supervisory challenges include:
    - Intensification of surveillance for systemic risks beyond the six guaranteed banks.
    - Further safeguards against related-party lending.
    - Continued development of a macro-prudential regulatory and supervisory process.

### Fiscal consolidation: stance and guidance
- The authorities have laid out an ambitious fiscal consolidation plan.
- While the initial reliance on increases in personal income tax rates was appropriate to minimize the contractionary effect of the consolidation, a greater focus on reductions in current expenditure will be needed in the coming years.
- Steps/principles to sustain execution of planned fiscal consolidation:
  - More targeting of the vulnerable (as proposed for child benefits) and greater reliance on incentives for efficient use of public resources.
  - Further ratcheting down of the public pay structure and employment levels.
  - Broadening the tax base.
  - A fiscal rule, backed by a medium-term expenditure plan that details the intended measures over the full horizon.

### Institutional timing
- It is proposed that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard 12-month cycle.

*Source: _cr09195 - 47.      With regard to NAMA, risk-sharing structures should be considered to address*

### 1.      General government gross debt is set to rise sharply over the medium term as a result

### 1.      General government gross debt is set to rise sharply over the medium term as a result of the deterioration of the fiscal position

### Debt outlook and baseline projections
- Baseline projection: gross debt rises from 43 percent of GDP in 2008 to 82 percent of GDP by 2014.
- Primary balance is projected to remain in deficit through 2013.
- GDP growth is expected to be below the average real interest rate throughout this period.
- Baseline public sector debt (percent of GDP) path (selected years): 2004: 29.4; 2005: 27.3; 2006: 24.7; 2007: 24.8; 2008: 43.2; 2009: 59.9; 2010: 75.0; 2011: 83.7; 2012: 86.0; 2013: 84.8; 2014: 82.2.
- Change in public sector debt (percent of GDP): 2004: -1.6; 2005: -2.2; 2006: -2.6; 2007: 0.1; 2008: 18.5; 2009: 16.7; 2010: 15.1; 2011: 8.7; 2012: 2.3; 2013: -1.1; 2014: -2.7.
- Gross financing need under baseline (percent of GDP): 2004: -1.4; 2005: -1.5; 2006: -2.9; 2007: -0.2; 2008: 7.1; 2009: 11.8; 2010: 12.7; 2011: 9.4; 2012: 6.7; 2013: 3.9; 2014: 1.4.
- Gross financing need in billions of U.S. dollars (selected years): 2004: -2.6; 2005: -3.0; 2006: -6.6; 2007: -0.6; 2008: 19.5; 2009: 27.0; 2010: 28.0; 2011: 21.2; 2012: 15.5; 2013: 9.4; 2014: 3.4.

### Fiscal balance and debt-creating flows
- Identified debt-creating flows (4+7+12) as percent of GDP: 2004: -3.4; 2005: -3.9; 2006: -5.3; 2007: -2.0; 2008: 7.8; 2009: 16.7; 2010: 15.1; 2011: 8.7; 2012: 4.7; 2013: 1.2; 2014: -1.5.
- Primary deficit (percent of GDP): 2004: -2.5; 2005: -2.5; 2006: -3.8; 2007: -1.2; 2008: 6.1; 2009: 9.8; 2010: 10.0; 2011: 6.2; 2012: 3.1; 2013: 0.2; 2014: -2.3.
- Revenue and grants (percent of GDP): 2004: 34.3; 2005: 34.5; 2006: 36.1; 2007: 35.1; 2008: 32.9; 2009: 32.9; 2010: 32.7; 2011: 34.9; 2012: 35.2; 2013: 35.4; 2014: 35.4.
- Primary (noninterest) expenditure (percent of GDP): 2004: 31.8; 2005: 31.9; 2006: 32.3; 2007: 33.9; 2008: 39.0; 2009: 42.6; 2010: 42.6; 2011: 41.1; 2012: 38.3; 2013: 35.6; 2014: 33.1.
- Automatic debt dynamics (percent of GDP): 2004: -0.9; 2005: -1.4; 2006: -1.4; 2007: -0.8; 2008: 1.7; 2009: 6.9; 2010: 5.2; 2011: 2.5; 2012: 1.6; 2013: 1.0; 2014: 0.7.
- Contribution from real interest rate (percent of GDP): 2004: 0.5; 2005: 0.4; 2006: 0.0; 2007: 0.6; 2008: 1.1; 2009: 2.8; 2010: 3.3; 2011: 3.3; 2012: 3.5; 2013: 3.1; 2014: 2.9.
- Contribution from real GDP growth (percent of GDP): 2004: -1.4; 2005: -1.7; 2006: -1.4; 2007: -1.4; 2008: 0.6; 2009: 4.1; 2010: 1.9; 2011: -0.7; 2012: -1.9; 2013: -2.1; 2014: -2.1.
- Residual, including asset changes (percent of GDP): 2004: 1.8; 2005: 1.7; 2006: 2.7; 2007: 2.0; 2008: 10.7; 2009: 0.0; 2010: 0.0; 2011: 0.0; 2012: -2.4; 2013: -2.3; 2014: -1.1.
- Public sector debt-to-revenue ratio (percent): 2004: 85.8; 2005: 79.1; 2006: 68.4; 2007: 70.6; 2008: 131.2; 2009: 182.2; 2010: 229.5; 2011: 239.9; 2012: 244.4; 2013: 239.8; 2014: 232.4.

### Sensitivity analysis, bound tests, and scenarios
- The sustainability analysis includes alternative scenarios and bound tests (Table A1 and Figure A1).
- Worst-case "no policy change" (constant primary balance) scenario: debt ratio rises to 114 percent in 2014.
- Scenario with no policy change (constant primary balance) public sector debt (percent of GDP) path shown: 2009: 59.9; 2010: 74.8; 2011: 87.1; 2012: 96.1; 2013: 104.6; 2014: 114.2.
- Scenario with key variables at their historical averages path (percent of GDP) includes 2009: 59.9; 2010: 55.2; 2011: 50.8; 2012: 44.5; 2013: 38.6; 2014: 33.9.
- Figure A1 bound tests include shocks: growth shock, primary balance shock, interest rate shock, combined shock, 30 percent depreciation, contingent liabilities shock, and combined real depreciation and contingent liabilities shocks. (Shocks are permanent one-half standard deviation unless noted otherwise; permanent 1/4 standard deviation shocks applied to some variables; one-time real depreciation of 30 percent and 10 percent of GDP shock to contingent liabilities occur in 2009 in one scenario.)

### External sustainability and net investment position
- Net external position (excluding direct investment) was in balance in 2007; external debt sustainability does not seem to be an issue (Table A2).
- Net external position including direct investment is in a moderate deficit given strong FDI inflows over the past decade.
- The relatively rapid decline in the net external position in recent years has been dominated by factors other than the current account deficit, such as revaluations.
- The large gross assets and liabilities in portfolio and other investments reflect activities of the International Financial Services Center.
- The composition of the external position implies a large negative net income flow in the current account.
- Inward foreign direct investment earned about 21 percent on average during 2000-07.

Key items from Table A2 (Net Investment Position, percent of GDP, selected entries):
- Net investment position (percent of GDP) series: 2000: -8; 2001: -15; 2002: -18; 2003: -20; 2004: -18; 2005: -25; 2006: -5; 2007: -16.
- Net investment position (excl. FDI) (percent of GDP) memorandum: 2000: 94; 2001: 75; 2002: 73; 2003: 65; 2004: 32; 2005: 61; 2006: 00; 2007: 00. (Table lists memoranda items; values preserved as shown in source.)

### Key macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions underlying baseline
- Real GDP growth (in percent): 2004: 4.7; 2005: 6.4; 2006: 5.7; 2007: 6.0; 2008: -2.3; 2009: -8.5; 2010: -3.0; 2011: 1.0; 2012: 2.3; 2013: 2.6; 2014: 2.6.
- Average nominal interest rate on public debt (in percent): 2004: 3.9; 2005: 3.8; 2006: 3.5; 2007: 4.2; 2008: 4.2; 2009: 4.3; 2010: 4.4; 2011: 4.4; 2012: 4.4; 2013: 4.4; 2014: 4.4.
- Average real interest rate (nominal rate minus change in GDP deflator, in percent): 2004: 1.8; 2005: 1.5; 2006: 0.1; 2007: 2.8; 2008: 4.5; 2009: 6.0; 2010: 5.4; 2011: 4.4; 2012: 4.3; 2013: 3.8; 2014: 3.5.
- Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent): 2004: 2.0; 2005: 2.3; 2006: 3.4; 2007: 1.4; 2008: -0.3; 2009: -1.7; 2010: -1.0; 2011: 0.0; 2012: 0.2; 2013: 0.7; 2014: 0.9.
- Growth of real primary spending (deflated by GDP deflator, in percent): 2004: 5.6; 2005: 7.0; 2006: 6.9; 2007: 11.2; 2008: 12.6; 2009: -0.1; 2010: -2.9; 2011: -2.8; 2012: -4.6; 2013: -4.6; 2014: -4.6.
- Primary deficit (repeated here for emphasis): 2004: -2.5; 2005: -2.5; 2006: -3.8; 2007: -1.2; 2008: 6.1; 2009: 9.8; 2010: 10.0; 2011: 6.2; 2012: 3.1; 2013: 0.2; 2014: -2.3.

### Assessment and policy implications
- The analysis shows that significant policy changes are required to entrench fiscal sustainability.
- The worst outcome—a rise in the debt ratio to 114 percent in 2014—is achieved under the assumption of a constant primary balance.
- No explicit policy prescriptions are listed in the provided text beyond the conclusion that significant policy changes are necessary to restore sustainability.

*Source: IMF staff report content provided in the source document.*

### 4.      Quarterly balance of payments data are compiled by the Central Statistics Office and

### _cr09195 - 4.      Quarterly balance of payments data are compiled by the Central Statistics Office and

### Balance of payments data compilation
- Quarterly balance of payments data are compiled by the Central Statistics Office and are based on statistical surveys combined with administrative data.
- These data are closely integrated with the compilation of national accounts and are in line with the Balance of Payments Manual, 5th edition (BPM5).
- Historical data coverage: only years starting from 1998.
- Note: some discrepancies remain between exports and imports data from the national accounts and the balance of payments.

### Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance (as of May 6, 2009)
- Exchange Rates
  - Date of Latest Observation: 5/6/09
  - Date Received: 5/6/09
  - Frequency of Data: D
  - Frequency of Reporting: D
  - Frequency of Publication: D
- International Reserve Assets and Reserve Liabilities of the Monetary Authorities
  - Date of Latest Observation: March 2009
  - Date Received: 04/30/09
  - Frequency of Data: M
  - Frequency of Reporting: M
  - Frequency of Publication: M
- Reserve/Base Money
  - Date of Latest Observation: March 2009
  - Date Received: 04/30/09
  - Frequency: M / M / M
- Broad Money
  - Date of Latest Observation: March 2009
  - Date Received: 04/30/09
  - Frequency: M / M / M
- Central Bank Balance Sheet
  - Date of Latest Observation: March 2009
  - Date Received: 04/30/09
  - Frequency: M / M / M
- Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Banking System
  - Date of Latest Observation: March 2009
  - Date Received: 04/30/09
  - Frequency: M / M / M
- Interest Rates
  - Date of Latest Observation: 5/6/09
  - Date Received: 5/6/09
  - Frequency: D / D / D
- Consumer Price Index
  - Date of Latest Observation: March 2009
  - Date Received: 04/09/09
  - Frequency: M / M / M
- Revenue, Expenditure, Balance and Composition of Financing – General Government
  - Date of Latest Observation: 2008
  - Date Received: 1/13/09
  - Frequency: A / A / A
- Revenue, Expenditure, Balance and Composition of Financing – Central Government
  - Date of Latest Observation: April 2009
  - Date Received: 5/5/09
  - Frequency: M / M / M
- Stocks of Central Government and Central Government-Guaranteed Debt
  - Date of Latest Observation: 2008
  - Date Received: 1/13/09
  - Frequency: Q / Q / Q
- External Current Account Balance
  - Date of Latest Observation: Q4, 2008
  - Date Received: 3/31/09
  - Frequency: Q / Q / Q
- Exports and Imports of Goods and Services
  - Date of Latest Observation: Q4, 2008
  - Date Received: 3/31/09
  - Frequency: Q / Q / Q
- GDP/GNP
  - Date of Latest Observation: Q4, 2008
  - Date Received: 3/31/09
  - Frequency: Q / Q / Q
- Gross External Debt
  - Date of Latest Observation: Q4, 2008
  - Date Received: 3/31/09
  - Frequency: Q / Q / Q

- Notes from table:
  - 1 Includes reserve assets pledged or otherwise encumbered as well as net derivative positions.
  - 2 Both market-based and officially-determined, including discount rates, money market rates, rates on treasury bills, notes and bonds.
  - 3 Foreign, domestic bank, and domestic nonbank financing.
  - 4 The general government consists of the central government (budgetary funds, extra budgetary funds, and social security funds) and state and local governments.
  - 5 Including currency and maturity composition.
  - 6 Daily (D), Weekly (W), Monthly (M), Quarterly (Q), Annually (A); Not Available (NA).

### Public Information Notice — Executive Board conclusions (June 24, 2009)
- Event: IMF Executive Board concluded the 2009 Article IV consultation with Ireland on June 15, 2009.
- Background findings:
  - Ireland experienced a property bubble driven by easy credit, with banks’ exposure to property lending soaring and reliance on wholesale funding intensifying.
  - Wages rose rapidly and international competitiveness was compromised.
  - GDP growth: 2007 growth at 6 percent; growth decelerated in 2008 and further in 2009 following Lehman Brothers' failure.
  - Banking system stress: asset quality deteriorated, especially in property development; global financial crisis tightened wholesale funding access; Irish bank stock prices fell sharply relative to overall stock index.
  - Government support has been vital to maintaining financial stability.
  - Fiscal position: general government deficit was 7 percent of GDP in 2008; structural deficit estimated at 12½ percent of GDP in 2008; gross public debt reached 43 percent of GDP.
  - Authorities have taken consolidation measures and laid out a multi-year fiscal plan.

- Executive Board assessment and recommendations:
  - Priorities: restore financial-sector health, ensure public finance sustainability, and enhance external competitiveness and medium-term growth potential.
  - Commended scale and speed of authorities’ response; noted need for sustained efforts over an extended period.
  - Financial sector:
    - Supported restructuring efforts, including establishment of the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA).
    - Underscored importance of adequate design and timely implementation of NAMA.
    - Advised authorities to consider risk-sharing structures to address pricing of distressed assets.
    - Recommended NAMA be given legal and operational flexibility to address all classes of distressed bank assets.
    - Suggested other restructuring options, including greater equity interest by the government, should not be ruled out.
    - Welcomed plans to strengthen the supervisory framework; recommended macro-prudential supervision blending systemic stability with individual-institution stress management.
    - Recommended intensified bank-by-bank surveillance beyond banks currently under deposit guarantee and stronger safeguards against related-party exposures.
    - Called for rigorous assessments of banks’ overall capital adequacy and strengthened home-host supervisory cooperation.
    - Noted that a special resolution regime for financial institutions would facilitate quicker and less disruptive resolution of distressed banks.
  - Fiscal policy:
    - Welcomed fiscal measures already taken, including significant cuts in public sector wages, and ambitious medium-term consolidation plans.
    - Emphasized that large structural deficit, rising public debt, and fiscal burden from bank support require sustained adjustment over several years.
    - Stressed importance of consolidation composition, with general concurrence that focus should be on expenditure reduction, possibly including further public sector wage bill reduction.
    - A few Directors cautioned that consolidation should not undermine efforts to arrest the downturn.
    - Recommended development of an effective institutional framework: an appropriate fiscal rule and a medium-term expenditure plan detailing measures over full planning horizon.
    - Underscored better targeting of benefits for the vulnerable, broadening the tax base without harming external competitiveness restoration, and further pension reform.
    - A few Directors expressed concern about using National Pension Reserve Fund resources for bank recapitalization.
  - Growth and competitiveness:
    - Stressed growth will hinge on restoring international competitiveness and reorienting the economy toward high-productivity activities.
    - Noted the absence of nominal exchange rate adjustment scope; flexible product and labor markets are an asset.
    - Welcomed authorities’ commitment to restore wage cost competitiveness and plans on infrastructure and R&D investment.
    - A few Directors cautioned that falling nominal wages could impair domestic demand and accelerate deflation.

### Ireland: Selected Economic Indicators (annual unless noted)
- Real Economy (change in percent)
  - Real GDP: 2003 4.5; 2004 4.7; 2005 6.4; 2006 5.7; 2007 6.0; 2008 -2.3
  - Real GNP: 2003 5.9; 2004 4.5; 2005 5.8; 2006 6.3; 2007 4.1; 2008 -3.1
  - Domestic demand: 2003 3.9; 2004 4.3; 2005 8.7; 2006 6.1; 2007 3.7; 2008 -5.7
  - Exports of goods and services: 2003 0.6; 2004 7.5; 2005 5.2; 2006 5.7; 2007 6.8; 2008 -0.4
  - Imports of goods and services: 2003 -1.6; 2004 8.5; 2005 8.2; 2006 6.3; 2007 4.1; 2008 -4.4
  - HICP: 2003 4.0; 2004 2.3; 2005 2.2; 2006 2.7; 2007 2.9; 2008 3.1
  - Unemployment rate (in percent): 2003 4.7; 2004 4.5; 2005 4.4; 2006 4.4; 2007 4.5; 2008 6.1
- Public Finances (percent of GDP)
  - General government balance: 2003 0.3; 2004 1.4; 2005 1.5; 2006 2.9; 2007 0.2; 2008 -7.1
  - Structural balance1/: 2003 -5.0; 2004 -4.4; 2005 -5.4; 2006 -5.7; 2007 -8.7; 2008 -12.5
  - General government debt: 2003 31.1; 2004 29.4; 2005 27.3; 2006 24.7; 2007 24.8; 2008 43.2
- Money and Credit (end-period, percent change)
  - M3 2/: 2003 9.8; 2004 22.5; 2005 22.0; 2006 28.5; 2007 9.6; 2008 -2.1
  - Private sector credit 3/: 2003 17.9; 2004 26.6; 2005 28.8; 2006 25.9; 2007 17.0; 2008 6.6
- Interest rates (end-period)
  - Three-month treasury bill: 2003 2.1; 2004 2.2; 2005 2.5; 2006 3.7; 2007 3.4; 2008 1.5
  - 10-year government bond yield: 2003 4.6; 2004 3.7; 2005 3.3; 2006 4.0; 2007 4.5; 2008 4.4
- Balance of Payments (percent of GDP)
  - Trade balance (goods and services): 2003 15.4; 2004 14.2; 2005 11.7; 2006 10.3; 2007 10.3; 2008 11.5
  - Current account: 2003 0.0; 2004 -0.6; 2005 -3.5; 2006 -3.6; 2007 -5.4; 2008 -4.5
  - Reserves (in billions of euros): 2003 3.3; 2004 2.1; 2005 0.7; 2006 0.7; 2007 0.6; 2008 0.7
- Exchange Rate
  - Euros per U.S. dollar: 2003 0.9; 2004 0.8; 2005 0.8; 2006 0.8; 2007 0.7; 2008 0.7
  - Nominal effective rate (1999Q1=100): 2003 101.9; 2004 104.5; 2005 104.1; 2006 104.4; 2007 107.4; 2008 113.0
  - Real effective rate (1999Q1=100, CPI based): 2003 112.6; 2004 115.8; 2005 115.4; 2006 116.0; 2007 120.1; 2008 125.5

- Sources listed: Central Statistics Office; Department of Finance, Datastream and IMF International Financial Statistics.
- Footnotes:
  - 1/ In percent of potential GDP.
  - 2/ The methodology used to compile M3 has been amended in line with Eurosystem requirements. Therefore, there is a break in the series.
  - 3/ Adjusted change, which includes the effects of transactions between credit institutions and non-bank international financial companies and valuation effects arising from exchange rate movements.

*International Monetary Fund — Public Information Notice No. 09/79 (June 24, 2009).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/_cr09195.pdf_
