## _cr09212 — 1. Real Sector

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### I. Staff appraisal — key findings and projections
- The United Kingdom has been hit hard by the global financial crisis: sharp contraction in economic activity, rising unemployment, plunging property prices, and falling inflation despite a significant depreciation of sterling.
- Authorities’ policy response has been forceful and wide ranging: public capital injections into weak banks; ring-fencing of troubled assets; shoring up banking sector liquidity; unprecedented easing of monetary policy; and temporary discretionary fiscal stimulus.
- These policies have "successfully contained the crisis," and there are "tentative signs that confidence is returning."
- The floating exchange rate has acted as a shock absorber; sterling depreciation offset some external demand weakening.
- GDP projection: fall by about 4¼ percent this year, with quarterly growth picking up gradually through 2010.
- Recovery outlook: "highly uncertain" given unprecedented crisis and confidence effects.
- Underlying vulnerabilities: dramatic deterioration in public finances; public debt projected to double in five years; sharp increase in government borrowing and contingent liabilities; continued financial sector fragility.
- Main policy priorities:
  - Resolve problems in the financial sector to buttress stability and normalize credit supply.
  - Set monetary and fiscal policies consistent with commitment to price stability and fiscal sustainability.

### I. Staff appraisal — financial sector repair (recommendations)
- Continue to seek further strengthening of banks' capital positions:
  - Encourage banks to augment their capital base as market conditions improve and, if necessary, provide further public capital support.
  - Promote options to preserve capital cushions and improve capital structures (e.g., restraining dividend payouts not supported by profits; converting preference shares to common shares).
  - Develop contingency plans in the event further shocks threaten financial institutions.
  - Support credit supply through targeted and appropriately designed intervention in dysfunctional credit markets.
- Strengthen prudential framework over the medium term:
  - Phased introduction of a maximum gross leverage ratio as a backstop against excessive balance sheet growth.
  - Develop new macro-prudential instruments to mitigate credit cycle amplitude and reduce feedback loops between the financial sector and the real economy.
  - Overhaul EU regulatory and supervisory arrangements and strengthen cross-border crisis management and orderly exit arrangements for large internationally active banks.
- Enhance disclosure by banks and the FSA to reduce uncertainty and enhance public surveillance.
- Turner Review noted as an important contribution to international debate on enhancing regulatory and supervisory systems.

### I. Staff appraisal — monetary policy assessment
- Bank of England aggressive easing appropriate given prospects for inflation to fall and stay below the 2 percent target for an extended period.
- Policy rates near zero; Bank started purchasing assets financed by expanding central bank reserves (quantitative easing).
- Early QE results "moderately encouraging": government bond rates kept low and liquidity in targeted private credit markets improved.
- Recommendation: further diversify Bank’s private asset purchases to improve functioning of viable capital markets and sustain credit flow to the real economy.
- Institutional safeguards:
  - Asset Purchase Facility operates as a separate legal entity under comprehensive indemnity assurances from the Treasury.
  - MPC will not need Treasury approval to determine and implement a future exit from QE required to meet the inflation target.
  - Exit tools include asset sales, other liquidity-draining operations, and higher interest rates.
- Bank Rate actions: reduced by a cumulative 450 basis points to 0.5 percent between October 2008 and March 2009; 0.5 percent expected to mark the floor.

### I. Staff appraisal — fiscal stance and recommendations
- Success of the policy package depends on trust in fiscal sustainability: "A strong commitment to reverse the sharp deterioration of public finances within a reasonable timeframe is crucial."
- Once recovery established, implement an ambitious fiscal consolidation plan to put public debt on a firmly downward path faster than envisaged in the 2009 Budget.
- Credibility enhanced by early clarification of specific measures, including in the next Comprehensive Spending Review.
- Emphasis on expenditure-based consolidation is appropriate; structural reforms needed to address rising costs associated with demographic change.
- Build broad public consensus on need for sizeable fiscal adjustment.

### II. Balance sheet strains — overview
- Pre-existing imbalances before global shocks: overheating in property markets; low domestic saving rates; high current account deficits; large external liabilities; rising (albeit still low) public debt; significant increases in leverage of financial sector and household balance sheets.

### II.A Financial institutions — conditions and vulnerabilities
- Banks under pressure to deleverage after rapid balance sheet expansion:
  - Assets relative to GDP nearly doubled over the last decade; growth financed disproportionately through wholesale funding.
  - Leverage increased; with deteriorating credit quality, large write-downs, and difficult funding conditions, banks must reduce leverage via capital-raising, asset sales, reduced lending growth, and some retrenchment of cross-border operations.
- Financial strains easing but far from normal:
  - Aggressive policy actions dispelled liquidity concerns and eased interbank term lending markets.
  - Some large institutions issued unsecured debt and fresh equity; equity prices remain significantly below pre-crisis levels.
  - Debt issuance still largely dependent on government debt guarantee schemes.
  - Risk premia remain elevated across bank debt, CDS, term lending, and currency swaps.
  - Asset-backed security markets essentially closed.
- Credit loss concerns:
  - UK banks reported record write-downs and losses for 2008 (especially on foreign exposures); some returned to net profit in Q1 2009 due to strong revenue.
  - Substantial further write-downs expected in 2009 and 2010.
  - Government support: large capital injections to RBS and Lloyds; RBS and Lloyds placed £585 billion of assets under Asset Protection Scheme.
  - Building society sector vulnerable: concentration in real estate lending, strained funding model, limited access to new capital.

### II.B Households and corporations — leverage and property market stress
- Household leverage:
  - Household debt increased to 175 percent of disposable income—"one of the highest levels among advanced countries."
  - Net household wealth estimated to have declined by about 15 percent in 2008, and may fall further in 2009.
- Property market:
  - House prices dropped by more than 20 percent from their peak.
  - Commercial real estate prices down by 40 percent.
  - Mortgage arrears and bank repossessions increased but remain relatively low as share of existing mortgages.
  - Foreclosure rate in 2008: 0.35 percent, compared to 4¼ percent in the United States.
  - Delinquency rates on newer non-conforming RMBS rising but much lower than U.S. subprime delinquency rates.
  - Leading indicators (mortgage approvals and sales-to-stock) suggest housing price adjustment not yet completed.
- Firms and investment:
  - Firms entered crisis with relatively strong balance sheets; non-financial corporate debt rise over last decade moderate; firms held substantial liquid financial assets.
  - Profit outlook deteriorated; business investment declined steadily over the last year.
  - Default rates started to rise from a low base.
  - Steep fall in commercial property prices reduced corporations' net worth.

### Consumer spending, credit conditions, and macro-financial feedbacks
- Consumer spending weakened on falling wealth, rising unemployment, and tighter credit constraints.
- Employment declining; unemployment rate reached 7.2 percent in the three months to April 2009.
- Household saving rate rising from very low levels since early 2008.
- Credit standards tightened significantly for secured and unsecured household lending.
- Adverse feedback loops described:
  - Banks reduced lending due to tight capital and funding; falling house prices and weaker job security retrenched consumption; reduced consumption depressed profits and investment; demand for credit weakened; rising defaults weakened banks further.
- Credit flows and spreads:
  - Monthly growth of secured and unsecured household credit fallen almost to zero.
  - Corporate bond issuance pickup insufficient to offset net decline in bank business credit.
  - Reduction in credit growth steeper than in previous recessions.
  - Lending spreads remain wide; corporate bond spreads over gilts elevated.

### Public sector balance sheet, fiscal stance, and financial interventions (selected exact figures)
- Headline deficit 2008/09: 6½ percent of GDP.
- Deficits projected about 13 percent of GDP for 2009 and 2010.
- Discretionary fiscal stimulus: 2 percent of GDP (components include temporary VAT reduction; larger personal income tax allowances and pension transfers; advancing planned capital expenditure).
- Public debt projections:
  - Post-crisis increase in net borrowing projected to result in doubling of gross general government debt over next 5 years to about 99 percent of GDP.
- Gross resources committed to financial sector support measures so far have exceeded 60 percent of GDP; net cost to taxpayers likely much smaller.
- Selected financial sector support measures (as presented in source table; columns: £ billion | percent of GDP):
  - Financial sector support: 126.6 | 8.8
  - Northern Rock 1/: 14.6 | 1.0
  - Bradford & Bingley 1/: 24.0 | 1.7
  - Kaupthing Singer & Friedlaender: 3.3 | 0.2
  - Landsbanki: 4.5 | 0.3
  - Heritable: 0.5 | 0.0
  - Dunfermline: 1.6 | 0.1
  - Bank recapitalization: 78.1 | 5.5
  - Increase in contingent liabilities: 777.3 | 54.3
  - Credit Guarantee Scheme: 250.0 | 17.5
  - Working Capital Scheme: 11.5 | 0.8
  - Asset-Backed Securities Guarantee Scheme: 50.0 | 3.5
  - Asset Protection Scheme 2/: 465.8 | 32.5
  - Total exposure: 903.9 | 63.1
  - Memo items:
    - Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS): 185.0 | 12.9
    - Asset Purchase Facility (APF): 150.0 | 10.5
- Note: Initial liquidity support from BoE to Northern Rock amounted to £ 149 billion, but was subsequently replaced by Treasury funding.
- 2009 Budget assumed net cost of financial interventions will be 3.5 percent of GDP.

### Sterling, external position, and cross-border spillovers
- Sterling depreciation: 27 percent between mid-2007 and April 2009 in real effective terms.
- Depreciation helped improve external position: trade deficit narrowed; current account deficit reduced; income balance improved due to valuation effects on external assets and liabilities.
- Since April 2009 some depreciation reversed.
- Based on CGER-type methodologies, sterling broadly in line with fundamentals as of June 2009.
- Export volumes dropped by 20 percent annualized in last quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009; decline in imports equally dramatic, affecting euro-area trading partners.
- UK banks’ global linkages: five largest UK-owned banks’ external assets exceed 200 percent of UK GDP.

### Box 1 — Potential Spillovers from the UK Financial System to the Rest of the World (selected exact figures)
- UK-owned banks’ consolidated foreign claims: almost US$3.7 trillion at end-2008.
- Interbank loans account for about one quarter of these claims.
- Illustrative deleveraging scenario: hypothetical across-the-board cut in UK banks’ foreign lending by 50 percent examined as a very harsh shock.
- Final quarter of 2008: overseas exposures trimmed minus 16½ percent quarter-on-quarter.
- Staff estimates: cumulative loss of potential output over 2008–10 could be as large as 4 to 5 percentage points.
- Medium-term potential growth may be ½ to ¾ percentage point below pre-crisis trend.

### Box 2 — Capitalization of the UK banking system (selected exact figures and findings)
- Staff top-down estimate (April 2009 GFSR): at end-2008 UK banking system would need £88 billion (US$125 billion, or about 6 percent of GDP) in fresh equity to reach a target leverage ratio of 4 percent.
- Authorities’ measures:
  - RBS and Lloyds received a £37 billion public capital injection in October 2008.
  - An additional injection of £35 billion in nonvoting B-shares pending in conjunction with the Asset Protection Scheme (APS).
- APS protection once contracts finalized: protect RBS and Lloyds from extreme losses on £325 billion and £260 billion of exposures respectively; banks would bear only 10 percent of losses beyond first-loss amounts of £42 billion and £35 billion.
- Staff judgment: capital bases now appear strong enough to avert a renewed systemic crisis, but uncertainty remains; case for erring on side of caution and seeking further strengthening of banks’ capital positions.
- Recommendations:
  - Encourage capital augmentation; stand ready to provide further public support if needed.
  - Release detailed information on pool of assets covered by APS once contracts finalized; consider bad bank arrangement for disposal.

### QE design, assessment, and operational independence
- BoE QE program:
  - BoE to buy £125 billion in assets through Asset Purchase Facility out of £150 billion initially authorized by the Treasury within five months, financed by expansion of base money.
  - Purchases concentrated on long-term gilts; BoE also buying selected high-quality private assets (commercial paper and corporate bonds).
- Assessment:
  - Gilt yields remained low since QE launch despite large new government debt issuance.
  - Spreads on commercial paper and corporate bonds have narrowed; asset prices broadly recovered.
  - Uncertainty remains whether effects strong and lasting enough to raise aggregate demand.
- Recommendation: diversify BoE asset purchases further toward private credit markets; BoE indicated intention in mid-June to start buying certain types of asset-backed commercial paper.
- Institutional safeguards and exit:
  - Asset Purchase Facility is separate legal entity indemnified by Treasury.
  - MPC retains independence to stop or unwind asset purchases; exit options include asset sales, liquidity-draining operations, and higher interest rates.
  - Clear BoE communication on exit strategy advised to underpin market confidence.

### Potential growth and medium-term outlook (Annex III selected exact figures)
- Staff combines capital, labor, and financial-sector effects to produce scenarios:
  - Near term: potential growth falls to ¼ to 1¼ percent.
  - Medium term: potential growth picks up to around 1¾ to 2¼ percent.
- Pre-crisis potential growth: 2¾ percent (labor ≈ ¾ percentage point; capital ≈ ½ percentage point; growth residual ≈ 1½ percentage points).
- Capital stock net growth path (percent): pre-crisis 2¼ → 2008: 1¼ → 2010: 0 → 2014: 1.
- Migrant inflows: pre-crisis 0.6 percent of workforce → 2010: 0.2 percent of workforce.
- Financial sector weight: about 7 percent of the economy.
- Financial sector growth differential: 3¼ percentage points per year faster than overall economy (2000–2007).
- Spillover elasticities:
  - 1 percentage point increase in financial sector growth → 0.6 percentage point increase in external finance-dependent industries' growth.
  - 1 percentage point reduction in financial sector growth → ≈ ¼ percentage point decline in output growth of other industries.

### Public debt sustainability (Annex V selected exact figures)
- General government gross debt projected: 43 percent of GDP in 2007/08 → about 100 percent of GDP by 2014/15.
- Primary deficit (percent of GDP) series: -0.6 (2007/08), -4.8 (2008/09), -11.1 (2009/10), -10.3 (2010/11), -7.6 (2011/12), -5.6 (2012/13), -3.9 (2013/14), -2.8 (2014/15), -1.4 (2015/16).
- Overall balance (percent of GDP) series: -2.7 (2007/08), -7.0 (2008/09), -13.1 (2009/10), -13.3 (2010/11), -10.8 (2011/12), -9.0 (2012/13), -7.5 (2013/14), -6.7 (2014/15), -5.2 (2015/16).
- Gross financing needs (percent of GDP): 6.2 (2004), 5.7 (2005), 6.2 (2006), 5.9 (2007), 9.5 (2008), 17.4 (2009), 18.1 (2010), 16.4 (2011), 15.1 (2012), 14.0 (2013), 13.1 (2014).
- Baseline public sector debt path (percent of GDP): 39.6 (2004), 41.7 (2005), 42.5 (2006), 43.2 (2007), 55.4 (2008), 72.7 (2009), 85.0 (2010), 91.9 (2011), 96.1 (2012), 98.6 (2013), 100.0 (2014).
- Alternative shocks:
  - Interest rate shock (real rates to 3.5 percent) → debt increases to 108 percent of GDP by 2014/15 (8 percentage points above baseline).
  - Growth downside (½ percentage point lower each year) → debt-to-GDP could reach 109 percent by 2014/15.
  - No policy change (constant primary balance 2009–2014) → debt evolves to 124.9 percent of GDP by 2013 in scenario table.
- Contingent liabilities from guarantees:
  - Central scenario: losses totalling 14 percent on £777 billion of guarantees (distributed over 5 years) → increase debt by 7 percent of GDP.
  - Conservative scenario: losses totalling 28 percent → increase debt by 13 percent of GDP.
- Scenario assuming additional £88 billion in public capital provision increases debt-to-GDP ratio to 105 percent by 2014/15.
- Debt composition:
  - Practically all public debt denominated in sterling.
  - Roughly one-third of gilts held by foreigners.
  - Average maturity of UK debt reported as 14 years.

### Annexes and policy measures (selected operational actions, exact figures preserved)
- Liquidity support:
  - Special Liquidity Scheme: total of £185 billion of T bills lent through SLS.
  - Unlimited US dollar swap line with the Federal Reserve in place until February 2010.
  - Discount Window Facility maximum maturity lengthened to 364 days.
- Financial sector assistance:
  - Up to £78.1 billion in capital injections in Lloyds/HBOS and RBS (including £22.1 billion in banks’ payment of shares as fees for asset insurance).
  - RBS and Lloyds placed a total of £585 billion of assets under the Asset Protection Scheme.
- Support for credit flows and private-sector assets:
  - Asset Purchase Facility may buy up to £50 billion of private assets.
  - BoE announced asset purchases of £125bn since inception; APF £150 billion initially authorized by Treasury.
- Macroeconomic stabilization:
  - Fiscal stimulus of about 2 percent of GDP implemented over 2008–2010.
  - Subsidies to companies hiring jobless people expected to total about £500 million.
  - Homeowners Support Mortgage Scheme contingent liability estimated at £1 billion.
  - Strategic Investment Fund: £750 million.

### Executive Board assessment, authorities’ views, and next steps
- Executive Board: welcomed aggressive UK policy response; noted measures averted systemic breakdown but key vulnerabilities remain (sharp increase in public debt; contingent liabilities; financial sector fragility).
- Main policy priorities reiterated: resolve financial sector problems; set monetary and fiscal policies consistent with price stability and fiscal sustainability.
- Authorities’ views (Statement by Alex Gibbs):
  - Treasury forecasts and authorities’ medium-term framing: Budget forecast range and commitment to fiscal consolidation once recovery established.
  - Authorities project public sector net borrowing to more than halve over 4 years to 5.5 percent of GDP in 2013–14; net debt projected to stabilize at 79 percent of GDP including potential losses on financial sector interventions.
  - Authorities committed to allowing sterling determined by market forces and to international cooperation on implementation of reforms.
- Government consultation and legislative timing: consult with FSA, BoE, other parties and international partners; concrete legislative action envisaged to start later in 2009.
- Bank of England FSR (June 25) calls for stronger market discipline, higher capital and liquidity buffers, improved information on interconnections, and countercyclical prudential policy.

*Source: _cr09212 - 1. Real Sector and related report excerpts (IMF staff report excerpts and annexes).*

### 1. Real Sector .........................................................................................................

### _cr09212 - 1. Real Sector .........................................................................................................

### I. Staff appraisal — key findings and projections
- The United Kingdom has been hit hard by the global financial crisis, with sharp contraction in economic activity, rising unemployment, plunging property prices, and falling inflation despite a significant depreciation of sterling.
- Authorities’ policy response has been forceful and wide ranging: public capital injections into weak banks; ring-fencing of troubled assets; shoring up banking sector liquidity; unprecedented easing of monetary policy; and temporary discretionary fiscal stimulus.
- These policies have "successfully contained the crisis," and there are "tentative signs that confidence is returning."
- The floating exchange rate has acted as a shock absorber, with depreciation of sterling offsetting to some extent the weakening of external demand.
- GDP is projected to fall by about 4¼ percent this year, with quarterly growth picking up gradually through 2010.
- The speed and strength of the recovery are "highly uncertain" given the unprecedented nature of the crisis and the importance of confidence effects.
- Underlying vulnerabilities remain sizeable: dramatic deterioration in public finances, public debt projected to double in five years, sharp increase in government borrowing and contingent liabilities, and continued financial sector fragility.
- Main policy priorities:
  - Resolve problems in the financial sector to buttress stability and normalize credit supply.
  - Set monetary and fiscal policies consistent with commitment to price stability and fiscal sustainability.

### I. Staff appraisal — financial sector repair (recommendations)
- Continue to seek further strengthening of banks' capital positions by:
  - Encouraging banks to take advantage of improving market conditions to augment their capital base and, if necessary, providing further public capital support.
  - Promoting options to preserve capital cushions and improve capital structures (e.g., restraining dividend payouts not supported by profits; converting preference shares to common shares).
  - Developing contingency plans in the event further shocks threaten the stability of financial institutions.
  - Supporting credit supply through targeted and appropriately designed intervention in dysfunctional credit markets.
- Strengthen the UK prudential framework over the medium term:
  - Phased introduction of a maximum gross leverage ratio as a backstop against excessive balance sheet growth.
  - Development of new macro-prudential instruments to mitigate the amplitude of the credit cycle and reduce feedback loops between the financial sector and the real economy.
  - Overhaul of the EU’s regulatory and supervisory arrangements, and in parallel strengthening cross-border arrangements for crisis management and orderly exit of large internationally active banks.
- Enhance disclosure of financial information by both banks and the FSA to reduce uncertainty and enhance public surveillance.
- The Turner Review is noted as an important contribution to international debate on enhancing regulatory and supervisory systems.

### I. Staff appraisal — monetary policy assessment
- The Bank of England’s aggressive monetary easing strategy is appropriate given prospects for inflation to fall and stay below the 2 percent target for an extended period.
- With policy rates near zero and impaired conventional transmission channels, the Bank has started purchasing assets financed by expanding central bank reserves (quantitative easing).
- Early results of quantitative easing are "moderately encouraging": government bond rates have been kept low and liquidity in targeted private credit markets has improved.
- Recommendation: Diversifying further the Bank’s private asset purchases could help improve functioning of viable capital markets and sustain flow of credit to the real economy.
- Institutional safeguards highlighted:
  - Asset Purchase Facility operates as a separate legal entity under comprehensive indemnity assurances from the Treasury.
  - MPC will not need Treasury approval to determine and implement a future exit from quantitative easing required to meet the inflation target.
  - Potential exit tools include asset sales, other liquidity-draining operations, and higher interest rates.

### I. Staff appraisal — fiscal stance and recommendations
- The success of the policy package depends on trust in fiscal sustainability.
- "A strong commitment to reverse the sharp deterioration of public finances within a reasonable timeframe is crucial."
- Once recovery is established, implement an ambitious fiscal consolidation plan to put public debt on a firmly downward path faster than envisaged in the 2009 Budget.
- Credibility of consolidation would be enhanced by early clarification of specific measures needed, including in the next Comprehensive Spending Review.
- Emphasis on expenditure-based consolidation is appropriate given international experience that expenditure-based consolidations are more durable.
- Structural reforms to address rising costs associated with demographic change are needed.
- Building a broad public consensus on the need for sizeable fiscal adjustment will be essential.

### II. Balance sheet strains — overview
- Pre-existing imbalances before global shocks: overheating in property markets, low domestic saving rates, high current account deficits, large external liabilities, rising (albeit still low) public debt, and significant increases in leverage of financial sector and household balance sheets.

### II.A Financial institutions — conditions and vulnerabilities
- Banks are under pressure to deleverage after rapid balance sheet expansion in the run-up to the crisis:
  - Assets relative to GDP nearly doubled over the last decade; growth financed disproportionately through wholesale funding.
  - Leverage steadily increased; faced with deteriorating credit quality, large write-downs, and difficult funding conditions, banks must reduce leverage.
  - Deleveraging channels: capital-raising efforts, asset sales, reduced lending growth, and some retrenchment of cross-border operations.
- Financial strains have started to ease, but situation remains far from normal:
  - Aggressive policy actions largely dispelled liquidity concerns and eased interbank term lending markets.
  - Some large institutions recently issued unsecured debt and fresh equity, indicating improving market confidence.
  - Major banks’ equity prices remain significantly below pre-crisis levels despite recent rebound.
  - Debt issuance is still largely dependent on government debt guarantee schemes.
  - Risk premia remain elevated: spreads on bank debt, credit default swaps, term lending, and currency swaps are above historical averages.
  - Asset-backed security markets are essentially closed.
- Concerns about potential credit losses persist:
  - UK banks reported record write-downs and losses for 2008 (especially on foreign exposures); some banks returned to net profit in Q1 2009 due to strong revenue.
  - Substantial further write-downs are expected in 2009 and 2010.
  - Government support: large capital injections to RBS and Lloyds; RBS and Lloyds placed £585 billion of assets under the government’s Asset Protection Scheme (insurance against large downside risks on these assets).
  - Building society sector faces particular vulnerabilities: concentration in real estate lending, strained funding model, limited access to new capital.

### II.B Households and corporations — leverage and property market stress
- Household leverage:
  - Household debt increased to 175 percent of disposable income—"one of the highest levels among advanced countries."
  - Rise in debt matched by increases in housing, pension funds, and other financial assets held by households.
  - Sharp fall of asset prices since the beginning of the crisis has eroded household portfolio values.
  - Net household wealth in the UK is estimated to have declined by about 15 percent in 2008, and may fall further in 2009.
- Property market developments:
  - House prices have dropped by more than 20 percent from their peak.
  - Commercial real estate prices are down by 40 percent.
  - Current price falls have been faster than the early 1990s correction.
  - Mortgage arrears and bank repossessions have increased but remain relatively low as a share of existing mortgages.
  - Foreclosure rate in 2008 was 0.35 percent, compared to 4¼ percent in the United States.
  - Delinquency rates on non-conforming mortgage-backed securities of newer vintages are rising but remain not far above older vintages and much lower than U.S. subprime delinquency rates.
  - Forward-looking indicators (mortgage approvals and sales-to-stock ratio) suggest the housing price adjustment is yet to be completed.

*Source: _cr09212 - 1. Real Sector .........................................................................................................*

### 16.      Consumer spending has weakened on falling wealth, rising unemployment,

### _cr09212 - 16.      Consumer spending has weakened on falling wealth, rising unemployment,

### Consumer spending and household balance sheets
- Consumer spending has weakened on falling wealth, rising unemployment, and tighter credit constraints.
- Employment is declining, and the unemployment rate reached 7.2 percent in the three months to April 2009.
- The household saving rate has been rising—from very low levels—since early 2008.
- Recent credit conditions surveys show significant tightening of credit standards for both secured and unsecured household lending.
- Liquid assets definition used in figures: sum of currency, deposits, and debt security holdings.

### Property prices and housing market indicators
- Exported charts and indicators show:
  - Mortgages entering into possession (percent of outstanding mortgages) series plotted for UK and US, with US, 2008 noted (RHS).
  - Real commercial property prices and real residential property prices comparisons with prior downturns (months since peak).
  - Mortgage approvals and housing transactions time series and leading indicators (Jan-00 to Jan-09).
  - Average of Halifax and Nationwide House Price Indices (3m/3m annualized, y-o-y change, percent).
- Spreads on fixed-rate mortgages with moderate loan-to-value ratios have risen since the beginning of the crisis in mid-2007; high-LTV mortgages initially turned more expensive, but have become largely unavailable of late.
- The rise in spreads on variable-rate mortgages is more recent, as lending rates have not mimicked the full decline in policy rates since late 2008.

### Firms, corporate balance sheets, and business investment
- Firms entered the crisis with relatively strong balance sheets, but vulnerabilities are increasing.
- The rise in non-financial corporate debt over the last decade has been moderate, and firms have held substantial liquid financial assets.
- Profit outlook has deteriorated as demand continues to contract and credit conditions remain tight.
- Business investment has declined steadily over the last year.
- Default rates have started to rise, although from a low base.
- The steep fall in commercial property prices has reduced further the net worth of corporations.

### Macro-financial linkages and feedback loops
- Adverse feedback loops developed between deteriorating financial conditions and a weakening economy over the past year:
  - Banks, constrained by tight capital positions and a difficult funding environment, reduced lending to the private sector.
  - Falling house prices reduced the value of pensions and other financial assets; job security weakened; consumers retrenched spending.
  - Decline in consumption reduced business profits and depressed investment, leading to further falls in employment and income.
  - Demand for credit weakened as households and businesses tried to repair balance sheets.
  - Actual and prospective rises in defaults and bankruptcies weakened banks’ balance sheets and their ability and willingness to restart lending.

### Credit flows, lending growth, and spreads
- The monthly growth of both secured and unsecured household credit has fallen almost to zero.
- A pick up in corporate bond issuance has not been sufficient to offset the net decline in business credit from banks.
- The reduction in credit growth is steeper than in previous recessions.
- Lending spreads remain wide, reflecting perception of high credit risks and increased capital costs; corporate bond spreads over government bonds remain elevated.
- Charted indicators and quoted series:
  - One-month change in MFI sterling lending to nonfinancial corporates (percent, seasonally adjusted) plotted for 2003–2009.
  - One-month change in total lending to households by type of loan (consumer loans, mortgages) (percent, seasonally adjusted) plotted for 2003–2009.
  - Net monthly change in total lending to households by lender type (billions of sterling, seasonally adjusted) plotted for 2006–2009.
  - Net monthly change in total domestic credit to nonfinancial corporates including capital market instruments and MFI loans (billions of sterling, seasonally adjusted).
  - Credit Impulse vs. GDP Growth: quarterly change in net new credit to nonfinancial private sector (percent of annual GDP) and real quarterly GDP growth (right scale).
  - Bank of England Survey: Credit Availability over Past 3 Months shows household secured credit, household unsecured credit, and corporate sector credit with negative values indicating worsening availability.
  - Credit spreads of corporate bonds with maturities 7-10 years over gilts charted by rating (AAA, BBB) from Jan 08 to Apr 09 (basis points).
  - Comparison of 5-year fixed mortgage rates and gilt yields (percent) and comparison of variable mortgage rates and Bank Rate (percent) show spreads and movements 1999–2009.

### Public sector balance sheet, fiscal stance, and financial interventions
- The financial crisis and the recession have led to a sharp deterioration of public finances.
- Revenue in the UK is sensitive to the economic cycle, asset prices, and financial sector activity; synchronized downturn led to rapid decline in income and corporation taxes, VAT, and asset price-related revenues.
- Headline deficit in 2008/09 was 6½ percent of GDP.
- Deficits of about 13 percent of GDP are projected for 2009 and 2010 (Table 2).
- Discretionary fiscal stimulus of 2 percent of GDP is being implemented. Main components of the stimulus package:
  - Temporary reduction of the VAT rate,
  - Larger personal income tax allowances and pension transfers,
  - Advancing of planned capital expenditure.
- The size of the discretionary stimulus and its impact on debt levels is small compared with the effect of automatic stabilizers and the loss of asset price-related revenue.
- Public debt projections and public sector net debt:
  - The post-crisis increase in net borrowing is projected to result in a doubling of gross general government debt over the next 5 years to about 99 percent of GDP.
  - Contingent liabilities from financial sector interventions have increased sharply.
  - Gross resources committed to financial sector support measures so far have exceeded 60 percent of GDP, although the net cost to taxpayers is likely to be much smaller.
- Selected financial sector support measures (as presented in the source table; columns: £ billion | percent of GDP):
  - Financial sector support: 126.6 | 8.8
  - Northern Rock 1/: 14.6 | 1.0
  - Bradford & Bingley 1/: 24.0 | 1.7
  - Kaupthing Singer & Friedlaender: 3.3 | 0.2
  - Landsbanki: 4.5 | 0.3
  - Heritable: 0.5 | 0.0
  - Dunfermline: 1.6 | 0.1
  - Bank recapitalization: 78.1 | 5.5
  - Increase in contingent liabilities: 777.3 | 54.3
  - Credit Guarantee Scheme: 250.0 | 17.5
  - Working Capital Scheme: 11.5 | 0.8
  - Asset-Backed Securities Guarantee Scheme: 50.0 | 3.5
  - Asset Protection Scheme 2/: 465.8 | 32.5
  - Total exposure: 903.9 | 63.1
  - Memo items:
    - Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS): 185.0 | 12.9
    - Asset Purchase Facility (APF): 150.0 | 10.5
- Notes in source:
  - Initial liquidity support from BoE to Northern Rock amounted to £ 149 billion, but was subsequently replaced by Treasury funding.
  - Asset Protection Scheme net exposure after first tranche of losses.
  - The 2009 Budget assumed that the net cost of financial interventions will be 3.5 percent of GDP.

### Sterling, external position, and cross-border spillovers
- Sterling depreciated by 27 percent between mid-2007 and April 2009 in real effective terms.
- Depreciation helped improve the UK’s external position:
  - Trade deficit narrowed, reducing the current account deficit.
  - With most of the UK’s large external assets (and a smaller fraction of external liabilities) denominated in foreign currencies, the income balance improved and the net international investment position strengthened significantly due to valuation effects.
- Since April 2009, some of the depreciation has been reversed.
- Based on CGER-type methodologies, sterling is broadly in line with fundamentals as of June 2009.
- Trade and capital flows during the downturn:
  - Export volumes dropped by 20 percent annualized in the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009.
  - The decline in imports was equally dramatic, affecting trading partners in the euro area.
- UK banks’ global linkages and spillovers:
  - The five largest UK-owned banks’ external assets exceed 200 percent of UK GDP.
  - Consolidated claims of UK-owned banks on foreign countries and consolidated claims of foreign-owned banks on the UK are plotted across major counterparties.
  - Statistical analysis shows stock prices of several large UK banks are heavily affected by changes in US banks’ equity values; betas estimated for weekly US$-based log returns for the period July 25, 2007 to May 27, 2009.

_https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/_cr09212.pdf_

### Box 1. Potential Spillovers from the UK Financial System to the Rest of the World

### Box 1. Potential Spillovers from the UK Financial System to the Rest of the World

### UK banks’ global footprint and channels for spillovers
- UK-owned banks’ consolidated foreign claims stood at almost US$3.7 trillion at end-2008.
- Interbank loans account for about one quarter of these claims.
- UK banks maintain significant retail business with firms and households abroad through subsidiaries and branches, mirroring the significant presence of foreign-owned banks in the UK banking market.
- A sharp deleveraging drive presents a particular spillover threat because of these large overseas operations.

### Illustrative deleveraging scenario and geographic impact
- A hypothetical across-the-board cut in UK banks’ foreign lending by 50 percent was examined as an illustrative, very harsh shock.
- The final quarter of 2008 saw a rapid trimming of overseas exposures (minus 16½ percent quarter-on-quarter), most notably in the interbank market.
- The impact of a large withdrawal of UK bank credit would be:
  - Concentrated in Western Europe and the US in absolute terms, affecting advanced countries with globally integrated banking systems most.
  - Significant relative to domestic GDP in a range of countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.
- Reduced external credit to affected countries could set in motion a further deleveraging spiral.
- The scenario’s true global impact would depend on:
  - The nature of the underlying claims (curbs in balanced interbank flows are ultimately less damaging than a complete exit from overseas retail business).
  - The speed of the credit withdrawal.
- Given the large-scale support provided by the UK authorities, a large-scale disorderly unwinding of foreign exposures should be viewed only as a tail risk; nonetheless, the UK’s close financial links with the rest of the world are a key systemic vulnerability.

### Recent trends: rising home bias and implications for UK credit supply
- Both external claims and external liabilities of UK-owned financial institutions have declined over the last year, partially reflecting a reduction in cross-border interbank activity.
- Some foreign financial institutions have limited or closed their operations in the UK.
- The withdrawal of foreign (especially European) lenders from the UK market, combined with the drying up of global securitization markets, has accentuated the domestic credit squeeze.

### Macroeconomic outlook, losses of potential output, and risks
- Staff estimates suggest that the cumulative loss of potential output over 2008–10 could be as large as 4 to 5 percentage points.
- In the medium term, the potential growth rate may be ½ to ¾ percentage point below the pre-crisis trend growth.
- Key uncertainties and risks around the central scenario:
  - Pace and extent of adjustment of bank and household balance sheets; high household indebtedness is likely to constrain recovery.
  - Whether recent recapitalization efforts will be sufficient to sustain credit provision and whether capital market funding can compensate for shortfalls in bank loans.
  - Upside possibility: significant monetary and fiscal stimulus, successful financial stabilization, durable asset price recovery, and faster-than-expected global pickup could restore confidence and support rapid recovery.
  - Downside possibilities: greater-than-expected realized credit losses, further deterioration of financial sector health, substantial further asset price declines, sharper contraction of foreign demand, and increasing home bias in financial services demand.
- The main policy priorities to limit downside risks and strengthen market confidence are:
  - Continued emphasis on resolving problems in the financial sector to support stability and promote normalization of credit supply.
  - Setting monetary and fiscal policies consistent with a firm commitment to price stability and fiscal sustainability.

### Repairing the financial system and restoring credit flows
- Wide-ranging policy measures implemented to forestall systemic breakdown included:
  - Large-scale guarantees of bank liabilities and an initial round of public capital injection in several large banks (initial rescue package in October 2008).
  - Bank of England actions: expanded special liquidity scheme, eased collateral requirements on open market operations, revamped emergency lending facilities, and significant US dollar funding under a swap line with the US Federal Reserve.
  - A second set of measures announced in early 2009: new capital injections and an Asset Protection Scheme (APS) designed to ring-fence bad assets and provide contingent capital.
  - Guarantee schemes for bank debt and asset-backed securities and support for new lending.
- Regulatory actions taken include:
  - Higher ceiling on retail deposit insurance introduced in October 2008.
  - A new Special Resolution Regime for dealing with failing banks legislated in February 2009.
  - Increased resources for supervision of systemically important institutions.
- Remaining challenges for restoring credit flows:
  - Uncertainty about the value of distressed assets and the recession’s adverse impact on credit quality.
  - Based on recent stress tests, banks are expected to maintain a ratio of core tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets above 4 percent, but substantial further write-downs could erode capital buffers.
  - Only sufficiently large capital buffers, if necessary provided by the government, would enable banks to resume normal credit activities.
- Recommended authorities’ actions to strengthen capital cushions and mitigate risks:
  - Encourage banks to augment their capital base as market conditions improve, and stand ready to provide further public support where needed.
  - Promote options to preserve capital cushions and improve capital structures (for example, restraining dividends not supported by profits, and if necessary converting preference shares to common shares).
  - Continue development of contingency plans for further shocks, with greater international coordination for banks with strong cross-border links based on the Financial Stability Board’s principles of crisis management.
- Additional transparency recommendation:
  - Detailed information should be released on the pool of assets covered by the APS once contracts are finalized to reduce uncertainty; disposal through a bad bank arrangement should remain under consideration.

### Box 2 — Capitalization of the UK banking system: staff estimates and authorities’ measures
- Staff top-down estimate (April 2009 GFSR): at end-2008 the UK banking system would need £88 billion (US$125 billion, or about 6 percent of GDP) in fresh equity to reach a target leverage ratio of 4 percent.
- A bottom-up analysis conducted by the UK mission team produced a median estimate in line with the GFSR result.
- Actual capital raising from private and public sources has fallen short of staff’s numbers.
- Authorities’ actions and assessments:
  - Two banks, RBS and Lloyds, received a £37 billion public capital injection in October 2008.
  - An additional injection of £35 billion in nonvoting B-shares is pending in conjunction with the Asset Protection Scheme (APS) announced in the first quarter of 2009.
  - Authorities’ stress tests indicate all systemically relevant large UK banks will be sufficiently capitalized to maintain a core tier 1 ratio above 4 percent even under stress over a five year time horizon.
- Reasons for differences between staff and authorities’ estimates:
  - Capital benchmark: staff used a simple leverage ratio (tangible equity over tangible assets) target of 4 percent; the FSA’s stress tests used the core tier 1 ratio, which includes APS-related B-shares as capital in the numerator and applies risk weights to assets in the denominator, raising the capitalization ratio.
  - Staff’s choice of a simple leverage ratio reflects a conservative approach given concerns about low risk weights and limited loss absorption from forms of bank capital other than equity, and reflects informational constraints.

*Source: IMF Research Department; based on text from Box 1 and related sections of the provided IMF staff report excerpts.*

### Box 2. Capitalization of the UK Banking System (continued)

### Box 2. Capitalization of the UK Banking System (continued)

### Impact of APS and capital estimates
- Staff’s bottom-up estimates anticipate the explicit provision of new capital under the APS but do not capture the contingent capital feature of the scheme.
- Once contracts are finalized, the APS will protect RBS and Lloyds from extreme losses on £325 billion and £260 billion of exposures respectively, as the two banks would bear only 10 percent of losses beyond first-loss amounts of £42 billion and £35 billion.
- Staff’s estimates:
  - Do not reduce total assets by the level of the protected assets.
  - Do not adjust equity for the banks’ first loss commitments.
- Footnote: First loss amounts are inclusive of existing provisions.

### Data granularity and assumptions
- Staff used detailed bank-by-bank balance sheet information from the largest banks’ financial statements for the bottom-up exercise.
- Published information did not always provide a very detailed breakdown of assets into precise risk categories.
- Data constraints required the use of somewhat crude assumptions on loss rates in various asset classes.

### Existing commitments and conservatism
- Authorities’ stress tests may give some credit for unannounced bank plans to reduce leverage through asset divestitures or specific capital measures.
- Staff’s estimates do not incorporate such prospective steps.
- Staff’s overall judgment, based on discussions with the authorities:
  - Capital bases now appear strong enough to avert a renewed systemic crisis.
  - Uncertainty remains about the speed and strength of recovery; a particularly slow or weak recovery could reintroduce doubts about bank capital levels by cycling back on funding and credit conditions.
  - There is a case for erring on the side of caution and seeking further strengthening of banks’ capital positions.
  - Larger capital cushions will afford greater lending capacity to underpin the economic recovery.

### Lending guarantees and lending facility
- The facility is welcome.
- Lending guarantee schemes are appropriate as long as they are designed to support viable new lending.
- Bank-specific lending commitments can serve as a coordination device to avert a credit crunch, provided safeguards ensure:
  - New lending is done on commercial terms.
  - Sound risk management practices are followed.

### Regulatory response: supervisory strengthening
- The crisis highlighted the need to strengthen the UK’s prudential framework.
- The UK’s prior “light-touch” approach—favoring market discipline and senior management responsibility—was recognized as deficient.
- The FSA has moved to more aggressive, hands-on supervision:
  - Funding of the FSA has been strengthened.
  - Greater resources allocated to assessment of large financial institutions and evaluation of systemic risk.
- The new Special Resolution Regime (February 2009 Banking Act) provides a legal framework for expeditious resolution of failing financial institutions (including large cross-border banks).
  - Effectiveness requires timely and comprehensive information sharing among the tripartite authorities.
- Increased reliance on stress tests for higher frequency evaluation of individual banks and system resilience is welcome.

### Turner Review recommendations and macro-prudential reforms
- Key calls in the Turner Review:
  - Higher capital requirements within a risk-based capital framework for trading book and off-balance sheet assets.
  - Introduction of a maximum leverage ratio as a backstop against excessive balance sheet growth.
  - Strengthening liquidity supervision, with emphasis on stress tests covering system-wide risks.
- Complementary measures needed:
  - Development of new macro-prudential instruments to mitigate the credit cycle and reduce feedback loops between the financial sector and the real economy.
  - Regulatory and supervisory coverage should follow economic substance, not legal form.
  - Regulators should have expanded powers to gather information on all significant financial institutions (including hedge funds) to assess system-wide risks.

### Disclosure practices
- Improved disclosure would reduce uncertainty and strengthen market discipline and public surveillance.
- Merits of increasing coverage and frequency of financial reporting on banks’ finances:
  - Encourage comparable and more comprehensive disclosure of financial results at quarterly intervals (example: RBS interim management statement in Q1 2009).
  - Over the medium term, authorities should consider publishing non-commercially sensitive bank-by-bank regulatory financial information at quarterly intervals.
- The FSA noted increased disclosure entails costs that must be weighed against potential benefits.

### Cross-border financial stability arrangements
- Emphasis on international cooperation to strengthen cross-border financial stability arrangements:
  - Continued collaboration on crisis management and orderly exit of cross-border banks.
  - Accelerated efforts to establish a dedicated resolution framework for the EU’s cross-border banks.
  - Work with partner countries to implement quickly the proposed overhaul of the EU’s regulatory and supervisory arrangements.
- Essential elements for effectiveness:
  - Adequate resources.
  - Effective decision-making mechanisms.
  - Independence for new institutions.
  - Unconstrained flow of information among bodies.

### Monetary outlook: inflation expectations and risks
- Short- to medium-term inflation outlook:
  - 12-month CPI inflation was slightly above the 2-percent target but is projected to fall to 1 percent later in 2009 as domestic energy cost pressures ease and rising spare capacity weakens pricing power and wage demands.
  - Looking further ahead, expected slow recovery should keep inflation below target for an extended period.
- Risks:
  - Downside: historical banking crises suggest more protracted disinflation if very weak demand persists; a slip into outright deflation is unlikely but cannot be ruled out.
  - Upside: pass-through of exchange rate weakness and a stronger-than-expected rebound in global commodity prices.
- Note: One traditional measure, the Retail Price Index (RPI), has dipped into negative territory in recent months largely due to the sharp drop in mortgage interest rates included in RPI but not CPI.

### Launching unconventional easing operations (QE) and Bank Rate policy
- Bank Rate action:
  - Bank Rate was reduced by a cumulative 450 basis points to 0.5 percent between October 2008 and March 2009.
  - 0.5 percent is expected to mark the floor for policy rates because lower rates could squeeze lenders’ interest margins and tighten credit supply.
- Quantitative easing (QE):
  - In March 2009 the MPC moved to QE.
  - BoE is on course to buy £125 billion in assets through its Asset Purchase Facility—out of £150 billion initially authorized by the Treasury—within five months, financed by an expansion of base money.
  - Purchases concentrated on long-term gilts to inject liquidity without assuming credit risk.
  - BoE also buying selected high-quality private assets, notably commercial paper and corporate bonds, to improve market functioning.
  - The overall volume of purchases is quantitatively important relative to the initial monetary base (some £90 billion) and the stock of relevant assets outstanding.

### Assessment of QE effectiveness and recommended diversification
- Rationale for aggressive easing:
  - High household debt, weak asset prices, fragile banks, and faltering demand create strong disinflationary pressures.
  - Sharp unexpected disinflation could amplify the downturn via debtor balance sheets.
  - Expansionary impact of rate cuts has been muted by large risk premia and tightening of private credit supply.
- Initial evidence:
  - Gilt yields have remained low since QE launch despite large new government debt issuance.
  - Spreads on commercial paper and corporate bonds have narrowed; asset prices have broadly recovered.
- Uncertainty remains whether effects will be strong and lasting enough to raise aggregate demand.
- Recommendation:
  - Further diversify BoE’s asset purchases, especially by targeting private credit markets that are currently dysfunctional but viable in the long run.
  - BoE indicated efforts underway and announced intention in mid-June to start buying certain types of asset-backed commercial paper.

### Addressing risks and exit strategy
- Institutional safeguards:
  - Asset Purchase Facility operates as a separate legal entity under comprehensive indemnity assurances from the Treasury, protecting the BoE’s balance sheet and independence.
  - Treasury approval will not be required for the MPC to stop or unwind asset purchases.
- Exit considerations:
  - MPC is in a strong position to determine and implement an exit from QE as appropriate to meet the inflation target.
  - Timing the exit requires vigilance in monitoring monetary aggregates and inflation expectations.
  - Exit options include asset sales, liquidity-draining operations, and higher interest rates.
  - Clear BoE communication on exit strategy would underpin market confidence.

*IMF staff report excerpt.*

### 48.      At a more fundamental level, trust in the BoE’s operational independence

### _cr09212 - 48.      At a more fundamental level, trust in the BoE’s operational independence

### Trust in the Bank of England’s operational independence
- Trust hinges on the stability of public finances and the absence of fiscal–monetary conflation.
- Concern: large-scale gilt purchases risk being perceived as a slippery slope toward monetization of the UK’s widening fiscal deficits.
- Government response: reaffirmed commitment to price stability, renewing the MPC’s remit with respect to the 2-percent inflation target.
- Core message: sound communication and implementation of monetary policy ultimately needs to be underpinned by a sustainable path of fiscal policy to remove residual doubts and preserve full confidence in the UK’s policy frameworks.

### Restoring fiscal sustainability — analytical summary
- Policy dilemma: revitalize the financial sector and support the economy while committing credibly to long-term fiscal sustainability.
- Context: private sector is repairing balance sheets; government must facilitate adjustment while fiscal balance has deteriorated sharply and contingent liabilities from financial sector interventions have increased sharply.
- Assessment of recent policy stance: the measured temporary fiscal stimulus in the 2008 Pre-Budget Report and the 2009 Budget, together with free operation of automatic stabilizers, is appropriate given the context.

### Fiscal outlook, risks, and projections (selected findings preserved verbatim)
- The 2009 Budget judges conservatively that the structural component of the deficit is almost 10 percent of GDP, or about four-fifths of the total deficit in 2009/10.
- The budget envisaged a moderate consolidation, which would bring the cyclically-adjusted current account into balance by 2017/18.
- Net public sector debt is projected to peak in 2013/14, consistent with the temporary operating rule.
- Gross financing needs of the general government could reach 16 percent of GDP in 2009/10.
- The stock of UK debt has an average maturity of 14 years.
- Risks identified:
  - Bond yields tend to increase with debt levels, so the burden of debt service may rise by more than expected.
  - A slower-than-forecast recovery or a larger-than-envisaged fall in potential output would make deficit reduction more challenging.
  - Potential losses from government guarantees and other contingent liabilities pose risks to the baseline debt projection.
  - Staff assumption: there is no recovery on past capital injections over the projection period.

### Policy recommendations to restore fiscal sustainability (text preserved)
- Once the economic recovery is established, a more ambitious fiscal adjustment should be implemented. The focus of this adjustment should be to put public debt on a firmly downward path faster than envisaged in the 2009 budget.
- Put greater emphasis on stabilizing the debt at a relatively low level within a reasonable time frame; this will require a significant fiscal effort.
  - Example from staff’s projection: achieving general government gross debt of 90 percent of GDP by 2014/15 (compared to 100 percent of GDP in the baseline) would require 1½ percentage points average improvement in the cyclically-adjusted overall balance per year (compared to ¾ percentage points in the baseline).
- More important than a specific medium-term fiscal goal is the credibility of consolidation plans.
  - Credibility would be enhanced by providing greater clarity on the specific revenue and expenditure measures to achieve the needed adjustment.
- Emphasis on expenditure reduction is appropriate given international experience that expenditure-based consolidations are more durable, although revenue measures would also be necessary.
  - The forthcoming Comprehensive Spending Review would provide an opportunity for committing to concrete expenditure measures.
- Any upside surprises to growth or revenue should be used to reduce deficits more aggressively.
- Interventions in the financial sector should be unwound gradually, with a goal of minimizing market disruptions and taxpayers’ costs.
- Long-term sustainability would be strengthened by implementing structural reforms to address the rising costs related to demographic change, especially in health care.

### Boxed international evidence (summary)
- Empirical analysis shows timing, speed, size, composition, initial conditions, and institutional factors matter for successful fiscal adjustment.
- Expenditure restraint tends to deliver longer-lasting and larger adjustment episodes.
- Selected episodes of large fiscal adjustments (change in central government primary balance during adjustment episode; composition in expenditure and revenue-to-GDP changes) include:
  - Canada 1993-97: Adjustment 6.8; Expenditure -5.5; Revenue 0.7
  - Denmark 1983-86: Adjustment 15.5; Expenditure -6.1; Revenue 4.6
  - Sweden 1994-98: Adjustment 15.9; Expenditure -10.8; Revenue 3.4
  - United Kingdom 1994-98: Adjustment 10.9; Expenditure -5.4; Revenue 1.4
  - United States 1993-98: Adjustment 6.5; Expenditure -2.9; Revenue 2.0

### Key fiscal and macroeconomic statistics (selected exact figures from tables and text)
- Structural component of the deficit: almost 10 percent of GDP.
- Share of structural component in total 2009/10 deficit: about four-fifths.
- Net public sector debt: projected to peak in 2013/14.
- Average maturity of UK debt: 14 years.
- Gross financing needs (general government) could reach: 16 percent of GDP in 2009/10.
- Example fiscal effort needed: 1½ percentage points average improvement in the cyclically-adjusted overall balance per year to reach 90 percent gross debt by 2014/15 versus ¾ percentage points in the baseline.
- Selected table figures (Budget 2009, percent of GDP):
  - Overall balance 2009/10 (Budget 2009): -12.4
  - Cyclically adjusted overall balance 2009/10 (Budget 2009): -9.8
  - Public sector net debt (excl. FS interventions) 2009/10 (Budget 2009): 55.4
  - Public sector net debt (incl. unrealized losses from FS interventions) 2009/10 (Budget 2009): 55.6
  - General government gross debt 2009/10 (Budget 2009): 71.9
- Staff projections (selected percent of GDP):
  - Overall balance 2009/10 (staff): -12.8
  - Cyclically adjusted overall balance 2009/10 (staff): -9.9
  - Public sector net debt (excl FS interventions) 2009/10 (staff): 56.4
  - General government gross debt 2009/10 (staff): 72.8
- Broad economic indicators (selected exact figures from Table 1 and Table 5):
  - Real GDP growth 2008: -1.0; 2009 est.: -4.2; 2010 proj. (Table 5, Q4/Q4): -1.8 (Q4/Q4)
  - CPI 2008: 3.6; 2009 est.: 1.7
  - Unemployment rate 2009 est.: 7.6; 2010 proj.: 9.2 (Table 1 shows 2009/10 unemployment rate 7.6–9.2 across different displays)
  - Current account balance 2009 (percent of GDP): -2.2 (staff projections and table variations)

*Source: HMT Budget 2009 and IMF staff projections as presented in the document.*

### Annex I. Selected Policy Measures in Response to the Crisis since July 2008

### Annex I. Selected Policy Measures in Response to the Crisis since July 2008

### Liquidity Support
- Expanded the size and frequency of BoE’s long-term repo operations, and the range of eligible collateral to boost banks’ access to term funding.  
- Introduced the Discount Window Facility (DWF) as a permanent liquidity insurance facility for the banking system.  
- Extended the drawdown period for the Special Liquidity Scheme (a T bills-illiquid asset swap program), and lengthened the DWF’s maximum maturity to 364 days (in addition to the standard option to draw for 30 days) upon the closure of SLS’s drawdown window in January 2009. A total of £185 billion of T bills were lent through the SLS.  
- Established an unlimited US dollar swap line with the Federal Reserve to relieve pressure in the US dollar funding markets. The swap line arrangement is in place until February 2010.

### Financial Sector Assistance
- Provided up to £78.1 billion in capital injections in Lloyds/HBOS and RBS (including £22.1 billion in the banks’ payment of shares as fees for asset insurance). The government has taken significant voting stakes in the banks. Lloyds has since repaid £2.3 billion to the government.  
- Set up Asset Protection Scheme to insure banks, for a fee, against excessive losses on troubled assets for at least 5 years. Participating banks will fully absorb the first loss, and the Treasury will absorb 90 percent of any remaining losses. So far, RBS and Lloyds have placed a total of £585 billion of assets under the scheme. As part of the agreement, the two banks have committed to increasing their lending.  
- Clarified FSA’s minimum capital ratio benchmark and disclosed key stress test assumptions to increase transparency of FSA’s supervisory requirements.  
- Enacted temporary short sale ban (in the four months to January 2009) on banking and other financial firm stocks.  

### Support for Credit Flows and Private-Sector Assets
- Introduced Credit Guarantee Scheme by the Treasury to provide guarantees for unsecured bank debts for up to five years (including rollover), and Asset-Backed Securities Guarantee Scheme to insure investors against credit and extension risks of new issues of AAA-rated UK RMBS.  
- Launched program to purchase high-quality private sector assets. Under the Asset Purchase Facility, the BoE may buy up to £50 billion of private assets, including investment-grade sterling commercial paper and corporate bonds.  
- Reversed decision to run down Northern Rock’s mortgage book in an effort to support mortgage lending. Northern Rock will now increase mortgage lending by up to £14 billion in 2009 and 2010.

### Resolution and Prudential Measures
- Resolved Bradford & Bingley, promptly transferring its branch network and retail deposit book to another bank to ensure undisrupted access by depositors, while the remaining parts of the business were taken into temporary public ownership.  
- Expedited a merger between Lloyds and HBOS.  
- Raised the ceiling of retail deposit guarantee to £50,000 from £35,000. Prefunding the insurance scheme (FSCS) with levies on the industry remains an option.  
- Introduced the Special Resolution Regime, a permanent regime to deal with failing banks. The BoE can make independent recommendations to the FSA regarding triggering the resolution regime.  
- Introduced a new capital instrument, Profit Participating Deferred Shares (PPDS), to allow building societies to raise core tier 1 capital from external sources.  
- Phasing in significant reforms to FSA’s regulatory approach, notably strengthening liquidity and capital requirements on banks.  
- Strengthened through legislation the BoE’s role in maintaining financial stability.

### Monetary Policy Actions
- Reduced policy rates rapidly to a historical low of 0.5 percent.  
- Flexibly adjusted the operational arrangements of the standing facilities (the width of the interest rate corridor between the facilities and of the target range of reserves balance) to allow more effective implementation of monetary policy objectives.  
- Introduced unconventional monetary policy. In March, the BoE began unsterilized purchase of assets (£125 billion planned until July). Gilts of 5-25 year maturities constitute a majority of the purchase.

### Macroeconomic Stabilization Efforts
- Adopted a fiscal stimulus package of about 2 percent of GDP, implemented over 2008-2010. Key measures included a 13-month VAT reduction (from 17.5 to 15 percent), advancing infrastructure investment, and various tax incentives for businesses. The twin fiscal rules have been suspended and replaced with a more flexible temporary operating rule.  
- Introduced subsidies to companies hiring jobless people (“golden hellos”). Subsidies are expected to total about £500 million.  
- Provided a job offer, work-focused training or work experience to every 18-24 year old who has been claiming unemployment benefit for 12 months.  
- Encouraged banks to more widely pursue mortgage workouts and avoid repossessions.  
- Provided guarantees for deferred mortgage interest payments by distressed borrowers for up to 2 years. Contingent liability associated with the Homeowners Support Mortgage Scheme is estimated at £1 billion.  
- Extended stamp duty holiday for all houses up to £175,000.  
- Introduced a trade credit insurance scheme, various credit guarantee schemes (e.g., the Working Capital Scheme), and a £750 million Strategic Investment Fund to support investment.

*Prepared by MK Tang — Annex I. Selected Policy Measures in Response to the Crisis since July 2008 (excerpt).*

### Annex II. Sterling and External Adjustment

### Recent exchange rate dynamics and external imbalances
- The UK’s current account deficit had swelled to 3½ percent of GDP and net liabilities climbed to 30 percent of GDP by mid-2007, against a background of robust capital inflows.  
- Sterling fell by 27 percent in REER terms between mid-2007 and April 2009.  
- The UK’s net investment position rose to 6 percent of GDP at end-2008.  
- One-year USD/GBP cross-currency basis swap spreads were very volatile and on several occasions surged past 100 basis points.  
- Market perceptions of sterling risk tracked global investment sentiment; elevated downside risk assessments likely pushed up sterling’s risk premium and contributed to the currency’s weakness.

### Composition of the balance sheet and currency risks
- The UK’s external position is highly leveraged, with gross assets and liabilities each at 5 times GDP, and is essentially composed of net risky assets (direct investment) funded by net debts (debt securities and loans), with the banking sector intermediating most cross-border capital flows.  
- The public sector is expected to become an increasingly large net debtor, despite the UK’s aggregate net liabilities having fallen. The projected sizable rise in government borrowing, considerable contingent liabilities from the banking sector, and lack of full clarity about the future fiscal consolidation path pose risks to confidence in the public sector’s debt sustainability.  
- The UK’s substantial exposure to FX liabilities—primarily through its banking sector—implies a non-negligible threat of a destabilizing FX liquidity crunch. The adequacy of the UK banking system’s liquid FX assets against short-term FX liabilities appears to hinge on the liquidity and market value of its holding of foreign debt securities. A renewed deterioration in global debt securities markets may therefore exacerbate risks of a FX liquidity crunch in the UK. While the existing US dollar swap line with the Federal Reserve mitigates such risks, its effectiveness in crisis situations remains to be tested.  
- Caveats noted: balance of payments data are not consolidated on a firm-level basis (a large portion of external FX assets and liabilities may represent intra-firm transactions), and many UK-resident banks may have access to FX liquidity support from foreign central banks through their overseas units. Official FX liquidity assistance to a bank is contingent upon its ability to produce eligible collaterals, which may become scarce in times of severe banking strains.

### Market measures of exchange rate risk and FX funding pressures
- Exchange rate risk measures (3 month, 25 delta risk reversals) and option-implied volatility (VIX; 3m option-implied volatility GBP/USD) showed elevated levels through 2008 and into 2009, indicating higher downside risk for sterling.  
- UK experienced massive foreign withdrawals from its banking system in 2008Q4, especially in FX deposits. UK banks’ own withdrawals from foreign banks and sales of foreign debt securities matched these foreign withdrawals, but the private FX swap market was heavily stressed and may have compounded sell-off pressure on sterling.

### CGER and valuation assessment
- Multilaterally consistent estimates using the IMF’s CGER methodology indicate that an external current account deficit of 2½ percent of GDP would be consistent with the UK’s structural economic factors.  
- The April 2009 CGER exercise—based on March REER—suggested that sterling was undervalued. The recent rebound of the currency (by roughly 8 percent in REER terms between March and June) appears to have brought sterling broadly in line with the fundamentals as of mid-June. Consensus forecasts similarly predict that the medium-term exchange rate is close to its spot value.

*Prepared by MK Tang — Annex II. Sterling and External Adjustment (excerpt).*

### Annex III. Assessing the Impact of the Financial Crisis on Potential Growth

### Annex III. Assessing the Impact of the Financial Crisis on Potential Growth

### Overview and context
- The deep and protracted financial crisis is likely to reduce the UK economy’s potential to grow in both the near and medium terms.
- A recent paper finds that a severe financial crisis appears to lower potential output by 4 percent on average, with the loss spread over several years.
- Prior to the crisis, historical data suggested potential growth was about 2¾ percent, with the labor, capital stock, and growth residual components contributing approximately ¾ , ½ , and 1½ percentage points, respectively.

### Productive capital stock
- Drivers of near-term slowing in net capital accumulation: demand uncertainty, credit tightening, and accelerated capital scrapping (forced discontinuation of ongoing capital projects).
- Key quantitative projections for net growth of capital stock:
  - Pre-crisis estimate: 2¼ percent
  - 2008: 1¼ percent
  - 2010: 0 percent
  - 2014: 1 percent

### Labor supply
- Near-term decline in migrant worker inflows is expected to persist, reflecting sterling depreciation and dimmer employment prospects.
- Assumptions and projections:
  - Annual net migrant worker inflows fall to 0.2 percent of the workforce in 2010 from the pre-crisis estimate of 0.6 percent of the workforce, before rebounding as unemployment recedes.
- Additional labor effects reducing potential growth:
  - A likely decline in the labor participation rate due to dropout of discouraged job seekers.
  - A rise in the structural unemployment rate caused by prolonged unemployment and sectoral shifts (skill mismatch).
  - A loss of labor skills arising from prolonged unemployment.

### Growth residual and financial sector adjustment

A. Direct impact of financial sector retrenchment
- The UK financial sector was a strong economic driver before the crisis:
  - Per-employee compensation in the UK financial sector climbed from 140 percent of the national average in 2000 to 180 percent in 2007.
  - The sector’s gross operating surplus jumped by 2½ percentage points to 3¾ percent of total gross value added between 2000 and 2007.
  - The financial sector’s net operating surplus rose from ¾ percent of total gross value added in 2000 to 3¼ percent in 2007.
  - In real terms, on average between 2000 and 2007, the financial sector grew 3¼ percentage points per year faster than the overall economy—with most of the growth differential accounted for by non-labor inputs.
- Given a weight of about 7 percent of the economy, a drop in growth rates of the financial sector to the economy-wide average would imply roughly a fall of ¼ percentage point in overall economic growth (noting potential measurement issues with financial sector deflators).

B. Spillover implications for the rest of the economy
- Evidence of financial spillovers:
  - Industries more dependent on external finance tend to grow more rapidly as the financial sector expands.
  - A 1 percentage point increase in financial sector growth appears to raise growth of external finance-dependent industries by 0.6 percentage point on average.
- Estimated economy-wide spillover from financial sector retrenchment:
  - A 1 percentage point reduction in financial sector growth is estimated to translate into approximately a ¼ percentage point decline in the output growth of the other industries.
- Long-run compositional effects:
  - Over a long horizon, the economy may shift toward less external-dependent industries in response to financial sector downsizing, possibly reducing the negative impact of decreased financial spillovers.

### Aggregated impacts on potential growth (scenarios and central estimates)
- Combining effects on capital stock, labor supply, and the direct and indirect effects of financial sector retrenchment yields a range of probable scenarios:
  - Near term: potential growth falls to ¼ to 1¼ percent.
  - Medium term: potential growth subsequently picks up to around 1¾ to 2¼ percent.
- Historical benchmark: 2000–07 average potential growth around 2¾ percent (component contributions noted above).

### Key quantitative relationships and figures (preserved)
- Pre-crisis potential growth: 2¾ percent (labor ≈ ¾ percentage point; capital ≈ ½ percentage point; growth residual ≈ 1½ percentage points).
- Capital stock net growth path: pre-crisis 2¼ percent → 2008: 1¼ percent → 2010: 0 percent → 2014: 1 percent.
- Migrant inflows: pre-crisis 0.6 percent of workforce → 2010: 0.2 percent of workforce.
- Financial sector growth differential: 3¼ percentage points per year faster than overall economy (2000–2007).
- Financial sector weight: about 7 percent of the economy.
- Financial sector gross operating surplus: rose by 2½ percentage points to 3¾ percent of total GVA (2000–2007).
- Financial sector net operating surplus: from ¾ percent to 3¼ percent of total GVA (2000–2007).
- Spillover elasticities:
  - 1 percentage point increase in financial sector growth → 0.6 percentage point increase in external finance-dependent industries' growth.
  - 1 percentage point reduction in financial sector growth → ≈ ¼ percentage point decline in output growth of other industries.

### Uncertainty and caveats
- Parameters underlying potential growth estimation are historically derived and may be invalid under significant regime change.
- Many key determinants of potential supply are still in flux (extent of downturn, financial sector transformation).
- UK’s potential supply is influenced by changes in other major economies’ growth potentials.
- Risks that a fast-deteriorating fiscal outlook could adversely affect potential growth through its impact on long-term interest rates (to date this channel appears muted).

*Prepared by MK Tang; Annex III of the IMF staff report.*

### Annex V. Public Debt Sustainability

### Annex V. Public Debt Sustainability

### Overview
- The UK’s public debt indicators were favorable at the outset of the crisis: debt levels were below the average of European peers, the debt portfolio had long maturities and minimal rollover amounts, and a broad range of debt instruments and placement mechanisms was available to ensure funding of government operations.
- The analysis focuses on general government consolidated gross debt (see Box A1), which closely tracks the Maastricht treaty definition and includes the gross cash cost of financial sector interventions.

### Baseline projections and key statistics
- General government gross debt is projected to increase from 43 percent of GDP in 2007/08 to about 100 percent of GDP by 2014/15.
- Primary deficit dynamics (in percent of GDP):
  - Primary deficit will peak at 11.1 percent of GDP in 2009/10.
  - Primary balance (excl. interest revenue) projected: -0.6 (2007/08), -4.8 (2008/09), -11.1 (2009/10), -10.3 (2010/11), -7.6 (2011/12), -5.6 (2012/13), -3.9 (2013/14), -2.8 (2014/15), -1.4 (2015/16).
- Overall and current balances (in percent of GDP):
  - Overall balance: -2.7 (2007/08), -7.0 (2008/09), -13.1 (2009/10), -13.3 (2010/11), -10.8 (2011/12), -9.0 (2012/13), -7.5 (2013/14), -6.7 (2014/15), -5.2 (2015/16).
  - Current balance: -0.6 (2007/08), -3.8 (2008/09), -9.9 (2009/10), -10.9 (2010/11), -8.9 (2011/12), -7.4 (2012/13), -6.2 (2013/14), -5.4 (2014/15), -3.9 (2015/16).
- Gross financing needs:
  - Expected to reach 18 percent of GDP in 2010/11, driven by high overall deficit, amortization, and increased share of short-term debt.
  - Gross financing need series (in percent of GDP): 6.2 (2004), 5.7 (2005), 6.2 (2006), 5.9 (2007), 9.5 (2008), 17.4 (2009), 18.1 (2010), 16.4 (2011), 15.1 (2012), 14.0 (2013), 13.1 (2014).
  - Gross financing need in billions of U.S. dollars: 138.8 (2004), 131.9 (2005), 154.4 (2006), 166.8 (2007), 260.9 (2008), 447.6 (2009), 477.7 (2010), 459.0 (2011), 450.3 (2012), 445.3 (2013), 441.1 (2014).
- Public sector debt-to-revenue ratio: 107.9 (2004), 110.9 (2005), 111.8 (2006), 113.4 (2007), 149.6 (2008), 210.6 (2009), 241.0 (2010), 252.7 (2011), 260.6 (2012), 265.5 (2013), 268.0 (2014).
- Baseline public sector debt path (percent of GDP): 39.6 (2004), 41.7 (2005), 42.5 (2006), 43.2 (2007), 55.4 (2008), 72.7 (2009), 85.0 (2010), 91.9 (2011), 96.1 (2012), 98.6 (2013), 100.0 (2014).
- Key macro-fiscal assumptions underlying the baseline:
  - Real GDP growth (percent): 2.5 (2004), 2.5 (2005), 2.7 (2006), 2.6 (2007), -1.1 (2008), -3.0 (2009), 0.5 (2010), 2.6 (2011), 2.9 (2012), 2.8 (2013), 2.7 (2014).
  - Average nominal interest rate on public debt (percent): 5.5 (2004), 5.4 (2005), 5.3 (2006), 5.4 (2007), 5.1 (2008), 3.5 (2009), 4.2 (2010), 4.0 (2011), 3.9 (2012), 4.0 (2013), 4.2 (2014).
  - Average real interest rate (percent): 2.7 (2004), 3.6 (2005), 2.3 (2006), 2.6 (2007), 2.9 (2008), 2.5 (2009), 2.6 (2010), 1.3 (2011), 1.1 (2012), 1.2 (2013), 1.4 (2014).
  - Inflation rate (GDP deflator, percent): 2.8 (2004), 1.9 (2005), 3.0 (2006), 2.8 (2007), 2.2 (2008), 1.0 (2009), 1.5 (2010), 2.7 (2011), 2.8 (2012), 2.8 (2013), 2.8 (2014).
  - Growth of real primary spending (percent): 4.7 (2004), 3.7 (2005), 2.7 (2006), 2.9 (2007), 7.0 (2008), 5.7 (2009), 0.4 (2010), -1.1 (2011), -0.5 (2012), -0.8 (2013), 0.5 (2014).

### Alternative scenarios and bound tests (uncertainty analysis)
- Interest rate shock:
  - Baseline assumes real interest rates average 1.5 percent over the projection period.
  - If real interest rates increase to 3.5 percent (above historical average of 3.2), debt would increase to 108 percent of GDP by 2014/15, 8 percentage points above the baseline.
- Growth shocks:
  - Downside: growth ½ percentage point lower each year → debt-to-GDP ratio could reach 109 percent by 2014/15.
  - Upside: growth ½ percentage point higher each year → debt-to-GDP ratio could fall to 96 percent by 2014/15.
- Primary balance shock / no policy change:
  - No policy change (constant primary balance) in 2009-2014: public sector debt would evolve from 72.7 (2008) to 85.7 (2009), 96.1 (2010), 105.8 (2011), 115.3 (2012), 124.9 (2013) (percent of GDP series shown in Table A2).
- Combined and other shocks:
  - Combined shock illustrated yields debt around 106 percent in the scenario panel.
  - Historical and baseline comparisons shown; figures in boxes in charts represent average projections and ten-year historical averages.

### Financial sector interventions, contingent liabilities, and exit scenarios
- Contingent liabilities from guarantees:
  - Central scenario: losses totalling 14 percent on the £777 billion of guarantees (distributed over 5 years) → could increase debt by 7 percent of GDP.
  - Conservative scenario: losses totalling 28 percent → could increase debt by 13 percent of GDP.
- Unwinding direct financial sector support (bank recapitalization):
  - Reversing cash bank recapitalization undertaken in 2008/09 has upside risks to debt of up to 6 percentage points.
  - Exit scenarios for bank shares purchased in 2008/09:
    - Sale of shares over next 5 years at purchase price → gains scenario produces debt-to-GDP of 94 (vs baseline 100).
    - Sale at double purchase price → "no losses" scenario produces debt-to-GDP of 97 (vs baseline 100).
    - If shares become worthless → gross government debt unchanged but public sector net worth would decrease.
- Further public capital provision:
  - Scenario assuming additional £88 billion in public capital provision increases debt-to-GDP ratio to 105 percent by 2014/15.
- Treasury indemnification and monetary policy operations:
  - Treasury’s indemnification of the Bank of England from any losses related to conduct of monetary policy is not included in the analysis.
  - Expected losses from the Special Liquidity Scheme are considered very low.
  - Potential losses on purchases under the Asset Purchase Facility are not included.

### Debt composition and external funding considerations
- Currency denomination and foreign holdings:
  - Practically all public debt is denominated in sterling.
  - Roughly one-third of gilts are held by foreigners; foreign investors play an important role in funding the budget deficit.
  - Sterling denomination protects the government from exchange rate risk, but exchange rate expectations affect overseas demand for UK securities.
- Measurement issues (Box A1):
  - The pending statistical classification of RBS and Lloyds as public sector corporations will cause public sector net debt to increase dramatically because few of the banks’ assets count toward public sector liquid assets.
  - Pending statistical treatment of assets bought under the Bank of England’s Asset Purchase Facility could also affect public sector net debt.
  - Note: Pending ONS decision, general government gross debt excludes Treasury bills created by HMT and lent to the Bank of England to operate the Special Liquidity Scheme (13 percent of GDP).

### Policy implications and analysis highlights
- High near-term gross financing needs (peak ~18 percent of GDP) and a primary deficit peaking at 11.1 percent of GDP in 2009/10 imply substantial fiscal consolidation will be required to stabilize debt.
- Debt-stabilizing primary balance under the baseline is projected to be -1.4 percent of GDP by 2015/16.
- Outcomes are highly sensitive to:
  - Real interest rate movements (1.5 percent baseline vs 3.5 percent shock).
  - Growth performance (±½ percentage point shocks change 2014/15 debt by -4 to +9 percentage points relative to baseline).
  - Realized costs of financial sector interventions and bank recapitalizations (losses or further capital injections could raise debt materially).
- Net worth considerations: scenarios where bank share values fall to zero leave gross debt unchanged but reduce public sector net worth.

*Prepared by IMF staff; Annex V. Public Debt Sustainability.*

### 3.      To take the proposed program forward the government intends to consult with the

### _cr09212 - 3.      To take the proposed program forward the government intends to consult with the

### Government consultation and legislative timing
- The government intends to consult with the FSA, the Bank of England, other relevant parties, and its international partners over the coming months.
- Concrete legislative action is envisaged to start later in 2009.

### Bank of England Financial Stability Report (FSR) findings (June 25)
- Banks in the UK (and internationally) will remain sensitive to further shocks for some time given their leverage and funding positions.
- Private demand for non-guaranteed bank debt has begun to return, but funding pressure is likely to persist in the coming years as banks need to secure substantial private financing to replace current official funding support.
- If the economic recovery stalls because of weak bank lending, losses on assets could rise, further affecting confidence in the banking sector.
- To increase financial system resilience the FSR calls for:
  - stronger market discipline, including through more granular and frequent disclosure by banks;
  - greater self-insurance, including by holding higher capital and liquidity buffers;
  - improved management of risks arising from interactions, including by improved information on connections between financial institutions; and
  - countercyclical prudential policy to limit the growth of financial imbalances.

### Relationship to other reviews and international cooperation
- Proposals in the Treasury’s white paper and the BoE’s FSR complement those in the Turner Review (released in February 2009) and are consistent with the thrust of the staff report’s recommendations.
- The UK authorities are encouraged to continue work on implementation of the proposed actions in close collaboration with international partners.

### IMF Article IV Consultation — Background and policy response (PIN No. 09/84, July 16, 2009)
- The Executive Board concluded the 2009 Article IV consultation with the United Kingdom on July 10, 2009.
- Crisis context and recent developments:
  - Large financial sector, high household indebtedness, and strong cross-border links made the UK particularly vulnerable.
  - Economic growth turned sharply negative since mid-2008; house prices have fallen by more than 20 percent from their peak; unemployment increased; inflation has come down.
  - Sterling depreciated significantly between mid-2007 and early 2009, then regained some strength in recent months.
  - Growth of credit to the private sector has fallen to nearly zero and is expected to remain low in the near term.
- Policy measures taken:
  - Expansion of the Bank of England’s liquidity facilities.
  - Significant public capital injections in several large banks.
  - An Asset Protection Scheme to limit losses on troubled bank assets.
  - Guarantees for banks’ debt.
  - Bank of England reduced interest rates to 0.5 percent by March 2009 and began purchasing assets (quantitative easing).
  - Government discretionary fiscal stimulus of around 2 percent of GDP.
- Effects:
  - Policies helped avert a systemic breakdown in the financial system, although vulnerabilities remain.

### Public finances and outlook
- Fiscal deterioration:
  - Fiscal deficits are expected to be about 13 percent of GDP in 2009 and 2010.
  - Gross general government debt is set to double over the next five years to nearly 100 percent of GDP.
  - Contingent liabilities of the government have increased rapidly.
- Real economy outlook (IMF staff projections cited in the PIN):
  - GDP is expected to contract by 4.2 percent in 2009, with growth picking up gradually in 2010.
  - Inflation is expected to fall below the 2-percent target in the second half of 2009 and remain low for an extended period.

### Executive Board assessment and recommendations
- Directors welcomed aggressive UK policy response and noted measures averted systemic breakdown.
- Key vulnerabilities: sharp increase in public debt, accumulation of sizable contingent liabilities, continued financial sector fragility.
- Main policy priorities:
  - Resolve problems in the financial sector.
  - Set monetary and fiscal policies consistent with price stability and fiscal sustainability.
- Financial sector recommendations:
  - Encourage banks to strengthen their capital base and explore options to improve capital structures.
  - Continue contingency planning and be prepared to provide further public capital if needed.
  - Effective implementation of the Special Resolution Regime requires timely and comprehensive information sharing and cooperation among tripartite authorities.
  - Work with international partners, including the EU, on strengthening cross-border financial stability arrangements and resolution frameworks.
- Prudential framework and macroprudential policy:
  - Support for proposals in the Turner Review and Treasury white paper, including enhanced liquidity regulation, emphasis on system-wide risks, and proposals for a Council for Financial Stability.
  - Encourage development of new macro-prudential instruments to mitigate amplitude of credit cycles.
  - A phased introduction of a maximum gross leverage ratio could act as a useful backstop against excessive balance sheet growth.
  - Improve frequency and quality of disclosure of financial information by banks.
- Monetary policy assessment:
  - Bank of England’s aggressive monetary easing aimed at maintaining inflation close to target is appropriate; too early to judge effectiveness of quantitative easing.
  - Diversifying the Bank’s private asset purchases could help improve the functioning of capital markets.
  - Robust institutional arrangements underpinning unconventional operations, including comprehensive indemnity assurances from the Treasury, preserve Bank of England’s operational independence and aid smooth exit from quantitative easing when warranted.
- Fiscal credibility:
  - Success of the policy package depends on continued trust in fiscal sustainability.
  - Strong commitment to reverse sharp deterioration of public finances once recovery is established is essential.
  - Fiscal consolidation should focus on putting public debt on a firmly downward path within a reasonable timeframe.
  - Credibility would be enhanced by specifying concrete expenditure and revenue measures; long-term sustainability aided by structural reforms to limit ageing-related costs.

### Selected economic and social indicators (selected key figures exactly as reported)
- Real GDP (change in percent): 2005: 2.2; 2006: 2.9; 2007: 2.6; 2008: 0.7; 2009 Proj.: -4.2; 2010 Proj.: 0.2
- Domestic demand (change in percent): 2005: 2.1; 2006: 2.4; 2007: 3.0; 2008: 0.5; 2009 Proj.: -5.0; 2010 Proj.: -0.3
- CPI: 2005: 2.1; 2006: 2.3; 2007: 2.3; 2008: 3.6; 2009 Proj.: 1.7; 2010 Proj.: 1.3
- Unemployment rate (in percent) 1/: 2005: 4.8; 2006: 5.4; 2007: 5.4; 2008: 5.5; 2009 Proj.: 7.6; 2010 Proj.: 9.2
- Gross national saving (percent of GDP): 2005: 14.5; 2006: 14.2; 2007: 15.6; 2008: 15.3; 2009 Proj.: 11.8; 2010 Proj.: 12.4
- Gross domestic investment (percent of GDP): 2005: 17.1; 2006: 17.5; 2007: 18.3; 2008: 17.0; 2009 Proj.: 14.1; 2010 Proj.: 14.4
- General government balance: 2005: -3.0; 2006: -2.6; 2007: -2.7; 2008: -7.0; 2009 Proj.: -13.1; 2010 Proj.: -13.3
- Public sector balance: 2005: -3.0; 2006: -2.3; 2007: -2.4; 2008: -6.1; 2009 Proj.: -12.8; 2010 Proj.: -13.1
- Cyclically adjusted balance (staff estimates): 2005: -2.8; 2006: -2.2; 2007: -2.8; 2008: -5.5; 2009 Proj.: -9.9; 2010 Proj.: -9.5
- Public sector net debt: 2005: 35.6; 2006: 36.2; 2007: 36.5; 2008: 42.1; 2009 Proj.: 56.4; 2010 Proj.: 67.9
- M4 (end-period, 12-month percent change): 2005: 12.8; 2006: 12.5; 2007: 12.3; 2008: 16.4; 2009 Proj.: 17.4
- Consumer Credit (end-period, 12-month percent change): 2005: 9.6; 2006: 7.4; 2007: 7.0; 2008: 4.5; 2009 Proj.: 2.1
- Three-month interbank rate (year average): 2005: 4.7; 2006: 5.3; 2007: 6.0; 2008: 5.5; 2009 Proj.: 1.9
- Ten-year government bond yield (year average): 2005: 4.4; 2006: 4.5; 2007: 5.0; 2008: 4.6; 2009 Proj.: 3.5
- Trade balance (in percent of GDP): 2005: -3.4; 2006: -3.1; 2007: -3.2; 2008: -2.7; 2009 Proj.: -2.3; 2010 Proj.: -2.0
- Current account balance (in percent of GDP): 2005: -2.6; 2006: -3.3; 2007: -2.7; 2008: -1.7; 2009 Proj.: -2.2; 2010 Proj.: -2.0
- Exports (percent of GDP): 2005: 26.4; 2006: 28.5; 2007: 26.6; 2008: 29.1; 2009 Proj.: 26.7; 2010 Proj.: 27.2
- Export volume (change in percent): 2005: 7.9; 2006: 11.3; 2007: -2.8; 2008: 0.8; 2009 Proj.: -12.9; 2010 Proj.: 0.7
- Imports (percent of GDP): 2005: 29.8; 2006: 31.6; 2007: 29.8; 2008: 31.8; 2009 Proj.: 29.0; 2010 Proj.: 29.2
- Import volume (change in percent): 2005: 7.1; 2006: 8.8; 2007: -0.7; 2008: -0.6; 2009 Proj.: -14.2; 2010 Proj.: -1.0
- Net exports of oil (in billions of US dollars): 2005: -4.0; 2006: -5.1; 2007: -8.1; 2008: -10.1; 2009 Proj.: -4.9; 2010 Proj.: -6.1
- Reserves (end of period, in billion of US dollars): 2005: 46.2; 2006: 51.8; 2007: 57.2; 2008: 53.9
- Fund Position (as of April 30, 2009): Holdings of currency (in percent of quota): 86.3; Holdings of SDRs (in percent of allocation): 15.2; Quota (in millions of SDRs): 10,738.5
- Bilateral exchange rate (May 26, 2009): US$ = £0.6272
- Nominal effective rate (2000=100): 2005: 100.0; 2006: 100.8; 2007: 103.1; 2008: 90.9; 2009 Proj.: 78.4
- Real effective rate (2000=100) 4/: 2005: 101.4; 2006: 103.2; 2007: 108.0; 2008: 95.0; 2009 Proj.: 80.5
- Social indicators (selected):
  - Income per capita (in US dollars, 2007): 46.716
  - Income distribution (ratio of income received by top and bottom quintiles, 2007): 5.5
  - Life expectancy at birth (2005): 77.1 (male) and 81.1 (female)
  - Automobile ownership (2004): 463 per thousand
  - CO2 emissions (ton per capita, 2005): 9.26
  - Population density (2007): 252 inhabitants per sq. km.
  - Poverty rate (at-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers, 2007): 19%

### Statement by Alex Gibbs, Executive Director for the United Kingdom (July 10, 2009) — authorities’ views
- Outlook and recent developments:
  - Treasury’s April 2009 Budget forecast: a -3¾ to -3¼ percent reduction in GDP in 2009, followed by 1 to 1½ percent growth in 2010; Treasury assumed a phased downward adjustment to the trend level of output of around 5 percent.
  - As spare capacity is brought back to productive use by 2011, GDP is forecast to grow by 3½ percent.
  - Authorities see potential upside to growth: effect of aggressive policy stimulus; lower sterling shifting expenditure toward UK goods and services; UK advanced in inventory cycle; normalisation of credit conditions from interventions; flexible labour market aiding adjustment.
  - Authorities forecast a stronger rebound in inflation than staff and consider risk of deflation in the CPI measure to be small given monetary stimulus and pass-through of exchange rate depreciation. Medium-term inflation expectations remain anchored to the inflation target.
- Fiscal policy — short-term stimulus:
  - 2008 Pre-Budget Report announced a temporary fiscal stimulus worth around 1 percent of GDP in 2009–10, including a temporary reduction in the rate of VAT to 15 percent and bringing forward £3 billion of capital spending.
  - 2009 Budget announced further targeted support; fiscal support amounts to 4 percent of GDP in 2009–10 from announced measures and the operation of automatic stabilisers.
- Fiscal policy — medium-term consolidation:
  - Government committed to delivering fiscal consolidation and has taken steps beyond withdrawal of temporary stimulus.
  - Fiscal forecast assumptions: majority of deterioration treated as structural; based on lower end of projected GDP forecast range; uses independently audited assumptions on oil prices, equity prices, and the VAT gap; includes provisional estimate of the net impact of unrealized losses on financial sector interventions equal to 3½ percent of GDP.
  - Temporary fiscal operating rule: set policies to improve the cyclically-adjusted current budget each year, once the economy emerges from the downturn, so it reaches balance and debt is falling as a proportion of GDP once global shocks have worked through.
  - Plans to deliver sustained fiscal consolidation include combination of adjustments to tax and spending; projected improvement in the cyclically-adjusted balance of, on average, over 0.8 percent a year from 2010–11 to 2013–14.
  - Public sector net borrowing projected to more than halve over 4 years to stand at 5.5 percent of GDP in 2013–14.
  - Net debt projected to stabilize at 79 percent of GDP, including potential losses on financial sector interventions.
  - Consistent with temporary operating rule: public finances set to achieve cyclically-adjusted current balance by 2017–18 and debt falling as a share of GDP by 2015–16.
- Authorities’ commitment: continue to ensure sustainable public finances while investing in public services and infrastructure.

*International Monetary Fund — Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 09/84, July 16, 2009*

### introduction in 1997, delivered over a decade of low and stable inflation. It enshrines a

### _cr09212 - introduction in 1997, delivered over a decade of low and stable inflation. It enshrines a

### Monetary policy, Asset Purchase Facility, and QE
- The Bank of England’s symmetric inflation target has enabled a decisive response by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) as aggregate demand weakened and the outlook for inflation was revised downwards.
- Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Bank Rate was reduced by 450 basis points in just six months.
- The Government established the Asset Purchase Facility to enable the Bank of England to increase the availability of corporate credit and to provide a framework for the MPC to use asset purchases for monetary policy purposes in January.
- Since its inception, the Bank of England has announced asset purchases of £125bn.
- Staff judged the Bank of England’s conventional and unconventional monetary easing to have been both “timely and appropriate.”
- The sharp drop in gilt yields on announcement provides some indication of the market’s view of the likely effectiveness of asset purchases.
- Diversifications of the Bank’s asset purchases are under active consideration; consultations have taken place on both a secured commercial paper (SCP) facility and a possible supply chain finance facility.
- Design features underscoring price-stability focus and operational independence:
  - The March 2009 exchange of letters between the Governor of the Bank of England and the Chancellor establishing the Asset Purchase Facility make clear that the MPC retains operational independence, with its remit unchanged; the MPC will decide the timing and size of asset purchases and sales, together with the level of Bank Rate.
  - The operational framework of the Asset Purchase Facility Fund, as a separate legal entity with a separate balance sheet, indemnified by the Treasury, underlines the Bank’s operational independence.
- Medium-term inflation expectations surveys suggest expectations continue to be well-anchored to the inflation target.

### Financial sector stabilization, recapitalization, and lending commitments
- Authorities deployed various measures to support banks, protect depositors and maintain stability; key measures include the October recapitalization scheme and the Asset Protection Scheme (APS) introduced in February 2009.
- The APS provides insurance for assets with the greatest uncertainty about future performance, allowing it to absorb losses and strengthen banks’ capital position.
- The Government replaced its preference shares in Lloyds and RBS with new ordinary shares, further strengthening their capital positions.
- Lending commitments to restart credit flows:
  - RBS will lend an additional £25 billion on commercial terms over the 12 months from March 2009 — £9 billion of mortgage lending and £16 billion of business lending.
  - Lloyds will lend an additional £14 billion on commercial terms over the 12 months from March 2009 — £3 billion of mortgage lending and £11 billion of business lending.
  - Similar lending commitments have been made in respect of the subsequent 12 months and will be reviewed to reflect economic circumstances at that time.
- Building society sector support and resolution framework:
  - Profit Participation Deferred Schemes were introduced and used in the recapitalization of West Bromwich Building Society.
  - Eligibility for the Government’s Recapitalisation and Credit Guarantee Schemes has been extended to building societies.
  - The Government will shortly consult on measures to enable building societies to offer a floating charge over their assets to the Bank of England or other institution offering financial assistance.
  - The February 2009 Banking Act, providing a strengthened framework for the resolution of deposit taking institutions, was put into almost immediate use in the resolution of another building society in March 2009.
- Signs of improving financial conditions since the Staff Mission:
  - The latest Bank of England credit conditions survey suggests an increase in credit availability for both households and corporates, reversing prior tightening.
  - Banks expect credit availability to improve further in the next three months for both corporates and households.
  - Much of the fall in lending has come from a reduction in non-bank credit, securities market activity and lending from foreign banks.
  - Over the past few months lending by UK-incorporated banks has continued to expand, albeit at a decelerating rate.
  - Recent data suggests house prices are starting to stabilize.
  - Bank funding conditions, as measured by the libor/OIS spread, have continued to improve and are now at their most favourable levels since the collapse of Lehmans.
  - Global financial conditions have generally eased and equity prices have continued to recover, including equity prices for UK banks.
- Regulatory and supervisory reform priorities:
  - Authorities agree with Staff that further reforms are needed to strengthen the financial sector, in the UK and globally, and that supervision of financial institutions is an area needing urgent improvement.
  - Lord Turner’s report (The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis, March 2009) provides a thorough analysis of key areas for reform and interactions between them.
  - Recommendations need consideration alongside those from the G20 Heads of Government summit and reports from the EU.
  - The work of the Basel Committee to deliver a global framework for stronger bank liquidity buffers and greater consistency in treatment of cross-border banking groups is strongly welcomed.
  - As agreed by all G20 Leaders in Washington DC last November, authorities are committed to undertaking a further FSAP and expect the next exercise to be undertaken in 2011.

### External spillovers and exchange rate adjustment
- The significant fall in the (real) external value of sterling over the past twelve months has improved the UK current account considerably, mostly reflecting stronger investment income.
- Authorities remain fully committed to allowing the value of sterling to be determined by market forces; the sterling effective exchange rate has risen by 13 percent since its trough in December 2008.
- The flexible exchange rate has acted as an effective shock absorber helping smooth adjustment as the economy contracts.
- On Article IV surveillance and spillovers:
  - Authorities welcome analysis of policy spillovers and international linkages but consider the hypothetical shock in Box 1 (page 22)—illustrating spillovers from a 50 percent cut in UK banks’ foreign lending—to be very extreme and of very low risk of materialising.
  - At the height of the financial crisis in Q4 2008, consolidated foreign claims of UK banks declined by only 14 percent and foreign lending by only 7.9 percent over their levels in September 2008.

### Looking ahead: policy stance and international collaboration
- A year of significant challenge has been supported by wide-ranging and decisive policy action.
- Authorities approach the year ahead with confidence tempered with caution given challenges ahead.
- International collaboration on the evolving policy response strengthens the prospect of success.
- The evolution of the UK economy will continue to be affected by international developments and global as well as domestic policy actions.
- Authorities stand ready to work with others and take whatever steps are necessary to restore non-inflationary growth and sustainable public finances.
- Authorities welcome the IMF’s continued policy advice.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpts provided in the content unit.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/_cr09212.pdf_
