## _cr0931 ## Source details **Canonical URL:** [_cr0931](https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/_cr0931.pdf) ## Other formats - [Markdown version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/_cr0931.pdf.md) - [Structured JSON version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/_cr0931.pdf.json) --- ### Introduction and report overview - Report: FATF Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes — FATF 40 Recommendations and 9 Special Recommendations; summary of Greece as of November 2006. - Purpose: - Summarises AML/CFT measures in place in Greece as of November 2006. - Assesses compliance with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations. - Provides recommendations to strengthen the AML/CFT system. - Note: Views agreed by FATF; do not necessarily reflect the Boards of the IMF or World Bank. ### Key findings — overall effectiveness and scope - General assessment: - Legal requirements to combat money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) are generally inadequate to meet FATF standards. - Serious concerns about the effectiveness of the AML/CFT system. - Legal history and criminalisation: - AML Law came into force in August 1995; amended in December 2005 to expand scope and clarify ML definition. - Criminalisation of terrorist financing is recent (July 2004); no FT cases to date. - ML offence appears not effectively implemented; very low rate of prosecutions and convictions. - Seizure/confiscation and UN Resolutions: - Provisions relating to confiscation of criminal proceeds do not fully comply with international standards. - Level of implementation of S/RES/1267(1999) and S/RES/1373(2001) is inadequate; Greek authorities have not frozen funds under either UNSCR. ### Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) — structure, capacity and performance - Institutional setup: - FIU originally set up in 1995; operational in July 1997; upgraded after 2005 AML Law into an independent administrative authority composed of the President and eleven part-time members. - Practical deficiencies observed at on-site visit: - limited access to all financial, administrative and law enforcement information required; - severely understaffed, especially lacking skilled financial analysts; - critically lacked organisational and technical resources; - needed enhanced measures to ensure information held is more securely protected; - published periodic reports not sufficiently comprehensive (especially on detailed statistics, typologies and trends). - Reporting and referrals: - From 2001 to 2006, only 1.5 to 3.5% of STRs received were sent to the public prosecutor. - FATF/Ratings summary points: - Recommendation 26 (The FIU) — NC: inappropriately structured, conflicts of interest, not connected to Egmont Secure Web, lacking IT and human resources; reports lack statistics/typologies/trends. - Recommendation 30 (Resources, integrity and training) — NC: FIU understaffed and lacks organisational and technical resources. - Recommendation (priority): - Restructure the FIU (e.g., task the President and Committee members with oversight/coordination and leave specialised staff to investigate incoming STRs). - Ensure FIU connection to FIU.Net / Egmont Secure Web; provide sufficient skilled staff and comprehensive IT systems; secure physical and electronic protection of STR data; provide more comprehensive published reports including statistics, typologies and trends. ### Money laundering and terrorist financing risks and typologies - Risk information gaps: - No comprehensive study on the amount of criminal proceeds or laundering methods. - A 2006 Ministry of Economy and Finance study estimated gross amount earned in 2000 from illegal prostitution, drug trafficking, and cigarette and alcohol smuggling is approximately €1.6 billion (1% GDP in 2000). - Identified laundering channels and methods: - Use of banks, investment firms, mutual funds, offshore companies, bureaux de change, newly founded companies, traders of precious metals. - Common methods: placement via bank deposits and share acquisition in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE); layering via structured domestic and international transactions by relatives and third parties. - TF risk perception and controls: - Greece perceived as low risk for terrorist financing; no assets of terrorist groups or terrorists found in Greece. - Authorities not aware of alternative remittance systems; assessors were told such systems take place using call centres but no systemic study conducted. - Noted cross-border cash transfers, particularly using tourist buses, suggesting potential TF risks. ### Legal system, definitions and confiscation measures - ML offence and predicate offences: - ML defined in Article 1.B of the AML Law; follows Vienna and Palermo Conventions in physical/material elements, but proof interpretation of predicate offences is restrictive, hindering prosecution of “third-party” laundering. - Greece uses a list of predicate offences and a threshold approach: catch-all applies only where the offence “generated a property of at least EUR 15,000”. - Self-laundering not clearly criminalised. - Corporate liability and penalties: - Corporate criminal liability not recognised in Greek law or doctrine. - Basic penalties for natural persons: 5-10 years imprisonment; for legal persons: administrative fine of up to nearly EUR 3 million, though certain provisions reduce effectiveness/deterrence (e.g., ML sentence cannot exceed sentence for predicate offence; fines can substitute prison for sentences under one year). - Terrorist financing offence shortcomings: - FT offence’s scope too narrow: does not criminalise collecting/providing funds or material support to terrorists or for specific terrorist acts; TF is not a standalone offence irrespective of actual use of funds. - Defence in Article 187.A (8) is broad and may undermine the provision. - Confiscation/seizure deficiencies: - Law appears not to permit confiscation of indirect proceeds. - Uncertainty whether authorities can confiscate instrumentalities intended for use in ML or a predicate offence. - Courts lack explicit power to void or prevent actions involving proceeds of crime from the time predicate offence was committed. - Powers of seizure do not extend to all property that could be proceeds of crime. - General confiscation legislation does not provide for freezing on an ex parte basis, with right to appeal. - Powers to trace, seize, freeze and confiscate have not been used since required powers are set out across different pieces of legislation. - Recommendations (selected): - Remove the EUR 15,000 threshold limitation; ensure predicate list includes all FATF designated offences and all offences punishable by at least six months in prison. - Criminalise self-laundering; extend criminal liability to legal persons. - Allow confiscation of indirect proceeds; extend seizure powers to all property that could be proceeds of crime; provide courts power to void/prevent transactions from time of crime; permit ex parte freezing with right to appeal. ### Implementation of UNSCRs, freezing and de-listing - Implementation status: - Some measures implemented through EU Regulations but limited action for provisions not covered by EU instruments. - Greek authorities have not frozen any funds under UNSCR 1267 or UNSCR 1373. - Notification process to ministries and financial sector of UN-listed entities would take too long to meet immediate freezing obligations. - No guidance provided to financial institutions or DNFBPs on freezing assets of listed entities without delay; no monitoring of compliance except by passing information to appropriate authority. - No clear/public procedures for de-listing and unfreezing. - SR ratings and deficiencies: - SR.III Freeze and confiscate terrorist assets — PC: limited ability to freeze funds outside EU listing system; process too slow; no sanctions for failure to follow freezing requests; no procedure for allowing payment of basic living expenses in line with UNSCR 1452; no court challenge process for frozen funds; inability to freeze without opening criminal investigation. - SR.I Implement UN instruments — PC; SR.II Criminalise terrorist financing — PC. ### Law enforcement, prosecution and judicial system - Institutional responsibilities: - FIU allocated preliminary investigation powers for AML Law offences. - Hellenic Police: national agency for detection and investigation of all crime (including drug violations and terrorism). - Special Control Service (SCS) within MOEF: authorised to investigate ML cases related to tax, customs and economic crime. - Hellenic Customs: authorised to investigate smuggling, tax fraud and other customs predicate offences. - All ML and FT cases prosecuted by Greek prosecution office; cases referred to investigative magistrate. - Observed investigative approach and weaknesses: - Investigations focused on predicate offence rather than ML offence or proceeds of crime. - Need for more proactive detection of third party ML (as opposed to self-laundering). - More resources needed for CFT investigations and prosecution service. - Consider use of special investigative techniques used in drug trafficking; greater specialisation of prosecutors and judges in financial crime and ML cases. - Criminal justice system duration and capacity: - Full rehearing of all criminal cases in Court of Appeal is permitted and commonly exercised, contributing to delays. - Reported case durations: - An average criminal case for a serious offence: approximately five years from referral to an investigating judge through completion in the Court of Appeal. - Money laundering cases would be fast-tracked and may take an average of three years to complete. - These delays may adversely impact ability to commence and complete ML and FT cases within reasonable timeframe. ### Cross-border cash controls and SR.IX - Controls status: - Greece has not implemented comprehensive measures to detect physical cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments related to ML or FT. - No obligation exists to declare currency or bearer negotiable instruments being imported or exported. - Authorities monitoring entry/exit of goods and persons: police (or port authority regarding water ports) and Hellenic Customs. - Implementation of the EC Regulation on Cash Control will result in changes to Greek requirements. - SR.IX rating: NC — no system for declaring or disclosing cash or bearer negotiable instruments in line with SR IX. ### Preventive measures — financial institutions and DNFBPs - Coverage and supervisory authorities: - AML Law covers all financial institutions defined by FATF except insurance brokers and agents. - Competent Authorities with AML/CFT supervisory power: - Bank of Greece (BOG): banks and other credit institutions, leasing and factoring, bureaux de change, money remitters. - Hellenic Private Insurance Supervisory Committee (HPISC): insurance companies (supervision being transferred from Ministry of Development). - Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC): securities firms. - BOG and HCMC have adopted enforceable requirements with sanctions; MOD/ID provisions are non-binding guidance and MOD has no legal status as competent authority since December 2005 amendment. - Customer due diligence (CDD) weaknesses (Rec.5): - Basic CDD requirements set out in AML Law and expanded by BOG Governor’s Act 2577/2006 for BOG-regulated institutions. - Not all basic obligations for customer identification are set out in law or regulation; AML Law does not fully impose CDD in all cases required by Recommendation 5. - Identification of legal persons, partnerships and other arrangements: fragmented guidance, inconsistencies and gaps; beneficial ownership measures should be strengthened. - Simplified and enhanced due diligence provisions insufficient; ongoing CDD requirements unsatisfactory for existing clients. - Requirement to identify and apply enhanced measures to politically exposed persons (PEPs) does not extend to securities and insurance sectors; incomplete for BOG-supervised institutions. - BOG Governor’s Act Annex 4: simplified due diligence measures appear unduly permissive. - Allowing 30 days to complete verification of identity of two categories of high risk customers is not in line with FATF. - Correspondent banking and technology risks: - BOG provisions on cross-border correspondent banking broadly satisfactory but do not cover banks in EU Member States. - Measures to prevent misuse of technological developments limited; non face-to-face business guidance too limited. - Uncertainty whether third parties are relied upon to carry out CDD or used strictly in outsourcing context. - Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) and reporting system: - AML Law requirement to report STRs covers suspicious transactions and other incidents indicative of criminal activity. - Important omissions: non-coverage of insurance agents and brokers; no explicit requirement to submit STRs in respect of all predicate offences. - Very few STRs outside banking system; conversion rate of STRs to law enforcement investigations may indicate poor quality of reports. - Existing guidance for reporting entities incomplete and insufficient. - Recommendations: - BOG, HCMC and HPISC should adopt sector-specific guidance with updated ML/FT trends and a broader scope to meet FATF requirements. - FIU should provide broader feedback to improve STR quality. - Internal controls, compliance and supervision: - BOG-supervised institutions required to have internal controls; link to AML/CFT should be strengthened (e.g., screening procedures for employees). - Securities and insurance sectors: requirements very general or non-existent. - AML Law provisions insufficient to meet Recommendation 22 in full. - Supervisory capacity constraints: BOG and HCMC have powers but lack resources to implement effectively; MOD/ID has not conducted on-site inspections in insurance AML/CFT area; expected change when HPISC takes over. - Sanctions use: - MOD/ID has not imposed sanctions on firms they supervise. - BOG has imposed sanctions, usually a non-interest bearing deposit for breaches regardless of seriousness. - No information on sanctions published; sanctions often minimum permissible. - Recommendation: Supervisory authorities should ensure sanctions are effective, proportionate and dissuasive and implemented properly. - DNFBPs (Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions): - AML Law obligations apply to chartered accountants, auditors, independent accountants and audit firms; tax consultants; real estate agents; casinos (including internet casinos); auction houses; dealers in high value goods where transaction value exceeds EUR 15,000; notaries and lawyers when engaging in covered activities. - AML/CFT measures do not apply to TCSPs, despite some company formation services offered in Greece. - Practical application extremely limited: lack of awareness of STR submission obligation; very general control requirements; no guidance provided to DNFBPs; no AML/CFT supervision undertaken in practice. - Recommendation: Fully implement AML Law provisions for DNFBPs, raise awareness, develop sector-relevant guidance, and undertake appropriate monitoring. ### Legal persons, bearer shares, beneficial ownership and registries - Business forms and registries: - Main structures: companies and partnerships; other forms: single traders, joint ventures, branch offices and foreign companies. - Companies limited by shares are most significant economically. - Company registries contain board composition information per articles of incorporation; changes of shareholders are not registered. - Information decentralised across 52 prefectures; often not computerised and not transparent. - Beneficial ownership shortcomings: - No requirement to collect or make available information on beneficial ownership and ultimate control. - Competent authorities lack timely access to adequate, accurate and current information on beneficial ownership and control. - No appropriate provision ensuring transparency of share ownership (direct or indirect) for bearer shares except for corporations listed on a stock exchange. - Recommendation: Establish a centralised registration system for all legal persons; remove power to issue bearer shares or ensure adequate transparency regarding beneficial ownership. ### Non-profit organisations (NPOs) - Legal forms and controls: - NPO forms: civil societies, associations, foundations and committees for collection; most common are associations and foundations. - Greece has not reviewed its non-profit sector; cannot provide information on activities, size or features. - Authorities consider NPO sector not at risk of being used for FT. - Greece has not implemented FATF requirements for NPOs; registration and record-keeping requirements insufficient to meet FATF standards. - Recommendation: Implement adequate measures in line with international requirements. ### National coordination, statistics and international cooperation - National coordination: - Development and coordination of AML/CFT policy carried out through MOEF; MOEF responsible for coordinating supervisory authorities. - Cooperation and coordination mechanisms are ad hoc and generally insufficient; no effective mechanisms for FIU, police, SCS, Customs, regulators to coordinate domestically. - Recommendation (priority): Develop and implement effective mechanisms to enable all authorities dealing with AML/CFT issues to cooperate; FIU Committee could play a key role. - MOEF Decision of 22 February 2007 introduces formal mechanisms for exchanging information between MOEF, FIU and supervisory authorities. - Statistics and review: - Greece does not review its AML/CFT system on a regular basis. - Significant statistical deficiencies across authorities: - FIU: no statistics on requests to/from foreign FIUs, whether granted/refused, or spontaneous referrals. - Law enforcement/MOJ: no statistics on ML/FT investigations, prosecutions, convictions, or on property frozen/seized/confiscated. - Mutual legal assistance and extradition: incomplete or no statistics on requests related to freezing/confiscation, TF, predicate offences; lack of data on nature of requests, outcomes and response times. - BOG: no statistics on formal requests for assistance made or received. - International conventions, MLA and extradition: - Greece ratified the Vienna Convention in 1991; signed Palermo Convention in 2000 but not yet ratified; ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in 2002. - Partial implementation of UN Conventions; ML and FT offences need strengthening to ensure full implementation. - Mutual legal assistance: incomplete/imprecise information; potential delays when requests not transmitted directly to judicial authority; ambiguity regarding dual criminality in treaties/domestic law and contradictory judicial practice. - Extradition: performed on bilateral/multilateral agreements or reciprocity; process seems to work efficiently but little experience with “pure” ML or FT cases; limitations in criminalisation may impact ability to extradite in ML/FT cases. - International cooperation by supervisors and FIU hampered by lack of resources and capacity. - Recommendations: - Provide FIU access to FIU.Net; increase FIU resources for international cooperation; resolve dual criminality ambiguities; compile comprehensive statistics on MLA and extradition. ### Ratings highlights (selected) - Forty Recommendations: many PC (Partially Compliant) and NC (Non-Compliant) ratings across core areas, including: - R.1 ML offence — PC - R.2 ML offence mental element & corporate liability — PC - R.3 Confiscation and provisional measures — PC - R.4 Secrecy laws consistent with the Recommendations — PC - R.5 Customer due diligence — PC - R.6 Politically exposed persons — NC - R.12 DNFBP (R.5,6,8-11) — NC - R.13 Suspicious transaction reporting — PC - R.14 Protection & no tipping-off — C - R.26 The FIU — NC - R.30 Resources, integrity and training — NC (FIU and others) - R.31 National co-operation — PC - R.33 Legal persons — NC - Nine Special Recommendations: many PC and NC ratings: - SR.I Implement UN instruments — PC - SR.II Criminalise terrorist financing — PC - SR.III Freeze and confiscate terrorist assets — PC - SR.IV Suspicious transaction reporting — PC - SR.V International co-operation — LC - SR.VI MVT services — PC - SR.VII Wire transfer rules — PC - SR.VIII Non-profit organisations — NC - SR.IX Cross Border Declaration & Disclosure — NC ### Table 2 — Selected priority recommended actions (summary) - Criminalisation and legal reform: - Ensure list of predicate offences includes all FATF designated offences; amend Article 1.A.q) to include all offences punishable by at least six months in prison regardless of property value. - Criminalise self-laundering; extend criminal liability to legal persons; ensure ML is a stand-alone offence not requiring predicate conviction. - Amend FT offence to criminalise collecting/providing funds or material support to terrorists or for specific terrorist acts; make TF an offence irrespective of occurrence of an attack or actual use of funds; review/limit Article 187.A (8) defence; clarify “funds”. - Confiscation and asset measures: - Allow confiscation of indirect proceeds; give courts power to void/prevent actions involving proceeds of crime from time of predicate conviction; extend seizure powers to all property; provide for ex parte freezing with right to appeal; issue guidance on instrumentalities and use of confiscation regimes; review laws and structures to trace, seize and confiscate criminal proceeds. - Freezing of terrorist assets: - Develop ability to freeze funds in accordance with S/RES/1373(2001) outside EU listing system; enable freezing without first opening criminal investigation; speed notification process for UN lists; provide guidance to FIs and DNFBPs; adopt sanctions for failure to follow freezing requests; establish de-listing/unfreezing processes and mechanisms for basic living expenses in line with UNSCR 1452; allow judicial challenge of frozen measures; protect bona fide third parties. - FIU strengthening: - Restructure FIU; hire specialised personnel for STR analysis; task Committee members with oversight; ensure connection to FIU.Net; allocate sufficient skilled staff; procure comprehensive IT system; secure information systems; provide timely access to information; publish more comprehensive STR statistics, typologies and trends; improve exchange mechanisms with judiciary. - Investigation, prosecution and cross-border controls: - Promote proactive detection of third party ML; consider special investigative techniques used in drug trafficking; specialise prosecutors and judges; strengthen coordination between Customs and other law enforcement for cash control. - Supervisory and preventive measures: - Introduce licensing requirement for insurance agents; conduct fit and proper tests for all directors of credit institutions; adopt risk-based supervisory programmes (BOG) and robust inspection procedures (HCMC, HPISC); strengthen CDD coverage to insurance brokers/agents and securities/insurance sectors; improve STR guidance and feedback; review informal remittance businesses and MVT supervision. *IMF assessment text as provided in the content unit.* ### 1. Introduction ### 1. Introduction ### Report overview - This Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes for the FATF 40 Recommendations for Anti-Money Laundering and 9 Special Recommendations Combating the Financing of Terrorism was prepared by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). - The report provides a summary of the AML/CFT measures in place in Greece as of November 2006, the level of compliance with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations, and contains recommendations on how the AML/CFT system could be strengthened. - The views expressed have been agreed by the FATF, but do not necessarily reflect the views of the Boards of the IMF or World Bank. ### Key findings - Greece’s legal requirements in place to combat money laundering and terrorist financing are generally inadequate to meet the FATF standards and there are some serious concerns about the effectiveness of the AML/CFT system in place. - The AML Law came into force in August 1995 and was amended in December 2005 to expand the scope and clarify certain aspects of the definition of ML. - It appears that the ML offence is not effectively implemented; limited data on prosecutions and convictions show a very low rate of conviction. - Criminalisation of terrorist financing is very recent (July 2004) and there have been no FT cases as yet. - Provisions relating to confiscation of criminal proceeds do not fully comply with international standards and lack of statistics inhibits measurement of implementation. - The level of implementation of S/RES/1267(1999) and S/RES/1373(2001) is inadequate. - Available data and information are not sufficient to conclude there is an effective system for investigating, prosecuting and taking related action on ML and FT cases in Greece. ### FIU structure, capacity and performance - The Greek FIU has been assigned extensive powers and responsibilities and authorities express a clear desire to create an effective FIU. - The evaluation team has serious doubts about the current structure and capacity of the unit to properly perform traditional core FIU functions; Greece should address as a matter of priority the structural issues raised by the current FIU model. - The FIU was originally set up in 1995, became operational in July 1997, and after the 2005 AML Law amendment was upgraded into an independent administrative authority composed of the President and eleven part-time members. - At the time of the on-site visit the FIU: - had limited access to all financial, administrative and law enforcement information required to undertake its functions; - was severely understaffed, especially with regard to skilled financial analysts; - critically lacked organisational and technical resources; - needed enhanced measures to ensure information held is more securely protected; - published periodic reports that are not sufficiently comprehensive (especially on detailed statistics, typologies and trends). - From 2001 to 2006, only 1.5 to 3.5% of STRs received were sent to the public prosecutor. - Recommendation: Greece needs to restructure the FIU (for example, task the President and Committee members with broad oversight/coordination and leave specialised staff to investigate incoming STRs). ### Money laundering and terrorist financing risks and typologies - No comprehensive study exists on the amount of criminal proceeds or laundering methods. - A 2006 Ministry of Economy and Finance study estimated gross amount earned in 2000 from illegal prostitution, drug trafficking, and cigarette and alcohol smuggling is approximately €1.6 billion (1% GDP in 2000). - Investigations revealed use of banks, investment firms, mutual funds, offshore companies, bureaux de change, newly founded companies, and traders of precious metals. - Common methods included traditional placement (bank deposits, share acquisition in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE)) and layering via structured domestic and international transactions by relatives and third parties. - Greece is perceived by authorities as a low risk country for terrorist financing; no assets of terrorist groups or terrorists have been found in Greece so far. - Authorities are not aware of alternative remittance systems operating in the country, although assessors were told such systems take place using call centres; no systemic study has been conducted. - Cross-border cash transfers, particularly using tourist buses, were noted and may suggest potential TF risks. ### Legal system and related institutional measures - ML is defined by Article 1.B of the AML Law; the definition’s physical and material elements closely follow the Vienna and Palermo Conventions, but interpretation of proof of predicate offences seems restrictive and makes prosecution of ML, particularly “third-party” laundering, difficult. - Greece has opted for a combination of a list of predicate offences and a threshold approach; some FATF “designated categories of offences” are not expressly included and the catch-all provision only includes predicate offences where the offence “generated a property of at least EUR 15,000”. - Ancillary offences (attempt, aiding and abetting, facilitating and counselling) are adequately covered in the Penal Code. - Regarding conspiracy, joining another person for the purpose of committing a misdemeanour punishable by imprisonment of at least one year, aiming at an economic or other material benefit could potentially apply to concerted ML acts. - Corporate criminal liability is not recognised in Greek law or doctrine; no fundamental or constitutional principles prohibit holding corporations criminally liable. - Basic penalties for natural persons are 5-10 years imprisonment and for legal persons an administrative fine of up to nearly EUR 3 million, though certain provisions reduce effectiveness/dissuasiveness (e.g., ML sentence cannot exceed the sentence for the predicate offence; provisions allow defendant to pay a fine instead of serving a prison sentence for sentences of less than a year). - The FT offence’s scope is too narrow: it does not criminalise collecting or providing funds or material support to terrorist individuals or for specific terrorist acts; terrorist financing is not an offence in itself whether or not a terrorist act occurred or funds were used; the defence in Article 187.A (8) is very broad and may undermine the provision’s intentions. - Seizure and confiscation provisions are insufficient to fully address FATF standards: - law appears not to permit confiscation of indirect proceeds; - uncertainty whether authorities can confiscate instrumentalities intended for use in ML or a predicate offence; - courts lack explicit power to void or prevent actions involving proceeds of crime from the time the predicate offence was convicted; - powers of seizure do not extend to all property that could be proceeds of crime; - general confiscation legislation does not provide for freezing on an ex parte basis, with right to appeal; - powers to trace, seize, freeze and confiscate have not been used since required powers are set out across different pieces of legislation. - Implementation of S/RES/1267(1999) and S/RES/1373(2001): - some measures implemented through EU Regulations but very limited action for provisions not covered by EU instruments; - Greek authorities have not frozen any funds under either UNSCR 1267 or UNSCR 1373; - current notification process to ministries and the financial sector of entities on UN lists would take too long to comply with immediate freezing obligations; - Greece has not provided guidance to financial institutions or DNFBPs on freezing assets of listed entities without delay and does not monitor FIs and DNFBPs for compliance with measures under the Resolutions except by passing information to appropriate authority; - no clear and publicly known procedures for de-listing and unfreezing in appropriate cases. - Law enforcement and prosecution: - FIU is allocated preliminary investigation powers for offences punishable under the AML Law; - Hellenic Police is national agency responsible for detection and investigation of all types of crime (including drug law violations and terrorism); - Special Control Service (SCS) within the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF) is authorised to investigate ML cases related to tax-related offences, customs offences and other economic crime predicate offences; - Hellenic Customs is authorised to investigate predicate offences related to smuggling, tax fraud and other customs offences; - All ML and FT cases are prosecuted by the Greek prosecution office, which refers cases to the investigative magistrate. - Observed prosecution/investigation approach and recommendations: - investigations have focused on the predicate offence rather than the ML offence or proceeds of crime; - a more proactive approach to detecting third party ML, as opposed to self-laundering, should be developed; - more resources should be dedicated to CFT investigations and to the prosecution service; - consideration should be given to using special investigative techniques proven successful in drug trafficking and to greater specialisation of prosecutors and judges in financial crime and ML cases. - Cross-border cash controls: - Greece has not implemented comprehensive measures to detect physical cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments related to ML or FT; - authorities monitoring entry/exit of goods and persons are police (or port authority regarding water ports) and Hellenic customs, but no obligation exists to declare currency or bearer negotiable instruments being imported or exported; - implementation of the EC Regulation on Cash Control will result in changes to Greek requirements. ### Preventive measures — financial institutions - The preventive side of the AML/CFT system is based on the AML Law; except for insurance brokers and agents, the AML Law covers all financial institutions defined by FATF. - Three regulatory agencies designated as “Competent Authorities” under the AML Law have power to issue binding regulations and/or comprehensive guidelines and are responsible for AML/CFT supervision: - Bank of Greece (BOG) for banks and other credit institutions, leasing and factoring, bureaux de change, and money remitters; - Hellenic Private Insurance Supervisory Committee (HPISC) for insurance companies (supervision being transferred from the Ministry of Development to the HPISC); - Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC) for securities firms. - The BOG and the HCMC have adopted further enforceable requirements with sanctions; provisions issued by the MOD/ID are non-binding guidance and the MOD has had no legal status as a competent authority since the December 2005 AML Law amendment. - Greece has not adopted a risk-based approach in full and there has been no thorough assessment of various AML/CFT risks, though the BOG has introduced certain risk-based elements into its new requirements. - Customer due diligence (CDD) measures: - certain basic CDD requirements are set out in the AML Law and were expanded by BOG requirements in BOG Governor’s Act 2577/2006, which sets out more comprehensive requirements for institutions regulated by the BOG; - not all basic obligations for customer identification are currently set out in law or regulation; the AML Law does not fully impose a requirement for financial institutions to conduct CDD in all cases contemplated by Recommendation 5. - Identification of legal persons, partnerships and other legal arrangements: - AML Law and guidance by competent authorities are fragmented, contain inconsistencies and gaps; - measures on ascertaining beneficial ownership should be strengthened. - Other CDD shortcomings: - requirement to ascertain purpose and nature of business relationship does not extend to securities and insurance sectors; - provisions on ongoing due diligence and simplified and enhanced due diligence are insufficient; - CDD requirements relating to existing clients are not fully satisfactory; - requirement to identify and take enhanced measures in relation to politically exposed persons (PEPs) does not extend to securities and insurance sectors and is incomplete for institutions supervised by the BOG. - Correspondent banking and technological risks: - BOG provisions on cross-border correspondent banking are broadly satisfactory but do not cover banks in EU Member States; - measures to prevent misuse of technological developments are limited and proposed means for dealing with non face-to-face business risks are too limited; - uncertainty exists in the regulated sector whether third parties are relied upon to carry out CDD or are used strictly in an outsourcing context; - existing BOG provisions are not fully consistent with FATF standards. *Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes for the FATF 40 Recommendations and 9 Special Recommendations — FATF (summary of Greece, as of November 2006).* ### 23. Bank secrecy is imposed for deposit accounts at credit institutions under Law 1059/1971. However, ### _cr0931 - 23. Bank secrecy is imposed for deposit accounts at credit institutions under Law 1059/1971. However, ### Bank secrecy and legislative clarity - Bank secrecy is imposed for deposit accounts at credit institutions under Law 1059/1971. - There is a lack of clarity on the extent of Law 1059/1971, and on its interaction with the AML Law and other legal provisions. - Provisions lifting bank secrecy in the AML Law appear only to apply to money laundering. - Recommendation: Greece should clarify exactly when Law 1059/1971 is over-ridden by other statutory provisions, and clarify the provisions of the AML Law on matters such as the scope of money laundering/terrorist financing. ### Record-keeping, fund transfers, and SR.VII - Greece’s record-keeping requirements are generally satisfactory. - Greece relies principally on the implementation of the EU Regulation on the payer accompanying transfers of funds that has been in force since 1 January 2007. - Some limited provisions are contained in the AML Law and BOG requirements. - The Regulation meets many of the technical requirements of the FATF standard. - The derogation set out in the EU regulation for wire transfers within the EU (classified as domestic transfers) is not in compliance with the FATF requirements under SR.VII. - There are currently no sanctions for non-compliance with the EU regulation, and the sanctions regime in Greece generally is neither effective nor dissuasive. - In terms of effectiveness, there is insufficient evidence of implementation given the Regulation’s recent enactment. ### Customer due diligence, unusual transactions, and FATF standards - Current requirements to pay special attention to all complex and unusual large transactions that have no apparent economic or lawful purpose do not adequately meet the FATF standards. - The obligation to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with persons from countries which do not follow the FATF Recommendations is not met. ### Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) and reporting system effectiveness - The AML Law requirement to report STRs in Greece covers both suspicious transactions and any other incident that could be an indication of criminal activity; basic legal measures are covered. - Important omissions: - Non-coverage of insurance agents and brokers. - No explicit requirement to submit STRs in respect of all predicate offences. - The obligation to report attempted transactions should be clarified. - Effectiveness concerns: - Very few STRs are made outside the banking system. - The conversion rate of STRs leading to law enforcement investigations may indicate poor quality of reports. - Existing guidelines to assist financial institutions to implement the reporting obligation are incomplete and insufficient to meet the FATF requirements. - Recommendations: - The BOG, the HCMC and the HPISC should adopt sector-specific guidance with updated information on ML and FT trends and techniques and a broader scope to comprehensively address the FATF requirements. - The FIU should provide greater and a further range of feedback to competent authorities and reporting institutions to assist in improving the quality of STRs submitted. ### Internal controls, sectoral coverage, and Recommendation 22 - Financial institutions supervised by the BOG are required to have internal controls, but the link to AML/CFT provisions should be strengthened (e.g., screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring employees). - Implementation of the requirements has not been evidenced yet. - For the securities and insurance sectors, existing requirements are either very general or non-existent. - The AML Law provisions are insufficient to address all of the requirements of Recommendation 22. ### Correspondent banking and shell banks - The provision preventing SIs from entering into, or continuing, correspondent banking relationships with shell banks applies only to SIs operating in non-EU countries. - There is no obligation on financial institutions to satisfy themselves that a respondent financial institution in a foreign country does not permit its accounts to be used by shell banks. ### Supervisory powers, resource constraints, and sanctions - The BOG and the HCMC have been given appropriate powers to monitor and ensure compliance by financial institutions with their AML/CFT requirements. - Implementation of existing provisions is challenging for the BOG and the HCMC due in particular to a lack of resources. - The Ministry of Development previously had the power to conduct on-site inspections in the insurance sector but has not used that power in the AML/CFT area; this is expected to change when the HPISC takes over supervision. - Recommendations: - The BOG should implement a risk-based supervisory program for AML/CFT and adopt a more systematic consolidated approach to supervision of AML/CFT policies and risk management systems. - The BOG should improve the quality of supervision of bureaux de change and money remittance companies. - The HCMC and the HPISC should implement robust supervisory programmes for AML/CFT purposes with proper inspection procedures. - Sanctions: - The MOD/ID has not imposed any sanctions on the firms they supervise. - The BOG has imposed sanctions, most usually in the form of a non-interest bearing deposit applied to all types of breaches regardless of seriousness. - No information on sanctions imposed is published. - In practice, sanctions applied in many cases have been the minimum permissible. - Recommendation: Supervisory authorities should ensure that sanctions fully meet the FATF standards i.e. are effective, proportionate and dissuasive and are implemented properly. ### Licensing, fit-and-proper tests, and informal remittance - Recommendation: Greek authorities should introduce a licensing requirement for insurance agents by the insurance regulator to enable application and enforcement of AML/CFT legal requirements in this sub-sector. - Recommendation: Fit and proper tests should be conducted for all directors of credit institutions. - Recommendation: Greek authorities should review the existence of informal remittance businesses for purposes of registration, licensing and oversight for AML/CFT purposes. ### DNFBPs (Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions) - AML Law obligations apply to: - chartered accountants, auditors, independent accountants and audit firms; - tax consultants, tax experts and related firms; - real estate agents and companies; - casinos (including internet casinos) and entities engaging in gaming activities; - auction houses; - dealers in high value goods and auctioneers, whenever the transaction value exceeds EUR 15,000 to be paid as a lump sum or in instalments; - notaries and lawyers when they engage in a range of activities covered by the FATF Recommendations. - AML/CFT measures do not apply to TCSPs, despite some businesses offering company formation services in Greece. - Lack of effective coverage of certain types of casinos: - Internet casinos are covered by law but no action is being taken in practice. - Casino type gambling facilities on Greek-operated ships leaving from Greece do not appear to have AML/CFT measures applied. - Main deficiencies for DNFBPs mirror those for financial institutions (Recommendations 5, 6, and 8-11) because core obligations are based on the same general AML/CFT regime; additional weaknesses arise because BOG’s more comprehensive requirements do not apply. - Practical application is extremely limited: - Serious lack of awareness of the STR submission requirement in the DNFBP sector. - Control requirements when they exist are very general. - None of the DNFBPs have been provided with guidance on submitting STRs. - No AML/CFT supervision is being undertaken in practice, although competent authorities have been assigned. - Recommendation: Greece should fully implement the provisions of the AML Law for DNFBPs, raise awareness, develop sector-relevant guidance, and undertake appropriate monitoring. ### Legal persons, bearer shares, and beneficial ownership - Greek law provides two main structures for business: companies and partnerships; other forms include single traders, joint ventures, branch offices and foreign companies. - Companies limited by shares are the most significant economically. - Company registries contain information on board composition as indicated in articles of incorporation; changes of shareholders are not registered. - Measures to ensure adequate transparency concerning beneficial ownership and control of legal persons are incomplete and insufficient. - Information is decentralised in registers across 52 prefectures, is often not computerised and is not transparent. - Recommendation: A centralised registration system for all legal persons should be established. - Competent authorities do not have timely access to adequate, accurate and current information on beneficial ownership and control; easier gateways to access ultimate beneficial ownership and control records by competent authorities are needed. - Under current law there is no appropriate provision to ensure transparency as to share ownership (direct or indirect) of corporations that have issued bearer shares, except for corporations listed on a stock exchange. - Recommendation: Greek authorities should either remove the power to issue bearer shares or otherwise ensure adequate transparency regarding beneficial ownership of such shares. - Trusts cannot be set up and are not recognised under Greek law. ### Non-profit organisations (NPOs) - NPO legal forms: civil societies, associations, foundations and committees for collection; statutes are detailed in the Greek Civil Code; associations and foundations are most common. - Greece has not reviewed its non-profit sector and cannot provide information on activities, size and other relevant features. - Greek authorities consider the non-profit organisations sector is not at risk of being used for FT. - Greece has not implemented FATF requirements in this area; basic requirements regarding registration and record keeping are not sufficient to meet FATF standards. - Recommendation: Greece should implement adequate measures in line with international requirements. ### National coordination and cooperation - Development, coordination and implementation of AML/CFT policy in Greece is carried out through the MOEF. - The MOEF is responsible for coordinating supervisory authorities’ activities. - Cooperation and coordination mechanisms are ad hoc and generally insufficient and should be improved. - There are no effective mechanisms enabling the police, SCS, the Customs, the FIU, and other competent authorities (e.g., regulators) to coordinate domestically and implement a national ML/FT policy. - Recommendation (priority): Develop and implement effective mechanisms to enable all authorities dealing with AML/CFT issues to cooperate and collaborate closely and effectively; the FIU Committee could play a key role. - Note: The MOEF Decision of 22 February 2007 introduces formal mechanisms for exchanging information between the MOEF, the FIU and the supervisory authorities. ### International conventions, mutual legal assistance, and extradition - Greece ratified the Vienna Convention in 1991 and signed the Palermo Convention in 2000, though it has not yet ratified the latter. - Greece ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in 2002. - Certain aspects of ML and FT offences should be strengthened to ensure proper implementation of international Conventions. - Greece has partially implemented the UN Conventions’ provisions relevant to the FATF recommendations. - Mutual legal assistance: - Incomplete and imprecise information is available on Greece’s mutual legal assistance system; effectiveness is difficult to assess. - There may be delays when dealing with requests not transmitted directly to the Greek judicial authority. - Lack of systematic compilation of data/statistics on incoming and outgoing requests prevents a comprehensive view. - The dual criminality requirement in the context of mutual legal assistance deserves clarification and clear guidance. - Ambiguity regarding dual criminality in treaties and domestic law, and contradictory judicial practice, should be resolved. - Concerns whether Greece can provide mutual legal assistance in all cases involving FT and ML as required by FATF standards due to definitions and dual criminality. - In the absence of a treaty, limitations on forms of assistance available appear to obstruct certain investigatory acts authorised domestically. - Extradition: - Extradition is carried out on the basis of bilateral or multilateral intergovernmental agreements, with concurrent application of the Criminal Procedure Code where agreements do not regulate matters. - Where no agreement exists, extradition is carried out on the reciprocity principle and in conformance with procedural provisions. - Extradition process seems to work efficiently despite workload. - Relatively little experience with “pure” ML cases and none with financing of terrorism cases. - Current limitations in criminalisation of ML and FT potentially impact Greece’s ability to extradite persons sought for these offences. - Potential extradition limitations where different punishment thresholds exist for some predicate offences of ML. - Risk that dual criminality requirement for extradition is applied narrowly; assessment team could not ensure categorisation differences would not impede mutual legal assistance. - Lack of statistics in relation to extradition requests. - International cooperation by supervisory authorities: - BOG, HCMC and MOD/ID have powers to exchange information with foreign counterparts. - HCMC and MOD/ID have not received requests for such cooperation in the AML/CFT area; effectiveness cannot be measured. - Little indication BOG cooperation with counterparts is effective and provided in line with FATF standards. - FIU international cooperation and resources: - Law enforcement authorities can engage in a wide range of international cooperation. - Due to lack of personnel and technical resources, there are serious doubts about the FIU’s capacity to provide rapid, constructive and effective international cooperation. - Recommendation: Greek FIU should ensure access to the FIU.Net to secure and increase information exchange with foreign counterparts. - Recommendation: Provide the FIU with more appropriate resources to fulfil tasks, including internationally. - Given lack of statistical data, the evaluation team could not determine that international cooperation mechanisms are fully effective. ### Other issues: criminal justice system and case duration - The Greek criminal justice system allows a full rehearing of all criminal cases in the Court of Appeal. - A very large majority of convicted defendants in criminal cases exercise the right to a full rehearing in the Court of Appeal. - Legal costs are apparently lower than in many other countries. - These factors, combined with available resources, create an overburdened criminal justice system with long delays. - Reported case durations: - An average criminal case for a serious offence would take approximately five years from referral to an investigating judge through completion of the hearing in the Court of Appeal. - Money laundering cases would be fast-tracked and may take an average of three years to complete. - The assessment team believes these factors may adversely impact the ability to commence and complete ML and FT cases within a reasonable timeframe. *IMF assessment text as provided in the content unit.* ### 48. As a member of the EU, Greek law has been greatly influenced by European Union law and the ### 48. As a member of the EU, Greek law has been greatly influenced by European Union law and the ### Overview - Greece has ratified many international conventions and adopted domestic legislation to meet international commitments, but in the criminal law area and AML/CFT matters the measures adopted “generally lack the precision and the quality that is required by international and domestic law” to impose efficient AML/CFT systems. - In the project to adopt a new AML Law, Greek authorities are advised to elaborate “a more harmonised and sophisticated set of measures in line with international standards” and ensure integration with existing domestic legislation. - The assessment uses the 2004 Methodology compliance levels: Compliant (C), Largely Compliant (LC), Partially Compliant (PC), Non-Compliant (NC), and possibly Not Applicable (NA). ### Ratings — Forty Recommendations (selected findings by Recommendation) - 1. ML offence — PC - predicate offences for ML are limited by the threshold of EUR 15,000 - terrorist financing is inadequately criminalised as a predicate offence - offence effectively requires prosecution to prove all elements of the predicate offence - self-laundering is not clearly criminalised - very low number of convictions indicates limited effective implementation - 2. ML offence – mental element and corporate liability — PC - criminal liability does not apply to legal persons and there is no fundamental principle of law prohibiting it - penalties are not sufficiently dissuasive (sentence for money laundering cannot exceed sentence for predicate offence with regard to a misdemeanour) - doubts about effectiveness of current administrative sanctions regime - very low number of convictions - 3. Confiscation and provisional measures — PC - indirect proceeds cannot be confiscated - seizure does not extend to all property that is the proceeds of crime - courts cannot void or prevent transactions from the time the crime has been committed - insufficient evidence of effective implementation and lack of uniformity in application of confiscation provisions - 4. Secrecy laws consistent with the Recommendations — PC - unclear that bank secrecy has been fully lifted by the AML Law; AML Law potentially only lifts bank secrecy for STRs in respect of money laundering - 5. Customer due diligence — PC - CDD requirement does not extend to all sectors (notably insurance brokers and agents) - basic obligations (when to conduct CDD, identifying legal persons) not consistently set out in law or regulation - no secondary and more detailed requirements for insurance sector - duty to conduct CDD not extended to all FATF-required situations (e.g., suspicion, doubts about previously obtained information) - simplified due diligence measures appear unduly permissive and lack clarity (BOG Governor’s Act Annex 4) - law, guidance and industry practice on identifying legal persons not in line with FATF requirements - obligation to identify beneficial owners of legal persons is too limited; no obligation to take proactive steps to identify persons exercising ultimate effective control - no obligation to apply enhanced measures for high risk customers in securities and insurance sectors - limited ongoing CDD requirements for firms supervised by HCMC and MoD - allowing a period of 30 days to complete verification of identity of two categories of high risk customers not in line with FATF - limited CDD requirements for existing clients in AML Law and securities and insurance sectors - requirement to ascertain nature and purpose of business relationship not clearly set out - BOG measures recently adopted; very limited evidence of effective implementation - 6. Politically exposed persons — NC - requirement to identify and conduct CDD on PEPs does not extend to securities and insurance sectors - BOG Governor's Act applies only to PEPs from countries outside the EU - nature and extent of enhanced CDD measures for PEPs not clearly stated - requirement to identify a PEP’s source of wealth not explicitly stated - BOG Governor's Act does not require senior management approval before setting up a relationship with a PEP - no evidence that recently adopted BOG measures have been effectively implemented - 7. Correspondent banking — LC - definition of “cross-border” is too narrow and excludes EU member states - BOG measures recently adopted; no evidence of effective implementation - 8. New technologies & non face-to-face business — PC - no requirements for securities or insurance sectors - no requirement for SIs to have measures to prevent misuse of technological developments - BOG measures for non face-to-face risks appear limited to customers with an account at an EU-based financial institution - 9. Third parties and introducers — PC - BOG provisions for third party reliance are partially inconsistent and do not address all requirements under Recommendation 9 - no provision for third party reliance in general AML Law or HCMC/MOD provisions - insurance brokers/agents not covered by AML Law and their role in CDD is unclear - 10. Record keeping — LC - AML Law does not clearly require keeping business correspondence - no specific record-keeping requirements or guidelines to ensure (i) transactions can be fully reconstructed and (ii) recorded information is available timely to domestic competent authority - 11. Unusual transactions — PC - no specific requirement to monitor all complex, unusual, large transactions unless they raise specific suspicions of ML or TF - BOG guidance not sufficiently clear and suggests certain findings need documentation only when considering STR submission - HCMC provisions limit monitoring requirement to transactions that could be connected with ML - MOD/ID Circular lacks requirements for insurance companies as set out in Recommendation 11 - 12. DNFBP – R.5, 6, 8-11 — NC - similar technical deficiencies applying to financial institutions also apply to DNFBPs - practical application among DNFBPs extremely limited, raising serious effectiveness concerns - no AML/CFT measures apply to TCSPs - internet casinos are covered by law but no action taken in practice - unclear coverage of casinos on Greek owned or operated vessels - 13. Suspicious transaction reporting — PC - insurance agents and brokers not covered by reporting obligation - not all predicate offences required in Rec. 1 are included in scope - not all required aspects of terrorist financing included in reporting scope - industry practice suggests not all attempted transactions are reported - weaknesses in STR system (low total numbers and very low numbers outside banking) raise significant concerns on effectiveness - 14. Protection & no tipping-off — C - Recommendation 14 is fully met - 15. Internal controls, compliance & audit — PC - for FIs supervised by BOG: internal control requirements (e.g., screening procedures) not fully AML/CFT oriented; doubts about implementation by SIs - for FIs supervised by HCMC and in insurance sector: requirements are very general or non-existent (independent audit function, training) - 16. DNFBP – R.13-15 & 21 — NC - similar technical deficiencies for DNFBPs as for FIs; little practical implementation - no AML/CFT measures apply to TCSPs - insufficient detailed requirements on implementing internal controls - 17. Sanctions — PC - BOG-supervised FIs: current use of sanctions (non-interest bearing deposit) neither sufficiently effective nor sufficiently dissuasive; range of sanctions not sufficiently broad or proportionate; uncertainty about imposing sanctions on directors/senior management - HCMC-supervised FIs: insufficient evidence that sanctions regime offers a sufficiently broad range; very low volume of compliance monitoring impedes measuring effectiveness - MOD/ID-supervised FIs: insufficient information that MOD/ID has authority to impose sanctions; no sanctions imposed for AML/CFT breaches - 18. Shell banks — LC - no obligation on financial institutions to verify that a respondent in a foreign country does not permit its accounts to be used by shell banks - 19. Other forms of reporting — NC - no evidence Greece has considered implementing a system for reporting currency transactions across all regulated sectors - 20. Other NFBP & secure transaction techniques — LC - Greece has not sufficiently encouraged development and use of modern and secure techniques for financial transactions that are less vulnerable to money laundering - 21. Special attention for higher risk countries — NC - absent an NCCT list, effectively no requirements for securities sector - no requirements for insurance sector - banking guidance lacks directly relevant criteria for special attention to countries not applying FATF Recommendations - industry practice suggests very limited measures and no effective implementation - 22. Foreign branches & subsidiaries — PC - AML Law provisions insufficient to address all elements of Rec. 22 - BOG provisions do not explicitly require foreign branches/subsidiaries in third countries to apply higher standards where local laws permit - HCMC and MOD/ID provisions do not apply to subsidiaries; no requirement to pay particular attention where branches/subsidiaries are in countries not or insufficiently applying FATF Recommendations - no explicit provision to require informing home supervisor when foreign branch/subsidiary unable to observe appropriate AML/CFT measures due to local prohibition - 23. Regulation, supervision and monitoring — PC - Market entry: absence of licensing requirement for insurance agents; fit and proper tests not conducted for all directors of credit institutions - Supervisory programme: BOG supervisory programme raises important doubts (lack of resources, qualified personnel, inspection quality) - HCMC AML/CFT supervision of securities firms very recent; effectiveness not demonstrated - MOD/ID: no AML/CFT supervision of insurance companies - 24. DNFBP - regulation, supervision and monitoring — NC - most DNFBPs included within AML Law scope but little effective supervision - lack of designed supervisors for some DNFBPs; regime ineffective as shown by lack of awareness among firms - unclear whether ship casinos are covered by AML/CFT Law - no AML/CFT measures apply to TCSPs - 25. Guidelines & Feedback — NC - very little feedback from FIU or competent authorities - BOG guidance on STRs not sufficiently specific for the diverse sector it supervises - other BOG guidelines very general and limited relevance for certain SIs - HCMC and MOD/ID guidelines are incomplete and too broad - no current guidance for DNFBPs; FIU does not provide guidance/feedback to DNFBPs - 26. The FIU — NC - FIU inappropriately structured to properly and effectively undertake functions - composition and functions of the Committee raise potential conflicts of interest affecting operational independence and autonomy - reporting forms and procedures not yet provided to all reporting entities - FIU lacks adequate and timely access to needed financial, administrative and law enforcement information - insufficient physical and electronic security systems to protect information held by FIU - FIU reports do not provide adequate information on statistics, typologies and trends - issues on application of Egmont principles and FIU not connected to Egmont Secure Web, impacting cooperation - lack of human resources, paper-based STR system, lack of appropriate IT infrastructure and processing system resulted in serious lack of FIU effectiveness, impeding overall AML/CFT effectiveness - 27. Law enforcement authorities — LC - AML Law system does not prevent parallel investigations and duplication of efforts on ML or FT cases - prosecution service resources insufficient given criminal justice structure and appeal procedures - available data insufficient to demonstrate ML/FT investigation and prosecution effectiveness - 28. Powers of competent authorities — C - Recommendation 28 is fully met - 29. Supervisors — PC - BOG has appropriate powers but limited capacity to use them effectively; has not used full range of sanctions - HCMC has only recently started to use supervision powers; insufficient evidence of effectiveness - MOD/ID has not used its supervision powers in AML/CFT area - 30. Resources, integrity and training — NC (in relation to the FIU and others) - FIU understaffed and critically lacks organisational and technical resources (no permanent financial analysts) - law enforcement: insufficient resources allocated to ML and FT investigations in Hellenic Police and Customs; training generally insufficient - prosecution authorities: insufficient resources for over-worked public prosecutor service - BOG lacks sufficient staff with specialist AML/CFT qualifications and expertise - HCMC dramatically lacks staff with relevant AML/CFT qualifications, skills and experience - MOD/ID dramatically lacks qualified staff to carry out supervisory powers ### Key recommendations (implied by findings) - Elaborate and adopt a harmonised and sophisticated new AML Law aligned with international standards and integrated with existing domestic legislation. - Expand criminalisation to include terrorist financing as predicate offence, clarify self-laundering, remove EUR 15,000 threshold limitation for predicate offences, and enable criminal liability for legal persons. - Strengthen confiscation powers to cover indirect proceeds, extend seizure powers, and provide courts authority to void/prevent transactions from time of crime. - Clarify lifting of bank secrecy in AML Law to ensure full access for STRs and broader investigative needs. - Extend CDD obligations to all relevant financial sectors (including insurance brokers/agents), tighten simplified due diligence, require proactive identification of beneficial owners and ultimate controllers, and remove permissive 30-day verification rule for high risk customers. - Extend PEP requirements to securities and insurance sectors, define scope of enhanced measures, and require senior management approval and source-of-wealth checks. - Strengthen FIU independence, resources, IT infrastructure, access to information, and connection to Egmont Secure Web; provide reporting forms/procedures to all reporting entities and improve reporting feedback and statistics. - Improve supervision capacity and resources at BOG, HCMC, MOD/ID; ensure use of full range of sanctions and effective supervisory programmes. - Implement comprehensive supervision, guidance and AML/CFT measures for DNFBPs and TCSPs; ensure ship/Internet casino coverage is clear and enforced. - Enhance training, staffing and specialised expertise across FIU, law enforcement, prosecution, BOG, HCMC and MOD/ID. *IMF assessment excerpt from the provided chapter content.* ### 31. National co-operation PC • mechanisms for cooperation between the FIU, law enforcement, ### _cr0931 - 31. National co-operation PC • mechanisms for cooperation between the FIU, law enforcement, ### 31. National co-operation - Rating: PC - Findings: - mechanisms for cooperation between the FIU, law enforcement, supervisors and other competent authorities are insufficient and ineffective to address the need for domestic AML/CFT coordination; - there is no regular review of the effectiveness of the AML/CFT system. ### 32. Statistics NC Review of the effectiveness of the AML/CFT system - Finding: - Greece does not review its AML/CFT system on a regular basis. - Collection of statistics — deficiencies (by authority): - FIU: - no statistics on the number of requests made or received by/from foreign FIUs, including whether the request was granted or refused, and on spontaneous referral made to foreign authorities; - law enforcement authorities/MOJ: - no statistics on ML/FT investigations, prosecutions and convictions, and on property frozen, seized and confiscated; - mutual legal assistance: - (1) no statistics on requests relating to freezing and confiscation made or received; - (2) no statistics on requests relating to TF; - (3) no statistics on requests relating to predicate offences; - (4) generally no statistics on the nature of the request, whether it was granted or refused and the time to respond; - extradition: - (1) incomplete statistics on requests relating to ML, TF and predicate offences; - (2) no statistics on requests relating to predicate offences; - (3) generally no data on the nature of the request, whether it was granted or refused and the time to respond; - BOG: - no statistics on the formal requests for assistance made or received by BOG, including whether the request was granted or refused. ### 33. Legal persons – beneficial owners - Rating: NC - Findings: - there is no requirement to collect or make available information on beneficial ownership and ultimate control of legal persons; - the system in place does not provide access to adequate, accurate and current information on beneficial ownership and ultimate control in a timely manner; - there is no appropriate measure to ensure transparency as to the shareholders of corporations that have issued bearer shares (unless the corporation is listed on a stock exchange). ### 34. Legal arrangements – beneficial owners - Rating: NA - Findings: - Trusts are not recognised under Greek law. There are no other legal arrangements similar to trusts that exist in Greece. ### International Co-operation — Key findings by topic - 35. Conventions — Rating: PC - Ratification of the Palermo Convention: - Greece has not ratified the Palermo Convention; - Implementation of the Palermo Convention: - the scope of the ML offence is too limited (see comments in relation to Rec.1); - self-laundering is not properly criminalised in Greece, and this cannot be justified on the basis of its being contrary to the Greek fundamental law (see comments in relation to Rec.1); - the penalties are not dissuasive and there are doubts about their effectiveness (see comments in relation to Rec.2); - Implementation of Vienna Convention: - The Greek provisions do not permit the confiscation of indirect proceeds (see comments in relation to Rec.3). - Implementation of the Terrorist Financing Convention: - the penalties are not dissuasive and there doubts about their effectiveness (see comments in relation to Rec.2); - the CDD requirements are inadequate and the implementation of STR reporting is not fully effective (see comments in relation to Rec.5 & 13). - 36. Mutual legal assistance (MLA) — Rating: LC - in the absence of a treaty the apparent limitation on the forms of assistance available for mutual assistance appear to constitute an obstacle to undertaking certain types of investigatory acts that are authorised in the domestic context; - the effectiveness of the current laws cannot be demonstrated due to the lack of quantitative and qualitative data; moreover the overloaded court system seems to have impacted on effectiveness; - the current limitations in relation to the criminalisation of ML and FT may have an impact on Greece’s ability to deliver mutual legal assistance in ML/FT cases. - 37. Dual criminality — Rating: LC - there is a lack of consensus on the scope and application of the dual criminality requirement; - there is a risk that the dual criminality requirement for extradition is applied in a narrow sense. - 38. MLA on confiscation and freezing — Rating: LC - Greece has not considered establishing an asset-forfeiture fund; - Greece’s limitations on the definition of ML may limit its ability to seize and confiscate property derived from predicate offences that are covered by the AML Law. - 39. Extradition — Rating: LC - the current limitations in relation to the criminalisation of ML may have an impact on Greece’s ability to extradite persons sought for this offence; - there are potentially some cases where extradition could be limited because a different threshold of punishment exists for some of the predicate offences of ML (some threshold are below the two year threshold applicable in extradition cases). - 40. Other forms of co-operation — Rating: PC - due to a lack of personnel and technical resources and limited database access, there is an issue of effectiveness with regard to the information exchange of the FIU with foreign authorities on AML matters; - there are no formal statistics to suggest that cooperation between financial supervisors and their counterparts in AML matters is effective and is provided in line with the FATF standards. ### Nine Special Recommendations — ratings and main deficiencies - SR.I Implement UN instruments — Rating: PC - Implementation of the Terrorist Financing Convention: - the CDD requirements are inadequate and the implementation of STR reporting is not fully effective (see comments in relation to Rec.5 & 13). - Implementation of S/RES/1267(1999) and S/RES/1373(2001): - the current process does not allow freezing of terrorist assets without delay (see comments in relation to SR.III); - Greece has a limited ability to freeze funds in accordance with S/RES/1373(2001) of designated terrorists outside the EU listing system (see comments in relation to SR.III). - SR.II Criminalise terrorist financing — Rating: PC - the scope of the offence is excessively narrow as it does not make it a crime to collect or provide funds or material support to terrorist individuals or for specific terrorist acts; - terrorist financing ought to be a stand alone offence for which prosecution is available, regardless of whether the group actually carries out or attempts a specific terrorist attack; - the defence in Article 187A(8) is too broad and appears to undermine and negate the intentions of the provision; - it is unclear that Article 2.5 of the Terrorist Financing Convention is applicable in relation to the FT offence; - administrative liability with regard to the financing of terrorism is too restrictive; - criminal liability does not apply to legal persons and there is no fundamental principle of law prohibiting it; - there have been no TF cases and it is too early to assess whether the offence is effectively implemented. - SR.III Freeze and confiscate terrorist assets — Rating: PC - the definition of funds in the EC Regulations does not fully cover the terms in SR III and assets that are wholly owned or controlled by a listed entity are not covered; - Greece has a limited ability to freeze funds in accordance with S/RES/1373(2001) of designated terrorists outside the EU listing system; - the current process for notifying ministries and the financial sector of entities on UN lists takes too long and therefore these entities would not be able to comply with freezing terrorist assets without delay; - Greece does not provide guidance to financial institutions as well as DNFBPs on freezing assets of listed entities without delay and does not monitor FIs and DNFBPs for compliance with measures taken under the Resolutions; - there are no sanctions for failure to follow freezing requests; - processes for de-listing and unfreezing funds are not publicly known and it is impossible to determine their effectiveness, if they exist at all; - Greece has no procedure in place for allowing payment of basic living expenses and fees in line with UNSCR 1452; - Greece does not have appropriate procedures through which a person or entity whose funds have been frozen can challenge that measure before a court; - Greek authorities should be able to freeze terrorist assets without first having to open a criminal investigation; - Greece does not have any measures in place to protect the rights of bona fide third party owners of property that may be involved in terrorist financing. - SR.IV Suspicious transaction reporting — Rating: PC - insurance agents and brokers are not covered by the obligation to report; - not all the required aspects of terrorist financing are included in the scope of the reporting requirement; - industry practice would suggest that not all attempted transactions are reported; - the weaknesses in the STR system (especially low numbers in total and very low numbers of STRs outside the banking system) raise significant concerns in relation to the effectiveness of the reporting system. - SR.V International co-operation — Rating: LC - concerns on the ability of Greece to provide a full range mutual legal assistance in cases involving FT as it is currently defined in Greece (in relation to Recommendation 36); - the application of the dual criminality may create an obstacle to extradition in cases involving FT activities that are not specifically criminalised in Greece (in relation to Recommendation 39); - due to a lack of personnel and technical resources and limited database access, there is an issue of effectiveness with regard to the information exchange of the FIU with foreign authorities on CFT matters (in relation with Rec.40); - there is no information to suggest that cooperation between financial supervisors and their counterparts in AML/CFT matters is effective and is provided in line with the FATF standards (in relation with Rec.40). - SR.VI AML requirements for money/value transfer services — Rating: PC - the lack of specialised, trained staff means that there are general concerns about the effectiveness of the BOG supervision programme as applied to MVT services; - there was some evidence of informal transfer services, which were not applying AML/CFT measures and not being supervised; - Greece should take immediate steps to properly implement Recommendations 5-7, SR.VII and other relevant FATF Recommendations and to apply them also to bureaux de change and money remittance companies. - SR.VII Wire transfer rules — Rating: PC - the derogation set out in the EU regulation for wire transfers within the EU (classified as domestic transfers) is not in compliance with the FATF requirements under SR.VII; - there are currently no sanctions for non-compliance with the EU regulation, and the sanctions regime generally is not effective or dissuasive; - in terms of effectiveness, there is insufficient evidence that the Regulation has been properly implemented, nor is there sufficient evidence of effective compliance monitoring of credit institutions with the requirements under the EU Regulation. - SR.VIII Non-profit organisations — Rating: NC - Greece has not implemented the requirements set out in SR VIII. - SR.IX Cross Border Declaration & Disclosure — Rating: NC - there is no system for declaring or disclosing cash or bearer negotiable instruments in line with SR IX. ### Table 2: Recommended Action Plan to Improve the AML/CFT System — Selected priorities - General (section header only in source) - 2. Legal System and Related Institutional Measures — Selected recommended actions (listed in order of priority) - Criminalisation of Money Laundering (R.1 & 2) - Greece should ensure that the list of predicate offences includes all of the FATF designated predicate offences and amend Article 1.A.q) of the AML Law to include all offences punishable by at least six months in prison, regardless of the value of the property generated by the offence; - Greece should criminalise self-laundering; - Greece should extend criminal liability to legal persons and ensure that the existing system of administrative and civil liability of companies is used effectively; - The authorities should ensure that ML is a stand alone offence that does not require, in effect and practice, a conviction for the predicate offence. - Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing (SR.II) - Greece should amend the scope of the FT offence to make it a crime to collect or provide funds or material support to terrorist individuals or for specific terrorist acts. In addition, terrorist financing should be an offence in itself, whether or not a terrorist act has actually occurred and whether or not funds were used to finance a particular act; - Greece should review and limit the legal defence to the law in Article 187.A (8); - Greece should clarify what “funds” means for the purpose of Article 187A and ensure that the FT offence does not require that the funds be actually used; - Greece should expand the administrative liability with regard to the financing of terrorism. - Confiscation, freezing and seizing of proceeds of crime (R.3) - Greece should adopt measures that allow: (1) the confiscation of indirect proceeds; (2) to give courts the power to void or prevent actions involving the proceeds of crime from the time the predicate offence was convicted; - Greece should extend the powers of to all property that could be the proceeds of crime, not just accounts, safe deposit boxes and immovable property; - The Greek general confiscation legislation should provide for freezing on an ex parte basis, with the right to appeal; - Greece should provide guidance on what they consider an instrumentality intended for use in a crime; - Greece should provide guidance on using the various confiscation regimes; - Greece should review its laws and administrative structures so as to have an effective system to trace, seize and confiscate criminal proceeds. - Freezing of funds used for terrorist financing (SR.III) - Greece should develop its ability to freeze funds in accordance with S/RES/1373(2001) of designated terrorists outside the EU listing system; - Greek authorities should ensure that the authorities can freeze terrorist assets without first having to open a criminal investigation; - Greece should take the appropriate measures to speed the current process for notifying ministries and the financial sector of entities on UN lists; - Greece should provide guidance to financial institutions as well as DNFBPs on freezing assets of listed entities and should monitor FIs and DNFBPs for compliance with measures taken under the Resolutions; - Greece should adopt a regime of sanctions for failure to follow freezing requests; - Greece should develop publicly known processes for de-listing and unfreezing funds and procedures for allowing payment of basic living expenses and fees in line with UNSCR 1452; - Greece should adopt appropriate procedures through which a person or entity whose funds have been frozen can challenge that measure before a court; - Greece should adopt measures to protect the rights of bona fide third party owners of property that may be involved in terrorist financing. - The Financial Intelligence Unit and its functions (R.26 and R.30) - The Greek authorities should consider restructuring the FIU (especially more specialised personnel should be hired to carry out STRs analysis functions and Greece should give consideration to tasking the Committee members with a broad oversight and/or coordination role at national level); - Greece should review the effectiveness of the FIU. For instance, a mechanism for exchange of information with the judiciary would be very helpful to provide the FIU with some useful indicators of effectiveness and more broadly, Greece should adopt measures that ease the mechanisms for exchange of information between the FIU and other competent authorities; - Greece should ensure that the FIU is allocated with sufficient and skilled staff and has a comprehensive IT system to collect and process the STRs (for instance, the FIU should as soon as possible ensure its connection to the FIU.net); - The FIU should take all necessary measures to ensure that the information held is securely protected. The physical security of the facilities should be appropriately ensured and the current STR data system should be properly protected and backed up; - Greece should ensure that the FIU has a more direct and timely access to all financial, administrative and law enforcement information it requires to properly undertake its functions; - More reporting forms should be adopted and the reports published by the FIU should provide information on statistics, typologies and trends. - Law enforcement, prosecution and other competent authorities (R.27 & 28) - Greece should promote a more proactive approach to detect and expose third party ML cases as opposed to self-laundering and consideration should be given to a greater specialisation of prosecutors and judges in financial crime and ML cases; - Consideration should be given to making use of special investigative techniques in relation to ML and FT as they have proved successful in relation to drug trafficking; - Particular attention should be paid to establish effective coordination and information sharing between Customs and other law enforcement authorities in relation to the implementation of the controls on cash and bearer negotiable instruments leaving and entering the Greek territory, so as to enable the use of special investigative techniques in relation to cash. - Cross border declaration or disclosure (SR.IX) - Greece should implement measures conforming to the requirements of SR.IX. *IMF document: _cr0931 - 31. National co-operation PC • mechanisms for cooperation between the FIU, law enforcement,* ### 3. Preventive Measures – Financial Institutions ### 3. Preventive Measures – Financial Institutions ### Risk of money laundering or terrorist financing - Greece should develop a less selective and partial approach to risk and carry out full risk assessments in order to identify areas of higher or lower ML/FT risk. ### Customer due diligence, including enhanced or reduced measures (R.5 to 8) General - Greece should make sure that all basic CDD obligations as defined by the FATF are set out in the AML Law; - Greece should take steps for insurance brokers and agents to be brought within the scope of the AML law, and thus the CDD requirements; - Greece should engage with the private sector to promote compliance with the CDD requirements; In relation to Recommendation 5: - Greece should consider adopting an express requirement precluding the opening and maintenance of anonymous or numbered accounts; - Financial institutions should be required to conduct CDD in all of the situations required by the FATF Recommendations, notably where there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, and where doubts arise as to previously obtained CDD information; - In relation to simplified and enhanced due diligence, Greece should consider expanding and updating the guidance issued by competent authorities, and consider including more guidance on how to apply the provisions on a risk-based basis; - Financial institutions should be required to identify legal persons and beneficial ownership in the circumstances set out in FATF standards; - Firms supervised by the HCMC and firms in the insurance sector should be required to conduct ongoing CDD in line with FATF requirements; - The timing of verification of high risk customers should be properly regulated and be in line with FATF requirements; - The requirements to conduct CDD in respect of existing clients in the AML Law and the securities and insurance sectors should be in line with the FATF standards; - All financial institutions should be subject to a clear requirement to ascertain the nature and purpose of the business relationship; - Competent authorities should clarify SIs’ responsibilities in situations where full CDD information cannot be obtained. In relation to Recommendation 6: - The securities and insurance sectors should be required to identify and conduct CDD on PEPs; - The requirements relating to PEPs should cover PEPs from EU countries and impose a specific requirement to obtain senior management approval before the business relationship commences; - The requirement to identify a PEP’s source of wealth should be explicitly stated; In relation to Recommendation 7: - The provisions in relation to cross-border correspondent banking should be extended to include institutions in EU member states; In relation to Recommendation 8: - Measures should be mandated to fully implement Recommendation 8 (i.e. introduce requirements for the securities or insurance sectors; adopt requirements for SIs to have measures in place to prevent misuse of technological developments and ensure that the existing BOG measures to deal with the risks of non face to face business apply to all FIs). ### Third parties and introduced business (R.9) - Greece should review the use of third parties to conduct CDD in all sectors (particularly in the insurance sector and in situations involving group companies); - Competent authorities should ensure that any appropriate guidance deemed necessary after considering the operation of third party reliance in the financial services sector covers all sectors where this is practised (particularly the insurance sector); - The current provisions adopted of the BOG should be clarified to be fully consistent and in line with the requirements under Recommendation 9. ### Financial institution secrecy or confidentiality (R.4) - Greece should consider clarifying exactly when the bank secrecy law (Law 1059/1971) is over-ridden by other statutory provisions, and clarify the provisions of the AML Law on matters such as the scope of money laundering/terrorist financing. ### Record keeping and wire transfer rules (R.10 & SR.VII) In relation to Recommendation 10: - The provisions on record keeping in the AML Law should clearly require retention of business correspondence; - Greece should adopt specific record-keeping requirements or guidelines to ensure that (i) transactions can be fully reconstructed, and (ii) recorded information is available on a timely basis to domestic competent authority. In relation to SR.VII: - More effort should be made vis-à-vis the financial community to raise awareness with regard to the new requirements applicable to domestic (in the FATF sense) and cross-border wire transfers; - The Greek authorities should adopt effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions applicable to infringements of the provision laid down in the EU Regulation on wire transfers. ### Monitoring of transactions and relationships (R.11 & 21) In relation to Recommendation 11: - Greece should require all financial institutions to examine all complex, unusual etc. transactions, even if suspicion does not technically arise, and impose a clear requirement to document the findings of any examination undertaken; In relation to Recommendation 21: - All financial institutions should be required to monitor business relationships with persons from countries not or insufficiently applying the FATF standards. ### Suspicious transaction reports and other reporting (R.13-14, 19, 25 & SR.IV) In relation to Recommendation 13 and SR.IV: - The obligation to submit STRs should be extended to cover all sectors of the financial services industry, and should cover all predicate offences in full (including tax evasion) and all aspects of terrorist financing; - The obligation to report attempted transactions should be clarified; - Greece should review the effectiveness of the reporting system; In relation to Recommendation 19: - Greece should consider the feasibility and utility of implementing a currency reporting system across all regulated sectors; In relation to Recommendation 25: - The competent authorities should provide more comprehensive guidance (and take steps to update existing guidance, where appropriate) to improve the effectiveness of suspicious transaction reporting; - The FIU should provide greater and a further range of feedback to competent authorities and reporting institutions to assist in improving the quality of STRs submitted, and to help identify new areas where suspicion might arise. ### Internal controls, compliance, audit and foreign branches (R.15 & 22) In relation to Recommendation 15: - Financial institutions supervised by the BOG are required to have screening procedures but the link to AML/CFT provisions should be strengthened; - Financial institutions in the securities and insurance sectors should be required to adopt internal procedures and policies; In relation to Recommendation 22: - Branches and subsidiaries of Greek SIs located in third countries should be required to apply the higher standard, to the extent that local laws and regulations permit ; - In the securities and the insurance sectors: (1) Greece should adopt provisions in relation to Rec. 22 that apply to subsidiaries; (2) Greece should adopt some requirements to pay particular attention to situations where branches and subsidiaries are based in countries that do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations; (3) Greece should adopt an explicit provision to require FIs to inform their home country supervisor when a foreign branch or subsidiary is unable to observe appropriate AML/CFT measures because this is prohibited by local laws, regulations or other measure. ### Shell banks (R.18) - Financial institutions should be required to determine that a respondent financial institution in a foreign country does not permit its accounts to be used by shell banks. ### The supervisory and oversight system - competent authorities and SROs Role, functions, duties and powers (including sanctions) (R.23, 29, 17 & 25) In relation to Recommendation 23: - The Greek authorities should introduce a licensing requirement for insurance agents by the insurance regulator. Fit and proper tests should be conducted for all directors of credit institutions; - The BOG should implement a risk-based supervisory program for AML/CFT and adopt a more systematic consolidated approach to the supervision of AML/CFT policies risk management systems. The BOG should improve the quality of the assessment of bureaux de change and money remitters. - The HCMC and the HPISC should implement a robust supervisory programme for AML/CFT purposes with proper inspection procedures. In relation to Recommendation 29: - The adoption of a proper risk based approach should be considered by the BOG to improve its capacity to use its supervision powers in an effective way; - The BOG should review its use of sanctions to ensure that they are effective, proportionate and dissuasive; - The HCMC should use its supervision powers on a regular and effective basis; - Once established, the HPISC should be given appropriate supervision powers in the AML/CFT area; In relation to Recommendation 17: - The BOG should review the regime of sanctions applicable for failing to apply AML/CFT requirements and specific sanctions for directors and senior managers should be available and implemented where appropriate; - The HCMC should ensure that the sanctions in place fully meet the FATF standards i.e. are effective, proportionate and dissuasive and are implemented properly; - In the insurance sector, the Greek authorities should adopt sanctions for violations of the AML Law requirements that are in line with the FATF standards and are sufficiently dissuasive. In relation to Recommendation 25: - The BOG, the HCMC and the HPISC should adopt sector-specific guidance with updated information on ML and FT trends and techniques and a broader scope in order to comprehensively address the FATF requirements. ### Money value transfer services (SR.VI) - Current provisions in relation to agents of bureaux de change should be clarified since it is not certain that bureaux de change are obliged to inform the BOG of the names and addresses of their agents; - The BOG should improve the quality of the supervision carried in bureaux de change and money remittance companies; - Sanctions should be available to directors and senior management of money remittance companies; - The Greek authorities should review the existence of informal remittance businesses for purposes of registration of licensing and oversight for AML/CFT purposes; - In general, Greece should take immediate steps to properly implement Recommendations 5-7, SR.VII and other relevant FATF Recommendations and to apply them also to the bureaux de change and money remittance companies. *Source: _cr0931 - 3. Preventive Measures – Financial Institutions_* --- _Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/_cr0931.pdf_