## 1. Labor Market Indicators

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [1. Labor Market Indicators](https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/_cr0987.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/_cr0987.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/_cr0987.pdf.json)

---

### Executive summary and macroeconomic outlook
- Belgium faces an extraordinary set of economic challenges from the global financial crisis, a deep recession, and a spike in inflation from early 2008.
- GDP growth averaged 2.6 percent from 2004–07.
- Staff anticipate GDP growth of -2 percent in 2009.
- Growth in 2009 is expected to be -2.5 percent in Germany and -1.9 percent in France.
- The global downturn and tightened credit conditions are expected to leave activity below potential into 2010.
- The financial crisis has boosted the gross debt-to-GDP ratio by some 6 percentage points.
- Mission team visited Brussels during December 3-16, 2008.

### Political and institutional context
- Parliamentary elections in June 2007; caretaker administration until Yves Leterme formed a government in March 2008.
- New Flemish Alliance Party withdrew in September 2008; Leterme resigned in December 2008; Hermann Van Rompuy named Prime Minister.
- Regional elections scheduled for June 2009.
- Despite instability, authorities acted quickly during the financial sector crisis; the 2008 federal budget was delayed and less ambitious, and the 2009 budget was late and based on outdated macro assumptions.

### Financial sector response and recommended intervention framework
- Authorities intervened in Fortis, Dexia, KBC, and Ethias in September-October 2008.
- Ongoing issues include legal complications in the Fortis operation and elevated systemic risks.
- Recommended actions:
  - Establish a broader intervention framework with pre-established legal rules for future interventions and mobilization of significant further financial resources.
  - Prepare specific contingency plans for each major bank, for smaller banks, and for the insurance industry.
  - Ensure EU-wide coordination for further interventions.
  - Strengthen banks’ risk management and effective cross-border supervisory cooperation.
  - Press for expansion of pan-European banking supervision mechanisms while strengthening existing cooperation venues.
  - Strengthen information sharing and coordination between the BFIC and the NBB.
  - Consider unification of macrofinancial risk analysis with banking and insurance supervision under a single structure.

### Fiscal policy: short-term stimulus and long-term sustainability
- Short-term recommendation: allow full operation of automatic stabilizers, plus a moderate discretionary stimulus around 1 percent of GDP in 2009.
- Stimulus should be timely, targeted, and tied to structural fiscal improvements; larger stimulus only in coordination with the EU if conditions worsen.
- Medium- and long-term recommendation: commit now to a structural adjustment of at least 0.7 percent of GDP per year until returning to fiscal balance and eventually a surplus.
- Institutional reforms recommended:
  - Multiyear budgeting with binding spending ceilings.
  - Strengthening the role of the High Finance Council.
  - Comprehensive expenditure and revenue reviews.
- Tackle imbalances in fiscal federalism by shifting more of the burden of fiscal consolidation and aging preparation from federal/social security to community/regional entities and addressing horizontal imbalances.

### Labor market, wage indexation, and structural reforms
- Wages: about two-thirds of private sector wages and public sector wages are indexed with a delay to a core inflation measure; some pass-through of increased inflation is inevitable and wages will continue to rise in 2009 even as inflation drops.
- Under the wage framework agreed by social partners for 2009-10 there will be a small additional wage increase beyond indexation.
- Mission cautioned against broader wage increases and recommended consideration of modifications to indexation parameters.
- Structural reform recommendations to raise productivity and competitiveness:
  - Modify indexation mechanisms within the current centralized bargaining framework to achieve greater real wage flexibility.
  - Improve activation policies and increase training opportunities focused on labor productivity.
  - Ease restrictions on new retail establishments and deregulate opening hours and sales periods.
  - Increase transparency in energy supply and tighten regulation in energy distribution.
  - Reinforce the Competition Council as a public advocate for competition and watchdog against rent-seeking.

### Inflation dynamics and price-setting concerns
- Headline inflation peaked in July 2008 at 5.9 percent, year-on-year.
- As of December 2008, Belgian HICP inflation stood at 2.7 percent, year-on-year, versus 1.6 percent in the euro area.
- Staff forecast Belgian inflation to remain above the euro area in 2009.
- Second-round effects: services-related inflation components have not dropped, implying second-round effects on wages and prices.
- Sources of the inflation differential with the euro area:
  - Compositional and measurement issues (e.g., CPI basket weighting and CPI measurement changes for electricity and gas in early 2007).
  - Most of the differential is accounted for by differences in processed food prices, services prices, and gas and electricity prices, suggesting downward price rigidities.
- Policy recommendation: promote more competition in processed food, services, and energy transmission/distribution.

### External sector and competitiveness
- Belgian exporters have been losing market share since 1995 and export mainly to slower growing economies.
- Preliminary 2008 estimates show a trade deficit and a corresponding current account deficit, compared with an average current account surplus of 3½ percent of GDP in 2002–06.
- Staff’s baseline forecast for the medium term is current account deficits on the order of 2 percent of GDP.
- Drivers of deterioration: appreciating real effective exchange rate and eroding competitiveness in unit labor cost terms; insufficient specialization in differentiated high-value-added products.
- Risks: additional decline in domestic demand, further drop in foreign demand, significant tightening of financing conditions.
- Offsetting factors: EU-wide stimulus packages, aggressive actions to defuse further financial crisis rounds, euro depreciation, and falling ECB interest rates.

### Real effective exchange rate and competitiveness (CGER and ULC indicators)
- CGER methodologies show Belgium with an overvaluation on average of 5.6 percent (compared to 1 percent one year ago).
- Appreciation of the euro and appreciation relative to France, Germany, Netherlands since 2007 account for part of the difference.
- Unit labor cost (ULC)-based real effective exchange rates indicate a cumulative trade-weighted deterioration of 27 percent since 2000.
- By comparison, Germany recorded a cumulative gain of 7 percent since 2000.
- Despite slow wage growth, labor costs remain higher than the average of the three major trading partners.
- The wage indexation mechanism in Belgium is generating higher wage increases in 2008–9, exacerbating the gap in unit labor costs.
- CGER Competitiveness Assessment (In percent):
  - Macro balances approach: 8.7
  - External sustainability approach: 1.5
  - Equilibrium RER approach: 6.5
  - Simple Average: 5.6

### The financial crisis and macrofinancial linkages
- Belgian financial sector weathered early 2007 turmoil but succumbed in September–October 2008.
- By January 2008, equity price volatility signaled market concerns about asset valuations and banks’ earnings and capital.
- Banks’ consolidation of off-balance sheet exposure raised concerns about earnings.
- Worsening world liquidity conditions after Lehman and specific concerns about Fortis and Dexia triggered the crisis in September 2008.
- Dexia’s CDS spread spiked in early 2008 due to U.S. monoline and securitized mortgages exposure; later compounded by AIG’s collapse.
- Fortis weakened by the costly acquisition of ABN-Amro in 2007, depleting capital and creating liquidity difficulties.
- Authorities intervened in Fortis on September 28 and in Dexia two days later; KBC faced pressures in October requiring government recapitalization.
- Macroeconomic impact quantification:
  - A shock of 100 b.p. on the credit spread leads to a slowdown in business investment of 0.4 percent per annum and reduces household investment in housing by 0.1 percent.
- Lending margins increased for all borrowers; enterprises’ margins increased up to 63 b.p.; mortgages’ margins increased up to 100 b.p. from June to October 2008.
- Cost of financing through stock issuance increased by 25 percent between June and September 2008.
- Rate on BBB quoted bonds with a 5-to-7 year maturity increased by 150 b.p. from June to September.
- Belgian stock exchange lost nearly 45 percent of its value over the past year, depressing household assets by 15 percent.
- Wealth effects expected to reduce consumption growth by 0.5 percent per annum during 2 to 3 years.
- Staff forecast: savings ratio increasing from 12 percent in 2007 to 14½ percent by 2009, depressing private consumption and domestic demand.

### Belgium’s banking sector (structure and market shares)
- Financial sector is large, internationally integrated and dominated by conglomerates; four main banks hold 80 percent of all banking assets.
- Market shares and profitability (selected):
  - Fortis: Banking market share 31.9; Insurance share of total profit 14.3
  - KBC: Banking market share 21.4; Insurance share of total profit 8.8
  - Dexia: Banking market share 14.7; Insurance share of total profit 6.9
  - ING: Banking market share 14.0; Insurance share of total profit 6.7
  - Total: Banking market share 82; Insurance share of total profit 44.3

### Government interventions in the financial sector (selected figures)
- Fortis:
  - Federal government invested €9.4 billion to acquire virtually all the equity in Fortis Bank, and sold a 75 percent stake to BNP Paribas in exchange for BNP Paribas shares (sale later subject to legal complications).
- Dexia:
  - Federal government and Belgium’s three regions together invested €2 billion in Dexia for 11.5 percent of equity.
  - Belgian and French government guarantee up to €12 billion of toxic assets held by Dexia.
  - Dexia received a funding guarantee that can engage the Belgian government up to an amount of €90 billion.
- KBC:
  - Federal government acquired €3.5 billion non-voting and non-transferable securities qualifying as core capital.
  - Flemish government announced an additional €2.0 billion capital injection using similar securities.
- Ethias:
  - Federal government, and the Flemish and Walloon regions each contributing €0.5 billion to a capital injection.
- Financial sector guarantees:
  - Deposit guarantee ceiling per depositor increased from €20,000 to €100,000.
  - Extension of guarantee coverage to insurance instruments akin to deposits.
  - Temporary guarantee for interbank loans and short-term debt instruments.
- Only Dexia has so far asked and received a funding guarantee (Belgian, French, Luxembourg governments).

### Risks, contingency planning, and recommended intervention framework
- Risks remain elevated; additional bank losses and further intervention cannot be ruled out.
- Market for unsecured financing reopened only with overnight repo, larger haircuts, and prime collateral.
- Court decision to suspend sale of Fortis Bank Belgium to BNP-Paribas increased uncertainties and may require additional government financing.
- Recommendation: move from ad hoc interventions to a systematic strategy including:
  - Pre-established rules for future interventions and ability to mobilize significant financial resources.
  - A strategy for dealing with toxic assets.
  - Legislation to transparently specify room for and conditions of additional capital injections and funding guarantees.
  - Development by Government, BFIC, and NBB of tailored contingency plans for major banks, smaller banks, and the insurance industry.

### Fiscal policy response and fiscal costs (selected figures)
- 2008 general government deficit estimated to have widened from ¼ percent of GDP in 2007 to about 1 percent of GDP in 2008.
- Public debt was boosted by nearly 4 percentage points of GDP by the cost of support to the financial sector.
- Increase in general government debt of €19.4 billion (somewhat more than 5 percent of 2009 GDP) due to federal and regional borrowing for direct support (excluding certain regional financed capital injections).
- At current interest rates for 10-year government bonds, corresponding interest payments would be around €850 million annually (around ¼ percent of 2009 GDP).
- Draft 2009 budget estimates additional revenue from fees at €100 million for the higher deposit guarantee and €500 million for the new bank funding guarantee.
- KBC securities entitle federal government annually to the higher of either €2.51 per security (yielding 8.5 percent) or 110 percent of the dividend paid in 2009 and 115 percent of the dividend in following years; no payment expected in years when KBC is not expected to distribute a dividend (notably, 2008).
- Contingent liabilities from additional guarantees do not yet raise debt or deficit but could be called; for Dexia a call on the toxic-asset guarantee would be equivalent to a capital injection.
- Staff view: a moderate discretionary stimulus (around 1 percent of GDP) is appropriate despite limited fiscal space.
- Public cost of bailout has boosted the debt-to-GDP ratio to nearly 88 percent of GDP.
- Sovereign spread on Belgian debt has risen sharply (to above 100 b.p.); ratings agencies downgraded the sovereign outlook from positive to neutral.

### Fiscal stimulus and the 2009 budget (Plan de Relance)
- The 2009 budget plus the December stimulus package would provide a fiscal impulse of around 1 percent of GDP.
- Federal draft budget in November envisaged a balanced general government budget based on optimistic macro assumptions; in early December the balanced target was abandoned and real GDP growth forecast for 2009 revised down to -0.2 percent alongside a new fiscal stimulus package.
- Approval of the budget delayed until January by the collapse of the Leterme government; measures awaited parliamentary approval under Prime Minister Van Rompuy.
- Footnote in source: GDP Growth of 1.2 percent was envisaged, with only a marginal increase in unemployment.

### Composition of the proposed stimulus (selected measures)
- Federal measures include:
  - New and accelerated public investment.
  - Across-the-board reductions in social security contributions.
  - A VAT reduction for selected construction activities.
  - An increase in benefits for temporary unemployment.
  - A limited subsidy for household electricity consumption.
  - Steps to improve liquidity of the enterprise sector.
- Regional measures invited by the federal government focus on:
  - Public investment in infrastructure and energy conservation.
  - Employment subsidies.
  - Guarantee schemes to facilitate enterprise access to bank loans.

### Staff assessment and recommended adjustments to the package
- Staff view: composition could be improved.
- Key recommendations:
  - Less ambitious public investment targets given limits on projects that can affect demand in H1 2009.
  - Include sunset clauses or long-term countervailing savings for expensive reductions in social contributions and increases in social benefits.
  - Sharpen focus of cuts/hikes toward increasing incomes of those most likely to spend it (e.g., low-income and unemployed).
- Authorities argued projects and timetables had been identified and some measures would be permanent due to longer-lasting benefits.
- Staff projects a headline general government deficit between 2½-3 percent of GDP in 2009.
- Letting automatic stabilizers operate freely would translate, under staff growth projections, into a year-on-year widening of the headline general government deficit by slightly more than 2 percent of GDP.
- Staff projects the Plan de Relance and other measures to boost the structural deficit by around ¾ percent of GDP.
- Under current policies with slow growth into 2010, the deficit would remain around 3½ percent of GDP over 2010-2012.

### Beyond the crisis—restoring growth, enhancing resilience, and returning fiscal sustainability
- A. Lowering inflationary pressures and improving competitiveness:
  - Pass-through of oil and commodity shocks should follow best competition practices; wage moderation to restrain second-round effects.
  - Competition and market reforms: reinforce Competition Council; ease retail restrictions; deregulate over-the-counter drug market; increase transparency in energy sector (CREG).
  - Expected impact: reforms could lower consumer price level by as much as 1-2 percentage points over time, boosting purchasing power by hundreds of euros per household and narrowing external competitiveness gap.
  - Wage indexation: reform parameters to protect poorest workers while allowing less-than-complete indexation for the economy as a whole.
- B. Lessons from the financial crisis:
  - Need for broader intervention framework; strengthen BFIC–NBB coordination, joint databases, joint inspection teams, and consider unifying macrofinancial risk analysis with banking and insurance supervision.
  - Cross-border exposures: press for expansion of pan-European supervision and ensure banks appropriately manage indirect credit risk from foreign currency loans.
- C. Restoring fiscal sustainability:
  - Recommend a medium-term anchor: structural adjustment of at least 0.7 percent of GDP per year once crisis passes.
  - Budget process reforms: medium-term budgetary framework; enhanced role for the HFC as independent evaluator; convert informal fiscal coordination into internal stability pacts with publication and sanctions; comprehensive expenditure and revenue reviews.
  - Reduce size of government (nearly 50 percent of GDP).

### Fiscal federalism: assessment and reform recommendations
- Vertical imbalances are deepening as federal government transfers increasing share of revenues to communities/regions while bearing aging-related spending increases.
- Addressing vertical imbalances complicated by horizontal imbalances between communities/regions.
- Opportunity to:
  - Reconsider horizontal imbalances.
  - Better match spending authority and revenue-raising responsibilities.
  - Improve transparency and incentive effects of intergovernmental solidarity mechanisms.

### Fiscal projections and staff-recommended scenario (selected figures, in percent of GDP)
- Current policies (A) projections:
  - Revenue: 48.7 (2008), 48.6 (2009), 48.6 (2010), 48.5 (2011), 48.4 (2012), 48.4 (2013), 48.2 (2014)
  - Expenditure: 51.8 (2008), 52.6 (2009), 52.5 (2010), 52.4 (2011), 52.2 (2012), 52.2 (2013), 52.1 (2014)
  - General government balance: -3.2 (2008), -4.0 (2009), -4.0 (2010), -3.9 (2011), -3.8 (2012), -3.9 (2013)
  - Structural balance: -1.4 (2008), -1.8 (2009), -2.0 (2010), -2.3 (2011), -2.5 (2012), -2.6 (2013)
  - Primary balance: 0.7 (2008), 0.1 (2009), 0.1 (2010), 0.2 (2011), 0.3 (2012), 0.2 (2013)
  - General government debt: 91.0 (2008), 92.5 (2009), 92.8 (2010), 92.7 (2011), 92.4 (2012)
- Staff-recommended scenario (B) projections:
  - Expenditure (total): 51.8 (2008), 52.2 (2009), 51.2 (2010), 50.1 (2011), 49.0 (2012), 48.1 (2013)
  - Primary expenditure: 45.8 (2008), 48.0 (2009), 47.2 (2010), 46.2 (2011), 45.2 (2012), 44.4 (2013)
  - Balance: -3.2 (2008), -3.6 (2009), -2.7 (2010), -1.7 (2011), -0.6 (2012), 0.1 (2013)
  - Structural balance: -1.4 (2008), -1.3 (2009), -0.7 (2010), 0.0 (2011), 0.7 (2012), 1.4 (2013)
  - Primary balance: 0.7 (2008), 0.4 (2009), 1.3 (2010), 2.3 (2011), 3.2 (2012), 3.9 (2013)
  - Debt: 91.0 (2008), 89.6 (2009), 90.7 (2010), 89.8 (2011), 84.3 (2012), 80.7 (2013)
- Memorandum items (staff scenario):
  - Real primary expenditure growth: 4.5 (2008), 2.3 (2009), 1.0 (2010), 0.0 (2011), 0.2 (2012), 0.8 (2013)
  - Output gap (percent): -3.3 (2009), -2.9 (2010), -2.2 (2011), -1.5 (2012), -0.7 (2013)
  - GDP growth (percent): -2.1 (2009), 0.6 (2010), 1.9 (2011), 2.2 (2012), 2.4 (2013), 2.6 (2014)

### Public debt sustainability and stress tests (selected figures)
- Baseline public sector debt ratio (percent of GDP): 2003: 98.7; 2004: 94.5; 2005: 92.0; 2006: 87.7; 2007: 83.9; 2008: 86.2; 2009: 91.0; 2010: 92.5; 2011: 92.8; 2012: 92.7; 2013: 92.4
- Change in public sector debt: 2004: -4.2; 2005: -2.5; 2006: -4.3; 2007: -3.8; 2008: 2.3; 2009: 4.8; 2010: 1.4; 2011: 0.3; 2012: -0.1; 2013: -0.3
- Identified debt-creating flows (4+7+12): 2008: 2.3; 2009: 4.8; 2010: 1.3; 2011: 0.2; 2012: -0.2; 2013: -0.4
- Primary deficit (percent of GDP): 2008: -2.8; 2009: -0.7; 2010: -0.2; 2011: -0.2; 2012: -0.3; 2013: -0.4
- Automatic debt dynamics (contribution, percent of GDP): 2008: 0.9; 2009: 4.0; 2010: 1.5; 2011: 0.3; 2012: 0.1; 2013: 0.0
- Key macro-fiscal assumptions (selected averages): average nominal interest rate on public debt: 4.6; average real interest rate: 2.5; inflation rate (GDP deflator): 2.1
- Stress-test scenario outcomes (public sector debt, percent of GDP):
  - A1 (key variables at historical averages 2008–2013): debt falls to 67.2 by horizon shown
  - A2 (no policy change, constant primary balance 2008–2013): debt rises to 80.2 by horizon shown
  - B1 (real interest rate = baseline + 1 st. dev.): 94.7 (peak)
  - B2 (real GDP growth = baseline – 0.5 st. dev.): 98.2 (peak)
  - B6 (10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2009): debt rises to 102.6–103.0 in subsequent years

### Financial sector soundness: banking sector (selected indicators, 2007 unless stated)
- Profitability and margins:
  - Return on assets: 0.4
  - Return on equity: 13.2
  - Net interest income to total income: 50.5
  - Interest margin: 0.8
- Asset composition (percent of total assets):
  - Loans to customers: 42.2
  - Debt securities: 18.8
  - Equity instruments: 3.4
  - Derivatives: 5.5
- Mortgage loans (in billion euro): 208
- Funding and liquidity (percent of total assets):
  - Debts to credit institutions: 27.4
  - Bank bonds and other debt securities: 11.3
  - Customer deposits: 37.9
- Asset quality:
  - NPL as percent of gross loans: 1.1
  - Provisions + writeoffs as percent of NPL: 48
- Capital adequacy:
  - Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets: 11.2
  - Regulatory Tier I capital to risk-weighted assets: 12.1
  - Capital to assets: 4.1
- System size:
  - Total assets (percent of GDP): 476.1

### Financial sector soundness: non-banking sectors and households (selected indicators, 2007)
- Insurance sector:
  - Solvency ratio: 224.6
  - Return on equity (annualised): 3.0
  - Life premiums (billion euro): 21.9
  - Technical result/premiums (life, percent): 4.4
  - Combined ratio (non-life, percent): 102.1
- Corporate and household sectors:
  - Corporate total debt as a percentage of equity: 59.9
  - Household debt (percent of GDP): 50.1
  - Interest burden (percent of disposable income): 2.9
  - Savings rate: 12.9
- Real estate sector:
  - House price inflation (houses): 3.9
  - Apartment price inflation: 3.4
  - Mortgage loans as percent of total loans: 29.6
  - Variable rate mortgages (percent of total new loans): 2.5

### Institutional, mission context, and data
- Mission: Brussels, December 4–15, 2008.
- Staff team: Messrs. Franks (Head), De Broeck, Ms. Yontcheva, and Mr. Jarmuzek (all EUR).
- Country interlocutors included the prime minister, the vice-prime minister for the budget, the governor of the NBB, and senior federal and regional officials.
- Belgium subscribes to the Fund’s Special Data Dissemination Standard; comprehensive economic data are available on a timely basis.

### ANNEX II — Statistical issues and 2009 outlook (selected projections and indicators)
- NBB publishes comprehensive databases via Belgostat; quarterly accounts published within a lag of three months.
- Staff projects real GDP contraction of 2.5 percent in 2009 (revised from 1.9 percent in the staff report).
- Household saving ratio projected to increase from 15.7 (2008) to 16.6 (2009) and 16.5 (2010).
- Key projections (selected Table 1 figures):
  - Real GDP (percent change): 2008: 1.2; 2009: -2.5; 2010: 0.3; 2011: 2.0; 2012: 2.2; 2013: 2.3; 2014: 2.3
  - Private consumption (percent change): 2008: 0.8; 2009: -1.1; 2010: 0.7
  - Gross fixed investment (percent change): 2008: 4.3; 2009: -5.3; 2010: -0.5
  - Exports (percent change): 2008: 2.7; 2009: -1.9; 2010: 0.7
  - Unemployment rate: 2008: 7.1; 2009: 8.8; 2010: 9.7
  - Consumer prices (percent change): 2008: 4.5; 2009: 0.9; 2010: 1.5
  - General government debt (percent of GDP): 2008: 86.3; 2009: 91.8; 2010: 94.1
  - Trade balance (percent of GDP): 2008: -1.2; 2009: -0.7; 2010: -0.9
  - Current account (percent of GDP): 2008: -2.4; 2009: -1.8; 2010: -2.3

### 2009 inflation, wages, and competitiveness (summary)
- "Inflation should fall to around 2 percent in 2009, but may still remain above the euro area average."
- "Indexation mechanisms will generate higher wage growth than in partner countries over the coming year," supporting demand but contributing to "a continued decline in external competitiveness."
- Structural concerns highlighted about price-setting in food and energy markets.
- Policy recommendations: review price-setting mechanism in energy supply and distribution; consider revision of wage indexation mechanisms within the centralized bargaining framework.

### Executive Board Assessment — key judgments
- Belgium "has been severely affected by the global financial crisis and economic slowdown, as well as the earlier commodity and oil price shocks."
- Directors commended authorities for prompt and decisive intervention in September 2008.
- Need to balance short-term stimulus with medium-term fiscal sustainability given high debt and aging population.
- Near-term outlook described as bleak: GDP expected to contract sharply in 2009 and recover only sluggishly in 2010 with significant downside risks.
- Directors encouraged allowing fiscal stabilizers to operate fully and welcomed a moderate discretionary stimulus while emphasizing no room for additional stimulus; measures should be "timely, targeted, and temporary."

*Source: IMF staff appraisal and mission materials contained in the provided chapter (content unit: _cr0987)._

### 1. Labor Market Indicators..............................................................................................

### _cr0987 - 1. Labor Market Indicators

### Executive summary and macroeconomic outlook
- Belgium faces an extraordinary set of economic challenges from the global financial crisis, a deep recession, and a spike in inflation from early 2008.
- GDP growth averaged 2.6 percent from 2004–07.
- Staff anticipate GDP growth of -2 percent in 2009.
- Growth in 2009 is expected to be -2.5 percent in Germany and -1.9 percent in France.
- The global downturn and tightened credit conditions are expected to leave activity below potential into 2010.
- The fiscal position has been weakened by the crisis: the financial crisis has boosted the gross debt-to-GDP ratio by some 6 percentage points.
- A mission team comprising Mr. Franks (head), Mr. De Broeck, Mr. Jarmuzek and Ms. Yontcheva (all EUR) visited Brussels during December 3-16, 2008.

### Political and institutional context
- Recent political timeline and instability:
  - Parliamentary elections in June 2007.
  - Caretaker administration until Yves Leterme formed a government in March 2008.
  - New Flemish Alliance Party withdrew in September 2008.
  - Leterme resigned in December 2008 after allegations relating to Fortis; Hermann Van Rompuy named Prime Minister.
  - Regional elections scheduled for June 2009.
- Despite political instability, authorities acted quickly and decisively during the financial sector crisis; however, the 2008 federal budget was delayed and less ambitious, and the 2009 budget was late and based on outdated macroeconomic assumptions.

### Financial sector response and recommendations
- Authorities intervened in Fortis, Dexia, KBC, and Ethias in September-October 2008.
- Ongoing issues:
  - Legal complications in the Fortis operation.
  - Elevated systemic risks remain.
- Recommended actions:
  - Establish a broader intervention framework with a legal framework providing pre-established rules for future interventions and mobilization of significant further financial resources.
  - Prepare specific contingency plans for each major bank, for smaller banks, and for the insurance industry.
  - Ensure EU-wide coordination for further interventions.
  - Strengthen risk management by banks and effective cross-border supervisory cooperation.
  - Press for expansion of pan-European banking supervision mechanisms while strengthening existing cooperation venues.
  - Strengthen information sharing and coordination between the Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission (BFIC) and the Belgian National Bank (NBB).
  - Consider eventual unification of macrofinancial risk analysis with banking and insurance supervision under a single structure.

### Fiscal policy: short-term stimulus and long-term sustainability
- Short-term:
  - Fiscal policy in 2009 should allow for full operation of the automatic stabilizers, plus a moderate discretionary stimulus around 1 percent of GDP.
  - Stimulus should be more timely and targeted than proposals advanced in late 2008 and tied to structural fiscal improvements.
  - If conditions deteriorate significantly further, a larger stimulus might be considered, but only in coordination with the EU.
- Medium- and long-term:
  - Once the crisis is past, the government—in collaboration with regions and communities—should firmly commit now to a structural adjustment of at least 0.7 percent of GDP per year until returning to fiscal balance and eventually a surplus.
  - The consolidation strategy should be supported by fiscal institutional reforms, including:
    - Multiyear budgeting with binding spending ceilings.
    - Strengthening the role of the High Finance Council.
    - Comprehensive expenditure and revenue reviews.
  - Tackle imbalances in fiscal federalism by shifting more of the burden of fiscal consolidation and preparation for population aging from federal/social security to community/regional entities and addressing horizontal imbalances between communities/regions.

### Labor market, wage indexation, and structural reforms
- Labor market and wages:
  - Wages: about two-thirds of private sector wages and public sector wages are indexed with a delay to a core inflation measure; some pass-through of increased inflation is inevitable and wages will continue to rise in 2009 even as inflation drops.
  - Under the wage framework agreed by social partners for 2009-10 there will be a small additional wage increase beyond indexation.
  - Mission cautioned against broader wage increases and recommended consideration of modifications to indexation parameters.
- Recommended structural reforms to raise productivity and competitiveness:
  - Modify indexation mechanisms within the current centralized bargaining framework to achieve greater real wage flexibility.
  - Improve activation policies and increase training opportunities focused on labor productivity.
  - Ease restrictions on new retail establishments and deregulate opening hours and sales periods to promote competition and lower consumer prices.
  - Increase transparency in energy supply and tighten regulation in energy distribution to guard against market-power abuse and ensure fair distribution price evolution.
  - Reinforce the Competition Council to be both a vocal public advocate for competition and a watchdog against rent-seeking behavior.

### Inflation dynamics and price-setting concerns
- Inflation developments:
  - Headline inflation peaked in July 2008 at 5.9 percent, year-on-year.
  - As of December 2008, Belgian HICP inflation stood at 2.7 percent, year-on-year, versus 1.6 percent in the euro area.
  - Staff forecast Belgian inflation to remain above the euro area in 2009.
- Second-round effects:
  - Even as energy and commodity prices fell, services-related inflation components have not dropped, implying second-round effects on wages and prices.
  - Trade union leaders proposed a reduction of the labor tax wedge; mission cautioned against broader wage increases.
- Sources of the inflation differential with the euro area:
  - Compositional and measurement issues partly explain the differential (e.g., CPI basket weighting and CPI measurement changes for electricity and gas in early 2007).
  - Most of the differential is accounted for by differences in processed food prices, services prices, and gas and electricity prices.
  - This suggests downward price rigidities in retail food, services, and energy transmission and distribution.
- Policy recommendation:
  - Promote more competition in processed food, services, and energy transmission/distribution.

### External sector and competitiveness
- Export performance and current account:
  - Belgian exporters have been losing market share since 1995 and export mainly to slower growing economies.
  - For 2008 as a whole preliminary estimates show a trade deficit and a corresponding current account deficit, compared with an average current account surplus of 3½ percent of GDP in 2002–06.
  - Staff’s baseline forecast for the medium term is current account deficits on the order of 2 percent of GDP.
- Drivers of deterioration:
  - An appreciating real effective exchange rate and eroding competitiveness in unit labor cost terms.
  - Insufficient specialization in differentiated high-value-added products.
- Risks to the outlook:
  - Additional decline in domestic demand from precautionary savings or renewed credit constraints.
  - Further drop in foreign demand if partner economies worsen more than expected.
  - Significant further tightening of financing conditions.
- Offsetting factors that could mitigate the downturn:
  - EU-wide stimulus packages.
  - Aggressive actions to defuse further rounds of financial crisis.
  - Euro depreciation and falling ECB interest rates boosting competitiveness.

*Source: IMF staff appraisal and mission materials contained in the provided chapter.*

### 16.      Analysis of the Real Effective Exchange Rate shows a worsening. Estimates using

### 16.      Analysis of the Real Effective Exchange Rate shows a worsening.

### Real effective exchange rate and competitiveness
- CGER methodologies show Belgium with an overvaluation on average of 5.6 percent (compared to 1 percent one year ago).
- Appreciation of the euro over the period accounts for part of the difference.
- Appreciation compared to key euro area partner countries (France, Germany, Netherlands) since 2007 has occurred.
- Unit labor cost (ULC)-based real effective exchange rates indicate a cumulative trade-weighted deterioration of 27 percent since 2000.
- By comparison, Germany recorded a cumulative gain of 7 percent since 2000.
- Despite slow wage growth, labor costs remain higher than the average of the three major trading partners.
- The wage indexation mechanism in Belgium is generating higher wage increases in 2008–9, exacerbating the gap in unit labor costs.
- CGER Competitiveness Assessment (In percent):
  - Macro balances approach:8.7
  - External sustainability approach:1.5
  - Equilibrium RER approach:6.5
  - Simple Average:5.6

### The financial crisis and macrofinancial linkages
- Belgium’s financial sector weathered early 2007 turmoil but succumbed in September–October 2008.
- By January 2008, volatility in equity prices indicated market concerns about asset valuations and implications for banks’ earnings and capital.
- Banks consolidating off-balance sheet exposure generated uneasiness about earnings.
- Worsening world liquidity conditions after the Lehman collapse and specific concerns about Fortis and Dexia triggered the crisis in September 2008.
- Dexia’s CDS spread spiked in early 2008 due to loss of confidence in its U.S. monoline and securitized mortgages exposure, later compounded by AIG’s collapse.
- Fortis was weakened by the costly acquisition of ABN-Amro in 2007, depleting capital and creating liquidity difficulties; contradictory statements about subprime involvement affected market sentiment.
- Authorities intervened in Fortis on September 28 and in Dexia two days later; KBC faced pressures in October, necessitating a government recapitalization.
- The financial sector crisis impacts GDP directly via reduction in the sector’s value added and indirectly through disrupted lending:
  - A shock of 100 b.p. on the credit spread leads to a slowdown in business investment of 0.4 percent per annum and reduces household investment in housing by 0.1 percent.
- Lending margins increased for all borrowers regardless of risk profile; enterprises’ margins increased up to 63 basis points (b.p.); mortgages’ margins increased up to 100 b.p. from June to October 2008.
- Financing through commercial papers and stock issuance became more expensive:
  - The cost of financing through stock issuance increased by 25 percent between June and September 2008.
  - The rate on BBB quoted bonds with a 5-to-7 year maturity increased by 150 b.p. from June to September.
- Belgian stock exchange lost nearly 45 percent of its value over the past year, depressing household assets by 15 percent.
- Wealth effects expected to reduce consumption growth by 0.5 percent per annum during 2 to 3 years.
- Staff forecast: savings ratio increasing from 12 percent in 2007 to 14½ percent by 2009, depressing private consumption and domestic demand.

### Belgium’s banking sector (structure and market shares)
- The financial sector is large, internationally integrated and dominated by conglomerates; four main banks hold 80 percent of all banking assets.
- Market Share / Banking Market Share / Insurance / Share of Total Profit: Banking / Share of Total Profit: Insurance
  - Fortis: 31.9 / 17.8 / 85.7 / 14.3
  - KBC: 21.4 / 13.4 / 91.2 / 8.8
  - Dexia: 14.7 / 6.4 / 93.1 / 6.9
  - ING: 14 / 6.7 / 93.3 / 6.7
  - Total: 82 / 44.3

### Government interventions in the financial sector
- Direct support provided to major institutions (Fortis, Dexia, KBC) and insurance company Ethias.
- Fortis:
  - Federal government invested €9.4 billion to acquire virtually all the equity in Fortis Bank, and [sold] a 75 percent stake to BNP Paribas in exchange for BNP Paribas shares.
- Dexia:
  - Federal government and Belgium’s three regions together invested €2 billion in Dexia, in exchange for 11.5 percent of Dexia’s equity.
  - Belgian and French government guarantee up to €12 billion of toxic assets held in portfolio by Dexia.
  - Dexia received a funding guarantee that can engage the Belgian government up to an amount of €90 billion.
- KBC:
  - Federal government acquired €3.5 billion non-voting and non-transferable securities that qualify as core capital.
  - Flemish government announced an additional €2.0 billion capital injection using similar securities.
- Ethias:
  - Federal government, and the Flemish and Walloon regions each contributing €0.5 billion to a capital injection.
- Financial sector guarantees:
  - Deposit guarantee ceiling per depositor increased from €20,000 to €100,000.
  - Extension of guarantee coverage to insurance instruments akin to deposits.
  - Temporary guarantee for interbank loans and short-term debt instruments issued by financial institutions.
- Only Dexia has so far asked and received a funding guarantee (Belgian, French, Luxembourg governments).

### Risks, contingency planning, and recommended intervention framework
- Risks remain elevated; additional bank losses and further intervention cannot be ruled out.
- Market for unsecured financing reopened but with overnight repurchase transactions only, larger haircuts, and prime collateral.
- Court decision to suspend sale of Fortis Bank Belgium to BNP-Paribas increased uncertainties and may require additional government financing.
- Recommendation: move from ad hoc interventions to a more systematic intervention strategy including:
  - Pre-established rules for future interventions.
  - Ability to mobilize significant further financial resources if needed.
  - A strategy for dealing with toxic assets.
  - Legislation to transparently specify room for and conditions of additional capital injections and funding guarantees.
  - Development by Government, BFIC, and NBB of tailored contingency plans for major banks, smaller banks, and the insurance industry.
- Some officials considered existing ad hoc arrangements adequate; others agreed with staff’s recommendation for a framework.

### Fiscal policy response and fiscal costs
- 2008 general government deficit estimated to have widened from ¼ percent of GDP in 2007 to about 1 percent of GDP in 2008.
- Public debt was boosted by nearly 4 percentage points of GDP by the cost of support to the financial sector.
- Fiscal costs of the response:
  - Increase in general government debt of €19.4 billion (somewhat more than 5 percent of 2009 GDP) due to federal and regional borrowing for direct support (excluding the €500 million capital injections by the Flemish region in Dexia and Ethias which are financed by drawing down assets).
  - At current interest rates for 10-year government bonds, corresponding interest payments would be around €850 million annually (around ¼ percent of 2009 GDP).
  - Draft 2009 budget estimates additional revenue from fees at €100 million for the higher deposit guarantee and €500 million for the new bank funding guarantee.
  - KBC securities entitle federal government annually to the higher of either €2.51 per security (yielding 8.5 percent) or 110 percent of the dividend paid in 2009 and 115 percent of the dividend in the following years; federal government will not receive any payment in years when KBC is not expected to distribute a dividend (notably, 2008).
- Contingent liabilities from additional guarantees do not yet raise debt or deficit but could be called (in Dexia’s case, a call of the guarantee on toxic assets would be equivalent to a capital injection).
- Staff view: a moderate discretionary stimulus (around 1 percent of GDP) is appropriate despite limited fiscal space.
- Public cost of bailout has boosted the debt-to-GDP ratio to nearly 88 percent of GDP.
- Sovereign spread on Belgian debt has risen sharply (to above100 b.p.); ratings agencies downgraded the sovereign outlook from positive to neutral.
- Authorities emphasize need for transparent debt policy to prudently manage rollover and repricing risks and noted political pressures to keep the deficit in check.

*Italic source: IMF staff report excerpt (content unit: _cr0987 - 16.      Analysis of the Real Effective Exchange Rate shows a worsening.)*

### 26.      The budget for 2009, together with a stimulus package announced in December,

### _cr0987 - 26.      The budget for 2009, together with a stimulus package announced in December,

### Fiscal stimulus and 2009 budget
- The budget for 2009, together with a stimulus package announced in December, would provide a fiscal impulse of around 1 percent of GDP.
- The federal draft budget submitted in November envisaged a balanced general government budget, but this relied on overly optimistic macroeconomic assumptions.
- The federal government in early December abandoned the balanced budget target: it revised the real GDP growth forecast for 2009 down to -0.2 percent and in tandem announced a new fiscal stimulus package.
- Approval of the budget was delayed until January by the collapse of the Leterme government; measures from the new package had yet to be approved by parliament under new Prime Minister Van Rompuy.
- Note in source footnote: GDP Growth of 1.2 percent was envisaged, with only a marginal increase in unemployment.

### Composition of the proposed stimulus (Plan de Relance)
- Federal measures include:
  - new and accelerated public investment;
  - across-the-board reductions in social security contributions;
  - a VAT reduction for selected construction activities;
  - an increase in benefits for temporary unemployment;
  - a limited subsidy for household electricity consumption;
  - steps to improve the liquidity position of the enterprise sector.
- Regional measures invited by the federal government focus on:
  - public investment in infrastructure and energy conservation;
  - employment subsidies;
  - guarantee schemes to facilitate enterprise access to bank loans.

### Staff assessment and recommended adjustments to the package
- Staff view: composition of the proposed fiscal stimulus package could be improved.
- Key staff recommendations:
  - Less ambitious public investment targets, given limits on how many new projects can be initiated or brought forward to affect demand in the first half of 2009.
  - Include sunset clauses or long-term countervailing savings for expensive reductions in social contributions and increases in unemployment and other social benefits; staff noted reversal was not envisaged in the Plan de Relance.
  - Sharpen the focus of proposed cuts in social security contributions and hikes in social benefits toward increasing incomes of those most likely to spend it (e.g. the low-income and unemployed).
- Authorities’ response:
  - Argued relevant projects and timetables had already been identified and that certain measures would be permanent due to longer-lasting benefits.

### Deficit and projection figures
- Staff projects a headline general government deficit between 2½-3 percent of GDP in 2009.
- Letting automatic stabilizers operate freely would, using staff’s growth projections, translate in a year-on-year widening of the headline general government deficit by slightly more than 2 percent of GDP.
- Staff projects the Plan de Relance, together with some measures, including one-offs, previously announced in the draft 2009 budget, to boost the structural deficit by around ¾ percent of GDP.
- Staff accepted additional stimulus might have to be considered given the deteriorating economic situation, but cautioned this would be appropriate only in coordination with the EU.
- With slow growth extending into 2010, the deficit would remain around 3½ percent of GDP over the period 2010-2012 under current policies.

### Beyond the crisis—restoring growth, enhancing resilience, and returning fiscal sustainability
- The economic and financial crises forced postponement of needed fiscal consolidation and revealed structural weaknesses; staff recommended using the downturn to crystallize awareness and boost willingness to reform.

#### A. Lowering inflationary pressures and improving competitiveness
- Two dimensions highlighted:
  - pass-through of oil and commodity shocks to domestic food and fuel prices should follow best competition practices;
  - wage moderation to restrain second-round effects.
- Competition and market reforms recommended:
  - Further reinforce the Competition Council as a public advocate for competition and watchdog against rent-seeking; empower and staff it adequately; reinforce cooperation with sectoral regulators.
  - In retail: ease restrictions on new retail establishments, opening hours, and sales periods to allow for lower consumer prices; deregulate prices and liberalize the market for over-the-counter drugs to benefit consumers and ease administrative burden on the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
  - In energy: build on enhanced investigation powers of the sectoral regulator (CREG) and take additional actions to obtain more transparency for the end user.
- Expected impact: reforms along these lines could lower the consumer price level by as much as 1-2 percentage points over time, boosting purchasing power by hundreds of euros per household while narrowing the external competitiveness gap.
- Wage indexation:
  - Centralized wage bargaining plus economy-wide indexation has produced real wage rigidity.
  - Staff recommended reforming wage indexation parameters to permit full coverage for the poorest, most vulnerable workers while allowing for less-than-complete indexation for the economy as a whole.
  - Social partners resisted breaking with full indexation, viewing competitiveness and inflation problems as temporary.

#### B. Lessons from the financial crisis
- Need for a broader intervention framework to guide future actions; suggested steps include:
  - Strengthen information sharing and coordination between the BFIC and the NBB, including joint databases for offsite inspections and joint onsite inspection teams; eventual consideration of unifying macrofinancial risk analysis with banking and insurance supervision under a single structure while leaving financial markets supervision separate.
  - Further improve on-site inspections; supervisors need resources to keep pace with the sophistication of financial instruments and complexity of bancassurance conglomerates.
- Cross-border bank exposures:
  - Rapidly expanding exposures of Belgian banks in EME created profit opportunities but increased credit risks, particularly related to foreign currency lending.
  - As macroeconomic conditions worsen in EME countries, loan quality may deteriorate and abrupt corrections could lead to sizeable losses.
  - Recommended actions:
    - Press for expansion of pan-European banking supervision mechanisms and strengthen existing cooperation venues (supervisory colleges, bilateral memoranda of understanding).
    - Ensure banks (i) appropriately manage indirect credit risk from foreign currency loans, and (ii) promote borrowers’ awareness of risk both domestically and abroad.

#### C. Restoring fiscal sustainability
- Fiscal deficits are appropriate in a crisis response but should not derail a medium-term fiscal strategy for population aging and long-run fiscal sustainability.
- Staff recommended a clear medium-term anchor: the federal government—together with regions and communities—should commit now to a structural adjustment of at least 0.7 percent of GDP per year once the crisis has passed, to return as soon as possible to fiscal balance, and eventually to a surplus.
- Budget process reforms recommended:
  - A medium-term budgetary framework to guide the annual budget process and articulate spending priorities over a multi-year horizon.
  - An enhanced role for the HFC: independent evaluator of submitted budgets and outcomes, producing regular reports; possible expansion of mandate to include expenditure policy issues and help set parameters for the medium-term budgetary framework.
  - Convert informal fiscal coordination arrangements between federal and community/regional governments into internal stability pacts debated by legislatures, published, and with sanctions for non-compliance; clarify responsibilities for fiscal discipline at the local level and improve reporting standards for local authorities in conformity with ESA95 requirements.
  - Comprehensive expenditure and revenue reviews to identify tax expenditure reductions and spending efficiencies; help find ways to reduce the size of government, which—at nearly 50 percent of GDP—is above the average for advanced countries.
- Authorities were receptive and indicated the IMF could help identify international best practice in budgeting.

*Source: IMF staff report.*

### 37.      Increasing strains in Belgium’s fiscal federalism arrangements need to be

### Increasing strains in Belgium’s fiscal federalism arrangements need to be tackled through further institutional reforms.

### Fiscal federalism: assessment and recommendations
- Staff and the authorities agreed that vertical imbalances between the federal level and communities/regions were deepening as the federal government transfers an increasing share of its revenues to communities/regions, and also bears the brunt of the increase in health- and aging-related spending.
- Addressing these vertical imbalances is complicated by horizontal imbalances between communities/regions.
- Staff argued that the institutional reform dialogue recently initiated by communities and regions would offer an opportunity to:
  - Reconsider the horizontal imbalances;
  - Provide a better match between spending authority and revenue-raising responsibilities;
  - Improve the transparency and incentive effects of intergovernmental solidarity mechanisms.

### Fiscal projections and staff-recommended scenario (selected figures, in percent of GDP)
- Current policies (A) projections (2008–2014):
  - Revenue: 48.7 (2008), 48.6 (2009), 48.6 (2010), 48.5 (2011), 48.4 (2012), 48.4 (2013), 48.2 (2014)
  - Expenditure: 51.8 (2008), 52.6 (2009), 52.5 (2010), 52.4 (2011), 52.2 (2012), 52.2 (2013), 52.1 (2014)
  - General government balance: -3.2 (2008), -4.0 (2009), -4.0 (2010), -3.9 (2011), -3.8 (2012), -3.9 (2013)
  - Structural balance: -1.4 (2008), -1.8 (2009), -2.0 (2010), -2.3 (2011), -2.5 (2012), -2.6 (2013)
  - Primary balance: 0.7 (2008), 0.1 (2009), 0.1 (2010), 0.2 (2011), 0.3 (2012), 0.2 (2013)
  - General government debt: 91.0 (2008), 92.5 (2009), 92.8 (2010), 92.7 (2011), 92.4 (2012)
- Staff-recommended scenario (B) projections (2008–2014):
  - Expenditure (total): 51.8 (2008), 52.2 (2009), 51.2 (2010), 50.1 (2011), 49.0 (2012), 48.1 (2013)
  - Primary expenditure: 45.8 (2008), 48.0 (2009), 47.2 (2010), 46.2 (2011), 45.2 (2012), 44.4 (2013)
  - Balance: -3.2 (2008), -3.6 (2009), -2.7 (2010), -1.7 (2011), -0.6 (2012), 0.1 (2013)
  - Structural balance: -1.4 (2008), -1.3 (2009), -0.7 (2010), 0.0 (2011), 0.7 (2012), 1.4 (2013)
  - Primary balance: 0.7 (2008), 0.4 (2009), 1.3 (2010), 2.3 (2011), 3.2 (2012), 3.9 (2013)
  - Debt: 91.0 (2008), 89.6 (2009), 90.7 (2010), 89.8 (2011), 84.3 (2012), 80.7 (2013)
- Memorandum items (staff scenario):
  - Real primary expenditure growth: 4.5 (2008), 2.3 (2009), 1.0 (2010), 0.0 (2011), 0.2 (2012), 0.8 (2013)
  - Output gap (percent): -3.3 (2009), -2.9 (2010), -2.2 (2011), -1.5 (2012), -0.7 (2013)
  - GDP growth (percent): -2.1 (2009), 0.6 (2010), 1.9 (2011), 2.2 (2012), 2.4 (2013), 2.6 (2014)

### Public debt sustainability and stress tests (selected figures)
- Baseline public sector debt ratio (percent of GDP):
  - 2003: 98.7; 2004: 94.5; 2005: 92.0; 2006: 87.7; 2007: 83.9; 2008: 86.2; 2009: 91.0; 2010: 92.5; 2011: 92.8; 2012: 92.7; 2013: 92.4
- Change in public sector debt:
  - 2004: -4.2; 2005: -2.5; 2006: -4.3; 2007: -3.8; 2008: 2.3; 2009: 4.8; 2010: 1.4; 2011: 0.3; 2012: -0.1; 2013: -0.3
- Identified debt-creating flows (4+7+12):
  - 2008: 2.3; 2009: 4.8; 2010: 1.3; 2011: 0.2; 2012: -0.2; 2013: -0.4
- Primary deficit (percent of GDP):
  - 2008: -2.8; 2009: -0.7; 2010: -0.2; 2011: -0.2; 2012: -0.3; 2013: -0.4
- Automatic debt dynamics (contribution, percent of GDP):
  - 2008: 0.9; 2009: 4.0; 2010: 1.5; 2011: 0.3; 2012: 0.1; 2013: 0.0
- Key macro-fiscal assumptions (selected averages):
  - Average nominal interest rate on public debt: 4.6 (projected average)
  - Average real interest rate: 2.5 (projected average)
  - Inflation rate (GDP deflator): 2.1 (projected average)
  - Growth of real primary spending (deflated by GDP deflator): 3.5 (2009), 4.5 (2010), 2.1 (2011), 1.7 (2012)
- Stress-test scenario outcomes (public sector debt, percent of GDP):
  - A1 (key variables at historical averages 2008–2013): debt falls to 67.2 by horizon shown
  - A2 (no policy change, constant primary balance 2008–2013): debt rises to 80.2 by horizon shown
  - B1 (real interest rate = baseline + 1 st. dev.): 94.7 (peak in scenario)
  - B2 (real GDP growth = baseline – 0.5 st. dev.): 98.2 (peak in scenario)
  - B6 (10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2009): debt rises to 102.6–103.0 in subsequent years

### Financial sector soundness: banking sector (selected indicators)
- Profitability and margins (2007):
  - Return on assets: 0.4 (2007)
  - Return on equity: 13.2 (2007)
  - Net interest income to total income: 50.5 (2007)
  - Interest margin: 0.8 (2007)
- Structure and asset composition (percent of total assets, 2007):
  - Loans to customers: 42.2
  - Debt securities: 18.8
  - Equity instruments: 3.4
  - Derivatives: 5.5
- Mortgage loans (in billion euro): 208 (2007)
- Funding and liquidity (percent of total assets, 2007):
  - Debts to credit institutions: 27.4
  - Bank bonds and other debt securities: 11.3
  - Customer deposits: 37.9
- Asset quality:
  - Non-performing loans (NPL) as percent of gross loans: 1.1 (2007)
  - Provisions + writeoffs as percent of NPL: 48 (2007)
- Capital adequacy (2007):
  - Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets: 11.2
  - Regulatory Tier I capital to risk-weighted assets: 12.1
  - Capital to assets: 4.1
- System size:
  - Total assets (percent of GDP): 476.1 (2007)

### Financial sector soundness: non-banking sectors (selected indicators)
- Insurance sector (2007):
  - Solvency ratio: 224.6
  - Return on equity (annualised): 3.0
  - Life premiums (billion euro): 21.9
  - Technical result/premiums (life, percent): 4.4
  - Combined ratio (non-life, percent): 102.1
- Corporate and household sectors:
  - Corporate total debt as a percentage of equity: 59.9 (2007)
  - Household debt (percent of GDP): 50.1 (2007)
  - Interest burden (percent of disposable income): 2.9 (2007)
  - Savings rate: 12.9 (2007)
- Real estate sector (2007):
  - House price inflation (houses): 3.9 (2007)
  - Apartment price inflation: 3.4 (2007)
  - Mortgage loans as percent of total loans: 29.6 (2007)
  - Variable rate mortgages (percent of total new loans): 2.5 (2007)

### Institutional and mission context (selected items)
- Mission: Brussels, December 4–15, 2008.
- Staff team: Messrs. Franks (Head), De Broeck, Ms. Yontcheva, and Mr. Jarmuzek (all EUR).
- Country interlocutors included the prime minister, the vice-prime minister for the budget, the governor of the National Bank of Belgium, and senior officials of federal and regional budget and financial authorities.
- Belgium subscribes to the Fund’s Special Data Dissemination Standard; comprehensive economic data are available on a timely basis.

*IMF staff report excerpt: _cr0987 - 37. Increasing strains in Belgium’s fiscal federalism arrangements need to be tackled through further institutional reforms._*

### ANNEX II. BELGIUM: STATISTICAL ISSUES

### ANNEX II. BELGIUM: STATISTICAL ISSUES

### Statistical framework and data availability
- Belgium’s economic and financial statistics are adequate for surveillance purposes.
- The National Bank of Belgium (NBB) regularly publishes a full range of economic and financial data and provides calendar dates of main statistical releases.
- On-line access to comprehensive databases is facilitated by the NBB’s data search engine, Belgostat.
- Belgium is a SDDS subscriber.
- Statistics for International Financial Statistics on banking institutions and monetary aggregates are prepared on a monthly basis and are timely.

### National accounts
- Belgium adopted the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts 1995 (ESA95) in 1999.
- Revisions of national accounts started in November 2005 to comply with EUROSTAT requirements and prepare for the adoption of chain-linked national accounts statistics.
- The NBB is responsible for compiling national accounts statistics (distinct from other countries).
- Quarterly accounts are published within a lag of three months.
- Annual and quarterly accounts data are of good quality, with shortcomings mainly related to export and import deflators, which are based on unit values rather than prices collected directly from exporters and importers.

### Government finance statistics
- General government revenue, expenditure, and balance on an accrual basis (ESA95) are published annually.
- The NBB publishes monthly data on central government operations and quarterly data on general government operations since April 2007.

### Financial sector indicators and risks
- The overall quality and availability of financial indicators are good.
- Authorities provide quarterly updates of financial sector indicators (FSIs) in a timely manner.
- Financial-sector developments (text summary):
  - The need for additional interventions in the financial sector cannot be ruled out.
  - The shareholders’ rejection of the sale of Fortis Bank Belgium to BNP-Paribas has heightened uncertainties about the future of the group and exposed the budget and Belgium’s sovereign rating to additional risk.
  - A sharp drop in KBC’s share price and a jump in its credit default spread indicate market uneasiness about the group’s core capital ratio and exposure to emerging Europe.
  - Dexia’s liquidity position remains severely mismatched and the group might need to shore up its capital.
  - Establishing a broader intervention framework remains a priority.

### 2009 outlook, fiscal stance, and policy intentions (staff summary and government stance)
- Staff projects real GDP contraction of 2.5 percent in 2009 (revised from 1.9 percent in the staff report).
- The revision is driven by worse-than-anticipated growth in Q4 2008 and downward revisions to the growth outlook in Belgium’s main economic partners.
- Consumer and business confidence eroded in February 2009 amid deteriorating labor market conditions.
- Significant downside risks remain related to the international environment and contagion effects from the global financial crisis.
- The general government deficit is officially projected to widen to 3.4 percent of GDP in 2009 (government update).
- At this stage, the government is not considering measures beyond those in the 2009 budget and the Plan de Relance (still debated by parliament).
- The government intends to return to a medium-term fiscal consolidation strategy as soon as economic conditions allow, and has tasked the High Finance Council with quantifying adjustment objectives.

### Key projections and macroeconomic indicators (selected figures from Table 1)
- Real GDP (percentage change): 2005: 2.2; 2006: 3.0; 2007: 2.6; 2008: 1.2; 2009: -2.5; 2010: 0.3; 2011: 2.0; 2012: 2.2; 2013: 2.3; 2014: 2.3
- Private consumption (percentage change): 2005: 1.5; 2006: 2.1; 2007: 2.0; 2008: 0.8; 2009: -1.1; 2010: 0.7; 2011: 2.4; 2012: 2.4; 2013: 2.2; 2014: 2.2
- Gross fixed investment (percentage change): 2005: 7.3; 2006: 4.8; 2007: 6.1; 2008: 4.3; 2009: -5.3; 2010: -0.5; 2011: 2.9; 2012: 3.0; 2013: 2.5; 2014: 2.6
- Exports, goods and services (percentage change): 2005: 3.9; 2006: 2.7; 2007: 3.9; 2008: 2.7; 2009: -1.9; 2010: 0.7; 2011: 1.1; 2012: 1.8; 2013: 2.7; 2014: 2.5
- Imports, goods and services (percentage change): 2005: 4.9; 2006: 2.7; 2007: 4.4; 2008: 4.0; 2009: -0.9; 2010: 1.3; 2011: 1.2; 2012: 3.0; 2013: 3.0; 2014: 2.9
- Household saving ratio (in percent): 2005: 12.6; 2006: 13.2; 2007: 13.2; 2008: 15.7; 2009: 16.6; 2010: 16.5; 2011: 16.8; 2012: 17.0; 2013: 17.1; 2014: 17.0
- Potential output growth: 2005: 1.9; 2006: 1.9; 2007: 1.8; 2008: 1.7; 2009: 1.6; 2010: 1.5; 2011: 1.4; 2012: 1.4; 2013: 1.3; 2014: 1.2
- Output gap (in percent): 2005: -0.2; 2006: 0.9; 2007: 1.7; 2008: 1.2; 2009: -3.0; 2010: -4.2; 2011: -3.8; 2012: -3.1; 2013: -2.4; 2014: -1.7
- Unemployment rate: 2005: 8.5; 2006: 8.3; 2007: 7.5; 2008: 7.1; 2009: 8.8; 2010: 9.7; 2011: 9.3; 2012: 8.9; 2013: 8.6; 2014: 8.0
- Consumer prices (percentage change): 2005: 2.5; 2006: 2.3; 2007: 1.8; 2008: 4.5; 2009: 0.9; 2010: 1.5; 2011: 1.9; 2012: 1.9; 2013: 2.0; 2014: 2.0
- Revenue (percent of GDP): 2005: 49.3; 2006: 48.6; 2007: 48.1; 2008: 48.8; 2009: 48.7; 2010: 48.6; 2011: 48.6; 2012: 48.5; 2013: 48.5; 2014: 48.3
- Expenditure (percent of GDP): 2005: 52.0; 2006: 48.3; 2007: 48.4; 2008: 49.7; 2009: 52.1; 2010: 53.1; 2011: 53.1; 2012: 53.0; 2013: 52.8; 2014: 52.8
- General government balance (percent of GDP): 2005: -2.7; 2006: 0.3; 2007: -0.3; 2008: -0.9; 2009: -3.4; 2010: -4.5; 2011: -4.5; 2012: -4.4; 2013: -4.3; 2014: -4.5
- Structural balance (percent of GDP): 2005: -0.1; 2006: -0.2; 2007: -0.3; 2008: -0.5; 2009: -1.3; 2010: -1.7; 2011: -1.9; 2012: -2.1; 2013: -2.3; 2014: -2.5
- Primary balance (percent of GDP): 2005: 1.5; 2006: 4.2; 2007: 3.5; 2008: 2.8; 2009: 0.5; 2010: -0.4; 2011: -0.4; 2012: -0.3; 2013: -0.1; 2014: -0.3
- General government debt (percent of GDP): 2005: 92.0; 2006: 87.7; 2007: 83.9; 2008: 86.3; 2009: 91.8; 2010: 94.1; 2011: 94.9; 2012: 95.3; 2013: 95.4; 2014: 95.9
- Trade balance (percent of GDP): 2005: 1.6; 2006: 0.8; 2007: 0.4; 2008: -1.2; 2009: -0.7; 2010: -0.9; 2011: -1.2; 2012: -1.4; 2013: -1.5; 2014: -1.8
- Current account (percent of GDP): 2005: 2.6; 2006: 2.6; 2007: 2.1; 2008: -2.4; 2009: -1.8; 2010: -2.3; 2011: -2.4; 2012: -2.2; 2013: -2.3; 2014: -2.4

### Fiscal scenarios (selected outcomes from Table 2)
- Under Current policies (A):
  - Balance (percent of GDP): 2008: -0.9; 2009: -3.4; 2010: -4.5; 2011: -4.5; 2012: -4.4; 2013: -4.3; 2014: -4.5
  - Debt (percent of GDP): 2008: 86.3; 2009: 91.8; 2010: 94.1; 2011: 94.9; 2012: 95.3; 2013: 95.4; 2014: 95.9
- Under Staff-recommended scenario (B):
  - Balance (percent of GDP): 2008: -0.9; 2009: -3.4; 2010: -4.1; 2011: -3.2; 2012: -2.2; 2013: -1.1; 2014: -0.4
  - Debt (percent of GDP): 2008: 86.3; 2009: 90.3; 2010: 92.3; 2011: 91.8; 2012: 90.1; 2013: 87.2; 2014: 84.0

### Public and market developments (public information notice highlights)
- The global financial crisis forced government intervention in major financial institutions.
- Belgian headline inflation peaked at 5.9 percent year-on-year in July 2008, almost 2 percentage points above the euro area average; this spike began to reverse but aftereffects remain.
- Staff expects a deep recession in 2009 with a sluggish recovery in 2010; downside risks are emphasized.

### Key publicly accessible websites for macroeconomic data and analysis (as listed)
- National Statistical Portal: www.belgostat.be
- National Statistics Institute: www.statbel.fgov.be
- Institute for National Accounts: www.inr-icn.fgov.be
- National Bank of Belgium: www.nbb.be
- Federal Planning Bureau: www.plan.be
- Banking, Finance, and Insurance Commission: www.cbfa.be
- High Finance Council: www.docufin.be
- Central Economic Council: www.ccecrb.fgov.be

*Source: _cr0987 - ANNEX II. BELGIUM: STATISTICAL ISSUES (IMF staff report supplement, March 2, 2009; Public Information Notice March 10, 2009).*

### 2009. Inflation should fall to around 2 percent in 2009, but may still remain above the euro area

### 2009. Inflation should fall to around 2 percent in 2009, but may still remain above the euro area average. Indexation mechanisms will generate higher wage growth than in partner countries over the coming year, which will help sustain demand but also contribute to a continued decline in external competitiveness. The recent inflation dynamics have also highlighted structural concerns about price-setting in food and energy markets.

### Inflation, wages, and competitiveness
- Inflation projection: "Inflation should fall to around 2 percent in 2009, but may still remain above the euro area average."
- Indexation and wages:
  - "Indexation mechanisms will generate higher wage growth than in partner countries over the coming year," sustaining domestic demand but contributing to "a continued decline in external competitiveness."
- Structural concerns:
  - "The recent inflation dynamics have also highlighted structural concerns about price-setting in food and energy markets."
- Policy recommendation:
  - "Reviewing the price-setting mechanism in energy supply and distribution."
  - "Consideration should also be given to revision of the wage indexation mechanisms within the centralized bargaining framework."

### Financial sector developments and policy response
- Timeline and causes:
  - Belgian financial sector initially "weathered the early rounds of financial turmoil in 2007, but succumbed in September–October 2008."
  - Early resilience due to "strong capitalization and moderate exposure to subprime risk" during the 2007 liquidity shock.
  - Crisis triggered by "tighter world liquidity conditions in the wake of the Lehman collapse, together with specific concerns about Fortis and Dexia banks," precipitating a September 2008 crisis.
- Authorities' actions:
  - "The authorities were forced to intervene in all three major Belgian banks and in an insurance company."
  - Directors "welcomed the government’s initial intervention in the banking sector, and noted that the need for further intervention could not be ruled out."
  - Recommendation to "establish a comprehensive framework for future interventions, in line with the framework agreed at the EU level."
- Cross-border supervision:
  - Rapid expansion of some Belgian banks in emerging market economies increases interlinkages and "call for strong and effective cross-border cooperation between supervisors."
  - Recommendation to "strengthen existing venues such as supervisory colleges and bilateral memoranda of understanding," with some Directors suggesting "consideration for expanding pan-European supervisory mechanisms."

### Fiscal policy stance and recommendations
- 2008 budget and 2009 stance:
  - "The implementation of the 2008 federal budget was delayed by the lack of a government, and its consolidation effort was less ambitious than originally envisaged."
  - Fiscal policy in 2009 "allows for full operation of the automatic stabilizers, plus a moderate discretionary stimulus (around 1 percent of GDP)," which will widen the general government deficit "to beyond 3 percent of GDP."
- Medium-term fiscal anchor:
  - Recommendation: "the government should firmly commit now to a structural adjustment of a least 0.7 percent of GDP per year once the crisis has past."
  - Directors' view: "at this stage there is no room for additional fiscal stimulus measures."
  - Stimulus design guidance: measures should be "timely, targeted, and temporary, and should be tied to structural fiscal improvements aimed at ensuring longer-term sustainability."
  - Encouragement to "adopt a strong and credible program of medium-term fiscal consolidation."
- Fiscal federalism:
  - Advice to "consider reforming the current fiscal federalism framework to improve its efficiency and effectiveness, with a view to providing a better match between spending authority and revenue-raising responsibilities."

### Structural reforms and labor market
- Longstanding structural weaknesses to address:
  - "Belgium’s inflation differentials with its European partner countries and relatively high labor costs."
- Recommended reforms:
  - "Reinforcing the competition authority."
  - "Liberalizing product and service markets."
  - "Press ahead with labor market reforms so as to boost participation rates and reduce unemployment."
  - "Consideration should also be given to revision of the wage indexation mechanisms within the centralized bargaining framework."

### Executive Board Assessment — key judgments
- Economic impact and response:
  - Belgium "has been severely affected by the global financial crisis and economic slowdown, as well as the earlier commodity and oil price shocks."
  - Directors "commended the authorities for their prompt and decisive intervention" as the banking sector faced pressure in September 2008.
- Policy balance:
  - Essential to "strike the right balance between the need for short-term stimulus and achieving medium-term fiscal sustainability, given the relatively high debt level and the aging population."
- Near-term outlook:
  - "Directors noted that the near-term economic outlook is bleak."
  - Projection: "GDP growth is expected to contract sharply in 2009 and to recover only sluggishly in 2010, with significant downside risks."
- Fiscal stimulus judgement:
  - Directors "encouraged the authorities to allow fiscal stabilizers to operate fully, and welcomed the moderate discretionary stimulus," while emphasizing no room for additional stimulus and the need for stimulus measures to be "timely, targeted, and temporary."

### Selected economic indicators (2005–10) — highlights and projections
- Real economy (percentage change from the previous period)
  - Real GDP: 2005 2.2; 2006 3.0; 2007 2.6; 2008 1.2; 2009 -2.5; 2010 0.3
  - Private consumption: 2005 1.5; 2006 2.1; 2007 2.0; 2008 0.8; 2009 -1.1; 2010 0.7
  - Public consumption: 2005 0.4; 2006 0.1; 2007 2.3; 2008 2.0; 2009 1.7; 2010 1.7
  - Gross fixed investment: 2005 7.3; 2006 4.8; 2007 6.1; 2008 4.3; 2009 -5.3; 2010 -0.5
    - Business investment: 2005 5.2; 2006 5.6; 2007 8.5; 2008 6.4; 2009 -6.2; 2010 -0.6
    - Dwellings: 2005 10.0; 2006 7.9; 2007 1.3; 2008 1.0; 2009 -4.1; 2010 -0.6
    - Public investment: 2005 15.5; 2006 -10.6; 2007 3.4; 2008 -2.8; 2009 -0.3; 2010 0.7
  - Stockbuilding (contribution to GDP growth): 2005 0.3; 2006 0.8; 2007 0.1; 2008 0.4; 2009 -0.3; 2010 0.3
  - Foreign balance (contribution to GDP growth): 2005 -0.6; 2006 0.0; 2007 -0.3; 2008 -1.1; 2009 -0.9; 2010 -0.5
  - Exports, goods and services: 2005 3.9; 2006 2.7; 2007 3.9; 2008 2.7; 2009 -1.9; 2010 0.7
  - Imports, goods and services: 2005 4.9; 2006 2.7; 2007 4.4; 2008 4.0; 2009 -0.9; 2010 1.3
  - Household saving ratio (in percent): 2005 12.6; 2006 13.2; 2007 13.2; 2008 15.7; 2009 16.6; 2010 16.5
  - Potential output growth: 2005 1.9; 2006 1.9; 2007 1.8; 2008 1.7; 2009 1.6; 2010 1.5
  - Output gap (in percent): 2005 -0.2; 2006 0.9; 2007 1.7; 2008 1.2; 2009 -3.0; 2010 -4.2
- Employment
  - Unemployment rate: 2005 8.5; 2006 8.3; 2007 7.5; 2008 7.1; 2009 8.8; 2010 9.7
  - NAIRU: 2005 7.8; 2006 7.7; 2007 7.6; 2008 7.5; 2009 7.5; 2010 7.5
  - Employment: 2005 1.3; 2006 1.4; 2007 1.5; 2008 1.2; 2009 -1.7; 2010 -0.7
- Prices
  - Consumer prices: 2005 2.5; 2006 2.3; 2007 1.8; 2008 4.5; 2009 0.9; 2010 1.5
  - GDP deflator: 2005 2.5; 2006 2.3; 2007 2.4; 2008 2.1; 2009 1.9; 2010 2.0
  - ULC (in whole economy): 2005 1.3; 2006 1.6; 2007 3.2; 2008 3.7; 2009 1.8; 2010 2.3
- Public finance (in percent of GDP)
  - Revenue: 2005 49.3; 2006 48.6; 2007 48.1; 2008 48.8; 2009 48.7; 2010 48.6
  - Expenditure: 2005 52.0; 2006 48.3; 2007 48.4; 2008 49.7; 2009 52.1; 2010 53.1
  - General government balance: 2005 -2.7; 2006 0.3; 2007 -0.3; 2008 -0.9; 2009 -3.4; 2010 -4.5
    - Structural balance: 2005 -0.1; 2006 -0.2; 2007 -0.3; 2008 -0.5; 2009 -1.3; 2010 -1.7
    - Primary balance: 2005 1.5; 2006 4.2; 2007 3.5; 2008 2.8; 2009 0.5; 2010 -0.4
  - General government debt: 2005 92.0; 2006 87.7; 2007 83.9; 2008 86.3; 2009 91.8; 2010 94.1
- Balance of payments
  - Trade balance: 2005 1.6; 2006 0.8; 2007 0.4; 2008 -1.2; 2009 -0.7; 2010 -0.9
  - Current account: 2005 2.6; 2006 2.6; 2007 2.1; 2008 -2.4; 2009 -1.8; 2010 -2.3
  - Terms of Trade (percent change): 2005 -0.9; 2006 -1.0; 2007 0.0; 2008 -0.4; 2009 0.7; 2010 -0.2
  - Exports, goods and services (volume, percent change): 2005 3.9; 2006 2.7; 2007 3.9; 2008 2.7; 2009 -1.9; 2010 0.7
  - Imports, goods and services (volume, percent change): 2005 4.9; 2006 2.7; 2007 4.4; 2008 4.0; 2009 -0.9; 2010 1.3

*Source: IMF staff report for the 2008 Article IV Consultation with Belgium, as provided in the content unit.*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/_cr0987.pdf_
