## _cr10157

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### Executive Summary
- Pre-crisis weaknesses (1999–2007)
  - Unit labor costs grew by nearly 25 percent during 1999–2007.
  - Government debt declined from 113¾ percent of GDP in 1999 to 103½ percent of GDP in 2007.
  - Structural primary balance deteriorated by some 2¾ percent of potential GDP during 1999–2007.
- Crisis impact (2008–2009)
  - Output: Italy experienced its worst recession since World War II; output contracted by 1.3 percent in 2008 and 5.0 percent in 2009.
  - Labour market: Unemployment increased to 8.3 percent in Q4 2009, a 1.9 percentage points increase from end-2007.
  - Public finances: Public debt increased by about 10 percentage points of GDP in 2009, reaching 115.8 percent of GDP; overall deficit estimated at 5.3 percent of GDP in 2009.
  - Banking sector: stock of nonperforming loans increased by around 40 percent in 2009; loan loss provisions for the 5 largest banks (as a percent of pre-provision earnings) rose from about 30 percent in 2008 to about 56 percent in 2009.
- Policy response
  - Financial measures included deposit insurance guarantees, state guarantee for new bank liabilities, asset-swap facility, anonymous collateralized interbank lending, and a recapitalization scheme (used by four banks for €4.05 billion).
  - Fiscal stimulus in 2009: total increase = 0.66 percent of GDP; composition (2009 expenditure-increasing measures): Family bonus 15%; Car incentives 22%; Subnational arrears settlement 23%; Purchase of services 5%; Current transfers to firms 6%; Employment Fund 4%; Guarantee Fund 1%; Other 16%.
  - Stimulus size among advanced G–20 countries: one of the smallest due to limited fiscal space and large automatic stabilizers.

### Outlook: Modest and Fragile Recovery
- Staff baseline projections and drivers
  - Staff projects output growth of 0.8 percent in 2010 and 1.2 percent in 2011.
  - Rebound drivers: global rebound, resumption of investment, restocking cycle; moderated by withdrawal of government support.
- Comparative growth forecasts (selected)
  - IMF/WEO Apr-10: 2010 = 0.8; 2011 = 1.2; 2012 = 1.5
  - Ministry of Finance Jan-10: 2010 = 1.1; 2011 = 2.0; 2012 = 2.0
  - OECD Nov-09: 2010 = 1.1; 2011 = 1.5
  - European Commission Oct-09: 2010 = 0.7; 2011 = 1.4
  - Consensus Mar-10: 2010 = 0.8; 2011 = 1.2
- Inflation outlook
  - Inflation rose from 0.1 percent year-on-year in August 2009 to 1.1 percent in December 2009; core inflation 1.5 percent year-on-year in December 2009.
  - Projected inflation: 1.4 percent in 2010 and 1.7 percent in 2011.
- Competitiveness and current account
  - Staff estimates a competitiveness gap (real exchange rate overvaluation) of the order of 7–8 percent by 2015.
  - Current account deteriorated since 2005; deficit expected to remain above CGER norms in the medium term.

### Policy Agenda — High-level Guidance
- Three pillars:
  - Fiscal sector: deep expenditure-based consolidation.
  - Financial sector: mitigate vulnerabilities and strengthen capitalization/asset quality.
  - Structural reform: restore competitiveness and productivity.

### Fiscal Sector — Key Findings and Risks
- Recent and near-term fiscal metrics
  - 2010 budget targets deficit of 5.0 percent of GDP (small reduction relative to 2009).
  - Budget includes stimulus measures equivalent to 0.4 percent of GDP, covered mainly by revenue collection postponed from 2009.
  - Government plans to reduce the deficit to below 3 percent of GDP by 2012 (Stability Program Update, Jan 2010); requires fiscal consolidation of over 1 percent of GDP in 2011–12 compared with existing legislation.
- Staff concerns on authorities’ strategy
  - Realism: reducing the deficit to about 2¾ percent of GDP by 2012 would require cuts in primary current spending of 2 percent every year in real terms (even assuming GDP growth of 2 percent in 2011–12).
  - Not ambitious enough: meeting SGP minimum adjustments in 2010–12 would still not deliver the MTO of structural balance; debt likely to remain well above 100 percent of GDP a decade ahead.
  - Risks: reliance on optimistic spending efficiency gains, combating tax evasion, unspecified local government savings from fiscal federalism, and one-off measures.
  - Tax amnesty concern: may decrease tax compliance because it provides full anonymity, immunity, and regularization of funds held abroad for a relatively low final tax.
- Staff medium-term scenario
  - Projects overall deficit in 2010 to remain about the same as in 2009 and decline only slowly thereafter.
  - Structural primary balance would stabilize at about 1¼ percent of GDP over the medium term.
  - Rising interest and pension costs could push debt ratio toward about 125 percent of GDP by the end of the projection period in staff projections.

### Fiscal Framework and Reform Recommendations
- Expenditure-side consolidation priorities
  - Rationalize current spending: reduce personnel costs (slow turnover), contain intermediate consumption and healthcare spending (pharmaceuticals focus), and implement expenditure review recommendations.
  - Maintain commitment appropriations at least for capital expenditure.
  - Set binding multiyear aggregate expenditure ceilings with strict top-down budgeting.
- Revenue-side guidance
  - High labor income tax-wedge limits scope for tax rate increases; focus on broadening tax base.
  - Avoid one-off revenue measures where possible.
- Fiscal federalism
  - Could help consolidation and quality of spending but must be implemented fiscally prudently to avoid overall spending increases.
- Budget process improvements
  - More formal scrutiny of macro forecasts by an independent institution.
  - Make fiscal risks and long-term projections part of the budget.

### Financial Sector — Conditions, Scenarios, and Policy Priorities
- Recent banking sector facts
  - Banks entered crisis from a position of comparative strength; customer deposits ~60 percent of total funding; deposits grew by 5 percent annually in 2008 and 2009.
  - Gross NPL ratios: household sector 2.7 percent in 2008 → 3.6 percent in 2009; corporate sector 3.0 percent → 4.5 percent; SME NPLs 6.2 percent → 7.4 percent.
  - Coverage ratio ~55 percent in 2009.
  - For the five largest banks NPL stock rose by 40 percent in 2009; provisions-to-pre-provision earnings rose from about 30 percent in 2008 to about 56 percent in 2009.
  - Core Tier1: weighted average 7.2 percent end-2009 for largest groups; system Tier1 8.2 percent in June 2009; Core Tier1 Italy end-2009 = 7.2 percent versus 8.8 percent in Europe.
- Banking sector scenario projections (staff)
  - Base Scenario macro assumptions: GDP growth 0.8 percent in 2010 and 1.2 percent in 2011.
    - Loans expected to grow by 1–3 percent in 2010–11.
    - Revenues expected to grow by 1–3 percent.
    - Loan loss provisions to increase by 6-9 percent in 2010, then fall by 3-0 percent in 2011.
    - Cumulated loan loss provisions in 2010–2011 would be one third higher than in 2008–2009.
    - Assuming dividend distribution of 10-30 percent of earnings, aggregated Core Tier1 ratio would rise in 2010–11 by less than 0.5 percentage points by 2011.
    - Capital shortfall with respect to an 8 percentage Core Tier1 would on average progressively close by 2011 with significant bank-by-bank differences.
  - Severe Scenario macro assumptions: GDP declining by -1.7 percent in 2010 and by -1.3 percent in 2011.
    - Loans would remain flat; revenue growth negative.
    - Loan loss provisions could increase by 18-22 percent in both 2010 and 2011.
    - Cumulated loan losses would be 65 percent higher than in 2008–09.
    - Aggregated Core Tier1 ratio would deteriorate to below the 7 percent mark for several banks.
- Policy recommendations for banking
  - Continue recapitalization efforts; earnings retention alone insufficient to significantly bolster capital.
  - Banks that issued recapitalization bonds should prepare alternative recapitalization strategies as interest on those securities rises sharply in three years.
  - Authorities to guide adoption of latest Basel Committee recommendations and adopt new international rules promptly.
  - Consider loosening strict tax rules on deductibility of loan write-downs (current fiscal treatment creates deferred tax assets that may be disallowed under new regulations).
  - Government-sponsored guarantees for SMEs appropriate with planned exit strategy: temporary, appropriately priced, and not preventing necessary restructuring.
  - Enhance bankruptcy and reorganization frameworks to support rehabilitation and speedy liquidation; reexamine eligibility criteria for bankruptcy trustees.

### Structural Reforms — Competitiveness, Productivity, and Labour Market
- Competitiveness and productivity challenges
  - Competitiveness eroded over more than a decade: labour costs rose relative to productivity; real exchange rate appreciation; staff estimates a competitiveness gap of ~7–8 percent by 2015.
  - Projected permanent output loss: level of output in 2015 projected to be around 10 percent lower than the pre-crisis historical trend (1990–2004).
- Structural reform priorities
  - Reduce policy and regulatory rigidities limiting competition.
  - Reduce state ownership in network sectors and limit local government enterprise involvement in local services.
  - Eliminate entry barriers to professional services and complete energy market deregulation.
  - Strengthen rule of law enforcement and enhance competition bodies’ role.
  - Implement the EU Services Directive without delay at all government levels.
  - Improve civil justice to accelerate legal processes.
- Labour market measures
  - Address disparities in social safety nets; reduce variation in employment protection across groups.
  - Reduce compression in wage distribution; strengthen link between wages and productivity.
  - Decentralize wage bargaining to reflect regional productivity and costs; public sector lead decentralization.
  - Make permanent contracts more flexible and temporary workers more protected; simplify labour legislation.
  - Foster spatial mobility by extending social safety nets and aligning wage-setting with regional conditions.

### Pensions and Long-Term Fiscal Sustainability
- Recent reforms and projections
  - Pension replacement ratio projected to fall from 67 percent in 2007 to 49 percent in 2060.
  - Authorities’ estimates: pension spending would decline from 14¼ percent of GDP in 2008 to about 13½ percent of GDP in 2060 after enacted reforms.
  - Without envisaged reforms, pension spending would increase to 24½ percent of GDP in 2050.
- Key assumptions and risks
  - Long-term average labor productivity growth assumed "over 1.6 percent" in EC projections (noting past decade stagnation).
  - Pension reform assumed fully implemented, including periodic revisions of conversion coefficients and maintenance of contributory principle; about two thirds of remaining adjustments expected after 2020.
  - Risks: flexible labor arrangements reducing pension revenues; contributor numbers might not materialize; implementation delays or reversals.
- Scenario findings and policy implications
  - Scenario: With somewhat higher growth (1.1 percent), an adjustment effort generating a structural improvement equivalent to about 2¼ percent of GDP over 2010–12 would be necessary to broadly stabilize the debt ratio over the long run.
  - Stronger adjustment (2¼ percent of GDP in 2010–2012) plus a nominal pension reduction of 5 percent would be needed to bring debt toward 60 percent in illustrations.
  - Enacting the legislated indexation of retirement age to life expectancy earlier (bring forward from 2015) could save as much as 0.3–0.7 percent of GDP a year over the medium term.
- Policy recommendations
  - Fully implement planned pension reforms and consider front-loading adjustments to improve intergenerational equity.
  - Revisit high replacement rates and consider increasing retirement age sooner.
  - Promote private pension development with sound regulation.
  - Contain health spending growth and strengthen governance of health spending at subnational level.

### Quantified Long-term Outlook — Key Numbers
- Public debt: reached 115.8 percent of GDP in 2009; staff projects possible rise toward about 125 percent of GDP by the end of the projection period under baseline assumptions.
- Output loss from crisis: estimated between 11 to 15 percent relative to precrisis trend by 2015 (Multivariate Filter: -14; Production Function Approach: -11; Evidence from previous episodes: -15).
- Sensitivity of debt to productivity: a 0.2 percentage point increase/decrease in average long-run labor productivity growth translates into about 60 percentage points of GDP decrease/increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio in the no-fiscal adjustment scenario.
- Long-term pension metrics: replacement ratio decline from "67 percent in 2007 to 49 percent in 2060"; nominal pension reduction scenario of "5 percent" considered in Scenario E.

### Modelling and Analytical Annexes (methodology highlights)
- Multivariate filter (MV): Bayesian estimation of a model linking output gap, unemployment gap (NAIRU), capacity utilization gap, and core inflation; sample 1992Q4–2009Q3; assumed steady-state values: labor share = 0.61; output growth = 0.7 percent; unemployment rate = 8.3 percent.
- Production Function Approach (PFA): decomposes output into trend components of productivity and factor inputs with unobserved stochastic components; finds TFP highly pro-cyclical and a drop in potential growth in 2009.
- Historical/judgmental approaches and cross-country crisis evidence estimate medium-term output loss ~15 percent for Italy relative to precrisis trend.

### Staff Appraisal (synthesis)
- Italy entered the global crisis with pre-existing structural weaknesses (stagnant productivity, declining competitiveness, fragile public finances); the crisis amplified these weaknesses.
- Policy priorities:
  - Undertake deep, expenditure-based fiscal consolidation implemented credibly and front-loaded where feasible.
  - Strengthen bank capitalization and address asset quality risks; plan exit strategies for temporary guarantees.
  - Renew structural reforms to restore competitiveness and foster sustained productivity-led growth.
  - Ensure faithful and timely implementation of pension reforms; consider further adjustments to improve sustainability and intergenerational equity.

*Source: IMF staff report Executive Summary, analytical chapters, annexes, and scenario analyses as provided in the supplied content unit.*

### Executive Summary ......................................................................................................

### Executive Summary

### I. Context: The Global Crisis Exacerbated Pre-Existing Problems
- Before the Crisis (1999–2007)
  - The global economic crisis hit an already structurally weak Italian economy: despite growing employment, income growth had been anemic due to stagnant productivity and declining competitiveness over more than a decade.
  - Italy steadily lost market share in world trade; earnings growth outpaced labor productivity, and Italy’s unit labor costs grew by nearly 25 percent during 1999–2007.
  - Public finances were fragile entering the crisis: government debt declined from 113¾ percent of GDP in 1999 to 103½ percent in 2007, but interest savings and (partly cyclical) revenue strength were offset by poor spending control. The structural primary balance deteriorated by some 2¾ percent of potential GDP during this period, and the overall deficit hovered around 3 percent of GDP.
  - The financial system entered the global crisis from a position of comparative strength, reflecting a traditional bank-based system, prior consolidation, improved governance, and a sound supervisory framework.

- The Global Crisis (2008–2009)
  - Real sector impact
    - Output fell sharply as trade and investment slumped; Italy’s downturn started earlier and lasted longer than most euro area peers.
    - The recession in Italy’s main trading partners led to a sharp fall in exports; financing conditions tightened and credit growth fell for households and corporates.
    - Corporate leverage increased, bankruptcies rose, profit share fell, and market indicators of expected corporate default spiked in 2009 and remained above pre-crisis levels.
    - Private consumption declined significantly despite strong household balance sheets, driven by rising unemployment and tighter consumer credit.
    - Gross fixed investment and inventories fell sharply.
    - The global crisis triggered Italy’s worst recession since World War II; Italy’s reliance on exports and predominance of SMEs increased vulnerability.
    - Inflation and wage growth remained above the euro area average, further worsening unit labor costs and squeezing profit margins.

  - Financial sector
    - Banks proved resilient to the initial phase of the global financial crisis owing to a conservative on-balance sheet lending-deposit model and strong customer relationships; Italian banks did not need emergency government intervention and recourse to ECB liquidity support schemes remained limited.
    - Asset quality and profitability deteriorated subsequently: credit risk increased during the second half of 2008 and deteriorated rapidly in 2009. In 2009, the stock of nonperforming loans increased by around 40 percent (from a low base) with respect to the previous year.
    - Loan loss provisions for the 5 largest banks (as a percentage of pre-provision earnings) increased from about 30 percent in 2008 to about 56 percent in 2009, in line with the European average.
    - Banks increased capitalization in 2008–09 through raising capital from core shareholders, selling nonstrategic assets, and cutting dividends (often to zero); some banks issued government-sponsored recapitalization bonds. Despite strengthening, Italian banks still display weaker Core Tier1 ratios than European peers; the leverage ratio comparison is more favorable.
    - Other financial institutions weathered the crisis relatively well: insurance industry issuer defaults amounted to ½ percent of technical reserves; in 2009 premium revenues increased and the insurance sector recorded a profit in the first semester. Most pension funds had positive (albeit low) returns in 2009, often offsetting 2008 losses. Profitability of asset management companies, investment firms, and financial companies fell but remained positive in 2008.

  - Labor market and social buffers
    - Unemployment increased to 8.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 2009, a 1.9 percentage points increase from end 2007, much lower than in most euro area peers.
    - Italy, like Germany and France, relied on temporary lay-off and work-reducing measures; the government provided additional wage supplementation funds (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, or CIG) to sustain labor demand.

  - Policy response during the crisis
    - Financial measures
      - Authorities guaranteed the deposit insurance fund and established instruments to improve bank liquidity, including a state guarantee for new bank liabilities, a facility for swapping bank assets or bonds for government securities, and a system for anonymous but collateralized interbank lending.
      - A recapitalization scheme was offered but used by only four banks for a total of €4.05 billion recapitalization bonds (less than half the €10 billion made available), reflecting conditionality and improving global financing conditions when launched.
      - Measures to support credit to SMEs included CDP funds for banks extending SME credit, strengthening the existing SME guarantee fund, and oversight of a bank loan moratorium agreement allowing suspension of loan repayments for €9 billion (0.6 percent of GDP). A recapitalization fund for SMEs was being set up, financed by the government, the CDP, the employers’ federation, and private banks.
    - Fiscal measures
      - The stimulus package included facilitating SME credit, a car scrapping program, a one-off family bonus, and wage supplementation schemes. This was one of the smallest stimulus packages among advanced G–20 countries due to limited fiscal space, large automatic stabilizers, and market reaction concerns.
      - Composition of expenditure-increasing measures in 2009 (total increase = 0.66 percent of GDP): Family bonus 15%; Car incentives 22%; Subnational arrears settlement 23%; Peace-keeping missions 5%; Purchase of services 5%; Current transfers to firms 6%; Subsidies to households 3%; Employment Fund 4%; Guarantee Fund 1%; Other 16%.

  - Fiscal outcomes in 2009
    - Public debt increased by about 10 percentage points of GDP in 2009, reaching 115.8 percent of GDP.
    - The overall deficit is estimated to have reached 5.3 percent of GDP, an increase of over 2½ percentage points from 2008.
    - Total revenue remained robust, supported by one-off capital tax receipts (about ¾ percent of GDP, including those from a tax amnesty), offsetting slumps in indirect and corporate income taxes.
    - Primary expenditure rose sharply because of increased social transfers and outlays on goods and services (including defense spending).
    - The deterioration in terms of the change in the structural primary balance was similar to euro area peers despite a relatively better fiscal outcome compared to other euro area countries.

### II. Outlook: A Modest and Fragile Recovery
- Indicators point to a modest recovery in consumption, industrial output, and investment based on recent confidence indicators, industrial production, capacity utilization, factory orders, and sectoral industrial production indices.
- Comparative growth forecasts for Italy (selected sources and forecasts for 2010–2012):
  - IMF/WEO Apr-10: 2010 = 0.8; 2011 = 1.2; 2012 = 1.5
  - Ministry of Finance Jan-10: 2010 = 1.1; 2011 = 2.0; 2012 = 2.0
  - OECD Nov-09: 2010 = 1.1; 2011 = 1.5
  - European Commission Oct-09: 2010 = 0.7; 2011 = 1.4
  - Consensus Mar-10: 2010 = 0.8; 2011 = 1.2

### III. The Policy Agenda: Renewing The Reform Momentum to Foster Sustained Growth
- High-level guidance (themes in the full text)
  - Fiscal sector: deep expenditure-based consolidation required.
  - Financial sector: mitigating vulnerabilities.
  - Renewing the structural reform momentum.

- Fiscal sector: key findings and constraints
  - The high level of public debt and the increase to 115.8 percent of GDP in 2009 constrain fiscal policy options and require credible consolidation.
  - The structural primary balance deteriorated by some 2¾ percent of potential GDP during 1999–2007.
  - Fiscal stimulus in 2009 was modest (total increase = 0.66 percent of GDP) given limited fiscal space and large automatic stabilizers.

- Financial sector: key findings and recommended priorities
  - Banks’ asset quality and profitability weakened in 2008–09; nonperforming loans rose by around 40 percent in 2009.
  - Capitalization improved through various measures, but Core Tier1 ratios remain weaker than many European peers.
  - Policy measures implemented included liquidity support instruments, guarantees, and targeted SME credit support; ensuring continued bank capitalization and addressing asset quality risks remain priorities.

- Structural reform: imperative to restore competitiveness and productivity
  - Italy’s competitiveness eroded over more than a decade: labor costs rose relative to productivity and the real exchange rate appreciated.
  - Renewing reforms to boost productivity, address rigidities, and shift specialization toward higher value-added activities is essential for sustained growth and export performance.

### IV. Staff Appraisal
- The staff appraisal reiterates that Italy entered the global crisis with pre-existing structural weaknesses (stagnant productivity, declining competitiveness, fragile public finances) and that the crisis amplified these weaknesses.
- Policy priorities include deep, expenditure-based fiscal consolidation, measures to mitigate financial sector vulnerabilities and strengthen bank capitalization and asset quality, and renewed structural reforms to restore competitiveness and foster sustained growth.

### V. References
- (References and annexes are listed in the full document; analytical annexes include: I. Italy’s Fiscal Sustainability Revisited; II. After the Crisis: Assessing the Damage; III. The Recent Slowdown in Bank Credit Growth: What are the Facts?; IV. Resisting the Storm, Navigating the Recovery: The Case of Italian Banks.)

*Source: Executive Summary (IMF staff report text provided).*

### 16.      The center-right government that came to power in May 2008 is likely to see out

### 16.      The center-right government that came to power in May 2008 is likely to see out its full term ending in 2013.

### Political context
- The government retains a handsome majority.
- Its popularity was confirmed by the outcomes of recent local elections.

### Outlook: A modest and fragile recovery — Baseline growth projections and drivers
- Staff projects Italy’s output to grow by 0.8 percent in 2010 and 1.2 percent in 2011.
- The rebound would be driven by the global rebound, resumption of investment, and the restocking cycle, more than offsetting the gradual withdrawal of government support.
- Factors likely to moderate the recovery:
  - Slow rebound of Italy’s major trading partners and persistent competitiveness gap limiting export growth.
  - Sustained rise in non-performing loans, enhanced lending discrimination, and need to rebuild capital in response to forthcoming new regulation constraining credit supply.
  - Rising and persistent unemployment undermining private consumption.
  - Firms remaining cautious on investment due to financing constraints, low capacity utilization, and falling profitability.
  - Structural impediments: pervasive rigidities in product and labor markets, stagnant productivity, and the burden of the public sector.

### Inflation outlook
- Inflation rose from 0.1 percent year-on-year in August 2009 to 1.1 percent in December.
- Core inflation reached 1.5 percent year-on-year in December 2009.
- Inflation is projected to rise to 1.4 percent in 2010 and 1.7 percent in 2011 owing to strengthening demand and rising energy prices.
- The differential with the euro area widened further, largely due to service prices, likely reflecting weak domestic competition.

### Competitiveness and current account
- Staff estimates indicate a competitiveness gap (real exchange rate overvaluation) of the order of 7–8 percent by 2015.
- Reasons for eroding competitiveness:
  - Low productivity growth.
  - Higher than average inflation compared to the euro area (affecting intra-euro area trade).
  - Strength of the euro (affecting trade with the rest of the world).
- Current account:
  - Has been deteriorating since 2005 and did not improve in 2009 because Italy’s export market share continued to shrink.
  - Export growth is expected to pick up with the global economy while import growth remains constrained by weak domestic demand.
  - Despite improvement, overvaluation issues are likely to remain and the current account deficit is expected to remain above the CGER current account norms in the medium-term.

### Medium-term output and legacy of the crisis
- A significant and permanent output loss is likely: level of output in 2015 is projected to be around 10 percent lower than the pre-crisis historical trend (for 1990–2004).
- Main contributors to the permanent output loss:
  - Sharp fall in capital accumulation during the recession.
  - Higher structural unemployment.
  - Deterioration in total factor productivity associated with the credit slowdown and lack of incentives for industrial restructuring.
  - Weaker growth in partner countries.
- Authorities’ view:
  - They considered staff projections for potential output too pessimistic, arguing the recession reflected only an external demand shock and could allow for a quick rebound once external conditions improve.
  - Both authorities and staff agreed considerable uncertainty surrounded post-crisis medium term dynamics.

### Risks and spillovers
- Near-term risks are tilted to the downside and become more negative in the long term.
- Upside near-term scenario: stronger global recovery and inventory cycle momentum.
- Downside near-term risks:
  - Continued tight credit and falling profitability limiting private investment.
  - Rising unemployment restraining consumption.
  - Destabilizing spillovers from regional financial market turbulence.
- Longer-term risk: prolonged economic stagnation from failure to address structural issues, leading to rising structural unemployment and deteriorating fiscal situation.
- Spillovers from market turbulence in Greece, Spain or Portugal:
  - Not unlikely but have been limited so far; sovereign bond spreads over bunds declined from early 2009 peak and were only marginally affected by recent regional turbulence.
  - Vulnerabilities: high debt-to-GDP ratio, large gross financing requirement (about 25 percent of GDP annually), dismal growth performance.
  - Offsetting strengths: strong corporate and household balance sheets, absence of a housing bubble, strength of banking sector, small competitiveness gap, relatively favorable net foreign asset position, traditionally high private savings.
  - Market sentiment risk if government does not promptly specify detailed plans to reduce the fiscal deficit according to its medium-term plan.

### The policy agenda: renewing reform momentum to foster sustained growth
- Comprehensive reforms required to raise longer-term growth potential and mitigate downside risks.
- Areas emphasized:
  - Tackling long-standing problems of poor productivity and fiscal weakness.
  - Need for determined political leadership over many years; reforms can take considerable time to bear fruit.
- International precedents: Canada, Australia, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Ireland, and the Netherlands implemented path-breaking fiscal and structural reforms after severe recessions; Italy itself made substantial reforms in earlier decades.
- Reform implementation approaches highlighted:
  - Independent commissions to set the agenda or monitor public finances.
  - Pacts with social partners.

### Fiscal sector: short- and medium-term fiscal outlook and risks
- 2010 budget targets a deficit of 5.0 percent of GDP, a small reduction relative to the outturn for 2009.
  - Targeted improvement reflects phasing out of some 2009 one-off outlays and implementation of expenditure rationalization measures.
  - Budget includes stimulus measures equivalent to 0.4 percent of GDP, covered mainly by revenue collection postponed from 2009.
- Government plans to reduce the deficit to below 3 percent of GDP by 2012 (outlined in January 2010 Stability Program Update).
  - This requires fiscal consolidation of over 1 percent of GDP in 2011–12 compared to existing legislation.
  - Authorities had not yet specified measures to achieve consolidation.
- Staff concerns about the fiscal adjustment strategy:
  - Realism: Reducing the deficit to about 2¾ percent of GDP by 2012 would require cuts in primary current spending of 2 percent every year in real terms, even assuming GDP growth of 2 percent in 2011–12; historical increases averaged 2 percent a year over the last decade.
  - The plan relies on optimistic assumptions about spending efficiency, combating tax evasion, unspecified local government savings from fiscal federalism, and one-off measures.
  - Not ambitious enough: Meeting the Stability and Growth Pact minimum (annual structural adjustment net of one-offs of ½ percent of GDP) in 2010–12 would still not deliver the medium-term objective (MTO) of structural balance by end of period; debt service costs rise and debt ratio would likely remain well above 100 percent of GDP a decade from now.
  - Withdrawal of stimulus: As unemployment is still rising, need for income and employment support may persist despite assumed expiry of anti-crisis measures by 2012.
  - Weaknesses in the budget process: Attempts to streamline and target the budget have been undermined by amendments and new extensions of provisions following budget approval.
  - Tax amnesty concerns: Could decrease already low tax compliance; unlike recent initiatives elsewhere, Italy’s amnesty provides full anonymity, immunity against further administrative or criminal investigations, and allows regularization of funds held abroad in connection with tax evasion in return for paying a relatively low final tax.
- Staff medium-term scenario vs authorities:
  - Staff projects overall deficit in 2010 to remain about the same as in 2009 and decline only slowly thereafter.
  - Structural primary balance would stabilize at about 1¼ percent of GDP over the medium term.
  - Rising interest and pension costs will make structural consolidation difficult; debt ratio could increase to about 125 percent of GDP by the end of the projection period.

### Fiscal risks at local level and public debt outlook
- Local governments’ exposure to derivatives:
  - Use of derivatives by local authorities banned temporarily since 2008 while more stringent legislation is prepared.
  - A special parliamentary commission found the problem limited in scale.
  - Bank of Italy data suggest potential losses from such instruments contracted with Italian banks could be of the order of €1–2 billion (0.1 percent of GDP) in total.
- Public debt trajectory concerns:
  - Even with optimistic expenditure assumptions combined with modest revenue expectations, sustained fiscal consolidation appears beyond reach, raising debt sustainability concerns.
  - Staff projections indicate public debt could rise toward about 125 percent of GDP by the end of the projection period under baseline assumptions.

*IMF staff report content as provided in the source document.*

### 33.      Official longer-term fiscal projections seem relatively favorable compared to

### _cr10157 - 33.      Official longer-term fiscal projections seem relatively favorable compared to

### Long-term fiscal projections and headline findings
- Italy had the highest pre-crisis debt ratio in the euro area but is projected to have the lowest debt ratio in the euro area in 2060: "206 percent of GDP versus an average of 422 percent of GDP" (2009 Sustainability Report of the European Commission).
- Various long-term fiscal sustainability analyses place Italy among the countries with the lowest sustainability gap.
- The positive outlook is largely due to projected stabilization of pension spending despite rapid aging, as a result of a series of past pension reforms with future implications.
- Pension spending will still remain among the highest in the world.
- The sharp fall in the replacement ratio is projected from "67 percent in 2007 to 49 percent in 2060" and may be politically challenging.

### Assumptions and downside risks in projections
- Projections use commonly applied EC assumptions including:
  - Long-term average labor productivity growth assumed "over 1.6 percent", well above stagnant growth of the past decade.
  - Key assumption: the pension reform is fully implemented, including periodic revisions of the conversion coefficients and maintenance of the contributory principle.
  - The remaining reform is heavily back-loaded: about two thirds of adjustments in benefits expected after 2020 (compared with about half after 2020 for reforms in other advanced economies).
- Additional risks:
  - Growing use of flexible labor market arrangements that reduce pension revenues and result in lower pension benefits.
  - Some key assumptions, like the number of contributors, "might not materialize."

### Pension system: timing, magnitude, and distribution of burden
- Projected replacement ratio decline: "67 percent in 2007 to 49 percent in 2060."
- Timing and size of implied replacement rate cuts show large intertemporal shifts, with Italy passing a substantial share of benefit cuts to future generations.
- Recommendation to revisit current high replacement rates and increase the age of retirement.
- Enactment of the legislated indexation of the retirement age to changes in life expectancy (though starting from 2015) could be brought forward, possibly saving "as much as 0.3–0.7 percent of GDP a year over the medium term."
- A more front-loaded adjustment effort would help balance the intergenerational distribution of the fiscal burden arising from past pension reforms.
- Scenario E includes a nominal pension reduction of "5 percent" as an additional saving assumption.

### Long-term fiscal sustainability scenarios (assumptions and implications)
- Without additional fiscal effort, the debt ratio would become unsustainable in a low growth scenario with real GDP growth of "about 0.8 percent" over the long term.
- In a scenario with somewhat higher growth ("1.1 percent"), an adjustment effort generating a structural improvement equivalent to "about 2¼ percent of GDP over 2010–12" (against the authorities’ envisaged "1¾ percent of GDP, of which about 1¼ percent of GDP is yet to be identified") would be necessary to broadly stabilize the debt ratio over the long run.
- Additional savings from age-related expenditure (equivalent to "cutting nominal pensions by 5 percent over the long term") would still be needed to bring debt ratio to 60 percent.

Illustrative scenario assumptions (growth rates are average rates for 2015–2060):
- Scenario A. Lower growth; no fiscal adjustment:
  - Labor productivity growth "1.00%"; employment growth "-0.18%"; fiscal projections as in staff baseline for 2010–2015.
- Scenario B. High growth; no fiscal adjustment:
  - Labor productivity growth "1.62%" and employment growth "-0.13%" (macroeconomic assumptions used in the Ministry of Economy and Finance projections); fiscal projections as in staff baseline for 2010–2015.
- Scenario C. Adjustment as in SP; average growth:
  - Fiscal adjustment as in the Stability Programme Update ("1¾ percent of GDP in 2010–2012"); labor productivity growth "1.20%"; employment growth "-0.13%".
- Scenario D. Stronger fiscal adjustment; average growth:
  - Fiscal adjustment of "2¼ percent of GDP in 2010–2012"; labor productivity growth "1.20%"; employment growth "-0.13%".
- Scenario E. Stronger fiscal adjustment; average growth; pension adjustment:
  - Scenario D assumptions plus nominal pension reduction of "5 percent".

### Fiscal consolidation and public finance reforms (policy recommendations)
- Fiscal consolidation should be based on rationalizing current spending:
  - Fully implement plans to reduce personnel costs (mainly via slowing turnover in public employment).
  - Contain growth of intermediate consumption of ministries and healthcare spending (particularly on pharmaceuticals).
  - Strict adherence to budget targets: minimize new spending initiatives outside the budget process; commit to save any revenue overperformance; implement recommendations of expenditure reviews.
- Revenue side:
  - High labor income tax-wedge limits feasibility for tax rate increases, but scope remains for broadening the tax base.
  - One-off revenue measures should generally be avoided.
- Fiscal framework reforms to strengthen consolidation (Box 1 recommendations):
  - Set binding multiyear aggregate expenditure ceilings and sanction a strict top-down budgeting procedure.
  - More formal scrutiny of macroeconomic forecasts by an independent institution.
  - Maintain commitment appropriations at least for capital expenditure.
  - Switch to a baseline design based on current policies (instead of current legislation).
  - Make a statement of fiscal risks and long-term fiscal projections part of the budget.
- Fiscal federalism:
  - Authorities view fiscal federalism as key to achieving fiscal consolidation, improving quality of public spending, and reviving the South.
  - Ensure a fiscally-prudent implementation to avoid an overall increase in fiscal expenditures.

### Banking sector vulnerabilities and recommended measures
- Macroeconomic backdrop and short-term outlook:
  - Base Scenario macro assumptions: IMF estimates of GDP growth "0.8 percent" in 2010 and "1.2 percent" in 2011.
  - Under Base Scenario:
    - Loans expected to grow by "1–3 percent in 2010–11".
    - Revenues expected to grow by "1–3 percent".
    - Loan loss provisions to further increase by "6-9 percent in 2010, before falling by 3-0 percent in 2011".
    - Cumulated loan loss provisions in 2010–2011 would be "one third higher than in the 2008–2009 periods".
    - Assuming dividend distribution of "10-30 percent of earnings", aggregated Core Tier1 ratio would rise in 2010–11 by "less than 0.5 percentage points by 2011".
    - The capital shortfall with respect to an "8 percentage Core Tier1" level would on average progressively close by 2011, with significant bank-by-bank differences.
  - Severe Scenario macro assumptions:
    - GDP declining by "-1.7 percent in 2010 and by -1.3 percent in 2011" (a cumulative 2.5 percentage points lower than in the Base Scenario).
    - Loans would remain flat; revenue growth negative.
    - Loan loss provisions could increase by "18-22 percent, in both 2010 and 2011".
    - Cumulated loan losses would be "65 percent higher than in 2008-09".
    - On an aggregated level, the Core Tier1 ratio would deteriorate to "below the 7 percent mark" for several banks.
- Bank recapitalization and regulation:
  - Efforts to strengthen banks’ recapitalization should continue; it will be difficult to significantly reinforce capital through earnings retention given moderate profitability.
  - Banks that used recapitalization bonds need alternative recapitalization strategies as interest on these securities rises sharply in three years.
  - Authorities should guide adoption of the latest Basel Committee recommendations and quickly adopt new international rules once defined.
- Tax and policy measures to support banking and lending:
  - Consider loosening current tax rules on deductibility of loan write-downs (rules are stricter than in other major European countries); current fiscal treatment creates substantial deferred tax assets that will not be allowed under forthcoming new regulations.
  - Government-sponsored loan guarantees to support SMEs were appropriate, but an exit strategy should be planned: guarantees should be temporary, appropriately priced, and not prevent needed restructuring.
  - Consider enhancements to bankruptcy regime to support rehabilitation of distressed but creditworthy firms and speedy liquidation of non-viable enterprises (e.g., support for prompt provision of new financing during restructuring; reexamining eligibility criteria for bankruptcy trustees).

### Authorities' stance
- The authorities considered the pension system sustainable but were open to the idea of bringing forward the already scheduled increase in the retirement age.
- The authorities concurred with staff on the need for further capital strengthening of banks and were concerned that excessive conservatism in lending could hinder credit rebound and recovery.

*Source: IMF staff summary of chapter/section as provided in the supplied content.*

### 47.      Persistent low productivity growth in Italy has deep structural causes. The main

### _cr10157 - 47.      Persistent low productivity growth in Italy has deep structural causes. The main

### Structural causes of persistent low productivity growth
- Main structural factors identified:
  - (1) policy and regulatory rigidities limiting competition and hindering the business environment;
  - (2) low efficiency, linked to the preponderance of small and medium-sized enterprises typically unable to exploit fully economies of scale;
  - (3) limited process and product innovation, hindered by labor market rigidities;
  - (4) outdated specialization patterns, given a production structure (especially in manufacturing) based on traditional low skill products;
  - (5) relatively poor human capital.

### Reforms undertaken and gaps
- Reforms already taken by the government include:
  - (1) passed the local public services bill;
  - (2) began abolishing obsolete legislation;
  - (3) strengthened the transparency and accountability of public administration management;
  - (4) implemented a law instituting competition assessments and regulatory impact analysis;
  - (5) incorporated the Antitrust Authority’s recommendations in a competition bill to be discussed by Parliament annually.
- Remaining priorities and impediments:
  - Reduce state ownership in key network sectors (electricity, gas, postal services, transport).
  - Limit local government involvement in enterprises providing local services.
  - Eliminate entry barriers to professional services.
  - Continue deregulation of the energy market.
  - Strengthen enforcement of the rule of law and enhance the role of competition bodies in formulating policy.
  - Implement the EU Services Directive without further delay; central government review completed and in final stage of amendments, but regions are lagging.

### Labor market performance and reform needs
- Observed outcomes:
  - Italy’s (measured) employment-to-population ratio continues to remain among the lowest in the euro area.
  - Nearly 50 percent of the unemployed have been out of work for more than one year, substantially above the euro area average.
  - Deregulation of fixed- and part-time contracts increased “atypical” employment, contributed to stagnant labor productivity, and increased employment risk without commensurate improvements in the social safety net.
- Second-generation labor market reform recommendations:
  - Address generous social safety net disparities: generous for some worker groups but virtually nonexistent for most others.
  - Reduce variation in employment protection across worker groups.
  - Reduce excessive compression in the aggregate wage distribution and strengthen the link between wages and productivity.
  - Decentralize wage bargaining arrangements to account for regional differences in productivity and cost of living; public sector to lead decentralization.
  - Make permanent contracts more flexible and temporary workers more protected while simplifying labor market legislation.
  - Foster spatial mobility by extending social safety nets and aligning wage-setting with regional conditions.

### Macroeconomic and fiscal appraisal
- Key vulnerabilities and strengths:
  - Strengths: high private savings rate, low private indebtedness, resilience of the financial sector.
  - Vulnerabilities: elevated level of public debt, disappointing growth performance, ongoing regional market turbulence.
- Fiscal objectives and cautions:
  - Staff endorses authorities’ fiscal targets of reducing the deficit to below 3 percent by 2012.
  - Caution: planned fiscal adjustment relies on optimistic assumptions—strong sustained recovery, full implementation of earlier consolidation plans, and additional measures yet to be announced.
  - Recommendation to maintain close monitoring of sub-national public finances and consider advancing the pace of consolidation if market turbulence continues.
- Recommended fiscal consolidation design:
  - Expenditure-based consolidation endorsed; containment of the public sector wage bill should be key.
  - Continue progressive reduction of public employment and exert firm control of public wages, especially at the local government level.
  - Effective implementation of the 2009 Accounting and Public Finance law is crucial.
  - When expenditure-based consolidation is underway, consider tax reform to reduce the tax wedge while increasing tax compliance; avoid ad-hoc revenue measures detrimental to long-term tax compliance.
- Fiscal federalism:
  - Fiscal federalism seen as opportunity to strengthen fiscal responsibility but carries risk of fiscal expansion; offsetting measures should be considered to prevent higher costs.
  - Need to balance regional autonomy and transfers across regions given large local income disparities.
- Pension system:
  - Bold pension reforms implemented have significantly improved sustainability.
  - Remaining adjustment in benefits is back-loaded and long-term projections rely on optimistic growth assumptions; authorities should consider bringing forward scheduled increases in the retirement age and intensify efforts to develop private pension schemes.

### Financial sector and banking recommendations
- Banks face medium-term challenges: high credit risk, low lending growth, and significantly lower profitability.
- Regulatory environment:
  - International regulatory rules will be tightened, including capital requirements.
  - Bank of Italy recommendation: increase bank capitalization.
- Policy measures recommended:
  - Encourage banks to dispose of non-strategic assets, retain earnings, and raise capital from the market.
  - Consider relaxing strict tax rules on deductibility of loan write-downs (stricter than other major European countries), in light of possible new capital regulation on deferred tax credits.

### Structural reform agenda and growth strategy
- Overarching goals: maintain fiscal discipline, reduce public debt burden, and raise long-term growth rate.
- Structural reform priorities to reinvigorate growth:
  - Remove structural bottlenecks and reduce high cost of doing business.
  - Enhance competition and raise productivity.
  - Improve quality of public services, public investment, and infrastructure.
  - Streamline bureaucratic requirements.
  - Reform civil justice and accelerate legal processes.
  - Strengthen enforcement of the rule of law.
  - Implement the EU Services Directive across all government levels without further delay.
- Timing:
  - The next three years (period of no scheduled national elections) are identified as a unique opportunity to push forward the reform agenda; authorities indicated decisive reforms would be announced in the next few months, especially in fiscal federalism and tax policy.

### Selected numerical indicators and projections (as reported)
- Labor market:
  - Nearly 50 percent of the unemployed have been out of work for more than one year.
- Fiscal target:
  - Reduce the deficit to below 3 percent by 2012.
- Table excerpts and headline projections (as presented in source tables):
  - Real GDP: 1.5-1.3-5.00.81.21.51.41.31.3
  - Public debt (percent of GDP): 103.4106.0115.8118.6120.5121.6122.8123.9124.7
  - General government net lending/borrowing: -1.5-2.7-5.3-5.2-4.9-4.9-4.8-4.7-4.6
  - Productivity: 0.4-1.0-2.40.20.40.50.60.70.8
  - Unit labor costs: 2.55.14.71.81.71.91.92.12.1
  - Consumer prices: 2.03.50.81.41.71.81.81.92.0
  - Employment (annual change): 1.00.8-1.5-0.70.40.70.90.90.8
  - Unemployment rate (%): 6.26.87.88.78.68.37.97.67.4
  - Current account balance: -2.4-3.4-3.4-2.8-2.7-2.6-2.5-2.5-2.4
  - Gross national saving: 19.417.715.516.116.216.516.816.917.2
- Financial soundness indicators (selected):
  - Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets: 11.211.411.610.610.710.410.811.3 (latest: June)
  - Nonperforming loans (share of total gross loans): 6.56.76.65.34.94.64.96.6 (latest: Sept.)
  - Return on assets: 0.50.50.60.70.80.70.0.3 (latest available)
  - Leverage: 20.220.820.719.219.721.123.924.4 (latest: June)
  - Geographical distribution of loans (North/Center/South): North62.262.362.262.061.861.959.961.7; Center24.124.023.523.523.423.323.323.2; South13.613.714.314.614.714.814.315.1 (latest: Sept.).

*Source: IMF staff report content provided in the supplied PDF extract.*

### Appendix 1. Italy: Scenario Analysis of the Banking Sector

### Appendix 1. Italy: Scenario Analysis of the Banking Sector

### Banking sector scenario findings and projections
- Charts and staff calculations present capital shortfalls (basis points) for the largest Italian banks under the Base Scenario and Severe Scenario for 2008–2011, with gaps reported to 7% Core Tier1, 8% Core Tier1, and 9% Core Tier1.
- Evolution of Core Tier1 ratio for the largest Italian banks is shown for 2008–2011 with two scenarios: Central Scenario and Severe Scenario (ratio scale 5 to 9).
- Base Scenario - Core Tier1 difference for largest 5 Italian banks expected in 2010 is illustrated (percent) with individual bank differences shown for Bank 1, Bank 2, Bank 3, Bank 4, Bank 5.
- Evolution of Net Income for the largest Italian banks is indexed to (2007=100) for 2007–2011 under Base Scenario and Severe Scenario.
- Evolution of Total Loan Loss Provisions for the largest Italian banks is indexed to (2007=100) for 2007–2011 under Base Scenario and Severe Scenario.

### Scenario analysis: main assumptions (as presented)
- Base Scenario / Severe Scenario (table-like assumptions preserved exactly as in source):
  - GDP Growth: 0.8% 1.2% -1.7% -1.3%
  - Revenue Growth: +1% to +3% +2% to +5% -1% to -3% -1% to +1%
  - Loan Loss Provision Growth: +6% to +9% -3% to +0% +18% to +22% +15% to +20%
  - Loans Growth: +1% to +3% +2% to +4% -1% to +2% -1% to +2%
- Source attribution on assumptions: IMF staff calculations.

### Financial indicators and market developments (selected observations)
- Bank equity prices have somewhat recovered since March 2009.
- Bank Credit Default Swap spreads have come down.
- Stock prices have rebounded.
- Credit growth has slowed down.
- Government borrowing costs are low on the short end, but sovereign spreads on longer maturities are not back to pre-crisis levels, yet.
- Sovereign spread metrics and market series presented include: Equities (1/1/2007 = 100) for Intesa, UniCredit, MPS; Credit Default Swap Spreads (Basis points, 5 years) for Intesa, UniCredit, MPS, iTraxx Europe; Stock Indices: Italy: FTSE All-Share Index and Euro Stoxx 50 (right scale); Government Interest Rates (Percent) 10 year and 3 month; Bank Loans to Private Sector (Year-on-year percent change) for Private sector, Nonfinancial corporations, Households, Home loans; Sovereign Spread (Basis points) 10 yr spread over German bond and 3 m interbank spread over 3 m govt. bond (right scale).
- The 2008–2010 time series visuals show market and banking indicators’ evolution across crisis and post-crisis periods.

### Policy-relevant implications from the scenario analysis (implied by charts and assumptions)
- Capital shortfalls under adverse scenarios highlight potential needs for capital strengthening for the largest Italian banks to meet 7%–9% Core Tier1 thresholds.
- Rising loan loss provisions and divergent net income trajectories across Base and Severe scenarios imply banks’ profitability and provisioning capacity are key determinants of capital adequacy in 2010–2011.
- Slower credit growth and stress on revenues under severe macro scenarios underscore the interplay between macroeconomic outcomes and banking sector resilience.

---

### Analytical Annex I: Italy’s Fiscal Sustainability Revisited

### High-level conclusion and required actions
- Despite unfavorable demographic trends, high public debt, and generous pensions, Italy’s longer-term fiscal outlook appears to be benign compared to euro area peers.
- Ensuring fiscal sustainability would require:
  - economic growth much stronger than in the past decade,
  - bold fiscal adjustment over the medium term,
  - full implementation of the planned pension reform,
  - further reforms to improve intergenerational equity.

### Demographics and age-related expenditure projections
- The old-age dependency ratio is projected to double in EU countries in 2010–2060: for every person over 65 there will be only two working-age persons instead of the current four.
- Between 2007 and 2060, total age-related government expenditure is projected to increase by about 5 percentage points of GDP for the EU, but only by 1.6 percentage points of GDP for Italy.
- At about 170 percent of GDP, the net present value of the projected increase in age-related spending in Italy is the second lowest after Japan, against an average of nearly 270 percent of GDP for advanced G-20 countries.

### Italy’s current fiscal environment (key figures)
- Public debt reached 115.8 percent of GDP in 2009.
- The share of non-discretionary primary spending in GDP increased substantially, reaching 30½ percent of GDP in 2009.
- Including in-kind social benefits increases non-discretionary spending to 33½ percent of GDP.
- One-third of budgetary resources are spent on pensions.
- Pension spending growth rate has stabilized at below 1½ percent per year.
- Public health spending is about 7 percent of GDP.
- The deficit of the National Health Service (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale, SSN) was €3.2 billion (0.2 percent of GDP) in 2008, expected to have been covered by the regions.

### Pension system structure and comparative metrics
- Italy uses Notional Defined Contribution Accounts; current workers’ contributions generally pay for current pensions as in other advanced G-20 systems.
- The Italian system offers the highest average gross replacement rate (nearly 70 percent of average earnings) among advanced G-20 countries.
- Italy has a relatively high payroll tax rate among the advanced G-20.
- In the absence of envisaged adjustments, pension spending would increase from 15¼ percent of GDP in 2010 to 24½ percent in 2050.
- Authorities’ latest estimates suggest pension spending would decline from the 2008 level of 14¼ percent of GDP to about 13½ percent of GDP in 2060 after enacted reforms.

### Pension reforms: measures, effects, and setbacks
- Waves of reforms in the 1990s and 2000s combined measures to increase revenues and reduce benefit generosity, including increasing age prerequisites for pension access.
- Specific reform actions and consequences:
  - 2004 reform widened “exit windows” for claiming early retirement, effectively increasing the early retirement age by up to 9–12 months.
  - 2007 reform increased the frequency of adjustments of transformation coefficients from every 10 to every 3 years and made them administrative; set a more rapid increase of the early retirement age to 62 in 2013 instead of 2014.
  - 2009 law linked the early retirement age to increases in life expectancy starting in 2015.
- Setbacks included discretionary adjustments that delayed or reversed reform impact:
  - A five year delay (from 2005 to 2010) in reviewing the transformation coefficients.
  - Increases in the early retirement age were partially delayed and slightly lowered for those with 36 years of contributions.
- Resulting system complexity remains high due to incremental changes.

### Risks, challenges, and considerations
- Risks to the favorable long-term outlook include:
  - potential reversal of reforms,
  - the weight of adjustment on future generations of workers,
  - uncertainty in health spending governance due to decentralization and “soft” budget constraints at subnational level,
  - complications from ongoing fiscal federalism reform affecting health financing.
- The analysis notes that even with some upward adjustments to age-related costs, Italy would still have one of the lowest age-related expenditures among advanced EU countries in the scenarios considered.

### Suggested policy directions (from annex discussion)
- Full implementation of planned pension reforms is necessary to preserve the favorable long-term fiscal outlook.
- Bold fiscal adjustment over the medium term is required given high public debt and post-crisis weak budgetary position.
- Policies to promote stronger economic growth than in the past decade are critical to support fiscal sustainability.
- Further reforms to improve intergenerational equity should be pursued to address the distributional aspects of fiscal adjustment and pension burden.

*Prepared by L. Lusinyan (EUR) and M. Soto (FAD); sources include IMF staff calculations, Eurostat, 2009 Ageing Report, 2009 Sustainability Report, WEO, ISTAT, RGS, MEF/RGS definitions as cited in the source content.*

### Box 1. Highlights of the Italian Pension Reform

### Box 1. Highlights of the Italian Pension Reform

### Major legislative reforms and core design changes
- 1992 reform:
  - Cut net pension liabilities by about 25 percent.
  - Increased retirement age from 60 (55) to 65 (60) for men (women).
  - Increased reference earnings from 5 to 10 years (lifetime earnings for younger workers).
  - Changed valorization to prices plus 1 percent.
  - Increased contributing years from 15 to 20.
  - Modified indexation from wages to prices.
- 1995 reform:
  - Adopted a Notional Defined Contribution system in which pension benefits depend on lifetime contributions and GDP growth.
  - Retirement age set at 57 (with 5 years of contributions), with benefits adjusted depending on the age at which pensions are first claimed.
  - After first receipt, pensions grow with inflation.
- 2004 reform:
  - Raised the minimum retirement age from 57 to 60 in 2008 to 62 in 2014 for those with a minimum of 35 years of contributions.
  - Widened the “exit windows”.
- 2007 reform:
  - Smoothed the initial increase in the retirement age (from 57 to 58 in 2008) but brought forward the increase to age 62 to 2013 (63 for the self-employed).
  - Reduced the minimum age requirement by a year for those with 36 years of contributions.
  - Age requirements apply uniformly to retributive, contributive, and mixed regimes.
- 2008 law:
  - Allowed old age and seniority pensions to be fully cumulated with labor income.
- 2009 measures:
  - Statutory retirement age of women in the public sector (60 in 2009) set to increase starting from 2010 to equalize with men (currently 65) by 2018, in response to the European Court of Justice sentence.
  - Introduced a five-year indexation mechanism linking age retirement prerequisites to changes in life expectancy starting in 2015; implementation mechanisms were yet to be enacted by end-2014.

### Private pensions and TFR (Trattamento di fine rapporto)
- From January 1, 2007, severance-pay benefits (TFR) are to be accumulated in funds outside employers; default destination for future contributions is private pension funds.
- Workers may opt out of private funds; in that case TFR contributions are held by a special fund of the INPS on behalf of the Treasury.
- Financial crisis effects:
  - Open and closed funds had substantial financial losses in 2008, fueling aversion to private-fund risk.
  - Funds recovered in 2009 but early enthusiasm diminished.
  - By December 2009, about 5 million workers (only about 1/5 of the labor force) had subscribed to these funds; for the remainder, TFR contributions were transferred to the INPS or remained within firms.

### Authorities' long-term projections (Stability Programme Update, Jan 2010) — key fiscal aggregates (Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
- Total revenue: 46.5 46.8 46.7 46.7
- Total expenditure: 51.4 48.3 47.3 46.0
- Age-related: 28.3 27.6 28.8 28.6
- Pensions: 15.2 14.8 15.0 13.8
- Health: 7.4 7.4 8.4 8.9
- Long-term care: 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.7
- Education: 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.8
- Interest expenditure: 4.9 5.2 2.9 1.8
- Overall fiscal balance: -4.9 -1.5 -0.6 0.7
- Debt: 116.9 below 40
- Assumptions (percent)
  - Labor productivity growth: 1.1 1.3 1.7 1.7
  - Total participation rate: 66.9 69.6 71.0 71.7
  - Real GDP growth: 1.1 2.5 1.4 1.3

### Alternative macro-fiscal scenarios and illustrative outcomes
- Medium-term staff baseline assumptions:
  - Real GDP growth assumed slower and hump-shaped: reaching 1½ percent of GDP in 2012 (authorities: 2¼ percent) and declining to 1¼ percent by 2015.
  - Starting point for staff exercises: 2015 (authorities used 2012).
  - Expenditure on pensions, health (‘reference scenario’) and long-term care calibrated to respective macro scenarios.
- Illustrative unsustainable outcome:
  - Lower long-term growth and lack of medium-term fiscal adjustment would render fiscal situation unsustainable: debt would reach 400 percent of GDP by 2060 in such illustrative scenario.
  - Assuming the authorities’ optimistic long-term growth assumptions, the debt ratio would reach over 200 percent of GDP (close to the projection in the 2009 Sustainability Report).
- Scenarios underlying public debt charts (average growth rates for 2015–2060):
  - A. Lower growth: labor productivity growth 1.00% and employment growth -0.18%.
  - B. Average growth: labor productivity growth 1.20% and employment growth -0.13%.
  - C. Average/high growth: labor productivity growth 1.45% and employment growth -0.16%.
  - D. High growth (MEF macro assumptions): labor productivity growth 1.62% and employment growth -0.13% (macroeconomic assumptions used in Ministry of Economy and Finance projections).
- Public Debt — With Medium-Term Fiscal Adjustment scenarios:
  - A. Adjustment as in SP; high growth (MEF).
  - B. Adjustment as in SP; lower growth.
  - C. Adjustment as in SP; average growth.
  - D. Stronger fiscal adjustment; average growth.
- Defined scenario specifications for illustrative charts:
  - A. Adjustment as in SP; high growth: Fiscal adjustment as in Stability Programme Update (1¾ percent of GDP in 2010–2012); labor productivity growth 1.62%; and employment growth -0.13%.
  - B. Adjustment as in SP; low growth: Fiscal adjustment as in Stability Programme Update (1¾ percent of GDP in 2010–2012); labor productivity growth 1.00%; and employment growth -0.18%.
  - C. Adjustment as in SP; average growth: Fiscal adjustment as in Stability Programme Update (1¾ percent of GDP in 2010–2012); labor productivity growth 1.20%; and employment growth -0.13%.
  - D. Stronger fiscal adjustment; average growth: Fiscal adjustment of 2¼ percent of GDP in 2010–2012; labor productivity growth 1.20%; and employment growth -0.13%.

### Fiscal consolidation, growth, and sustainability trade-offs
- The fiscal consolidation envisaged in the Stability Programme Update (1¾ percentage points of GDP in 2010–2012) combined with the authorities’ optimistic growth assumptions would:
  - Put debt on a declining path and keep the deficit broadly within the 3 percent of GDP threshold.
  - Still leave debt-to-GDP above the 60 percent level by 2060.
- With stronger fiscal consolidation—assumed as an additional ½ percentage points of GDP over the SP effort in 2011–12 via non-age related spending cuts—debt would eventually fall under the 60 percent threshold (not shown on the chart).
- Under more realistic average growth assumptions, even with stronger fiscal adjustment the debt dynamics would reverse and sustainability concerns may re-emerge.

### Challenges, implementation risks, and pension-specific concerns
- Two main challenges for pension projections:
  - Implementation risks and sensitivity of some assumptions.
  - Issues of intergenerational equity due to back-loading of the remaining reform.
- Implementation risks evidenced by reform reversals or delays:
  - Delays in the update of the transformation coefficient or more gradual increases in early retirement age have occurred and pose significant risks.
  - The effects of delays are non-negligible: initial pension benefits were reduced by between 6 and 8 percent for new beneficiaries depending on age after the new coefficients were introduced in 2010.
  - Risk that expected cuts in replacement rates could precipitate further attempts to delay the reform.
- Replacement rates and role of voluntary pensions:
  - Projected decline in replacement rates points to a larger role for voluntary pensions.
  - The Italian pension system includes sharp cuts in replacement rates, especially for the very young.
  - Relative to other advanced countries, Italy currently has rather small accumulations in private pensions.

### Summary indicators and scenario outcomes (selected figures)
- Scenario indicator excerpts (sources: Ministry of Economy and Finance; Stability Programme Update, January 2010; IMF staff estimates):
  - S2: -0.9 3.8 -0.9 0.4 0.0
  - Initial budgetary position: -1.6 1.3 -1.7 -1.2 -1.6
  - Long-term changes in primary balance: 0.7 2.5 0.8 1.6 1.6
  - S1: -0.3 4.6 0.3 1.4 0.9
  - Debt requirement in 2060: 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
  - RPB (Required primary balance): 2.8 5.1 2.5 3.8 3.7
- Scenario definitions referenced in the summary table:
  1. No fiscal adjustment; low growth (productivity growth 1.00%; employment growth -0.18%).
  2. Fiscal effort as in SP; high growth (productivity growth 1.62%; employment growth -0.13%).
  3. Fiscal effort as in SP; average growth (productivity growth 1.20%; employment growth -0.13%).

*Source: IMF staff summary of Italian pension reform and fiscal sustainability material as presented in the referenced content unit.*

### 4. Stronger f iscal ef f ort in 2011–12; average grow th (productivity grow th 1.20%; employment grow th -0.13%).

### 4. Stronger fiscal effort in 2011–12; average growth (productivity growth 1.20%; employment growth -0.13%)

### Context and baseline assumptions
- Central illustrative scenario assumes:
  - A somewhat stronger fiscal adjustment of ½ percentage points of GDP in 2011–12 on top of the one envisaged by the authorities.
  - Average long-run labor productivity growth of 1.20%.
  - Employment growth of -0.13%.
  - Footnote baseline: Fiscal adjustment of 2¼ in 2010–12 is referenced in the scenario framework.

### Key findings on pensions and ageing
- Pension reform outcomes and intergenerational effects:
  - The 1992 reform (introducing price indexation) reduced net pension liabilities by about 25 percent.
  - Net present value of pensions for a current new born are about 75 percent of benefits of a 40-year old and 50 percent of benefits of a 60-year old.
  - Cohorts grandfathered into the old system (≥15 years of contributions in 1992; 18 years in 1995) are projected to receive benefits until at least 2040.
  - Simple simulations: a worker with a temporary contract in initial working years would receive a pension about 30 percent lower than a worker with an open-ended contract (other things equal).
- Timing and magnitude of implied replacement rate cuts:
  - Over the next 40 years, reform-induced decline in pension outlays is larger in Italy (a decline of 36.4 percent) than in other G-20 countries (a decline of 28.2 percent).
  - About 2/3 of Italy’s remaining adjustments are expected to happen after 2020 (versus about 1/2 for advanced G-20 countries).
- Medium-term fiscal pressures:
  - Official projections: pension expenditures are set to increase by nearly 1 percent of GDP between 2015 and 2040.
  - Net present value of this projected increase over 2015–2040 is about 8 percent of 2010 GDP.
  - To offset the projected increase, either benefits would have to be cut by about 5 percent between 2015 and 2040 on top of already legislated adjustments, or the retirement age could be increased by one year (with accompanying changes to transformation coefficients).
- Non-contributory pensions:
  - In 2008, non-contributory welfare pensions (GIAS) accounted for about 15 percent of pension expenditures (2 percent of GDP).
  - This level of spending has remained virtually unchanged as a percent of GDP over the last 20 years.
- Health spending uncertainty:
  - Baseline 2009 Ageing Report projection (as reported): health care spending in Italy is projected to increase by 1.1 percent of GDP between 2007 and 2006 compared to a decline of 0.4 percent for pensions. (Text preserves original phrasing.)
  - IMF staff scenario aligned with historical trends: points to an increase in health spending of over 2½ percent of GDP between 2007 and 2060.
- Sensitivity and fiscal risk:
  - A 5 percent permanent increase in pension expenditures would put public debt on an unsustainable path.
  - Public debt is sensitive to pension outlays; debt dynamics under the illustrative scenario target roughly 60 percent of GDP in the long run if reforms and adjustments occur as specified.

### Illustrative fiscal scenarios and projection implications
- Under the central scenario (stronger fiscal adjustment + average growth):
  - An adjustment in pension expenditure of a minimum 5 percent in nominal terms would be needed to put public debt on a declining path and bring it to just about 60 percent of GDP in the long run.
  - Containing growth in health spending toward the end of the projection horizon may still be needed to tip the debt ratio down more decisively.
- Scenario elements featured in charts (as described):
  - Public debt and overall balance trajectories are shown under permutations: pensions +10%, +5%, -5%, -10%, and pensions -5% with health constant after 2040 (chart legend preserved).
  - Evolution of official pension and health spending projections across vintage releases (Dec-2002 through Feb-2010) indicate upward revisions in projected age-related spending.

### Policy recommendations and reform priorities
- Ensure timely and faithful implementation of pension reforms already legislated:
  - Follow scheduled increases in the retirement age.
  - Update transformation coefficients in a timely and transparent way.
  - Limit discretionary adjustments in future revisions of the system.
- Further reforms to improve intergenerational equity and automaticity:
  - Future reforms should focus on automatic adjustments (e.g., valorization of contributions, periodic revision of the transformation coefficient) to distribute adjustment across current and future pensioners.
  - Bringing forward the already planned increase in the early retirement age could yield savings of 0.3–0.7 percent of GDP per year in the medium term (depending on the share of retirees who claim early retirement).
  - Other possible adjustments include limiting price indexation of pensions to account for increases in life expectancy or changes in the mass of contributors, or freezing pensions to respond to long-term actuarial imbalances (examples cited: Japan, Canada).
- Strengthen compliance and broad-based participation:
  - Maintain incentives to participate (notional defined contribution features link contributions to pensions).
  - Address risks that lower replacement rates and expanded temporary labor arrangements could encourage informal work or reduce contributions over time.
- Develop private pension provision:
  - Continue efforts to develop private pensions, supported by a sound regulatory framework and assessment of private sector capacity to manage schemes efficiently.
- Assess structural reforms in fiscal sustainability context:
  - Evaluate health spending reforms, fiscal federalism reforms, and budgetary reforms with attention to long-run fiscal implications and cost-conscious implementation.

### Conclusions (policy synthesis)
- Long-term fiscal sustainability requires:
  - Bold medium-term fiscal consolidation and strong long-run economic growth.
  - Timely and full implementation of pension reforms, with additional adjustments to secure sustainability if projections deviate.
  - Complementary measures to contain health spending growth and strengthen private pension provision.
- Key risks to the authorities’ optimistic projections include:
  - Slower-than-expected medium-term growth rebound.
  - Lower long-run labor productivity.
  - Delays or shortfalls in fiscal consolidation (notably the assumed 1¾ percent of GDP in 2010–12 with underlying measures yet to be identified).
  - Uncertainties and upward revisions in age-related spending projections.

*Source: IMF staff analysis as presented in the content unit "4. Stronger fiscal effort in 2011–12; average growth (productivity growth 1.20%; employment growth -0.13%)" from the supplied PDF content.*

### Box 1A. Italy’s Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: Some Highlights in Numbers

### Box 1A. Italy’s Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: Some Highlights in Numbers

### Demographics and pension burden
- For every inactive person over 65, there were two employed persons 15–64 age in 2007; in 2060, the relation will be nine-to-ten, the highest in Europe.
- Public pensions consume 1/3 of budgetary resources or over 15 percent of GDP in 2009, the highest among advanced economies.
- In the absence of the envisaged pension reform, pension expenditure will increase to 24½ percent in 2050, much more than in other advanced G-20 countries.
- The pension reform is not generationally fair—the net present value of pensions for a current new born are about 75 percent of benefits of a 40-year old and 50 percent of benefits of a 60-year old.
- The waves of pension reform have helped improve the balance of fiscal adjustment across generations, but the effects of the remaining reform are heavily back-loaded—about 2/3 of the adjustments are expected to happen after 2020 (about 1/2 for the advanced G-20 countries).

### Public debt and fiscal vulnerability
- Public debt reached 115.8 percent of GDP in 2009, the second highest to Japan among advanced G-20 countries.
- With no fiscal consolidation in the medium term and lower than envisaged growth in the long run, the public debt will reach over 400 percent of GDP in 2060.
- A ½ percentage points of GDP increase in the envisaged fiscal structural consolidation in 2011–2012 will cumulate in the long run to about 35 percentage points of GDP lower debt ratio in 2060.
- Average long-run growth of about 1.1 percent and fiscal adjustment of 2¼ percent of GDP in the medium term would be needed to close the sustainability gap but at the debt level close to that of 2010.
- Still, at least a 5 percent nominal cut in overall pension costs (or 0.8 percent of GDP) on average will be needed to bring debt close to 60 percent of GDP by 2060.

### Growth, productivity, and sensitivity of debt to productivity
- Italy’s deep-rooted structural problems resulted in an unsatisfactory productivity performance and a dismal growth over the last 15 years.
- With output back to its end-2001 level, Italy’s output losses associated with the crisis have been, thus far, about 132 billion of 2000 euro (around 10 percent of precrisis 1998‒2004 real GDP). About three quarters of these losses are estimated to be due to a shortfall in potential output.
- Italy’s real GDP growth averaged 1.6 percent during the period 1995‒2007, down from over 2 percent in the earlier decade.
- Italy’s dismal growth performance is largely due to poor productivity: TFP contributions decreased substantially over the period 1995‒2005.
- Since the onset of the crisis, productivity has plummeted even further, exacerbating Italy’s long-standing structural weaknesses; the drop in TFP growth over 2008‒09 has been so large it has offset most of the resilience in capital and—to a lesser extent—employment.
- A 0.2 percentage point increase/decrease in average long-run labor productivity growth translates, other things equal, into about 60 percentage points of GDP decrease/increase in debt-to-GDP ratio in the no-fiscal adjustment scenario.

### Crisis impact and dynamics
- Output contracted by 1.3 percent in 2008 and 5.0 percent in 2009.
- The recession in Italy’s main trading partners led to a sharp fall in exports; investment dropped more sharply than in earlier recessions; private consumption also declined significantly despite strong household balance sheets.
- The economy suffered the worst recession since World War II; in the first quarter of 2009, growth witnessed a decline in growth of 6 percent (year-on-year), four times as large as the one experienced during the EMS crisis.
- The most distinguishing feature of this recession was the sharp deterioration of exports; the globally synchronized nature of this recession led to the largest historical contraction of Italian exports since the 1930s.
- Survey measures of capacity utilization and expected capacity constraints indicate that the adverse demand shocks started in late 2008; during 2009, demand collapsed and this limited production.

### Policy-relevant numerical implications and scenarios
- Without the envisaged pension reform, pension expenditure will rise to 24½ percent of GDP in 2050.
- With no fiscal consolidation and lower long-run growth, public debt can exceed 400 percent of GDP by 2060.
- A 0.2 percentage point change in average long-run labor productivity growth implies about a 60 percentage point of GDP movement in the debt-to-GDP ratio in the no-fiscal adjustment scenario.
- A ½ percentage points of GDP increase in fiscal structural consolidation in 2011–2012 yields about 35 percentage points of GDP lower debt ratio by 2060.
- Average long-run growth of about 1.1 percent combined with fiscal adjustment of 2¼ percent of GDP in the medium term would close the sustainability gap but leave debt near the 2010 level.
- At least a 5 percent nominal cut in overall pension costs (or 0.8 percent of GDP) on average will be needed to bring debt close to 60 percent of GDP by 2060.

*Source: Box 1A. Italy’s Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: Some Highlights in Numbers (excerpt).*

### 2. Historical approach. Evidence from previous international crises is also considered.

### 2. Historical approach. Evidence from previous international crises is also considered.

### Overview
- The historical (judgmental) approach does not impose a priori restrictions on the analysis and offers an alternative perspective to purely statistical methodologies.
- Methods discussed: univariate two-sided smoothing (HP filter), a multivariate (MV) filter, and a production function approach (PFA) with unobserved stochastic components.

### Univariate two-sided filter (HP filter)
- Characteristics and limitations:
  - Uses only the data for the series itself, ignoring other relevant economic information.
  - Extracts a trend component by balancing fit to the actual series with smoothness of the trend.
  - Results are not model-based and are prone to “end-point bias,” which becomes significant given substantial revisions of recent estimates.
  - Generally useful for historical analysis but not well-suited for forward-looking analysis.
- Empirical implication:
  - HP-filter estimates point to a pre-existing weakness in labor productivity trend growth.
  - Because of the “end-point” problem intrinsic to the two-sided moving average smoothing procedure, trend measures based on HP-filtering generally prove unreliable, especially if a prolonged recession or a structural break occurs at the end of the sample (as with the outbreak of the crisis).

### Multivariate (MV) filter
- Approach and assumptions:
  - Incorporates both recent data and long-term trends by using a small macroeconomic model (see Appendix II).
  - Estimates empirical relationships among actual and potential GDP, unemployment, core inflation, and capacity utilization in manufacturing.
  - Assumes relationships between major economic variables were stable despite large crisis shocks, providing a counterfactual of a “normal” recession (large shock but no structural break).
- Key empirical findings:
  - Estimates positive output gaps for 2005‒08, contrasting with the IMF’s historical estimates that suggested potential output levels were overestimated.
  - Model estimates negative output gap for 2009-2011, which are smaller than current projections.
  - While staff forecasts the output gap to close in 2015, the model projects closure by 2012.
  - Projected real GDP level suggests an output loss of about 14 percent relative to precrisis trend (1998‒2004) by 2015.
  - Output gap dynamics:
    - Trough at about minus 2 percent in 1993 (EMS crisis).
    - In 2000‒07, estimated output gap mostly positive.
    - With the 2008‒09 recession, gap drops to a trough of about minus 2.5 percent.
    - Model forecasts output gap of minus 1.3 percent for 2010, declining to minus 0.4 percent in 2011 before closing in 2012.
    - Economy expected to converge to steady state growth by 2012.
  - Confidence and consistency:
    - 2-standard-deviation confidence band is about +/- 1 percent of the estimated potential growth for Italy.
    - Behavior of inflation consistent with output gap dynamics (core inflation declined during negative output gap periods and rose during positive gap years).
  - Labor market:
    - NAIRU peaked in 1998, then gradually declined before climbing toward end-2009.
    - Decline during 2008 and early 2009 likely due to discouraged worker effect and falling participation rates.
    - Model forecasts NAIRU to increase by only 0.2 during 2008‒10, well below the estimated 1‒2 percentage rise points in most countries projected by Benes et al (2010), reflecting measures in Italy for temporary lay-off and work-reducing measures.
    - Unemployment gap closes by 2014, reflecting persistence in the labor market; NAIRU’s return to steady state rate is slow.
  - Dynamics of gaps:
    - Recoveries in output and utilization gaps expected to move in tandem; unemployment gap lags behind.
    - Unemployment gap influenced by current and lagged output gap but has smaller cyclical fluctuations due to labor hoarding and the “discouraged worker” effect.
    - Utilization gap exhibits more volatility with sharp declines during recessions: declined in 1993 and to over 8 percent in 2009.
    - Following the 2009 trough, capacity utilization and output gaps rebound, closing by 2012; unemployment gap closes by 2014.
  - Forecast uncertainty:
    - High degree of uncertainty around the forecast; confidence bands widening to about 4 percentage points (-2 to +2 percent).
  - Dynamics of drivers:
    - Fluctuations in output mainly driven by demand shocks in the short-term and by movements in potential output in the long-term.
    - Estimated path of potential growth is rather smooth, with estimated potential growth correlated with actual growth.

### Production Function Approach (PFA) with unobserved stochastic components
- Rationale:
  - Estimates potential output from trend levels of structural determinants such as productivity and factor inputs (see Appendix III).
  - Trend levels extracted by accounting for relationships between cyclical components of output and unemployment, cyclical productivity and cyclical hours worked, and business cycle impacts on labor supply dynamics.
  - Estimates are carried out using real-time data and a Bayesian framework; reliance on low-quality capital stocks and hours worked series may raise measurement issues for the TFP component.
- Key empirical findings:
  - Major source of potential growth variation associated with changes in labor participation.
    - Bulk of permanent variation in output driven by shifts in labor trends (labor participation and employment).
    - Cyclical variations in real GDP mainly driven by total factor productivity (TFP) fluctuations.
  - TFP dynamics:
    - TFP is highly pro-cyclical.
    - Structural component of TFP diverges markedly from potential output dynamics.
    - Since mid-1990s, TFP growth declined from one percent to zero.
  - Potential growth dynamics:
    - Potential growth rose from an annual rate of 0.7 percent at end-1992‒93 recession to over 2 percent just before the current slowdown.
    - There is a constant wedge between trend growth in labor and factor productivity, consistent with capital deepening remaining stable at around 1 percent.
  - Cyclicality:
    - TFP and hours worked are strongly pro-cyclical; both plunged below trend since 2002 and became more pro-cyclical since 1999.
    - Unemployment rate is significantly countercyclical; estimated to fall by about 0.04 percent as output rises 1 percent above potential.
    - Labor participation found to be broadly acyclical.
    - Evidence of positive comovements between average hours worked per employee, output, and productivity once structural shifts in factor trends are identified.
  - Volatility and gaps:
    - Implied output gap estimates from PFA tend to exhibit higher volatility than corresponding MV approach estimates.
  - Quantitative projections:
    - Projected real GDP level suggests an output loss of about 11 percent relative to precrisis trend (1998‒2004) by 2015.
    - Output gap estimated to have troughed in 2009 at 2.6 percent.
    - Potential output growth likely to have dropped by 2.7 percent in 2009, expected to increase to 0.4 percent in 2010 before reaching steady-state rate of 0.8 percent.
    - NAIRU is estimated to rise gradually (pace and magnitudes described above in labor market section).

### Key quantitative statistics (preserved exactly as reported)
- Output loss projections relative to precrisis trend (1998‒2004):
  - MV filter: about 14 percent by 2015.
  - PFA: about 11 percent by 2015.
- Output gap levels and timings:
  - Trough about minus 2 percent in 1993 (EMS crisis).
  - Trough about minus 2.5 percent with 2008‒09 recession.
  - MV model forecasts: minus 1.3 percent for 2010; minus 0.4 percent in 2011; closes in 2012.
  - PFA: output gap troughed in 2009 at 2.6 percent.
- Confidence and uncertainty:
  - 2-standard-deviation confidence band about +/- 1 percent of estimated potential growth (MV).
  - Forecast uncertainty bands widening to about 4 percentage points (-2 to +2 percent).
- Labor and productivity metrics:
  - NAIRU forecast increase by only 0.2 during 2008‒10 (MV).
  - TFP growth decline from one percent to zero since mid-1990s (PFA).
  - Potential growth rose from 0.7 percent (end-1992‒93) to over 2 percent pre-slowdown (PFA).
  - Potential output growth drop by 2.7 percent in 2009 (PFA); increase to 0.4 percent in 2010; steady-state rate of 0.8 percent.
  - Unemployment falls by about 0.04 percent as output rises 1 percent above potential (PFA).
  - Capacity utilization gap decline to over 8 percent in 2009 (MV).

### Uncertainty and interpretation
- HP-filter (two-sided) results are unreliable for forward-looking inference because of end-point bias, especially around structural breaks.
- MV filter provides a counterfactual of a “normal” recession but relies on the assumption of stable relationships among key variables despite crisis shocks.
- PFA relies on potentially low-quality capital and hours series at quarterly frequency, which can contaminate TFP estimates.
- Both multivariate approaches indicate lower potential output levels than staff projections and highlight persistent output losses and slow recoveries in labor market outcomes.

*Source: _cr10157 - 2. Historical approach. Evidence from previous international crises is also considered.*

### 7.2 in 2009 to 7.9 percent by 2014, when the unemployment gap is also expected to be

### _cr10157 - 7.2 in 2009 to 7.9 percent by 2014, when the unemployment gap is also expected to be

### Evidence from previous international episodes
- IMF (2009) methodology: estimated OLS coefficients from cross-country analysis of financial crises applied to Italy to calculate medium-term output impact.
- Main quantitative findings from applying IMF (2009) coefficients to Italy:
  - Medium-term output is estimated to decline by about 15 percent relative to the precrisis trend.
  - This 15 percent loss is above the 10 percent average found for historical international financial crisis episodes in IMF (2009).
  - Drivers highlighted:
    - High precrisis investment share of GDP correlated with negative capital dynamics.
    - Large initial output loss during the crisis (the variable most associated with medium-term output performance).
    - Deep-rooted structural weaknesses in Italy amplified permanent output loss.
- Table 4 contributions (dependent variable: output at t=7 in percent of precrisis trend):
  - Investment/GDP: -0.255
  - Investment/GDP gap: -0.009
  - Current account/GDP: -0.001
  - Current account/GDP gap: -0.011
  - Inflation: 0.0001
  - Inflation gap: 0.0001
  - Fiscal balance: 0.016
  - Fiscal balance gap: -0.002
  - Log (PPP GDP per capita): 0.039
  - Credit/GDP: -0.028
  - Credit/GDP gap: 0.070
  - Currency crisis: 0
  - U.S. Treasury bill rate: 0.042
  - External demand shock: 0
  - Financial openness/GDP: 0.016
  - Trade openness/GDP: -0.017
  - Precrisis output: -0.010
  - First-year output change: -0.127
  - Constant term: 0.125

### Short- and medium-term forecast and indicator snapshots
- Selected projected path from PFA / MV filter and related indicators (annual unless noted):
  - Real GDP (2009–2014): -5.2, 0.9, 1.6, 1.4, 1.2, 1.1
  - Potential GDP (2009–2014): -2.7, 0.4, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8
  - Output gap (percent of potential GDP, 2009–2014): -2.6, -2, -1.2, -0.6, -0.3, -0.1
  - Natural rate of unemployment (percent, 2009–2014): 7.2, 7.7, 7.8, 7.8, 7.8, 7.9
  - Employment (2009–2014): -0.8, -0.4, 0.1, 0, 0, 0
  - Unemployment rate (percent, 2009–2014): 7.6, 7.9, 7.9, 7.9, 7.9, 7.9
  - Labor productivity (2009–2014): -3.2, -1.8, 0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4
  - Structural balance net of one-offs (percent of potential GDP, 2009–2014): -4.5, -4.3, -4.5, -4.8, -4.9, -5.1
- Unemployment forecasts (percent of labor force displayed in source charts): total unemployment and long-term unemployment series shown for 2000–2014 (charted but specific annual numeric series above).

### Summary of results and quantified damage
- Estimated crisis legacy and output losses:
  - With output back to its end-2001 level, Italy’s output losses at end-2009 are estimated at about 125 billion of 2000 euro (about 10 percent of precrisis 1998‒2004 real GDP).
  - Three quarters of these losses are estimated to be related to shortfalls in potential output.
  - Medium-term recovery expectations:
    - Path of output level not expected to rebound to precrisis trend over the medium term, although growth is projected to return to positive rates within two years.
    - Short-run decline in output growth mainly due to a collapse in productivity growth.
    - Over the medium term, productivity likely to recover and contribute to potential output growth by approximately 0.5 percent.
    - Employment expected to suffer more enduring losses; capital accumulation expected to remain weak over 2010 and contribute to growth slightly less than previously.
  - Estimated output loss by 2015 relative to precrisis trend (1998‒2004) using different methodologies:
    - Multivariate Filter: -14
    - Production function framework: -11
    - Evidence from previous episodes: -15
    - Stated summary range: between 11 to 15 percent.

### Fiscal implications and policy recommendations
- Fiscal stance and debt dynamics:
  - The profile of potential output and output gap projected by the MV filter and the PFA implies that fiscal structural deficits are underestimated.
  - The consolidation envisaged in the authorities’ latest Stability Program would still not be sufficient to ensure a sustained reduction in public debt under forecasted real GDP growth.
  - With lower real GDP growth over the medium term than currently projected, a stronger, expenditure-based, adjustment effort would be needed to put debt on a declining path.
  - A more front-loaded fiscal adjustment would help partially address the highly unequal intergenerational distribution of the long-term fiscal adjustment arising particularly from the current design of the pension reform.
- Policy to limit permanent output loss:
  - Macroeconomic policies can shape medium-term dynamics and reduce permanent costs of the crisis.
  - Example policy instrument: the wage supplementation fund (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni) includes on-the-job training which could cushion impact on structural unemployment.
  - Application of the Lisbon Assessment Framework (LAF) to identify priorities to strengthen medium-term TFP growth:
    - Key areas affecting TFP: R&D and innovation, education, product and capital market regulation, labor market policies that increase working time and make work pay.
  - European-level guidance:
    - The European Economic Recovery Programme (EERP) called for structural policies consistent with Lisbon Strategy objectives, smooth functioning of the Single Market, and facilitating move towards a low-carbon economy.
    - European Commission (2009) assessment: Member States largely undertaking policy responses consistent with these principles.
- Caveats and risks:
  - Downside risks for permanent loss in potential output remain, especially if global recovery stalls and financial conditions worsen, impacting investment and TFP growth.
  - Evidence from previous crises indicates risks stem from sharper-than-expected falls in TFP and capital accumulation, and declining labor participation due to weak incentives for industrial restructuring.
  - If growth cannot be resumed through structural reforms, sizeable fiscal adjustment (expenditure-based and front-loaded) will be required.

### Appendix I — Features and pitfalls of the HP filter
- HP filter definition and properties:
  - HP minimizes sum of squared deviations of the log variable from the estimated trend τ subject to smoothness constraint penalizing squared variations in growth of τ.
  - The estimated trend τ is a function of λ and both past and future values of y. Higher λ puts larger weight on smoothness; very large λ → trend converges to linear time trend; λ → 0 → trend coincident with series.
  - Standard choice: λ = 100*s^2, where s denotes frequency of the series.
- Two main pitfalls when using HP filter for ongoing prolonged slowdown:
  - End-of-sample (end-period) problem:
    - HP suffers from an in-sample phase shift problem because it relies on future information about the series.
    - Tackled by extending actual data out of sample using average historical growth rate or autoregressive forecasts, but if past growth rates are not reasonable proxies, this may bias the end of the filtered series.
  - Mis-specification when cyclical fluctuations are highly persistent or trends subject to temporary stochastic shocks with greater variance than business cycle:
    - Choice of λ implicitly assumes relative importance of supply and demand shocks (example: trend fluctuations account for 2½ percent of cyclical fluctuations in quarterly data or 1 percent in annual data).
    - Over short periods this assumption may not hold.
- Conclusion: Using HP trends to analyze macroeconomic fluctuations during prolonged slowdown can be misleading.

*Source: IMF staff calculations and text from the provided content unit.*

### Annex II: Appendix II. A Multivariate Filter

### Annex II: Appendix II. A Multivariate Filter

### MV model: core specification and equations
- The model includes output, unemployment, and capacity utilization gaps.
- Equation (1) defines the output gap y_t as the log difference between actual GDP (Y_t) and potential GDP (Y_t^*). The output gap is approximately measured as percent of potential output.
- Equation (2) defines the unemployment gap u_t as the difference between the equilibrium unemployment rate, or NAIRU, (U_t^*) and the actual unemployment rate (U_t).
- Equation (3) defines the capacity utilization gap c_t as the difference between the actual manufacturing capacity utilization index (C_t) and its equilibrium level (C_t^*).
- The model focuses on core inflation; Equation (4) describes inflation dynamics where current core inflation is affected by:
  - the level of the output gap (y_t), and
  - the change in the output gap (y_t − y_{t−1}).
- The previous period inflation enters with coefficient set to one to (i) proxy for inflation expectations and (ii) entail no long-run tradeoff between inflation and output.

### Labor market and capacity utilization dynamics
- Equation (5) (unemployment dynamics):
  - The unemployment gap dynamics are identified by the output gap and the lagged unemployment gap.
  - Okun's law motivates the relationship between unemployment and output movements.
- Equation (6) (capacity utilization dynamics):
  - Capacity utilization gap dynamics depend on its lag and the output gap.
- Equation (7) (NAIRU evolution):
  - The equilibrium unemployment (U_t^*) is influenced by its lag, transitory shocks (ε_t^{u_bar}), persistent shocks (G_t^{u_bar}), the output gap, and the difference between current equilibrium unemployment and its steady-state level (U_bar).
- Equation (8) specifies that the persistent shocks follow an autoregressive process.

### Potential output, NAIRU and capacity utilization steady processes
- Equation (9) relates potential output growth to changes in NAIRU and the underlying potential growth trend:
  - The coefficient for the first difference of the NAIRU is set equal to the labor share in a Cobb-Douglas production function (θ).
  - The coefficient of the long-run difference (19 quarters) of NAIRU is constrained to (1−θ) so that in the long run the impact of a permanent change in NAIRU is fully reflected in the potential output level.
- The underlying potential growth trend (g_t^*) follows serially correlated deviations from the steady-state growth rate.
- The equilibrium capacity utilization (C_t^*) follows a stochastic process with transitory (ε_t^{c_bar}) and persistent (G_t^{c_bar}) shocks.
- Equation (13) formulates the perceived long-term inflation objective, including revisions to previous period expectations captured by ξ_t.
  - Historical data for long-term inflation expectations is obtained from Consensus Economics.
- Equation (14) indicates the output gap is influenced by monetary policy and other factors encompassed by the stochastic term (η_t^y).

### Estimation, sample, and steady-state assumptions
- The model is estimated using Bayesian technique.
- Sample period: 1992Q4 to 2009Q3.
- Assumed steady-state values:
  - labor share = 0.61
  - output growth = 0.7 percent
  - unemployment rate = 8.3 percent

### Data sources (as listed)
- Y: Gross Domestic Product (SAAR, Bil.Chn.2000.Euros)
- C: Capacity utilization in manufacturing sector (Haver)
- PIE: Annual rate of core inflation (Haver)
- PIELTE: Long term inflation expectations (Consensus Economics)
- U: Unemployment rate (SA, percent)

### Priors and estimated posteriors (Table 1. Maximum Regularised Likelihood)
- alpha — Prior: Mode 0.500 Dispersion 0.016; Posterior: Mode 0.496 Dispersion 0.024
- beta — Prior: Mode 0.400 Dispersion 0.032; Posterior: Mode 0.218 Dispersion 0.040
- omega — Prior: Mode 0.500 Dispersion 0.032; Posterior: Mode 0.392 Dispersion 0.045
- rho1 — Prior: Mode 0.800 Dispersion 0.016; Posterior: Mode 0.806 Dispersion 0.024
- kappa1 — Prior: Mode 0.100 Dispersion 0.063; Posterior: Mode 0.427 Dispersion 0.059
- phi1 — Prior: Mode 0.800 Dispersion 0.016; Posterior: Mode 0.813 Dispersion 0.025
- phi2 — Prior: Mode 0.300 Dispersion 0.016; Posterior: Mode 0.252 Dispersion 0.024
- tau — Prior: Mode 0.100 Dispersion 0.016; Posterior: Mode 0.113 Dispersion 0.022
- delta — Prior: Mode 0.500 Dispersion 0.016; Posterior: Mode 0.498 Dispersion 0.024
- kappa2 — Prior: Mode 1.500 Dispersion 0.158; Posterior: Mode 1.735 Dispersion 0.141
- parhist — Prior: Mode 5.000 Dispersion 0.316; Posterior: Mode 4.925 Dispersion 0.472
- rho2 — Prior: Mode 5.000 Dispersion 0.316; Posterior: Mode 5.034 Dispersion 0.468
- lambda — Prior: Mode 1.000 Dispersion 0.316; Posterior: Mode 1.061 Dispersion 0.441
- std_RES_Y — Prior: Mode 1.000 Dispersion 0.032; Posterior: Mode 0.906 Dispersion 0.049
- std_RES_G — Prior: Mode 1.000 Dispersion 0.032; Posterior: Mode 1.038 Dispersion 0.049
- std_RES_UNR_GAP — Prior: Mode 0.500 Dispersion 0.032; Posterior: Mode 0.330 Dispersion 0.044
- std_RES_UNR_BAR — Prior: Mode 0.100 Dispersion 0.016; Posterior: Mode 0.099 Dispersion 0.024
- std_RES_UNR_G — Prior: Mode 0.100 Dispersion 0.016; Posterior: Mode 0.117 Dispersion 0.021
- std_RES_CAPU_GAP — Prior: Mode 0.400 Dispersion 0.032; Posterior: Mode 0.569 Dispersion 0.040
- std_RES_CAPU_BAR — Prior: Mode 0.250 Dispersion 0.016; Posterior: Mode 0.274 Dispersion 0.025
- std_RES_CU_G — Prior: Mode 0.075 Dispersion 0.003; Posterior: Mode 0.076 Dispersion 0.005
- std_RES_PIE — Prior: Mode 0.500 Dispersion 0.032; Posterior: Mode 0.478 Dispersion 0.039
- std_RES_PIELTE — Prior: Mode 0.300 Dispersion 0.032; Posterior: Mode 0.159 Dispersion 0.019

### Forecasting accuracy and revision robustness (Table 2)
- Parameter forecast medians (1Q Ahead, 4Q Ahead, 8Q Ahead, 12Q Ahead):
  - LGDP: 0.598 1.929 2.882 3.259
  - PIE: 40.273 0.656 0.826 0.907
  - UNR: 0.228 0.691 1.164 1.421
  - CAPU: 1.043 2.717 3.221 3.067
  - PIELTE: 0.142 0.326 0.453 0.621
- Mean absolute revisions (according to most recent estimates) by horizon (t-12, t-8, t-4, nowcast):
  - Y: 0.144 0.176 0.227 0.295
  - Y (HP): 0.120 0.177 0.327 0.498
  - UNR_GAP: 0.131 0.125 0.110 0.096
  - UNR_GAP (HP): 0.076 0.070 0.177 0.332
- Root Mean Squared Errors: (heading present; specific RMSE values not provided in supplied content)

### Key conceptual implications and modeling choices
- The filter connects excess demand measures (output gap, unemployment gap, capacity utilization gap) to core inflation dynamics, emphasizing the role of both levels and changes in the output gap.
- Inclusion of lagged gaps captures adjustment lags (e.g., unemployment responds with delay to output).
- Permanent and transitory components of NAIRU and capacity utilization are explicitly modeled to allow for both short-run fluctuations and persistent shifts.
- The specification enforces that permanent changes in NAIRU fully affect long-run potential output (19-quarter restriction).
- Bayesian estimation and the stated priors produce posterior estimates that the authors describe as relatively robust, with limited sensitivity of current-quarter estimates to new data revisions.

*Annex II: Appendix II. A Multivariate Filter (extracted from the provided IMF content)*

### Section II, do not operate in the long run, so that over long horizons, productivity is solely driven by

### _cr10157 - Section II, do not operate in the long run, so that over long horizons, productivity is solely driven by

### Model and methodology: multivariate unobserved components (UC) and state-space estimation
- The model decomposes the log of total hours (l) into working-age population (wpop), participation ratio (pr), unemployment rate (u), and average number of hours per employee (h).
- Determinants are disentangled into permanent and cyclical components so that permanent and cyclical labor contributions are written as:
  - ****, . cccc lwpoppruh lpruh   (equation (18) as provided)
- Combining identities yields a multivariate UC model for output decomposition with measurement equation for real output: (19)  (1)11, tt ttt ywpopk μψ
  - Unobserved permanent and transitory components: *
    ***
    '
    t
    apruh
    
    
    
    μ
    and 
    '
    c
    ccc
    t
    apruh
    
    
    
    ψ
- Transition dynamics (20) specify:
  - Trends (vector t μ) follow random walks with stochastic drifts (vector t κ).
  - Trend growth rates shaped by matrix P; example: if first element P1,1 is insignificantly different from 1, TFP is integrated of second order; if 0<P1,1<1 the time-varying TFP growth converges back to steady-state rate *1 κ.
  - Reference cycle is an AR(2) process ()Lφ constrained to be common across factor inputs and driven by industrial production index, ip.
  - The four transitory components in vector t ψ (Solow residual ac, participation ratio prc, unemployment rate uc, average hours hc) are linear combinations of current and lagged values of the reference cycle via loading matrix τ.
- Shocks:
  - t ψ, t μ, t κ, and idiosyncratic errors ε, v, ω follow i.i.d. processes with covariance matrices Σε, Σv, Σω respectively.
  - Demand and supply shocks are assumed orthogonal (footnote 15).
- Estimation:
  - Kalman filter and smoothing algorithms used for maximum likelihood estimation and signal extraction.
  - Iteration from t=1 to T, evaluating log-likelihood from observation τ+1 to T to minimize initial-value effects.
  - Under linearity and Gaussian disturbances, conditional distributions are Gaussian and parameters estimated by maximum-likelihood.
  - Estimation was carried out in Gauss 6.0 (footnote 16).

### Findings: the recent slowdown in bank credit growth in Italy
- Context and magnitude:
  - Bank lending tightened significantly since early 2008, especially for the corporate sector.
  - Credit growth to the private sector slowed from around 10 percent (annual basis) in 2007 to 0.1 percent in October 2009, and picked up slightly since November 2009.
  - Annual loan growth to non financial corporations has been negative since September 2009.
  - Credit growth to households remained positive and bottomed out at the beginning of 2009.
- By firm size (changes from 2007 to 2009):
  - Large and medium sized enterprises: loan growth fell by 17 percentage points, from plus 14 percent average annual rate in 2007 to minus 3.0 percent in October 2009.
  - Small firms: loan growth fell by 8.3 percentage points, from plus 6.5 percent average annual rate in 2007 to minus 1.8 percent in July 2009.
- Historical comparison:
  - Six quarters after the start of the recession, nominal annual lending growth to the private sector fell by 8.0 percentage points; in the early 1990s the drop had been 14.5 percentage points.
  - Table 1 episodes (selected rows preserved verbatim):
    - 1973Q4-1975Q4  -4.3-3.8
    - 1976Q1-1978Q3 1/-13.7-12.0
    - 1979q2-1983q1 2/-3.0-4.6
    - 1980Q4-1982Q4-4.40.2
    - 1983Q4-1986Q4-1.12.4
    - 1988Q4-1991Q4-2.0-2.7
    - 1991Q4-1994Q4 1/-12.7-10.2
    - 2007Q4-2009Q4-9.3-7.4
- Survey evidence:
  - Bank of Italy bank lending survey: credit standards tightened increasingly in late 2008 until early 2009 for large firms and SMEs.
    - Main contributing factors: expectations regarding economic activity and firm/industry outlooks; capital costs and access to market financing mattered less.
  - ISAE and Bank of Italy–Sole 24 Ore surveys: access to bank credit became more difficult from early 2008 to early 2009, improved until September 2009, with some deterioration afterwards.
  - ECB–EU Commission firm survey: share of firms able to obtain all financing requested decreased in second half of 2009.
  - Bank of Italy lending surveys: credit demand from all firms progressively slowed in 2007–2008 and has been falling since early 2009, albeit at a slower rate in Q4.
  - Demand drivers: fall in financing needs for business investment; financing needs for debt restructuring rose sharply.
- Econometric analysis of credit supply and demand (estimation approach and results):
  - Credit demand modeled as function of confidence indicators (PMI, ISAE consumer confidence), lending rates, corporate bond yields, and corporate bankruptcies.
  - Credit supply modeled as function of lending rates, capital-to-asset ratio (actual minus desired), liquidity ratio, growth in demand deposits, nonperforming loan ratio, and corporate bankruptcies.
  - Desired capital-asset ratio assumed to be 8 percent (footnote 8).
  - Estimated results (Table 2 summary, coefficients and notes preserved):
    - Lagged dependent variable coefficient: 0.9 with p-values [0.00] (in all specifications shown).
    - D(Lending rate) in supply equations: 1.9, 1.8, 1.8 with p-values [0.08], [0.08], [0.08]; in demand equations coefficient -0.1 with p-values [1.0], [1.0].
    - Bankruptcies growth (-1) coefficients around -0.006 to -0.007 with p-values [0.01]–[0.05].
    - Growth in confidence indicators in demand equations: 0.01 with p-values [0.1], [0.05].
    - Adjusted R squared: 0.9 across reported equations.
    - Estimation period: 2002m2-2009m10; Number of observations: 93 (Table 2 footnote details retained).
  - Interpretation:
    - Loan demand mainly driven by confidence indicators and bankruptcies growth.
    - Loan supply responds mainly to changes in lending rates and bankruptcies growth.
    - Availability of capital and loanable funds do not appear to have been significant factors.
    - Interacting measures of loanable funds and capital availability with pre-crisis/crisis dummy does not change results, indicating no major change in loan supply function during the crisis.
- Excess demand and timing:
  - Estimated excess demand (difference between estimated demand and estimated supply, derived from equation [3] in Table 2) shows:
    - Loan demand was much lower than supply in late 2008.
    - Lending supply constraints prevailed for a brief period in early 2009.
    - Excess demand was particularly acute for a brief period, in early 2009.
  - Corporate bond issuance:
    - Debt securities issues by non-financial firms peaked in early 2009, then declined despite improved corporate bond market conditions in the second half of 2009 — consistent with brief substitution from bank borrowing to bond issuance during the acute phase.

### Policy recommendations and actions taken
- Overall recommendation:
  - Policy actions to sustain credit growth in Italy should rely on measures to support borrowers rather than lenders.
  - Avoid directed lending; government guarantees should be temporary and appropriately priced.
  - Support for enterprises should be accompanied by corporate restructuring when needed.
- Measures implemented by Italian authorities (preserved verbatim):
  - Existing guarantee fund for SMEs strengthened: increased maximum guaranteed amount and expanded list of eligible beneficiaries.
  - In 2009 guarantees provided by the fund amounted to €8 billion (0.5 percent of GDP).
  - Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) made available €8 billion (0.5 percent of GDP) to banks that extend credit to SMEs.
  - SACE allowed to guarantee up to 50 percent of the loans extended to SMEs with CDP’s funds.
  - SACE permitted to provide up to 50 percent guarantee on bank loans extended to firms using receivables from the public administration as collateral.
  - Government requested banks that took advantage of the recapitalization scheme to increase lending to SMEs.
  - Ministry of Finance overseeing a bank loan moratorium agreement allowing suspension of loan repayments for €7 billion (0.5 percent of GDP).
  - Government setting up an equity fund for SMEs recapitalization, financed by the CDP and private banks.
- International comparisons and instruments:
  - Most OECD countries extended public guarantees on bank loans to alleviate SME financing difficulties (OECD, 2009).
  - Examples elsewhere:
    - Belgium and France appointed a credit mediator at regional and central levels.
    - UK established SMEs Lending Monitoring Panel.
    - US monitors monthly the credit activities of banks rescued by public funding.
    - Ireland instituted a legally binding code of conduct for banks’ SMEs lending.
  - Note: public guarantees can reduce capital requirements under Basel II for guaranteed credit lines.
- Corporate restructuring and insolvency framework suggestions:
  - Accompany support with corporate restructuring to boost creditworthiness and banking sector soundness.
  - Enhance mechanisms for prompt provision of new financing during restructuring, in line with international best practices.
  - Improve reorganization and debt restructuring frameworks: clarify scope of judicial review of restructuring plans; provide more detailed and predictable regime on out-of-court restructurings.
  - Reexamine eligibility criteria for bankruptcy trustees to promote appointment of trustees with firm management and restructuring skills.
  - Streamline liquidation procedures to support speedy exit of nonviable enterprises.
  - Reform judicial system to ensure consistent, predictable and transparent implementation of legal framework.

### Conclusion and risks
- Summary findings:
  - Lending tightened significantly since 2008, especially for the corporate sector; slowdown milder than the 1992‒93 recession and not unprecedented.
  - Initial driver: weak loan demand; then progressive tightening of lending standards in late 2008–early 2009.
  - Excess demand acute in early 2009; little evidence of a prolonged supply-driven “credit crunch”.
- Risks to credit rebound:
  - Availability of firms’ 2009 balance sheet data may result in worse assessments of borrowers’ creditworthiness and possibly enhanced lending discrimination.
  - Credit quality may continue to deteriorate even after recovery begins, with adverse implications for credit risk.
  - Need to rebuild capital due to forthcoming new regulation could have an unfavorable impact on the near-term credit rebound.
- Policy assessment:
  - Policies introduced so far appear broadly appropriate and in line with other advanced economies.
  - Nonetheless, direct public intervention in the credit market should be avoided; government guarantees should be temporary and appropriately priced.
  - Further support actions for enterprises should be accompanied by corporate restructuring when needed.

*Prepared by IMF staff based on the provided content unit.*

### REFERENCES

### _cr10157 - REFERENCES

### References
- Albertazzi U. and D. Marchetti, 2010, “Credit Supply, Flight to Quality and Evergreening: An Analysis of Bank-Firm Relationships after Lehman”, Bank of Italy, forthcoming.
- Athanasopoulou, M. E., and E. J. Lundback, 2009, “Credit Conditions in Germany Following the Global Sub-Prime Crisis”, IMF, mimeo.
- Barajas A., and R. Steiner, 2002, “Why Don’t They Lend? Credit Stagnation in Latin America, IMF Staff Papers 49, pp. 156-184.
- Bassanetti A., Cecioni M., Nobili A. e G. Zevi, 2009, “Le principali recessioni italiane: un confront retrospettivo”, Bank of Italy, Questioni di Economia e Finanza n. 46.
- Bernanke B. and Lown C. S. 1991, “The Credit Crunch”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, pp. 205-248.
- Claessens S., M. A. Kose, and M. E. Terrones, 2008, “What Happens During Recessions, Crunches and Busts?”, IMF Working paper 08/274 (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund).
- Del Giovane P., G. Eramo, and A. Nobili, 2010, “Disentangling Demand and Supply in Credit Developments: A Survey Based Analysis for Italy”, Bank of Italy, forthcoming.
- Di Giulio D., 2009, “Bank Lending to the Production Sector: Credit Crunch or Extra-Credit?”, ABI Working Paper, No. 1.
- Ghosh S. R., and A. R. Ghosh, 1999, “East Asia in the Aftermath: Was There a Crunch?”, IMF Working paper 99/38 (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund).
- Pazarbasioglu C., 1997, “A Credit Crunch? Finland in the Aftermath of the Banking Crisis,” IMF Staff Papers 44, pp. 315-327.
- OECD, 2009, “The Impact of the Global Crisis on SME and Entrepreneurship Financing and Policy Responses”, (Paris: Organization for Economic cooperation and Development).
- Panetta F. and F. M. Signoretti, 2010, “Credit Demand and Supply in Italy during the Financial Crisis”, Bank of Italy Occasional paper No. 63.

### Analytical Annex IV — Resisting the Storm, Navigating the Recovery: The Case of Italian Banks

- Core finding
  - Italian banks entered the global crisis from a relatively strong position due to conservative business profiles, improved risk management (including Basel II adoption and Chief Risk Officer roles), domestic consolidation, and a traditional on-balance-sheet lending-deposit business model.
  - Low exposures to complex financial products shielded banks from abrupt securities mark-downs.
  - There was no major real estate bubble; housing prices grew less than the European average in the ten years prior to the crisis. Real estate accounted for about 25 percent of banks’ loan book.

- Liquidity and funding
  - Customer deposits represent on average 60 percent of total bank funding.
  - The stock of deposits continued to grow by 5 percent annually both in 2008 and 2009.
  - Large banks had somewhat weaker liquidity due to relatively higher dependence on wholesale funding.
  - Government liquidity/support measures included: a state guarantee for new bank liabilities; a facility for swapping bank assets or bonds issued by banks for government securities; a system for anonymous but collateralized interbank lending. A recapitalization scheme with public money was used by only four banks, for a total €4.05 billion.

- Asset quality deterioration (timing and magnitude)
  - Credit risk increased during the second half of 2008 and continued to deteriorate in 2009.
  - Gross nonperforming loans ratio: household sector deteriorated from 2.7 percent in 2008 to 3.6 percent in 2009; corporate sector from 3.0 percent to 4.5 percent.
  - Nonperforming loans ratio to SMEs grew from 6.2 percent to 7.4 percent.
  - For the five largest banks the stock of nonperforming loans (NPLs) increased by 40 percent from 2008 to 2009.
  - Three-quarters of the new flow of NPLs came from the corporate sector; one-quarter from households.
  - Coverage ratio (NPLs covered by loan loss provisions) remained broadly stable in 2009 at about 55 percent.

- Comparative metrics (Italy vs Europe)
  - Largest five domestic banks: NPL ratio increased on average from 3.2 percent in December 2008 to 4.7 percent in December 2009; in Europe the average moved from 2.4 percent to 4.0 percent.
  - Coverage ratio in Europe declined from 75 percent to about 66 percent from December 2008 to December 2009; Italy kept loss reserves at about 55 percent of NPLs.
  - Provisions for loan losses as a percentage of pre-provision income (provisions to profits ratio) for the five largest Italian banks rose from 30 percent in 2008 to 56 percent in 2009; in Europe, the ratio reached 60 percent, from 34 percent in 2008.
  - Total banking activity abroad was €150bn at year-end 2008, or just 5 percent of the banking system loans; main exposures to Eastern Europe and select other countries. UniCredit and Intesa lending outside Italy account for about 11 percent and 7 percent of total loans, respectively.

- Profitability and revenues
  - For the largest five Italian banks, net income in 2008 was about 50 percent lower than in 2007; net income in 2009 was about 30 percent lower than in 2008. In 2009 profits were one third of what was generated in 2007.
  - Provisions consumed a larger share of profits: provisions-to-profits increased from 30 percent in 2008 to 56 percent in 2009.
  - Interest margins fell by 8 percent in 2009 compared to one year before; Italian banks have assets with short duration, high proportion of variable-rate assets, and a high proportion of cheap customer deposits.
  - Italian banks had limited trading and investment banking activity and therefore could not capture large trading gains that benefited some European banks in 2009.

- Capital and recapitalization
  - Pre-crisis capital use included large acquisitions generating significant goodwill and dividend payout ratios exceeding 50 percent (in some cases up to 70 percent).
  - Since the crisis, capital strategy shifted: capital increases, sales of nonstrategic assets, issuance of recapitalization bonds, and curtailed dividend payouts.
  - Examples: UniCredit equity issuance of €4 billion; Intesa and MPS sale of assets including branches.
  - Tier1 ratios: average for largest five banks fell to 6.5 percent at end-2007 (from 7.5 percent at end-2004) and improved to above 8 percent at end-2009 after capital measures.
  - System Tier1 ratio was 7.7 percent at end-2007 and reached 8.2 percent in June 2009.
  - Across Europe, Tier1 ratios for the largest 30 banks rose above 10 percent at end-2009 from 8.6 percent one year before.
  - Core Tier1 weighted average: 7.2 percent as of end-2009 in Italy versus 8.8 percent in Europe.
  - Core Tier1 represented, at end-2009, an average 88 percent for the largest five banks.
  - Regulatory rules limit inclusion of hybrid instruments to 20 percent in Italy (average limit about 35 percent in several European countries).

- Forward-looking scenario analysis (staff-run on five largest banks)
  - Macro assumptions: IMF projections of GDP growth of 0.8 percent in 2010, and 1.2 percent in 2011.
  - Under the Base Scenario:
    - Loans expected to grow by 1–3 percent in 2010–11.
    - Revenues expected to grow by 1–3 percent in 2010–11.
    - Loan loss provisions expected to further increase by 6‒9 percent in 2010, and then fall by 3–0 percent in 2011.
    - Cumulated loan loss provisions in 2010–2011 would be one-third higher than in 2008–2009.
    - Earnings would slightly improve in 2010 and in 2011 but remain significantly lower than pre-crisis levels.
    - Assuming a dividend distribution in the order of 10‒30 percent of earnings, aggregated Core Tier1 ratio would rise in the 2010‒11 period by less than [text truncated in source].

- Policy implications and priorities (implied by analysis)
  - Continue strengthening of capital base and improvement of risk profiles, given the anticipated higher global regulatory capital requirements.
  - Maintain prudent provisioning and risk management to address high credit risk during recovery.
  - Manage dividend policies and capital-raising actions to rebuild capital ratios without undermining franchise value.
  - Monitor exposures to foreign lending and concentration in corporate/SME segments where NPL inflows were concentrated.

*Prepared by Alberto Buffa di Perrero (MCM/FA); content drawn from the PDF chapter.*

### 0.5 percentage points by 2011. The capital shortfall with respect to an 8 percentage Core

### _cr10157 - 0.5 percentage points by 2011. The capital shortfall with respect to an 8 percentage Core

### Methodology for Scenario Analysis
- Panel: UniCredit, Intesa SanPaolo, Banca Monte Paschi, Unione di Banche Italiane, and Banco Popolare. Aggregated they represent two-thirds of the banking system’s assets, and almost 90 percent of profit generation.
- Horizon: 2010 and 2011.
- Starting point: 2009 profit and loss and balance sheet data for each bank.
- Two macro scenarios:
  - Base Scenario: GDP growth in line with IMF forecasts.
  - Severe Scenario: GDP growth stressed to lower levels.
- Main projected variables for 2010–2011: revenues growth; loan loss provision growth; operating cost growth; loan growth.
- Mechanics:
  - For each bank staff estimate net income; assuming certain earnings retention levels, retained earnings feed into the capital base.
  - Staff estimate a correlation between loans growth rate and risk-weighted assets (RWA) growth to project RWA.
  - Core Tier1 capital ratios for 2010 and 2011 are calculated using the formula provided in the source: CR = K(1+i)+E−D (1+i) / RWA(1+i) G (formula notation preserved as in source).
  - Capital shortfalls are calculated as the difference between projected capital ratios and target Core Tier1 levels of 7, 8, and 9 percent.
- Regulatory boundary: Analysis performed under current regulatory capital rules and does not take into consideration forthcoming regulatory changes under discussion.

### Findings on Capitalization and Earnings
- Earnings retention alone would not be enough to improve capitalization to required levels.
- During 2008 and 2009, large banks raised their Core Tier1 ratios by injecting a cumulated €15 billion of new capital through capital increases, sales of nonstrategic assets, or the subscription of recapitalization Bonds.
- The average Core Tier1 for the largest five banks improved more than 100 basis points during 2008–2009.
- Future projected improvements under the Base Scenario, driven just by future earnings retention, would be much more modest, of the order of a few tens of basis points per year in 2010 and 2011.
- In the Severe Scenario:
  - Macroeconomic assumptions: GDP shrinking by 1.7 percent in 2010 and by 1.3 percent in 2011 (or 2.5 percentage points lower than in the Base Scenario).
  - Loans would remain flat, revenues growth would be negative, and loan loss provisions would increase by around 18-22 percent in both 2010 and 2011.
  - Cumulated loan losses would be 65 percent higher than in 2008-09.
  - On an aggregated level, the Core Tier1 ratio would deteriorate to below the 7 percent mark for several banks.
- Heterogeneity across banks:
  - The strongest bank would be about 25 percent better capitalized than the weaker one.
  - The strongest could reach a Core Tier1 ratio above 8 percent, while the weaker could be lower than 7 percent in the Base Scenario.
  - In the Severe Scenario the difference between stronger and weaker banks would not materially change, but more banks would have Core Tier1 below 7 percent.

### Ability to Feed Economic Recovery
- Lending growth to the private sector slowed from about 10 percent in 2007 to close to 2 percent at end-2009.
- Banks have become more selective in granting new credit due to higher counterparty risk perception; banks may also contain loan growth to reinforce capital ratios and deleverage.
- Demand for credit has fallen due to the sharp economic contraction.
- Banks’ ability to increase lending and reinforce capital ratios will be significantly weaker than in the pre-crisis period.
- Staff expects banks will need to keep dividends very low in coming years to support lending growth while achieving some growth of capital ratios.

### The Future Regulatory Framework and Impact
- BCBS December 2009 measures aim to raise the quality, consistency, and transparency of regulatory capital; dominant Tier1 should be common shares and retained earnings.
- Proposed prudential filters would deduct items from common equity computation: defined benefit pension assets; capital in insurance subsidiaries; deferred tax assets; intangibles; negative available-for-sale reserves; minority interests and minority participations. Government-subscribed bonds would be excluded from core capital.
- Preliminary simulation result: aggregate Core Tier1 ratio for the largest domestic Italian banks would decline by about 150 basis points under the proposed framework.
- Transition: Impact assessment in first half of 2010; fully calibrated standards by end of 2010; aim of implementation by end-2012 with phase-in measures and grandfathering arrangements.

### Policy Recommendations and Priority Actions
- Continue efforts to strengthen capitalization; on a case-by-case basis capital will need further reinforcement to face the challenging credit and earnings outlook and to support future economic growth.
- Specific recommendations for banks:
  - Limit the distribution of dividends.
  - Refocus on core businesses/geographies and dispose of nonstrategic assets if needed.
  - Issue new capital.
  - Adopt long-term strategies in terms of core capital, particularly banks that used government recapitalization bonds should prepare alternative recapitalization strategies as interest on these securities rises sharply in 2013.
- In the context of high credit risk:
  - Prompt recognition of nonperforming loans is essential to avoid legacy problems.
  - Reserve coverage should be maintained at an adequate level.
- Supervisory recommendation:
  - The Bank of Italy should consider publishing a by-annual stability review in line with current practice in other countries to enhance the supervisory framework and raise awareness of the domestic banking system’s strengths and weaknesses.
- Authorities should guide the domestic banking system toward prompt adoption of the forthcoming regulatory framework and encourage banks to adapt capital strategies early.

### Scenario Analysis — Key Quantitative Assumptions and Results (as presented)
- Capital ratio targets used for shortfall calculations: 7 percent, 8 percent, 9 percent (Core Tier1).
- Severe Scenario macro assumptions:
  - GDP growth: 2010 = 1.7 percent (shrink by 1.7 percent in 2010), 2011 = 1.3 percent (shrink by 1.3 percent in 2011) — presented in source as "GDP shrinking by 1.7 percent in 2010 and by 1.3 percent in 2011".
- Scenario Analysis: Main Assumptions table (values preserved as in source)
  - Base Scenario (2010 / 2011):
    - GDP Growth: 0.8% / 1.2%
    - Revenue Growth: +1% to +3% / +2% to +5%
    - Loan Loss Provision Growth: +6% to +9% / -3% to +0%
    - Loans Growth: +1% to +3% / +2% to +4%
  - Severe Scenario (2010 / 2011):
    - GDP Growth: -1.7% / -1.3%
    - Revenue Growth: -1% to -3% / -1% to +1%
    - Loan Loss Provision Growth: +18% to +22% / +15% to +20%
    - Loans Growth: -1% to +2% / -1% to +2%
- Historical and projected figures referenced:
  - Cumulated €15 billion recapitalization in 2008–2009.
  - Average Core Tier1 improvement for largest five banks: more than 100 basis points (2008–2009).
  - Projected decline under new regulatory proposals: about 150 basis points.
  - Cumulated loan losses in Severe Scenario: 65 percent higher than in 2008–09.
  - Dispersion: strongest bank about 25 percent better capitalized than the weaker.

*Source: IMF staff calculations; selected text and figures from the Staff Report for the 2010 Article IV Consultation—Informational Annex (April 8, 2010).*

### ANNEX II. I

### ANNEX II. I — ITALY: STATISTICAL INFORMATION

### Data provision and statistical framework
- Data provision is adequate for surveillance.  
- Italy’s economic database is comprehensive and of generally high quality.  
- Italy has subscribed to the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) and has posted the metadata on the Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board (DSBB).  
- Data are provided to the Fund in a comprehensive manner.  
- Authorities regularly publish a full range of economic and financial data and a calendar of dates for the main statistical releases.  
- Italy is subject to the statistical requirements and timeliness and reporting standards of Eurostat and the European Central Bank (ECB), and has adopted the European System of Accounts 1995 (ESA95).  
- The shift to chain-weighted indices for national accounts has been largely completed over the course of 2006.

### ROSC—Data Module findings (Country Report No. 02/234, 10/18/02)
- Overall assessment: macroeconomic statistics of generally high quality, but shortcomings hinder accurate and timely analysis.  
- Identified shortcomings:
  - (i) No statistical agency had responsibility to compile and disseminate a comprehensive statement of government finances; persistent difference between the SGP-monitored fiscal deficit and the PSBR net of privatization receipts (discussed in the 2004 Staff Report).  
  - (ii) Source data and/or statistical techniques could be strengthened, notably by: raising response rates on enterprise surveys used in national accounts and producer price index; making price collection for the consumer price index more efficient; improving the coverage of cross-border financial transactions.  
  - (iii) Balance of payments and government finance statistics could be closer aligned with internationally accepted methodological guidelines on concepts and definitions, scope, classification and sectorization, and/or valuation.  
  - (iv) Resources were under pressure in parts of Istat in the face of EU and Euro area statistical requirements.  
- National accounts issue: changes in inventories are derived as a residual and lumped together with the statistical discrepancy, hampering economic analysis.

### ROSC—Fiscal Transparency Module Update (Country Report No. 06/64, February 2006)
- Progress observed since 2003 ROSC update, especially toward strengthening integrity of data.  
- Outstanding issues:
  - Improve transparency and timeliness of budget documents; key details underlying budgetary plans typically available only well after the draft budget, hampering assessment of fiscal plans.  
  - More information needed on financial transactions between the government and public enterprises to help address discrepancies in fiscal balances.  
  - Address lack of data on operations of larger nonstate entities where the state is a shareholder (example: the road company).  
  - As public private partnerships (from a current low base) gain ground, operations and associated contingent liabilities should be transparently recorded, including in budget documentation; project evaluation should be strengthened across all levels of government.  
- Recent progress: reconciling the discrepancy between cash-based net borrowing requirement and accrual budget deficit; statistical discrepancy has decreased in recent years.

### Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance (As of April 7, 2010) — selected dataset timeliness and quality signals
- Exchange Rates: Date of latest observation April 2010; Date received April 2010; Frequency: D (daily) for Data/Frequency of Reporting/Frequency of Publication.  
- International Reserve Assets and Reserve Liabilities of the Monetary Authorities: Date of latest observation Febr. 2010; Date received April 2010; Frequency: M (monthly).  
- Reserve/Base Money: Date of latest observation Febr. 2010; Date received April 2010; Frequency: M (monthly); Data Quality—Methodological soundness: O,O,LO,LO; Data Quality—Accuracy and reliability: O,O,O,O,LO.  
- Consumer Price Index: Date of latest observation Febr. 2010; Date received March 2010; Frequency: M (monthly); Data Quality—Methodological soundness: O,O,O,O; Data Quality—Accuracy and reliability: LO,O,LO,O,O.  
- Revenue, Expenditure, Balance and Composition of Financing – General Government: Date of latest observation Q4 2009; Date received April 2010; Frequency: Q (quarterly); Data Quality—Methodological soundness: LO,O,LO,O; Data Quality—Accuracy and reliability: LO,O,O,O,LO.  
- Stocks of Central Government and Central Government-Guaranteed Debt: Date of latest observation Jan. 2010; Date received April 2010; Frequency: M (monthly).  
- External Current Account Balance: Date of latest observation Jan. 2010; Date received Febr. 2010; Frequency: M (monthly); Data Quality—Methodological soundness: O,LO,LO,O; Data Quality—Accuracy and reliability: LO,O,LO,O.  
- GDP/GNP: Date of latest observation Q4 2009; Date received March 2010; Frequency: Q (quarterly); Data Quality—Methodological soundness: O,O,O,O; Data Quality—Accuracy and reliability: LO,LO,O,O,O.  
- Footnotes (selected):  
  - 1 Includes reserve assets pledged or otherwise encumbered as well as net derivative positions.  
  - 2 Both market-based and officially-determined interest rates.  
  - 3 Foreign, domestic bank, and domestic nonbank financing.  
  - 4 General government consists of central government (budgetary funds, extra budgetary funds, and social security funds) and state and local governments.  
  - 5 Including currency and maturity composition.  
  - 6 Includes external gross financial asset and liability positions vis a vis nonresidents.  
  - Frequency codes: D; W; M; Q; A; I; NA.  
  - Assessment codes for methodological soundness: O (fully observed); LO (largely observed); LNO (largely not observed); NO (not observed); NA (not available).  
  - Assessment codes for accuracy and reliability: same scale as footnote above.

### Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 10/66 — Executive Board and staff summary (May 26, 2010)
- Background on crisis impact:
  - The global crisis affected Italy mainly through trade, credit, and confidence channels.  
  - Recession in main trading partners led to a sharp fall in exports.  
  - Financing conditions tightened; credit growth fell.  
  - Private consumption declined significantly despite strong household balance sheets, reflecting uncertainty and tighter consumer credit.  
  - Fixed investment and inventories fell sharply.  
  - Drop in aggregate demand, not offset by limited fiscal response, produced one of the largest output falls among large industrialized countries.  
  - Unemployment rose only modestly due to wage supplementation schemes and falling participation.  
  - A modest and fragile recovery based on external demand, restocking of inventories, and some government support is underway.  
  - Output contracted by 5 percent in 2009 and is projected to increase by 0.8 percent in 2010.

- Fiscal position and policy:
  - Large public debt and fear of adverse market reactions limited countercyclical fiscal policy; Italy’s stimulus package was the smallest among advanced G-20 countries.  
  - Fiscal position deteriorated sharply in 2009: overall deficit reached 5.3 percent of GDP in 2009; public debt increased to about 115.8 percent of GDP by end-2009.  
  - Fiscal deficit projected at 5.2 percent of GDP in 2010.  
  - On May 25, 2010, Italian authorities announced a package of fiscal measures purported to represent a cumulative adjustment equivalent to 1.6 percent of GDP over 2011–12.

- Banking sector assessment:
  - Banking system weathered the global financial crisis relatively well due to limited exposure to toxic assets, absence of a property bubble, retail-based business models, and a sound supervisory/regulatory framework.  
  - Italian banks did not need emergency government intervention; recourse to ECB liquidity support schemes remained limited.  
  - Economic deterioration weakened banks’ asset quality and profitability: credit risk increased during the second half of 2008 and in 2009; lending growth to the private sector slowed sharply; profitability declined; asset quality deteriorated.  
  - Banks increased capitalization in 2008–09, but capital ratios still range from weak to average compared with other countries in Europe. Banks will need to raise more capital in view of forthcoming new regulations and probable increases in non-performing loans.

### Executive Board Assessment — key messages and policy recommendations
- Overall view:
  - Despite strengths (high private savings, low private indebtedness, resilient financial system), the global crisis had a severe impact on Italy.  
  - Directors commended authorities for supportive response to the crisis; fiscal policy appropriately tight and timely financial-sector support measures taken.  
  - Economy set for gradual recovery but key weaknesses remain: high public debt and low income growth.  
  - Overarching policy goals: maintain fiscal discipline, reduce burden of public debt, and raise long-term growth.

- Fiscal policy recommendations:
  - Welcome commitment to reduce fiscal deficit to below 3 percent by 2012.  
  - Strong commendation for the fiscal package announced on May 25 aimed at this objective.  
  - Contain public sector wage bill as a key element of consolidation strategy.  
  - Continue close monitoring of sub-national public finances.  
  - Further strengthen fiscal framework; note adoption of 2009 Accounting and Public Finance law and need for additional efforts.  
  - Ensure fiscal consolidation guides implementation of fiscal federalism.  
  - Tackle longer-term fiscal challenges including improving efficiency of public expenditure.

- Pension and labor market recommendations:
  - Commend progress on bold pension reforms that significantly improved sustainability.  
  - Some Directors recommended bringing forward the scheduled increase in retirement age due to back-loaded adjustment in benefits.  
  - Intensify efforts to develop private pension schemes.  
  - Pursue more ambitious structural reform program to raise growth potential: enhance competition, boost productivity, reduce high cost of doing business.  
  - Critical reforms: civil justice reform, accelerating legal processes, strengthening enforcement of the rule of law.  
  - Labor market reform needed to strengthen link between wages and productivity, allow wages to better respond to regional differences, and foster spatial mobility of labor.

- Financial sector recommendations:
  - Continue to encourage banks to strengthen capital given medium-term challenges from weak economy, future international regulations, and continued euro area financial market turbulence.

### Selected economic indicators and projections (2004–10; staff estimates and projections where noted)
- Real economy (change in percent):
  - Real GDP: 2004: 1.5; 2005: 0.7; 2006: 2.0; 2007: 1.5; 2008: -1.3; 2009: -5.0; 2010: 0.8.  
  - Domestic demand: 2004: 1.4; 2005: 1.2; 2006: 1.4; 2007: 1.2; 2008: -1.2; 2009: -3.5; 2010: 0.9.  
  - CPI (year average, harmonized index): 2004: 2.3; 2005: 2.2; 2006: 2.2; 2007: 2.0; 2008: 3.5; 2009: 0.8; 2010: 1.4.  
  - Unemployment rate (percent): 2004: 8.0; 2005: 7.7; 2006: 6.8; 2007: 6.2; 2008: 6.8; 2009: 7.8; 2010: 8.7.  
  - Gross national saving (percent of GDP): 2004: 19.9; 2005: 19.0; 2006: 19.0; 2007: 19.4; 2008: 17.7; 2009: 15.5; 2010: 16.1.  
  - Gross domestic investment (percent of GDP): 2004: 20.8; 2005: 20.7; 2006: 21.6; 2007: 21.9; 2008: 21.1; 2009: 18.9; 2010: 18.9.

- Public finance (percent of GDP):
  - General government balance: 2004: -3.6; 2005: -4.4; 2006: -3.3; 2007: -1.5; 2008: -2.7; 2009: -5.3; 2010: -5.2.  
  - Structural balance net of one-offs (in % of potential GDP): 2004: -4.8; 2005: -4.6; 2006: -3.3; 2007: -2.5; 2008: -2.6; 2009: -3.9; 2010: -3.5.  
  - Primary balance: 2004: 1.1; 2005: 0.1; 2006: 1.1; 2007: 3.3; 2008: 2.2; 2009: -0.8; 2010: -0.8.  
  - Public debt: 2004: 103.8; 2005: 105.8; 2006: 106.5; 2007: 103.4; 2008: 106.0; 2009: 115.8; 2010: 118.6.

- Money and credit (end-of-period, percent change):
  - Credit to the nonfinancial private sector (12-month credit growth, adjusted for securitizations): 2004: 5.8; 2005: 7.7; 2006: 11.0; 2007: 9.8; 2008: 4.9; 2009: 1.7; 2010: ...  
  - National contribution to euro area M3 (excludes currency in circulation held by nonbank private sector): 2004: 5.1; 2005: 6.3; 2006: 7.7; 2007: 7.6; 2008: 6.9; 2009: 5.8; 2010: ...

- Interest rates (end-period):
  - 6-month interbank rate: 2004: 2.2; 2005: 2.6; 2006: 3.8; 2007: 4.9; 2008: 3.7; 2009: 1.0; 2010: ...  
  - 10-year government bond yield: 2004: 3.8; 2005: 3.5; 2006: 4.2; 2007: 4.7; 2008: 4.5; 2009: 4.1; 2010: ...

- Balance of payments (percent of GDP):
  - Trade balance: 2004: 0.6; 2005: 0.0; 2006: -0.7; 2007: 0.2; 2008: 0.0; 2009: 0.0; 2010: 0.3.  
  - Current account (including capital transfers): 2004: -0.9; 2005: -1.7; 2006: -2.6; 2007: -2.4; 2008: -3.4; 2009: -3.4; 2010: -2.8.

- Exchange rate:
  - Exchange rate regime: -- euro-area member.  
  - Exchange rate (NC/US$): 2004: 1.2; 2005: 1.2; 2006: 1.3; 2007: 1.4; 2008: 1.5; 2009: 1.4; 2010: ...  
  - Nominal effective rate (2000=100): 2004: 100.8; 2005: 100.0; 2006: 100.1; 2007: 102.0; 2008: 104.4; 2009: 104.5; 2010: ...  
  - Real effective rate (2000=100): 2004: 113.8; 2005: 112.2; 2006: 111.9; 2007: 113.2; 2008: 115.0; 2009: 115.8; 2010: ...

- Notes:
  - Sources: National Authorities; Eurostat; and IMF staff calculations (April 2010 WEO).  
  - 1/ Staff estimates and projections, unless otherwise noted.

### Comparative growth forecasts (selection)
- Forecasts for Real GDP growth (percent):
  - IMF/WEO Apr-10: 2010: 0.8; 2011: 1.2; 2012: 1.5.  
  - Ministry of Finance May-10: 2010: 1.0; 2011: 1.5; 2012: 2.0.  
  - OECD Nov-09: 2010: 1.1; 2011: 1.5.  
  - European Commission May-09: 2010: 0.8; 2011: 1.4.  
  - Consensus May-10: 2010: 0.8; 2011: 1.1.

### Additional staff update (Statement by IMF Staff Representative, May 26, 2010)
- Recent developments since Staff Report:
  - Italy’s real GDP grew by 0.5 percent quarter-on-quarter in Q1 2010 — strongest since 2007 and above euro area average (preliminary ISTAT estimates).  
  - Industrial output (seasonally adjusted) grew 1.4 percent qoq in Q1 2010 versus 1.0 percent qoq in Q4 2009.  
  - Ministry of Finance revised down its growth forecasts; official forecast now closer to staff projections but still above consensus. Recent market turbulence increased uncertainty of growth projections.  
  - Inflation and unemployment continued to increase: CPI inflation rose to 1.6 percent year-on-year in April compared to 1.4 percent in March; monthly rise of 0.9 percent partly due to increases in energy prices. Unemployment rate rose to 8.8 percent in March 2010, compared to 7.8 percent in March 2009. Total employment contracted by 0.9 percent year-on-year in March 2010.  
  - The 2010 Combined Report on the Economy and Public Finance (May 6) confirmed commitment under the Excessive Deficit Procedure to achieve deficit of 3.9 percent of GDP in 2011 and 2.7 percent of GDP in 2012; measures to achieve this expected to be announced in due course.  
  - Financial markets experienced major turbulence: euro depreciated by 8 percent against the US dollar since start of April; main stock index recorded a 16 percent decline; banks’ equity prices suffered large losses; sovereign 5-year CDS and 10-year government bond spreads widened by 23 and 36 bps, respectively, since April 1.

### Statement by the Executive Director for Italy (Arrigo Sadun, May 26, 2010)
- The Italian economy was severely hit by the global crisis due to collapse in international trade despite limited impact on financial sector.  
- Having hit the bottom of the cycle by mid-2009, the Italian economy is now recovering broadly in line with the rest of Europe. GDP rebounded in Q3 2009 and recovery appears back on track according to recent data.

*IMF Public Information Notice and related annex material (May 26, 2010).*

### 1. Some Hidden Strengths of the Italian Economy

### 1. Some Hidden Strengths of the Italian Economy

### Hidden strengths and productivity
- Aggregate data can understate performance of Italian industry characterized by many dynamic small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
- New ISTAT data (released last December) show total-factor productivity (TFP) in the manufacturing sector grew by 1.2 percent per year from 2003 to 2007.
- Staff assessments describing “stagnant productivity and declining competitiveness over more than a decade” contrast with the ISTAT-based evidence.

### Exports and competitiveness
- When nominal export data are deflated by appropriate prices rather than National Accounts (NA) deflators, Italy’s exports (in volume) grew by an annual average of 4.6 percent from 2005 to 2008 (vs. 2 percent using NA data).
- Before the crisis, Italian exports rose substantially more than the European average and were second only to Germany’s performance.
- Italian firms’ strategy: upgrade value added, introduce innovative products, strengthen client relationships, and focus on specialized niches rather than greater volume market shares — well-suited to small firm size and effective at securing profit margins and employment.

### Labor market and financial sector resilience
- Several years of reforms increased labor market flexibility.
- Italian financial sector showed resilience: limited exposure to toxic assets, limited excessive leveraging, funding largely based on clients’ deposits, close bank-customer relationships, and negligible government support due to limited exposure to market turmoil.

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### 2. Economic Outlook: from Recession to Recovery

### Recent growth and near-term prospects
- The recession in Italy ended in the second quarter of 2009.
- GDP grew by 2 percent on an annualized basis in the first quarter of this year.
- Near-term indicators (industrial production and business confidence surveys) point to solid growth.
- Even assuming lower growth in the second half of this year, the target of a 1 percent growth for the entire year appears comfortably within reach.
- For 2011, the Combined Report on Economy and Public Finance (RUEF) official forecast at the beginning of May points to GDP growth of 1.5 percent, broadly in line with the IMF’s and the European Commission’s projections.

### Labor market performance
- Unemployment declined steadily before the global crisis, reaching a low of 5.8 just before the global crisis.
- Despite the 2008-09 recession, unemployment increased less than in neighboring countries, reaching 8.3 percent at the end of last year.
- Temporary measures (Casas Integration Guarani) were adopted to broaden employment protection coverage and prevent larger losses in human capital.
- Active labor market policies and recent bargaining framework reforms are expected to bolster employment growth, align wages to productivity, increase competitiveness, and enhance potential growth.

### Structural position and external environment
- Italy was primarily affected by the global crisis through international trade rather than systemic real estate or financial sector failures.
- Private sector debt levels, particularly household debt, are low by international standards.
- The recent weakening of the euro vis-a-vis the US dollar and other currencies has enhanced near-term export opportunities.

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### 3. Fiscal Policy

### Fiscal stance during the downturn
- Authorities resisted generalized countercyclical fiscal measures and allowed automatic stabilizers to operate; discretionary measures targeted vulnerable social groups and SMEs.
- The increase in the deficit was limited to 5.3 percent of GDP in 2009.
- The debt increase was limited to 9.7 percentage points.

### Medium-term fiscal strategy and targets
- To achieve medium-term fiscal targets and reduce the deficit below 3 percent of GDP by 2012, the government will shortly unveil a comprehensive fiscal package based on the containment of current expenditures.
- Fiscal federalism aims at fiscal consolidation, improved quality of public spending, and reduced regional disparities; implementation is gradual to limit short-term costs.
- The Accounting and Public Finance law introduced a new three-year budget process, harmonized public accounting systems, strengthened expenditure control and monitoring, and enhanced performance orientation of the budget.

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### 4. Pensions and Other Structural Reforms

### Long-term fiscal sustainability and pension reforms
- IMF Fiscal Monitoring indicates Italy needs a fiscal consolidation of 4.1 percent of GDP in the next ten years to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to 60 percent by 2030.
- This requirement is less than half of what is required from other advanced economies and largely reflects prior pension reforms that moved the system from a defined benefit to a notional defined-contribution scheme.
- Projections assume the crisis reduces medium-term growth by an average of 0.5 percent compared to the 2009 Ageing Report for 2010-2020; from 2021 onwards projections assume convergence in labor productivity to the EU average.

### Recent and forthcoming pension measures
- Recent modifications have increased retirement age substantially; from 2015 onwards the retirement age will be linked to life expectancy.
- Revisions of conversion coefficients used to calculate benefits will be determined by an administrative and automatic procedure every three years instead of by negotiation.
- Authorities are ready to act promptly should pension expenditure trends deviate from the envisaged path.
- The report’s concerns about implementation and maintenance of the contributory principle are stated to be unfounded because provisions are included in fully enacted laws.

### Other structural reforms
- Authorities are committed to reforms to increase productivity and potential growth: enhance public service efficiency, improve quality of public investments in infrastructure, and streamline bureaucratic requirements.
- Implementation of fiscal federalism and justice system reform (improving civil justice, accelerating legal processes, strengthening enforcement) are highlighted as key to improving the business environment.
- Labor market reforms of the past decade have enhanced employment growth and participation; the new bargaining framework is prioritized for swift implementation.

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### 5. The Financial Sector

### Banking system strengths and crisis response
- Italian banks entered the global crisis from a position of comparative strength due to a traditional lending-deposit business model, strong customer relationships, limited exposure to structured financial products, less dependence on wholesale funding, prior sectoral consolidation, improved governance, a sound supervisory framework, and stricter prudential rule application.
- At end-2009 the net direct cost of financial sector support was limited to 0.3 percent of GDP (as opposed to an average of 2.7 percent for G-20 advanced economies); recourse to ECB liquidity support schemes remained limited.
- Slowdown in lending since early 2008 was primarily demand-driven; staff evidence in Annex III indicates credit supply was not constrained by lack of capital and loanable funds even as lending standards tightened.
- The downturn affected banks through deterioration in asset quality, higher loan loss provisions, and reduced profitability.

### Recapitalization and capital ratios
- Banks launched capital-raising initiatives: additional capital from core shareholders, sales of nonstrategic assets, and cuts to dividends.
- Four banks issued government-sponsored recapitalization bonds for a total of less than half the available amount (€10 billion).
- Between end-2008 and December 2009, the core Tier 1 ratio of the largest banking groups increased, on average, from 5.8 percent to 7.2 percent.
- At end-2009 core Tier 1 represented, on average, close to 90 percent of Tier 1 capital for the largest five banks, one of the highest levels in Europe.
- Authorities agree recapitalization efforts should continue in light of Basel Committee recommendations and forthcoming more stringent international regulatory standards.

*Source: _cr10157 - 1. Some Hidden Strengths of the Italian Economy*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/_cr10157.pdf_
