## _cr10205

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---

### Executive summary — context, crisis response, and outlook
- Context and recent developments
  - Growth averaged some 6¼ percent during 2005–08.
  - External debt was low (17 percent of GDP) and reserves coverage stood above six months of imports.
  - Structural weakness: comparatively underdeveloped business environment; total public debt levels were sizable.
- At the onset of the crisis
  - Financial system entered the crisis well capitalized, relatively solvent, liquid, and profitable.
  - Bank of Albania (BoA) adopted macroprudential measures that slowed credit growth and limited unhedged foreign currency lending effects.
- Crisis transmission and outcomes
  - Panic deposit withdrawals in fall 2008; deposits began recovering in the second half of 2009.
  - February 2009 pressures on the lek subsided after BoA intervention plus privatization receipts and a syndicated loan.
  - Remittances and nonclassified inflows estimated to have fallen drastically.
  - Growth continued at an estimated 2.8 percent in 2009.
  - Inflation mostly in line with the target of 3±1 percent, though recently above 4 percent due to depreciation pass-through and higher electricity prices.
- Crisis response — policy buffers used
  - Liquidity buffers used to meet deposit withdrawals; deposit insurance limits raised fivefold.
  - Monetary loosening via BoA direct liquidity injections in late 2008; interest rate cuts of 50 bps each in January and October 2009.
  - Lek depreciated by a cumulative 14 percent.
  - Considerable fiscal stimulus; automatic stabilizers fully played (1 percent of GDP); social security contributions were cut; a large infrastructure project was in train.
- Outlook
  - Baseline: V-shaped recovery, albeit to a lower potential growth than before the crisis.
  - Staff projected GDP growth in the range of 2–2½ percent in 2010 with recovery resuming in Q1 2010.
  - Annual inflation projected at 3.5 percent in 2010 and 3 percent in the medium term.
  - Current account deficit can narrow from 14 to 13 percent in 2010 and decline further over the medium term.
  - Risks: downside risks are significant; elevated budget financing requirements will crowd out private investment and undermine potential growth.

### Downside risks and external vulnerabilities
- Main risks identified
  - Domestic vulnerabilities alongside external risks; relatively high presence of Greek banks amplifies trade-related contagion risk.
  - Rollover risks: a large part of domestic public debt matures every month; remaining privatization program unlikely to generate significant proceeds.
  - Banking sector pressures: weaker credit demand, worsening loan portfolios, and lower profitability.
  - Faltering confidence may decrease consumption and investment more than anticipated.
- Exchange rate assessment (Box 2 key findings)
  - REER depreciated about 10 percent over 2009 toward equilibrium; end-2008 overvaluation largely eliminated.
  - Macroeconomic balance (MB) approach: exchange rate somewhat overvalued (by about 8 percent) at end-2008; gap narrows in the medium term.
  - External sustainability (ES) approach: a real depreciation of about 20 percent would be required to stabilize the NFA to GDP ratio at its estimated end-2008 level.
  - Current Account: 2008 Est. underlying CA -12.1; MB norm -4.9; ES norm -1.5. 2015 Est. underlying CA -5.2; MB norm -4.3; ES norm -1.7.

### Fiscal outlook, vulnerabilities, and consolidation options
- Recent fiscal deterioration and debt
  - 2009 fiscal deficit increased to 7.4 percent of GDP.
  - Public debt rose to close to 60 percent of GDP; 40 percent of it short-term with substantial rollover risks.
  - Staff baseline: public debt 62.8 percent of GDP in 2010, rising to 69.9 percent by 2015.
- Staff fiscal projections and comparisons with authorities (percent of GDP, table-format preserved)
  - Real GDP growth (series): 2.3 / 5.5 / 3.2 / 6.5 / 3.6 / 7.1 / 4.2 / 6.7
  - Retail prices (avg.): 3.5 / 3.0 / 2.9 / 3.0 / 3.0 / 3.0 / 2.9 / 3.0
  - Revenues and grants: 25.2 / 26.6 / 25.0 / 26.8 / 25.4 / 26.9 / 25.7 / 27.1
  - Expenditures: 30.3 / 30.6 / 31.1 / 29.9 / 31.6 / 29.9 / 31.9 / 30.0
  - Overall balance (including grants): -5.2 / -4.0 / -6.1 / -3.2 / -6.1 / -3.0 / -6.1 / -3.0
  - Public Debt: 62.8 / 59.5 / 65.1 / 58.2 / 66.9 / 55.7 / 68.1 / 54.0
  - Nominal GDP (billions of lek, memorandum): 1,216.8 / 1,242.8 / 1,295.0 / 1,363.5 / 1,383.6 / 1,503.4 / 1,486.8 / 1,654.6
- Staff fiscal recommendations and scenarios
  - Urged upfront consolidation: target a cut in the 2010 deficit to around 3 percent of GDP (staff expected deficit of 5.2 percent of GDP under unchanged policies; assumes planned one-off cuts to the 2010 budget of some 30 billion lek or 2.5 percent of GDP).
  - Two fiscal-rule options to reach debt reduction to 50 percent of GDP by end-2013:
    - Expenditure rule: keep real expenditure constant or limit increases to 2 percent to achieve debt reduction to 50 or 54 percent of GDP, respectively, by 2013; include mechanism to trigger lower spending growth if revenues fall and translate positive surprises into fiscal savings.
    - Deficit rule: favored by authorities; staff warned it could conflict with low income tax rates (flat at 10 percent) if expenditure growth continues.
  - Specific measures recommended:
    - Reconsider past tax and contribution cuts; last year’s cut in social security contributions aggravated the pension deficit to 2.5 percent of GDP.
    - Advise against a planned tax amnesty.
    - Save remaining contingency allowance (0.4 percent of GDP) in the 2010 budget.
    - Scale back public investment after completion of Reshen-Kalimash road.
    - Rationalize civil service employment; keep wages and pensions in check, possibly indexing pensions only to inflation.
  - Policy-adjusted scenario (selected percent of GDP rows):
    - Revenue & Grants: 25.2 / 25.7 / 25.0 / 25.8 / 25.4 / 26.8 / 25.7 / 27.1
    - Total expenditure: 30.3 / 28.5 / 31.1 / 27.8 / 31.5 / 27.1 / 31.8 / 26.2
    - Overall balance: -5.2 / -2.8 / -6.1 / -2.0 / -6.1 / -0.3 / -6.1 / 0.9
    - Public debt: 62.3 / 60.4 / 64.6 / 58.8 / 66.4 / 55.2 / 67.7 / 50.1
- Debt dynamics and risks (Appendix)
  - Total public debt "practically reach[ed] the Albanian legal limit of 60 percent of GDP in 2009."
  - Staff projects debt will continue to grow and reach 70 percent of GDP in 2015 under authorities’ current medium-term spending plan.
  - The government's medium-term target is a debt-to-GDP ratio below 50 percent; this target will not be met in the baseline scenario without substantial short-run consolidation.
  - Average maturity of domestic debt low (duration of the domestic portfolio was 0.8 years at beginning-2010).
  - Scenario with no policy change (constant primary balance) in 2009–2014 leads to public sector debt:
    - 2009: 59.7; 2010: 90.9; 2011: 95.2; 2012: 98.7; 2013: 101.3; 2014: 103.4; 2015: 105.3.
  - Baseline public sector debt path (percent of GDP): 2009: 59.7; 2010: 62.8; 2011: 65.1; 2012: 66.9; 2013: 68.1; 2014: 69.1; 2015: 69.9.
  - Gross financing need (percent of GDP): 2009: 7.5; 2010: 8.4; 2011: 6.7; 2012: 6.8; 2013: 6.8; 2014: 7.2; 2015: 9.5.

### Monetary policy, banking sector resilience, and financial stability
- Monetary framework and actions
  - Albania de facto follows a floating exchange rate regime with occasional interventions; maintains exchange rate restrictions under transitional arrangements of Article XIV but no restrictions subject to Fund jurisdiction under Article VIII.
  - Staff recommended continuing a cautious monetary stance focused on anchoring inflation expectations; interest rate decisions should be guided by the inflation target while monitoring financial stability and macroprudential needs.
  - Staff advised against administrative measures to boost credit to the private sector; viable resumption of credit flows depends on fiscal consolidation.
- Banking sector indicators and stress tests (selected figures)
  - Financial soundness indicators (2008: Q3 vs 2009: Q3): Regulatory Capital to Risk-weighted Assets 17.5 / 16.4; NPL to total loans 4.1 / 8.6; Return on Equity 16.3 / 4.3.
  - Banking soundness indicators (Table 3, selected):
    - Regulatory capital as percent of risk-weighted assets: 18.6 (Dec-05), 18.1 (Dec-06), 17.1 (Dec-07), 17.2 (Dec-08), 16.2 (Dec-09).
    - Nonperforming loans (gross) as percent of total loans: 2.3 (Dec-05), 3.1 (Dec-06), 3.4 (Dec-07), 6.6 (Dec-08), 10.5 (Dec-09).
    - Return on equity (ROE): 22.2; 20.2; 20.7; 11.4; 4.6 (Dec-05 to Dec-09).
    - Liquid-asset ratio: 62.6; 57.6; 49.8; 42.8; 27.6 (Dec-05 to Dec-09).
  - Stress-test conclusions
    - Regulatory capital would remain above minimum required level; two banks modestly undercapitalized per Tier 1 leverage in some scenarios.
    - Liquidity risk: some banks vulnerable to reduced credit lines from parents; reliance on short-term BoA repo funding increased to some €270 million in 2009.
    - Exchange rate risk: banking sector would remain adequately capitalized with shocks due to small positive FX positions; indirect credit risks contained.
    - Interest rate risk: a few banks would become modestly undercapitalized with interest rate hikes of 5 percent.
    - Aggregate: capital cushions, profits and increased provisioning should provide enough resources to absorb foreseen loan losses; simultaneous shocks may require new capital for some institutions.
- Euroization and prudential guidance (Box 3)
  - High euroization increases banking sector risks via currency mismatches and higher default probabilities; de-euroization should be market-based and preserve macro stability.
  - Supervisors should enhance risk-based supervision, set high risk-management standards, and ensure banks hold adequate buffers.
  - Policy guidance: contingency plans and adaptation of the macroprudential toolkit to emerging risks; banks should "begin aggressively seizing collateral of nonperforming loans or seek viable loan restructuring."

### External sector and balance-of-payments projections
- Current account and trade balances (selected projections, percent of GDP)
  - Current account: -10.3 (2007), -15.3 (2008), -14.0 (2009), -12.6 (2010), -11.3 (2011), -9.4 (2012), -7.5 (2013), -6.2 (2014), -5.2 (2015).
  - Trade balance (goods and services): -26.7 (2007), -26.8 (2008), -25.0 (2009), -22.7 (2010), -22.4 (2011), -20.9 (2012), -19.2 (2013), -17.9 (2014), -16.7 (2015).
  - Exports (percent of GDP): 28.1 (2007), 29.6 (2008), 28.2 (2009), rising to 32.9 (2015).
  - Imports (percent of GDP): 54.9 (2007), 56.5 (2008), 53.2 (2009), declining to 49.6 (2015).
- Reserves and external-debt indicators
  - Gross usable reserves (millions EUR): 1,467 (2007), 1,721 (2008), 1,621 (2009), 1,586 (2010), 1,580 (2011), 1,725 (2012), 1,924 (2013), 2,226 (2014), 2,571 (2015).
  - External debt (percent of GDP): 23.8 (2007), 29.9 (2008), 34.1 (2009), peak projected 37.2 (2011–12) under baseline, then decline to 30.2 (2015).
  - External debt-to-exports ratio: 120.8 (2009), 124.4 (2010), 128.1 (2011), 91.6 (2015).
- Balance-of-payments (Table 5b, millions EUR, selected)
  - Current account (millions EUR): -809 (2007), -1,342 (2008), -1,227 (2009), -1,101 (2010), -1,040 (2011), -918 (2012), -787 (2013), -703 (2014), -638 (2015).
  - Exports of goods and services (millions EUR): 2,202 (2007), 2,605 (2008), 2,469 (2009), rising to 4,035 (2015).
  - Imports of goods and services (millions EUR): 4,293 (2007), 4,967 (2008), 4,652 (2009), rising to 6,090 (2015).
- Stress tests on external debt
  - Baseline: external debt projected to peak at 37 percent of GDP in 2012 and decline to 30 percent by 2015.
  - Combined shocks (real interest, growth and current account balance shocks) project external debt to increase to 42 and 37 percent of GDP by 2015 under specified scenarios.

### Structural reforms, competitiveness, and statistics
- Competitiveness and business environment
  - Need to broaden growth sources and raise productivity; greater investment needed.
  - Priorities: improve business environment, secure property rights (especially land tenure), reduce regulatory uncertainty from past privatizations, and enforce formal rules to reduce the sizeable informal economy.
  - Specific privatization-related issues: resolve regulatory issues regarding privatized electricity distributor OSSH; initiate recovery proceedings against ARMO to support Albpetrol privatization.
- Nonbank financial sector and statistics
  - Further development of the nonbank financial sector (insurance and pension) essential; authorities working with World Bank.
  - INSTAT progress noted; staff recommended significant increase of resources and administrative support for INSTAT and welcomed intention to subscribe to the IMF Special Data Dissemination Standard.

### Staff appraisal, policy priorities, and mission outreach
- Staff appraisal and core recommendations
  - Albania weathered the global crisis fairly well, aided by policy stimulus; growth estimated at 2.8 percent in 2009.
  - Policy buffers now exhausted and must be rebuilt.
  - Priorities: timely and decisive fiscal tightening in 2010 to reduce financing risks and crowding out; mix of one-off and structural revenue and expenditure measures; adopt credible fiscal rule targeting debt reduction toward 50 percent of GDP by 2013.
  - Financial sector: continue vigilant supervision, adapt macroprudential toolkit, elaborate contingency plans, and ensure banks address nonperforming loans.
  - Monetary policy: BoA should continue cautious stance and anchor inflation expectations; interest rate decisions governed by actual and projected inflation.
  - Structural: improve business environment, investor protection, property rights, rule enforcement, and statistical quality.
- Mission details and outreach
  - Mission: Mr. Bell (head), Ms. Chen, Mr. Steinlein (EUR), Mr. Christofides (SPR), and Ms. Pereira (FAD) visited Tirana from February 25 to March 9, 2010.
  - Met Prime Minister, Ministers of Finance and Economy, Governor of the Central Bank, senior officials, parliamentarians, private sector, academics.
  - Outreach conference on March 4, 2010 with staff presentations on fiscal rules, euroization, market access conditions, and competitiveness.
- Scheduling
  - It is proposed that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard 12-month cycle.

*Italic source attribution: IMF staff report excerpt and supporting annexes as presented in the source PDF.*

### Executive Summary

### _cr10205 - Executive Summary

### Context and recent developments
- Pre-crisis performance:
  - Growth averaged some 6¼ percent during 2005–08.
  - Inflation was kept in check.
  - External debt was low (17 percent of GDP).
  - Reserves coverage stood above six months of imports.
  - Structural weakness: comparatively underdeveloped business environment; total public debt levels were sizable.
- At the onset of the crisis:
  - Flexible monetary policy framework, sound banks, and substantial foreign exchange reserve buffers.
  - Financial system entered the crisis well capitalized, relatively solvent, liquid, and profitable.
  - Bank of Albania (BoA) adopted macroprudential measures that slowed credit growth and limited unhedged foreign currency lending effects.
- Transmission channels of the crisis:
  - Panic deposit withdrawals following US market dislocation and concerns about Greek banking in fall 2008; deposits began recovering in the second half of 2009.
  - February 2009 pressures on the lek that subsided after BoA intervention plus privatization receipts and a syndicated loan.
  - Recession in trading partners (particularly Greece and Italy) led to falling exports.
  - Remittances and nonclassified inflows estimated to have fallen drastically.

### Crisis response — use of built-up policy buffers
- Liquidity and banking measures:
  - Ample liquidity buffers used to meet deposit withdrawals.
  - Foreign banks increased exposure, complied with BoA ban on distributing dividends.
  - Deposit insurance limits were raised fivefold.
- Monetary policy:
  - Monetary loosening via BoA direct liquidity injections in late 2008.
  - Interest rate cuts of 50 bps each in January and October 2009.
  - Lek depreciated by a cumulative 14 percent.
- Fiscal policy:
  - Considerable fiscal stimulus, partly financed from privatization of the electricity distribution system.
  - Automatic stabilizers fully played (1 percent of GDP).
  - Social security contributions were cut and a large infrastructure project was in train.
  - Strong fiscal relaxation prior to mid-2009 elections produced another 1 percent of GDP fiscal impulse.
- Outcomes during crisis:
  - Growth continued at an estimated 2.8 percent in 2009.
  - Inflation mostly in line with the target of 3±1 percent, though recently above 4 percent due to depreciation pass-through and higher electricity prices.

### Post-crisis context — a depleted arsenal
- Fiscal deterioration:
  - 2009 fiscal deficit increased to 7.4 percent of GDP.
  - Public debt rose to close to 60 percent of GDP; 40 percent of it short-term with substantial rollover risks.
  - Late-year attempt at fiscal pullback resulted in arrears of 0.5 percent of GDP.
- Banking sector:
  - Slow remonetization, rising NPLs, creeping credit growth lowered profitability.
  - Concerns about financial health of some parent banks.
  - Financial soundness indicators (2008: Q3 vs 2009: Q3 for Albania): Regulatory Capital to Risk-weighted Assets 17.5 / 16.4; NPL to total loans 4.1 / 8.6; Return on Equity 16.3 / 4.3.
- External imbalances:
  - Current account deficit around some 15 percent of GDP in 2009.
  - Private sector imbalances had begun to adjust; more recently the fiscal deficit became a key driver of the current account.
- Regional and political risks:
  - Exposure to the Mediterranean euro-periphery via trade, remittances, and financial links to Greece and Italy.
  - Greek bank subsidiaries and branches account for one quarter of the banking system and have the lowest capital and liquidity buffers in the system.
  - Political uncertainty: opposition did not accept mid-2009 election outcome (international observers endorsed the election result).

### Outlook
- Recovery shape and timing:
  - Baseline is for a V-shaped recovery, albeit to a lower potential growth than before the crisis.
  - Staff projected GDP growth in the range of 2–2½ percent in 2010 with recovery resuming in Q1 2010 after an estimated GDP contraction in Q4 2009.
  - Authorities were more optimistic, expecting a quicker bounce-back.
- Inflation:
  - Headline inflation may temporarily exceed the 3±1 percent target band due to administrative price increases.
  - Annual inflation projected at 3.5 percent in 2010 and 3 percent in the medium term.
- External sector:
  - Current account deficit can narrow from 14 to 13 percent this year, and decline further over the medium term to reach a sustainable level.
  - Real exchange rate appears competitive; recent depreciation eliminated the overvaluation depicted in GGER-type analysis.
- Risks to growth:
  - Downside risks are significant.
  - Elevated budget financing requirements under unchanged policies will crowd out private investment and undermine potential growth over the medium term.
  - Projected increased interest rates from high levels of government borrowing will lead private savings to pick up sharply; private investment unlikely to recover to past levels.

### Policy discussions and recommendations
- Fiscal policy:
  - A tighter fiscal stance with improvements in productivity and competitiveness is a superior adjustment strategy.
  - Consolidation could enhance, rather than damage, growth prospects.
  - Authorities’ fiscal adjustment strategy based on over-optimistic revenue and growth expectations.
  - Agreement on benefits of a clear, credible, and monitorable fiscal rule to safeguard fiscal sustainability.
- Monetary policy and financial stability:
  - Monetary policy should remain cautious.
  - Supervisors should remain vigilant given heightened regional uncertainty.
  - Continued macroprudential vigilance is important given euroization and banking sector risks.
- Competitiveness and structural reforms:
  - Improvements in the business environment are critical to harvest benefits from closer EU integration.
  - Enhancing productivity and competitiveness is central to allow fiscal consolidation without undermining growth.

### Exchange rate regime and mission
- Exchange rate regime:
  - Albania follows (de facto) a floating exchange rate regime with occasional interventions.
  - Maintains exchange rate restrictions under the transitional arrangements of Article XIV, but maintains no restrictions subject to Fund jurisdiction under Article VIII.
- Team and outreach:
  - Mission: Mr. Bell (head), Ms. Chen, Mr. Steinlein (all EUR), Mr. Christofides (SPR), and Ms. Pereira (FAD) visited Tirana from February 25 to March 9, 2010.
  - Met Prime Minister, Ministers of Finance and Economy, Governor of the Central Bank, senior officials, parliamentarians, private sector, academics.
  - Outreach conference on March 4, 2010 with staff presentations on fiscal rules, euroization, market access conditions, and competitiveness.

*Source: _cr10205 - Executive Summary*

### 10.      Downward risks to the baseline are significant. Both staff and the authorities agreed

### _cr10205 - 10.      Downward risks to the baseline are significant. Both staff and the authorities agreed

### Downward risks to the baseline
- Domestic vulnerabilities remain alongside external risks; the relatively high presence of Greek banks amplifies trade-related contagion risk.
- Rollover risks have increased as a large part of domestic public debt matures every month, while the remaining privatization program is unlikely to generate significant proceeds.
- Banking sector pressures: weaker credit demand, worsening loan portfolios, and lower profitability require banks to keep pace with the new outlook.
- Faltering confidence of households and enterprises may decrease consumption and investment more than anticipated.

### Contributions to inflation (chart highlights)
- Contributions split by Energy, Food, Other (core items) across monthly observations from 2006M12 through 2010M03 (chart source: Albania authorities). (Chart presented in source; values preserved there.)

### Domestic public debt rollover (chart highlight)
- Albania: 2010 Monthly Domestic Public Debt Rollover Requirements (In percent of GDP). (Chart presented in source; values preserved there.)

### Box 2. Exchange Rate Assessment — key findings
- The exchange rate does not appear to pose a risk to external stability; measures pointed to some overvaluation at end-2008 but the REER depreciated about 10 percent over 2009 toward equilibrium.
- A large deviation of the current account from its medium-term norm remains to be corrected; on current policies the correction is projected to be driven by substantial crowding out of the private sector.
- Long-run PPP-based assessment: Albania appears in line with other countries—within one standard deviation from the trend line—when comparing productivities (approximated by GDP per capita in PPP prices) with real exchange rates per PPP dollar.
- CGER-type analyses:
  - ERER approach (CEE panel-based regression) suggests neither under- nor over-valuation at end-2009.
  - Macroeconomic balance (MB) approach: underlying current account balance is below the norm at end-2008; the gap narrows in the medium term with the exchange rate remaining somewhat overvalued (by about 8 percent).
  - External sustainability (ES) approach: a real depreciation of about 20 percent would be required to stabilize the NFA to GDP ratio at its estimated end-2008 level.
- Current Account: Estimated/Projected vs. Norms (In percent of GDP): Source table shows
  - 2008: Est. underlying CA -12.1; MB norm -4.9; ES norm -1.5
  - 2015: Est. underlying CA -5.2; MB norm -4.3; ES norm -1.7
  (Source: IMF staff projections and calculations.)

### III. POLICY DISCUSSIONS — A. Rebuilding Fiscal Space and Aligning the Budget with Sustainable Financing
- Consensus: fiscal consolidation is the key near- and medium-term policy challenge; after large fiscal stimulus in 2009 there is no further scope for countercyclical policy.
- Government large financing requirement and rollover needs threaten market access and macroeconomic stability; fiscal deficit has begun to crowd out investment.
- Staff cautioned against optimistic revenue forecasts. Government target: reduce deficit to 3 percent of GDP over the medium term; staff view less optimistic.
- Staff expected a deficit of 5.2 percent of GDP (footnote: assumes planned one-off cuts to the 2010 budget of some 30 billion lek or 2.5 percent of GDP).
- Under current policies, deficits in excess of 6 percent throughout the medium term would push debt to close to 70 percent of GDP.
- Staff baseline projections and authorities' views (selected figures, percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated):
  - Real GDP growth (Staff / Auth. / Staff / Auth. ... in table): 2.3 / 5.5 / 3.2 / 6.5 / 3.6 / 7.1 / 4.2 / 6.7 (table formatting preserved as in source).
  - Retail prices (avg.): 3.5 / 3.0 / 2.9 / 3.0 / 3.0 / 3.0 / 2.9 / 3.0
  - Revenues and grants: 25.2 / 26.6 / 25.0 / 26.8 / 25.4 / 26.9 / 25.7 / 27.1
  - Expenditures: 30.3 / 30.6 / 31.1 / 29.9 / 31.6 / 29.9 / 31.9 / 30.0
  - Overall balance (including grants): -5.2 / -4.0 / -6.1 / -3.2 / -6.1 / -3.0 / -6.1 / -3.0
  - Public Debt: 62.8 / 59.5 / 65.1 / 58.2 / 66.9 / 55.7 / 68.1 / 54.0
  - External: Trade balance (goods and services) -22.7 / -22.4 / -20.9 / -19.2; Current account balance (including official transfers) -12.6 / -11.3 / -9.4 / -7.5
  - Nominal GDP (in billions of lek) (Memorandum): 1,216.8 / 1,242.8 / 1,295.0 / 1,363.5 / 1,383.6 / 1,503.4 / 1,486.8 / 1,654.6
- Staff recommended a clear, credible, and monitorable fiscal rule anchored to cutting public debt below 50 percent of GDP by the end of the current government’s mandate in 2013. Two options discussed:
  - Expenditure rule: Keep real expenditure constant or limit increases to 2 percent to achieve debt reduction to 50 or 54 percent of GDP, respectively, by 2013; include mechanism to trigger lower spending growth in event of revenue shortfall and translate positive surprises into fiscal savings.
  - Deficit rule: Favored by authorities; staff warned that lower post-boom revenue could call into question low income tax rates (flat at 10 percent) if higher expenditure growth were to be accommodated.
- Staff urged upfront progress on fiscal consolidation: targeting a cut in the 2010 deficit to around 3 percent of GDP would lower financing requirement and start credible debt reduction; achieving this in 2010 requires a considerable share of one-off measures followed by structural measures.
- Impact of consolidation measures on 2010–13 budget accounts (percent of GDP) — Policy-adjusted scenario (selected rows):
  - Revenue & Grants: 25.2 / 25.7 / 25.0 / 25.8 / 25.4 / 26.8 / 25.7 / 27.1
  - Total expenditure: 30.3 / 28.5 / 31.1 / 27.8 / 31.5 / 27.1 / 31.8 / 26.2
  - Overall balance: -5.2 / -2.8 / -6.1 / -2.0 / -6.1 / -0.3 / -6.1 / 0.9
  - Public debt: 62.3 / 60.4 / 64.6 / 58.8 / 66.4 / 55.2 / 67.7 / 50.1
- Specific fiscal recommendations:
  - Reconsider past tax and contribution cuts; last year’s cut in social security contributions aggravated the pension deficit to 2.5 percent of GDP.
  - Advise against a planned tax amnesty as it could undermine future tax compliance.
  - Significant expenditure adjustments feasible in 2010: reduce remaining contingency allowance (0.4 percent of GDP); scale back public investment after completion of Reshen-Kalimash road; rationalize civil service employment while keeping wages and pensions in check, possibly indexing pensions to only inflation.
- Structural fiscal reforms to continue: address capital expenditure execution problems, enhance planning and implementation capacities, and pursue an effective tax compliance strategy (including under-reporting by high-wealth individuals and capturing informal activity).
- Historical budget vs. outcome (2005–09, percent of actual GDP highlights):
  - Total Expenditure: Budget 30.4 / Actual 28.6 / ... 33.4 / 33.4 (table preserved from source).
  - Capital Expenditure: Budget 6.2 / Actual 4.7 / ... 8.6 / 8.8
  - RK road contributions shown in table.

- Authorities seeking to place a Eurobond to lessen reliance on short-term domestic financing, reduce near-term rollover risk and lower crowding out; heightened uncertainty in international markets may impact size and pricing; other options include a Fund-supported program.

### III. POLICY DISCUSSIONS — B. Conducting Effective Monetary Policy and Preserving Financial Stability
- Monetary framework (inflation target range + flexible exchange rate) is an asset; it provided resilience during the 2007–08 energy and food price shock.
- Moderate depreciation in 2009 eased adjustment while keeping inflation expectations anchored, important given significant euroization.
- Staff recommended continuing a cautious monetary stance focused on anchoring inflation expectations; interest rate decisions should be guided by the inflation target while monitoring financial stability and macroprudential needs.
- Staff advised against administrative measures to boost credit to the private sector; viable resumption of credit flows depends on fiscal consolidation.
- Actual and Predicted Policy Rates chart (Mar-04 to Sep-09) shows policy rate behavior vs. predicted rate (chart preserved in source).
- Credit to the private sector (Constant Exchange Rate, Dec 2002 = 100) chart presented (Dec-02 to Dec-09) (chart preserved in source).

### Box 3. Euroization and Banking Sector Risks — key findings and recommendations
- Euroization increases banking sector risks and requires high capital and reserve buffers.
  - Currency mismatches raise solvency risks via exchange rate movements or indirectly via credit risks of non-hedged portfolios.
  - Central bank lender-of-last-resort facilities may have limited foreign currency funding in case of bank runs, exacerbating run risks.
  - Empirical analysis for some South and Eastern European countries shows higher degree of Euroization associated with higher default probabilities and higher nonperforming loan levels; higher risks reduce banking sector’s capacity to provide credit by requiring higher capital or reserves.
- Charts and data presented:
  - FX deposits/Total deposits, FX loans/Total loans, Private sector credit/GDP (2003–2009) — source: Bank of Albania; IMF staff estimates.
  - Cross-country scatter: Average credit growth 02-09 vs FX deposit/Total deposit and FX loans/Total loans (sample and chart preserved).
  - Regression results (dependent variables: proxies of Default Probabilities and Non-performing Loans) showing Euroization coefficients and significance levels; sample of countries and significance markers (*, **, ***) preserved in table.
- Policy guidance:
  - While lower Euroization would facilitate monetary policy, it cannot be forced; de-euroization policies should maintain macroeconomic stability, especially low inflation.
  - De-euroization could involve market-based and administrative measures but must prioritize macro stability.
  - Banking supervisors should enhance risk-based supervision, set high standards for risk management, and ensure banks hold adequate buffers to handle large shocks.

### Monetary and prudential measures across region (select table excerpts)
- Albania: Floating exchange rate; policy rate was lowered from 6.25 to 5.75 in January 2009 and further to 5.25 in October 2009; no change in required reserve ratios.
- Comparable country actions (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, FYR, Romania) summarized in table (entries preserved in source).

*Italic source attribution: IMF staff and Albanian authorities as presented in the source PDF.*

### 10.25 to 10 percent in Feburary

### 10.25 to 10 percent in Feburary

### Monetary policy actions and reserve requirement changes
- Repo and policy rate moves noted:
  - Serbia, Rep. Floating: "The repo rate was cut from 15.75 to 16.5 in January, 15 in April, 13 in June, 12 in July, 11 in october and 10 in November 2009."
  - Other chronology: "10.25 to 10 percent in Feburary 2009, 9.5 in May 2009, 9 in July 2009, 8.5 in August 2009, and 8 in September 2009."
- Reserve requirement ratio changes:
  - "Reduced from 20 to 18 percent in November 2008 and to 15 percent in July 2009 for lei denominated liabilities with residual maturities up to two years."
  - "Reduced from 40 percent to zero for foreign currency liabilities with residual maturity of over two years in May 2009."
  - "Reduced from 40 to 35 percent in July, 30 percent in August, and 25 percent in November 2009 for foreign currency liabilities with residual maturity of up to two years."
- Additional October 2008 and January 2009 measures:
  - "In October 2008, the minimum required reserve ratio for foreign assets was reduced to zero and the allocation of dinars in the required reserves was increased from 10 to 20 percent. This ratio was further increased to 40 percent in January 2009."
- Sources: "Central banks, and IMF" (as cited in text).

### Banking sector stress tests, vulnerabilities, and outlook
- Stress test coverage of key risks and findings:
  - Credit risk: "The regulatory capital of the banking sector would remain above the minimum required level, with two banks modestly undercapitalized according to Tier 1 leverage."
  - Liquidity risk: "Some banks are vulnerable to reduced credit lines from parents. Reliance on short-term BoA repo funding has increased to some €270 million in 2009."
  - Exchange rate risk: "The banking sector would remain adequately capitalized with shocks to the exchange rate due to its small positive foreign exchange positions, and the associated indirect credit risks are fairly contained."
  - Interest rate risk: "A few banks would become modestly undercapitalized with interest rate hikes of 5 percent, but the banking sector would remain adequately capitalized."
- Aggregate stress-test conclusion: "The stress tests suggest that capital cushions, profits and increased provisioning should provide enough resources to absorb foreseen loan losses. Assuming simultaneous shocks, some institutions may require new capital, and the relevant banks have agreed to increase capital accordingly."
- Near-term outlook and risks:
  - "The near-term banking sector outlook is stable, but uncertainties loom large."
  - Positive supports: "Banks have been aided by their reliance on funding through their domestic deposit base, which is now recovering. Many foreign parents have boosted the capital of their subsidiaries. Albanian firms and households are only moderately leveraged compared to South Eastern European (SEE) peers."
  - Emerging risks and supervisory recommendations:
    - "A drawn-out recovery could further worsen the quality of domestic credit."
    - "Contingency plans that deal with new tail risks need to be elaborated."
    - "The macroprudential toolkit should be accordingly adapted to address any developing risks to financial stability early on."
    - Banks should "begin aggressively seizing collateral of nonperforming loans or seek viable loan restructuring" to promote real estate market correction and economic rebalancing.
- Nonbank financial sector development:
  - "Further development of the nonbank financial sector was seen as essential."
  - Authorities "continue to work with the World Bank to develop the insurance and pension sectors" and staff advised that "relevant legal and regulatory problems in these two sectors should be resolved expeditiously."

### Competitiveness, business environment, and EU integration
- Strategic need: "The Albanian economy needed to broaden its sources of growth and strengthen competitiveness by raising productivity and helping Albania’s exports to climb up the value-added ladder."
- Comparative advantage and required actions:
  - "Albania’s light regulation already provides the economy with welcome flexibility, especially in labor markets, and wage levels are among the lowest in the region."
  - "The needed productivity gains should be secured by greater investment."
- Priority reforms and recommendations:
  - Address obstacles to effective operation of privatized industries:
    - "Quick resolution of the regulatory issues regarding the privatized electricity distributor OSSH that could potentially trigger a World Bank Partial Risk Guarantee (PRG), with adverse effects for the country’s reputation."
    - "Increasing payment arrears from the privatized refinery complex (ARMO) threaten the successful privatization of Albpetrol—and thereby the conclusion of the strategic privatization program. Staff thus recommended the initiation of legal recovery proceedings against ARMO."
  - Speed up establishment of a clear property rights system, "particularly for land tenure." Authorities plan industrial zones to attract investment as a bypass.
  - Enforce formal rules and reduce the sizeable informal economy: "Considerable implementation and enforcement gaps for formal rules as well as the sizeable informal economy are key—and mutually reinforcing—weaknesses."

### Macroeconomic statistics
- Progress and needs for INSTAT:
  - "The national statistical agency INSTAT has made formidable progress over recent years, for example, by starting to publish quarterly national accounts and continuously upgrading their quality."
  - Staff recommendation: "a significant increase of resources and administrative support for INSTAT and welcomed the intention to subscribe to the IMF Special Data Dissemination Standard."

### Staff appraisal, growth projections, and fiscal policy recommendations
- Recent performance and baseline projection:
  - "In the face of strong headwinds, the Albanian economy has weathered the global crisis fairly well so far, in part reflecting policy stimulus."
  - "GDP is estimated to have registered positive growth of 2.8 percent in 2009."
  - "The baseline scenario is for a V-shaped recovery, albeit to a lower post-boom level of potential growth, with growth in 2010 projected at 2–2½ percent. Underlying inflation is expected to remain well contained."
- Assessment of policy buffers: "However, policy buffers are now exhausted and must be rebuilt."
- Fiscal tightening and 2010 target:
  - "The 2010 fiscal deficit should be cut to around 3 percent of GDP (from 5.2 percent on unchanged policies) by a combination of one-time and structural measures on both the revenue and expenditure side."
  - Specific recommendations:
    - "Past tax and contributions cuts should be reconsidered and a tax amnesty eschewed."
    - "All remaining contingency reserves in the 2010 budget should be saved."
    - "Public investment should be scaled back to more financeable and administratively manageable levels after the completion of the Reshen-Kalimash road."
    - "Current spending needs to be revisited with a view to rightsizing the civil service, and keeping wages and pensions in check, indexing them only to inflation."
- Medium-term fiscal framework:
  - "Medium-term fiscal policy should be governed by a credible and monitorable fiscal rule."
  - Proposal: "Limiting real expenditure increases to below 2 percent could go some way toward achieving the government’s goal of debt reduction to 50 percent by 2013."
  - Complementary design: "This rule would preferably be augmented by a mechanism that would trigger lower spending growth in the event of an unexpected revenue shortfall. In contrast, positive surprises should translate into fiscal savings, reducing the risk of ever exceeding the debt ceiling."
- Debt management and financing options:
  - "The authorities are appropriately seeking to place a Eurobond."
  - Advice: "The authorities are well advised to keep other options on the table, including a Fund-supported arrangement, if a balance of payments need emerges."
- Financial sector and monetary policy guidance:
  - Supervisors: "need to continue to stay ahead of evolving challenges and risks" and "continuously elaborate contingency plans that deal with tail risks."
  - Banks should "execute collateral of nonperforming loans or seek viable loan restructurings."
  - Monetary policy: "The Bank of Albania should continue with its cautious stance, with a strong focus on anchoring inflation expectations."
  - "Interest rate decisions should be governed by actual and projected inflation developments with respect to the inflation target," while staying mindful of financial stability and macroprudential needs.
- Structural and investment recommendations:
  - "Going forward, the Albanian economy needs to broaden its sources of growth and strengthen competitiveness."
  - Priorities: "implementation and enforcement of formal rules; improving the security of property rights (including for land tenure); and reducing regulatory uncertainties associated with some past privatizations."
  - Funding suggestion: "Finding new institutional investors, for instance, via accelerated pension reforms."

*Source: IMF staff report excerpt as provided in the supplied content.*

### 33.      It is proposed that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard

### _cr10205 - 33.      It is proposed that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard

### Scheduling
- It is proposed that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard 12-month cycle.

### Comparative economic performance before the onset of the global crisis (Figure 1)
- Real Annual Economic Growth (Average 2003-08, in percent): charted up to "10" (labels show range 0–10).
- Average Inflation Rates (Dec 2003-07 and Sep 2008, annual, percent): charted up to "12" (labels show range 0–12).
- External Debt (Average 2003-08, percent of GDP): charted 0–100 (labels).
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation (Average 2003-08, percent of GDP): charted 15–30 (labels).
- Trade (2003-08 average, percent of GDP): Exports plus imports shown up to 160 (labels); exports individually charted.
- Current account deficit and financial account balance (2003-08 average, percent of GDP): charts show Current account deficit and Financial account balance up to 20 (labels).

### Characteristics of Albanian banking sector prior to the crisis (Figure 2, Table 3)
- Financial intermediation noted as "well below potential" despite high monetization.
- Funding and currency composition:
  - DMBs: Foreign Currency Liabilities as Percent of Total Credit, September 2008: country comparisons include Albania among others.
  - Foreign currency-denominated loans to total loans: 75.5 (Dec-05), 71.9 (Dec-06), 72.5 (Dec-07), 72.6 (Dec-08), 70.2 (Dec-09).
  - Foreign currency-denominated liabilities as a percent of total liabilities: 41.0 (Dec-05), 44.0 (Dec-06), 46.9 (Dec-07), 48.5 (Dec-08), 48.9 (Dec-09).
- Credit, deposits, and catch-up effect:
  - Private sector credit to GDP in 1999 and percent change real credit 1999-2008 illustrated (charts).
  - Funding of credit expansion (Change in deposits and change in credit, 2002-08) shown in chart; 45 degree line referenced.
- Banking soundness indicators (selected, Table 3, 2005–2009):
  - Regulatory capital as percent of risk-weighted assets: 18.6 (Dec-05), 18.1 (Dec-06), 17.1 (Dec-07), 17.2 (Dec-08), 16.2 (Dec-09).
  - Regulatory Tier 1 capital as percent of risk-weighted assets: 18.1; 17.1; 16.0; 16.3; 15.3 (same dates).
  - Capital as percent of total assets (Regulatory capital / Tier 1 / Shareholders' equity): regulatory capital as percent of total assets 5.6; 6.2; 6.2; 7.0; 9.2; shareholders' equity as percent of total assets 6.6; 6.8; 7.6; 8.6; 9.6.
  - Nonperforming loans (gross) as percent of total loans: 2.3 (Dec-05), 3.1 (Dec-06), 3.4 (Dec-07), 6.6 (Dec-08), 10.5 (Dec-09).
  - Nonperforming loans net of provisions as percent of regulatory Tier 1 capital: 4.4; 7.2; 12.0; 27.2; 29.9 (Dec-05 to Dec-09).
  - Return on equity (ROE) (annual basis): 22.2; 20.2; 20.7; 11.4; 4.6 (Dec-05 to Dec-09).
  - Liquid-asset ratio (liquid assets as percent of total assets): 62.6; 57.6; 49.8; 42.8; 27.6 (Dec-05 to Dec-09).
  - Return on assets (ROA) (annual basis): 1.4; 1.4; 1.6; 0.9; 0.4 (Dec-05 to Dec-09).
- Memorandum (Table 3):
  - Customer deposits as percent of total (non-interbank) loans: 342.5; 265.5; 215.5; 162.6; 154.3 (Dec-05 to Dec-09).
  - Risk weighted assets as percent of total assets: 30.0; 34.6; 36.4; 40.8; 56.7.
  - Total loans as percent of total assets: 25.7; 31.7; 39.4; 47.6; 50.8.

### External sector developments, 2009 (Figure 3 and Tables 5a/5b)
- Exports and imports (2008–09): charts show declines; commentary: "Global crisis impacted export and imports of Albania, but by less than of other SEE countries."
- Imports decline smaller than exports, "partly because of strong government spending."
- Current account and reserves:
  - Current account deficit (percent of GDP): charted series noted with contributions from private transfers and FDI.
  - Gross international reserves (in millions of EUR): series include 1,467; 1,721; 1,621; 1,586; 1,580; 1,725; 1,924; 2,226; 2,571 (2004–2011 Jan in chart).
  - REER (2004=100) and export market share series shown; commentary: "REER depreciation contributed to improved export competitiveness."
- Direction of exports: increased geographic diversification with shares to "Greece and Italy", "Other EU area", "Exports to Cent. & East. Europe", "Rest of World" shown for 2006–2008.
- Balance of Payments (selected Table 5a, percent of GDP, 2007–15 projections):
  - Current account: -10.3 (2007), -15.3 (2008), -14.0 (2009), -12.6 (2010), -11.3 (2011), -9.4 (2012), -7.5 (2013), -6.2 (2014), -5.2 (2015).
  - Trade balance (goods and services): -26.7 (2007), -26.8 (2008), -25.0 (2009), -22.7 (2010), -22.4 (2011), -20.9 (2012), -19.2 (2013), -17.9 (2014), -16.7 (2015).
  - Exports (percent of GDP): 28.1 (2007), 29.6 (2008), 28.2 (2009), 28.9 (2010), 28.9 (2011), 29.9 (2012), 31.1 (2013), 32.0 (2014), 32.9 (2015).
  - Imports (percent of GDP): 54.9 (2007), 56.5 (2008), 53.2 (2009), 51.6 (2010), 51.3 (2011), 50.7 (2012), 50.3 (2013), 49.9 (2014), 49.6 (2015).
  - Financial account (percent of GDP): 9.8 (2007), 16.7 (2008), 11.4 (2009), 10.2 (2010), 9.3 (2011), 9.1 (2012), 7.7 (2013), 7.3 (2014), 6.6 (2015).
  - Direct investment (percent of GDP): 6.1 (2007), 6.8 (2008), 7.7 (2009), 6.7 (2010), 6.8 (2011), 6.3 (2012), 6.3 (2013), 6.3 (2014), 6.3 (2015).
- Balance of Payments (Table 5b, in millions of Euros, 2007–15 projections):
  - Current account (millions EUR): -809 (2007), -1,342 (2008), -1,227 (2009), -1,101 (2010), -1,040 (2011), -918 (2012), -787 (2013), -703 (2014), -638 (2015).
  - Exports of goods and services (millions EUR): 2,202 (2007), 2,605 (2008), 2,469 (2009), 2,529 (2010), 2,661 (2011), 2,931 (2012), 3,274 (2013), 3,633 (2014), 4,035 (2015).
  - Imports of goods and services (millions EUR): 4,293 (2007), 4,967 (2008), 4,652 (2009), 4,510 (2010), 4,724 (2011), 4,977 (2012), 5,297 (2013), 5,668 (2014), 6,090 (2015).
  - Gross usable reserves (millions EUR): 1,467 (2007), 1,721 (2008), 1,621 (2009), 1,586 (2010), 1,580 (2011), 1,725 (2012), 1,924 (2013), 2,226 (2014), 2,571 (2015).
  - GDP in Euros (memorandum): 7,823 (2007), 8,796 (2008), 8,749 (2009), 8,742 (2010), 9,208 (2011), 9,810 (2012), 10,528 (2013), 11,358 (2014), 12,281 (2015).

### Basic indicators and macroeconomic framework, 2007–15 (Table 1 and Tables 2a/2b)
- Real GDP growth (growth rate in percent):
  - 2007: 6.0
  - 2008: 7.8
  - 2009: 2.8 (Est.)
  - 2010: 2.3
  - 2011: 3.2
  - 2012: 3.6
  - 2013: 4.2
  - 2014: 4.7
  - 2015: 5.0
- Retail prices (avg.): 2.9 (2007), 3.4 (2008), 2.2 (2009), 3.5 (2010), 2.9 (2011), 3.0 (2012), 2.9 (2013), 3.0 (2014), 3.0 (2015).
- Saving-investment balance (percent of GDP):
  - Foreign savings: 10.3 (2007), 15.3 (2008), 14.0 (2009), 12.6 (2010), 11.3 (2011), 9.4 (2012), 7.5 (2013), 6.2 (2014), 5.2 (2015).
  - National savings: 19.1; 17.3; 15.0; 13.3; 14.8; 16.9; 19.0; 20.3; 21.5 (2007–15).
  - Investment: 29.4; 32.5; 29.0; 25.9; 26.1; 26.2; 26.5; 26.5; 26.7.
- Fiscal sector (percent of GDP):
  - Revenues and grants: 25.7 (2007), 26.8 (2008), 26.0 (2009), 25.2 (2010), 25.0 (2011), 25.4 (2012), 25.7 (2013), 25.9 (2014), 26.0 (2015).
  - Expenditures: 29.6 (2007), 32.3 (2008), 33.4 (2009), 30.3 (2010), 31.1 (2011), 31.6 (2012), 31.9 (2013), 32.1 (2014), 32.2 (2015).
  - Overall balance (including grants): -3.9 (2007), -5.5 (2008), -7.4 (2009), -5.2 (2010), -6.1 (2011), -6.1 (2012), -6.1 (2013), -6.2 (2014), -6.2 (2015).
  - Primary balance (including grants): -1.2; -2.7; -4.3; -1.8; -2.3; -2.3; -2.3; -2.2; -2.1 (2007–15).
  - Public debt: 53.9 (2007), 55.2 (2008), 59.7 (2009), 62.8 (2010), 65.1 (2011), 66.9 (2012), 68.1 (2013), 69.1 (2014), 69.9 (2015).
    - Domestic: 38.2; 36.8; 36.0; 36.6; 38.2; 40.1; 43.0; 46.1; 49.3.
    - External (including publicly guaranteed): 15.7; 18.4; 23.7; 26.2; 26.9; 26.8; 25.1; 23.0; 20.6.
- Monetary indicators (percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated):
  - Broad money growth (annual): 13.7 (2007), 7.7 (2008), 6.8 (2009), 7.0 (2010), 9.0 (2011), 11.5 (2012), 13.0 (2013), 13.5 (2014), 13.5 (2015).
  - Private credit growth: 48.2 (2007), 32.1 (2008), 10.3 (2009), 8.6 (2010), 8.1 (2011), 7.6 (2012), 6.9 (2013), 5.9 (2014), 5.7 (2015).
  - Interest rate (3-mth T-bills, end-period): 6.3 (2007), 6.3 (2008), 6.3 (2009); later years shown as "...".
- External sector (percent of GDP):
  - Trade balance (goods and services): -26.7 (2007), -26.8 (2008), -25.0 (2009), -22.7 (2010), -22.4 (2011), -20.9 (2012), -19.2 (2013), -18.0 (2014), -16.8 (2015).
  - Current account balance (including official transfers): -10.3; -15.3; -14.0; -12.6; -11.3; -9.4; -7.5; -6.2; -5.2.
  - Gross international reserves (in millions of Euros): 1,467 (2007), 1,721 (2008), 1,621 (2009), 1,586 (2010), 1,580 (2011), 1,725 (2012), 1,924 (2013), 2,226 (2014), 2,571 (2015).
    - In months of imports of goods and services: 4.1; 4.2; 4.2; 4.2; 4.0; 4.2; 4.4; 4.7; 5.1.
    - Relative to external debt service: 12.1; 12.4; 9.5; 3.7; 6.3; 6.9; 7.2; 6.8; 4.0.
    - In percent of broad money: 23.3; 26.1; 26.0; 23.9; 21.9; 21.5; 21.3; 21.7; 22.1.
- Memorandum: Nominal GDP (in billions of lek): 967 (2007), 1,088 (2008), 1,153 (2009), 1,217 (2010), 1,295 (2011), 1,384 (2012), 1,487 (2013), 1,604 (2014), 1,735 (2015).

### Fiscal composition and projections (Tables 2a/2b)
- Revenue composition (percent of GDP, 2008–15 projections):
  - VAT: 9.1 (2008), 9.8 (2009), 9.5 (2010), 9.3 (2011), 9.2 (2012), 9.5 (2013), 9.6 (2014), 9.7 (2015).
  - Profit tax: 2.2; 1.7; 1.5; 1.5; 1.5; 1.5; 1.6; 1.6.
  - Excise tax: 3.0; 3.0; 2.9; 2.9; 2.9; 2.9; 2.9; 2.9.
  - Social insurance contributions: 4.3; 4.4; 4.3; 4.2; 4.2; 4.3; 4.5; 4.5; 4.6 (2007–15 series).
- Expenditure composition (percent of GDP, 2008–15 projections):
  - Current expenditure: 23.3 (2008), 23.2 (2009), 24.5 (2010), 24.8 (2011), 25.3 (2012), 25.7 (2013), 26.0 (2014), 26.3 (2015).
  - Capital expenditure: 5.9 (2007), 8.6 (2008), 8.8 (2009), 5.1 (2010), 5.2 (2011), 5.2 (2012), 5.2 (2013), 5.2 (2014), 5.2 (2015).
  - Interest: 2.6 (2007), 2.9 (2008), 3.1 (2009), 3.3 (2010), 3.8 (2011), 3.8 (2012), 3.9 (2013), 4.0 (2014), 4.1 (2015).
- Financing:
  - Domestic financing (percent of GDP): 3.3 (2007), 2.2 (2008), 3.7 (2009), 2.0 (2010), 3.8 (2011), 4.4 (2012), 5.7 (2013), 6.2 (2014), 6.7 (2015).
  - Foreign financing: 0.5 (2007), 3.2 (2008), 3.7 (2009), 3.1 (2010), 2.3 (2011), 1.7 (2012), 0.4 (2013), 0.0 (2014), -0.5 (2015).
  - Privatization receipts: 1.6 (2007), 0.5 (2008), 2.4 (2009), 0.0 thereafter.

### Monetary aggregates and banking sector quantities (Tables 4a/4b)
- Broad money (percent of GDP / in billions of lek):
  - As percent of GDP (selected): 78.4 (2007), 75.0 (2008), 69.9 (2009); end-period series in later tables.
  - In billions of lek (end-period projections): 757.6 (2007), 815.7 (2008), 805.4 (2009), 819.4 (2010), 843.6 (2011), 871.5 (2012), 932.5 (2013), 1,016.4 (2014), 1,133.3 (2015), continuing upward to 1,649.7 in projection series.
- Currency outside banks and deposits (billions of lek): currency outside banks 155.0 (2007), 195.8 (2008), 201.0 (2009), ... up to 395.9 (projection end series); deposits 602.7; 619.9; 604.4; ... up to 1,253.8.
- Net foreign assets (billions of lek): 232.1 (2007), 206.7 (2008), 197.3 (2009), ... up to 378.5.
- Net domestic assets and claims on government and private sector reported in detail for 2007–15 (see tables).
- Key annual growth rates and ratios:
  - Annual broad money growth: 13.7 (2007), 7.7 (2008), 6.7 (2009), 5.9 (2010), 2.8 (2011), 6.8 (2012), 7.0 (2013), 9.0 (2014), 11.5 (2015), 13.0; 13.5; 13.5 in later projection rows.
  - Annual growth in private sector credit: 48.2 (2007), 32.1 (2008), 28.9 (2009), 17.9 (2010), 11.9 (2011), 10.3 (2012), 8.6 (2013), 8.1 (2014), 7.6 (2015), etc.
  - Private sector credit as percent of GDP: 29.6 (2007), 35.0 (2008), 36.0 (2009), 36.0 (2010), 36.7 (2011), 36.8 (2012), 37.7 (2013), 38.3 (2014), 38.6 (2015).

### Selected fiscal and balance-sheet dynamics and projections (Tables 2b, 5b, and memorandum)
- Public debt (billions and percent series in Tables 2b and 5b show rising debt levels across projections):
  - Public Debt (percent of GDP in Table 1): 53.9 (2007) rising to 69.9 (2015).
  - Table 2b shows large numeric expansions in levels (index-like series), including Public Debt: 521.1; 600.2; 688.1; 764.0; 842.8; 925.7; 1,013.0; 1,109.2; 1,212.6 (2007–15 row).
- External debt and debt-service indicators:
  - Total external debt stock (percent of GDP) (Table 5b memorandum): 23.8 (2007), 29.9 (2008), 34.1 (2009), 36.6 (2010), 37.2 (2011), 37.2 (2012), 35.3 (2013), 33.0 (2014), 30.2 (2015).
  - Debt service (percent of exports of goods and services): 2.6 (2007), 2.7 (2008), 5.0 (2009), 12.8 (2010), 5.0 (2011), 4.3 (2012), 3.3 (2013), 3.5 (2014), 10.3 (2015).

*Sources: Albanian authorities; Bank of Albania; Ministry of Finance; IMF staff estimates and projections.*

### Appendix I. Public

### Appendix I. Public

### Debt outlook and projections
- Total public debt "practically reach[ed] the Albanian legal limit of 60 percent of GDP in 2009."
- Staff projects that, "taking into account the authorities’ current medium-term spending plan," debt ratios "will continue to grow and reach 70 percent of GDP in 2015 (Table A.1)."
- The medium-term target is "a debt-to-GDP ratio below 50 percent" as stated in the government's program; this target "will not be met in the baseline scenario."
- The analysis emphasizes that "a drastic reduction of budget deficits in the short run" is needed for debt to converge swiftly to the below-50 percent target.
- Debt financing concerns noted:
  - "The average maturity of domestic debt is still relatively low (as of the beginning of 2010 the duration of the domestic portfolio was 0.8 years)."
  - "The share of concessional lending should decrease in the coming years as Albania seeks financing in international capital markets."

### Debt dynamics for different budget deficits
- The source presents debt paths under alternative constant-deficit scenarios labeled:
  - "3% deficit"
  - "4% deficit"
  - "2% deficit"
- These scenario labels are shown in the chart titled "Debt Dynamics for Different Budget Deficits" covering the period 2009–2029 with markers at 2009, 2014, 2019, 2024, and 2029.

### Stress tests and vulnerabilities
- "Stress tests indicate important vulnerabilities (Figure A.1)."
- Public debt dynamics are "particularly vulnerable to a sharp depreciation of the lek and to a lower than projected growth path (half standard deviation drop)."
- Additionally noted: "persistently higher primary deficits (by" [sentence in source is incomplete in the supplied content].

### Policy implications
- Without further policy adjustment, "public debt levels may turn unsustainable."
- To meet the government's medium-term debt objective ("below 50 percent of GDP") requires "substantial fiscal consolidation" and "a drastic reduction of budget deficits in the short run."
- Financing risks to monitor:
  - Dependence on shorter domestic-debt duration (duration "0.8 years" as of beginning-2010).
  - Reduced availability of concessional lending as external market financing increases.

*Sources: Albanian authorities; and IMF staff estimates.*

### 0.6 percent) due, for example, to a protracted burden of the current social security system, would

### _cr10205 - 0.6 percent) due, for example, to a protracted burden of the current social security system, would

### Public debt outlook and projections
- Baseline: Public sector debt path (public sector debt in percent of GDP)
  - 2005: 58.0
  - 2006: 56.0
  - 2007: 53.9
  - 2008: 55.2
  - 2009: 59.7
  - 2010: 62.8
  - 2011: 65.1
  - 2012: 66.9
  - 2013: 68.1
  - 2014: 69.1
  - 2015: 69.9
- Change in public sector debt (year-on-year)
  - 2005: 0.3
  - 2006: -2.0
  - 2007: -2.1
  - 2008: 1.3
  - 2009: 4.5
  - 2010: 3.1
  - 2011: 2.3
  - 2012: 1.8
  - 2013: 1.2
  - 2014: 1.0
  - 2015: 0.7
- Identified debt-creating flows (4+7+12)
  - 2005: 0.1
  - 2006: -5.9
  - 2007: -17.4
  - 2008: -5.1
  - 2009: -23.8
  - 2010: 2.2
  - 2011: 2.0
  - 2012: 1.7
  - 2013: 1.2
  - 2014: 1.2
  - 2015: 1.0
- Primary deficit (percent of GDP)
  - 2005: 0.5
  - 2006: 0.4
  - 2007: 1.2
  - 2008: 2.7
  - 2009: 3.8
  - 2010: 2.3
  - 2011: 2.3
  - 2012: 2.3
  - 2013: 2.3
  - 2014: 2.2
  - 2015: 2.1
- Public sector debt-to-revenue ratio
  - 2005: 232.4
  - 2006: 221.0
  - 2007: 209.9
  - 2008: 206.1
  - 2009: 230.0
  - 2010: 249.4
  - 2011: 260.3
  - 2012: 263.4
  - 2013: 264.9
  - 2014: 267.1
  - 2015: 268.6
- Gross financing need (percent of GDP)
  - 2005: 4.1
  - 2006: 3.7
  - 2007: 4.3
  - 2008: 5.9
  - 2009: 7.5
  - 2010: 8.4
  - 2011: 6.7
  - 2012: 6.8
  - 2013: 6.8
  - 2014: 7.2
  - 2015: 9.5
- Scenario: with no policy change (constant primary balance) in 2009–2014 leads to public sector debt levels
  - 2009: 59.7
  - 2010: 90.9
  - 2011: 95.2
  - 2012: 98.7
  - 2013: 101.3
  - 2014: 103.4
  - 2015: 105.3

### External debt outlook and projections
- Baseline: External debt (percent of GDP)
  - 2005: 20.4
  - 2006: 25.3
  - 2007: 25.8
  - 2008: 27.6
  - 2009: 34.1
  - 2010: 35.9
  - 2011: 37.0
  - 2012: 37.0
  - 2013: 35.3
  - 2014: 32.9
  - 2015: 30.2
- Change in external debt (year-on-year)
  - 2005: -3.9
  - 2006: 4.9
  - 2007: 0.6
  - 2008: 1.8
  - 2009: 6.5
  - 2010: 1.8
  - 2011: 1.2
  - 2012: 0.0
  - 2013: -1.7
  - 2014: -2.4
  - 2015: -2.7
- Identified external debt-creating flows (4+8+9)
  - 2005: -4.7
  - 2006: -0.1
  - 2007: 0.5
  - 2008: 3.9
  - 2009: 8.2
  - 2010: 5.0
  - 2011: 3.8
  - 2012: 1.7
  - 2013: -0.4
  - 2014: -1.8
  - 2015: -3.0
- Current account deficit, excluding interest payments (percent of GDP)
  - 2005: 5.7
  - 2006: 5.0
  - 2007: 9.7
  - 2008: 14.5
  - 2009: 13.3
  - 2010: 11.4
  - 2011: 10.1
  - 2012: 8.2
  - 2013: 6.5
  - 2014: 5.2
  - 2015: 4.1
- External debt-to-exports ratio (in percent)
  - 2005: 89.4
  - 2006: 100.4
  - 2007: 91.5
  - 2008: 93.4
  - 2009: 120.8
  - 2010: 124.4
  - 2011: 128.1
  - 2012: 123.9
  - 2013: 113.3
  - 2014: 103.0
  - 2015: 91.6
- Gross external financing need (in billions of US dollars)
  - 2005: 551.0
  - 2006: 598.7
  - 2007: 1349.0
  - 2008: 2413.2
  - 2009: 2584.2
  - 2010: 2459.6
  - 2011: 2066.5
  - 2012: 1891.0
  - 2013: 1731.6
  - 2014: 1677.2
  - 2015: 1971.3
- Scenario with key variables at their historical averages projects external debt to:
  - 2009: 35.9
  - 2010: 31.2
  - 2011: 28.5
  - 2012: 26.5
  - 2013: 25.2
  - 2014: 24.6

### Stress tests, shocks, and vulnerabilities
- Staff projections and stress tests indicate:
  - External debt projected to peak at 37 percent of GDP in 2012 and decline to 30 percent of GDP by 2015 under baseline assumptions.
  - Stress tests highlight vulnerabilities to the current account and combined shocks including real interest, growth and current account balance shocks.
  - Under combined shocks, external debt is projected to increase to 42 and 37 percent of GDP by 2015, respectively (text indicates combined shocks including real interest, growth and current account balance shocks).
- Public debt sensitivity:
  - A scenario of unchanged policies would push public debt above 100 percent of GDP by 2015 as privatization proceeds are now mostly exhausted.
  - An illustrative adverse shock (e.g., a persistent social security burden raising deficits by 0.6 percent) would bring debt up to almost 74 percent by 2015 (text statement).

### Key macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions underlying baseline
- Real GDP growth (in percent)
  - 2005: 5.8
  - 2006: 5.5
  - 2007: 6.0
  - 2008: 7.8
  - 2009: 2.8
  - 2010: 2.3
  - 2011: 3.2
  - 2012: 3.6
  - 2013: 4.2
  - 2014: 4.7
  - 2015: 5.0
- Average nominal interest rate on public debt (in percent)
  - 2005: 6.0
  - 2006: 5.3
  - 2007: 5.1
  - 2008: 6.0
  - 2009: 6.0
  - 2010: 5.9
  - 2011: 6.5
  - 2012: 6.3
  - 2013: 6.2
  - 2014: 6.3
  - 2015: 6.4
- Average real interest rate (nominal rate minus change in GDP deflator, in percent)
  - 2005: 3.1
  - 2006: 1.7
  - 2007: 3.0
  - 2008: 1.7
  - 2009: 3.0
  - 2010: 2.7
  - 2011: 3.3
  - 2012: 3.2
  - 2013: 3.1
  - 2014: 3.2
  - 2015: 3.4
- Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent)
  - 2005: 2.9
  - 2006: 3.5
  - 2007: 2.1
  - 2008: 4.3
  - 2009: 3.1
  - 2010: 3.2
  - 2011: 3.1
  - 2012: 3.1
  - 2013: 3.1
  - 2014: 3.1
  - 2015: 3.0
- Growth of real primary spending (deflated by GDP deflator, in percent)
  - 2005: 3.5
  - 2006: 6.8
  - 2007: 10.6
  - 2008: 18.0
  - 2009: 3.9
  - 2010: -5.6
  - 2011: 2.5
  - 2012: 5.3
  - 2013: 5.2
  - 2014: 5.2
  - 2015: 4.9

### IMF assessment, policy recommendations, and risks
- IMF staff and Executive Directors noted:
  - Albania used accumulated fiscal and monetary policy space to cushion crisis impacts; growth continued at an estimated 2.8 percent in 2009 and inflation mostly in line with the target of 3±1 percent.
  - Policy buffers are now exhausted and need rebuilding given external risks and domestic vulnerabilities.
- Recommended policy actions:
  - Timely and decisive fiscal tightening in 2010 to reduce financing risks and crowding out of private investment.
  - Implement both one-off and structural revenue and expenditure measures; save remaining contingency reserves in the 2010 budget.
  - Pursue civil service reform; keep wages and pensions in check; strengthen public investment execution.
  - Adopt a sound medium-term fiscal policy framework governed by a credible and monitorable fiscal rule to lower public debt to sustainable levels.
  - Continue vigilant bank supervision and macroprudential measures; develop contingency plans to deal with tail risks.
  - Continue cautious monetary stance and focus on anchoring inflation expectations while mindful of financial stability considerations.
  - Advance structural reforms to improve business environment, investor protection, property rights, rule enforcement, and statistical quality.
- Specific vulnerabilities highlighted:
  - Risks associated with current account and external shocks.
  - Rising public debt under no policy change scenario (above 100 percent of GDP by 2015).
  - Dependence on privatization receipts to offset debt-creating flows (privatization receipts decline to 0.0 by 2014–2015 in projections).

### Selected country indicators (high-level)
- Real GDP growth: 2009 est.: 2.8; 2010 proj.: 2.3
- Retail prices (avg.): 2009: 2.2; 2010 proj.: 3.5
- Revenues and grants (percent of GDP): 2009: 26.0; 2010 proj.: 25.2
- Expenditures (percent of GDP): 2009: 33.4; 2010 proj.: 30.3
- Overall balance (including grants, percent of GDP): 2009: -7.4; 2010 proj.: -5.2
- Primary balance (including grants, percent of GDP): 2009: -4.3; 2010 proj.: -1.8
- Public debt (percent of GDP): 2009: 59.7; 2010 proj.: 62.8
- Current account balance (including official transfers, percent of GDP): 2009: -14.0; 2010 proj.: -12.6
- Gross international reserves (in millions of Euros): 2009: 1,621; 2010 proj.: 1,586
- Public and external debt composition (public debt percent of GDP)
  - Domestic: 2009: 36.0; 2010 proj.: 36.6
  - External (including publicly guaranteed): 2009: 23.7; 2010 proj.: 26.2

*Source: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Staff Report for the 2010 Article IV Consultation — Informational Annex (April 23, 2010) as provided in the content unit.*

### 1. This paper briefly summarizes recent developments since the issuance of SM/10/100.

### _cr10205 - 1. This paper briefly summarizes recent developments since the issuance of SM/10/100.

### Summary of additional information and staff appraisal
- The additional information does not change the thrust of the staff appraisal.
- Official figures suggest a sharper than expected fall in GDP in the fourth quarter of last year; however, earlier quarters could have been higher than assumed.
- On balance, staff believe that the growth estimate in SM/10/100 of 2.8 percent for 2009 remains valid.
- If confirmed, the sharp downturn in the fourth quarter could imply a more significant negative carry-over effect into 2010, so that the growth projection of 2.3 percent could be revised down.

### Growth and inflation
- GDP and growth
  - Staff growth estimate for 2009: 2.8 percent.
  - Staff growth projection for 2010: 2.3 percent (subject to downward revision if Q4 weakness persists).
- Inflation developments
  - Consumer price inflation returned to the 3±1 percent target range.
  - Inflation was 3.9 percent in March, and 3.5 percent in April 2010.
  - The decline in inflation was mainly owing to dropping food price inflation.
  - These developments are broadly in line with the profile underlying the staff forecast for average and end-period inflation in 2010.

### Fiscal developments and budgetary outlook
- First-quarter budget
  - The first quarter budget deficit was somewhat higher than expected, but staff believe the full year projection remains valid.
  - Revenue developments were fully in line with staff’s projections.
  - Expenditure came in some 10 percent higher than forecast, owing to significant growth in current spending—especially on social insurance outlays and operations and maintenance—that is expected to be offset by lower capital spending going forward.
- Authorities’ intentions and measures
  - Authorities indicated their intention to effect a mid-year budget tightening.
  - They intend to use the budget review exercise to keep public debt within the 60 percent of GDP legal ceiling.
  - The authorities reported their intention to make progress in introducing a fiscal rule that would be operationalized through deficit ceilings.

### Banking system liquidity and deposit flows
- Liquidity in the banking system has continued to improve, driven by deposit inflows.
- Following the IMF-EU program with Greece, Greek-owned banks (which had earlier seen some deposit withdrawals) are now also part of the system-wide deposit growth.

### Statement by Mr. Sadun and Mr. Spadafora on Albania (May 24, 2010) — Overview
- Global crisis impact
  - The global crisis impacted the Albanian economy through lower exports and remittances, reduced capital inflows, heightened risks in the financial sector, and a moderation of domestic demand due to higher precautionary saving.
- Resilience and policy response
  - Albania weathered the global crisis better than most other regional and European economies.
  - The authorities used policy space accumulated during years of strong growth (over 6 percent on average during 2005–08) to mitigate consequences of the deteriorating external environment.
  - Monetary conditions were repeatedly eased and a considerable fiscal stimulus was provided by acting on both the revenues and expenditure side.
  - The depreciation of the lek (by a cumulative 14 percent) helped mitigate the fall in exports; export performance has improved significantly since the beginning of 2010.
  - Current account deficits mainly reflect an ambitious public investment program and transition-driven productivity gains; about half of these deficits have been financed by net inflows of foreign direct investments.
  - External debt is low and reserves coverage remains high.
- Growth outlook and baseline
  - INSTAT estimated growth at 3.3 percent in 2009.
  - A V-shaped recovery constitutes the baseline scenario.
  - Authorities expect activity to bounce back more quickly than staff projections because of gains from large investments and structural reforms undertaken in the past.
  - Authorities’ 2010 policies aim at preserving macroeconomic stability, consolidating public finances and advancing structural reforms.

### Fiscal Policy (authorities’ position and measures)
- Fiscal targets and framework
  - In the Macroeconomic and Fiscal Framework 2011–2013 approved by the Council of Ministers on January 2010, the government targeted a reduction in the overall deficit from 7.4 percent of GDP in 2009 to 3 percent over the medium term.
  - Targeted overall deficit not exceeding 4 percent of GDP in 2010, and of 3 percent during 2011-2013.
  - Public investment scaled back from 8.8 percent of GDP in 2009 to 5.2 percent.
- 2010 budget adjustments
  - The 2010 budget has been strengthened through one-off expenditure cuts of about 30 billion lek (2.5 percent of GDP).
  - The budget allows for contingency funds should revenues fall below projections.
- Mid-term review and fiscal rule
  - The forthcoming mid-term budget review in the summer will verify that the current fiscal stance is in line with objectives and ascertain the need for corrective measures.
  - Authorities intend to adopt a fiscal rule and currently favor a deficit rule over an expenditure one.
  - The deficit rule places greater emphasis on protecting recent gains in tax administration and the overall fiscal balance.
- Financing strategy
  - Authorities are seeking to place a Eurobond to lessen reliance on short-term domestic financing, although current conditions in international markets may affect timing, size and pricing.
- Views on Fund support
  - Authorities consider that current economic perspectives do not call for a Fund-supported program.
- Cash-basis note
  - On a cash basis, the deficit was 6.9 percent, of which 2.4 percent was financed through privatization receipts.

### Monetary Policy and the Financial Sector
- Monetary framework
  - The prevailing framework is an inflation target range combined with a flexible exchange rate, which has increased resilience and kept inflation expectations well anchored.
  - The exchange rate acted as a shock absorber for the 2007-08 energy and food price shocks and eased adjustment to the global crisis.
- Banking system strengths and supervisory measures
  - Financial system entered the crisis well capitalized, relying on a funding model based on domestic deposits; it is relatively solvent, liquid, and profitable.
  - Bank of Albania’s strong supervision enabled banks to build large liquidity and capital buffers.
  - BoA proactively adopted macroprudential measures that slowed credit growth and limited balance sheet effects of unhedged foreign currency lending.
- Deposit withdrawals and recovery
  - Albanian banks experienced substantial panic deposit withdrawals amid global market instability and concerns about Greek banking system health in fall 2008.
  - Ample liquidity buffers were used to meet withdrawals.
  - Deposit insurance limits were raised fivefold, and deposits started to recover from the second half of 2009.
- Resilience assessments
  - Stress tests suggest the banking system has sufficient buffers to weather the expected downturn.
  - Albanian firms and households are only moderately leveraged compared to South Eastern European peers.
- Vigilance and cross-border coordination
  - Authorities remain vigilant given the preponderance of foreign-owned banks; BoA has stepped up cross-border coordination with regional supervisors and parent-bank supervisors.

### Structural reforms and competitiveness
- Labor and business environment
  - Albania’s light regulation provides flexibility, especially in labor markets; wage levels are among the lowest in the region.
  - Improving the business environment is paramount to exploit benefits from prospective EU integration.
- Investment and financial sector development
  - Greater investment is needed to raise productivity and strengthen competitiveness and broaden growth sources.
  - Authorities plan a number of industrial zones to attract additional investment, including from abroad.
  - Authorities continue to work with the World Bank to develop the insurance and pension sectors to provide longer-term funds for investment.

*Source: _cr10205 - 1. This paper briefly summarizes recent developments since the issuance of SM/10/100.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/_cr10205.pdf_
