## _cr10353 — Assessment of Compliance with the Basel Core Principles (Republic of South Africa, as of end-March 2010)

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### A. Overall assessment and key findings
- Banking supervision in South Africa has been effective and contributed to reducing the impact on the global financial crisis; banks remained profitable and capital adequacy ratios were maintained well above the regulatory minimum.
- BSD early adoption and full implementation of the Basel II framework on 1 January 2008; implementation described as “rigorous and comprehensive.”
- Strengthening since 2000 and 2008 FSAPs: legal framework for combating money laundering, regulatory powers for related party lending, consolidated supervision, and improved cooperation with the Financial Services Board (FSB).
- Principal areas needing improvement:
  - Capital adequacy regulation should allow explicit revocation of the advanced approaches for credit and market risk.
  - A specific regulation dealing with country and transfer risk should be promulgated; BSD lacks a consolidated view of banks’ individual country and transfer risks.
  - Prudential returns should be expanded to include information on country and transfer risk exposures and related party lending.
  - Registrar’s remedial powers are limited: cannot appoint a curator at a bank without CEO or chairperson consent; severe limitations on authority to cancel or suspend a bank’s license and mandatory notice periods constrain decisive action.
  - BSD appears short of human resources given rising complexity; needs expanded expertise in operational risk (including IT risk), AML/CFT, and more staff for credit risk reviews.
  - BSD’s extensive reliance on internal and external auditors for IT operational risk matters is not in line with international best practice.

### B. Institutional and market structure (key statistics and dates)
- Assessment timing and methodology:
  - Assessment conducted in March 2010; reflects practices as of end-March 2010.
  - Methodology: Core Principles (CPs) Methodology, Basel Committee, October 2006; ratings based on “essential” criteria.
- Banking sector structure:
  - 34 commercial banks: 13 locally controlled banks, 6 subsidiaries of foreign banks, 13 local branches of foreign banks, 2 mutual banks.
  - 41 representative offices of foreign banks.
  - Industry dominated by four large banks; their assets represent approximately 85 percent of total banking assets.
- Key dates and regulatory implementation:
  - Basel II implemented for all banks (except mutual banks) on 1 January 2008.
  - Draft Deposit insurance bill 2008 circulated; no timeline set for finalization or public consultation.

### C. Capital adequacy framework and supervisory capital practice (Principle 6)
- Capital definitions and minimums:
  - Capital = Tier 1 + Tier 2 + Tier 3.
  - Tier 1 must constitute at least 50 percent of the bank’s capital.
  - Minimum ratios (paragraph 4 of Regulation 38):
    - minimum Tier 1 ratio at 7 percent,
    - minimum core Tier 1 ratio at 5.25 percent,
    - minimum total capital ratio at 9.5 percent.
  - An additional systemic requirement of 1.5 percent (Pillar 2a charge defined in reporting form BA700) is imposed across the board on top of the internationally agreed minimum capital ratio of 8 percent.
  - Banks required to keep an idiosyncratic capital buffer (Pillar 2b); sum of Pillar 2a and Pillar 2b regarded as the hard floor for target ratios.
- Use of internal models and advanced approaches:
  - Accreditation requires registrar approval with references to Regulation 23(10) a, Regulation 33(3)(b-c), and Regulation 28(4)b.
  - Registrar has explicit revocation power for operational risk advanced approaches (Regulation 33(6)); no explicit revocation power in regulation for credit and market risk (revocation included in approval conditions).
  - Recommendation: add explicit revocation power to regulation for credit and market risk similar to Regulation 33(6).
- Supervisory practice:
  - ICAAP assessed at least biannually for low risk banks and annually for higher risk banks.
  - Registrar uses moral suasion and enforcement powers (e.g., suspension of dividends, directives, fines under Section 74 and BA section 91A).

### D. Supervisory powers, enforcement and remedial action (Principle 1 and CP23)
- Registrar powers include:
  - raising an individual bank’s capital requirement (Regulation 38(4));
  - derecognizing fitness and propriety of executive officers (BA section 60(6)(a));
  - full access to relevant information (BA sections 6, 7);
  - imposing fines (BA section 91A).
- Limitations and procedural constraints:
  - Minister of finance required for setting prudential regulations (BA section 6(4)); ministerial role in cancellation or suspension (BA section 23) and curator appointment (BA section 69) — written consent of the bank’s CEO or chairperson required for curator appointment.
  - BA section 25: registrar may apply to a competent court for cancellation or suspension; BA section 26 allows restricting activities instead of court order.
  - Time-lag: before restricting activities or cancelling/suspending under certain sections, registrar must notify bank and allow at least 30 days to respond; during this period the bank may continue operations.
- Compliance assessment and dispute:
  - Assessors rate registrar’s remedial powers as materially constrained; assessment: Materially non-compliant for aspects related to decisive remedial action.
  - BSD disputes the “materially non-compliant” rating for CP23 and requests amendment to “compliant,” arguing ministerial roles are a “check and balance” and that practice has shown timely action is feasible.

### E. Supervisory reporting, data quality and information gaps (Principles 11, 12, 21)
- Reporting regimes and certification:
  - BA section 75 and Regulation 7 require returns on capital, liquidity, credit risk, market risk, operational risk, large exposures, etc., submitted both solo and consolidated; returns prepared in accordance with IFRS.
  - CEO, chief accounting officer and executive officer responsible for FICA compliance must certify each submission.
  - External auditors required to report on year-end returns and significant weaknesses (Regulation 46 and BA section 63).
- Notable reporting gaps identified:
  - Related party exposures:
    - Regulation 36 defines related persons and requires board-approved policies; aggregate related party exposures (except intragroup exposures exceeding 1 percent of group qualifying capital and reserve funds) are not regularly reported to BSD.
    - Assessment: Materially non-compliant for Principle 11.
    - BSD considering adding related party exposures as a separate reportable item on form BA 600.
  - Country and transfer risk:
    - No specific regulation or prudential limits for country or transfer risk; exposures expected to be captured in overall credit risk management and ICAAP.
    - Form BA210 reports exposures by 6 geographic regions.
    - Assessors note lack of consolidated view of banks’ individual country and transfer risks; assessment: Materially non-compliant for CP12.
    - Reported distribution: approximately 90 per cent of South African banks’ credit exposure relates to exposure within South Africa, with the remaining approximately 10 per cent distributed between all other countries across the world.
    - Recommended actions: promulgate a regulation specifically dealing with country and transfer risk; increase granularity of regional exposures on BA610; provide more guidance on scope of external auditors’ work under Regulation 46(4).

### F. Deposit insurance and crisis management
- Deposit insurance status:
  - Draft Deposit insurance bill 2008 circulated by the National Treasury; discussions ongoing with no timeline for finalization or public consultation.
  - Issues complicating progress: integration into existing supervisory landscape, accounting for specificities of the South African financial system, and the predominant role of corporate depositors in past bank runs.
  - Assessors note absence of explicit deposit insurance regulation may have adverse effects in light of December 2009 Basel Committee draft liquidity proposals.
- Crisis preparedness and safety net:
  - Financial Sector Contingency Forum (FSCF) created in 2002; structure reviewed in late 2009 creating two subcommittees (Operational Subcommittee and Financial Risk Subcommittee).
  - SARB can provide exceptional liquidity assistance against pledged collateral or a government guarantee; eligible collateral could be further clarified in a regulation under the SARB Act of 1989.

### G. Risk areas and supervisory capacity (Principles 15, 17, 19, 20)
- Operational risk and IT:
  - Operational risk framework in Regulations 33 and 34; BSD collects BA 410 operational loss data.
  - Specialist operational risk team lacks strong IT skills; BSD relies heavily on banks’ internal audit and external auditors for IT assessment — identified supervisory weakness.
  - Recommendation: prioritize IT capacity building within BSD and clarify business continuity requirements into regulation.
- AML/CFT and FICA:
  - FIC created by FIC Act (FICA) of 2001; FICA obligations embedded in supervisory framework (Regulation 36(17)(a), Regulation 47, Regulation 49).
  - BSD commissioned detailed external audits and conducted its own 2006/2007 FICA compliance review; assessment: Compliant.
  - Recommendation: BSD expand in-house forensic/FICA expertise; consider amending Banks Act to allow the registrar to impose fines for FICA offences (per FATF recommendation).
- Supervisory approach and resourcing:
  - Risk-based SREP in place; quarterly risk classification (high/medium/low) determines supervisory cycle: 12, 18, or 24 month cycles depending on systemic relevance and bank-specific risk.
  - Specialist teams and resource constraints:
    - Credit risk review team of six specialists; three market risk specialists; four quantitative experts; two capital experts; one consolidated supervision specialist; one operational risk specialist; one disclosure specialist.
    - BSD staffing shortfalls noted for credit file sampling, IT risk, forensic work.
  - Recommendation: expand staff and develop integrated IT tools for risk analysis and monitoring.

### H. Selected regulatory thresholds, forms and legal provisions (exact figures and references)
- Minimum initial capital for licensing: R 250,000,000 (Banks Act).
- Large exposure board approval threshold: exposures greater than 10 percent of qualifying capital require board or board Committee approval; aggregate of exposures exceeding 10 percent must be less than 800 percent of qualifying capital (Section 73(1)a and (1)b).
- Registrar approval threshold: exposures exceeding 25 percent of qualifying capital require written approval of the registrar (Section 73(2)a).
- Reporting forms referenced: BA002 (Application for Authorisation/Registration), BA099 (monthly FICA compliance certification), BA210 (quarterly geographic exposure breakdown), BA300 (monthly liquidity), BA320/BA325 (market risk), BA330 (interest rate risk in the banking book), BA410 (operational loss/event data), BA600 (consolidated returns), BA610 (cross-border operations).
- Systemic Pillar 2a charge: 1.5 percent imposed across the board (Pillar 2a defined in BA700).
- Basel II implementation date: 1 January 2008.

### I. Priority recommendations (enumerated)
- Promulgate a specific regulation for country and transfer risk and increase granularity of geographical exposure reporting (forms BA210/BA610).
- Expand prudential returns to capture related party exposures individually and in aggregate (consider adding related party reporting to form BA600).
- Amend capital adequacy regulations to include explicit revocation powers for advanced approaches for credit and market risk analogous to Regulation 33(6).
- Strengthen registrar’s remedial toolset and procedures to ensure decisive and timely action (reconsider ministerial consent and procedural delays related to curator appointment and cancellation/suspension powers).
- Implement a deposit insurance scheme with mandatory membership in the commercial banking sector to protect small depositors and reduce contagion risk.
- Enhance BSD staffing and specialist expertise in operational/IT risk, AML/CFT (forensic skills), and credit risk reviews; reduce reliance on external auditors for core supervisory assessments.
- Provide clearer guidance to external auditors under Regulation 46(4) on the scope of work related to provisioning, country/transfer risk, and other prudential topics.

*Source: Assessment of compliance with the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision in the Republic of South Africa, as of end-March 2010.*

### 1. Summary of Compliance with the Basel Core Principles ....................................................40

### 1. Summary of Compliance with the Basel Core Principles

### A. Summary — overall assessment and key findings
- Banking supervision in South Africa has been effective and contributed to reducing the impact on the financial sector of the global financial crisis; banks remained profitable and capital adequacy ratios were maintained well above the regulatory minimum.
- The registrar’s direct access to the board and the audit committee, combined with sound governance requirements, has been effective in raising board awareness of regulatory and supervisory matters and ensuring strong risk management in South African banks.
- The Bank Supervision Department (BSD) of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB):
  - Early adoption and full implementation of the Basel II framework in an emerging market environment on 1 January 2008.
  - Continuous efforts to remain in line with subsequent international developments.
  - Implementation of a systemic risk-add on and idiosyncratic capital buffers that contributed to the strength and stability of the banking system.
  - Overall implementation of the Basel II advanced approaches described as rigorous and comprehensive.
- Strengthening since 2000 and 2008 FSAPs:
  - Legal framework and practical arrangements introduced for combating money laundering and other financial crime.
  - Regulatory powers for related party lending introduced.
  - Supervision applied on a consolidated basis; cooperation between BSD and the Financial Services Board (FSB) has advanced.
  - Authorities are encouraged to further intensify cooperation (e.g., joint inspections at group level and exchange of supervisory reports on individual groups).
- Areas needing improvement:
  - Capital adequacy regulation should allow explicit revocation of the advanced approaches for credit and market risk.
  - A specific regulation dealing with country and transfer risk should be drafted; BSD lacks a consolidated view of banks’ individual country and transfer risks.
  - Prudential returns should be expanded to include information on country and transfer risk exposures and related party lending.
  - Registrar’s remedial powers are limited: cannot appoint a curator at a bank; severe limitations on authority to cancel or suspend a bank’s license, constraining decisive action.
  - BSD appears short of human resources given rising complexity; needs expanded expertise in operational risk (including IT risk), AML/CFT, and more staff for credit risk reviews.
  - BSD’s extensive reliance on internal and external auditors for IT operational risk matters is not in line with international best practice.

### B. Introduction, scope and timing
- Assessment undertaken as part of a joint IMF-World Bank Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) mission.
- The assessment was conducted in March 2010 and reflects banking supervision practices as of end-March 2010.
- Assessment team members: Katia D’Hulster (World Bank) and Jan Rein Pruntel (Consultant to the IMF).
- Methodology: performed in accordance with the Core Principles (CPs) Methodology issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, October 2006; ratings based on compliance with the “essential” criteria.

### C. Information and methodology used for assessment
- Sources used:
  - A self-assessment prepared by the BSD of the SARB.
  - Detailed interviews with the registrar and BSD staff.
  - Reading of laws, regulations, and other documentation on the supervisory framework and the financial sector.
  - Meetings with the National Treasury, the Financial Services Board, the banking association, individual institutions, and an accountancy firm.
  - Consideration of the report of the 2008 FSAP.
- The assessment covered both “essential” and “additional” criteria; ratings reflect “essential” criteria only.
- Assessment is based on laws, supervisory requirements, and practices in place at the time; assessors noted regulatory initiatives not yet completed or implemented.

### D. Institutional and macro-prudential setting; market structure overview
- Legal framework and responsibilities:
  - The South African Reserve Bank Act of 1989, the Banks Act of 1990, and the Mutual Banks Act of 1993 assign bank registration and supervision to the SARB.
  - Bank registration and supervision powers assigned within SARB to an Office for Banks (Bank Supervision Department, BSD) headed by the registrar of Banks.
  - Registrar is an employee of the SARB, accountable to the Governor and has a direct reporting line to the minister.
- Other authorities involved in supervision:
  - Financial Services Board (FSB) — supervises non-bank financial institutions.
  - Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) — combats abuse of financial services.
  - National Credit Regulator (NCR) — principally a consumer protection agency.
  - Relevant Acts provide for cooperation between SARB and these authorities.
- Banking sector structure and concentrations:
  - There are 34 commercial banks in South Africa:
    - 13 are locally controlled banks,
    - 6 are subsidiaries of foreign banks,
    - 13 are local branches of foreign banks,
    - 2 are mutual banks.
  - There are also 41 representative offices of foreign banks.
  - The banking industry is dominated by four large banks; their assets represent approximately 85 percent of total banking assets.
  - Locally incorporated banks have subsidiaries and branches primarily in other African countries, Europe and Asia.
- BSD mission and approach:
  - Mission commits to “the effective and efficient application of international regulatory and supervisory standards”.
  - BSD uses a risk-based approach; banks consider supervision to be strict but fair and effective.
- Performance during the global financial crisis:
  - South African financial sector fared relatively well, attributed to domestic orientation and quality of supervision.
  - Banks’ asset quality deteriorated over the past two years but remained profitable and maintained capital adequacy ratios above the minimum requirement.
  - No government support or LOLR operations by the SARB were needed.
  - As of the fourth quarter of 2009, credit impairment trends started to improve.

### E. Preconditions for effective banking supervision
- Macroeconomic policy stance:
  - Policies described as countercyclical, with a large investment-centered fiscal stimulus over the past two years and substantial monetary easing.
  - Budget plans envisage a moderation in spending growth over the medium term.
  - Risks to the medium-term fiscal position if complementary reforms to improve public service delivery and infrastructure efficiency are delayed.
  - Authorities intend to run a disciplined and pragmatic fiscal policy, including taking action well before net government and government guaranteed debt reaches their debt limit of 50 percent of GDP.
- Monetary policy:
  - Monetary policy stance described as appropriate.
  - SARB is aware of inflation risks and intends to use monetary policy to anchor inflation expectations and keep inflation within its target band.
- Legal, accounting and public infrastructure:
  - Legal and accounting infrastructure comparable to many advanced economies.
  - Contract and property laws based on common law and enforceable; commercial court system efficient.
  - Accounting and auditing standards reported to be among the best in the world.
  - Auditing Professions Act of 2005 governs accounting and auditing professions; IFRS and International Auditing Standards adopted.
- Market discipline and disclosure:
  - From 2004, South Africa adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) issued by the IASB.
  - Financial statements must be prepared in accordance with IFRS, provide a true and fair view; annual accounts must be audited; half-yearly reports subject to review or audit.
  - Listed companies subject to modern continuous disclosure regime; banks subject to specific disclosure requirements including publication of annual reports.
  - SARB prescribes key elements to be disclosed, including governance and risk-management arrangements, and publishes financial statement information on the industry.
- Crisis preparedness and public safety net:
  - Framework for domestic contingency planning strengthened; channels of communication expanded between National Treasury (NT) and SARB.
  - Financial Sector Contingency Forum (FSCF) created in 2002 to facilitate cross-sector cooperation on stability threats and coordinate crisis resolution; structure reviewed in late 2009 creating two subcommittees: the Operational Subcommittee and the Financial Risk Subcommittee.
  - SARB reviewing contingency planning and crisis management strategies as part of FSCF work.
  - SARB can provide exceptional liquidity assistance against pledged collateral or a government guarantee.
  - Eligible collateral for lender of last resort operations could be further clarified in a regulation under the SARB Act of 1989 to describe criteria, lending programs, terms and conditions, and types of eligible collateral.
- Deposit insurance:
  - Implementation of a deposit insurance scheme with mandatory membership in the commercial banking sector is needed.
  - Deposit insurance should primarily aim to protect small depositors and avoid creating ambiguities in bank intervention powers.
  - As plans for a specific regime for deposit insurance for cooperative banks may progress faster, implementation of an explicit scheme with mandatory membership in the commercial banking sector is needed to level the playing field and limit potential for contagion.

*Source: Assessment of compliance with the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision in the Republic of South Africa, as of end-March 2010.*

### 25. Limited progress has been made in the launching a deposit insurance scheme in

### _cr10353 - 25. Limited progress has been made in the launching a deposit insurance scheme in

### Deposit insurance: status and immediate concerns
- A draft Deposit insurance bill 2008 has been circulated by the National Treasury to interested parties for comments.
- Discussions between the relevant parties are still ongoing and no timeline for finalization or public consultation of the proposals has been set.
- Challenges complicating progress:
  - Integration into the current supervisory and regulatory landscape.
  - Need to take into account the specificities of the South African financial system.
  - Predominant role of corporate depositors in previous bank run episodes.
- In light of the recent draft liquidity proposals issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in December 2009, the absence of explicit deposit insurance regulation may have an adverse effect on the South African banks.

### Institutional context and stakeholders
- Members of the Forum include the SARB, FSB, NT, the Banking Association of South Africa, the Life Offices Association, the South African insurance association, the JSE, BESA, the Payment Association of South Africa, BANKSERV and STRATE.
- The draft bill has been circulated by the National Treasury; relevant supervisory and regulatory authorities remain engaged in ongoing discussions.

### Supervisory framework — Principle 1: objectives, autonomy, powers, resources
- Core responsibilities and legal bases:
  - Section 10(1)(v) of the South African Reserve Bank Act of 1989 assigns responsibility for performing the functions specified in the Banks Act of 1990 and the Mutual Banks Act of 1993 to the SARB.
  - Section 3 of the Banks Act establishes an Office for Banks (Bank Supervision Department, BSD) headed by the registrar of Banks responsible for registration and supervision of banks and mutual banks.
  - Regulations issued under the Banks Act have the same legal status as the Act itself (BA section 1).
- Regulatory review and change process:
  - A Standing Committee for the Revision of the Banks Act reviews the Act and Regulations (BA section 92).
  - The Committee is chaired by a Deputy Governor of the SARB and comprises representatives including the registrar and bankers’ association.
  - The minister of finance issues Regulations (BA section 90); Parliamentary approval required for changes to the Act but not for Regulations.
  - Registrar may issue Directives applicable to all banks without Standing Committee or minister approval; Circulars and Guidance Notes are also used.
- Transparency and disclosure:
  - BSD Annual Reports and a monthly brochure “Selected South African banking sector trends” are published.
  - All prudential returns are published on the SARB’s website on an aggregate basis; balance sheets are also published for each bank individually.
  - Regulation 43 requires each bank to publish reliable, relevant and timely qualitative and quantitative information; Regulation 44 requires annual financial statements in accordance with Financial Reporting Standards.
- Risk classification and supervisory resourcing:
  - BSD classifies banks quarterly as high risk, medium risk or low risk considering complexity, systemic importance, and risk profile.
  - Classification informs supervisory cycle length and allocation of supervisory resources.
- Assessment: Compliant.

### Supervisory framework — Principle 1(2): independence, accountability, transparency
- Appointment and status of the registrar:
  - SARB designates an employee as registrar of Banks subject to approval of the minister of finance (BA section 4(1)); registrar is an SARB employee appointed for an indefinite period.
  - The registrar submits an Annual Report to the minister of finance, which is transmitted to Parliament and made publicly available.
- Resourcing and human capital:
  - BSD operations are financed from the SARB budget; SARB has operational independence.
  - No evidence of government or industry interference with BSD operations and budget.
  - BSD attracts and retains staff with required skills; many staff hold postgraduate qualifications; training programs and outside expert engagement are used.
- Assessment: Compliant.

### Supervisory framework — Principle 1(3): legal framework for authorization and ongoing supervision
- Registrar powers and duties:
  - Banks Act authorizes the registrar to perform functions including authorization and registration of banks (BA sections 11–25).
  - The registrar may obtain information and periodic returns from banks, their controlling companies and subsidiaries (BA sections 7 and 75).
- Limitations:
  - It is the minister of finance, not the registrar, who is responsible for setting prudential regulations; the registrar’s formal role is limited to issuing circulars with guidelines (BA section 6(4)).
  - In practice the registrar initiates changes and prepares drafts for consultation.
- Assessment: Largely compliant.

### Supervisory framework — Principle 1(4): legal powers to address safety and soundness
- Tools available to the registrar:
  - Power to increase a bank’s individual capital requirement (Regulation 38(4)).
  - Power to derecognize fitness and propriety of executive officers (BA section 60(6)(a)).
  - Full access to relevant information from banks, parents and subsidiaries including internal management information (BA section 6).
- Ministerial involvement:
  - Minister’s approval required for cancellation or suspension of a bank’s registration (BA section 23).
  - If registrar believes a bank will be unable to meet obligations, the minister may appoint a curator if he deems this in the public interest; the written consent of the bank’s CEO or chairperson is required (BA section 69).
- Assessment: Largely compliant.
- Comment: Minister’s role in remedial actions and required consent for curator appointment should be reconsidered to avoid hampering the registrar’s ability to act decisively.

### Supervisory framework — Principle 1(5): legal protection for supervisors
- Legal protection:
  - Section 88 of the Banks Act provides that no liability shall attach to the SARB or its board members, the registrar or any employee for any loss or damage resulting from anything done or omitted in the bona fide performance of any function or duty under the Act.
- Assessment: Compliant.

### Supervisory framework — Principle 1(6): cooperation and information sharing
- Confidentiality and information sharing:
  - Section 33 of the SARB Act obliges BSD to preserve secrecy of information acquired, except vis-à-vis the minister of finance or under court order.
  - BA section 89 allows the registrar to provide information to domestic public officials and foreign supervisory authorities at his discretion if the recipient is willing and able to keep information confidential.
  - The Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000 has created some doubt about maintaining confidentiality, but no practical problems have arisen.
  - Regulations indicate prudential returns are confidential and not available for public inspection.
- MOUs and supervisory colleges:
  - MOUs in place between BSD and the FSB and thirteen foreign supervisory authorities; additional MOUs with twenty-one foreign supervisors, FIC and NCR are in preparation.
  - BSD has organized and participated in supervisory colleges for host and home supervisors.
  - Regular domestic meetings occur between BSD and other authorities (e.g., consolidated banking group meetings with the FSB).
- Assessment: Compliant.

### Permissible activities — Principle 2
- Definitions and name controls:
  - “Bank” and “business of a bank” are defined in section 1 of the Banks Act; “business of a bank” principally includes taking deposits and using proceeds for lending and investment, and other activities declared by the registrar by notice in the Gazette.
  - Exclusions: banking-like business by cooperatives (subject to prescribed conditions) and institutions covered by other acts designated by the minister of finance (e.g., mutual banks) — these remain subject to supervision.
  - BA section 22 limits the use of the word “bank” in names to institutions registered in South Africa and registered foreign branches or representative offices.
  - A current list of authorized banks and registered branches of foreign banks is published on the SARB’s website.
- Assessment: Compliant.

### Licensing criteria — Principle 3
- Licensing process:
  - Two-step process: authorization to establish a bank and registration as a bank (BA sections 12 and 16); registrar decides on granting or refusal.
  - Registrar will not grant authorization unless conditions in BA section 13 are fulfilled, including availability of sufficient financial means and the ability and willingness to run a bank prudently.
  - An authorization lapses automatically after 12 months; may be withdrawn earlier if false or misleading information was furnished.
  - Registration requires the registrar to be satisfied the applicant will continuously meet Banks Act requirements (BA section 17(2)(b)).
- Due diligence and information requirements:
  - Detailed information on all major shareholders required; shareholders, shareholding structures and sources of capital are evaluated and approved before registration.
  - Assessment includes major shareholders’ ability to provide future financial support; a letter of comfort is requested from all significant shareholders (shareholders holding more than 15 percent).
  - Financial projections must be submitted and their viability assessed by the BSD.
- Minimum initial capital:
  - The minimum amount of initial capital is R 250,000,000 (BA).
- Alignment with supervision:
  - Licensing process consistent with BSD’s Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) Manual.
- Assessment: (implicit consistency with supervisory process as described).

*Source: _cr10353 - 25. Limited progress has been made in the launching a deposit insurance scheme in (IMF staff report content as provided).*

### section 70).

### _cr10353 - section 70)

### Registration, fitness and propriety; AML controls
- Directors and senior management are assessed for fitness and propriety, including an assessment of their knowledge of the proposed bank’s operations.
- The BSD has issued a Guidance Note recommending that new bank directors attend the directors training at the Gordon Institute of Business School (a well-regarded business school affiliated with the University of Pretoria).
- The BSD requires information on all business systems, business plans, management, auditors, etc. as part of the registration approval process.
- The process includes assessment of a bank’s policies and procedures regarding the detection and prevention of criminal activities and compliance with anti-money laundering requirements, although providing information on this is not yet required in the application form (Regulation 53, form BA 002).
- For a foreign bank wishing to set up a subsidiary or a branch in South Africa, the BSD seeks a written confirmation from the home supervisor that there is no objection to the proposed establishment, even though this is not required by the Banks Act. (For representative offices there is such a requirement (BA section 34(2B)(b)(i)).)
- The BSD will also seek to verify that the home supervisor practices consolidated supervision and meets international supervisory standards to a reasonable extent (BA section 18A(3)(b)).
- Assessment: Compliant.
- Comments:
  - The BSD is in the process of including “...the detection and prevention of criminal activities ...” in form BA 002 (Application for Authorisation/Registration) as well as Regulation 39 section (5) (minimum requirements for risk management processes, policies and procedures).

### Principle 4 — Transfer of significant ownership
- Legal framework:
  - Section 37 of the Banks Act: no person shall acquire more than 15 percent of the nominal value or the voting rights of all the issued shares of a bank or a controlling company without the written approval of the registrar.
  - For acquisitions in excess of 49 percent, the written permission of the minister of finance is required.
  - Permission will not be granted if this would, in the view of the registrar or the minister, be contrary to the interests of the bank concerned or its depositors, or to the public interest.
  - Section 38: bank shares must actually be held by the beneficial shareholder; transfer to nominees is not allowed.
  - Section 42: defines a “controlling interest” as an interest of more than 50 percent of the nominal value of all the issued shares of a bank.
- Ongoing reporting and restrictions:
  - Banks must provide the BSD with an annual return concerning their shareholders (form BA 125).
  - Dividends shall not be paid, and voting rights cannot be exercised, on shares that have been obtained in contravention of the provisions of the Banks Act (BA section 41).
  - There is no specific requirement for banks to notify the BSD of any material information that may negatively affect the suitability of a major shareholder, but the BSD views such notification as implied by the general obligation of a bank’s directors to act in good faith.
- Assessment: Compliant.
- Comments and recommendation:
  - Consider introducing a specific legal requirement for banks to notify the BSD of material information that negatively affects the suitability of its shareholders.
  - The threshold of 15 percent beyond which supervisory approval is needed appears high by international comparison (many countries set the threshold at 5 or 10 percent), but the BSD’s experience indicates this has not caused problems.

### Principle 5 — Major acquisitions
- Legal framework and limits:
  - Section 52 of the Banks Act: a bank shall not—without the prior written approval of the registrar and subject to such conditions as the registrar may set—establish or acquire a subsidiary, or invest more than 5 percent of its capital and reserves in a joint venture.
  - Regulation 56: sets out the information that needs to be submitted with an application for permission for investing in subsidiaries or joint ventures.
  - Section 50: a company controlling a bank shall manage its investments in non-banking activities so that these investments do not exceed a certain threshold; the registrar has set this threshold at 40 percent of share capital and reserves (the so-called 60/40-rule).
  - BA section 76: limits the sum of a bank’s investments in real estate and shares, and loans to subsidiaries.
- Supervisory practice:
  - The criteria by which the registrar assesses applications for such investment are not spelled out in laws or regulations.
  - The BSD’s SREP Manual (“Consolidated Supervision” → “Section 52 Policy”) describes the BSD’s assessment process, including analysis of shareholders, financial strength, legal and operational structure, risk profile and quality of management, and— for foreign acquisitions—secrecy laws and other regulations that might hinder information flows.
- Assessment: Largely compliant.
- Comments and recommendations:
  - The Banks Act and Regulations do not define absolute amounts or relative thresholds of investments in a subsidiary that need prior supervisory approval.
  - Criteria used by the registrar for approving or disapproving proposed investments in subsidiaries and joint ventures are not specified in law or regulation (though implicitly reflected in required application information (Regulation 56)).
  - Neither the Banks Act nor any Regulation or BSD circular clearly indicate when notification after the investment is sufficient; apparently all acquisitions and investments, no matter how small, require the registrar’s prior approval.
  - Suggestion: exempt investments and acquisitions under a certain threshold from prior approval to increase BSD efficiency and reduce supervisory burden on banks.

### Principle 6 — Capital adequacy
- Scope and legal basis:
  - Capital adequacy rules apply to all banks in South Africa, including foreign branches, on a consolidated and solo basis.
  - Section 70 of the Banks Act sets an absolute and a risk based minimum capital requirement for banks on a solo basis.
  - Section 70A of the Act sets a risk based minimum amount of capital for the controlling company on a consolidated basis.

*Source: _cr10353 - section 70).*

### Section 4 of the Act allows the registrar to publish the factors relating to the setting of the

### _cr10353 - Section 4 of the Act allows the registrar to publish the factors relating to the setting of the

### Capital adequacy framework and Basel II implementation
- The capital of a bank is the sum of primary (Tier 1) and secondary (Tier 2) and tertiary (Tier 3) capital.
- Tier 1 capital must constitute at least 50 percent of the bank’s capital.
- Definitions of capital components and deductions applied to Tier 1 and total capital are specified in Regulation 38 (9–16) and Regulation 23 respectively.
- The SARB implemented Basel II on 1 January 2008 for all banks, except the mutual banks which remain on Basel I.
- Paragraph 4 of Regulation 38 gives the BSD authority to set each bank’s capital ratio at any time and sets:
  - minimum Tier 1 ratio at 7 percent,
  - minimum core Tier 1 ratio at 5.25 percent,
  - minimum total capital ratio at 9.5 percent.
- An additional systemic requirement of 1.5 percent (Pillar 2a charge defined in reporting form BA700) is imposed across the board on top of the internationally agreed minimum capital ratio of 8 percent to align Basel II calibration to an emerging market environment.
- The systemic add-on was last determined at the time of the Basel II implementation 2008 on a capital planning cycle basis (3 to 5 years) and is subject to continuous assessment.
- Banks are required to keep an idiosyncratic capital buffer (Pillar 2b charge), as determined by the registrar reflecting the individual risk profile; the sum of Pillar 2a and Pillar 2b is regarded as the hard floor for target ratios.
- The BSD review panel periodically sets the idiosyncratic add-on; review frequency varies with the BSD risk assessment.
- Assessment: Largely compliant.
- Comment: BSD commended for early adoption and full implementation of Basel II on 1 January 2008.

### Supervisory monitoring, enforcement, and capital management practices
- The BSD closely monitors compliance with minimum capital ratios reported by banks.
- Section 74 of the Banks Act allows the registrar to impose fines for non-compliance.
- In practice, the registrar engages with banks before ratios fall below minimum and can use enforcement powers such as suspension of dividends or issuance of a directive.
- Registrar can require banks to adopt more forward looking approaches to capital management; example: January 2009 moral suasion to encourage banks to increase their Tier 1 ratio due to expected market changes.
- No instances of a bank refusing to comply with capital adequacy requirements were recorded.
- By assessing ICAAP and strategy, the BSD determines overall capital adequacy relative to a bank’s risk profile.
  - ICAAP assessment frequency: at least biannually for low risk banks and annually for higher risk banks.
- Assessment: Largely compliant.

### Use and accreditation of internal models and advanced approaches
- Banks are allowed to use Basel II advanced approaches for credit and operational risk and the internal models method for market risk.
- Accreditation for internal risk estimates as regulatory inputs requires rigorous qualifying standards and registrar approval:
  - Regulation 23(10) a for the IRB approaches,
  - Regulation 33(3)(b-c) for advanced approaches for operational risk,
  - Regulation 28(4)b for market risk.
- Registrar has explicit power to revoke accreditation for operational risk advanced approaches (Regulation 33(6)).
- No explicit revocation powers in regulation for advanced approaches for credit and market risk; however, revocation power is included in conditions for approval for use of advanced approaches for credit and market risk.
- Recommendation/Comment: An explicit revocation power should be added to the regulation for credit and market risk similar to Regulation 33(6) on operational risk.
- Assessment: Largely compliant.

### Principle 7 — Risk management process (Description and supervisory verification)
- Legal requirements:
  - Section 60B (1) of the Banks Act: boards must establish and maintain an adequate and effective process of corporate governance.
  - Section 64A: Risk and Capital Committee must establish an independent risk management function and a group risk management function, where applicable.
  - Regulation 39 (4): banks must have comprehensive risk management processes and board approved policies and procedures to identify, measure, monitor, control and report risk.
  - Regulation 36 (17): requirements apply to controlling companies.
  - Regulation 39 (5) and (15-17): specify minimum requirements for risk management processes, board and senior management oversight, capital assessment, monitoring and reporting, internal control reviews.
  - Regulation 39 (5)f: requirement for documentation of risk management processes, strategies and procedures.
- Supervisory practices:
  - SREP Manual “Analytical Framework – Corporate Governance and Risk Management” guides verification.
  - BSD obtains bank policies and assesses adequacy and compliance during prudential meetings with risk managers and heads of business units; meeting frequency depends on BSD risk rating.
  - BSD verifies board approval and effective implementation, limits, senior management monitoring, timely reporting to board and senior management, and new product oversight.
  - If concerns arise, BSD performs focused onsite visits or requires internal/external audits; boards must yearly assess and document governance, internal controls, risk management, capital management and capital adequacy (Regulation 39 (18)).
  - ICAAP discussions with boards at least biannually and annually for higher risk banks; ICAAP covers all material risks including strategic and reputational risks.
  - Registrar can require additional capital and/or strengthening of risk management/internal controls per Regulation 38 (4).
  - Regulations and guidance:
    - Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 stress tests required; Guidance note 9/2008 issued by BSD in 2008 clarifies expectations.
    - Robust approval process and periodic independent validation/testing for banks using internal models.
    - Registrar-issued regulations for credit risk (Regulation 23 and 24), market risk (Regulation 28), liquidity risk (Regulation 26), interest rate risk in the banking book (Regulation 30), operational risk (Regulation 33 and 34).
- Assessment: Compliant.

### Principle 8 — Credit risk (Description and supervisory approach)
- Regulation 39 assigns board/senior management responsibility for effective credit risk management; Regulation 39 (7–12) sets strict governance for IRB banks including approval of rating and risk estimation processes.
- Section 6 and 7 of the Banks Act grant registrar full access to credit and investment portfolio information.
- Regulation 23 and 24 specify qualitative and quantitative credit risk requirements for IRB and standardized approaches.
- Supervisory tools and practices:
  - IRB banks complete a BSD self-assessment questionnaire informing prudential meetings focused on credit risk.
  - BSD performs in-depth quantitative analysis (peer group comparisons, trend analysis) of monthly returns.
  - For IRB banks, BSD credit risk specialists perform onsite visits focused on wholesale and retail portfolios and new model developments.
  - External auditors: Regulation 46 (4) requires external auditors to report to the registrar on significant weaknesses in internal controls related to lending, investments, portfolio management, credit impairments, loan loss provisions and reserves.
  - BSD engaged with South African Institute of Chartered Accountants to ensure Regulation 46 report content and criteria adequacy.
  - For IRB banks, external auditors perform an additional annual long form review of estimates and models; BSD reviews and discusses these reports with auditors and bank audit committees.
  - For standardized banks, onsite review team focuses on correct implementation of standardized approach including risk weighting, use of eligible credit assessment institutions, collateral compliance, assignment to past due buckets; reviews performed on portfolio and sample transaction basis.
- Legal limits and reporting:
  - Section 73 requires credit decisions in excess 10 percent of qualifying capital to be taken by a board appointed committee; exposures exceeding 25 percent of qualifying capital require registrar approval.
  - All banks submit an ICAAP which includes credit concentration risk.
  - BSD maintains records of large outstanding credit exposures by individual banks.
- Aggregation monitoring:
  - No specific legal/regulatory stipulation requiring banks to monitor total indebtedness of entities, but BSD onsite reviews of standardized banks assess aggregation practices to classify retail exposures under Basel II.
- Assessment: Compliant.

### Principle 9 — Problem assets, provisions, and reserves
- Regulation 23 (22) requires a “sufficiently robust system for the calculation of credit impairment” in accordance with Financial Reporting Standards (FRS); definition of impaired assets explicitly includes off-balance sheet exposures.
- Regulation 24 (5)(c) specifies criteria for asset classification for standardized banks (special mention, substandard, doubtful and loss) but does not prescribe provisioning percentages.
- Regulation 23 (22)b empowers the registrar to require banks to raise provisions if deemed inadequate.
- Supervisory reliance:
  - BSD relies partly on external auditors who review adequacy of policies and provisioning under FRS and report significant weaknesses under Regulation 46(4).
  - Some essential criteria (periodical assessment of value of risk mitigants, periodic review of problem assets, adequacy of organizational resources for identification/oversight/collection, and timely reporting to the board) are not explicitly captured in Regulation 46(4) or the regulation but are expected under “sufficiently robust system for calculation of credit impairment.”
- Recommendations/Comments:
  - Recommend BSD clarify principles-based expectations of a “robust system for the calculation of credit impairment” in more detail via regulation or guidance note.
  - BSD should provide more specific qualitative guidance to external auditors and/or banks to ensure essential criteria are addressed.
  - BSD should clarify expectations regarding forward looking provisioning for prudential purposes; note that a general allowance for credit impairment is not clearly defined under IFRS and part may be included in Tier 2 capital.
- Supervisory practices:
  - BSD performs onsite reviews for standardized banks on correct implementation of standardized approaches including overdue bucketing classification.
  - Supervisory teams perform quantitative analysis and peer benchmarking from monthly returns; credit risk Dashboard-report produced monthly to compare impaired advances and specific impairments across peers.
  - BSD conducted a 2009 survey on credit risk covering collateral valuation, impairment and best estimates in 6 to 12 months, with outcomes to be used to refine standardized approach risk weights.
- Assessment: Largely compliant.

### Principle 10 — Large exposure limits
- Regulation 39 (3) and (4) require banks to have adequate policies and procedures to identify and manage concentration risk.
- Criteria for determining “connected persons” are set out in Section 73(3)a and in Regulation 65, which defines the notions of person and connected person.

*Source: _cr10353 - Section 4 of the Act allows the registrar to publish the factors relating to the setting of the capital adequacy ratios that are in excess of the prescribed minimum capital adequacy ratio.*

### Section 73(4) allows the registrar to exercise discretion on a case by case basis.

### _cr10353 - Section 73(4) allows the registrar to exercise discretion on a case by case basis.

### Prudential concentration limits
- The prudential concentration limits are set in Section 73 (1)a of the Banks Act.
- Section 73 (1)a requires banks to obtain board or board Committee approval for exposures greater than 10 percent of qualifying capital.
- Section 73(1)b requires that the aggregate amount of all exposures exceeding 10 percent of qualifying capital be less than 800 percent of qualifying capital.
- Section 73 (2)a requires written approval of the registrar for exposures exceeding 25 percent of qualifying capital.

### Board and committee composition requirements
- Directive 5/2008 requires that in addition to executive representatives, at least three non executive directors are included in such board Committee.

### Exposure calculation and off-balance-sheet items
- Both Regulation 24(6) and (7) provide more detailed guidance of the concentration limits in place and explicitly require off balance sheet items to be included in the exposure calculation.

### Registrar discretion
- Section 73(4) allows the registrar to exercise discretion on a case by case basis.

*Source: _cr10353 - Section 73(4) allows the registrar to exercise discretion on a case by case basis.*

### Section 73(2) c, d and e of the Banks Act allows the registrar to require banks to hold

### _cr10353 - Section 73(2) c, d and e of the Banks Act allows the registrar to require banks to hold

### Concentration risk (Section 73(2) c, d and e; reporting and supervisory practice)
- Legal basis: Section 73(2) c, d and e of the Banks Act allows the registrar to require banks to hold additional capital or comply with prescribed conditions or requirements in case concentration risk is considered excessive.
- Reporting requirements:
  - Banks must report concentration risk on a solo basis (reporting form BA 210) and on a consolidated basis (reporting form BA 600) including sectoral, currency and geographical concentration to the BSD on a quarterly basis.
- Supervisory practice:
  - The BSD analyses concentration risk in the prudential returns; analysis forms the basis for prudential meetings with senior management focused on credit concentration risk.
  - BSD assesses adequacy of banks’ risk management policies and procedures and decides if additional onsite work is required.
  - Supplementary supervisory verification for standardized banks is performed by the review team during on-site exams of credit risk compliance.
  - The credit risk specialist team performs on-site reviews for IRB banks during which they assess credit concentrations.
  - The ICAAP periodically submitted by banks includes concentration risk; ICAAP review allows the supervision team to challenge senior management periodically and the board of directors at least annually on concentration risk.
  - Example: The assessment team reviewed the supervisory files relating to the ICAAP of one of the larger banks and concluded that the review was comprehensive.
- Assessment: Compliant.

### Principle 11 — Exposures to related parties (Regulation 36)
- Regulatory requirements:
  - Comprehensive definition of a “related person” provided in Regulation 36(6)(c), includes “any other person or entity specified in writing by the registrar”.
  - Regulation 36(15) requires board-approved policies to control related party exposures, prohibits extending exposures to a related person on more favorable terms than to a non-related person, requires that persons benefiting from the exposure shall not be responsible for the loan assessment or credit decision, and requires documentation and monitoring of any extension of credit to a related person.
  - Registrar may require specific related party exposures to be deducted from capital or that adequate collateral is obtained if policies/processes are inadequate.
  - Aggregate limits for related party exposures are the same as those for large exposures.
- Supervisory verification:
  - SREP Manual foresees BSD staff meet with banks’ credit risk managers to obtain information on individual and aggregate related party exposures and to discuss adherence to Regulation 36(15).
  - External auditors verify related party exposures as part of audit of annual financial statements.
- Gaps identified:
  - Related party exposures (except intragroup exposures exceeding 1 percent of group qualifying capital and reserve funds) are not regularly reported to the BSD individually or in aggregate unless they fall in the large exposures category.
- Assessment: Materially non-compliant.
- Comments / supervisory shortcomings:
  - BSD does not obtain on a regular basis comprehensive information on banks’ aggregate exposures to related parties.
  - BSD is considering inclusion of related party exposures as a separate reportable item on form BA 600.
  - BSD does not obtain regular information on individual related party exposures, raising doubt about its ability to instruct deduction from capital effectively.
  - BSD does not yet require that transactions with related parties and write-offs of related party exposures exceeding specified amounts be subject to prior board approval; amendments to Regulation 36(15) are being proposed to include these requirements and to require that persons benefiting from an exposure not manage that exposure.
  - No specific requirement exists for banks to have policies/processes to identify individual related party exposures.
  - Prior board approval for transactions with related parties in excess of specified amounts is not yet required; an amendment to Regulation 36 is under preparation.

### Principle 12 — Country and transfer risks
- Regulatory and reporting context:
  - No specific regulations or prudential limits in place for country risk or transfer risk; these risks are expected to be captured in overall credit risk management.
  - Scope of Regulation 39 includes translation risk and concentration risk (paragraph 2).
  - Regulation 39 (5)(f) requires banks to establish robust risk management processes to promptly identify material concentrations in respect of counterparties in the same geographic region.
  - Regulation 56(2)(b)(xii)(D) requires a bank to provide the BSD with an evaluation of country and transfer risk of the host country when planning to acquire or establish an off-shore subsidiary, off-shore branches, joint ventures or other interest.
- Reporting:
  - Every quarter banks report form BA210 which breaks down exposures by 6 geographic regions: Africa (other than South Africa), Europe, Asia, North America, South America and Other, and by external credit ratings.
  - BSD receives reporting from foreign subsidiaries or operations of domestic banks which allows monitoring of country and transfer risk to some extent but no consolidated view of individual country risk is reported.
- Supervisory practice:
  - High-level discussions with selected banks with cross-border exposures indicate policies and procedures are generally established; adequacy and implementation captured through prudential meetings.
  - Banks with significant country and/or transfer risk exposures are expected to take these into account in their ICAAP; assessors saw evidence that some banks do so.
  - External auditors are required to review compliance with reporting of large exposures, credit concentration risk and provisioning, but there is no reference to country risk in particular.
- Assessment: Materially non-compliant.
- Comments / recommendations:
  - A regulation specifically dealing with country and transfer risk should be promulgated since these are material risks to some of the banks.
  - The granularity of regional exposures on form BA210 should be increased so BSD can monitor country and transfer risk on an ongoing basis.

### Principle 13 — Market risk (Regulation 28, Regulation 39; reporting BA 320, BA 325)
- Regulatory framework and responsibilities:
  - Regulation 39 establishes board responsibility for market risk; Regulation 28 (6) requires board-approved policies for allocation to trading or banking book, a risk appetite statement including trading activities, and annual review.
  - Regulation 28(4) prescribes methodology for capital requirements and prudential limits for specific market risks: interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, equity position risk and commodity risk.
  - Banks must hold capital against market risk using the Standardized or the Internal model method or a combination.
  - Regulation 28 (8) d-g sets requirements for stress testing and scenario analysis.
- Internal models and supervisory review:
  - 4 internal model approvals have been granted and one bank has applied.
  - Internal model users are subject to an accreditation process and an annual onsite renewal review; required to provide signed market risk policies and limit mandates to BSD.
  - Reviews assess policies, processes, controls, internal reports on model validation, monitoring, measuring and controlling market risk; analyze mark to market revaluations, valuation adjustments and reserving, back-testing exceptions, limit breaches and control failures.
  - Onsite prudential meetings review deal capture/input systems, scenario analysis, stress testing and contingency planning.
  - Large banks required to account for reconciliation failures to BSD on a quarterly basis.
- Supervision resourcing and specialist teams:
  - Market Risk Specialist teams support supervisors; onsite visits conducted by teams combining frontline supervisors and market risk specialists.
  - Regulation 39 (13-14) requires independent price verification at least once a month for market data used to value trading book positions.
- Reporting:
  - BA 320 (monthly) covers standardized approach and Internal Models Approach.
  - BA 325 (daily) covers selected risk information for both approaches; BA 325 analyzed periodically and compared with banks’ trading balance sheets, limit structures and financial performance.
  - For internal model users, backtesting results are regularly provided to BSD; poor model specification can lead to adjustment of the model capital requirement multiplier.
- Assessment: Compliant.

### Principle 14 — Liquidity risk (Regulation 26; BA section 64A; forms BA 300, BA 325)
- Governance and regulatory requirements:
  - BA section 64A requires banks’ boards to appoint at least three of its members to a risk and capital management committee; tasks include assisting board in establishing policies/procedures to identify and measure material risks and developing risk mitigation strategy.
  - Regulation 39 lists risks to be managed and includes liquidity risk.
  - BA section 72 and Regulation 26 set minimum liquidity requirements for banks.
  - Regulation 26 requires prior written approval of board or board-approved committee for assumptions applied in ALM process and liquidity stress testing.
- Reporting and monitoring:
  - Monthly form BA 300 includes on and off balance sheet liabilities (undrawn commitments, guarantees, liquidity facilities), reports on deposit concentration, balance sheet mismatches under business-as-usual and bank-specific stress assumptions, liquidity stress testing, available sources of stress funding, and maturity ladders for foreign currency positions.
  - Banks’ foreign currency positions (gross assets and liabilities per currency) are reported daily in form BA 325 and are generally quite small. BA 325 also contains daily information on participation in repo transactions with the SARB and interbank funding.
- Thematic work and supervisory follow-up:
  - In 2009 the BSD conducted a thematic review of banks’ ALM including liquidity and interest rate risk in the banking book; questionnaire, documentation review, and discussions with board members, senior managers and internal auditors were used.
  - Also in 2009 BSD asked all bank boards to present their degree of compliance with the “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision” (Basel Committee, October 2008).
  - Result: banks took action monitored by BSD to strengthen liquidity risk management where shortcomings were found, notably in contingency planning for funding at some banks.
- Assessment: Compliant.
- Comments / recommendations:
  - Given banks’ reliance on wholesale funding and high concentration of liabilities, BSD should continue close monitoring of liquidity management, including periodic review of liquidity stress testing and contingency planning.
  - Where material foreign currency exposures exist, BSD should ensure ALM reviews include in-depth analysis of stress testing of foreign currency liquidity strategies and that results influence appropriateness of mismatches.

### Principle 15 — Operational risk (Regulation 65; Regulations 33 and 34; BA 410)
- Regulatory framework:
  - Operational risk definition included in Regulation 65 and includes legal risk.
  - Regulation 39 assigns board and senior management responsibility for effective operational risk management.
  - Regulation 40 (4v) requires annual board report to registrar about material malfunctions in internal controls, procedures and systems.
  - Regulation 47 calls for banks to report within 30 days any offences listed in paragraph 3 (a-f) (e.g., fraud, reporting irregularities, breach of fiduciary duty).
  - Regulation 33 and 34 specify qualitative and quantitative criteria for operational risk management for standardized and advanced measurement approaches.
- Supervisory verification and information sources:
  - SREP Manual “Analytical Framework –Operational Risk” guides verification; BSD obtains banks’ policies and assesses adequacy and compliance during prudential meetings.
  - Operational Risk specialist team performs onsite visits including focused operational risk reviews and advanced risk measurement accreditation visits.
  - BSD includes IT risk in scope: reviews management reports covering IT, analyzes internal loss data (form BA 410 returns—Business disruption and system failure—event type), and IT elements within self-assessments for advanced approaches.
- Capacity gap and reliance on external assurance:
  - Specialist team lacks strong IT skills; BSD relies to a large extent on banks’ internal audit and external auditors for IT assessment.
  - Given importance of IT systems integrity to operational risk and limited scope of external auditor work, this reliance is a supervisory weakness.
- Supervisory actions:
  - 2008: registrar raised board awareness by tabling “the board’s involvement in the oversight of the banking institutions operational risk framework” at annual registrar-board meetings; included discussion of three most severe operational risk events at the relevant board meeting.
  - 2006: BSD required all banks to present business continuity frameworks for major business disruptions at trilateral discussions; Circular 4/2006 provides format; ongoing compliance verified as part of operational risk onsite review.
- Assessment: Largely compliant.
- Comments / recommendations:
  - BSD should prioritize IT capacity building within specialist risk areas to assess IT risk adequately and reduce reliance on external auditors.
  - BSD should clarify business continuity requirements into a regulation so supervisory expectations are clear.

### Principle 16 — Interest rate risk in the banking book (Regulation 30; BA 330)
- Regulatory and supervisory framework:
  - Regulation 39 (1–5) and (16) require effective risk management processes, policies and procedures.
  - Regulation 30 provides detailed requirements for management of interest rate risk in the banking book.
  - SREP Manual section “Interest rate risk in the banking book” — “ALM process” addresses supervisory assessment; a questionnaire is generally sent to banks followed by assessment.
- Reporting and analysis:
  - Monthly reporting form BA330 deals with interest rate risk in the banking book and includes sensitivity analysis of net interest income and change in the economic value of equity.
  - BA330 forms are analyzed and discussed with senior management during the graph discussion.
- Onsite verification and thematic work:
  - If necessary, BSD conducts onsite engagements to verify ALM quality, model validation and assumptions.
  - For systemically relevant banks, an onsite visit occurs irrespective of the quality of responses and reporting forms.
  - In 2006, BSD performed an industry thematic review on interest rate risk in the banking book.
- ICAAP and stress testing:
  - ICAAP process includes bank’s approach to interest rate risk in the banking book and capital impact; analyzed and discussed with senior management.
  - Regulation 39 (6)(e) requires banks to regularly stress test main risk exposures.
  - Regulation 30 (23–36) has specific requirements for calculation of interest rate sensitivity and stress testing to measure vulnerability under adverse interest rate movements; outcomes are reported in prudential reporting forms.

*Source: _cr10353 - Section 73(2) c, d and e of the Banks Act allows the registrar to require banks to hold*

### Section 64A of the Banks Act requires, unless the registrar grants an exemption, the Risk and

### Section 64A of the Banks Act requires, unless the registrar grants an exemption, the Risk and

### Principle 17 — Internal control and audit
- Assessment: Assessment Compliant.
- Regulatory framework and duties:
  - Section 60 of the Banks Act sets out the general duties of directors of a bank or controlling company.
  - Section 60 B assigns responsibility to the board of directors and the executive officers of a bank to establish and maintain an effective process of corporate governance.
  - Section 64A of the Bank Act requires the board of directors of a Bank and/or a controlling company to appoint at least three of its members, of which at least two are non executive directors, to form and serve on a risk and capital committee.
  - Regulation 39 provides further minimum requirements to the corporate governance processes in banks.
- Internal audit and compliance functions:
  - Regulation 48 outlines the required characteristics of the internal audit function; exemptions (paragraph c,i and ii of Regulation 48) may be agreed with the registrar where the scale of a bank does not warrant a full time internal audit.
  - Exemptions under Regulation 48 have been granted to five banks; in these cases appropriately qualified accounting firms or individuals provide the internal audit service on an outsourced basis.
  - An Audit Committee, composed of a minimum of three non-executive members (Section 64(3)a of the Banks Act) must oversee the internal audit function.
  - Internal audit is required to cover all activities of the bank and has full access to all staff, functions, systems, records, and outsourced functions.
- Compliance function and reporting:
  - Regulation 49 requires banks to establish an independent compliance function and imposes minimum criteria on the compliance officer in terms of effectiveness, monitoring, reporting and resources.
  - The Compliance officer is required to table a report at every meeting of the board of directors or Audit Committee.
  - Regulation 47 imposes the duty on the bank to inform the registrar of any act of a member of the board of directors, an executive officer or an employee in charge of the risk management function that results or will probably result in the reputation of the bank being adversely affected.
- Supervisory processes and assessments:
  - The BSD assesses governance through information gathering meetings with internal audit, the head of material risk areas, the compliance officer, external auditors (bilateral meeting) and the audit committee (trilateral meeting).
  - The BSD reviews minutes of the board on an ad hoc basis.
  - For accounting processes and policies, the BSD generally relies on the external auditor in accordance with Regulation 46 (3) which imposes the duty on the external auditor to report to the registrar any significant weaknesses in the system of internal control relating to financial regulatory reporting and compliance with the Act and Regulations which came to his attention.
  - The supervisory assessment of the internal audit function includes annual bilateral meetings with external auditors, review of internal audit reports, discussions with senior management, and detailed prudential meetings with the internal audit function.
- Fitness and propriety of senior appointees:
  - Regulation 42 requires banks to submit form BA020 for each person it wishes to appoint as a director or executive officer prior to the appointment; applications are screened and consent is required from the registrar.
  - Section 60 (6) allows the registrar to object to the appointment or continued employment of a chief executive officer, director or executive officer if the registrar reasonably believes the person is no longer fit and proper or if holding such office is not in the interest of the public.
  - Feedback from banks confirmed that this approval process is stringent and consistently applied.

### Comments on Principle 17
- Corporate governance principles are in accordance with international standards, as they are inspired largely by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision guidance with respect to internal audit and internal control.

### Principle 18 — Abuse of financial services
- Assessment: (implicit through description — supervisory framework described)
- Institutional framework:
  - A Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) was created by the FIC Act (FICA) of 2001.
  - FICA section 3: principal objectives include assisting in identification of proceeds of unlawful activities and combating money laundering and financing of terrorist activities.
  - FICA section 4: FIC must cooperate with other authorities, including supervisory bodies.
  - FICA section 45(1): each supervisory body remains responsible for supervising compliance with the FICA by the institutions it supervises.
- Bank obligations and guidance:
  - FICA section 42 requires “accountable institutions” (including banks) to formulate and implement internal rules relating to the identification of clients and procedures for determining when a transaction is reportable to the FIC.
  - FICA section 43 requires adequate training be provided to staff to enable compliance with applicable requirements.
  - BA Regulation 36(17)(a) further specifies know-your-customer requirements for banks.
  - FIC Guidance Note 3 provides detailed guidance for banks on customer identification and verification, including special measures for correspondent banking relationships and high risk accounts such as those for politically exposed persons.
- Reporting and internal controls:
  - Regulation 47 lists offences to be reported to the registrar, including any money laundering activity not identified and reported in a timely manner as required by the FICA, cases of market abuse and financial fraud within the bank, and other irregularities.
  - Regulation 50 details policies and procedures to guard a bank against being used for market abuse and financial fraud, including money laundering, insider trading and market manipulation.
  - BA section 60A requires each bank to establish an independent compliance function; duties are detailed in Regulation 49.
- Supervisory practices:
  - The BSD reviews banks’ adherence to Regulations, requests copies of policies and procedures, conducts regular internal audit and compliance meetings with individual banks, and uses focused reviews to ascertain compliance with minimum requirements regarding abuse of financial services.
  - The BSD receives regular reports from banks’ compliance officers.
  - Banks’ Chief Executive Officers, Chief Accounting Officers and the Executive Officers responsible for FICA compliance must sign on a monthly basis form BA 099, certifying that the bank has complied with all the relevant requirements of the FICA and the Regulations issued under it.
  - A detailed review of FICA compliance at the largest banks was commissioned by the BSD from an external audit firm under BA section 7(1)(b).

*https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/_cr10353.pdf*

### 2005. Another detailed review by the BSD itself of FICA compliance at the other banks,

### _cr10353 - 2005. Another detailed review by the BSD itself of FICA compliance at the other banks,

### FICA compliance reviews, legal provisions, and enforcement
- A detailed review by the BSD of FICA compliance at the other banks, including sampling of credit files and documentation, was carried out in 2006/2007.
- Outcomes were discussed with each bank’s compliance officer and resulted in letters from the BSD with bank-specific recommendations, the follow-up of which the BSD monitors.
- For enforcement, the BSD may, if called for, use its general regulatory powers, e.g., calling into question the fitness and propriety of a bank’s directors or withholding approval for expansion of the bank’s activities.
- Relevant FICA provisions cited:
  - FICA section 38(1) provides civil and criminal immunity to any person complying in good faith with the requirements to provide information about fraudulent or suspicious transactions to the authorities.
  - FICA section 36(1) requires the registrar to make a report to the FIC if he knows or suspects that, as a result of a transaction concluded by or with a bank, the bank wittingly or unwittingly has received or is about to receive the proceeds of unlawful activities, or has been used or may be used in future for money laundering purposes.
  - FICA section 40 provides for the exchange of information pursuant to a written agreement between the FIC and the supervisory bodies and other entities such as investigating authorities inside or outside South Africa.
- Assessment: Compliant.
- Comments:
  - The FICA and other relevant Acts are currently being revised to implement recommendations made during a FATF assessment in 2008.
  - Main FATF recommendation with respect to banks: the BA should include a specific provision allowing the registrar to impose fines on banks for offences against the FICA requirements.
  - The BSD should consider expanding its in-house expertise on FICA matters; it currently has no forensic expertise and relies exclusively on external audit firms.
  - The BSD should ensure that all the aspects listed in Essential Criteria 4, 8 and 9 of the Core Principles Methodology are specifically addressed in the SREP Manual.

### Principle 19 — Supervisory approach: description and practices
- BSD information sources on each bank: prudential returns, on-site work, meetings with bank officers, review of documentation, auditors’ reports.
- Quarterly risk classification: all banks classified each quarter as either high, medium or low risk, based on a two dimensional approach:
  - systemic relevance (size and complexity), and
  - size of the risks and the quality of the controls within a particular bank.
- Risk classification and supervisory cycle lengths:
  - systemically important bank with low bank-specific risk: twelve month cycle;
  - bank with low systemic relevance but high bank-specific risk: twelve month cycle;
  - medium risk banks: 18 month cycle;
  - low risk banks: 24 month cycle.
- Review intensity by risk category:
  - high risk banks: full reviews;
  - low risk banks: low intensity reviews (e.g., questionnaires).
- Resource allocation principle: a large high risk bank would be allocated more supervisory resources than a small high risk bank.
- BSD internal functions and coordination:
  - Research Section analyses sector data; results discussed monthly.
  - Risk Specialists do bank-specific work and sector-wide risk focus.
  - BSD shares macroprudential information with SARB’s Financial Stability Department.
  - MOU and regular supervisory meetings with the FSB to discuss developments at the largest significant systemic banking/insurance groups.
  - Meetings with the National Credit Regulator to exchange views on the credit environment.
- SREP Manual role and status:
  - Describes SREP cycle as continuous: supervisory planning, gathering information, forming a view on main risk areas, focused reviews, feedback to bank management, possible remedial actions or increase in individual capital requirement.
  - Stress testing used to reinforce forward-looking elements.
  - Many parts of the Manual are currently still in a draft stage; the BSD views it as a live document to be developed further.
  - BSD is turning SREP Manual documents into “approved” policy documents; a committee has been established to approve and monitor changes.
- Regulation 49 requirement: banks must have an independent compliance function that continuously monitors compliance and reports to the bank’s board or audit committee, while supplying a copy of its reports to the registrar.
- BSD tools and records:
  - Uses an internal “compliance checklist” and conducts compliance meetings with banks.
  - No explicit statutory requirement for banks to inform the registrar of substantive changes or material adverse developments, but in practice banks comply when the registrar insists.
  - Prudential returns are on BSD’s Oracle IT system; system automatically creates graphs and reports for cross-bank and time-series analysis.
  - All correspondence captured on the Papertrail system.
  - Issues requiring follow-up are kept in a paper-based “Issues File.”
- Assessment: Compliant.
- Comments:
  - BSD focuses on important risk areas within a bank, per industry sources.
  - The BSD’s approach could be strengthened by developing an IT tool that integrates risk analysis, planning of supervisory work and monitoring of follow-up actions; currently risk classification is on Excel sheets and the Issues File is paper-based.
  - Interaction with the FSB has been strengthened but could be further improved, e.g., by conducting joint inspections at group level and exchanging supervisory reports on individual groups.
  - The SREP Manual is conceptually sound; BSD is encouraged to develop it further, including more detailed guidance for staff in day-to-day work, without converting it into a checklist.

### Principle 20 — Supervisory techniques: on-site and off-site supervision
- BSD employs a mix of on-site and off-site supervision; the mix determined during the SREP cycle which begins with a written supervisory plan.
- Supervisory plan purpose: ensure disciplined and comprehensive planning; updated continuously as new information arises.
- BSD Strategic Planning Process: high level forum identifying strategic risks for ongoing supervisory activities.
- Coordination and feedback:
  - Same teams of analysts and risk specialists perform on-site and off-site work for a bank.
  - Bi-weekly BSD management committee meetings provide feedback on on-site meetings; further discussion at divisional meetings and analysts/risk specialists meetings.
  - Weekly correspondence meetings discuss all correspondence with banks to ensure consistency.
- On-site work:
  - Consists of focused reviews and frequent meetings with boards, board committees, and managers.
  - Focused reviews may be performed by BSD analysts, risk specialists, on-site review team, or outsourced to external auditors, external risk consultants, or other advisors (e.g., lawyers or forensic experts).
  - BSD specialist teams: credit risk review team of six specialists; three specialists on market risk; four quantitative experts; two experts on capital issues; one specialist on consolidated supervision; one on operational risk; one on disclosure issues.
  - The credit risk review team has over the past two years devoted attention to correct application of the Basel II standardized approach to credit risk and has not been available for other credit work (e.g., sampling credit files).
  - BSD lacks in-house experts on specialized areas such as IT risk and forensic work; relies on special assignments to external auditors.
- Off-site work:
  - Used to analyze prudential returns, auditors’ reports, published financial statements; may identify areas requiring detailed or specialized on-site review.
  - Issues Files are continuously updated and monitored.
- Meetings and ICAAP:
  - SREP Manual outlines meetings with boards, audit committees, external auditors, internal audit, compliance, heads of risk areas and other staff.
  - ICAAP reviews form part of the supervisory program.
  - Trilateral meetings (board, external auditors, BSD) held with BSD feedback.
  - BSD reviews internal audit reports and audit plans; external auditors are asked about the quality of internal audit and reliance placed on it.
- Final SREP stage: informing the bank of BSD findings and follow-up actions via letter and meetings.
- Assessment: Compliant.
- Comments:
  - BSD should consider expanding its staff to allow more work on credit risk and specialized areas such as IT risk and forensic investigations.

### Principle 21 — Supervisory reporting: authority, returns, and data quality
- Legal authorities and reporting requirements:
  - BA section 7: registrar may require banks, subsidiaries and controlling companies to furnish information reasonably required.
  - BA section 75: banks shall furnish the registrar with returns relating to capital adequacy and liquidity at such intervals and in such form as the registrar may prescribe.
  - Regulation 7: lists returns to be submitted, including balance sheets, off-balance sheet activities, income statements, information on shareholders, various returns relating to credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, large exposures, and others.
  - All returns must be submitted both on a solo and a consolidated basis.
- Accounting and reporting standards and frequency:
  - Returns prepared in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
  - Reporting frequency varies from daily (return on selected risk exposures) to annually (return on shareholders), with most returns submitted either monthly (solo supervision) or quarterly (consolidated supervision).
  - All banks report for the same dates and periods to allow peer comparisons.
- Data validation, certification and auditor roles:
  - BSD has implemented validation rules to help prevent incorrect data submission.
  - BSD verifies data quality via on-site and off-site work.
  - Certification required: a bank’s CEO, chief accounting officer and executive officer responsible for FICA compliance certify each submission of prudential returns as correct.
  - External auditor must report whether submitted year-end returns are, in his opinion, materially correct and complete (Regulation 46).
  - External auditor must inform the registrar throughout the year on any matter which may endanger the bank’s viability or ability to repay depositors, or which is contrary to sound management and internal controls (BA section 63).
  - Bilateral meetings ask auditors whether they are aware of any “material shortcomings” at a bank.
- Enforcement for inaccurate returns:
  - BA section 91 lists non-compliance with obligation to submit accurate and timely prudential returns as an offence.
  - BA section 91A allows the registrar to impose penalties for offences under the BA.
- Access and investigative powers:
  - BA section 6: BSD has full access to all relevant information from banks, their parents and subsidiaries, including internal management information.
  - BA sections 7 and 85B allow the registrar to order banks to appoint outside experts to investigate specified matters and report to him.
- Assessment: Largely compliant.
- Comments:
  - Some essential information is not reported regularly to the BSD, including related party lending (ref. Principle 11) and country and transfer risk (ref. Principle 12).

### Principle 22 — Accounting and disclosure: standards, audits, and disclosure requirements
- IFRS adoption and company law:
  - IFRS promulgated by the IASB were enacted as South African law in 2004.
  - Section 11 of the Banks Act: prerequisite to be registered as a public company before conducting business as a bank.
  - Companies Act Section 284: duty of every company to keep financial records.
  - Companies Act requires financial statements to be audited and published.
- Auditor appointment and registrar powers:
  - Section 61 of the Banks Act: approval of the appointed external auditor by the registrar is required.
  - Section 62: if a bank fails to appoint an auditor, the registrar may appoint one.
  - Registrar can request external auditors to review areas outside normal audit procedures (Section 7 (1)b of the Banks Act).
  - Under Regulation 46 (4) the external auditor reports annually to the registrar on certain aspects of credit risk management for all banks.
- Directors’ responsibility and reporting:
  - Regulation 40 (4): directors required annually to report to the registrar whether the bank’s internal controls provide reasonable assurance as to the integrity and reliability of the bank’s financial statements.
- Regulation 3 and reporting instructions:
  - Regulation 3 requires prudential returns to be prepared in accordance with Financial Reporting Standards and provides specific risk management guidance for application of the fair value option.
  - BA reporting form instructions specify presentation and valuation methods.
- Disclosure obligations:
  - Regulation 43 imposes specific qualitative and quantitative disclosure obligations and requires banks to have a disclosure policy.
  - Disclosure scope and level commensurate with size and complexity; aligned with Pillar 3 under Basel II.
  - Registrar may use enforcement powers and remedial actions if banks do not comply with disclosure requirements.
- Registrar publications:
  - Registrar publishes periodic aggregated information on the banking system from prudential returns, including a monthly overview of banking sector trends: capital ratios, impaired advances, profitability indicators and balance sheet structure.
- Auditor interactions and protections:
  - Frequent bilateral meetings between BSD and external auditors form part of supervisory approach.
  - Section 63 (1) details auditor reporting duties to BSD and registrar’s power to require additional information.
  - Paragraph 3 of Section 63 ensures auditor cannot be held liable for breach of confidentiality when reporting in good faith.
- Auditor rotation:
  - Banks Act Directive 6/2008 establishes auditor rotation rules: rotation of an audit firm’s lead and engagement partners (not necessarily the audit firm).
  - Registrar can refuse an external auditor as enforcement.
- Registrar access to auditor workpapers:
  - Registrar has no unfettered access to auditors’ working papers but can issue a directive requiring an auditor to provide information or documents on a specific issue.
- Assessment: Compliant.
- Comments: (none provided in source text)

### Principle 23 — Corrective and remedial powers of supervisors
- BSD supervisory follow-up process:
  - Throughout the SREP cycle, BSD discusses review outcomes with banks at meetings with CEO, internal audit, compliance, heads of risk areas, heads of business units, and bilateral meetings with external auditors; outcomes also discussed at graph discussions.
  - Where concerns identified, on-site reviews take place followed by feedback letters with requests for regular progress reports to BSD.
  - Issues registered in the Issues File; progress monitored closely and followed up regularly.
  - BSD meets with boards and holds trilateral meetings with audit committee, external and internal audit at the end of the SREP cycle.
  - Registrar may personally contact bank CEOs on concerns outside the formal SREP cycle.
- Statutory powers related to license cancellation, restriction, and curatorship:
  - BA section 25: registrar can apply to a competent court for an order for cancellation or suspension of a bank’s registration; pending court order the bank may continue operations.
  - BA section 26: registrar may restrict the activities of the bank in specified respects instead of seeking a court order.
  - BA section 23: where registration obtained by false or misleading information, or where a foreign bank’s home supervisor has revoked parent license, the registrar needs ministerial consent to cancel registration; in these cases the registrar need not go to court.
  - BA section 24: before restricting activities under section 26 or cancelling/suspending registration under section 23, the registrar must inform the bank, explain reasons, and allow at least 30 days to argue against cancellation or suspension; as when a court order is pending, the bank may continue operations in the meantime.
  - BA section 69: minister may appoint a curator to a bank if the registrar believes the bank will be unable to meet its obligations; written consent of the CEO or chairperson of the board is required for curator appointment.
- Assessment statement (partial in source): The BA provides the registrar with an appropriate range of tools to address issues in banks on a going concern basis, including issuing directives to banks individually or collectively (text truncated in source).

*Source: _cr10353 - 2005. Another detailed review by the BSD itself of FICA compliance at the other banks,*

### section 6(6)(a)), raising an individual bank’s capital requirement or requiring the bank to

### _cr10353 - section 6(6)(a)), raising an individual bank’s capital requirement or requiring the bank to

### Registrar powers, remedial actions, and timing
- Registrar powers include: raising an individual bank’s capital requirement; requiring the bank to strengthen its risk management and internal controls (Regulation 38(4)); declaring that a bank’s CEO or other officer is no longer fit and proper (BA section 60(6)(a)); imposing fines (BA section 91A); seeking court decisions on offences committed by a bank or its officers; taking the initiative for a cancellation or suspension of a bank’s registration.
- The registrar’s power to increase a bank’s individual capital requirement or to derecognize the fitness and propriety of its executive officers enables him to require banks to take necessary action.
- Common law and administrative law principles require administrative action or decision to be appropriate, equitable, and carried out without undue delay; undue delays by the registrar that are in bad faith might result in the SARB or the registrar being liable for damage caused by such delay.
- BA section 70A(1)(b) allows ring-fencing of a bank from unregulated entities in a group.
- Under the MOU between the BSD and the FSB, the BSD would inform the FSB of material information (including remedial supervisory action) in respect of a bank that is part of a group that includes entities supervised by the FSB.
- Assessment: Materially non-compliant.
- Comments: Severe limitations on the registrar’s authority to cancel or suspend a bank’s license or restrict activities (BA sections 23–26), in particular the delay of at least 30 days between the announcement of such measures to a bank and their actual application, call seriously into question his ability to use these supervisory powers decisively, expediently and effectively. The same comment applies to the registrar’s inability to appoint a curator without the consent of the CEO or the chairperson of the board of the bank concerned.

### Consolidated supervision (Principle 24): description and practices
- Annual reporting requirements: banks and controlling companies must provide the registrar annually with detailed qualitative information on major shareholders, legal and operational group structure, strategy, risk management, business activities, etc (Regulation 36(8)(a)).
- Biannual reporting: all banking groups must submit a detailed organization chart biannually reflecting all interests under the bank or the controlling company (Regulation 56(2)(a)(ix)(C)).
- Additional information: to be provided on request (Regulation 36(8)(b)).
- Quarterly quantitative reporting: consolidated information on group capital adequacy, intragroup exposures, group large exposures (including related party exposures) and group foreign exchange exposures (form BA 600); includes significant non-banking financial activities and commercial activities. All significant entities listed line-by-line on form BA 600.
- Supervisory staffing: BSD has a dedicated consolidated supervision analyst for each of the five largest banking groups, and one consolidated supervision specialist.
- Legal powers: BA sections 70A and 73 allow prudential standards for a banking group relating to capital requirements and concentration risk. Detailed standards set in Regulations 36, 37, 38, and 45. BA sections 6 and 7 allow BSD to obtain information from parent companies and subsidiaries.
- Supervisory review/process powers: BA section 4(4) includes on-site and off-site review of banks or controlling companies and their branches, subsidiaries or related entities both within and outside South Africa, discussions with board members, executive officers and risk managers, and review of external auditors’ work.
- Prior approval requirements: BA section 52 requires registrar’s prior written approval for establishing or acquiring a subsidiary or a branch, investing in joint ventures, and acquiring an interest in any undertaking registered outside South Africa; BSD has a Section 52 Committee to consider impacts and may reject applications.
- Limitations: where a bank is owned by an insurance company, the BSD cannot impose prudential standards on the group; such cases are covered in regular meetings with the FSB which, as lead regulator, has wider responsibility for group oversight (the banking sub-group is subject to BSD consolidated supervision).
- Cross-border and MOUs: BSD requires MOUs with cross-border supervisors; MOUs in place with the FSB and thirteen foreign bank supervisory authorities; MOUs with a further twenty-one foreign supervisors, as well as the FIC and the NCR, are in various stages of preparation.
- Cross-border supervisory cooperation: BSD occasionally sends staff abroad; foreign supervisors come to South Africa; BSD convenes ad-hoc meetings with foreign supervisors on material supervisory concerns.
- Reporting and audits for foreign operations: quarterly return for cross-border operations (form BA 610); Regulation 46 requires external auditors to issue a report on each foreign banking operation; senior management appointments at foreign operations subject to fitness and propriety testing by BSD; foreign operations expected to report on interactions with host supervisors.
- Enforcement: under BA section 26, BSD may restrict a bank’s activities (e.g., foreign operations) if it has failed to comply with a requirement of the BA.
- Assessment: Compliant.
- Comments: Interaction between BSD and FSB can be further improved by conducting joint inspections at group level and exchanging supervisory reports on individual groups on a regular basis; temporary secondments of staff would help understanding and facilitate operational communication; consider harmonization of regulatory requirements in areas of common interest, such as corporate governance and fitness and propriety.
- Note: The power of the BSD to establish and enforce fit and proper standards for owners and senior managers of parent companies of banks is not clearly stated in the BA (ref. AC 1).

### Home-host relationships (Principle 25): description and practices
- Legal basis: Section 4(3) of the Bank’s Act gives the registrar authority to enter into cooperation agreements (MOUs) with host or home supervisors; Section 89(b) allows furnishing information to another country for bank supervision.
- MOUs: SARB has MOUs with a number of authorities where South African banks have significant operations; they establish a formal basis for cooperation, including exchange of information, though not covering all supervisory agencies with which BSD has home/host relationships.
- Information exchange: BSD does not exchange prudential risk assessments and reports on specific prudential meetings and visits, but the level and detail exchanged appears adequate given the size and complexity of cross-border operations.
- SREP Manual: requires BSD to consult with the other supervisor before taking action on information received from them, but this has not occurred in practice.
- Working relationships: BSD has very close working relationships with the UK FSA and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, realized in joint model validation visits during Basel II implementation.
- BSD as home supervisor:
  - Section 52: prior approval required to establish a subsidiary or other operation abroad; an MOU is required for cross-border banking operations.
  - Onsite review: when reviewing foreign operations on site, BSD meets host supervisor; serious concerns prompt prompt contact with host supervisors.
  - SREP manual addresses onsite examinations of foreign operations; BSD receives regular prudential reporting and external auditors credit risk report required under Regulation 46(4) for foreign operations.
  - BSD hosted the first College of African bank supervisors in 2007; another college meeting planned in 2010.
- BSD as host supervisor:
  - Requires all foreign branches and subsidiaries of international banks to comply with requirements of the Bank’s Act and the Regulations (including capital adequacy for branches).
  - Requires an MOU when acting as host supervisor and ensures home supervisor has no objections per branch regulations (1)(6)(b)(i).
  - Section 18A(3)b requires foreign institution to lodge written application including information on consolidated supervision in the home country.
  - Legal department establishes contact with home supervisor as part of licensing; home supervisors are given on-site access per Section 4(3)c; several onsite inspections by foreign authorities have taken place.
  - BSD is a member of several supervisory colleges and regularly attends meetings; provides information to home supervisors during college meetings or ad hoc.
- BSD policy: does not permit creation of shell banks and booking offices.
- Assessment: Compliant.

### Summary of compliance highlights (selected Core Principles and comments)
- Principle 1.1 Responsibilities and Objectives: Compliant.
- Principle 1.2 Independence, Accountability, Transparency: Compliant.
- Principle 1.3 Legal framework: Largely Compliant — minister of finance, not the registrar, is responsible for setting prudential regulations; registrar’s formal role limited to issuing circulars (BA section 6(4)), though in practice registrar prepares draft regulations.
- Principle 1.4 Legal powers: Largely Compliant — minister’s role in supervisory remedial actions and required consent of CEO or chairperson for appointment of curator need reconsideration.
- Principle 1.5 Legal protection: Compliant.
- Principle 1.6 Cooperation: Compliant.
- Principle 2 Permissible Activities: Compliant.
- Principle 3 Licensing Criteria: Compliant — BSD is including “...the detection and prevention of criminal activities ...” in form BA 002 and Regulation 39 section (5).
- Principle 4 Transfer of Significant Ownership: Compliant — consider introducing requirement for banks to notify BSD of material information that negatively affects suitability of shareholders; threshold of 15 percent for supervisory approval noted, with international comparisons of 5 or 10 percent.
- Principle 5 Major Acquisitions: Largely Compliant — Banks Act and Regulations do not define amounts requiring prior supervisory approval; apparent requirement that all acquisitions and investments, no matter how small, require prior approval; recommend exempting investments below a threshold from prior approval to improve efficiency.
- Principle 6 Capital Adequacy: Largely Compliant — BSD adopted and implemented Basel II on 1 January 2008; no explicit power to revoke advanced approaches for credit or market risk; recommend adding explicit revocation power similar to Regulation 33(6) on operational risk.
- Principle 7 Risk Management Process: Compliant.
- Principle 8 Credit Risk: Compliant.
- Principle 9 Problem Assets, Provisions and Reserves: Largely Compliant — reliance on FRS provisions audited by external auditors and Regulation 46(4) auditor reports; recommend more specific qualitative guidance to external auditors and/or banks on periodic assessment of risk mitigants, review of problem assets, adequacy of organizational resources, oversight and collection of problem assets, and forward-looking provisioning for prudential purposes.
- Principle 10 Large Exposure Limits: Compliant.
- Principle 11 Exposures to Related Parties: Materially Noncompliant — BSD does not obtain on a regular basis comprehensive information on banks’ aggregate exposures to related parties; considering inclusion of related party exposures as a separate reportable item on form BA 600; BSD does not obtain regular information on individual related party exposures; BSD does not yet require transactions with related parties and write-offs exceeding specified amounts to be subject to prior board approval, though amendments to Regulation 36(15) are under preparation.

*Source: _cr10353 - section 6(6)(a)), raising an individual bank’s capital requirement or requiring the bank to (excerpt) PDF*

### 12. Country and Transfer Risks

### 12. Country and Transfer Risks

### Assessment
- Rating: Materially Noncompliant
- Core findings:
  - "A regulation specifically dealing with country and transfer risk should be promulgated since these are material risks to some of the banks."
  - "The granularity of regional exposures on form BA210 should be increased so that the BSD is in a position to monitor country and transfer risk on an ongoing basis."

### Supervisory reporting and data
- Identified gaps:
  - Form BA210 currently used for reporting regional/geographical exposures; assessors recommend increased granularity.
  - In the Recommended Action Plan the specific line for Country and Transfer Risks (CP 12) states:
    - "Promulgate a regulation specifically dealing with country and transfer risk."
    - "Increase the granularity of regional exposures on BA610."
    - "Provide more guidance on the scope of the work done by the external auditors under Regulation 46 (4)"

### Context and quantitative exposure
- Reported bank credit exposure distribution:
  - "Currently approximately 90 per cent of South African banks’ credit exposure relates to exposure within South Africa..."
  - "with the remaining approximately 10 per cent of credit exposure distributed between all other countries across the world."
- Implication noted by BSD in response:
  - For the material credit exposure (the approximately 90 per cent within South Africa), existing large exposure rules of "10 per cent and 25 per cent" (10 per cent of capital and reserve funds for board approval; 25 per cent for registrar approval for private-sector non-bank person) apply.
  - BSD view: South African banks’ credit exposures to country and transfer risk (exposure outside the borders of South Africa) are "largely immaterial per country or region," and thus, to date, there has been "no need or purpose ... to specify limits in the Banks Act or the Regulations."

### BSD response and dispute of rating
- BSD position:
  - Disputes "materially non-compliant" rating and proposes reconsideration to "largely compliant" based on prior submissions (paragraphs 39–47 referenced).
  - Notes it has already recognized and "noted the only two recommendations of the assessors specified under ‘comments’" (promulgate a regulation and increase BA210 granularity).
- Legal and regulatory references cited by BSD:
  - "Section 73 of the Banks Act read with regulations 24(6) and 24(7) of the Regulations, and the form BA 210, deal extensively with concentration risk," including:
    - Exposure to a person
    - Exposure to a private-sector non-bank person
    - Exposure to an industry
    - Exposure to a sector
    - Exposure to a geographical area
    - Board approval for exposures in excess of 10 per cent of capital and reserve funds
    - Registrar approval for exposure to a private-sector non-bank person in excess of 25 per cent of capital and reserve funds
    - Separate reporting requirements for concentrated exposure (see form BA 210)
    - Specified reporting thresholds
    - Provision to specify further reporting thresholds or limits
    - Provision to specify additional capital requirements or conditions in respect of any exposure that exceeds any specified threshold

### Recommended supervisory actions (as listed in the Recommended Action Plan)
- Promulgate a regulation specifically dealing with country and transfer risk.
- Increase the granularity of regional exposures on BA610.
- Provide more guidance on the scope of the work done by the external auditors under Regulation 46 (4).

*Source: _cr10353 - 12. Country and Transfer Risks*

### 42. In respect of EC 3, for example, provisioning for country and transfer risk is set by banks

### _cr10353 - 42. In respect of EC 3, for example, provisioning for country and transfer risk is set by banks

### Country and transfer risk (EC 3) — provisioning and supervisory approach
- Provisioning for country and transfer risk is set by banks themselves for each individual loan, based on IFRS.
- The IFRS provisioning is then judged by the external auditor during their year-end audits and by the BSD during prudential meetings, on-site visits or Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process meetings (ICAAPs), when required or judged appropriate.
- This approach is identified as one of the options provided for by EC 3.
- EC3 states that “... there are different international practices which are all acceptable as long as they lead to risk-based results ...”.
- Based on the aforesaid and the related risk-based approached followed in South Africa, which is in line with the principles contained in the CP and in the Basel II framework, it has not been necessary for the BSD to specify any country and transfer risk limits, although the regulatory framework (Banks Act) does provide the BSD with the power to do so when, and if, required in the future.
- The statement under “Description” that “There are no specific regulations or prudential limits in place for country risk or transfer risk as these risks are expected to be captured in the overall credit risk management framework of banks.” is noted as not being based on the requirements of any of the ECs, because specific regulations or prudential limits for country and transfer risk are not included in the ECs of this CP. The ECs make provision for banks to have in place country exposure limits and it is then expected of supervisors to confirm adherence thereto (EC2).
- Through its assessment of banks’ ICAAPs, the BSD assesses banks’ policies and processes for country and transfer risk that give due regard to the identification, measurement, and monitoring and control of country risk and transfer risk, which is in accordance with the requirements of the ECs.
- The BSD considers that no additional guidance in terms of Regulation 46(4) is necessary. The external auditors assess banks’ adherence to IFRS that require banks to impair financial assets where there is evidence that a financial loss had occurred.
- It is noted that an increase in country and transfer risk exposures in general would result in increased diversification (as the South African banking system is concentrated) and would therefore lower the level of concentration risk in South Africa.

### Core Principle 23 — Corrective and Remedial Powers of Supervisors (BSD position and legal framework)
- The BSD disputes the assessment of ‘materially non-compliant’ and requested on 30 April 2010 that the assessment be amended to ‘compliant’.
- The BSD contests that there are “severe limitations” on the Registrar’s authority to cancel or suspend a bank’s licence and explains the Minister’s role as a “check and balance” to avoid recourse to the courts, which is described as potentially lengthy, expensive and not necessarily always achieving the desired outcome.
- Sections of the Banks Act cited by the BSD:
  - Section 23 read with section 24: the Registrar may cancel or suspend a bank's registration - with the consent of the Minister - in specifically defined areas:
    - a. where a bank does not commence business within 6 months of registration;
    - b. if the registration was obtained through false or misleading information;
    - c. if an international parent bank's licence has been revoked in such a foreign jurisdiction;
    - d. if a bank has failed to comply with conditions prescribed by the Registrar for registration; or
    - e. if a bank ceases to do business or is no longer in operation.
  - Section 25: provides for the suspension or cancellation in any other case than described above - by an application to Court, especially in the following cases - but not limited thereto:
    - f. the directors or executive officers of the bank have been convicted of any offence in terms of the Banks Act;
    - g. the bank does not conduct business satisfactorily;
    - h. the bank failed to comply with requirement of Banks Act;
    - i. the bank continues to employ undesirable practices;
    - j. the bank has materially misrepresented facilities it offers to the public.
- The 30 days afforded to a bank before cancellation of its registration only relates to section 23 of the Banks Act. In all other cases a court may be approached on an urgent basis for cancellation of a bank’s registration.
- EC4 of CP23 requires the supervisor to have the power to revoke or “recommending the revocation” of the banking licence.
- Section 69(1)(a) of the Banks Act requires the written consent of the Chief Executive Officer OR the chairperson of the board of directors of that bank before the appointment of a curator; the BSD frames this as a process to protect the rights of the bank while ensuring a speedy process and avoiding court approaches that are slower, more expensive, and in the public domain.
- The BSD asserts the Registrar can take prompt remedial action and that the current arrangement does not restrict the Registrar from acting in accordance with the CP in a suitable or legal manner. The BSD notes that the Registrar has deregistered a bank and appointed curators for banks on various occasions, without problems or delays.
- The legal framework is described as providing a wide range of measures and tools to address non-compliance or to effect the orderly resolution of problem banks.
- The BSD contends that the assessors overemphasise the role of the Minister in cancellation or suspension of registration or in the appointment of a curator; the process has been tested in practice on numerous occasions and found to work well and expediently each time.
- Given compliance with the detail within all the ECs and the subjective nature of the judgemental view, the BSD requests that the assessment be amended to ‘compliant’.

*Source: _cr10353 - 42. In respect of EC 3, for example, provisioning for country and transfer risk is set by banks*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/_cr10353.pdf_
