## _cr1038

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---

### Overall assessment, stability and development issues
- Total assets of the banking sector have increased twofold since 2003 and credit to the private sector has risen threefold.
- Private domestic banks now hold a majority of banking assets; the role of state-owned commercial banks (SCBs) and specialized banks (SBs) has declined.
- Banking sector penetration and branch networks have expanded; MFIs’ loans are now equal to 3 percent of GDP; MFIs’ assets have doubled since 2001.
- Non-performing loans (NPLs) have decreased steadily since 2003; reported classified assets represent 10.8 percent of loans (under 5 percent for private and foreign banks).
- Remaining vulnerabilities and supervisory shortfalls:
  - Loan classification, provisioning, and capital remain uneven across the banking sector, with many weaknesses concentrated in the SCBs and SBs.
  - Non-prudential government intervention (interest rate ceilings, moral suasion, directed credit, orders to ease debt service) increases risks, reduces transparency, and creates inefficiency.
  - Rapid growth in nontraditional banking activities (capital market activity, merchant banks and brokerage subsidiaries, exposure to MFIs) is creating new risks; banks’ capital could be exposed to a fall in the market.
  - MFIs are expanding into areas traditionally reserved for banks while managerial and regulatory capacity lags; scope exists to expand the regulatory perimeter to include unregistered MFIs.
  - Supervisory agencies need stronger staffing, training, and retention of expert professionals; banks’ allowable activities should be clarified and enforcement buttressed.

### Priority FSAP update recommendations (with timeframes)
- Banking Sector Stability Analysis
  - Continue improving information collection and the use of the stress testing methodology. — Near Term
  - Integrate stress test analysis with the supervisory function. — Near Term
  - Replace interest rate ceilings, moral suasion, and directed credit with market-based incentives. — Medium Term
- Banking Sector Risks and State Owned Banks
  - Strengthen bank capital in line with banks‘ risks in the equity markets. — Near Term
  - Continue the reform of state-owned banks with monitorable targets and a plan for eventual divestiture. — Near Term
  - Establish a plan for improving the specialized development banks. — Near Term
- Crisis Management and Safety Net Arrangements
  - Introduce a lender of last resort facility to provide liquidity to solvent banks at a penalty rate. — Near Term
- Monetary Policy Implementation
  - Transform the repo/reverse repo into standing facilities and introduce a short-term (7 to 14 days) repo/reserve auction. Manage the market interest rate in the corridor defined by the repo/reverse repo. — Near Term
  - Enlarge the time horizon of liquidity forecasting to match the reserve requirement maintenance period. — Near Term
  - Scale down the use of the statutory liquidity requirement. — Near Term
- Financial System Oversight
  - Continue to strengthen BB by automating its operations, improving supervisory capacities (including more effective risk-based supervision), increasing transparency, enhancing disclosure policies, and providing it with greater independence and autonomy. — Near Term
  - Improve assessment of banks‘ risk profile, management and governance and develop a clear, monitorable program for improvement in these areas. — Near Term
  - Establish a framework for bank participation in merchant banking and brokerage activities through legally separate entities. — Near Term
- Equity Markets
  - Provide the SEC with greater autonomy in budget and personnel decisions and rules enforcement. — Near Term
  - Set up a committee of stakeholders to develop a roadmap for demutualization of stock exchanges. — Near Term

(Note: Near Term: 6-12 months; Medium Term: 12-24 months.)

### Macrofinancial environment — key findings and risks
- Macroeconomic performance buoyant despite natural disasters and volatile food and energy prices; strengthened policy frameworks and resilient export and remittance flows supported growth and external stability.
- External debt is sustainable and largely concessional; international reserves are strong.
- Financial sector resilience to global turmoil:
  - Banks have low exposures to FX structured products and credit derivatives, except some forward contracts.
  - Off-balance sheet activities are typically basic swap contracts with negligible trading volume.
- Structural context:
  - Banking sector assets equal 65 percent of GDP.
  - Sector remains structurally weak with low capitalization, provisions, and distortions due to weak, systemically important SCBs and SBs.
  - Nonbank financial sector underdeveloped except for the MFI sector.
- Macro risks and indicators:
  - Remittances grew 22 percent in the just-ended fiscal year; remittances reached almost 11 percent of GDP in FY09.
  - Rising commodity prices could erode balance of payments improvement.
  - High excess liquidity from unsterilized interventions could lead to inflationary pressures and credit risk.
  - Uncollateralized overnight money market average turnover about Tk50 billion (1 percent of the GDP).
  - BB should consider introducing an interest rate corridor to establish a minimum (reference) rate and provide greater stability in the call market.

### Banking sector structure, performance and governance
- Size and ownership shifts:
  - Bank assets equivalent to 62 percent of GDP in 2008 compared to 47 percent in 2001.
  - Private domestic banks own 55 percent of bank assets in 2008, compared to 35 percent in 2002.
- Key market measures:
  - Bank deposits are now 53 percent of GDP, having risen from 42 percent of GDP in 2002; elsewhere noted as over 50 percent of GDP (from 30 percent in 2001).
  - Equity market capitalization about 14 percent of GDP at end-2008; CSE capitalization of $11.3 billion.
  - Debt securities market accounted for about 17 percent of financial system assets in 2006; nonmarketable national savings certificates account for more than three-fifths of debt instruments.
- Capital, NPLs and provisioning:
  - Reported average capital ratio about 10 percent of risk-weighted assets, roughly equal to the new minimum standard.
  - Commercial banks expected minimum 10 percent CAR, with 5 percent as tier 1 capital; increased from 9 percent and 4.5 percent in 2007.
  - Tier 2 capital includes a general provision of 1 percent for all unclassified loans except: housing and SME lending (2 percent), and consumer credit and special mention loans (5 percent).
  - Average NPLs have dropped from 41 percent to 10.8 percent of assets from 2001 to 2008 owing to rapid growth of GDP and credit.
  - Provisioning ratio over total assets decreased to 3.8 percent in the same period.
  - Liquid assets cover only 29.4 percent of liquid liabilities.
  - Specific provisions for non-term loans: 20 percent after debt service overdue for 6 months, 50 percent after 9 months, and 100 percent after 12 months.
  - Loan classification rules (current): Sub-standard = past due/overdue for 6 months─or beyond─but less than 9 months; Doubtful = 9 months─or beyond─but less than 12 months; Bad-Debt = 12 months─or beyond.
  - Borrowers can be rescheduled as performing if they pay a set fee (10 percent of the outstanding debt for the first rescheduling).
- Income and market risk:
  - Average returns on assets and equity have increased for all types of banks; private and foreign banks earn higher rates of return than SCBs.
  - Recent increases in equity-market related activities have raised market-related risk; additional capital allocation to value at risk and improved market risk management and consolidated supervision are recommended.
- State-owned commercial banks (SCBs) reform outcomes:
  - SCBs corporatized into LLCs owned by a government holding company in 2007; corporatization brought SCBs under BB regulatory authority and included a notional accounting increase of Taka 87.9 billion in goodwill/capital, equivalent to SCBs‘ accumulated losses.
  - SCBs committed to use pre-tax “amortizations” to replace this notional capital increase over 10 years; 2008 “amortizations” have been made.
  - Despite improvements, SCBs’ finances remain much worse than private banks; Rupali Bank privatization failed and it was added to the restructuring program.

### Microfinance regulation and risks
- MFIs are regulated and supervised by the Microfinance Regulatory Authority (MRA).
- Licensing and ongoing supervision are ineffective given lack of resources and the approach.
- Thousands of microfinance companies operate, but only 400 are registered with the MRA.
- Banks are opening microfinance units, making the border between regulated banking and largely unregulated microfinance increasingly porous.
- Recommendations:
  - Consider stricter regulations and supervision practices for larger MFIs, closer to those applicable to banks.
  - Revise taxation regulations for banks, MFIs, and cooperatives to reduce distortions and arbitrage.
  - Implement deposit insurance scheme for MFIs foreseen in the MRA ordinance, together with a framework for failing MFIs.
  - BB and MRA should consider strengthening capacity to supervise MFIs.

### Stress testing and scenario analysis — key results
- Coverage: Tests covered the entire 48 banks operating in Bangladesh as of December 2008.
- Sensitivity analysis (uniform 20 percent deterioration assumed):
  - Banking sector CAR declined by 1.4 percent and would require Tk29 billion to meet the regulatory minimum of 10 percent.
  - Five banks including two state-owned are currently below the CAR minimum; when shocks applied, three more banks fell below the minimum CAR.
  - All nine foreign banks operating in Bangladesh were resilient.
  - Exchange rate risk limited because net open positions of many banks minimal.
- Scenario analysis (GDP decline and associated shocks):
  - Scenario assumed GDP declined by 1.5 percent; regression estimated effects included: NPLs (20 percent), exchange rate (25 percent depreciation of the taka against the dollar) and interest rates (200bp decrease).
  - Results indicated 15 banks would fall below regulatory requirements including all SCBs; Development Finance Institutions (DFI) would essentially be insolvent.
  - Private and foreign banks would be resilient.
- Appendix 5 headline CAR results (initial and after shocks):
  - System initial CAR: 10.1
  - NCBs initial CAR: 7.8
  - PCBs initial CAR: 11.2
  - FBI initial CAR: 23.8
  - DFI initial CAR: -3.3
  - CAR after shock — NPLs increase: System 7.7; NCBs 2.2; PCBs 10.2; FBI 23.9; DFI -11.5
  - CAR after shock — Category shift from watch to substandard: System 6.6; NCBs 3.8; PCBs 8.0; FBI 20.9; DFI -1.1
  - CAR after shock — Depreciation of Taka: System 9.9; NCBs 7.5; PCBs 11.1; FBI 23.6; DFI -3.3
  - Scenario Analysis CAR: System 8.4; NCBs 0.7; PCBs 10.7; FBI 22.2; DFI -2.5
- Liquidity ratios (initial and post-shock):
  - Initial SLR Ratio: System 23.7; NCBs 30.0; PCBs 19.9; FBI 35.0; DFI 11.4
  - Initial Liquid Assets/Liquid Liabilities (LA/LL) Ratio: System 94.8; NCBs 82.4; PCBs 100.3; FBI 114.5; DFI 76.9
  - Liquidity after shock — Run on deposits on LA/LL Ratio: System 89.2; NCBs 77.5; PCBs 94.4; FBI 107.8; DFI 72.4
  - Liquidity after shock — Run on deposits on SLR ratio: System 19.8; NCBs 23.7; PCBs 17.2; FBI 30.8; DFI 9.7

### Financial system oversight, supervisory capacity and legal framework
- Supervision is fragmented and organized by type of intermediary and sector; coordination with other domestic supervisors is imperative due to cross-supervisory activities.
- Shortcomings and areas for improvement:
  - Regulatory and supervisory system falls short of international standards; considerable scope to improve regulations, strengthen enforcement, and enhance supervisory practices.
  - Initial steps toward risk-based supervision have been taken but further effort required; supervisors still applying outdated techniques.
  - Problems undermining supervisory process include Government legal authority to alter BB actions; liberal classification of loans, rescheduling, and provisions; absence of single overall exposure limit and weak definition of related parties; limited supervision of market, interest rate, and liquidity risk.
- Basel II and AML/CFT:
  - Implementation of Basel II intended for 2010; assessors caution considerable efforts needed by industry and supervisors.
  - Heavy Government involvement in supervisory mandate needs to be addressed to remove its impact on market discipline (Pillar 3).
  - APG Mutual Evaluation Report adopted July 2009: Bangladesh faces significant ML/TF risks; FIU within BB performing core functions; gaps in ML and TF offense scope and preventive measures; assessors recommend preparing a ML/TF risk-analysis and adopting a national AML/CFT strategy.
- Main recommended supervisory and legal reforms:
  - Change BBO and BCA to remove Government involvement in supervisory mandate and strengthen BB authority.
  - Upgrade to a risk-based supervisory framework with qualitative, forward-looking assessments; enhance coordination between on-site and off-site supervision.
  - Revise and tighten requirements for classification, rescheduling, write-offs and provisioning; remove ability of banks to de-classify loans.
  - Broaden related-party definition; establish aggregate exposure limits; expand consolidated supervision; step up AML enforcement and extend AML requirements to unlicensed deposit-taking institutions.

### Financial stability diagnostic — top scenario risks (Appendix 7)
- 1. Slowdown in remittances
  - Overall level of concern: Medium; Likelihood in next [1-3] years: High.
  - Remittances growth noted at 22 percent in the just-ended fiscal year; remittances about US$10 billion (noted elsewhere).
  - Sustained reductions could trigger a sharp downturn, negative exchange rate effects, and deterioration in borrowers’ repayment capacity.
- 2. Rapid deterioration in credit risks, especially affecting state-owned banks
  - Overall level of concern: Medium; Likelihood: Medium-to-High.
  - Credit risk largest single-factor impact; state-owned banks currently below CAR minimum.
- 3. State-owned banks low capital position
  - Overall level of concern: Low; Likelihood: High.
  - SCBs finances remain weak; ad hoc government demands stress profitability.
- 4. Excess Liquidity
  - Overall level of concern: Medium; Likelihood: High.
  - Unsterilized interventions led to excess liquidity and pushed down short-term interest rates; may lead to credit booms, inflation, and asset bubbles.
- 5. Sharp commodity price increase
  - Overall level of concern: Low; Likelihood: Medium.
  - Rising commodity prices could erode balance of payments improvement and increase credit risk.
- 6. Natural disaster realization
  - Overall level of concern: Low; Likelihood: High.
  - BB lacks proper crisis management framework and foreign exchange adequacy strategy for such events.

### Key economic and financial statistics (selected)
- Nominal GDP (FY09): US$89 billion
- Main export (percent of total): garments and textiles (79)
- Population (FY08): 142.5 million
- FDI (percent of GDP, FY09): US$941 million (1.0)
- GDP per capita (FY08): US$554
- Government debt: 45.4 percent of GDP
- Poverty rate (FY05): 40.8 percent
- Foreign government debt: 53 percent of total debt
- Real GDP (percent change) — Est. FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14:
  - 6.4 6.2 5.9 5.0 5.8 6.0 6.0 6.0
- CPI inflation (annual average) — Est. FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14:
  - 7.2 9.9 6.7 7.8 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.5
- Bank deposits and credit indicators:
  - Bank deposits are now 53 percent of GDP; credit to the private sector equivalent to 37 percent of GDP.
- Financial soundness indicators (selected):
  - Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (years shown): 6.9 7.3 5.1 7.4 10.1
  - Non-performing loans to total loans: 17.5 13.2 12.8 14.5 11.2
  - Loan provisions to total non-performing loans: 26.8 28.3 45.2 43.0 50.1
  - Profitability — Return on equity: -12.1 12.1 -37.3 18.7 20.3
  - Asset quality by bank type — Non-performing loans to total loans:
    - State-owned commercial banks: 8.6 8.9 22.8 29.0 28.0
    - Specialized development banks: 25.0 18.0 14.3 13.5 11.7
    - Private commercial banks: 7.4 5.1 4.9 5.4 5.1
    - Foreign commercial banks: 4.3 3.1 2.8 2.9 3.7

### Principal recommended policy actions (condensed)
- Strengthen accounting rules, loan classification, supervisory and provisioning requirements to align with internationally accepted practices.
- Enforce prudential regulations strictly to ensure full and accurate disclosure of banks‘ real capital, NPLs, and other prudential indicators.
- Strengthen credit information and the legal framework for finance; improve legal execution of collateral and mortgage enforcement.
- Continue SCB reform program with monitorable targets, improved governance, and plan for eventual divestiture; bring Rupali Bank into the reform program.
- Clarify roles of Specialized Banks (SBs) and contain market distortions from subsidized lending.
- Introduce a formal LOLR facility and expand liquidity management instruments (repo corridor, short-term repos, broaden horizon of liquidity forecasting, scale down SLR).
- Improve supervisory capacity, adopt risk-based supervision, broaden consolidated supervision, and enhance AML/CFT framework and enforcement.

*Source: _cr1038 - IMF staff report (extracted content provided).*

### 1. Recent Economic Developments ........................................................................................

### 1. Recent Economic Developments

### Overall assessment, stability and development issues
- Total assets of the banking sector have increased twofold since 2003 and credit to the private sector has risen threefold.
- Private domestic banks now hold a majority of banking assets; the role of state-owned commercial banks (SCBs) and specialized banks (SBs) has declined.
- Banking sector penetration and branch networks have expanded.
- Non-performing loans (NPLs) have decreased steadily since 2003 and the stated capital position of banks has improved.
- Remaining vulnerabilities and supervisory shortfalls:
  - Loan classification, provisioning, and even capital remain uneven across the banking sector, with many weaknesses concentrated in the SCBs and SBs.
  - Non-prudential government intervention (interest rate ceilings, moral suasion, potential for regulatory forbearance, government orders to direct credit and ease debt service) increases risks, reduces transparency, and creates inefficiency.
  - SCBs and SBs have improved management and boards but need further technical and financial skills.
  - Rapid growth in nontraditional banking activities (capital market activity, merchant banks and brokerage subsidiaries, exposure to microfinance institutions (MFIs)) is creating new risks; banks’ capital could be exposed to a fall in the market.
  - MFIs are expanding into areas traditionally reserved for banks while managerial and regulatory capacity lags; scope exists to expand the regulatory perimeter to include unregistered MFIs.
  - Supervisory agencies need stronger staffing, training, and retention of expert professionals; banks’ allowable activities should be clarified and enforcement buttressed to improve capital and provisions and limit excessive risks.
- Stress testing and indicators:
  - Basic stress tests on commercial banks suggest credit risk remains a particular concern.
  - Exchange rate risk is limited because many banks have minimal net open positions.
  - Financial soundness indicators are generally favorable, but the commercial loan portfolio quality remains weak with a large share of loans in substandard and doubtful categories.
  - Stress tests indicate commercial banks would be resilient to a moderate economic downturn, but SCBs and SBs would require capital injections under more severe conditions.
- SCB corporatization (2007) outcomes:
  - Brought SCBs under Bangladesh Bank (BB) regulatory authority, strengthened boards/management, upgraded operations via a monitorable reform program, and reduced NPLs.
  - Capital was notionally boosted through an accounting transaction increasing goodwill by the amount of accumulated losses; that goodwill is being gradually replaced by pre-tax, retained earnings.
  - Despite improvements, SCBs’ finances remain much worse than private banks.
- Securities market:
  - Rapid growth but still small and underdeveloped.
  - Legal and regulatory framework adequate, but enforcement is lagging due to resource shortages at the securities regulator.
  - Recommended: continue development of a secondary market in government bonds and broaden corporate debt with a commercial paper market.
- Further strengthening needed:
  - Improve implementation of accounting rules, loan classification, supervisory and provisioning requirements to align with international best practices.
  - Stricter enforcement of prudential regulations to ensure full and accurate disclosure of banks‘ capital, NPLs, and other prudential indicators.
  - Strengthen credit information and legal framework for finance.
  - Continue SCB reform program with monitorable targets and plan for eventual divestiture.

### Summary of FSAP update recommendations (Priority recommendations with timeframes)
- Banking Sector Stability Analysis
  - Continue improving information collection and the use of the stress testing methodology. — Near Term
  - Integrate stress test analysis with the supervisory function. — Near Term
  - Replace interest rate ceilings, moral suasion, and directed credit with market-based incentives. — Medium Term
- Banking Sector Risks and State Owned Banks
  - Strengthen bank capital in line with banks‘ risks in the equity markets. — Near Term
  - Continue the reform of state-owned banks with monitorable targets and a plan for eventual divestiture. — Near Term
  - Establish a plan for improving the specialized development banks. — Near Term
- Crisis Management and Safety Net Arrangements
  - Introduce a lender of last resort facility to provide liquidity to solvent banks at a penalty rate. — Near Term
- Monetary Policy Implementation
  - Transform the repo/reverse repo into standing facilities and introduce a short-term (7 to 14 days) repo/reserve auction. Manage the market interest rate in the corridor defined by the repo/reverse repo. — Near Term
  - Enlarge the time horizon of liquidity forecasting to match the reserve requirement maintenance period. — Near Term
  - Scale down the use of the statutory liquidity requirement. — Near Term
- Financial System Oversight
  - Continue to strengthen BB by automating its operations, improving supervisory capacities (including more effective risk-based supervision), increasing transparency, enhancing disclosure policies, and providing it with greater independence and autonomy. — Near Term
  - Improve assessment of banks‘ risk profile, management and governance and develop a clear, monitorable program for improvement in these areas. — Near Term
  - Establish a framework for bank participation in merchant banking and brokerage activities through legally separate entities. — Near Term
- Equity Markets
  - Provide the SEC with greater autonomy in budget and personnel decisions and rules enforcement. — Near Term
  - Set up a committee of stakeholders to develop a roadmap for demutualization of stock exchanges. — Near Term

Note: Near Term: 6-12 months; Medium Term: 12-24 months.

### I. Macrofinancial environment — key findings
- Macroeconomic performance has been buoyant despite natural disasters and volatile food and energy prices; strengthened policy frameworks and macroeconomic fundamentals along with limited openness (short-term capital flows) and resilient export and remittance flows bolstered growth and external stability.
- External debt is sustainable and largely concessional; international reserves are strong.
- Financial sector resilience to global turmoil:
  - Banks have low exposures to FX structured products and credit derivatives, except some forward contracts.
  - Off-balance sheet activities are typically basic swap contracts with negligible trading volume.
  - Little evidence that external shocks increased asset quality problems or precipitated a credit crunch, but a potential “third wave” of the global crisis (slowing exports and remittances) poses risks.
- Structural context:
  - 1990s legal/regulatory reforms, partial interest rate liberalization, and increased share of private banks contributed to sector strengthening.
  - Banking sector assets equal 65 percent of GDP.
  - Sector remains structurally weak with low capitalization, provisions, and distortions due to weak, systemically important SCBs and SBs.
  - Nonbank financial sector underdeveloped except for the MFI sector.
- Macro risks:
  - Major potential risks arise from remittances, export earnings, commodity prices, and excess liquidity in the banking system.
  - Remittances grew 22 percent in the just-ended fiscal year; remittances reached almost 11 percent of GDP in FY09.
  - Strong export earnings reflect shifts in demand to lower-end garments.
  - Rising commodity prices could erode balance of payments improvement.
  - High excess liquidity from unsterilized interventions could lead to inflationary pressures and credit risk.
- Liquidity and money market:
  - Unsterilized intervention to keep exchange rate stable has led to excess liquidity and pushed down short-term interest rates.
  - Persistent excess liquidity may lead to credit booms, rising equity prices, and inflation (e.g., housing prices).
  - Some banks increased dependency on short-term wholesale funding, exposing them to liquidity risk.
  - The uncollateralized overnight money market (call market) has an average turnover of about Tk50 billion (1 percent of the GDP).
  - BB should consider introducing an interest rate corridor to establish a minimum (reference) rate and provide greater stability in the call market.

### Monetary policy framework, liquidity management, and FX operations
- Central bank legislation:
  - A revised central bank act under review; focus group recommendations (2007) included: (i) officially give autonomy to BB; (ii) simplify monetary policy objective to price and financial sector stability; (iii) install a monetary policy committee; (iv) introduce a LOLR facility.
  - BB expected to play role of government agent; advances to government limited to a three-month term and cost linked to the T-bills market rate.
- Liquidity forecasting and operations:
  - BB prepares liquidity projections on a four-day basis; projection quality is good over this short period but likely to decline over a longer horizon.
  - The Ministry of Finance does not provide its cash flow projection to BB’s liquidity projection section, complicating government position estimation.
  - Stability of the exchange rate suggests the central bank reacts to FX market pressures, making BB‘s interest rate projection less accurate.
- Foreign exchange regulations and controls:
  - Exchange rate arrangement classified as “stabilized” in the IMF (de facto) classification; authorities consider it a managed float with intervention limited to deal with undue fluctuation.
  - Taka has been very stable against the U.S. dollar since 2006 amid regular interventions.
  - Turnover on the foreign exchange market is 11.8 million U.S. dollars per day on average since January 2009, representing less than 1 percent of the GDP.
  - Average daily intervention has been 7 million U.S. dollars a day.
  - FX regulations leave most current account transactions free, but export earnings must be partially surrendered to authorized dealers; surrender ratio determined by import financing needs of sectors.
  - Worker remittances may be kept in owner‘s foreign currency accounts in a domestic bank; FX remitted to someone else must be surrendered to authorized dealers.
  - Resident investment abroad requires BB prior approval.
  - Bank-specific regulations include: (i) prior BB approval for local lending in foreign exchange; (ii) control over interest rates on foreign exchange deposits; (iii) a limit on banks‘ net open position—recently relaxed to 15 percent of banks' capital.

*Source: _cr1038 - 1. Recent Economic Developments*

### 10.      As a result of the capital controls, the foreign exchange denominated assets and

### 10.      As a result of the capital controls, the foreign exchange denominated assets and

### FX exposure and capital controls
- FX denominated loans by the banking system are 0.4 percent of bank loans, and are mainly provided for external trading purposes.
- FX denominated deposits are only 1.8 percent of deposits and represent mainly deposits by foreigners.
- As a result of the capital controls, the foreign exchange denominated assets and liabilities of the banking system, including foreign exchange related derivatives, are low.

### Banking sector overview and recent developments
- The financial system has grown rapidly; bank assets are now equivalent to 62 percent of GDP compared to 47 percent in 2001.
- Private domestic banks now own 55 percent of bank assets, compared to 35 percent in 2002.
- Outside the banking system:
  - Equity market capitalization grew to about 14 percent of GDP at the end of 2008.
  - Listings have increased by nearly 30 percent.
  - The Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE) had a capitalization of $11.3 billion.
- MFIs’ loans are now equal to 3 percent of GDP; MFIs’ assets have doubled since 2001.
- Bank deposits are now over 50 percent of GDP, having risen from 30 percent of GDP in 2001.
- The debt securities market accounted for about 17 percent of financial system assets in 2006; government debt securities overwhelmingly dominate the market and nonmarketable national savings certificates account for more than three-fifths of debt instruments.

### Structural constraints and market gaps
- The corporate bond market remains largely undeveloped; long-term financing is scarce, affecting infrastructure, power, and housing investment.
- Housing finance:
  - Is underdeveloped, expensive, and rationed in favor of salaried employees with relatively high incomes.
  - The Bangladesh House Building Finance Corporation (BHBFC) has weakened due to decreasing government support and operational ineffectiveness.
  - Legal execution of collateral and enforcement of mortgage contracts are weak.
- The public Credit Information Bureau (CIB) suffers from lengthy and manual processes; absence of reputable credit rating companies increases pressure on the local rating agency.
- Investment funds are emerging as vehicles to mobilize term finance for infrastructure, but require complementary public-private partnership policies, legal framework improvements, and market development.

### Performance of banks: capital, NPLs, income, and profits
- Reported average capital ratio is now about 10 percent of risk-weighted assets, roughly equal to the new minimum standard.
- Commercial banks are expected to have a minimum 10 percent CAR, 5 percent of which must be tier 1 capital. These ratios were increased from 9 percent and 4.5 percent in 2007.
- Tier 2 capital includes a general provision of 1 percent for all unclassified loans except for:
  - housing and SME lending (2 percent), and
  - consumer credit and special mention loans (5 percent).
- Reported classified assets represent 10.8 percent of loans (under 5 percent for private and foreign banks).
- Average NPLs have dropped from 41 percent to 10.8 percent of assets from 2001 to 2008 owing to rapid growth of GDP and credit.
- The provisioning ratio over total assets decreased in the same period to 3.8 percent.
- From a risk-classification perspective, the asset quality of the commercial loan portfolio remains weak.
- Liquid assets cover only 29.4 percent of liquid liabilities.
- Specific provisions required for non-term loans: 20 percent after debt service overdue for 6 months, 50 percent after 9 months, and 100 percent after 12 months. Term loans, especially to agriculture and SMEs, allow for much longer delinquency periods before provisions are required.
- Loan classification rules (current):
  - `Sub-standard` if past due/overdue for 6 months─or beyond─but less than 9 months;
  - `Doubtful` if past due/overdue for 9 months─or beyond─but less than 12 months;
  - `Bad-Debt` if past due/overdue for 12 months─or beyond.
- Borrowers can be rescheduled as performing if they pay a set fee (10 percent of the outstanding debt for the first rescheduling).
- Coverage of required provisions by SCBs has improved though it remains less than 100 percent for private banks on average.
- Average returns on assets and equity have increased for all types of banks; private and foreign banks earn higher rates of return than SCBs.
- Recent increases in equity-market related activities have raised market-related risk; additional capital allocation to value at risk and improved market risk management and consolidated supervision are recommended.

### Vulnerabilities, governance, and market distortions
- Significant and long-standing risks remain: uneven loan classification, provisioning, capital, and bank management and governance.
- Non-prudential government intervention (interest rate ceilings, moral suasion, directed credit, explicit requirements to ease debt service) increases risks, reduces transparency, and creates inefficiencies.
- Interest rate ceilings and directed credit have specific effects:
  - Interest rate ceilings force banks to lend only to the most creditworthy customers, depriving other borrowers and affecting profitability.
  - Directed credit forces banks to lend to inefficient segments that often fail to service debt, raising NPLs and slowing growth.
- Specialized Development Banks (SDBs) continue distorting the market with subsidized loans and lax loan recovery policies, burdening the government budget; Basic Bank is noted as an exception providing reasonable SME service.

### State Bank (SCB) reforms and condition (Box 1)
- Under the reform program, SCBs have raised their capital to 10 percent on average (excluding the worst SCB).
- The four SCBs were corporatized into LLCs owned by a government holding company in 2007; corporatization brought SCBs under BB‘s regulatory authority and included a notional accounting increase of Taka 87.9 billion in goodwill/capital, equivalent to the SCBs‘ accumulated losses.
- The SCBs are committed to use pre-tax “amortizations” to replace this notional capital increase over 10 years; the 2008 “amortizations” have been made. This procedure reduces reported earnings from the SCBs.
- In 2007 the government began restructuring three SCBs (monitored by BB and supported by the World Bank) with competitive selection and private-sector level remuneration of CEOs/MDs and four General Managers, and set annual monitorable goals for cash recovery of NPLs, limits on new NPLs, operations, computerization, profitability, increased net worth, and disclosure. These goals were almost wholly achieved in 2008 and mostly on target for 2009.
- Rupali Bank’s privatization failed; operations were suspended awaiting privatization, performance deteriorated, and it was added to the restructuring program but with unresolved management changes and ongoing unsecured exposures to state-owned enterprises.
- Despite gains, SCBs’ finances remain weak and ad hoc government demands (e.g., pressure to open low return L/Cs for petroleum, fertilizer, and food) put additional stress on profitability.

### Key recommended reforms and priorities
- Improve accounting rules, loan classification, supervisory and provisioning requirements to meet international accepted practices.
- Stricter enforcement of prudential regulations to ensure full and accurate disclosure of banks‘ real capital, NPLs and other prudential indicators.
- Strengthen credit information and the legal framework for finance to support credit expansion and loan quality.
- Continue improvements in the efficiency and governance of the SCB reform program with the eventual goal of reducing state control of institutions.
- Clarify roles of Specialized Banks (SBs) with respect to policy objectives and commercial activities to improve governance and performance.
- Allocate additional capital for market risk (value at risk) and improve banks‘ market risk management; consider consolidated supervision for banks engaging in capital market operations through subsidiaries.

_Extracted from IMF country report content unit: _cr1038 - 10.      As a result of the capital controls, the foreign exchange denominated assets and_

### 25.      The regulation of microfinance is weak, creating potential future vulnerabilities.

### 25.      The regulation of microfinance is weak, creating potential future vulnerabilities.

### Microfinance regulation and supervision
- MFIs are regulated and supervised by the Microfinance Regulatory Authority (MRA).
- Licensing and ongoing supervision are ineffective given both the lack of resources and the approach.
- MFIs are small, so this in itself does not pose risks to the financial system. However, banks are opening microfinance units, making the border between the regulated banking sector and the largely unregulated microfinance sector increasingly porous.
- Recommendations and measures noted:
  - Stricter regulations and supervision practices—closer to those applicable to banks—should be considered for larger MFI.
  - Revise regulations concerning taxation that applies to banks, MFIs, and cooperatives to reduce distortions and arbitrage.
  - Implement the deposit insurance scheme for MFIs—foreseen in the MRA ordinance—together with a framework for failing MFI.
  - Bangladesh Bank (BB) and MRA should consider strengthening capacity to supervise MFI.

### State-owned commercial banks (SCBs) — situation and recommended actions
- Current situation:
  - SCBs profits remain lower than private banks because of provisioning of their large NPLs and amortization of the goodwill addition to capital.
  - The level of nonperforming loans was reduced by 4 percentage points in 2008, but still stands at 25 percent, five times the NPL ratio of private banks.
  - Authorities‘ reform plan reinforced SCBs capital ratio to 10 percent; a significant part of the recapitalization was notional, made by adding a goodwill account.
  - Situation of the Specialized Banks (SBs) is even worse, due to pressure to provide directed credit.
- Recommended measures to contain risks posed by the SCBs:
  - Continue the reform program, in particular the approach of monitorable targets and maintaining pay and incentives to attract and retain top quality management.
  - Improve governance of the SCBs with more independent and technically capable boards responsible for performance.
  - Bring Rupali Bank into the reform program.
  - Avoid unfunded demands on the SCBs for directed lending, easing of debt service payments, and provision of services.
  - Establish a long-run plan for the SCBs and their role in the financial system, which may include eventual conversion into private ownership; ensure actions such as sale of minority ownership do not hinder long-run goals.

### Financial stability and Z-score findings
- The analysis suggests a modest improvement in financial stability since 2003, but little change in the relative position of institutions.
- The average Z-score of the system has improved somewhat since 2003, but the same institutions that were fragile then remained so in 2008, except the state-owned banks.
- The Z-score measures the number of standard deviations a return realization has to fall in order to deplete equity—under the assumption of normality of banks‘ returns; higher Z-score implies stronger resilience to shocks.

### Stress test results (sensitivity and scenario analyses)
- Purpose: assess resilience of the banking sector to extreme but plausible shocks using single-factor sensitivity and macroeconomic scenario analysis.
- Sensitivity analysis findings:
  - Credit risk continues to have a larger impact than any other single factor.
  - Shocks assumed a uniform 20 percent deterioration of the loan portfolio for top-down and bottom-up analysis.
  - The banking sector‘s CAR declined by 1.4 percent and would require Tk29 billion to meet the regulatory minimum of 10 percent.
  - Five banks including two state-owned are currently below the CAR minimum; when shocks were applied, three more banks fell below the minimum CAR.
  - All nine foreign banks operating in Bangladesh were resilient.
  - Exchange rate risk does not present a major risk because the net open position of many banks is minimal.
- Scenario analysis findings:
  - Given reliance on exports and garment exports accounting for 75 percent of all exports, a slowdown would directly affect banks‘ asset quality.
  - A scenario assumed GDP declined by 1.5 percent (plausible given the last 15 years); regression estimated effects: NPLs (20 percent), exchange rate (25 percent depreciation of the taka against the dollar) and interest rates (200bp decrease).
  - Results indicated 15 banks would fall below regulatory requirements including all SCBs; Development Finance Institutions (DFI) would essentially be insolvent.
  - Private and foreign banks would be resilient.
- Methodology notes (selected):
  - Tests covered the entire 48 banks operating in Bangladesh as of December 2008.
  - Remittances were noted at about US$10 billion.
  - In exchange rate risk analysis, an appreciation of the Taka against the U.S. dollar by 5 percent was assumed in one context; in the GDP-decline scenario, a 25 percent depreciation was assumed.

### Financial intermediation indicators
- Bank deposits are now 53 percent of GDP, having risen from 42 percent of GDP in 2002.
- Bangladesh intermediates a reasonable proportion of deposits to the private sector: credit to the private sector is equivalent to 37 percent of GDP.
- The deposit-to-GDP ratio is large given per capita income and comparable to South Asian counterparts; lower than Southeast Asian countries, which have much higher per capita GDP.

### Risk mitigation, safety nets, and crisis management capabilities
- Contingent risks remain for financial safety nets and crisis management:
  - Weak or failing institutions are usually allowed to keep operating, implicitly incurring restructuring costs.
  - Standard safety nets, such as lender of last resort (LOLR) facilities, have not been introduced; relevance of those in place, such as the deposit insurance scheme, is yet to be tested.
  - Foreign exchange regulation and BB intervention policy have limited development of market-based hedging facilities for exchange rate related risks.
  - BB does not have a strategy for self-insurance against external shocks based on targeting an adequate stock of reserves.
- Bank resolution framework:
  - The Banking Companies Act (BCA) of 1991 provides BB and/or the government extensive powers to suspend licenses and wind up banks, but these powers have never been used.
  - Authorities prefer rehabilitation under enhanced supervision rather than least-cost resolution.
- Lender of Last Resort and Emergency Liquidity Assistance:
  - No formal procedure for emergency liquidity assistance.
  - Banks may borrow up to five-day maturity at the repo facility if they have required collateral and BB accepts requests; no mechanism exists for longer-period case-by-case liquidity or overnight standing facilities.
  - Need for LOLR is reduced by practice of rescheduling obligations for distressed institutions.
- Deposit Insurance Scheme (DIS):
  - The DIS is operational and covers a significant share of insured deposits, administered by the Department of Offsite Supervision of BB.
  - Relevance of premiums is challenged by absence of effective liquidation procedures; specifics of DIS role in failed banks‘ resolution have not been determined.
  - The scheme is expected to function as a pay box; a payment has never been made out of the fund as no bank has been liquidated yet.

### Supervisory and regulatory framework (BB and broader system)
- Supervision is fragmented and organized by type of intermediary and sector, mainly due to lack of coordination.
  - BB supervises government-owned, domestic private and foreign commercial banks; government-owned specialized banks; off-shore banks; nonbank financial institutions; exchange houses and cash remittance services.
  - Thousands of microfinance companies operate, but only 400 are registered with the MRA.
  - Credit cooperatives operate under Cooperative Societies Ordinance under the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs.
- Shortcomings and areas for improvement:
  - Regulatory and supervisory system falls short of international standards; considerable scope to improve regulations, strengthen enforcement, and enhance supervisory practices.
  - Coordination with other domestic supervisors is imperative due to cross-supervisory activities (e.g., commercial banks licensed by SEC to conduct merchant banking).
  - Initial steps to shift from compliance-based to risk-based supervision have been taken, but further effort required; supervisors still applying outdated techniques.
  - Problems undermining supervisory process include Government legal authority to alter BB actions; liberal classification of loans, rescheduling, and provisions; need to improve supervisors‘ assessment of risk management; absence of single overall exposure limit and weak definition of related parties; supervision of market, interest rate, and liquidity risk needs upgrade; better communication between on-site and off-site supervision needed; and supervision of state-owned banks needs improvement.
- Basel Capital Accord implementation:
  - BB has issued guidelines on asset liability management, foreign exchange rate risk, internal control & corporate governance, anti-money laundering, credit risk, and information and communication technology.
  - Effectiveness compromised by outdated supervisory processes and lack of coordination and information exchange between BB supervisory departments and directorates.

*Source: _cr1038 - 25.      The regulation of microfinance is weak, creating potential future vulnerabilities.*

### 45.      Implementation of Basel II is intended for 2010, however BB is cautioned that

### Implementation of Basel II is intended for 2010, however BB is cautioned that

### Basel II implementation and supervisory framework
- Implementation of Basel II is intended for 2010.
- Assessors caution that considerable efforts by the industry as well as by the supervisors will be needed to ensure successful realization.
- Bangladesh Bank (BB) has been working on strengthening the supervisory framework (Pillar 2), but assessors view this as work in progress.
- A number of practices and regulations should more closely match internationally accepted practices.
- The heavy involvement of the Government in the supervisory mandate will have to be addressed in order to remove its impact on market discipline (Pillar 3).

### AML/CFT framework (Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering assessment)
- The Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) conducted an assessment of Bangladesh’s AML/CFT framework; the Mutual Evaluation Report was adopted by its plenary meeting in July 2009.
- Bangladesh faces significant risks of money laundering (ML) and terrorism financing (TF).
- Authorities have taken actions including creation of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) within BB; the FIU is performing its core functions.
- Critical legal and regulatory gaps identified:
  - Gaps in the scope of both the ML and the TF offenses.
  - Shortcomings in AML/CFT preventive measures for the private sector.
  - Lack of effective sanctions for legal persons.
- Recommendations from assessors:
  - Prepare as soon as possible a ML/TF risk-analysis.
  - Adopt at the highest level a national AML/CFT strategy to widen and implement effective measures to address national risks.
- Authorities’ comments noted:
  - Money Laundering was first criminalized in the 2002 Money Laundering Prevention Act (MLPA).
  - Following legal challenge, the new government reissued the Money Laundering Prevention Ordinance (MLPO) 2008 and Anti-Terrorism Ordinance (ATO) 2008 as Acts of parliament with retrospective effect from the day of their issuance as ordinances.
  - Bangladesh criminalized terrorism financing in the Anti-Terrorism Ordinance (ATO) in 2008 and has ratified the UN Terrorist Financing Convention.

### Key economic and fiscal statistics (selected figures from Table 1)
- Nominal GDP (FY09): US$89 billion
- Main export (percent of total): garments and textiles (79)
- Population (FY08): 142.5 million
- FDI (percent of GDP, FY09): US$941 million (1.0)
- GDP per capita (FY08): US$554
- Government debt: 45.4 percent of GDP
- Poverty rate (FY05): 40.8 percent
- Foreign government debt: 53 percent of total debt

- Real GDP (percent change) — Est. FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14:
  - 6.4 6.2 5.9 5.0 5.8 6.0 6.0 6.0
- GDP deflator — Est. FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14:
  - 6.8 8.0 6.4 6.4 6.0 5.0 5.0 4.5
- CPI inflation (annual average) — Est. FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14:
  - 7.2 9.9 6.7 7.8 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.5
- CPI inflation (end of period) — Est. FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14:
  - 9.2 10.0 2.2 10.0 7.2 5.0 5.0 4.0

- Investment and savings (percent of GDP) — Gross investment:
  - 24.5 24.2 23.3 24.2 24.4 24.6 24.8 25.4
- National savings (percent of GDP):
  - 25.9 25.1 26.2 27.1 25.8 25.4 25.6 26.2

- Central government operations (percent of GDP) — Total revenue:
  - 10.2 10.8 10.4 10.7 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.7
- Total expenditure:
  - 13.4 15.9 14.1 14.8 14.8 14.9 14.9 14.9
- Overall balance (excluding grants):
  - -3.2 -5.1 -3.7 -4.0 -4.3 -4.2 -4.2 -4.1
- Primary balance:
  - -1.3 -2.6 -1.3 -1.7 -1.9 -1.8 -1.7 -1.6
- Total central government debt (percent of GDP):
  - 48.8 46.7 45.3 44.0 44.1 44.0 43.8 43.6

- Money and credit (end of fiscal year; percent change) — Credit to private sector:
  - 15.1 25.1 14.6 15.7 16.6 16.6 17.1 17.2
- Broad money (M2):
  - 17.1 17.6 19.2 18.8 17.2 16.6 16.4 16.2

- Balance of payments (in billions of U.S. dollars) — Exports, f.o.b.:
  - 12.1 14.2 15.6 16.1 17.3 19.2 21.8 24.6
- Current account (in billions):
  - 1.0 0.7 2.5 2.9 1.5 0.9 1.0 1.1
- Current account (Percent of GDP):
  - 1.4 0.9 2.8 2.9 1.4 0.8 0.8 0.8
- Gross official reserves (in billions of U.S. dollars):
  - 5.1 6.1 7.5 10.9 12.3 13.2 14.5 16.2
- In months of imports of goods and services:
  - 2.7 3.1 3.6 4.7 4.8 4.6 4.6 4.6

### Financial soundness indicators (selected figures from Table 2)
- Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (years shown):
  - 6.9 7.3 5.1 7.4 10.1
- Regulatory capital to assets:
  - 4.3 4.7 3.3 4.6 6.5
- Regulatory Tier I capital to risk-weighted assets:
  - 5.7 6.0 3.3 5.3 7.4
- Non-performing loans to total loans:
  - 17.5 13.2 12.8 14.5 11.2
- Non-performing loans to regulatory capital:
  - 265.1 195.9 275.3 205.9 116.1
- Loan provisions to total non-performing loans:
  - 26.8 28.3 45.2 43.0 50.1
- Loan provisions to total loans:
  - 4.7 3.7 5.8 6.2 5.6

- Profitability — Return on equity:
  - -12.1 12.1 -37.3 18.7 20.3
- Return on assets:
  - -0.5 0.6 -1.2 0.9 1.3

- Asset quality by bank type — Non-performing loans to total loans:
  - State-owned commercial banks: 8.6 8.9 22.8 29.0 28.0
  - Specialized development banks: 25.0 18.0 14.3 13.5 11.7
  - Private commercial banks: 7.4 5.1 4.9 5.4 5.1
  - Foreign commercial banks: 4.3 3.1 2.8 2.9 3.7

- Sensitivity to market risk — Net open position in foreign exchange to capital:
  - 20.3 15.2 31.5 14.7 9.9

- Composition of credit (percent of total) — Industry (other): 33.4 31.3 32.2 34.5 36.0; Trade: 24.5 22.6 22.1 24.3 24.0; Agriculture: 9.8 9.0 8.2 7.7 6.8; Households: 3.4 3.4 3.3 4.7 4.8

### Monetary policy instruments and practices
- Since the early 1990s BB discontinued use of direct instruments.
- BB stated in its monetary policy document (July 19, 2009) its intention to resort to direct controls on interest rates, commissions, and fees to influence credit distribution.
- Repo and reverse repo facilities:
  - Allow banks to place bids for funds collateralized by T-bills and T-bonds; not used as standing facilities and BB could reject banks’ requests at its discretion.
  - Not used as open market operations because interest rates are fixed by BB and rarely changed.
  - Since the surge in liquidity and the collapse of short-term interest rates, BB has refrained from intervening on the domestic currency market.
- Securities:
  - BB could issue securities at its discretion for 30 and 91 days; BB has not issued any bills during the last 18 months.
  - Treasury bills are dedicated to the Treasury cash flow management.
- Lending facilities:
  - BB manages uncollateralized lending facilities, which rate stands at 5 percent since 2005.
  - Facility is used to refinance credit by the banks to priority sectors (mostly agriculture) based on promissory note and bills.
- Islamic compliant monetary policy instrument:
  - BB introduced its own sharia compliant bonds in 2006; the bond issued by BB is a Mudaraba type bond, which could be traded on the secondary market.
- Cash reserve requirement (CRR):
  - BB requests banks to keep five percent of their demand and time liabilities on account at the central bank. Cash in till is not eligible for the CRR.
- Statutory liquidity requirement (SLR):
  - Rate was set at 18 percent since 2005.
  - Specialized banks are exempted while banks guided by Islamic laws are required to keep reserve at the concessional rate of 10 percent.
  - SLR defined under section 33(1) of the Bank Company Act of 1991 as minimum (in percentage of total time and demand liabilities) that a scheduled bank has to maintain in liquid assets with BB.

### Financial system structure (selected figures, 2002 and 2008)
- All banks:
  - 2002: Number 51; Billion taka 1,276.5; Percent of Banking System Assets 100.0; Percent of GDP 46.8
  - 2008: Number 48; Billion taka 3,378.2; Percent of Banking System Assets 100.0; Percent of GDP 62.0
- State-owned banks:
  - 2002: Number 9; Billion taka 742.2; Percent of Banking System Assets 58.1; Percent of GDP 27.2
  - 2008: Number 9; Billion taka 1,253.2; Percent of Banking System Assets 37.1; Percent of GDP 23.0
- Commercial banks (2002 vs 2008):
  - 2002: Number 42; Billion taka 534.3; Percent of Banking System Assets 41.9; Percent of GDP 19.6
  - 2008: Number 39; Billion taka 2,124.9; Percent of Banking System Assets 62.9; Percent of GDP 39.0
- Domestic (PCBs) 2002 vs 2008:
  - 30; 446.4; 35.0; 16.4 → 30; 1,852.9; 54.8; 34.0
- Foreign (FCBs) 2002 vs 2008:
  - 12; 87.9; 6.9; 3.2 → 9; 272.0; 8.1; 5.0
- Finance companies:
  - 2002: 26; 18.8; 0.7 percent of GDP
  - 2008: 29; 90.2; 1.7 percent of GDP
- Securities markets:
  - 2002: 230; 65.5; 2.4 percent of GDP
  - 2008: 294; 789.4; 14.4 percent of GDP

### Implementation status of 2003 FSAP recommendations (selected items)
- State-Owned Commercial Banks (SCBs):
  - Recommendation: Strengthen governance, appoint professional management with discretion over hiring/firing, due diligence audits, resolution plans, privatization or liquidation over realistic time period; subject SCBs to BB supervision; audited financial statements per international accounting standards disclosed publicly.
  - Current status: Partially achieved. MOF still appoints boards, no change. Under Government reform program, professional management was chosen competitively and directed to resolve NPLs; MOF retains discretion over hiring and firing but voluntary retirement programs proposed. SCBs were corporatized as limited liability companies and BB now has legal authority to supervise them. Audited financial statements available with only a short lag and accessible on-line. No long term program for privatization/liquidation prepared.
- Specialized development banks:
  - Recommendation: Increase transparency of subsidies and consider restructuring BSB/BSRS; fully compensate BKB and RAKUB for costs associated with debt forgiveness and directed credit programs.
  - Current status: Not achieved. Subsidies are not transparent; no change in BSB operations. Government considering merging BSRS and BSB.
- Banking supervision:
  - Recommendations included anti-corruption program, re-evaluate compensation to hire/retain staff, improve information systems, develop liquidity and market risk analysis, data on default rates by sector, enhanced training, hire experienced staff, formalize inter-departmental review, more aggressive enforcement, review minimum capital and limits on connected lending.
  - Current status: Mixed progress. BB challenged in hiring/retaining staff due to pay scales; training and career paths acknowledged as essential. Capital requirement raised to 10 percent of risk-weighted assets. Progress in information gathering and analysis is mixed; supervisors aware of liquidity but assessment of banks’ risk management activities lacking. Credit Information Bureau IT upgrade in progress. Scope for improved coordination and more aggressive enforcement remains.
- Bank exit policies:
  - Recommendation: Develop clear comprehensive policy/strategy for resolving problem banks; overhaul Banking Companies Act (BCA).
  - Current status: No policy exists for resolving problem banks. BCA allows Government to acquire undertaking of any bank or declare exemptions; these provisions should be removed or revised.
- Monetary policy and debt management:
  - Recommendation: New central bank law granting BB more autonomy and accountability, disentangle responsibilities for debt management and monetary management, improve BB capacity to forecast market liquidity, broaden liquidity management tools, phase out SLR, limit direct credit to government.
  - Current status: Partially achieved. A revised regulation granting more autonomy prepared but not adopted. Debt management responsibility separation not achieved; MOF-BB joint committee still decides both matters. BB communicates extensive indicator sets to its Board daily but liquidity forecasting exercise could be improved and time horizon enlarged. No significant improvements on broader liquidity tools; suggestion to introduce LOLR facility made but other items not significantly advanced.
- Debt management specifics:
  - Recommendation: Redefine MOF-BB relationship so MOF manages cash balances and issues t-bills to keep temporary advances below permitted levels; other credit to government should be BB purchases of securities in the market.
  - Current status: Achieved. Public Debt Office recommendation: Not achieved.
- Payments system:
  - Recommendations: Establish payment system development and oversight unit; advisory body with bank representatives; automatic check clearing; electronic linkage between BB and branches and banks.
  - Current status: Unit established; oversight function not yet formalized. Electronic clearing system implementation in progress.
- Financial sector development:
  - Recommendations: Improve SEC budgetary autonomy and capacity; reform Registrar of Joint Stock Companies; limit government role in sector development; phase out government microfinance programs; complete regulatory framework for microfinance; develop long-term debt market; transfer Department of Insurance authority to Ministry of Finance; reform Money Loan Court Act for faster enforcement and auction procedures.
  - Current status: Partially achieved. SEC budget/staff size remains under MOF control; SEC has adequate powers but would benefit from additional enforcement powers and access to banking information. Urgent need to strengthen regulatory system for MFIs. Partial progress on legal and enforcement improvements.
- Anti-Money Laundering:
  - Recommendation: Amend the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 to implement FSAP recommendations.
  - Current status: Amendments made. Updated assessment adopted by APG at July 2009 Annual Meeting.

*Source: IMF staff report content as provided in the supplied PDF text.*

### Appendix 5. Banking Sector Stress Test Table

### Appendix 5. Banking Sector Stress Test Table

### Stress test headline results
- System initial CAR: 10.1
- NCBs initial CAR: 7.8
- PCBs initial CAR: 11.2
- FBI initial CAR: 23.8
- DFI initial CAR: -3.3

- CAR after shock — NPLs increase:
  - System: 7.7
  - NCBs: 2.2
  - PCBs: 10.2
  - FBI: 23.9
  - DFI: -11.5

- CAR after shock — Category shift from watch to substandard:
  - System: 6.6
  - NCBs: 3.8
  - PCBs: 8.0
  - FBI: 20.9
  - DFI: -1.1

- CAR after shock — Appreciation of Taka:
  - System: 10.1
  - NCBs: 7.9
  - PCBs: 11.3
  - FBI: 24.1
  - DFI: -3.3

- CAR after shock — Depreciation of Taka:
  - System: 9.9
  - NCBs: 7.5
  - PCBs: 11.1
  - FBI: 23.6
  - DFI: -3.3

- CAR after shock — Upward parallel shift of yield curve in bp:
  - System: 9.7
  - NCBs: 7.2
  - PCBs: 11.1
  - FBI: 22.9
  - DFI: -3.8

- CAR after shock — Downward parallel shift of yield curve in bp:
  - System: 10.4
  - NCBs: 8.4
  - PCBs: 11.4
  - FBI: 24.8
  - DFI: -2.9

- Scenario Analysis CAR:
  - System: 8.4
  - NCBs: 0.7
  - PCBs: 10.7
  - FBI: 22.2
  - DFI: -2.5

### Liquidity ratios — initial and post-shock
- Initial SLR Ratio:
  - System: 23.7
  - NCBs: 30.0
  - PCBs: 19.9
  - FBI: 35.0
  - DFI: 11.4

- Initial Liquid Assets/Liquid Liabilities (LA/LL) Ratio:
  - System: 94.8
  - NCBs: 82.4
  - PCBs: 100.3
  - FBI: 114.5
  - DFI: 76.9

- Liquidity after shock — Run on deposits on LA/LL Ratio:
  - System: 89.2
  - NCBs: 77.5
  - PCBs: 94.4
  - FBI: 107.8
  - DFI: 72.4

- Liquidity after shock — Run on deposits on SLR ratio:
  - System: 19.8
  - NCBs: 23.7
  - PCBs: 17.2
  - FBI: 30.8
  - DFI: 9.7

### Key findings and supervisory context (summarized from Appendix 6)
- Structural and market context:
  - Banking dominates the financial sector; private banks hold more than 50 percent of total deposits versus 30 percent for the SCBs; foreign banks hold some 8 percent of deposits.
  - Legacy issues from state-owned banks include high NPL ratios and weak solvency due to poor governance and political interference.

- Supervisory capacity and practices:
  - Bangladesh Bank (BB) issues guidelines on core risk areas (ALM, foreign exchange rate risk, internal control & corporate governance, AML, credit risk, ICT) but guidelines do not have the force of law.
  - Supervisory processes remain largely compliance-based; CAMELS ratings rely primarily on historic reviews; forward-looking and qualitative risk assessments are limited.
  - Coordination and information exchange between BB supervisory departments and with the monetary directorate is limited.
  - Human resource constraints include frequent mandatory job rotation and uncompetitive pay scales.

- Accounting, provisioning and loss recognition:
  - Minimum CAR required: 10 percent, largely aligned with Basel I definition.
  - Loss recognition is slow: loans are only recognized as loss after 60 months of past due status.
  - Banks can declassify loans classified by examiners upon Board approval; interest recognition on NPLs and recovered loans is not consistent with international accounting standards.
  - Recapitalization practices (e.g., conversion of accumulated losses into a Goodwill asset to be amortized out of future profits) raise concerns about true financial condition.

- Market discipline and regulatory environment:
  - BB has effectively imposed a moratorium on entry of new banks and has been reluctant to allow weak banks to fail, leading to prolonged rehabilitation periods.
  - Deposit insurance scheme established in 1984 and revised in 2004; all scheduled banks are required to be members.
  - Gaps exist in coverage of non-bank entities (MFIs, merchant banks), and coordination with the Microfinance Regulatory Authority (MRA) is essential.

### Main recommendations (condensed from the Recommended Action Plan)
- Strengthen legal and institutional framework:
  - Change BBO and BCA to remove Government involvement in the supervisory mandate and to strengthen BB authority.
  - Upgrade BBO, BCA, regulations, policies, directions; give guidelines the weight of law.
  - Amend BBO and BCA to provide explicit powers to issue regulations, to take corrective actions, and to require ad-hoc information requests with sanctions.

- Improve supervisory approach and tools:
  - Upgrade to a risk-based supervisory framework with qualitative, forward-looking assessments; supplement CAMELS with qualitative judgment.
  - Enhance coordination and information exchange between on-site and off-site supervision; abolish differential treatment of SCBs with regard to EWS and transfer to problem bank department.
  - Establish legal powers to make ad hoc information requests and to sanction for non-delivery.

- Strengthen prudential standards and enforcement:
  - Establish a supervisory process that considers the bank's risk profile when determining capital requirements.
  - Revise and tighten requirements for classification, rescheduling, write-offs and provisioning for loan losses; remove the ability of banks to de-classify loans.
  - Broaden definition of related parties to include major shareholders, senior management, key staff, and their direct business interests.
  - Establish aggregate limits for all exposures and formulate policies for country and transfer risks.
  - Expand reporting and supervisory requirements to include consolidated supervision.

- Improve market integrity and AML controls:
  - Step up enforcement on AML legislation; extend AML requirements to unlicensed deposit-taking institutions; raise fines.
  - Enhance monitoring of accounting methods and fight imprudent accounting practices.

- Expand cross-border and consolidated supervision:
  - Intensify contacts with overseas supervisors through MoUs and informal professional relations.
  - Require pre-approval and fit-and-proper testing for transfers of significant ownership (5 percent stock ownership) and for major acquisitions.

*Source: Appendix 5. Banking Sector Stress Test Table*

### Appendix 7. Bangladesh: Financial Stability Diagnostic and

### Appendix 7. Bangladesh: Financial Stability Diagnostic and Assessment Matrix for FSSAs

### 1. Slowdown in remittances
- Overall level of concern: Medium
- Nature/Source of Main Threats:
  - Currently, there is excess liquidity in the banking system with strong growth potential, improved fiscal stance, and strong commitment of the authorities to macro and financial stability.
- Likelihood of severe realization of threat in the next [1-3] years: High
- Expected impact on financial stability if threat is realized:
  - Dependence of the financial system and domestic credit on remittances is high. Mitigating factors are the generally higher quality of the international banks when compared against state-owned banks.
  - Although remittances have held up—with growth of 22 percent in the just-ended fiscal year—a fall in the number of workers leaving the country pose a risk for the future.
  - Downside risk of a more protracted or a deepening global slowdown, which could impact negatively the continued employment prospects of Bangladeshi expatriates.
  - Sustained reductions in remittances could trigger a sharp downturn in the macro-financial environment (with negative consequences for the exchange rate and capital position of banks) and a deterioration in the repayment capacity of borrowers that receive those remittances as a source of income.
  - Second round effects would involve a severe impact on the economy through reductions in consumption and investment activities.
  - The impact on the financial system and the economy will be linked to the duration of the slowdown. In particular, if the slowdown is temporary and the authorities chose to soften the impact on the exchange rate through FX-market sales, the second-round effects on dollar-denominated loan quality deterioration associated with an exchange rate depreciation will be muted (stress tests performed provide a broad quantitative sense of the impact of this shock).

### 2. A rapid deterioration in credit risks, especially affecting state-owned banks
- Overall level of concern: Medium
- Nature/Source of Main Threats:
  - Credit risk continues to have a larger impact than any other single factor risk.
  - State-owned banks are currently below the CAR minimum. All nine foreign banks operating in Bangladesh, all were resilient.
  - Competitive pressures exist between banks and the large microfinance institutions, which are less regulated and tax free.
  - Non-prudential government intervention, such as interest rate ceilings, moral suasion, directed credit and explicit requirements to ease debt service for some sectors of the economy, increases risks, reduces transparency, and creates inefficiencies.
  - Moreover, inadequate information, attributable to nontransparent accounting and reporting, affects market discipline.
- Likelihood of severe realization of threat in the next [1-3] years: Medium-to-High
- Expected impact on financial stability if threat is realized:
  - When shocks are performed assuming a uniform 20 percent deterioration of the loan portfolio for top down and bottom up analysis, the banking sector capital asset ratio requires significant recapitalization efforts to meet the regulatory minimum of 10 percent.
  - It is likely that the risk profile of those loans outside the regulatory perimeter remains higher relative to those on the books of the supervised institutions. In the event of a negative credit shock, some microfinance institutions would be severely affected.
  - Loan classification, provisioning, and even capital remain uneven in the banking sector, may aggravate potential vulnerabilities and magnify the impact of the shock.

### 3. State-owned banks low capital position
- Overall level of concern: Low
- Nature/Source of Main Threats:
  - Despite recent gains, SCBs‘ finances remain weak and ad hoc government demands put an additional stress on profitability.
  - SCBs‘ performance may also be hindered by BB‘s special prudential limitation on their loan growth to 15 percent of paid in capital. However, removal of this limitation needs to be complemented by measures to ensure the SCB‘s do not engage in excessive lending.
- Likelihood of severe realization of threat in the next [1-3] years: High
- Expected impact on financial stability if threat is realized:
  - Government pressured banks to open low return L/Cs for petroleum, fertilizer and food during the oil/food price run up.
  - The government‘s moral suasion and targets for various types of lending decrease profitability—potentially more so than for PCBs.
  - SCBs like all banks, may suffer lower returns due to the recent ceilings on lending rates.

### 4. Excess Liquidity
- Overall level of concern: Medium
- Nature/Source of Main Threats:
  - Some risks for the stability of the financial system are actually arising from the strong position of Bangladesh‘s balance of payments and the monetary and exchange rate frameworks.
  - Unsterilized intervention aimed at keeping the taka stable has led to excess liquidity and has pushed down short-term interest rates.
  - Already certain financial institutions have increased their dependency on short-term funding, exposing themselves to the fluctuation of the money market.
- Likelihood of severe realization of threat in the next [1-3] years: High
- Expected impact on financial stability if threat is realized:
  - High excess liquidity arising from unsterilized interventions could lead to rapid credit growth and subsequent inflationary pressures.
  - Persistent excess liquidity may eventually turn into a credit boom, inflation—such as of housing prices—and a financial crisis once that bubble bursts.
  - In particular, if excess liquidity eventually fuels inflation and a concomitant real exchange rate appreciation, the competitiveness of the export sector would be affected and, given the exposure of banks to this sector, there could be a deterioration in loan credit quality.

### 5. Sharp commodity price (mostly oil) increase
- Overall level of concern: Low
- Nature/Source of Main Threats:
  - Supply is not constrained
  - Demand has not yet increased abruptly.
- Likelihood of severe realization of threat in the next [1-3] years: Medium
- Expected impact on financial stability if threat is realized:
  - Looking forward, rising commodity prices could erode the recent strong improvement in the balance of payments
  - Could trigger a substantial increase in credit risk of households and corporates.

### 6. Realization of a natural disaster
- Overall level of concern: Low
- Nature/Source of Main Threats:
  - BB lacks a proper crisis management framework to address natural disaster‘s consequences.
  - Central banks usually accumulate foreign reserves as a self-insurance against external shocks. The adequate level is an arbitrage between the insurance and its cost as holding reserves has a cost. This reserve level defines a target for foreign exchange intervention.
  - BB tends to react to the market demand passively as it would be the case under a pegged exchange rate arrangement.
- Likelihood of severe realization of threat in the next [1-3] years: High
- Expected impact on financial stability if threat is realized:
  - The current framework for crises management does not envisage a proper foreign exchange adequacy framework in the event of a crisis or natural disaster.
  - Risks to financial stability remain high in case of a realization of a natural disaster.

*Source: Appendix 7. Bangladesh: Financial Stability Diagnostic and Assessment Matrix for FSSAs*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/_cr1038.pdf_
