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### Consolidated Government Finances, 2007–11 — Background and Context
- Federation of seven emirates; net external creditor position.
- Abu Dhabi:
  - Produces 95 percent of the country’s oil and gas.
  - Owns one of the largest sovereign wealth funds with more than $300 billion assets under management.
- Dubai:
  - More diversified (re-export trade, services, real estate).
  - Highly leveraged, with a gross debt-to-GDP ratio above 100 percent.
- Each emirate manages its own budget independently within the federal structure.
- Expatriates constitute 80 percent of the U.A.E. population and are virtually fully employed.
- Unemployment among nationals: 14 percent in 2009 (concentrated among youth and in the northern emirates).
- Global financial crisis drivers: decline in oil prices, post-Lehman shut down of international capital markets, price correction in Dubai’s property market.
- Authorities’ responses: liquidity injection, recapitalization, deposit guarantees for banks; Abu Dhabi provided financial support to Dubai.

### Recent Economic Developments, Outlook, and Risks — Signs of Stabilization (2009–10)
- Real GDP:
  - Contracted by 3¼ percent in 2009.
  - Grew by an estimated 3.2 percent in 2010.
- Inflation:
  - 12-month CPI inflation rate: 1.7 percent in December 2010 (up from -0.3 percent at end-2009).
- External sector:
  - Exports increased by 15 percent in 2010; imports increased by 6 percent in 2010.
  - Current account balance estimated at 7.7 percent of GDP in 2010.
  - Central bank foreign exchange reserves recovered from 2009 losses ($ 7 billion), reaching US$32 billion by year-end (1.7 months of imports).
- Fiscal developments:
  - Nonhydrocarbon primary fiscal deficit (excluding investment income): 35.2 percent of nonhydrocarbon GDP in 2010 (from 44 percent in 2009).
  - Consolidated fiscal deficit: about 1.3 percent of GDP in 2010 (from 12.6 percent in 2009).
  - Drivers: slower project implementation in Abu Dhabi (including through GREs), lower transfers to Dubai GREs, higher hydrocarbon revenue.
- GREs and restructurings:
  - Dubai World (DW) sought debt standstill; restructuring completed and improved market confidence.
  - Other Dubai GREs entered restructuring negotiations; Abu Dhabi stepped up support to some GREs.
- Banking sector:
  - Banks remained profitable in 2010 despite restructurings and weak activity.
  - Nonperforming loans (NPLs): 5.9 percent in 2010 (from 4.3 percent in 2009); Dubai banks NPLs: 8.8 percent.
  - Banks increased provisions—the most in the GCC—and local banks boosted capital pre-emptively, including through official support.
  - Credit to the private sector remained sluggish; Dubai banks reduced lending while Abu Dhabi banks expanded.

### Box 1 — Dubai World (DW) Debt Restructuring (key facts and timeline)
- Pre-standstill support:
  - Dubai Financial Support Fund (DFSF) established July 2009.
  - DFSF manages a US$20 billion bond program subscribed 50 percent by the central bank and 50 percent by Abu Dhabi.
- Timeline:
  - DW standstill announcement: November 25, 2009.
  - DW submitted restructuring plan: March 25, 2010.
  - Most creditors agreed terms: September 9, 2010.
  - DW announced full support of its creditors: October 27, 2010.
- Restructuring coverage and terms:
  - Plan covered US$24.9 billion of debt: US$14.4 billion owed to some 90 domestic and foreign banks and US$10.5 billion owed to the government of Dubai.
  - Bank debt (US$14.4 billion) tranches:
    - US$4.4 billion tranche with a 5 year maturity and 1 percent interest.
    - US$10.0 billion tranche with an 8-year maturity and 1 percent interest paid each year.
    - Additional payment of 1.5 to 2.5 percent upon maturity; Government of Dubai guarantee between US$1 billion and 4 billion.
  - Government claims (US$10.5 billion) converted into equity through the DFSF.
  - DFSF committed up to US$1.5 billion to DW for working capital and interest payments.
  - Nakheel: DFSF to provide US$8 billion new equity and convert existing US$1.2 billion debt into equity; outstanding Nakheel bonds to be paid off in full and on time.
  - Trade creditors and suppliers: 40 percent cash and 60 percent publicly traded debt security with a 10 percent annual interest rate.
- Other GRE restructurings:
  - DHCOG: two-month extension on a US$555 million loan in July 2010; later rescheduled and reportedly converted into a 5-year loan.
  - Dubai Group: missed two scheduled loan payments worth US$1.8 billion; started restructuring US$6.2 billion liabilities.
  - DIC: agreed in December 2010 to restructure US$2.5 billion of bank loans: US$2 billion extended to 2016 at 2 percent; US$500 million extended to 2014 at unchanged interest.

### Fragile Recovery — Key Risk Factors
- Property overhang and size uncertainty:
  - Excess supply in Dubai will increase as unfinished projects are completed, weighing on prices, investment, and growth.
  - Abu Dhabi’s ramp-up of housing supply could put further pressure on property market unless managed.
- Lack of clarity on GRE financing strategies:
  - Estimated US$31 billion of debt due in 2011–12, of which at least $5 billion is in the real estate sector—significant short-term roll-over risks for Dubai.
  - Absence of coherent, transparent GRE financing strategy raises borrowing costs for Dubai.
  - Dubai strategy to use earnings of well-performing GREs to finance underperforming entities may dampen investment and growth.
- International sanctions on Iran:
  - Sanctions could undermine recovery by reducing trade and real-estate demand from Iranian nationals.
- Regional turmoil:
  - Re-pricing of regional risk may result in more difficult market conditions; higher oil prices benefit U.A.E. but may damp global demand.

### Box 2 — Real Estate Market Developments (findings)
- Dubai:
  - Number of transactions by early 2009 was one fourth of summer 2008 peak.
  - Prices had fallen by some 50 percent.
- Abu Dhabi:
  - Residential prices also fell by almost 50 percent; commercial real estate more resilient.
  - Flexible payment plans and more competitive finance rates helped cushion impact.
- Recovery constraints:
  - Uncertainty, large oversupply, tight mortgage lending conditions particularly in Dubai.
  - Surplus of residential properties reportedly exceeds 30 percent.
  - Inventory projected to stay high as more supply (15 percent of current stock) from pre-crisis projects is expected in next two years.
  - Potential buyers find mortgages difficult as banks repair balance sheets.
  - Some upside from higher oil prices and regional turmoil.

### Box 3 — Economic Impact of International Sanctions on Iran (findings and scenarios)
- Trade and broader impact:
  - Losses from disruptions could reach 0.2 to 0.7 percent of GDP annually.
  - Banks reportedly cut financial services to Iran-based customers; sanctions complicate payments and settlements and risk stifling Dubai real estate demand.
  - Iran accounts for a little more than 6 percent of total and 12 percent of nonhydrocarbon exports of the U.A.E.; second largest destination after India.
  - Re-exports account for more than 90 percent of exports to Iran.
  - Dubai’s total trade with Iran in Q3 2010 declined by 15 percent versus Q3 2009; Iran’s share in re-exports from Dubai fell to 13 percent from 18 percent in 2009.
  - Value of trade in first nine months of 2010 broadly unchanged versus same period of 2009.
- Staff scenarios and figures (US$ millions unless otherwise noted):
  - Scenario 1 (30 percent reduction of exports to Iran):
    - Exports affected by the sanctions: 2,277
    - percent of exports to Iran: 30.0
    - percent of exports to world: 1.9
    - percent of nonoil exports to world: 3.7
    - percent of 2009 GDP: 0.8
    - percent of 2009 nonoil GDP: 1.2
    - Impact on net exports /3: 569
    - percent of 2009 GDP: 0.20
    - Memorandum items: Exports to Iran, 2009: 7,582; of which re-exports: 7,551
  - Scenario 2 (no exports to Iran):
    - Exports affected by the sanctions: 7,582
    - percent of exports to Iran: 100.0
    - percent of exports to world: 6.2
    - percent of nonoil exports to world: 12.2
    - percent of 2009 GDP: 2.8
    - percent of 2009 nonoil GDP: 3.9
    - Impact on net exports /3: 1,896
    - percent of 2009 GDP: 0.7
  - Note /3 assumes re-exports to Iran have 25 percent local value-added content.
  - Footnote: Iranian nationals have been the fourth largest buyers of Dubai real estate, after India, the U.K., and Pakistan.

### Baseline Medium-Term Scenario and Projections
- Staff baseline:
  - Assumes gradual pick up in private activity replacing government stimulus.
  - With oil prices around $105 per barrel over medium term:
    - Fiscal and external accounts will remain in surplus.
    - Real nonhydrocarbon growth projected to increase to 4.5 percent.
  - Main medium-term risk: GREs, given substantial debt roll-over needs after restructurings.
  - Trend growth rate expected to be lower than before the crisis because of a smaller real estate sector.

### Real Exchange Rate Assessment (Appendix I summary)
- Dirham broadly in line with fundamentals across three approaches (equilibrium exchange rate, macroeconomic balance, external sustainability); slight to modest overvaluation within margin of error.
- Real exchange rate movements:
  - REER depreciated by 10.2 percent since Q1 2009 (from March 2009 peak to end-2010).
  - At end-2010, REER overvalued by about 1 percent (within margin of error).
- Macroeconomic balance approach:
  - Current account norm: 8.3 percent of GDP in 2010; 11.6 percent of GDP in 2015.
  - Projected current account position: 11.4 percent of GDP in 2015.
  - Actual surplus: 7.7 percent of GDP in 2010.
  - Interpretation: projected 2015 position lies within confidence interval of norm; 2010 difference marginal and within confidence band.
- External sustainability approach:
  - Under three annuity specifications, projected current account balance is too low, implying need to accumulate further savings of about 9 percentage points of GDP.
  - Notwithstanding estimated overvaluation, nonhydrocarbon exports have continued to grow rapidly.

### U.A.E. Gross Public and Publicly Held Debt — key figures (in billion of US$)
- Maturing in 2011 | 2012 | Beyond | Total
  - Government of Abu Dhabi: 0.4 | 1.3 | 9.9 | 11.6
  - Abu Dhabi GREs: 16.6 | 9.3 | 66.4 | 92.4
  - Total Abu Dhabi: 17.1 | 10.6 | 76.4 | 104.0
  - In percent of Abu Dhabi 2010 GDP: 8.9 | 5.5 | 54.2
  - Government of Dubai 1/: 5.6 | 1.6 | 28.9 | 36.0
  - Dubai GREs: 10.4 | 13.6 | 52.9 | 76.9
  - Total Dubai: 16.0 | 15.2 | 81.7 | 113.0
  - In percent of Dubai and Northern Emirates' 2010 GDP: 14.5 | 13.8 | 102.6
  - Other Emirate Sovereign: 0 | 0 | 2.8 | 2.8
  - Other Emirate GREs: 0.9 | 0.3 | 1.2 | 2.4
  - Total Other Emirates: 0.9 | 0.3 | 4.0 | 5.2
  - Federal Government: 19.1 (in percent of U.A.E. 2010 GDP: 6.3)
  - Total U.A.E.: 33.1 | 25.8 | 158.1 | 236.0
  - In percent of U.A.E. 2010 GDP: 11.0 | 8.5 | 78.2
  - 1/ Including GRE debt guaranteed by the Dubai government.

### Policy Theme #1 — Supporting the Still Fragile Recovery (policy recommendations)
- Fiscal policy:
  - Fiscal policy should support economic recovery in 2011.
  - Federal budget foresees a deficit in 2011 with the reduction in communication fees.
  - Dubai entering fiscal consolidation as some investment projects complete.
  - Abu Dhabi intends to increase infrastructure spending, including through GREs; staff recommended maintaining a neutral fiscal stance in 2011 following the sharp contraction in 2010.
- Be prepared to expand productive investment:
  - Government should be ready to expand spending on productive investment if regional unrest affects the economy.
  - Authorities advised to undertake cost-benefit analyses to implement projects with high economic return.
- Infrastructure and subsidies:
  - Expand plan to upgrade infrastructure in the northern emirates to ease electricity shortages.
  - Replace implicit subsidies on water and electricity with explicit cash transfers to lower-income households to better target need and reduce utility bottlenecks.
- Central bank and liquidity:
  - Central bank should monitor bank liquidity conditions and stand ready to relieve potential pressures.
  - Accommodative policy stance in an environment of low global interest rates will support recovery in private sector credit.
  - CBU should monitor individual bank liquidity to ensure sufficient liquid assets given re-pricing of risk could trigger sudden reversal of recent deposit inflows.

### Policy Theme #2 — Strengthening the Economy’s Resilience (policy recommendations)
- Rationale:
  - As recovery firms up, policies should shift to strengthen resilience: monitor Dubai debt restructuring implications, sizeable GRE roll-over needs, growing GRE borrowings across emirates, and financial sector resilience.
  - Under a pegged exchange rate, mutually-supportive countercyclical fiscal and macroprudential policies and coordination across federal and emirate governments are required.
A. Mitigating Risks Posed by GREs
- GRE risks and outlook:
  - GREs contributed to diversification but pose risks; DW restructuring increased Dubai sovereign debt and spillovers to banking sector and markets.
  - Some Abu Dhabi GREs heavily invested in real estate are experiencing financial difficulties.
  - Overall GRE debt high by international comparisons; estimated US$60 billion of GRE debt due in 2011–12 (short-term roll-over risk).
  - Post-restructuring significant Dubai debt will mature in medium term (2014–15).
  - Real estate overhang could materialize contingent liabilities affecting sovereign balance sheets and banks holding GRE debt.
- Steps taken and recommended:
  - Draft federal law on public debt to set issuance and management principles, establish DMOs, regulate coordination, allow federal DMO to monitor federal GRE debt.
  - DMOs established at federal, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai levels; Abu Dhabi preparing public debt policy framework to limit GRE borrowings.
  - Short-term priority: complete GRE debt restructuring and clean balance sheets—write-off impaired assets and undertake operational restructuring.
  - Increase transparency on GRE liabilities and financing strategy, including stock, composition, maturity profile, and government support.
  - Disclose real estate sector state and government strategy to address overhang.
- Risk management framework:
  - Identify, assess, monitor, and report contingent liabilities from GREs and disclose these liabilities in government accounts.
  - Consider a fiscal risks statement as part of annual budget documents covering GRE risks and eventually PPP and other risks; include forward-looking risk estimates.
  - Authorities have requested IMF technical assistance in this area.
- Containing GRE borrowing:
  - Achieve through limits on GRE borrowing defined by individual governments and communicated via the fiscal coordination committee.
  - DMOs would monitor compliance; federal DMO could ensure information-sharing and disseminate public sector debt data by emirate.
  - Draft federal law should clarify interrelations among DMOs, expand coverage to Emirati GREs, define federal DMO scope and objectives, and specify coordination mechanisms with fiscal and monetary authorities.
- Corporate governance and transparency:
  - Assess corporate governance against OECD standards.
  - Separate commercial from noncommercial GRE operations, clarify government support strategy, standardize accounting, auditing, and financial reporting for GREs.
  - Abu Dhabi has disclosed the list of GREs it will support and included explicit transfers in the budget for noncommercial GRE operations.
  - Better disclosure of GRE financial accounts would help attract investors and lower funding costs.

### Banking System Resilience and Key Indicators
- Core resilience:
  - Strong core earnings and higher capital compared to pre-crisis levels.
  - Capital adequacy ratio: 20.8 percent.
    - Includes about 5 percentage points of tier 2 capital notes subscribed by the federal government in 2009; notes start to amortize in 2012 at 20 percent per year.
  - System liquidity improved due to slower credit growth and high deposit rates attracting foreign flows.
  - Stress tests on overall banking data indicate resilience to shocks, though aggregate data can mask risks in individual banks.
- Dubai-based banks and concentrated exposures:
  - Dubai banks face greater pressures from exposures to GREs and Dubai real estate.
  - Greater burden of provisions on Dubai loan restructuring; NPLs twice as high as Abu Dhabi banks.
  - Dubai banks continue to deleverage and are losing market share.
  - Islamic banks under pressure due to larger exposure to real estate.
- CBU reforms and staff recommendations:
  - CBU strengthened risk monitoring, revamped regulatory framework, and developed macroprudential policies.
  - Staff recommendations:
    - Consider capital charges above 100 percent for unrated GREs deemed risky by CBU; CBU would need internal risk management and rating function.
    - Share GRE financial information collected by DMOs with the CBU.
    - Broaden regulation on real estate exposure.
    - Monitor performance of restructured loans and consider regulating classification and provisioning if further restructuring needed.
    - Continue to contain banks’ dividend distribution; link CBU approval of dividends to stress test results with uniform parameters.
    - Consider more forward-looking provisioning (incurred to expected loss) as envisaged by forthcoming IFRS changes.
- Debt restructuring and rollover risk:
  - Restructuring may postpone realization of losses and create roll-over risk in a few years.
  - Current restructuring plans assume liquidity rather than solvency problems; lack of asset price recovery could impair borrowers’ ability to pay when loans mature.
  - Staff advised monitoring restructured loans’ performance and consider regulatory action on classification and provisioning if needed.

### Dubai’s Debt Sustainability (Box 4)
- Contingent liabilities from GREs increased Dubai’s fiscal vulnerability.
  - Dubai’s gross government debt, including guarantees: 1.6 percent of Dubai GDP in 2007; 10.3 percent in 2008; 34 percent as of end-2010 (mainly due to GRE bailouts).
- Government debt data underestimate total public sector debt by omitting quasi-sovereign contingent liabilities.
  - Assuming GRE debt as contingent liability, at least US$11 billion of contingent risk foreseen for government of Dubai by end-2016; more than 70 percent due in 2011–12.
  - This would raise total debt-to-GDP ratio to 47.4 percent in 2012 (compared to 34.6 percent for government alone).
- Debt sustainability projections:
  - Baseline: Dubai government debt estimated to increase to 41 percent of GDP by end-2016.
  - A1. No policy change (constant primary balance in 2005–09): projected to reach 53 percent by 2016.
  - A2. Including contingent liabilities (with baseline fiscal adjustment): total debt-to-GDP would increase to 54.3 percent by end-2016.
  - A3. No policy change including contingent liabilities: projected to reach 62.5 percent by 2016.
- Public sector debt /1 (in percent of GDP): 2008 = 10.3; 2009 = 32.4; 2010 = 34.0; 2011 = 32.9; 2012 = 34.6; 2013 = 36.1; 2014 = 37.4; 2015 = 39.0; 2016 = 41.0. Debt stabilizing primary balance = 0.7.
  - Note: 1/ Dubai government and government guaranteed debt. Source: IMF staff estimates.

### Governance, AML/CFT, and Oversight
- Government control of banks and high GRE exposure point to potential governance issues.
  - Crisis increased government stakes in banks; some banks heavily involved in lending to GREs and GRE debt restructurings.
  - Staff recommended a diagnostic for bank governance prior to FSAP update.
- AML/CFT:
  - Authorities committed to conform framework to FATF’s 40+9 Recommendations.
  - U.A.E. framework needs further strengthening, particularly criminalization of money laundering and financing of terrorism, and reinforcement of AML/CFT supervisory system.

### Fiscal Policy, Intergovernmental Coordination, and Macroprudential Tools
- Countercyclical fiscal policy:
  - Could mitigate boom-bust cycles; except in 2009, fiscal stance has been procyclical.
  - Fiscal policy under pegged exchange rate should delink government and GRE spending from oil price volatility.
  - Abu Dhabi should ensure long-term sustainability and intergenerational equity; other emirates need medium-term fiscal sustainability.
  - Dubai should undertake fiscal consolidation to achieve a prudent debt-to-GDP ratio.
  - Authorities preparing to introduce a VAT in the context of the GCC to enhance revenue mobilization and facilitate consolidation.
- Intergovernmental coordination:
  - Effective coordination is key given federal structure.
  - Timely, reliable information-sharing (medium-term fiscal frameworks, annual budgets and execution, consolidated fiscal accounts) is prerequisite.
  - Fiscal Coordination Council progress noted; coordination to expand to include ministry of economy, CBU, and departments of economic development at emirates level.
- Macroprudential tools:
  - In coordination with countercyclical fiscal policy, macroprudential tools could help avert resurgence of imbalances.
  - CBU should:
    - Tailor early warning system to system-wide systemic risks (GRE borrowing, real estate, speculative flows).
    - Ensure matching prudential tools are in place to act on warning signs.
    - Decide trigger values to activate tools and communicate them.
  - CBU intends to progress on macroprudential policies building on IMF technical assistance.

### Structural Issues: Statistics, Capital Markets, Labor, and GCC Monetary Union
- Statistical capacity:
  - National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) established; progress on databases and consolidated fiscal accounts.
  - Further efforts needed for timely national accounts, balance of payments, fiscal accounts, and harmonization across emirates.
  - NBS intends to request IMF technical assistance to develop national accounts and IIP data disclosure.
- Domestic capital markets:
  - Heavy reliance on external borrowing was a vulnerability.
  - Authorities focus on developing domestic capital and debt markets, including issuing federal securities to establish a yield curve.
  - Developing domestic debt market would help banks improve liquidity buffers and meet Basel III liquidity requirements over time.
  - Authorities could explore non-traditional funding (e.g., term deposits from government sources).
  - Foreign term-funding remains essential but maturities should avoid coinciding with GRE debt maturities.
- Labor markets:
  - Policies to create jobs for nationals via federal and local job programs, SME funds, training programs.
  - Encouraged locating some federal agencies/entities in the North to create employment opportunities.
  - Labor market and unemployment statistics (2009):
    - Average unemployment rate: 4.2 percent.
    - Unemployment among U.A.E. nationals: 14 percent.
    - Unemployment among expatriate workers: 2.8 percent.
    - Estimates of unemployed: between 10,000 and 40,000 persons (no official data).
    - Unemployment among nationals aged 20-24: 23.9 percent.
    - Rural vs urban: 18.6 percent versus 11.5 percent.
    - Northern emirates account for about 80 percent of unemployment among nationals.
    - Unemployment among women: 28.1 percent; among men: 7.8 percent.
  - Structural bottlenecks: skills gap (foreign professionals on average 4 more years of formal education than nationals), high reservation wages, around 90 percent of nationals employed in public sector.
- GCC Monetary Union:
  - U.A.E. does not plan to join GCC monetary union at this stage.
  - Authorities believe further work needed on harmonization of payment and settlement systems, regulatory and supervisory frameworks, statistical systems, and removal of nontrade barriers.

### Staff Appraisal, Short-Term Policy Stance, and Administrative Recommendation
- Outlook:
  - U.A.E. economy recovering amid uncertain regional environment.
  - Nonhydrocarbon GDP growth projected to accelerate from 2.1 percent in 2010 to 3.3 percent in 2011.
- Short-term macroeconomic policy:
  - Overall neutral fiscal stance following last year’s contraction would support recovery; Dubai should consolidate.
  - Central bank to maintain accommodative monetary policy stance and stand ready to provide liquidity if re-pricing of regional risk triggers deposit outflows.
  - Ensure efficiency of spending via cost-benefit analyses.
- GRE risk mitigation (policy priorities):
  - Short-term: complete GRE debt restructuring, write-off impaired assets, communicate GRE refinancing strategy.
  - Medium/longer-term: limit overall GRE borrowing by emirate, develop GRE risk management framework, report GRE contingent liabilities in fiscal accounts, improve GRE governance, improve disclosure of GRE financial accounts.
- Banking sector supervision:
  - CBU to continue preparing banks for possible deterioration in asset quality: ensure adequate provisioning, monitor restructured loans, consider higher capital charges on risky GREs, maintain retained earnings.
- Demand management and macroprudential framework:
  - Mutually-supportive countercyclical fiscal and macroprudential policies required under peg; close intergovernmental coordination imperative.
- Domestic capital markets and funding:
  - Develop domestic capital markets to reduce external dependency; explore stable funding from non-traditional sources if federal securities limited in short term.
- Statistical capacity:
  - Continue progress on macro statistics and harmonization; improve timeliness and dissemination; develop leading indicators and IIP data capacity.
- Administrative recommendation:
  - Next Article IV consultation recommended on standard 12-month cycle.

### Selected Macroeconomic Indicators (2007–11) — as presented (annual percent change or levels)
- Output and prices
  - Nominal GDP (in billions of AED): 9481, 156993, 1,1091,336
  - Nominal GDP (in billions of U.S. dollars): 258315270, 302364
  - Real GDP: 6.5, 5.3, -3.2, 3.2, 3.3
  - Real hydrocarbon GDP: -2.7, 1.6, -9.6, 5.3, 3.4
  - Real nonhydrocarbon GDP: 9.1, 6.3, 0.6, 2.1, 3.3
  - CPI inflation (average): 11.1, 12.3, 1.6, 0.9, 4.5
- Public finances
  - Revenue: 33.1, 38.6, 25.3, 28.4, 33.5
  - Hydrocarbon revenue: 24.6, 31.3, 17.5, 21.6, 27.4
  - Nonhydrocarbon revenue: 8.4, 7.4, 7.7, 6.8, 6.1
  - Expenditure and net lending: 17.7, 22.2, 37.8, 29.7, 27.0
  - Budget balance: 15.4, 16.5, -12.6, -1.3, 6.5
  - Non-hydrocarbon balance 1/: -14.0, -23.5, -42.3, -34.7, -35.1
- Monetary sector
  - Credit to private sector: 40.1, 49.3, 0.7, 1.2, 3.5
  - Broad money: 41.7, 19.2, 9.8, 6.2, 9.6
- External sector (in billions of U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated)
  - Exports of goods: 178.6, 240, 192, 222, 265
  - Hydrocarbon exports: 73.8, 103, 68, 78, 108
  - Imports of goods: 132, 176, 150, 158, 179
  - Current account balance: 15.4, 23.3, 8.2, 23.3, 37.7
  - Current account balance (in percent of GDP): 6.0, 7.4, 3.0, 7.7, 10.4
  - Gross official reserves 2/: 77.9, 30.9, 24.7, 32.0, 49.7
  - In months of next year's imports of goods & services: 4.3, 2.0, 1.5, 1.7, 2.5
  - Real effective exchange rate (2000 = 100): 99.8, 102.8, 107.9, 103.7, ..
- Notes:
  - 1/ In percent of nonhydrocarbon GDP.
  - 2/ Excludes foreign assets of sovereign wealth funds.
  - Sources: U.A.E. authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

*Source — UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: 2011 ARTICLE IV REPORT, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

### 3. Consolidated Government Finances, 2007–11 __________________________________________  27

### 3. Consolidated Government Finances, 2007–11

### Background
- The U.A.E. is a federation of seven emirates, with a net external creditor position.
- Abu Dhabi produces 95 percent of the country’s oil and gas and owns one of the largest sovereign wealth funds in the world, with more than $300 billion assets under management.
- Dubai is more diversified (re-export trade, services, real estate) and is highly leveraged, with a gross debt-to-GDP ratio above 100 percent.
- Each emirate manages its own budget independently within the federal structure.
- Expatriates constitute 80 percent of the U.A.E. population and are virtually fully employed.
- Unemployment among nationals is high (14 percent in 2009) and concentrated among the youth and in the northern emirates.
- The global financial crisis ended a decade of high growth; factors included decline in oil prices, post-Lehman shut down of international capital markets, and a price correction in Dubai’s property market.
- Authorities supported the banking sector through liquidity injection, recapitalization, and deposit guarantees; Abu Dhabi provided financial support to Dubai.

### Recent Economic Developments, Outlook, and Risks — A. Signs of Economic Stabilization
- Real GDP:
  - Real GDP is estimated to have contracted by 3¼ percent in 2009.
  - Real GDP grew by an estimated 3.2 percent in 2010.
- Inflation:
  - 12-month CPI inflation rate was 1.7 percent in December 2010, up from -0.3 percent at end-2009.
- External sector:
  - Exports increased by 15 percent in 2010; imports increased by 6 percent in 2010.
  - Current account balance is estimated to have reached 7.7 percent of GDP in 2010.
  - Central bank foreign exchange reserves recovered from the losses sustained in 2009 ($ 7 billion), reaching US$32 billion by year-end (1.7 months of imports).1
- Fiscal developments:
  - Nonhydrocarbon primary fiscal deficit (excluding investment income) contracted sharply to 35.2 percent of nonhydrocarbon GDP in 2010, from 44 percent in 2009.
  - Consolidated fiscal deficit shrunk to about 1.3 percent of GDP in 2010 from 12.6 percent in 2009.
  - The decline in the nonhydrocarbon primary fiscal deficit was largely due to slower project implementation in Abu Dhabi (including through GREs) and lower transfers to Dubai GREs; higher hydrocarbon revenue also reduced the consolidated deficit.
- GREs and restructurings:
  - Dubai World (DW) sought a debt standstill due to maturity mismatches and leverage; its restructuring was completed and improved market confidence.
  - Other Dubai GREs entered restructuring negotiations; Abu Dhabi stepped up support to some of its GREs.
- Banking sector:
  - Despite restructurings and weak activity, banks remained profitable in 2010.
  - Nonperforming loans (NPLs) increased to 5.9 percent in 2010 from 4.3 percent in 2009, reflecting mainly deterioration in Dubai banks (8.8 percent).
  - Banks increased provisions—the most in the GCC—and local banks boosted capital pre-emptively, including through official support.
  - Credit to the private sector remained sluggish; Dubai banks reduced lending while Abu Dhabi banks expanded.

Box 1 — Dubai World (DW) Debt Restructuring (key facts and timeline)
- Pre-standstill institutional support:
  - Dubai Financial Support Fund (DFSF) established July 2009 to provide financial assistance to GREs of strategic importance.
  - DFSF manages a US$20 billion bond program subscribed 50 percent by the central bank and 50 percent by Abu Dhabi.
- Timeline:
  - DW standstill announcement: November 25, 2009.
  - DW submitted a restructuring plan: March 25, 2010.
  - Most creditors agreed terms: September 9, 2010.
  - DW announced full support of its creditors: October 27, 2010.
- Restructuring coverage and terms:
  - Restructuring plan covered US$24.9 billion of debt: US$14.4 billion owed to some 90 domestic and foreign banks and US$10.5 billion owed to the government of Dubai.
  - Bank debt (US$14.4 billion) divided into two tranches:
    - US$4.4 billion tranche with a 5 year maturity and 1 percent interest.
    - US$10.0 billion tranche with an 8-year maturity and 1 percent interest paid each year.
    - An additional payment of 1.5 to 2.5 percent will be made upon maturity and the Government of Dubai will offer a guarantee of between US$1 billion and 4 billion.
  - Government claims (US$10.5 billion) converted into equity through the DFSF.
  - DFSF committed to provide new funds up to US$1.5 billion to DW for working capital and interest payments.
  - Nakheel: DFSF to provide US$8 billion new equity and convert existing US$1.2 billion debt into equity; outstanding Nakheel bonds to be paid off in full and on time.
  - Trade creditors and suppliers to be paid with 40 percent cash and 60 percent publicly traded debt security with a 10 percent annual interest rate.
- Other GRE restructurings and negotiations:
  - Dubai Holding Commercial Operations Group (DHCOG) secured a two-month extension on a US$555 million loan in July 2010, later rescheduled through year-end and reportedly converted into a 5-year loan.
  - Dubai Group missed two scheduled loan payments worth US$1.8 billion and started restructuring US$6.2 billion liabilities.
  - Dubai International Capital (DIC) agreed in December 2010 to restructure US$2.5 billion of bank loans: US$2 billion extended to 2016 at 2 percent; US$500 million extended to 2014 at unchanged interest.

### Recent Economic Developments, Outlook, and Risks — B. Fragile Recovery Gaining Strength Under Uncertainty
- Macroeconomic outlook:
  - Real GDP projected to grow at 3.3 percent in 2011.
  - Nonhydrocarbon GDP growth expected to increase from 2.1 percent in 2010 to 3.3 percent in 2011.
  - CPI inflation rate expected to rise to 4.5 percent in 2011.
  - Rents account for 40 percent of the CPI basket and continue to decline, moderating overall inflation.
- Growth drivers and inter-emirate dynamics:
  - Abu Dhabi: higher oil production and increased infrastructure spending (including through GREs) are main drivers of growth; nonhydrocarbon growth will continue to slow partly due to last year’s fiscal contraction.
  - Dubai: benefits from its position as a regional hub and growing links to Asia; improved competitiveness due to ongoing real estate price correction.

*Italic: Source — UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: 2011 ARTICLE IV REPORT, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

### 11.      Several    factors    make    the    economic

### 11.      Several    factors    make    the    economic

### Fragility of the recovery — key factors
- The large property overhang and uncertainty regarding its size:
  - Excess supply of property in Dubai will further increase as unfinished projects are completed and will continue to weigh on property prices, investment, and growth.
  - Risk that Abu Dhabi’s strategy to ramp up its housing supply, unless carefully managed, may put further pressure on the property market (Box 2).
- Lack of clarity on GRE financing strategies:
  - An estimated US$31 billion of debt is due in 2011–12, of which at least $5 billion is in the real estate sector, creating significant short-term roll-over risks for Dubai.
  - Absence of a well-defined, coherent, and transparent strategy to address GRE financing translates into higher borrowing costs for Dubai (sovereign and GREs).
  - Dubai government strategy to use earnings of well-performing GREs to finance underperforming entities may dampen investment and growth.
- International sanctions on Iran:
  - Sanctions on Iran, a major U.A.E. trading partner and traditional source of Dubai real-estate demand, could undermine the recovery (Box 3).
- Regional turmoil:
  - Re-pricing of risk in the region will likely result in more difficult market conditions, though the U.A.E. may benefit from increased tourism and attractiveness of its business environment.
  - Higher oil prices are benefiting the U.A.E. as a hydrocarbon exporter, though if sustained, they may dampen global demand.

### Box 2 — Real Estate Market Developments (findings)
- Dubai experienced one of the largest price corrections in the world:
  - By early 2009, the number of transactions was one fourth of the summer 2008 peak.
  - Prices had fallen by some 50 percent.
- Abu Dhabi real estate also fell but fared better than Dubai:
  - Residential prices in Abu Dhabi have also fallen by almost 50 percent; commercial real estate proved more resilient.
  - Flexible payment plans and more competitive finance rates offered by banks helped cushion the impact in Abu Dhabi.
- Real estate recovery prospects are undermined by:
  - Uncertainty about the economy, large existing and prospective oversupply, and tight mortgage lending conditions, particularly in Dubai.
  - The surplus of residential properties reportedly exceeds 30 percent.
  - Inventory is projected to stay high as more supply (15 percent of the current stock) from projects initiated before the crisis is expected in the next two years.
  - Potential buyers continue to find it difficult to secure mortgages as banks focus on repairing balance sheets.
  - Some upside may come from higher oil prices and turmoil elsewhere in the region.

### Box 3 — Economic Impact of the International Sanctions on Iran (findings and scenarios)
- Trade and broader economic impact:
  - Losses from disruptions in trade links between the U.A.E. and Iran could reach 0.2 to 0.7 percent of GDP annually.
  - Banks have reportedly cut financial services to Iran-based customers; sanctions complicate payments and settlements and risk stifling demand for Dubai real estate.
  - Iran accounts for a little more than 6 percent of total and 12 percent of nonhydrocarbon exports of the U.A.E.; it is the second largest destination of U.A.E. exports after India.
  - Re-exports account for more than 90 percent of exports to Iran.
  - Dubai’s total trade with Iran in the third quarter of 2010 declined by 15 percent compared to the same period of 2009; Iran’s share in re-exports from Dubai fell to 13 percent, from 18 percent in 2009.
  - Value of trade in the first nine months of 2010 remained broadly unchanged compared to the same period of 2009, reflecting strong trade in the first half of 2010.
- Staff calculations and scenario impacts:
  - A 30-percent fall in exports to Iran would reduce the U.A.E. GDP by 0.2 percent.
  - Such a decline would represent almost 4percent of U.A.E.’s nonhydrocarbon exports.
  - Impact on net exports and the balance of payments would be substantially less, considering re-exported goods dominate trade with Iran.
- UAE: The Economic Impact of the Sanctions on Iran — scenarios and figures (US$ millions unless otherwise noted):
  - Scenario 1 (Assumes a 30 percent reduction of exports to Iran):
    - Exports affected by the sanctions: 2,277
    - percent of exports to Iran: 30.0
    - percent of exports to world: 1.9
    - percent of nonoil exports to world: 3.7
    - percent of 2009 GDP: 0.8
    - percent of 2009 nonoil GDP: 1.2
    - Impact on net exports /3: 569
    - percent of 2009 GDP: 0.20
    - Memorandum items: Exports to Iran, 2009: 7,582; of which re-exports: 7,551
  - Scenario 2 (Assumes no exports to Iran):
    - Exports affected by the sanctions: 7,582
    - percent of exports to Iran: 100.0
    - percent of exports to world: 6.2
    - percent of nonoil exports to world: 12.2
    - percent of 2009 GDP: 2.8
    - percent of 2009 nonoil GDP: 3.9
    - Impact on net exports /3: 1,896
    - percent of 2009 GDP: 0.7
  - Note /3 assumes that re-exports to Iran have 25 percent local value-added content.
  - Footnote: Iranian nationals have been the fourth largest buyers of Dubai real estate, after India, the U.K., and Pakistan.

### Baseline scenario and medium-term projections
- Staff’s baseline scenario:
  - Assumes a gradual pick up in private activity replacing government stimulus.
  - With oil prices remaining around $105 per barrel over the medium term:
    - Fiscal and external accounts will remain in surplus.
    - Real nonhydrocarbon growth is projected to increase to 4.5 percent.
  - Main medium-term risk: GREs, as debt roll-over needs will remain substantial given restructurings.
  - Trend growth rate is expected to be lower than before the crisis because of a smaller real estate sector.

### Real exchange rate assessment
- Analysis suggests the dirham is broadly in line with fundamentals:
  - Three approaches (equilibrium exchange rate, macroeconomic balance, and external sustainability) indicate slight to modest overvaluation, but within the margin of error (Appendix I referenced).

### U.A.E. Gross Public and Publicly Held Debt — key figures (in billion of US$)
- Maturing in 2011 | 2012 | Beyond | Total
  - Government of Abu Dhabi: 0.4 | 1.3 | 9.9 | 11.6
  - Abu Dhabi GREs: 16.6 | 9.3 | 66.4 | 92.4
  - Total Abu Dhabi: 17.1 | 10.6 | 76.4 | 104.0
  - In percent of Abu Dhabi 2010 GDP: 8.9 | 5.5 | 54.2
  - Government of Dubai 1/: 5.6 | 1.6 | 28.9 | 36.0
  - Dubai GREs: 10.4 | 13.6 | 52.9 | 76.9
  - Total Dubai: 16.0 | 15.2 | 81.7 | 113.0
  - In percent of Dubai and Northern Emirates' 2010 GDP: 14.5 | 13.8 | 102.6
  - Other Emirate Sovereign: 0 | 0 | 2.8 | 2.8
  - Other Emirate GREs: 0.9 | 0.3 | 1.2 | 2.4
  - Total Other Emirates: 0.9 | 0.3 | 4.0 | 5.2
  - Federal Government: 19.1 (in percent of U.A.E. 2010 GDP: 6.3)
  - Total U.A.E.: 33.1 | 25.8 | 158.1 | 236.0
  - In percent of U.A.E. 2010 GDP: 11.0 | 8.5 | 78.2
  - 1/ Including GRE debt guaranteed by the Dubai government.
  - Note: Sources cited include Dealogic, Zawya, Bloomberg, U.A.E. authorities, and Fund staff estimates.

### Policy Theme #1 — Supporting the still fragile recovery (policy recommendations)
- Fiscal policy:
  - Fiscal policy should support economic recovery in 2011.
  - Federal budget foresees a deficit in 2011 with the reduction in communication fees.
  - Dubai is entering a period of fiscal consolidation as some investment projects complete.
  - Abu Dhabi intends to increase infrastructure spending, including through GREs; staff recommended maintaining a neutral fiscal stance in 2011 following the sharp contraction in 2010.
- Be prepared to expand productive investment:
  - Government should stand ready to expand spending on productive investment if regional unrest affects the economy.
  - Authorities advised to undertake cost-benefit analyses to implement projects with high economic return.
- Infrastructure and subsidies:
  - Plan to upgrade infrastructure in the northern emirates should be expanded; it will ease electricity shortages.
  - Replace implicit subsidies on water and electricity with explicit cash transfers to lower-income households to better target need and reduce utility bottlenecks through more effective conservation.
- Central bank and liquidity:
  - Central bank should monitor bank liquidity conditions and stand ready to relieve potential pressures.
  - Accommodative policy stance in an environment of low global interest rates will support recovery in private sector credit.
  - Re-pricing of risk could trigger sudden reversal of recent deposit inflows; CBU should monitor individual bank liquidity to ensure sufficient liquid assets.

### Policy Theme #2 — Strengthening the economy’s resilience (policy recommendations)
- Rationale:
  - As recovery firms up, policies should shift to strengthen resilience: monitor Dubai debt restructuring implications, sizeable GRE roll-over needs, growing GRE borrowings across emirates, and financial sector resilience.
  - Under a pegged exchange rate, this requires mutually-supportive countercyclical fiscal and macroprudential policies and coordination across federal and emirate governments.
A. Mitigating Risks Posed by GREs
- GREs contributed to diversification but pose risks highlighted by the global financial crisis and DW debt restructuring:
  - DW restructuring increased Dubai sovereign debt; spillovers to banking sector and markets occurred.
  - Some Abu Dhabi GREs heavily invested in real estate are experiencing financial difficulties.
- GRE debt outlook and risks:
  - Overall GRE debt is high by international comparisons.
  - An estimated US$60 billion of GRE debt is due in 2011–12, posing short-term roll-over risk.
  - Post-restructuring, significant Dubai debt will mature in the medium term (2014–15).
  - Real estate overhang could materialize contingent liabilities affecting sovereign balance sheets and banks holding GRE debt.
- Steps taken and recommended:
  - Authorities prepared a new draft federal law on public debt to set principles for issuance and management, establish DMOs, regulate coordination, and allow federal DMO to monitor federal GRE debt.
  - DMOs established at federal, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai levels; Abu Dhabi preparing a public debt policy framework to limit GRE borrowings.
  - Short-term priority: complete GRE debt restructuring and clean balance sheets—write-off impaired assets and undertake operational restructuring.
  - Increase transparency on GRE liabilities and financing strategy, including stock, composition, maturity profile, and government support.
  - Disclose state and outlook of the real estate sector and government strategy to address the overhang.
- Develop a proper risk management framework:
  - Framework should identify, assess, monitor, and report contingent liabilities from GREs and disclose these liabilities in government accounts.
  - Authorities should consider a fiscal risks statement as part of annual budget documents covering GRE risks and eventually PPP and other risks; include forward-looking risk estimates.
  - Authorities have requested Fund technical assistance in this area.
- Containing GRE borrowing:
  - Achieve through limits on GRE borrowing defined by individual governments and communicated via the fiscal coordination committee.
  - DMOs would monitor compliance; federal DMO could ensure information-sharing and disseminate public sector debt data by emirate.
  - Draft federal law should clarify relations between federal and emirate DMOs, expand coverage to Emirati GREs, define federal DMO scope and objectives, and specify coordination mechanisms with fiscal and monetary authorities.
- Corporate governance and transparency:
  - Assess corporate governance against OECD standards.
  - Separate commercial from noncommercial GRE operations, clarify government support strategy, and standardize accounting, auditing, and financial reporting for GREs.
  - Abu Dhabi has disclosed the list of GREs it will support and included explicit transfers in the budget for noncommercial GRE operations.
  - Better disclosure of GRE financial accounts would help attract investors and lower funding costs.

*2011 ARTICLE IV REPORT UNITED ARAB EMIRATES — INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

### 26.      Strong  core  earnings  and  higher  capital

### _cr11111 - 26.      Strong  core  earnings  and  higher  capital

### Banking system resilience and key indicators
- Strong core earnings and higher capital compared to pre-crisis levels have prepared the banking system to withstand shocks.
- NPLs have already doubled since the crisis (they remain low but have doubled), the second highest increase in the GCC after Kuwait.
- Capital adequacy ratio: 20.8 percent (high, thanks to government support).
  - Note: This includes about 5 percentage points of tier 2 capital notes subscribed by the federal government in 2009; the notes will start to amortize in 2012 at 20 percent per year.
- System liquidity has improved due to slower credit growth and high deposit rates attracting foreign flows.
- Stress tests on overall banking data indicate resilience to shocks, although aggregate data can mask risks in individual banks from concentrated exposures to particular borrowers or sectors.

### Dubai-based banks and concentrated exposures
- System resilience in the aggregate conceals greater pressure on Dubai-based banks, which may pose a risk to financial stability.
- Dubai banks face greater pressures from exposures to GREs and real estate in Dubai:
  - Greater burden of provisions on Dubai loan restructuring.
  - NPLs are twice as high as Abu Dhabi banks.
  - Dubai banks continue to deleverage and are losing market share.
- Islamic banks are under some pressure because of larger exposure to real estate.

### Central Bank (CBU) reforms and staff recommendations
- The CBU has strengthened risk monitoring and management through wide-ranging reforms to:
  - Strengthen financial stability analysis.
  - Revamp the regulatory framework.
  - Develop macroprudential policies.
- Staff advice and recommendations:
  - Consider capital charges above 100 percent for unrated GREs that the CBU deems risky to align GRE exposure with banks’ risk-bearing capacity.
    - To implement this, the CBU would need to develop an internal risk management and rating function.
    - Sharing GRE financial information collected by DMOs with the CBU would help monitor GRE risks.
    - Authorities agreed monitoring and limiting GRE risks was key to financial stability.
  - Broaden regulation on real estate exposure to improve risk management.
    - The CBU believed real estate risk was manageable for local banks, partly because real estate activity has relied heavily on foreign financing.
  - Monitor performance of restructured loans and consider regulating their classification and provisioning should they need further restructuring.
  - Continue to contain banks’ dividend distribution over the next few years to ensure banks can handle risks without new government support.
    - Since 2009, the CBU has been limiting dividend distribution to strengthen banks’ resilience.
    - Staff recommended linking CBU approval of dividend distribution to the results of stress tests with uniform parameters across the industry.
  - Consider more forward-looking provisioning (moving from incurred to expected loss) as envisaged by forthcoming changes to International Financial Reporting Standards.

### Debt restructuring, GRE maturities, and rollover risk
- Debt restructuring in Dubai may imply postponing realization of losses and a new bout of roll-over risk in a few years that requires monitoring.
  - Current restructuring plans assume borrowers’ problems are liquidity rather than solvency.
  - If asset prices do not recover, some borrowers may not be able to pay when loans mature.
  - Staff advised monitoring restructured loans’ performance and considering regulatory action on classification and provisioning if further restructuring is needed.
- Figure 8 (Maturity Profile of Dubai GRE Debt) indicates restructured debt and non-restructured debt across maturity buckets (2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2019, Beyond) in U.S. dollar billion (data sources: Dealogic; Bloomberg; country authorities; and Fund staff estimates).
  - Note: Preliminary estimates are based on public information about Dubai Holding and other GRE ongoing debt restructurings, as well as Dubai World's completed restructuring; including debt guaranteed by the Dubai government.

### Governance, AML/CFT, and oversight
- Government control of banks together with high GRE exposure point to potential governance issues.
  - Crisis increased government stakes in banks; some banks heavily involved in lending to GREs and GRE debt restructurings.
  - Good governance should be part of risk-based oversight.
  - Staff recommended conducting a diagnostic for bank governance prior to the forthcoming Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) update.
- Authorities committed to conform AML/CFT framework to FATF’s 40+9 Recommendations.
  - The U.A.E. framework needs further strengthening, particularly criminalization of money laundering and financing of terrorism, and reinforcement of the AML/CFT supervisory system.

### Fiscal policy, intergovernmental coordination, and macroprudential tools
- Countercyclical fiscal policy could mitigate boom-bust cycles in the U.A.E. economy.
  - Except in 2009, the fiscal stance has always been procyclical (Figure 9).
  - Procyclical fiscal policy contributed to overheating before the crisis; in 2010 a contractionary fiscal stance slowed recovery.
  - Fiscal policy under a pegged exchange rate regime should delink government and GRE spending from oil price volatility.
  - Abu Dhabi—holding the bulk of hydrocarbon wealth—should ensure long-term sustainability and intergenerational equity; other emirates need medium-term fiscal sustainability.
  - Dubai should undertake fiscal consolidation to achieve a prudent debt-to-GDP ratio.
  - Authorities are preparing to introduce a VAT in the context of the GCC to enhance revenue mobilization and facilitate consolidation.
- Intergovernmental coordination:
  - Given the federal structure, effective intergovernmental coordination is key for short-term demand management and medium-term sustainability.
  - Timely and reliable information-sharing structures (medium-term fiscal frameworks, annual budgets and execution, consolidated fiscal accounts) are prerequisites.
  - The Fiscal Coordination Council has made progress in sharing information; coordination will be expanded to include the ministry of economy, the CBU, and departments of economic development at the emirates level.
- Macroprudential tools:
  - In coordination with countercyclical fiscal policy, macroprudential tools could help avert a resurgence of imbalances.
  - The CBU should:
    - Tailor its early warning system to system-wide systemic risks (e.g., GRE borrowing, real estate, speculative flows).
    - Ensure a matching range of prudential tools are in place to act on warning signs.
    - Decide trigger values to ensure activation of tools and communicate them effectively to stakeholders.
  - The CBU intends to make swift progress on macroprudential policies by building on IMF technical assistance recommendations on measuring and managing system-wide risks.

### Dubai’s Debt Sustainability (Box 4)
- Contingent liabilities from GREs have raised Dubai’s fiscal vulnerability.
  - Dubai’s gross government debt, including guarantees, increased from 1.6 percent of Dubai GDP in 2007 to 10.3 percent in 2008 and 34 percent as of end-2010 (mainly due to GRE bailouts).
- Government debt data underestimate Dubai’s total public sector debt by omitting quasi-sovereign contingent liabilities.
  - Assuming GRE debt as contingent liability for the government, at least US$11 billion of contingent risk can be foreseen for the government of Dubai by end-2016, with more than 70 percent of these liabilities coming due in 2011–12.
  - This would raise the total debt-to-GDP ratio to 47.4 percent in 2012, compared to 34.6 percent for the government alone.
- Debt sustainability projections:
  - Baseline: Dubai’s government debt is estimated to increase to 41 percent of GDP by the end of 2016 (despite gradual fiscal consolidation projected).
  - A1. No policy change (constant primary balance in 2005–09): projected to reach 53 percent by 2016.
  - A2. Including contingent liabilities (with baseline fiscal adjustment): total debt-to-GDP would increase to 54.3 percent by the end of 2016.
  - A3. No policy change including contingent liabilities: projected to reach 62.5 percent by 2016.
- Public Sector Debt Sustainability Framework table (2008–16; in percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated):
  - Public sector debt /1: 2008 = 10.3; 2009 = 32.4; 2010 = 34.0; 2011 = 32.9; 2012 = 34.6; 2013 = 36.1; 2014 = 37.4; 2015 = 39.0; 2016 = 41.0. Debt stabilizing primary balance = 0.7.
  - Alternative scenarios summarized above (A1, A2, A3) with specific year profiles noted in the source table.
  - Note: 1/ Dubai government and government guaranteed debt. Source: IMF staff estimates.

### Structural issues: statistics, capital markets, labor, and GCC monetary union
- Statistical capacity:
  - Establishment of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) is an important step for federal statistical capacity.
  - NBS has made progress establishing databases for key statistics; Ministry of Finance has developed consolidated fiscal accounts.
  - Further efforts needed for timely compilation and dissemination of national accounts, balance of payments, fiscal accounts, and harmonization of methodologies across emirates.
  - NBS intends to request Fund technical assistance to further develop national accounts and strengthen capacity to collect and disclose IIP data.
- Domestic capital markets:
  - Heavy reliance on external borrowing was a vulnerability of the Dubai model.
  - Authorities focus on developing domestic capital and debt markets, including issuing federal securities to establish a yield curve.
  - Developing a domestic debt market would help banks improve liquidity buffers and meet Basel III liquidity requirement over time.
  - Given limited role of federal debt in the foreseeable future, authorities could explore non-traditional funding (e.g., term deposits from government sources).
  - Foreign term-funding is essential for asset-liability management, but maturities should avoid coinciding with GRE debt maturities in case of market disruption.
- Labor markets:
  - Government working to create job opportunities for nationals via federal and local jobs programs, SME funds, and training programs.
  - Staff welcomed active labor market policies and encouraged locating some federal agencies/entities in the North; strengthening skills mix will facilitate job creation among nationals.
  - Labor market segmentation and unemployment statistics:
    - Average unemployment rate: 4.2 percent in 2009.
    - Unemployment among U.A.E. nationals: 14 percent in 2009.
    - Unemployment among expatriate workers: 2.8 percent in 2009.
    - Estimates of number of unemployed range between 10,000 and 40,000 persons (no official data).
    - Unemployment among nationals aged 20-24: 23.9 percent in 2009.
    - Rural vs urban: 18.6 percent versus 11.5 percent.
    - Northern emirates account for about 80 percent of unemployment among nationals.
    - Unemployment among women: 28.1 percent; among men: 7.8 percent.
  - Structural bottlenecks include a skills gap (foreign professionals have attained, on average, 4 more years of formal education than nationals) and high reservation wages reflecting better public sector pay; around 90 percent of nationals employed in public sector.
- GCC Monetary Union:
  - The U.A.E. does not plan to join the GCC monetary Union at this stage.
  - Authorities believe further efforts are needed to establish a framework for a currency union focusing on harmonization of payment and settlement systems, regulatory and supervisory frameworks, statistical systems, and removal of nontrade barriers.

### Staff appraisal and outlook
- The U.A.E. economy is recovering in an increasingly uncertain regional environment.
  - Nonhydrocarbon GDP growth projected to accelerate from 2.1 percent in 2010 to 3.3 percent in 2011.
- Risks and vulnerabilities:
  - Real estate overhang and short-term refinancing needs from overleveraged GREs continue to weigh on the near-term outlook.
  - Downside risks to the recovery relate to possible economic spillovers of regional events, including the re-pricing of risk. 

*Source: 2011 ARTICLE IV REPORT UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

### 41.      In  light  of  the  still  fragile  recovery,  short-

### _cr11111 - 41.      In  light  of  the  still  fragile  recovery,  short-

### Short-term macroeconomic policy stance
- Overall neutral fiscal policy stance following last year’s fiscal contraction would support the economic recovery, while Dubai should consolidate.
- Monetary policy: the central bank will maintain its accommodative monetary policy stance, and should stand ready to provide liquidity to the market in case the re-pricing of risk in the region triggers a reversal of the recent deposit inflows to the banking sector.
- Ensure efficiency of spending by undertaking cost-benefit analyses and implementing projects that have high economic return.

### Response to regional events and social policy
- The authorities’ response to the unfolding events in the region is appropriate.
- Improved infrastructure in the northern emirates will help raise standards of living in these areas.
- Staff advises considering replacing subsidies on water and electricity with explicit cash transfers to lower-income households.
- Active labor market policies should be complemented by strengthening the skills mix.
- Given concentration of unemployment in the northern Emirates, the government could consider locating some agencies/entities in the North to create employment opportunities for nationals.

### Exchange rate regime
- The exchange rate is broadly aligned with fundamentals, and the dollar peg continues to serve as an effective nominal anchor for the economy.

### GRE (Government-Related Entities) risk mitigation (policy priorities)
- Short-term actions:
  - Complete the restructuring of GRE debt.
  - Ensure the viability of GREs through writing-off impaired assets.
  - Communicate strategy on GRE debt refinancing.
- Medium/longer-term actions:
  - Limit overall GRE borrowing by emirate.
  - Develop a GRE risk management framework.
  - Report contingent liabilities arising from GREs in the fiscal accounts.
  - Improve GRE governance by clarifying ownership, government support strategy, and delineating commercial and noncommercial operations.
  - Improve information disclosure about GRE financial accounts to boost investor confidence and lower funding costs.

### Banking sector resilience and supervision
- The CBU should continue to prepare the banking system for further possible deterioration in asset quality and future risks.
- Central bank steps taken to date help improve resilience.
- Given likelihood of further increase in NPLs, the central bank should:
  - Continue to ensure banks provision adequately.
  - Monitor performance of restructured loans.
- Additional measures:
  - Higher capital charges on risky GREs.
  - Continued retained earnings by banks to limit potential financial risks posed by GREs.

### Demand management, macroprudential framework, and intergovernmental coordination
- The recent boom-bust underscores the need for strong demand management over the cycle.
- Under a pegged exchange rate regime, mutually-supportive countercyclical fiscal and macroprudential policies are required.
- The federal structure of the U.A.E. makes close coordination between various governments imperative.
- Staff is encouraged by the authorities’ decision to deepen intergovernmental cooperation, including the CBU.

### Domestic capital markets and funding
- Developing domestic capital markets will reduce U.A.E.’s dependency on external markets.
- Given limited scope for federal securities in the short term, authorities should explore stable funding from non-traditional sources, such as term deposits from government sources.

### Statistical capacity and data dissemination
- Progress by the NBS in establishing macroeconomic statistics and by the ministry of finance in preparing consolidated fiscal accounts is an important step.
- Further efforts are needed for timely compilation and dissemination of key statistics, including national accounts, balance of payments, and fiscal accounts.
- Harmonization of methodologies across emirates is required.
- Staff encourages further development of capacity to produce leading indicators and to collect and disseminate data on U.A.E.’s IIP.

### Administrative recommendation
- It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation take place on the standard 12-month cycle.

*2011 ARTICLE IV REPORT UNITED ARAB EMIRATES — INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

### Appendix I. Exchange Rate Assessment

### Appendix I. Exchange Rate Assessment

### Summary conclusion
- Estimates from CGER-type methodologies indicate that the U.A.E. dirham exchange rate is broadly in line with fundamentals.
- Different assessment approaches yield at most modest or slight indications of overvaluation, generally within confidence bands.

### Real exchange rate movements
- The real exchange rate depreciated by 10.2 percent since the first quarter of 2009, moving broadly in line with fundamentals.
- Following strong appreciation between 2005 and 2008, the trade-weighted real effective exchange rate (REER) depreciated by 10.2 percent from the peak in March 2009 until end-2010.
- Estimation of the equilibrium exchange rate shows that at end-2010, the REER was overvalued by about 1 percent, well within the margin of error.

### Macroeconomic balance approach (current account norms)
- The macroeconomic balance approach suggests a slight overvaluation of the dirham but well within the margin of error.
- Estimated current account norms:
  - Current account norm for the U.A.E. at a surplus of 8.3 percent of GDP in 2010.
  - Current account norm of 11.6 percent of GDP in 2015.
- Projected/current account positions:
  - Projected current account position of 11.4 percent of GDP in 2015.
  - Actual surplus of 7.7 percent of GDP in 2010.
- Interpretation:
  - The projected current account in 2015 (11.4 percent) lies within the confidence interval relative to the norm of 11.6 percent, indicating only slight evidence of exchange rate overvaluation.
  - For 2010, the difference is marginally larger but still within the confidence band—norm of 8.3 percent of GDP compared to actual surplus of 7.7 percent of GDP.
- Note on methodology:
  - The macroeconomic balance approach estimates an equilibrium current account norm from fundamentals (nonhydrocarbon fiscal balance, hydrocarbon reserves, a proxy for an underreported international investment position, old-age dependency ratio, population growth rate, initial net foreign assets, hydrocarbon trade balance, growth rate of real per capita GDP, and relative income), using a generalized method of moments technique.

### External sustainability approach
- The external sustainability approach indicates a modest overvaluation of the dirham.
- Based on estimated hydrocarbon wealth, import trajectories (annuities or allocation rules) are calculated under three policy scenarios:
  - (a) a constant share of GDP annuity;
  - (b) constant real per capita annuity;
  - (c) constant real annuity.
- Results:
  - All three annuity specifications lead to the same result for the U.A.E.: the projected current account balance is too low.
  - This would imply a need to accumulate further savings (e.g., higher fiscal savings) of about 9 percentage points of GDP.
- Additional observation:
  - Notwithstanding the estimated overvaluation, nonhydrocarbon exports have continued to grow rapidly.
- Conceptual underpinning:
  - Sustainability requires that the net present value (NPV) of all future hydrocarbon and investment income equal the NPV of imports of goods and services net of nonhydrocarbon exports; subject to this constraint, a current account norm supports intergenerational equity and precautionary savings through an appropriate pace of accumulation of net foreign assets.

*Source: Appendix I. Exchange Rate Assessment, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 2011 ARTICLE IV REPORT.*

### 4.5 percent, as property rents continue to decline. At 4.2 percent, the U.A.E’s unemployment

### _cr11111 - 4.5 percent, as property rents continue to decline. At 4.2 percent, the U.A.E’s unemployment

### Economic recovery and outlook
- The U.A.E. economy is recovering in an increasingly uncertain regional environment.
- Nonhydrocarbon GDP growth is projected to accelerate from 2.1 percent in 2010 to 3.3 percent in 2011.
- Downside risks:
  - Possible economic spillovers of regional events, including the re-pricing of risk.
  - Excess supply of property in Dubai and uncertainty regarding the scale of oversupply.
  - At more than 100 percent of GDP, Dubai’s GRE debt is large and roll-over needs are expected to remain substantial for the medium term, posing continued fiscal and financial risks to the U.A.E. overall.

### Labor market and social indicators
- Aggregate unemployment: 4.2 percent.
- Unemployment among nationals: 14 percent, concentrated in the northern emirates.
- Policy notes:
  - Active labor market policies will help create jobs for nationals and should be complemented by strengthening the skills mix.
  - Given the concentration of unemployment in the northern Emirates, the government could consider locating some of its agencies/entities in the North to create further employment opportunities for nationals.
  - Consider replacing subsidies on water and electricity with explicit cash transfers to lower-income households.

### GRE debt, restructuring, and fiscal risks
- Dubai World (DW) debt restructuring was completed; other GREs initiated DW-style debt restructuring talks with banks.
- Abu Dhabi stepped up its support to some GREs.
- Successful restructuring of DW's debt improved market confidence and allowed top-grade Dubai issuers to regain market access; however, Dubai spreads remain high due to risks of further potential debt restructuring needs.
- Policy recommendations to mitigate GRE risks:
  - Complete the restructuring of GRE debt in the short term and ensure viability through writing-off impaired assets.
  - Communicate a clear strategy on GRE debt refinancing.
  - Limit overall GRE borrowing by emirate.
  - Develop a GRE risk management framework and report contingent liabilities arising from GREs in fiscal accounts.
  - Improve GRE governance by clarifying ownership, government support strategy, and delineating commercial and noncommercial operations.
  - Improve information disclosure about GRE financial accounts to boost investor confidence and lower funding costs.

### Banking sector and financial stability
- Banking sector characteristics:
  - High capital buffers—including from the government—and remained profitable in 2010.
  - Nonperforming loans (NPLs) have doubled since the crisis.
- Central Bank of the U.A.E. (CBU) progress:
  - Strengthened financial stability analysis, revamped the regulatory framework, and developed macroprudential policies to improve bank risk management practices.
- Policy recommendations for the CBU and banks:
  - Continue to prepare the banking system for further possible deterioration in asset quality.
  - Ensure banks provision adequately given the likelihood of further increase in NPLs and monitor the performance of restructured loans.
  - Apply higher capital charges on risky GREs and encourage continued retained earnings by banks to limit potential financial risks posed by GREs.
  - Stand ready to provide liquidity if regional re-pricing of risk triggers a reversal of recent deposit inflows to the banking sector.

### Macro policy guidance
- Short-term policy stance:
  - Focus on supporting domestic demand and adjust to economic spillovers from unfolding regional events.
  - An overall neutral fiscal policy stance following last year’s fiscal contraction would support the economic recovery, while Dubai should consolidate.
  - Ensure efficiency of spending via cost-benefit analyses and implement projects with high economic return.
- Monetary and exchange rate policy:
  - The central bank will maintain an accommodative monetary policy stance and should be ready to provide market liquidity if needed.
  - The exchange rate is broadly aligned with fundamentals; the dollar peg continues to serve as an effective nominal anchor.
- Structural and market development:
  - Mutually-supportive countercyclical fiscal and macroprudential policies are needed under a pegged exchange rate regime; close coordination among federal and emirate governments is imperative.
  - Develop domestic capital markets to reduce dependency on external markets; with limited scope for federal securities in the short term, explore stable funding from non-traditional sources, such as term deposits from government sources.
  - Continue building statistical capacity: timely compilation and dissemination of national accounts, balance of payments, fiscal accounts, harmonization of methodologies across emirates, development of leading indicators, and data on U.A.E.’s International Investment Position.

### Selected macroeconomic indicators (2007–11) — annual percent change or levels as presented
- Output and prices
  - Nominal GDP (in billions of AED): 9481, 156993, 1,1091,336
  - Nominal GDP (in billions of U.S. dollars): 258315270, 302364
  - Real GDP: 6.5, 5.3, -3.2, 3.2, 3.3
  - Real hydrocarbon GDP: -2.7, 1.6, -9.6, 5.3, 3.4
  - Real nonhydrocarbon GDP: 9.1, 6.3, 0.6, 2.1, 3.3
  - CPI inflation (average): 11.1, 12.3, 1.6, 0.9, 4.5
- Public finances
  - Revenue: 33.1, 38.6, 25.3, 28.4, 33.5
  - Hydrocarbon revenue: 24.6, 31.3, 17.5, 21.6, 27.4
  - Nonhydrocarbon revenue: 8.4, 7.4, 7.7, 6.8, 6.1
  - Expenditure and net lending: 17.7, 22.2, 37.8, 29.7, 27.0
  - Budget balance: 15.4, 16.5, -12.6, -1.3, 6.5
  - Non-hydrocarbon balance 1/: -14.0, -23.5, -42.3, -34.7, -35.1
- Monetary sector
  - Credit to private sector: 40.1, 49.3, 0.7, 1.2, 3.5
  - Broad money: 41.7, 19.2, 9.8, 6.2, 9.6
- External sector (in billions of U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated)
  - Exports of goods: 178.6, 240, 192, 222, 265
  - Hydrocarbon exports: 73.8, 103, 68, 78, 108
  - Imports of goods: 132, 176, 150, 158, 179
  - Current account balance: 15.4, 23.3, 8.2, 23.3, 37.7
  - Current account balance (in percent of GDP): 6.0, 7.4, 3.0, 7.7, 10.4
  - Gross official reserves 2/: 77.9, 30.9, 24.7, 32.0, 49.7
  - In months of next year's imports of goods & services: 4.3, 2.0, 1.5, 1.7, 2.5
  - Real effective exchange rate (2000 = 100): 99.8, 102.8, 107.9, 103.7, ..
- Notes:
  - 1/ In percent of nonhydrocarbon GDP.
  - 2/ Excludes foreign assets of sovereign wealth funds.
  - Sources: U.A.E. authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

*Public Information Notice: Executive Board discussion and staff report details as summarized in the 2011 Article IV consultation with the United Arab Emirates.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/_cr11111.pdf_
