## Costa Rica: Selected Economic Indicators, 2003-10

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---

### I. Introduction and summary
- The Fund approved a 15-month high-access precautionary stand-by arrangement for Costa Rica on April 10, 2009.
- Objectives of the arrangement:
  - Provide a liquidity buffer to shield Costa Rica from external financing risks and bolster confidence.
  - Make room for the authorities’ macroeconomic strategy to work (tighter monetary stance to counter external financing shortfall; countercyclical fiscal policy to alleviate the slowdown).
- Program outcomes and assessment:
  - The program remained on track until its conclusion in July 2010; the authorities did not draw on any Fund resources under the program.
  - Near-term objectives were met: external risks did not materialize and the economy rebounded relatively quickly after the global crisis.
  - Submission of laws on the financial safety net and bank resolution framework were delayed but completed before program end.
  - Structural reforms progressed slowly and fiscal risks increased during the program period.
  - Transition to inflation targeting (IT) was not accelerated despite an episode of gradual appreciation of the colón between mid-2009 and late-2010.
- Institutional context:
  - Continuous democratic regime since 1948, strong constitutional checks; legislative consensus-seeking traditions and impending February 2010 elections constrained reform scope.

### II. Economic context (pre- and during-crisis)
- Pre-crisis boom (2003–07):
  - Real GDP growth averaged 6.7 percent during 2003-07.
  - Per capita GDP (2010, U.S. dollars): 7,843
  - Poverty: 2009, percent of households: 18.5; 2007: 16.7 percent of households below the poverty line (down from 20.6 percent in 2002).
  - Public debt-to-GDP ratio fell by 9½ percentage points to 43 percent by end-2007.
  - Foreign direct investment contributed to covering current account deficit; foreign exchange reserves were comfortable.
- Monetary policy environment:
  - Exchange rate regime: de facto crawling band.
  - Steps toward IT: single rate crawling peg replaced by a crawling band in October 2006; band widened twice in 2007 (January and November).
  - Central Bank actions: streamlined open market operations; established an overnight facility; a recapitalization law was in parliament.
  - Constraints: monetary policy constrained by need to defend exchange rate band and weaknesses in central bank balance sheet.
- Inflation and overheating:
  - Consumer prices (end of period): 2007: 10.8; 2008: 13.9; 2009: 4.0; 2010 (est): 5.8.
  - Inflation peaked at 16.3 percent in November 2008.
  - Credit to the private sector grew at annual rates ranging from 30 to 40 percent in 2007.
  - Central bank purchased US$422 million (2.9 percent of GDP) in the first 4 weeks of January 2008.
- Financial sector:
  - 2008 FSAP Update: called for consolidated supervision, improved crisis management framework (system-wide deposit insurance, bank resolution).
  - Banks remained well capitalized and liquid; nonperforming loans low and fully provisioned.

### III. Why the authorities requested a program
- External shock and domestic impact:
  - Global financial crisis reduced demand for exports and FDI; exchange rate came under pressure as expectations shifted to depreciation and the colón moved rapidly to the top of the band.
  - Real GDP growth fell from 7.9 percent in 2007 to 2.7 percent in 2008.
  - Current account deficit widened to 9.3 percent of GDP in 2008, with FDI falling short of financing that deficit.
- Policy trade-offs and intentions:
  - Authorities planned to tighten monetary conditions to shore up external position and to gradually increase exchange rate flexibility to pave the way for IT.
  - Fiscal space built during the boom would allow countercyclical fiscal policy to cushion tighter monetary policy effects.
  - Financial sector reforms aimed to strengthen resilience and limit spillovers.
- Rationale for IMF precautionary support:
  - Baseline program fully financed, but investor confidence required liquidity buffers to absorb large possible balance-of-payments shocks.
  - Authorities sought precautionary Fund support given expectations of continued global turmoil.

### IV. Program ownership and design (summary of assessment)
- Design consistency:
  - Program design broadly consistent with immediate objectives and Fund policies: supporting confidence via liquidity buffer and allowing the macroeconomic strategy to function.
  - Macroeconomic strategy combined a tighter monetary stance with countercyclical fiscal policy.
- Implementation notes:
  - Financial sector reform measures experienced delays but were completed prior to program end.
  - Structural reforms that would bolster medium-term resilience (e.g., accelerating the move to IT; fiscal consolidation after recovery) were not implemented during the program.
- Governance and political constraints:
  - Legislative process and upcoming elections constrained the authorities’ ability to advance some reforms during the program period.

### V. Program ownership, timing, and key commitments
- Program initiation and negotiations:
  - Authorities proactively approached staff after preparing economic policies for 2009 that formed the basis of the program.
  - Program negotiations lasted about 3 months before agreement on appropriate fiscal position.
  - Authorities sought a 15-month short program due to elections in February 2010.
- Macroeconomic and financial policy design:
  - Monetary policy tightened to address inflation concerns and exchange rate pressures.
  - Exchange rate was not used to cushion the external shock because it was not perceived to be fundamentally misaligned; adjusting the band could have damaged confidence; dollarization implied banking sector vulnerability to a significant depreciation.
  - Fiscal stimulus chosen within fiscal space.
- Key measures and commitments:
  - January 2009: central bank raised short-term interest rates on its deposit facility by 70-150 bps.
  - Rate of crawl of the ceiling of the exchange rate band raised from 3 to 9 percent per year; band to widen to about 22 percent by end 2009 and 30 percent by end 2010.
  - Access to the wholesale component of the foreign exchange market was broadened.
  - Inflation target for 2009 (end-year basis) set at 9 percent +/- 1 percent.
  - Benchmarks for end-June 2009: introduce a daily liquidity forecasting exercise; integrate the segmented money market.
- Fiscal policy stance and targets:
  - Fiscal stimulus through higher social and capacity-building expenditure (education, health, security, and labor-intensive infrastructure).
  - Program envisaged a substantial increase in the fiscal deficit in 2009:
    - 3.2 percent of GDP for the central government;
    - 4.1 percent of GDP for the combined public sector.
  - Deficit primarily financed from domestic sources; contingent World Bank loan available for any remaining shortfall.
  - Fiscal targets expected to remain at same level in 2010; debt increase expected to reverse as output gap closed.
- Financial sector reforms and benchmarks:
  - Benchmarks: submit draft bank resolution framework law (end-September 2009, later moved to December 2009); create system-wide deposit insurance scheme (end-December 2009).
  - Benchmark for end-June 2009: closer scrutiny of banks’ liquidity position.
  - Central bank committed to keep exceptional liquidity assistance measures in colones as long as needed.
  - Non-binding reforms: recapitalize central bank; establish consolidated supervision of financial conglomerates; enhance sanctions regime.

### VI. Conditionality and financing
- Conditionality focused on maintaining buffers (foreign exchange reserves) and ensuring cautious fiscal policy.
- Floor on net international reserves (NIR) set at 85 percent of short-term debt for 2009.
- Limits on cash balances of central government and combined public sector, and on debt accumulation.
- Structural conditionality streamlined to:
  - strengthen the financial sector; and
  - advance preparations for implementing IT and strengthen interest-rate transmission.
- Proposed access: 492.3 million SDRs, equivalent to 300 percent of quota.
- Access calibrated to preserve NIR coverage at more than 90 percent of short-term debt under stress scenarios such as:
  - additional decline in exports of 8 percent;
  - halving of projected FDI;
  - decline in assumed roll-over rates from 100 to 80 percent.
- Frontloading and signaling:
  - Substantial frontloading: 200 percent of quota or SDR 328.2 million, to provide a large immediately available liquidity cushion and signal strong international support.
  - Short program duration underscored crisis-prevention nature.
  - Frequency of program reviews reduced from quarterly to biannual at second program review.

- IFIs and contingent financing:
  - World Bank made available a US$ 500 million budget support loan (not drawn during program).
  - IDB extended a US$ 500 million loan for bank liquidity assistance (never drawn; IDB credit line canceled in June 2009).
  - World Bank credit line approved by Legislative Assembly only by end of SBA period, drawn after program expiration.

- Table 3 (Potential Liquidity Drains and Buffers; in percent of GDP):
  - Potential Liquidity Drains 42.6
    - Prospective current account deficit 5.3
    - Maturing external debt obligations 13.0
    - Commercial bank FX deposits 10.0
    - Commercial bank local currency deposits 10.8
    - Currency in circulation 3.5
  - Liquidity Buffers 20.8
    - Commercial bank liquidity 2.0
    - Net international reserves 12.9
    - Contingent financing from IDB and WB 3.4
    - Fund support (Total access) 2.5
  - Memorandum items:
    - Total access (in percent of quota) 300
    - Initial purchase (percent of total access) 67

- Assessment against exceptional access criteria:
  - a. Exceptional balance of payments pressures criterion met.
  - b. Debt sustainability criterion met: combined public sector debt 36 percent of GDP at authorities’ request; staff projections showed sustainability under baseline and severe but plausible shocks.
  - c. Prospects of regaining market access criterion met.
  - d. Policy program strength criterion met.

### VII. Program outcomes and overall assessment
- Program execution:
  - Program remained on track as risks declined; authorities’ policies conformed to program agreements.
  - All quantitative performance criteria were met, often with large margins.
  - Frequency of program reviews reduced from quarterly to biannual as external risks abated.
- Elements of success:
  - Precautionary contingency did not materialize; global conditions improved after approval.
  - Program likely helped buttress market confidence: confidence-related capital outflows slowed or halted after approval; exchange rate pressures abated.
  - Downturn comparable to peers and milder than other program countries; export rebound stronger.
  - Costa Rica maintained very stable debt levels while broad emerging market universe experienced substantial public debt increases.
  - Recovery by late 2009 led by manufacturing; business and consumer confidence turned around.
  - Inflation decelerated sharply in 2009, enabling cautious mid-year interest rate cuts.
  - By early 2010 headline inflation edging up due to administered price increases; core inflation remained subdued.
  - Balance of payments strengthened and exchange rate on appreciation track.
- Banking sector soundness (Table 4, year-end data 2007-09; latest available 2010):
  - Risk-adjusted capital ratio: 2007 15.7, 2008 15.1, 2009 16.0, 2010 17.5
  - Nonperforming loans to total loans: 2007 1.1, 2008 1.5, 2009 2.0, 2010 1.8
  - Liquid assets to total assets: 2007 30.8, 2008 27.7, 2009 30.6, 2010 30.6
  - Loans to deposits ratio: 2007 107.1, 2008 109.7, 2009 98.9, 2010 98.1
  - Loan loss provisions to total loans: 2007 1.7, 2008 1.8, 2009 1.9, 2010 1.8
- Authorities proactively supported banking system (liquidity boosts, public bank capital increases); one small institution intervened (COOPEMEX, less than 1 percent of total banking sector assets).

### VIII. Challenges at program end and fiscal outcomes
- Outstanding issues:
  - Legislation to strengthen financial system not approved.
  - Progress towards IT sluggish; central bank recapitalization law pending.
  - No steps underway to consolidate weakened fiscal stance.
- Monetary policy framework gaps:
  - Daily management of monetary policy operations (e.g., central bank FX interventions) remained unclear.
  - Efforts to introduce IT stalled; gradual appreciation of the colón from summer 2009 onward seen as opportunity not seized.
- Fiscal outcomes and drivers:
  - Costa Rica exited the program with a much weakened fiscal position partly due to permanent nature of many stimulus measures (increases in public sector wages and pensions; new hires in education and security).
  - Wage increases extended beyond initial small group (initially costing below 0.1 percent of GDP) raising total cost to some 1 percent of GDP.
  - Weaker-than-expected revenues and optimistic tax revenue projections contributed to deficit increases.
  - Only minor taxes introduced under the program (including on luxury homes); comprehensive tax reform not implemented.
  - Continued stimulus through first quarter of 2010 judged appropriate given fragile outlook; by third review recovery clearer but limited scope to adjust fiscal impulse due to timing.
- Considerations on fiscal conditionality:
  - An adjustor linking fiscal balance to the economic cycle might have helped contain fiscal expansion but would be hard to calculate/explain.
  - Alternative approaches discussed: channel stimulus through temporary measures or cap recurrent spending; include tax reform in conditionality (unlikely to change outcomes given legislative constraints).

- Box 1. Fiscal Policy Under the Program (key fiscal findings):
  - Program design allowed an increase in the budget deficit; structural balance of the central government projected to decline by 2.3 percent of GDP in 2009.
  - For 2010, budget deficit envisaged to remain at 2009 level, implying small improvement in structural balance under agreed macro framework.
  - Staff expected public sector debt could be kept below 40 percent of GDP over medium term if revenues enhanced (e.g., tax reform).
  - Evolution during program:
    - First review (August 2009): 2009 revenues marked down; deficit targets revised upwards to protect spending.
    - Second review (November 2009): overall expenditure envelope maintained; reduced capital expenditure offset expanded wages and pensions; deficit targets held constant for 2010.
    - Third review: stronger-than-expected recovery meant ex-post fiscal policy looser than planned for 2009.
    - Third review noted difficulty tightening policy in second half of 2010 due to political transition (new government taking office May 2010).
  - Outcome:
    - Latest estimates put the 2010 central and consolidated government deficit at 5.5 percent of GDP, a full percentage point above expectations at time of final review.
    - Weak tax revenue recovery and increases in current and capital expenditures (security, education, infrastructure) contributed to outcome.
    - Staff projected public debt ratio could rise to 44 percent of GDP by 2015 under a no-policy change scenario and reiterated advice to start fiscal consolidation in 2011.

- Selected table excerpts (Table 6: Selected Economic Indicators, in percent of GDP; Real GDP Growth):
  - CPS balance 2010 Latest Est.: -5.5
  - CPS Revenues 2010 Latest Est.: 22.2
  - CPS Noninterest Expenditures 2010 Latest Est.: 24.9
  - Wages and salaries 2010 Latest Est.: 9.8
  - Capital expenditure 2010 Latest Est.: 3.4
  - Central Government Revenues 2010 Latest Est.: 13.9
  - Central Government Expenditures 2010 Latest Est.: 19.4
  - Central gov balance 2010 Latest Est.: -5.5
  - Structural overall balance 2010: n.a.
  - Real GDP Growth (in percent) 2010 Latest Est.: 4.2
  - Sign of the output gap 2010: +
  - Sign of the fiscal impulse 2010: +
  - (Table notes: CPS = central government + central bank + other public entities ex Instituto de Electricidad; structural balance measure used during program differs from current staff methodology; fiscal impulse estimates as of March 7th, 2011.)

### IX. Key lessons and policy implications
- Conditionality and program design:
  - Streamlined, well-targeted conditionality helpful for short-duration programs with focused immediate objectives; light conditionality increased ownership and facilitated negotiation and implementation.
  - Trade-off: including structural fiscal conditionality might have contained fiscal deterioration but risked program ownership.
  - Flexibility in conditionality as macro environment changes can help achieve better outcomes; adjusting conditionality during the second review might have helped contain fiscal deterioration.
- Monetary policy and institution-building:
  - Need to account for consensus-based legislative process; absent IT implementation, monetary policy room constrained.
  - Rapid progress on IT implementation important to remove constraints on monetary policy.
  - Work with legislature to approve key laws to address financial sector gaps and consolidate fiscal position.
- Fiscal policy design:
  - Nature of stimulus matters: permanent expenditure increases undermine fiscal position; prefer temporary measures and early corrective fiscal measures if permanent stimulus occurs.

### X. Authorities’ views and program assessment
- Program considered to have "met the country’s needs in the wake of the crisis."
- Program allowed authorities to respond to the external shock and alleviate impact on exchange rate and real activity.
- Program not a platform for faster progress on longer-term reforms.
- Authorities and private sector credited high upfront access and public signals (including an IMF Managing Director visit in November 2008) with shoring up confidence.
- Central bank view on exchange rate band and IT:
  - Faster progress on monetary policy framework difficult due to fragile recovery and proximity of elections.
  - Window for removing the exchange rate band passed as exchange rate became more appreciated by time new Governor took office.
- Fiscal authorities’ rationale:
  - Insufficient “shovel-ready” investment projects to provide stimulus via capital expenditure.
  - Increase in current spending aimed to boost public sector productivity and improve public services, particularly education and security.
  - Acknowledged fiscal position deteriorated more than anticipated, partly blaming overly optimistic tax revenue projections.
  - Tax reform could not be pursued during program due to political capital spent on CAFTA; authorities expected tax reform approval in the year following program as essential to fiscal consolidation.

*IMF staff report text as provided in content unit.*

### 1.  Costa Rica: Selected Economic Indicators, 2003-10 ............................................................7

### Costa Rica: Selected Economic Indicators, 2003-10

### I. Introduction and summary
- The Fund approved a 15-month high-access precautionary stand-by arrangement for Costa Rica on April 10, 2009.
- Objectives of the arrangement:
  - Provide a liquidity buffer to shield Costa Rica from external financing risks and bolster confidence.
  - Make room for the authorities’ macroeconomic strategy to work (tighter monetary stance to counter external financing shortfall; countercyclical fiscal policy to alleviate the slowdown).
- Program outcomes and assessment:
  - The program remained on track until its conclusion in July 2010; the authorities did not draw on any Fund resources under the program.
  - Near-term objectives were met: external risks did not materialize and the economy rebounded relatively quickly after the global crisis.
  - Submission of laws on the financial safety net and bank resolution framework were delayed but completed before program end.
  - Structural reforms progressed slowly and fiscal risks increased during the program period.
  - Transition to inflation targeting (IT) was not accelerated despite an episode of gradual appreciation of the colón between mid-2009 and late-2010.
- Institutional context:
  - Costa Rica has a continuous democratic regime since 1948 and strong constitutional checks; legislative consensus-seeking traditions and impending February 2010 elections constrained reform scope.

### II. Economic context (pre- and during-crisis)
- Pre-crisis boom (2003–07):
  - Real GDP growth averaged 6.7 percent during 2003-07.
  - Per capita GDP (2010, U.S. dollars): 7,843
  - Poverty (2009, percent of households): 18.5; Poverty in 2007: 16.7 percent of households below the poverty line (down from 20.6 percent in 2002).
  - Public debt-to-GDP ratio fell by 9½ percentage points to 43 percent by end-2007.
  - Foreign direct investment (FDI) and reserves:
    - Foreign direct investment contributed to covering current account deficit; foreign exchange reserves were comfortable.
- Monetary policy environment:
  - Exchange rate regime: classified by the Fund as a de facto crawling band.
  - Steps toward IT: single rate crawling peg replaced by a crawling band in October 2006; band widened twice in 2007 (January and November).
  - Central Bank actions: streamlined open market operations; established an overnight facility; a recapitalization law was in parliament.
  - Constraints: monetary policy constrained by need to defend exchange rate band and weaknesses in central bank balance sheet.
- Inflation and overheating:
  - Consumer prices (end of period): 2007: 10.8; 2008: 13.9; 2009: 4.0; 2010 (est): 5.8 (Table 1 figures preserved as presented).
  - Inflation peaked at 16.3 percent in November 2008.
  - Credit to the private sector grew at annual rates ranging from 30 to 40 percent in 2007 (noted as rapid credit growth).
  - Central bank purchased US$422 million (2.9 percent of GDP) in the first 4 weeks of January 2008.
- Financial sector:
  - 2008 FSAP Update: called for consolidated supervision, improved crisis management framework (system-wide deposit insurance, bank resolution).
  - Banks remained well capitalized and liquid; nonperforming loans low and fully provisioned.

### III. Why the authorities requested a program
- External shock and domestic impact:
  - The global financial crisis reduced demand for exports and FDI; exchange rate came under pressure as expectations shifted to depreciation and the colón moved rapidly to the top of the band.
  - Real GDP growth fell from 7.9 percent in 2007 to 2.7 percent in 2008.
  - Current account deficit widened to 9.3 percent of GDP in 2008, with FDI falling short of financing that deficit for the first time in recent years.
- Policy trade-offs and intentions:
  - Authorities planned to tighten monetary conditions to shore up external position and to gradually increase exchange rate flexibility to pave the way for IT.
  - Fiscal space built during the boom would allow countercyclical fiscal policy to cushion tighter monetary policy effects.
  - Financial sector reforms were to strengthen resilience and limit spillovers.
- Rationale for IMF precautionary support:
  - Baseline program fully financed, but investor confidence required liquidity buffers to absorb large possible balance-of-payments shocks.
  - Given expectations of continued global turmoil, authorities sought precautionary financial support from the Fund to protect against potential spillovers.

### IV. Program ownership and design (summary of assessment)
- Design consistency:
  - The program’s design was broadly consistent with immediate objectives and Fund policies: supporting confidence via liquidity buffer and allowing the macroeconomic strategy to function.
  - The macroeconomic strategy supported by the Fund combined a tighter monetary stance (to address external financing risks) with countercyclical fiscal policy (to alleviate the slowdown).
- Implementation notes:
  - Financial sector reform measures experienced delays but were completed prior to program end.
  - Structural reforms that would bolster medium-term resilience (e.g., accelerating the move to IT; fiscal consolidation after recovery) were not implemented during the program.
- Governance and political constraints:
  - Legislative process and upcoming elections constrained the authorities’ ability to advance some reforms during the program period.

*IMF Staff Report material: Costa Rica — Stand-By Arrangement review and related analysis (sections I–IV.A as provided).*

### 16.      The government’s proactive approach towards a program with the Fund before

### 16.      The government’s proactive approach towards a program with the Fund before

### Program ownership and timing
- The authorities approached staff to explore modalities for Fund support after they had already prepared the economic policies for 2009 that would form the basis of the program.
- Fund financing did not require changes in these policies; it was made available to support an already-designed economic plan.
- Program negotiations dragged on for about 3 months before an agreement was reached on the appropriate fiscal position during the program.
- The authorities proactively approached other IFIs to secure additional financing for budget and financial sector support.
- The authorities requested a short program duration of 15 months because of forthcoming elections in February 2010; this was judged reasonable to address uncertainty associated with a change in government.
- The authorities were proactive in communications: they informed the public about risks, explained efforts to avert an external financing shortfall, and publicized contacts with international financial institutions — steps that helped shore up market confidence.

### Macroeconomic and financial policy design
- Monetary policy was tightened to address inflation concerns and exchange rate pressures.
- The exchange rate was not used to cushion the external shock because:
  - the exchange rate was not perceived to be fundamentally misaligned;
  - adjusting the currency band after 2008 monetary policy developments could have damaged confidence and triggered a currency crisis;
  - dollarization implied banking sector vulnerability to a significant depreciation.
- Fiscal stimulus was chosen within the limit allowed by the country’s fiscal space.
- Financial sector policies were needed to strengthen the financial sector and counter contagion risks.

Key measures and commitments:
- In January 2009, the central bank raised short-term interest rates on its deposit facility by 70-150 bps to halt pressures on international reserves and control underlying inflation.
- The authorities raised the rate of crawl of the ceiling of the exchange rate band from 3 to 9 percent per year; the band would widen to about 22 percent by end 2009 and 30 percent by end 2010.
- Access to the wholesale component of the foreign exchange market was broadened to foster competition and reduce intermediation spreads.
- Inflation target for 2009 (end-year basis) set at 9 percent +/- 1 percent.
- Authorities committed to adjust interest rates as needed to achieve inflation targets and maintain orderly conditions in the foreign exchange market.

Inflation-targeting and money market reforms:
- Implementing IT predated the program; it did not become a program objective but the authorities intended to make progress with the “hope to complete” it by late 2010.
- Increasing exchange rate flexibility was viewed as an important component.
- Commitments (benchmarks for end-June 2009):
  - introduce a daily liquidity forecasting exercise to estimate required central bank intervention in the money market;
  - integrate the segmented money market.

Fiscal policy stance and targets:
- Fiscal policy aimed to provide economic stimulus through higher social and capacity-building expenditure (education, health, security, and labor-intensive infrastructure projects).
- Program envisaged a substantial increase in the fiscal deficit in 2009:
  - 3.2 percent of GDP for the central government;
  - 4.1 percent of GDP for the combined public sector.
- The deficit would be primarily financed from domestic sources, with a contingent World Bank loan for budget support available for any remaining shortfall.
- Fiscal targets were expected to remain at the same level in 2010; debt increase expected to reverse over the medium term as the output gap closed.

Financial sector reforms and benchmarks:
- Commitments to submit draft laws to parliament to:
  - introduce a bank resolution framework (benchmark for end September 2009; later moved to December 2009 to coincide with deposit guarantee law);
  - create a system-wide deposit insurance scheme (benchmark for end December 2009).
- Benchmark for end-June 2009: closer scrutiny of banks’ liquidity position.
- Central bank committed to keep exceptional liquidity assistance measures in colones for as long as needed.
- Other legislative reforms intended (non-binding in program):
  - recapitalize the central bank to enhance monetary policy independence;
  - establish consolidated supervision of financial conglomerates and enhance the sanctions regime.

### Conditionality
- Program conditionality focused on maintaining buffers (foreign exchange reserves) and ensuring cautious fiscal policies by containing the stimulus.
- Floor on net international reserves (NIR) set at 85 percent of short-term debt for 2009 to maintain investor confidence and allow room for intervention.
- Limits were imposed on the cash balances of both the central government and the combined public sector, as well as on debt accumulation.
- Structural conditionality was streamlined and focused on:
  - strengthening the financial sector; and
  - advancing preparations for implementing inflation targeting and strengthening the interest-rate transmission mechanism.
- Prior actions and consultation clauses were not included, given Costa Rica’s strong track record prior to the global downturn.

Key targeted gaps (emphasized in 2007 Article IV consultation and FSAP update):
- Boosting financial sector resilience as a priority given the sector’s role in transmitting external shocks to Costa Rica’s open economy.

### Program financing and exceptional access policy
- Proposed access: 492.3 million SDRs, equivalent to 300 percent of quota.
- Access calibrated to preserve NIR coverage at more than 90 percent of short-term debt under stress scenarios such as:
  - additional decline in exports of 8 percent;
  - halving of projected FDI;
  - decline in assumed roll-over rates from 100 to 80 percent.
- Total access under the program as a percent of gross financing needs was below most other programs approved around the same period.

IFIs and contingent financing:
- World Bank made available a US$ 500 million budget support loan to be drawn should financing of the public debt not be forthcoming from domestic sources.
- IDB extended a US$ 500 million loan aimed at providing liquidity assistance to banks should bank funding dry out.
- These additional sources of financing were never drawn; in June 2009 the authorities canceled the IDB credit line.
- The World Bank credit line was approved by the Legislative Assembly only by the end of the SBA period, and drawn after the expiration of the program.

Frontloading and program signaling:
- Substantial frontloading: 200 percent of quota or SDR 328.2 million, to provide:
  - a large and immediately available liquidity cushion against worse-than-expected external shocks; and
  - a signal of strong international support for the authorities’ economic program.
- Short program duration (15 months) underscored the crisis prevention nature of the precautionary arrangement and the absence of fundamental imbalances.
- Frequency of program reviews was reduced from quarterly to biannual at the time of the second program review, given abating external risks and good program performance.

Table 3 figures (Potential Liquidity Drains and Buffers; in percent of GDP):
- Potential Liquidity Drains 42.6
  - Prospective current account deficit 5.3
  - Maturing external debt obligations 13.0
  - Commercial bank FX deposits 10.0
  - Commercial bank local currency deposits 10.8
  - Currency in circulation 3.5
- Liquidity Buffers 20.8
  - Commercial bank liquidity 2.0
  - Net international reserves 12.9
  - Contingent financing from IDB and WB 3.4
  - Fund support (Total access) 2.5
- Memorandum items:
  - Total access (in percent of quota) 300
  - Initial purchase (percent of total access) 67

Assessment against the four exceptional access criteria:
a. Exceptional balance of payments pressures criterion met: Costa Rica experienced sizable capital outflows during May–October 2008 and faced significant risk of exceptional capital account pressures given the global crisis.
b. Debt sustainability criterion met: combined public sector debt was 36 percent of GDP at the authorities’ request, and staff projections showed debt-to-GDP would remain sustainable under baseline and severe but plausible shocks.
c. Prospects of regaining market access criterion met: moderate debt level, good policy track record, and promising outlook supported prospects of regaining access; sovereign did not tap international capital markets during the program as needed financing came from domestic sources.
d. Policy program strength criterion met: strong political and economic institutions, sound macro policy implementation track record, high degree of program ownership, and appropriate policy responses provided reasonable assurance of program success.

*From IMF staff report: _cr11157 - 16.*

### 32.      As required under the exceptional access policy, early Board involvement took

### As required under the exceptional access policy, early Board involvement took place in the period leading up to the program request

### VI. PROGRAM OUTCOMES AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT
- The program remained on track as risks declined; authorities’ policies conformed to program agreements.
- All quantitative performance criteria were met, often with large margins.
- Reduced uncertainty about the global environment allowed reduction in the frequency of program reviews from quarterly to biannual (agreed during the second review).

### A. Elements of Success
- The precautionary program’s contingency did not materialize; global economic conditions improved after program approval.
- Program likely helped buttress market confidence:
  - Confidence-related outflows of capital appear to have slowed or halted after program approval.
  - Exchange rate pressures abated; exchange rate fluctuated away from—although still very close to—the upper band.
- Macroeconomic performance relative to peers:
  - The downturn in Costa Rica was comparable to other emerging countries and milder than other program countries.
  - Export rebound was stronger in Costa Rica.
  - Costa Rica maintained very stable debt levels while the broad emerging market universe experienced substantial increases in public debt.
- Recovery dynamics and macro indicators:
  - By late 2009, economic activity started picking up with manufacturing leading the recovery; business and consumer confidence turned around.
  - Inflation decelerated sharply in 2009, enabling cautious interest rate cuts mid-year.
  - By early 2010, headline inflation was edging up largely due to administered price increases; core inflation remained subdued.
  - Balance of payments strengthened and the exchange rate was on an appreciation track.

- Banking sector soundness (Table 4, year-end data for 2007-09; latest available observation for 2010):
  - Risk-adjusted capital ratio: 2007 15.7, 2008 15.1, 2009 16.0, 2010 17.5
  - Nonperforming loans to total loans: 2007 1.1, 2008 1.5, 2009 2.0, 2010 1.8
  - Liquid assets to total assets: 2007 30.8, 2008 27.7, 2009 30.6, 2010 30.6
  - Loans to deposits ratio: 2007 107.1, 2008 109.7, 2009 98.9, 2010 98.1
  - Loan loss provisions to total loans: 2007 1.7, 2008 1.8, 2009 1.9, 2010 1.8
- Authorities proactively supported the banking system (liquidity boosts, public bank capital increases); one small institution was intervened (COOPEMEX, less than 1 percent of total banking sector assets).

### B. Challenges Ahead
- Outstanding issues at program end:
  - Legislation to strengthen the financial system had not been approved.
  - Progress towards inflation targeting (IT) was sluggish; central bank recapitalization law pending in parliament (crucial for IT).
  - No steps underway to consolidate the weakened fiscal stance.
- Monetary policy framework gaps:
  - Daily management of monetary policy operations (e.g., central bank FX interventions) remained unclear.
  - Efforts to introduce IT stalled; gradual appreciation of the colón from summer 2009 onward was seen as an opportunity not seized.
- Fiscal outcomes and drivers:
  - Costa Rica exited the program with a much weakened fiscal position due in part to permanent nature of many stimulus measures (increases in public sector wages and pensions; new hires in education and security).
  - Wage increases extended beyond initial small group (initially costing below 0.1 percent of GDP) raising total cost to some 1 percent of GDP.
  - Weaker-than-expected revenues and optimistic tax revenue projections contributed to deficit increases.
  - Only minor taxes were introduced under the program (including on luxury homes); comprehensive tax reform was not implemented.
- Uncertainty affected fiscal stance timing:
  - Continued stimulus through first quarter of 2010 was judged appropriate given fragile outlook; by third review the recovery was clearer but limited scope to adjust fiscal impulse due to timing.
- Considerations on fiscal conditionality:
  - An adjustor linking fiscal balance to the economic cycle might have helped contain fiscal expansion but would be hard to calculate/explain given data constraints.
  - Alternative approaches discussed:
    - Channel fiscal stimulus through temporary measures or cap recurrent spending (risk to program ownership).
    - Include tax reform in program conditionality (unlikely to change outcomes given legislative constraints and political transition).

### Box 1. Fiscal Policy Under the Program (summary of key fiscal findings)
- Program design:
  - The Fund-supported program allowed an increase in the budget deficit; structural balance of the central government was projected to decline by 2.3 percent of GDP in 2009.
  - For 2010, budget deficit was envisaged to remain at the 2009 level, implying a small improvement in structural balance under the agreed macro framework.
  - Staff expected public sector debt could be kept below 40 percent of GDP over the medium term if revenues were enhanced (e.g., tax reform) should spending increases become permanent.
- Evolution during program:
  - At first review (August 2009) revenues for 2009 were marked down; deficit targets revised upwards to protect spending.
  - Second review (November 2009) maintained overall expenditure envelope; reduced capital expenditure offset expanded wages and pensions; deficit targets held constant for 2010.
  - By third review, stronger-than-expected recovery meant fiscal policy ex-post was looser than planned for 2009.
  - Third review noted difficulty tightening policy in second half of 2010 due to political transition (new government taking office May 2010).
- Outcome:
  - Latest estimates put the 2010 central and consolidated government deficit at 5.5 percent of GDP, a full percentage point above expectations at time of final review.
  - Weak tax revenue recovery and increases in current and capital expenditures (security, education, infrastructure) contributed to outcome.
  - Staff projected public debt ratio could rise to 44 percent of GDP by 2015 under a no-policy change scenario and reiterated advice to start fiscal consolidation in 2011.
- Selected table excerpts (Table 6: Selected Economic Indicators, in percent of GDP; Real GDP Growth in percent):
  - CPS balance 2010 Latest Est.: -5.5
  - CPS Revenues 2010 Latest Est.: 22.2
  - CPS Noninterest Expenditures 2010 Latest Est.: 24.9
  - Wages and salaries 2010 Latest Est.: 9.8
  - Capital expenditure 2010 Latest Est.: 3.4
  - Central Government Revenues 2010 Latest Est.: 13.9
  - Central Government Expenditures 2010 Latest Est.: 19.4
  - Central gov balance 2010 Latest Est.: -5.5
  - Structural overall balance 2010: n.a.
  - Real GDP Growth (in percent) 2010 Latest Est.: 4.2
  - Sign of the output gap 2010: +
  - Sign of the fiscal impulse 2010: +
  - (Table notes: CPS = central government + central bank + other public entities ex Instituto de Electricidad; structural balance measure used during program differs from current staff methodology; fiscal impulse estimates as of March 7th, 2011.)

### C. Key Lessons
- Streamlined, well-targeted conditionality is helpful for short-duration programs with focused immediate objectives; light conditionality increased ownership and facilitated negotiation and implementation.
- Trade-off in conditionality: including structural fiscal conditionality might have contained fiscal deterioration but risked program ownership.
- Future engagement implications:
  - Need to account for consensus-based legislative process and, absent IT implementation, constrained monetary policy room for maneuver.
  - Advisable for government to work with legislature to approve key laws in parliament to address financial sector gaps and consolidate fiscal position.
  - Rapid progress on IT implementation is important to remove constraints on monetary policy.
- Nature of stimulus matters:
  - Permanent expenditure increases, other things equal, undermine fiscal position over medium term.
  - Prefer temporary measures when possible, and early corrective fiscal measures if permanent stimulus occurs.
- Flexibility in conditionality:
  - Adjusting conditionality as macroeconomic environment changes can help achieve better outcomes; in Costa Rica’s case, adjusting conditionality during the second review might have helped contain fiscal deterioration.

*Source: IMF staff report text as provided in content unit.*

### 45.      The Fund’s program with Costa Rica met the country’s needs in the wake of the

### The Fund’s program with Costa Rica met the country’s needs in the wake of the crisis

### Program assessment and immediate outcomes
- The program "met the country’s needs in the wake of the crisis."
- It allowed the authorities to respond to the external shock and alleviate its impact on the exchange rate and on real economic activity.
- The program did not readily lend itself to a platform for seeking progress on longer-term reforms.
- Costa Rica’s financial reforms and adjustments to its monetary policy framework preceded the crisis and progress on these fronts is proceeding, albeit slowly.
- It is now time to tackle fiscal consolidation, which was partly undermined by the stimulus allowed within the program.

### Authorities’ views on program effectiveness
- The authorities agreed that the program had met its immediate objectives.
- The program’s effectiveness in shoring up confidence had already been felt during the negotiations, as the government and the IFIs were sending reassuring signals about likely successful program negotiations.
- Private sector participants in Costa Rica echoed this view.
- A visit to the country by the IMF Managing Director in November, 2008, in which he publicly stated the IMF’s readiness to support Costa Rica, had been helpful.
- In the authorities’ view, high upfront access was a key contributor to the success of the program in shoring up confidence.

### Monetary policy framework and exchange rate band
- The central bank noted that it would have been difficult to make faster progress on reforms to the monetary policy framework.
- Ex-Governor Gutierrez indicated factors that made it impossible to remove the exchange rate band when the exchange rate was gradually appreciating in 2009-10 away from the bands:
  - The recovery was still fragile initially and any shock to policy would have risked undermining it.
  - By the time the recovery had taken a stronger hold, elections were around the corner and the Governor was keen to avoid policy changes that may become the focal point of the political debate.
  - Subsequently, when Governor Bolanos took office, the window of opportunity had passed and the exchange rate was already at the most appreciated end of the band.

### Fiscal policy conduct and rationale
- The former authorities defended the conduct of fiscal policy under the program, arguing:
  - There had not been enough “shovel-ready” investment projects to provide the needed stimulus via capital expenditure.
  - The increase in current government spending was required to boost public sector productivity, reduce wage gaps within the public sector, and make needed improvements in public sector services, particularly education and security.
- They acknowledged that the fiscal position deteriorated more than anticipated, and partly blamed it on overly optimistic tax revenue projections.
- It had not been possible to push for tax reform under the program because the government had spent all its political capital on the legislative approval of CAFTA in the run-up to the presidential elections.
- The authorities expected tax reform to be approved this year as all parties understand its essential contribution to Costa Rica’s fiscal consolidation plans.

*EPE team visit to Costa Rica: March 14-15, 2011.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/_cr11157.pdf_
