## _cr11231 - 1. This Technical Note (TN) provides an overview of the anti-money laundering

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### Overview of the Technical Note
- The TN provides an overview of the anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) framework of the United Kingdom (U.K.).
- It includes the main findings of the June 2007 mutual evaluation report (MER) prepared by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) with respect to the United Kingdom’s compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and 9 Special Recommendations.
- The TN summarizes progress reported by the British authorities since June 2007 in addressing the most significant deficiencies identified in the MER.
- The TN does not constitute a reassessment by the Fund of the United Kingdom’s AML/CFT regime.

### MER process and overall assessment
- The June 2007 mutual evaluation was conducted by the FATF during a November 27 to December 8, 2006 on-site visit to the United Kingdom and was discussed and adopted during the June 2007 FATF Plenary meeting.
- The MER describes and assesses AML/CFT legislation, regulation and other enforceable means; the institutional framework; systems to deter ML and TF through financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs); effectiveness of implementation; and provides recommendations for strengthening.
- Overall FATF ratings for the U.K. (out of the 40+9 Recommendations):
  - “compliant” (C) with 24
  - “largely compliant” (LC) with 12
  - “partially compliant” (PC) with 10
  - “noncompliant” (NC) with 3
- Ratings for Recommendations designated by FATF as “core and key” were reported as:
  - 1: C
  - 3: C
  - 4: C
  - 5: PC
  - 10: C
  - 13: C
  - 23: LC
  - 26: LC
  - 35: C
  - 36: LC
  - 40: C
  - SRI: C
  - SRII: C
  - SRIII: C
  - SRIV: C
  - SRV: C
- Under FATF procedures, upon adoption of the MER the U.K. was directed to report back to the June 2009 FATF plenary on progress addressing deficiencies; the authorities provided required information in June 2009 and indicated they would report again in October 2009.
- The United Kingdom updated its AML CFT legislation in 2007 via the new Money Laundering Regulations (MLRs), implementing in part the Third European Union (EU) Money Laundering Directive.
- The FATF analyzed progress in two follow-up reports in June and October 2009 and indicated that, overall, significant progress had been made.

### Context: ML/TF threat, typologies, strategies, and institutions
- ML/TF threat and typologies:
  - The MER indicates the overall threat to the United Kingdom from serious organized crime and related money laundering was high.
  - U.K. law enforcement estimated economic and social costs of serious organized crime, including costs of combating it, at upwards of £20 billion a year.
  - The total quantified organized crime market in the United Kingdom was reportedly worth about £15 billion per year, with the composition: drugs (50 percent); excise fraud (25 percent); fraud (12 percent); counterfeiting (7 percent); organized immigration crime (6 percent).
  - Estimated total recoverable criminal assets per annum at the time were £4.75 billion, of which it was estimated that £2.75 billion was sent overseas.
  - Cash remained the mainstay of most serious organized criminal activity in the United Kingdom.
  - Typologies of most concern: cash/value couriering; financial abuse through certain nonfinancial businesses and professions and money transmission agents (including Hawala and other alternative remittance systems); cash-rich businesses and front companies; high-value assets and property; abuse of bank accounts; other over-the-counter financial sector products.
- Terrorism finance (TF) context:
  - Principal terrorist threat identified was from Islamic extremists; attacks carried out by both British nationals and outsiders.
  - Use of banks to move terrorist funds overseas thought to have declined; growing concerns: abuse of charitable organizations, and abuse through the money service business (MSB) sector (including alternative remittance services).
- Strategies and priorities:
  - Government Anti Money Laundering Strategy (published October 2004) set three key objectives: deter (via enforceable safeguards and supervision); detect (using financial intelligence); disrupt (using penalties such as prosecutions or asset seizures).
  - As of the 2007 MER, U.K. priorities included: domestic implementation of the Third EU Money Laundering Directive; adoption of controls from payments regulation and mandatory declaration of currency regulation; reform of the suspicious activity reporting framework (Lander Review); enhanced regulatory environment for MSBs; assessment of controls for charitable organizations; implementation of European controls to restrict couriering cash.
  - U.K. annual threat assessments on serious and organized crime included ML analysis; a joint Treasury–Home Office–SOCA exercise was underway to map U.K. strategy on ML and FT; this AML/CFT strategy was published on February 28, 2007.
- Legal and institutional framework:
  - ML offense viewed as broad and fully covering Vienna and Palermo Conventions; prosecutions and convictions under POCA increased since 2003.
  - TF offense viewed as broad, covering collection or provision of funds for terrorist acts and provision to terrorist organizations or individual terrorists.
  - Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) significantly improved ability to restrain, confiscate, and recover proceeds of crime.
  - Effective terrorist asset-freezing regime in place; U.K. FIU generally effective; a number of competent authorities designated to investigate and prosecute ML and TF offenses; domestic and international cooperation measures generally comprehensive.
  - All types of “financial institutions” as defined in the FATF Recommendations are active in the U.K. and covered by the MLRs.
  - U.K. is a major international center for investment and private banking; U.K. insurance industry largest in Europe and third largest in the world.
  - Estimate of U.K. funds management industry at end of 2004: over £2,960 billion of funds under management (including international private wealth management, hedge funds, and private equity).
  - Effectiveness of preventive measures for financial institutions varied; implementation of the Third EU Money Laundering Directive in 2007 expected to improve matters.
  - Main CDD deficiency identified: identification and verification of beneficial owners of accounts were not required by law or regulation.
  - Record-keeping and suspicious transaction (or activity) reporting requirements viewed as comprehensive and effective.
  - FSA had extensive powers to monitor and ensure compliance; supervision of certain smaller firms (including some small banks, insurance companies, securities dealers, and investment managers) required enhancement.
  - The FSA commenced a project looking at AML/CFT systems and controls in small firms: 159 small firms were selected across wholesale and retail sectors; a report was published in May 2010.
  - The FSA’s Financial Crime Operations Team routinely visits small firms and has visited a total of 337 firms from 2007 to 2010.
  - All types of DNFBPs are active in the U.K. and covered by the MLRs; DNFBPs appeared to be effectively complying with their STR obligations.
  - Generally comprehensive monitoring of casinos, lawyers, and certain accountants; main deficiencies: lack of AML/CFT supervision for real estate and company service provider sectors and certain unregulated accountants.
  - U.K. has a wide range of legal persons and arrangements, including Companies Act companies, other companies (public and private), partnerships, societies, and longstanding use of trusts.

### Key findings of the MER and remedial actions taken by authorities
- Legal systems and institutional measures:
  - ML offenses were comprehensive and used frequently; POCA removed need to distinguish drug trafficking from other predicate offenses.
  - In England and Wales, investigations, prosecutions, and convictions under POCA increased substantially each year since POCA came into force in 2003.
  - TF provisions were broad and covered collection/provision of funds for terrorist acts and provision to terrorist organizations and individual terrorists.
  - U.K. had comprehensive regime to confiscate criminal proceeds; POCA had significant positive impact; provisional measures to freeze and seize property and instrumentalities were sufficient.
  - Effective terrorist asset-freezing regime: as an EU member the U.K. bound by EU freezing mechanism and domestic measures expanded coverage; domestic designation process rapid and efficient.
    - At the time of the on-site visit: 84 individuals and 58 entities had been designated under the 2006 UN Order.
    - Failure to abide by an asset freeze under the Order punishable by seven years imprisonment and an unlimited fine.
    - Bank of England (BOE), as HMT’s agent on asset freezing, issued notices with respect to persons designated and maintained a consolidated sanctions list on its website.
  - Since March 2006, the U.K. FIU housed within the Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) and operated with a high degree of independence; private sector reported improved relations and cooperation since transfer of FIU responsibilities to SOCA.
  - U.K. took proactive approach to pursuing predicate offenses, proceeds of crime, and financial aspects of terrorist cases.
    - Investigation and prosecution agencies included SOCA, HMRC; for England and Wales: Crown Prosecution Service and Revenue and Customs Prosecution Office; for Northern Ireland: Public Prosecution Service of Northern Ireland; for Scotland: Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Services and Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency.
    - There were 43 regional police forces in England and Wales, eight in Scotland, and one in Northern Ireland.
    - National Terrorist Finance Investigation Unit actively pursued terrorist financing issues.
    - Agencies appeared adequately structured, funded, and resourced; integrity and confidentiality standards for investigators and prosecutors were high.
  - Cross-border cash disclosure system generally effective, but assessors found authorities did not have the authority to detain cash purely for a false disclosure and no requirement to retain, at minimum, the amount and identification of the bearer in false disclosure cases. Cash seizure provisions allowed individual officers discretion based on “reasonable grounds to suspect”.
  - EU Council Regulation No. 1889/2005 (“the Cash Controls Regulation”) applied in the United Kingdom as of June 15, 2007; the regulation’s declaration system complemented the existing disclosure system and applied only to cross-border movements of currency and bearer negotiable instruments into and out of the EU.

### Risk-based supervisory framework and ARROW
- The United Kingdom used a risk-based approach to financial sector regulation.
- The risk-based approach applied to:
  - JMLSG Guidance Notes: firms should apply guidance to the extent required, taking into account the firm’s risk-based view to meet high-level obligations under the MLRs and the FSA Handbook.
  - Level of supervision by the FSA: determined on a risk-based approach.
- The FSA’s internal risk-based supervision process was called ARROW.
  - The FSA measured risk (impact and probability) before deciding supervisory relationship or action.
  - The FSA undertook an “impact” assessment to measure the size of the firm and number of customers.
- Supervision intensity by firm size/impact:
  - Largest financial institutions: 39 complex major retail groups (account for about 80 percent of retail business in the United Kingdom) and 43 major wholesale groups — classified as “high impact.”
    - Adopted “close and continuous” supervision, with more intense supervision and regular risk assessments (typically, every 12–24 months).
  - All firms: subject to baseline (off-site) monitoring and to “Thematic Work.”
- ARROW supervisory activity and scope:
  - Between 2007 and 2010, the FSA reviewed 313 banks, 127 securities companies, 155 insurance undertakings, and 120 other financial institutions.
  - FSA supervisory visits include review of controls over all foreign branches and subsidiaries as part of the ARROW assessment (post-MLRs 2007, Regulation 15 for non-EEA countries).

### Customer due diligence (CDD), Recommendation 5, and MLRs
- MLRs contained basic customer identification requirements:
  - Applied when customers were establishing business relations or conducting transactions over €15,000, and when a suspicion of ML and TF arose.
- Identified CDD gaps:
  - No legal/regulatory requirement to identify the beneficial owner or to take reasonable measures to verify the identity of the beneficial owner or determine the natural persons who ultimately own or control the customer, including those with ultimate effective control.
  - No legal/regulatory obligation to apply CDD to existing customers on the basis of materiality and risk.
  - Measures for enhanced due diligence were not sufficient.
- Recommendations and follow-up:
  - Assessors recommended mandating measures including obtaining information on the intended purpose and nature of the business relationship; specifying procedures for ongoing due diligence in compliance with the FATF Recommendations; requiring maintenance and periodic review of documents and CDD data.
  - Second follow-up report: authorities made “significant progress” on Recommendation 5 via adoption of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 (MLRs 2007); FATF concluded that, although a few shortcomings remain, the United Kingdom has taken significant action to bring its compliance to a level essentially equivalent to LC.

### Politically-exposed persons (PEPs), correspondent banking, and introduced business
- Assessors recommended creation of enforceable obligations for PEPs as required by the standard.
- JMLSG Guidance on correspondent banking appeared comprehensive and covered main areas of Recommendation 7, but Guidance did not constitute “other enforceable means” as required.
- Second follow-up report: these deficiencies were generally remedied by adoption of MLRs 2007.
- At assessment time:
  - No enforceable means required financial institutions to ensure introducers would make ID and other documentation available on request.
  - Financial institutions were not required to ensure third parties were regulated and supervised (Recommendations 23, 24, and 29).
- Developments and supervisory strengthening:
  - Deficiencies on Recommendation 24 largely remedied through MLRs 2007.
  - FSA implemented intensive supervision via ARROW involving in-depth file reviews, interviews with senior management and staff where appropriate, and monitoring of post-visit remedial work.
  - All DNFBPs covered under the MLRs 2003 at the time; JMLSG Guidance notes did not apply to DNFBPs but sector guidance had been issued.
  - Second follow-up report indicates MLRs 2007 largely address CDD and DNFBP concerns.

### Wire transfers, Special Recommendation VII, and Transfer of Funds Regulations
- No financial institution secrecy laws inhibited FATF implementation; record-keeping requirements deemed comprehensive.
- EU Regulation No. 1781/2006 (in force since January 1, 2007) generally meets technical requirements of Special Recommendation VII (wire transfers), but the derogation for wire transfers within the EU (classified as domestic) was not in compliance with the standard.
- Sanctions for noncompliance were not effective or dissuasive at that time.
- Most recent follow-up report: deficiencies fully remedied through adoption of the Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2007, except for the EU derogation issue (subject of continuing policy debate within the European Union).

### Monitoring transactions, unusual activity, and suspicious activity reports (SARs)
- No specific legal obligation to monitor all complex, unusual large transactions, examine background and purpose and set forth findings in writing; JMLSG Guidance Notes provided comprehensive guidance and FSA-regulated institutions appeared to follow guidance.
- Assessors recommended adopting specific requirements to monitor transactions involving certain countries and to set forth findings in writing; most recent follow-up report: addressed via MLRs 2007.
- Obligations to submit SARs were comprehensive:
  - No de minimis limit; attempted transactions subject to reporting.
  - Immunity from prosecution provided for good faith reporting to the U.K. FIU.
  - “Tipping off” and “prejudicing an investigation” were offenses.
  - Assessors noted implementation concern: many banks interpreted legislation as requiring them, after a SAR was filed, to seek consent on every subsequent transaction over £250 for that same customer.

### Internal controls, foreign branches/subsidiaries, and shell banks
- Internal control systems viewed as generally strong and complete.
- Assessors recommended more specific rules for foreign branches and subsidiaries per Recommendation 22:
  - Authorities adopted Regulation 15 of the MLRs 2007 with respect to non-EEA countries.
  - FSA supervisory visits include review of instructions to and requirements on foreign branches and subsidiaries, internal audit programs and reports, and controls to prevent fraud and money laundering (CDD, ongoing monitoring, record keeping).
- Shell banks:
  - Shell banks were not permitted to be established or to continue to operate in the United Kingdom.
  - No legal obligation at assessment time for financial institutions not to enter into or continue correspondent banking relationships with shell banks, nor to satisfy themselves respondent financial institutions did not permit accounts to be used by shell banks.
  - JMLSG Guidance provided guidance; most recent follow-up report: concerns fully addressed by adoption of MLRs 2007.

### FSA powers, resources, and enforcement activity
- FSA was prudential and designated AML/CFT regulator for Financial Services and Markets Act activities with extensive powers:
  - Authority to conduct on-site inspections, review policies, procedures, books, records, and sample testing.
  - Seemed adequately funded, staffed, and had sufficient technical and other resources to perform its functions.
- Sanctions:
  - Criminal sanctions available in various AML/CFT legislation.
  - FSA administrative sanctions included unlimited financial penalties, public censure, prohibition, variation or cancellation of permissions, injunctions, and issuance of a formal caution.
- Enforcement statistics:
  - From November 30, 2001 through 2007, the FSA’s Enforcement Division dealt with 167 cases relating to financial crime (including market-abuse matters); 18 related specifically to AML compliance.
    - Of these 18: three resulted in a private warning, eight in a fine, two in a variation of the firm's permissions, and one in a prohibition (for a total of 14 enforcement actions).
    - Assessors viewed the number of FSA disciplinary sanctions since 2001 as relatively low given the size of the U.K. financial sector.
  - Between 2007 and 2010, authorities conducted 200 enforcement actions against firms and individuals for financial crime (7 of which were for failure to comply with AML measures) for a total amount of fines of £41,413,887.

### HMRC supervision of MSBs and sanctions
- HMRC supervised MSBs, including money exchangers and money/value transfer offices.
  - HMRC had powers to access records, documents or information relevant to monitoring compliance.
  - HMRC could issue a warning letter and impose financial penalties up to £5,000.
  - Assessors considered sanctions against directors and senior managers were not adequate at that time.
  - Authorities noted HMRC could classify individuals as not “fit and proper” under regulation 28(2)(e)-(g), leading to removal of ability to trade and prevention of continuing to work in a Money Service Business where businesses consistently fail AML obligations.
- Preventive measures and DNFBPs:
  - DNFBPs covered under MLRs 2003 at assessment time; MLRs 2007 subsequently addressed many deficiencies.
  - DNFBPs had comprehensive obligations to report suspicious activities and appeared to be adequately complying.
  - Assessors recommended stronger obligations to monitor transactions in line with Recommendations 11 and 21 and recommended requiring estate agents to identify the buyer of real estate.
    - Most recent follow-up report: deficiencies largely corrected through MLRs 2007 and amendments to the Counter-Terrorism Act.

### Casinos, legal professionals, accountants, and other DNFBP supervision
- Casinos:
  - Supervisory framework in transition at assessment time.
  - Legal/regulatory measures existed to prevent criminals or associates from holding significant/controlling interests or management functions.
  - Gambling Commission sanctions included actions against licensing requirements; possible sanctions for AML/CFT breaches included warnings and license revocation.
  - Assessors recommended expanding range of sanctions; expected to be achieved with the Gambling Act 2005 coming into force later in 2007.
  - Most recent follow-up: MLRs 2007 generally address these deficiencies.
- Legal professionals:
  - Subject to generally adequate AML/CFT monitoring by self-regulatory organizations across England, Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland.
- Accountants:
  - Members of professional bodies received adequate AML monitoring; assessors concerned about numerous accountants who are not members of professional bodies.
- Real estate agents and trust and company service providers (TCSPs) who were not lawyers or accountants were not yet supervised for AML/CFT at assessment time.
  - Authorities generally addressed these issues with the introduction of MLRs 2007.
- High-value dealers (dealers in precious metals and stones): subject to same HMRC monitoring applied to MSBs.

### Legal persons, arrangements, beneficial ownership, and trusts
- United Kingdom had a wide range of legal persons and arrangements:
  - Companies Act companies and other forms of companies: 11,500 public and over two million private companies.
  - Partnerships and societies; trusts are longstanding and integral to the legal and economic landscape.
- Approach to preventing misuse of legal persons/arrangements relied on investigative powers of law enforcement, regulatory, supervisory, and other competent authorities to obtain/access information.
- Identified deficiency:
  - No appropriate measures to ensure adequate, accurate, and timely information on beneficial ownership and control of legal persons was available to competent authorities in a timely fashion.
  - Companies’ registrar information pertains only to legal ownership/control, is not verified, and is not necessarily reliable; directors and shareholders could be nominees and other legal persons, potentially slowing investigations.
- Assessors’ recommendation:
  - Review AML/CFT system to determine ways to make adequate and accurate beneficial ownership information available on a timely basis to law enforcement.
- Follow-up actions and outstanding issues:
  - Latest follow-up report: deficiencies regarding Recommendation 33 (legal persons) have not been addressed and no further action is expected from the authorities on bearer shares.
  - Recommendation 34 (legal arrangements): MLRs 2007 deal with supervision issues relating to trust and company service providers (TCSPs), but beneficial ownership issue remains unaddressed.
  - Authorities stated they keep these issues under active consideration.

### Charities and nonprofit organizations
- England, Wales, and Scotland had well-established systems for regulation of charities with adequate provision for registration, transparency, supervision, and investigation.
  - Charity Commission had extensive legal powers to sanction wrongdoing or mismanagement and conducted 400 targeted “Review Visits” each year to review compliance with the Charities Act 1993 (normally based on annual returns).
- Northern Ireland:
  - At assessment time, no supervisory regime applied to Northern Ireland (legislation being drafted).
  - Subsequent developments: a system similar to the English regime established for Northern Ireland through the Charities Act (Northern Ireland) 2008.
    - Registration of charities had yet to commence within Northern Ireland at that time, but transitional provisions brought within the jurisdiction of the Charity Commission for Northern Ireland institutions operating in Northern Ireland and granted tax exceptions, enabling investigation and sanction where necessary.

### National cooperation, international obligations, MLA, and extradition
- National cooperation and coordination between U.K. policy makers, the FIU, law enforcement and supervisors, and other competent authorities appeared to be effective at the time of the assessment both at the policy and operational levels.
- The system benefited from an effective network of interdepartmental and interagency contact and cooperation, both for policy and for operational matters.
- The United Kingdom has ratified and implemented the provisions of the Vienna, Palermo and FT Conventions and the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001).
- The United Kingdom had broad legal provisions to facilitate requests for mutual legal assistance.
  - Standard evidence-gathering mechanisms were reviewed and updated in the Crime (International Cooperation) Act 2003.
  - New provisions were introduced to allow for the restraint and confiscation of instrumentalities of crime at the request of foreign jurisdictions.
  - New legislation under POCA gives effect to foreign restraint, confiscation, and forfeiture orders in both the criminal and civil contexts.
  - There were no unduly restrictive measures on the provision of assistance; dual criminality was only required for certain coercive measures such as search warrants.
  - The United Kingdom could share confiscated or forfeited assets with other jurisdictions and, internally, could use funds confiscated to provide incentives to law enforcement and prosecution agencies.
- Timeliness and capacity concerns for MLA; progress:
  - Assessors raised concerns about the ability of the U.K. authorities (excluding Scotland) to handle routine or non-urgent mutual legal assistance requests in a timely and effective manner.
  - Substantial progress achieved in practice included:
    - A significant reduction of the backlog of cases of 67 percent
    - A reduction in the length of time to bring a case to completion
- Extradition and administrative cooperation:
  - ML and TF were extraditable offenses; there were no restrictive conditions or impediments existing in law for extradition.
  - The United Kingdom was able to extradite its own nationals.
  - Overall systems were in place for adequate administrative cooperation for the FIU, law enforcement, and financial supervisors.
- Institutional structure, resourcing, and planned changes:
  - Competent authorities, including law enforcement and the FSA, appeared to be adequately structured and resourced to effectively perform their functions.
  - Recommendations from the assessors included:
    - HMRC should deploy a broader allocation of resources at all levels of ML/FT risk for the MSB sector.
    - The FIU should increase its resources in order to meet commitments made under government reviews.
  - Implementation and status:
    - HMRC is carrying out a comprehensive program to take on new staff and train existing staff.
    - SOCA, which houses the FIU, is undergoing restructuring in advance of prospective amalgamation with other agencies into the new National Crime Agency to be launched in 2012.
- Statistics, information systems, and gaps:
  - U.K. authorities maintained a wide range of statistics on the full range of AML/CFT matters.
  - Gaps identified at time of assessment:
    - For MLA requests, no statistics on the breakdown of the offenses concerned in each case (i.e., ML, predicate offenses, or TF).
    - No statistics on the number of MLA requests granted and refused.
    - No statistics on the time required to respond to MLA requests.
    - Information technology provisions for MLA requests were under review by the U.K. Central Authority.
    - Comprehensive statistics were not available for the number of SARs analyzed and disseminated by the FIU.

### Appendix I — Selected summary of FATF recommendation ratings and deficiencies
- R.5 – Customer due diligence: Rated PC. Deficiencies included no requirement in law or regulation regarding (#1) Identifying and verifying beneficial owner; (#2) Verify that any person purporting to act on behalf of the customer is so authorized; (#3) Identification where there are doubts regarding previously obtained customer data; (#4) Obtaining information on the purpose and nature of the business relationship; (#5) Ongoing monitoring/ongoing CDD & up-to-date records; (#6) Additional measures for high-risk scenarios; (#7) Termination of relationship if CDD cannot be conducted; (#8) Application of CDD to existing customers on basis of materiality and risk; (#9) Problems with reduced CDD (EU equivalence); and (#10) CDD exemption could still apply when ML is suspected within a business relationship. FATF conclusion: Significant progress in addressing R.5 issues through adoption of MLRs 2007; framework enhanced to an LC rating.
- R.6 – Politically exposed persons: Rated NC. Deficiency: No currently enforceable obligations. Note: MLRs 2007 addresses most of the required criteria.
- R.7 – Cross border correspondent relationships: Rated NC. Deficiency: No currently enforceable obligations. Note: MLRs 2007 addresses most of the required criteria.
- R.9 – Third parties and introducers: Rated PC. Deficiencies included limited reference to beneficial owners in information on the CDD process; no enforceable requirement to make ID and documentation available on request; firms not required to satisfy themselves that a third party is regulated and supervised; limited consideration of country application of FATF Recommendations. Note: MLRs 2007 addresses most of the required criteria.
- R.11 – Attention to complex, unusual large transactions: Rated PC. Deficiencies: No specific obligation to pay special attention to all complex, unusual, large transactions; no specific requirement to examine background and purpose and set forth findings in writing. Note: MLRs 2007 addresses most of the required criteria.
- R.12 – CDD and recordkeeping for DNFBPs: Rated PC. Multiple deficiencies across application of R.5, requirements for casinos, estate agents, PEPs for DNFBPs, technological measures, introduced business, recordkeeping sufficiency, and obligations to examine unusual transactions and retain findings. Note: MLRs 2007 addresses most of the required criteria.
- R.18 – Shell banks: Rated PC. Deficiencies: No enforceable obligation not to enter into or continue correspondent relationships with shell banks; no obligation to satisfy themselves that respondent institutions do not permit accounts to be used by shell banks. FATF conclusion: Fully addressed in MLRs 2007.
- R.21 – Special attention to transactions from certain countries: Rated PC. Deficiencies: No requirement to give special attention to business with countries that do not sufficiently apply FATF Recommendations; limited coverage by MLR 28 and JMLSG guidance. FATF conclusion: MLRs 2007 and amendments to Counter-Terrorism Act address most of the required criteria.
- R.22 – Application to foreign branches and subsidiaries: Rated NC. Deficiency: No requirements relating to foreign branches and subsidiaries. No new obligations.
- R.24 – Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs: Rated PC. Deficiencies: No AML/CFT supervision for real estate agents or TCSPs that are not legal or accountancy professionals, or accountants not members of professional bodies (approximately 40,000); current sanctions for Gambling Commission not yet adequate pending Gambling Act (September 2007); notaries in England and Wales not supervised unless also lawyers or accountants who are members of professional bodies. FATF conclusion: MLRs 2007 generally addresses deficiencies.
- R.33 – Transparency of legal persons: Rated PC. Deficiencies: Inadequate measures to ensure adequate, accurate and timely information on beneficial ownership and control of legal persons accessible by competent authorities; companies registrar information pertains only to legal ownership/control and is not verified or necessarily reliable; no specific measures on share warrants to bearer. FATF conclusion: Deficiencies not addressed; no further action expected from authorities on (#3), bearer shares.
- R.34 – Transparency of legal arrangements: Rated PC. Deficiencies: Inadequate measures for beneficial ownership/control information on legal arrangements; no standardization of beneficial ownership data; providers of trust services who are not lawyers or accountants not monitored. FATF conclusion: Supervision of TCSPs addressed by MLRs 2007.
- SR.VII – Wire transfers: Rated PC. Deficiencies: (#1) The derogation in the 3MLD is at odds with SR VII; (#2) Sanctions are not effective or dissuasive; and (#3) Doubts about implementation and effective compliance monitoring. FATF conclusion: While continuing policy debate in the EU on (#1), new regulations, the Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2007, fully address (#2) and (#3).

*Italicized: Source — IMF staff technical note summarizing FATF June 2007 mutual evaluation of the United Kingdom and subsequent progress as reported by U.K. authorities.*

*Italicized source attribution: IMF assessment text (sections 51–56 and Appendix I summary).*

### 1. This Technical Note (TN) provides an overview of the anti-money laundering

### _cr11231 - 1. This Technical Note (TN) provides an overview of the anti-money laundering

### Overview of the Technical Note
- The TN provides an overview of the anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) framework of the United Kingdom (U.K.).
- It includes the main findings of the June 2007 mutual evaluation report (MER) prepared by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) with respect to the United Kingdom’s compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and 9 Special Recommendations.
- The TN summarizes progress reported by the British authorities since June 2007 in addressing the most significant deficiencies identified in the MER.
- The TN does not constitute a reassessment by the Fund of the United Kingdom’s AML/CFT regime.

### MER process and overall assessment
- The June 2007 mutual evaluation was conducted by the FATF during a November 27 to December 8, 2006 on-site visit to the United Kingdom and was discussed and adopted during the June 2007 FATF Plenary meeting.
- The MER describes and assesses AML/CFT legislation, regulation and other enforceable means; the institutional framework; systems to deter ML and TF through financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs); effectiveness of implementation; and provides recommendations for strengthening.

- Overall FATF ratings for the U.K. (out of the 40+9 Recommendations):
  - “compliant” (C) with 24
  - “largely compliant” (LC) with 12
  - “partially compliant” (PC) with 10
  - “noncompliant” (NC) with 3

- Ratings for Recommendations designated by FATF as “core and key” were reported as:
  - 1: C
  - 3: C
  - 4: C
  - 5: PC
  - 10: C
  - 13: C
  - 23: LC
  - 26: LC
  - 35: C
  - 36: LC
  - 40: C
  - SRI: C
  - SRII: C
  - SRIII: C
  - SRIV: C
  - SRV: C

- A list of the 13 Recommendations rated PC or NC is provided in Appendix I of the MER (not reproduced here).
- Under FATF procedures, upon adoption of the MER the U.K. was directed to report back to the June 2009 FATF plenary on progress addressing deficiencies; the authorities provided required information in June 2009 and indicated they would report again in October 2009.

- The United Kingdom updated its AML CFT legislation in 2007 via the new Money Laundering Regulations (MLRs), implementing in part the Third European Union (EU) Money Laundering Directive.
- The FATF analyzed progress in two follow-up reports in June and October 2009 and indicated that, overall, significant progress had been made.

### Context: ML/TF threat, strategies, and institutional landscape

- ML/TF threat and typologies:
  - The MER indicates the overall threat to the United Kingdom from serious organized crime and related money laundering was high.
  - U.K. law enforcement estimated economic and social costs of serious organized crime, including costs of combating it, at upwards of £20 billion a year.
  - The total quantified organized crime market in the United Kingdom was reportedly worth about £15 billion per year, with the composition: drugs (50 percent); excise fraud (25 percent); fraud (12 percent); counterfeiting (7 percent); organized immigration crime (6 percent).
  - Estimated total recoverable criminal assets per annum at the time were £4.75 billion, of which it was estimated that £2.75 billion was sent overseas.
  - Cash remained the mainstay of most serious organized criminal activity in the United Kingdom.
  - Typologies of most concern: cash/value couriering; financial abuse through certain nonfinancial businesses and professions and money transmission agents (including Hawala and other alternative remittance systems); cash-rich businesses and front companies; high-value assets and property; abuse of bank accounts; other over-the-counter financial sector products.
- Terrorism finance (TF) context:
  - Principal terrorist threat identified was from Islamic extremists; attacks carried out by both British nationals and outsiders.
  - Use of banks to move terrorist funds overseas thought to have declined; growing concerns: abuse of charitable organizations, and abuse through the money service business (MSB) sector (including alternative remittance services).
- Strategies and priorities:
  - Government Anti Money Laundering Strategy (published October 2004) set three key objectives: deter (via enforceable safeguards and supervision); detect (using financial intelligence); disrupt (using penalties such as prosecutions or asset seizures).
  - As of the 2007 MER, U.K. priorities included: domestic implementation of the Third EU Money Laundering Directive; adoption of controls from payments regulation and mandatory declaration of currency regulation; reform of the suspicious activity reporting framework (Lander Review); enhanced regulatory environment for MSBs; assessment of controls for charitable organizations; implementation of European controls to restrict couriering cash.
  - U.K. annual threat assessments on serious and organized crime included ML analysis; a joint Treasury–Home Office–SOCA exercise was underway to map U.K. strategy on ML and FT; this AML/CFT strategy was published on February 28, 2007.

- Legal and institutional framework:
  - ML offense viewed as broad and fully covering Vienna and Palermo Conventions; prosecutions and convictions under POCA increased since 2003.
  - TF offense viewed as broad, covering collection or provision of funds for terrorist acts and provision to terrorist organizations or individual terrorists.
  - Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) significantly improved ability to restrain, confiscate, and recover proceeds of crime.
  - Effective terrorist asset-freezing regime in place; U.K. FIU generally effective; a number of competent authorities designated to investigate and prosecute ML and TF offenses; domestic and international cooperation measures generally comprehensive.
  - All types of “financial institutions” as defined in the FATF Recommendations are active in the U.K. and covered by the MLRs.
  - U.K. is a major international center for investment and private banking; U.K. insurance industry largest in Europe and third largest in the world.
  - Estimate of U.K. funds management industry at end of 2004: over £2,960 billion of funds under management (including international private wealth management, hedge funds, and private equity).
  - Effectiveness of preventive measures for financial institutions varied; implementation of the Third EU Money Laundering Directive in 2007 expected to improve matters.
  - Main CDD deficiency identified: identification and verification of beneficial owners of accounts were not required by law or regulation.
  - Record-keeping and suspicious transaction (or activity) reporting requirements viewed as comprehensive and effective.
  - FSA had extensive powers to monitor and ensure compliance; supervision of certain smaller firms (including some small banks, insurance companies, securities dealers, and investment managers) required enhancement.
  - The FSA commenced a project looking at AML/CFT systems and controls in small firms: 159 small firms were selected across wholesale and retail sectors; a report was published in May 2010.
  - The FSA’s Financial Crime Operations Team routinely visits small firms and has visited a total of 337 firms from 2007 to 2010.
  - All types of DNFBPs are active in the U.K. and covered by the MLRs; DNFBPs appeared to be effectively complying with their STR obligations.
  - Generally comprehensive monitoring of casinos, lawyers, and certain accountants; main deficiencies: lack of AML/CFT supervision for real estate and company service provider sectors and certain unregulated accountants.
  - U.K. has a wide range of legal persons and arrangements, including Companies Act companies, other companies (public and private), partnerships, societies, and longstanding use of trusts.

### Key findings of the MER and remedial actions taken by authorities

- Legal systems and institutional measures:
  - ML offenses were comprehensive and used frequently; POCA removed need to distinguish drug trafficking from other predicate offenses.
  - In England and Wales, investigations, prosecutions, and convictions under POCA increased substantially each year since POCA came into force in 2003.
  - TF provisions were broad and covered collection/provision of funds for terrorist acts and provision to terrorist organizations and individual terrorists.
  - U.K. had comprehensive regime to confiscate criminal proceeds; POCA had significant positive impact; provisional measures to freeze and seize property and instrumentalities were sufficient.
  - Effective terrorist asset-freezing regime: as an EU member the U.K. bound by EU freezing mechanism and domestic measures expanded coverage; domestic designation process rapid and efficient.
    - At the time of the on-site visit: 84 individuals and 58 entities had been designated under the 2006 UN Order.
    - Failure to abide by an asset freeze under the Order punishable by seven years imprisonment and an unlimited fine.
    - Bank of England (BOE), as HMT’s agent on asset freezing, issued notices with respect to persons designated and maintained a consolidated sanctions list on its website.
  - Since March 2006, the U.K. FIU housed within the Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) and operated with a high degree of independence; private sector reported improved relations and cooperation since transfer of FIU responsibilities to SOCA.
  - U.K. took proactive approach to pursuing predicate offenses, proceeds of crime, and financial aspects of terrorist cases.
    - Investigation and prosecution agencies included SOCA, HMRC; for England and Wales: Crown Prosecution Service and Revenue and Customs Prosecution Office; for Northern Ireland: Public Prosecution Service of Northern Ireland; for Scotland: Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Services and Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency.
    - There were 43 regional police forces in England and Wales, eight in Scotland, and one in Northern Ireland.
    - National Terrorist Finance Investigation Unit actively pursued terrorist financing issues.
    - Agencies appeared adequately structured, funded, and resourced; integrity and confidentiality standards for investigators and prosecutors were high.
  - Cross-border cash disclosure system generally effective, but assessors found authorities did not have the authority to detain cash purely for a false disclosure and no requirement to retain, at minimum, the amount and identification of the bearer in false disclosure cases. Cash seizure provisions allowed individual officers discretion based on “reasonable grounds to suspect”.
  - EU Council Regulation No. 1889/2005 (“the Cash Controls Regulation”) applied in the United Kingdom as of June 15, 2007; the regulation’s declaration system complemented the existing disclosure system and applied only to cross-border movements of currency and bearer negotiable instruments into and out of the EU.

- Preventive measures — financial institutions:
  - The MLRs, POCA and the Terrorism Act applied to all financial institutions carrying out activities as defined by FATF.
  - For FSA-regulated firms, additional obligations set forth in the FSA Handbook, including additional regulatory requirements and guidance.
  - The Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG) Guidance Notes provided further detail to the MLRs; however, the Guidance Notes as a whole could not be considered “other enforceable means” as defined by the FATF, meaning compliance was not fully ensured on a number of relevant criteria.

*Italicized: Source — IMF staff technical note summarizing FATF June 2007 mutual evaluation of the United Kingdom and subsequent progress as reported by U.K. authorities.*

### 26. The United Kingdom used a risk-based approach to financial sector regulation.

### 26. The United Kingdom used a risk-based approach to financial sector regulation

### Risk-based supervisory framework and ARROW
- The risk-based approach applied to:
  - JMLSG Guidance Notes: firms should apply guidance to the extent required, taking into account the firm’s risk-based view to meet high-level obligations under the MLRs and the FSA Handbook.
  - Level of supervision by the FSA: determined on a risk-based approach.
- The FSA’s internal risk-based supervision process was called ARROW.
  - The FSA measured risk (impact and probability) before deciding supervisory relationship or action.
  - The FSA undertook an “impact” assessment to measure the size of the firm and number of customers.
- Supervision intensity by firm size/impact:
  - Largest financial institutions: 39 complex major retail groups (account for about 80 percent of retail business in the United Kingdom) and 43 major wholesale groups — classified as “high impact.”
    - Adopted “close and continuous” supervision, with more intense supervision and regular risk assessments (typically, every 12–24 months).
  - All firms: subject to baseline (off-site) monitoring and to “Thematic Work.”
- ARROW supervisory activity and scope:
  - Between 2007 and 2010, the FSA reviewed 313 banks, 127 securities companies, 155 insurance undertakings, and 120 other financial institutions.
  - FSA supervisory visits include review of controls over all foreign branches and subsidiaries as part of the ARROW assessment (post-MLRs 2007, Regulation 15 for non-EEA countries).

### Customer due diligence (CDD), Recommendation 5, and MLRs
- MLRs contained basic customer identification requirements:
  - Applied when customers were establishing business relations or conducting transactions over €15,000, and when a suspicion of ML and TF arose.
- Identified CDD gaps:
  - No legal/regulatory requirement to identify the beneficial owner or to take reasonable measures to verify the identity of the beneficial owner or determine the natural persons who ultimately own or control the customer, including those with ultimate effective control.
  - No legal/regulatory obligation to apply CDD to existing customers on the basis of materiality and risk.
  - Measures for enhanced due diligence were not sufficient.
- Recommendations and follow-up:
  - Assessors recommended mandating measures including obtaining information on the intended purpose and nature of the business relationship; specifying procedures for ongoing due diligence in compliance with the FATF Recommendations; requiring maintenance and periodic review of documents and CDD data.
  - Second follow-up report: authorities made “significant progress” on Recommendation 5 via adoption of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 (MLRs 2007); FATF concluded that, although a few shortcomings remain, the United Kingdom has taken significant action to bring its compliance to a level essentially equivalent to LC.

### Politically-exposed persons (PEPs) and correspondent banking
- Assessors recommended creation of enforceable obligations for PEPs as required by the standard.
- JMLSG Guidance on correspondent banking appeared comprehensive and covered main areas of Recommendation 7, but Guidance did not constitute “other enforceable means” as required.
- Second follow-up report: these deficiencies were generally remedied by adoption of MLRs 2007.

### Introduced business, third-party reliance, and supervision of DNFBPs
- At assessment time:
  - No enforceable means required financial institutions to ensure introducers would make ID and other documentation available on request.
  - Financial institutions were not required to ensure third parties were regulated and supervised (Recommendations 23, 24, and 29).
- Developments and supervisory strengthening:
  - Deficiencies on Recommendation 24 largely remedied through MLRs 2007.
  - FSA implemented intensive supervision via ARROW involving in-depth file reviews, interviews with senior management and staff where appropriate, and monitoring of post-visit remedial work.
  - All DNFBPs covered under the MLRs 2003 at the time; JMLSG Guidance notes did not apply to DNFBPs but sector guidance had been issued.
  - Second follow-up report indicates MLRs 2007 largely address CDD and DNFBP concerns.

### Wire transfers, Special Recommendation VII, and Transfer of Funds Regulations
- No financial institution secrecy laws inhibited FATF implementation; record-keeping requirements deemed comprehensive.
- EU Regulation No. 1781/2006 (in force since January 1, 2007) generally meets technical requirements of Special Recommendation VII (wire transfers), but the derogation for wire transfers within the EU (classified as domestic) was not in compliance with the standard.
- Sanctions for noncompliance were not effective or dissuasive at that time.
- Most recent follow-up report: deficiencies fully remedied through adoption of the Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2007, except for the EU derogation issue (subject of continuing policy debate within the European Union).

### Monitoring transactions, unusual activity, and suspicious activity reports (SARs)
- No specific legal obligation to monitor all complex, unusual large transactions, examine background and purpose and set forth findings in writing; JMLSG Guidance Notes provided comprehensive guidance and FSA-regulated institutions appeared to follow guidance.
- Assessors recommended adopting specific requirements to monitor transactions involving certain countries and to set forth findings in writing; most recent follow-up report: addressed via MLRs 2007.
- Obligations to submit SARs were comprehensive:
  - No de minimis limit; attempted transactions subject to reporting.
  - Immunity from prosecution provided for good faith reporting to the U.K. FIU.
  - “Tipping off” and “prejudicing an investigation” were offenses.
  - Assessors noted implementation concern: many banks interpreted legislation as requiring them, after a SAR was filed, to seek consent on every subsequent transaction over £250 for that same customer.

### Internal controls, foreign branches/subsidiaries, and shell banks
- Internal control systems viewed as generally strong and complete.
- Assessors recommended more specific rules for foreign branches and subsidiaries per Recommendation 22:
  - Authorities adopted Regulation 15 of the MLRs 2007 with respect to non-EEA countries.
  - FSA supervisory visits include review of instructions to and requirements on foreign branches and subsidiaries, internal audit programs and reports, and controls to prevent fraud and money laundering (CDD, ongoing monitoring, record keeping).
- Shell banks:
  - Shell banks were not permitted to be established or to continue to operate in the United Kingdom.
  - No legal obligation at assessment time for financial institutions not to enter into or continue correspondent banking relationships with shell banks, nor to satisfy themselves respondent financial institutions did not permit accounts to be used by shell banks.
  - JMLSG Guidance provided guidance; most recent follow-up report: concerns fully addressed by adoption of MLRs 2007.

### FSA powers, resources, and enforcement activity
- FSA was prudential and designated AML/CFT regulator for Financial Services and Markets Act activities with extensive powers:
  - Authority to conduct on-site inspections, review policies, procedures, books, records, and sample testing.
  - Seemed adequately funded, staffed, and had sufficient technical and other resources to perform its functions.
- Sanctions:
  - Criminal sanctions available in various AML/CFT legislation.
  - FSA administrative sanctions included unlimited financial penalties, public censure, prohibition, variation or cancellation of permissions, injunctions, and issuance of a formal caution.
- Enforcement statistics:
  - From November 30, 2001 through 2007, the FSA’s Enforcement Division dealt with 167 cases relating to financial crime (including market-abuse matters); 18 related specifically to AML compliance.
    - Of these 18: three resulted in a private warning, eight in a fine, two in a variation of the firm's permissions, and one in a prohibition (for a total of 14 enforcement actions).
    - Assessors viewed the number of FSA disciplinary sanctions since 2001 as relatively low given the size of the U.K. financial sector.
  - Between 2007 and 2010, authorities conducted 200 enforcement actions against firms and individuals for financial crime (7 of which were for failure to comply with AML measures) for a total amount of fines of £41,413,887.

### HMRC supervision of MSBs and sanctions
- HMRC supervised MSBs, including money exchangers and money/value transfer offices.
  - HMRC had powers to access records, documents or information relevant to monitoring compliance.
  - HMRC could issue a warning letter and impose financial penalties up to £5,000.
  - Assessors considered sanctions against directors and senior managers were not adequate at that time.
  - Authorities noted HMRC could classify individuals as not “fit and proper” under regulation 28(2)(e)-(g), leading to removal of ability to trade and prevention of continuing to work in a Money Service Business where businesses consistently fail AML obligations.

### Preventive measures and DNFBPs (Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions)
- DNFBPs covered under MLRs 2003 at assessment time; MLRs 2007 subsequently addressed many deficiencies.
- DNFBPs had comprehensive obligations to report suspicious activities and appeared to be adequately complying.
- Assessors recommended stronger obligations to monitor transactions in line with Recommendations 11 and 21 and recommended requiring estate agents to identify the buyer of real estate.
  - Most recent follow-up report: deficiencies largely corrected through MLRs 2007 and amendments to the Counter-Terrorism Act.

### Casinos, legal professionals, accountants, and other DNFBP supervision
- Casinos:
  - Supervisory framework in transition at assessment time.
  - Legal/regulatory measures existed to prevent criminals or associates from holding significant/controlling interests or management functions.
  - Gambling Commission sanctions included actions against licensing requirements; possible sanctions for AML/CFT breaches included warnings and license revocation.
  - Assessors recommended expanding range of sanctions; expected to be achieved with the Gambling Act 2005 coming into force later in 2007.
  - Most recent follow-up: MLRs 2007 generally address these deficiencies.
- Legal professionals:
  - Subject to generally adequate AML/CFT monitoring by self-regulatory organizations across England, Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland.
- Accountants:
  - Members of professional bodies received adequate AML monitoring; assessors concerned about numerous accountants who are not members of professional bodies.
- Real estate agents and trust and company service providers (TCSPs) who were not lawyers or accountants were not yet supervised for AML/CFT at assessment time.
  - Authorities generally addressed these issues with the introduction of MLRs 2007.
- High-value dealers (dealers in precious metals and stones): subject to same HMRC monitoring applied to MSBs.

### Legal persons, arrangements, beneficial ownership, and trusts
- United Kingdom had a wide range of legal persons and arrangements:
  - Companies Act companies and other forms of companies: 11,500 public and over two million private companies.
  - Partnerships and societies; trusts are longstanding and integral to the legal and economic landscape.
- Approach to preventing misuse of legal persons/arrangements relied on investigative powers of law enforcement, regulatory, supervisory, and other competent authorities to obtain/access information.
- Identified deficiency:
  - No appropriate measures to ensure adequate, accurate, and timely information on beneficial ownership and control of legal persons was available to competent authorities in a timely fashion.
  - Companies’ registrar information pertains only to legal ownership/control, is not verified, and is not necessarily reliable; directors and shareholders could be nominees and other legal persons, potentially slowing investigations.
- Assessors’ recommendation:
  - Review AML/CFT system to determine ways to make adequate and accurate beneficial ownership information available on a timely basis to law enforcement.
- Follow-up actions and outstanding issues:
  - Latest follow-up report: deficiencies regarding Recommendation 33 (legal persons) have not been addressed and no further action is expected from the authorities on bearer shares.
  - Recommendation 34 (legal arrangements): MLRs 2007 deal with supervision issues relating to trust and company service providers (TCSPs), but beneficial ownership issue remains unaddressed.
  - Authorities stated they keep these issues under active consideration.

### Charities and nonprofit organizations
- England, Wales, and Scotland had well-established systems for regulation of charities with adequate provision for registration, transparency, supervision, and investigation.
  - Charity Commission had extensive legal powers to sanction wrongdoing or mismanagement and conducted 400 targeted “Review Visits” each year to review compliance with the Charities Act 1993 (normally based on annual returns).
- Northern Ireland:
  - At assessment time, no supervisory regime applied to Northern Ireland (legislation being drafted).
  - Subsequent developments: a system similar to the English regime established for Northern Ireland through the Charities Act (Northern Ireland) 2008.
    - Registration of charities had yet to commence within Northern Ireland at that time, but transitional provisions brought within the jurisdiction of the Charity Commission for Northern Ireland institutions operating in Northern Ireland and granted tax exceptions, enabling investigation and sanction where necessary.

*Source: IMF staff assessment as presented in the provided content unit.*

### 51. National cooperation and coordination between U.K. policy makers, the FIU,

### 51. National cooperation and coordination between U.K. policy makers, the FIU,

### Effectiveness of national cooperation and review processes
- National cooperation and coordination between U.K. policy makers, the FIU, law enforcement and supervisors, and other competent authorities appeared to be effective at the time of the assessment both at the policy and operational levels.
- The system benefited from an effective network of interdepartmental and interagency contact and cooperation, both for policy and for operational matters.
- The United Kingdom regularly reviewed the effectiveness of its AML/CFT systems; results and recommendations of the reviews were endorsed by ministers and were being implemented.

### International conventions, UNSCRs, and mutual legal assistance (MLA)
- The United Kingdom has ratified and implemented the provisions of the Vienna, Palermo and FT Conventions and the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001).
- The United Kingdom had broad legal provisions to facilitate requests for mutual legal assistance.
- Standard evidence-gathering mechanisms were reviewed and updated in the Crime (International Cooperation) Act 2003.
- New provisions were introduced to allow for the restraint and confiscation of instrumentalities of crime at the request of foreign jurisdictions.
- New legislation under POCA gives effect to foreign restraint, confiscation, and forfeiture orders in both the criminal and civil contexts.
- There were no unduly restrictive measures on the provision of assistance; dual criminality was only required for certain coercive measures such as search warrants.
- The United Kingdom could share confiscated or forfeited assets with other jurisdictions and, internally, could use funds confiscated to provide incentives to law enforcement and prosecution agencies.

### Timeliness and capacity concerns for MLA; progress
- Assessors raised concerns about the ability of the U.K. authorities (excluding Scotland) to handle routine or non-urgent mutual legal assistance requests in a timely and effective manner.
- Substantial progress achieved in practice included:
  - A significant reduction of the backlog of cases of 67 percent
  - A reduction in the length of time to bring a case to completion

### Extradition and administrative cooperation
- ML and TF were extraditable offenses; there were no restrictive conditions or impediments existing in law for extradition.
- The United Kingdom was able to extradite its own nationals.
- Overall systems were in place for adequate administrative cooperation for the FIU, law enforcement, and financial supervisors.

### Institutional structure, resourcing, and planned changes
- Competent authorities, including law enforcement and the FSA, appeared to be adequately structured and resourced to effectively perform their functions.
- Recommendations from the assessors included:
  - HMRC should deploy a broader allocation of resources at all levels of ML/FT risk for the MSB sector.
  - The FIU should increase its resources in order to meet commitments made under government reviews.
- Implementation and status:
  - HMRC is carrying out a comprehensive program to take on new staff and train existing staff.
  - SOCA, which houses the FIU, is undergoing restructuring in advance of prospective amalgamation with other agencies into the new National Crime Agency to be launched in 2012.

### Statistics, information systems, and gaps
- U.K. authorities maintained a wide range of statistics on the full range of AML/CFT matters.
- Gaps identified at time of assessment:
  - For MLA requests, no statistics on the breakdown of the offenses concerned in each case (i.e., ML, predicate offenses, or TF).
  - No statistics on the number of MLA requests granted and refused.
  - No statistics on the time required to respond to MLA requests.
  - Information technology provisions for MLA requests were under review by the U.K. Central Authority.
  - Comprehensive statistics were not available for the number of SARs analyzed and disseminated by the FIU.

### Appendix I — Summary of FATF recommendations ratings and deficiencies (selected items)
- R.5 – Customer due diligence: Rated PC. Deficiencies included no requirement in law or regulation regarding (#1) Identifying and verifying beneficial owner; (#2) Verify that any person purporting to act on behalf of the customer is so authorized; (#3) Identification where there are doubts regarding previously obtained customer data; (#4) Obtaining information on the purpose and nature of the business relationship; (#5) Ongoing monitoring/ongoing CDD & up-to-date records; (#6) Additional measures for high-risk scenarios; (#7) Termination of relationship if CDD cannot be conducted; (#8) Application of CDD to existing customers on basis of materiality and risk; (#9) Problems with reduced CDD (EU equivalence); and (#10) CDD exemption could still apply when ML is suspected within a business relationship. FATF conclusion: Significant progress in addressing R.5 issues through adoption of MLRs 2007; framework enhanced to an LC rating.
- R.6 – Politically exposed persons: Rated NC. Deficiency: No currently enforceable obligations. Note: MLRs 2007 addresses most of the required criteria.
- R.7 – Cross border correspondent relationships: Rated NC. Deficiency: No currently enforceable obligations. Note: MLRs 2007 addresses most of the required criteria.
- R.9 – Third parties and introducers: Rated PC. Deficiencies included limited reference to beneficial owners in information on the CDD process; no enforceable requirement to make ID and documentation available on request; firms not required to satisfy themselves that a third party is regulated and supervised; limited consideration of country application of FATF Recommendations. Note: MLRs 2007 addresses most of the required criteria.
- R.11 – Attention to complex, unusual large transactions: Rated PC. Deficiencies: No specific obligation to pay special attention to all complex, unusual, large transactions; no specific requirement to examine background and purpose and set forth findings in writing. Note: MLRs 2007 addresses most of the required criteria.
- R.12 – CDD and recordkeeping for DNFBPs: Rated PC. Multiple deficiencies across application of R.5, requirements for casinos, estate agents, PEPs for DNFBPs, technological measures, introduced business, recordkeeping sufficiency, and obligations to examine unusual transactions and retain findings. Note: MLRs 2007 addresses most of the required criteria.
- R.18 – Shell banks: Rated PC. Deficiencies: No enforceable obligation not to enter into or continue correspondent relationships with shell banks; no obligation to satisfy themselves that respondent institutions do not permit accounts to be used by shell banks. FATF conclusion: Fully addressed in MLRs 2007.
- R.21 – Special attention to transactions from certain countries: Rated PC. Deficiencies: No requirement to give special attention to business with countries that do not sufficiently apply FATF Recommendations; limited coverage by MLR 28 and JMLSG guidance. FATF conclusion: MLRs 2007 and amendments to Counter-Terrorism Act address most of the required criteria.
- R.22 – Application to foreign branches and subsidiaries: Rated NC. Deficiency: No requirements relating to foreign branches and subsidiaries. No new obligations.
- R.24 – Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs: Rated PC. Deficiencies: No AML/CFT supervision for real estate agents or TCSPs that are not legal or accountancy professionals, or accountants not members of professional bodies (approximately 40,000); current sanctions for Gambling Commission not yet adequate pending Gambling Act (September 2007); notaries in England and Wales not supervised unless also lawyers or accountants who are members of professional bodies. FATF conclusion: MLRs 2007 generally addresses deficiencies.
- R.33 – Transparency of legal persons: Rated PC. Deficiencies: Inadequate measures to ensure adequate, accurate and timely information on beneficial ownership and control of legal persons accessible by competent authorities; companies registrar information pertains only to legal ownership/control and is not verified or necessarily reliable; no specific measures on share warrants to bearer. FATF conclusion: Deficiencies not addressed; no further action expected from authorities on (#3), bearer shares.
- R.34 – Transparency of legal arrangements: Rated PC. Deficiencies: Inadequate measures for beneficial ownership/control information on legal arrangements; no standardization of beneficial ownership data; providers of trust services who are not lawyers or accountants not monitored. FATF conclusion: Supervision of TCSPs addressed by MLRs 2007.
- SR.VII – Wire transfers: Rated PC. Deficiencies: (#1) The derogation in the 3MLD is at odds with SR VII; (#2) Sanctions are not effective or dissuasive; and (#3) Doubts about implementation and effective compliance monitoring. FATF conclusion: While continuing policy debate in the EU on (#1), new regulations, the Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2007, fully address (#2) and (#3).

*Italicized source attribution: IMF assessment text (sections 51–56 and Appendix I summary).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/_cr11231.pdf_
