## _cr11294

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [_cr11294](https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/_cr11294.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/_cr11294.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/_cr11294.pdf.json)

---

### Incoming data, recent developments, and revisions to near-term outlook
- Recent data since mid-June:
  - 2011Q2 GDP growth (preliminary, seasonally-adjusted quarter-on-quarter): 0.1 percent (2011Q1: 0.9 percent).
  - Retail trade and fixed investment indicators suggested robust April–June performance.
  - Inflation: 9.4 percent year-on-year in June; 9 percent in July.
  - Financial conditions (since end-July):
    - MICEX index drop: more than 10 percent.
    - EMBI+ spread increase: about 35 basis points.
    - Ruble depreciation: about 5 percent vis-à-vis the currency basket.
  - Fiscal outturns:
    - End-July federal government nonoil deficit: 5.1 percent of GDP.
    - End-May general government nonoil deficit: 1.4 percent of GDP.
    - Staff revised federal government nonoil deficit forecast for 2011: 11 percent (previously 11.2 percent).
- Staff revisions to forecasts and outlook:
  - GDP growth forecasts: 4.3 percent for 2011 (down by half a percent); 4.1 percent for 2012 (down by 0.4 percent).
  - Staff end-2011 inflation forecast: 7.5 percent (marked down by half a percent).
  - Balance of risks: tilted to the downside (global growth and oil prices could be weaker).
  - Monetary policy view: further monetary tightening necessary to bring inflation toward 3–5 percent.
  - Fiscal advice conditionality: unless oil prices fall substantially and growth weakens markedly, staff advises a more ambitious medium-term fiscal consolidation to return the nonoil deficit to a sustainable level through growth-friendly, credible measures.

### Fiscal, monetary, and financial conditions — findings
- Fiscal:
  - Latest outturns improved due to higher nonoil revenues and lower spending.
  - Staff federal government nonoil deficit forecast for 2011: 11 percent (vs. 11.2 percent in staff report).
  - Expectation of another supplemental budget later in the year.
  - Recommendation: credible, ambitious, and growth-friendly deficit reduction backed by a sound fiscal framework; implementation difficult in a pre-election year.
- Monetary and inflation:
  - Yearly inflation: 9.4 percent in June; 9 percent in July.
  - Central bank end-2011 target range: 6–7 percent.
  - Staff medium-term inflation objective: 3–5 percent.
  - Staff end-2011 forecast: 7.5 percent.
  - Staff stance: further monetary tightening necessary.
- Financial sector and markets:
  - MICEX: rose 23 percent in 2010; volatility erased most gains in 2011; recent drop >10 percent.
  - Sovereign spreads: improved to around 160bp in early April from >300bp in May 2010, later around 200bp.
  - EMBI+ spread: increased by about 35 basis points since end-July.
  - Net capital outflows persisted into 2011 despite a stronger current account.
  - Banking system: stability maintained but high stock of nonperforming assets; FSAP recommendations welcomed (connected lending and consolidated supervision legislation flagged as priority).
- Credit and banking:
  - NPLs: peaked at 10 percent during the crisis; 8.1 percent of loans in April.
  - Real credit growth: about 4 percent in 2010; picked up further in recent months.
  - Profitability: bounced back from crisis lows.
  - Residual banking-sector vulnerabilities remain.

### Policy recommendations (staff advice)
- Fiscal policy:
  - Implement a more decisive fiscal consolidation that is credible, ambitious, and growth-friendly to restore nonoil deficit sustainability.
  - Use a sound fiscal framework; consider front-loading consolidation.
  - Reconsider reliance on supplementary budgets that increase procyclicality.
- Monetary policy:
  - Tighten further to lower inflation toward a medium-term 3–5 percent range.
  - Improve operational framework: drain excess reserves via open market operations, narrow the policy-rate corridor, adopt a binding open market operations rate, and communicate a time-bound path for changes.
- Financial supervision and intermediation:
  - Strengthen supervision to reduce risks and support sustainable credit growth.
  - Speed adoption of legislation on connected lending and consolidated supervision.
  - Implement FSAP short-term and medium-term recommendations (empower CBR, expand supervisory powers, prompt remedial action framework).
- Structural reforms and investment climate:
  - Improve the business and investment climate to diversify exports and achieve high-quality growth.
  - Implement governance reforms, reduce state role where appropriate, and pursue WTO accession to boost predictability.

### Strategy 2020, political calendar, and process
- Strategy 2020:
  - Initial draft released in August as an interim report by expert working groups.
  - Proposes ensuring macroeconomic and social stability, improving the business and investment climate, and diversifying exports to achieve high-quality growth.
  - Discussion ongoing; authorities plan foreign expert input including the Fund; process expected to conclude by December 1.
  - Staff’s preliminary assessment: dovetails with staff report reforms and would help lay basis for sustained growth.
- Political timetable:
  - Parliamentary elections: December 4.
  - Presidential elections: first part of 2012.

### Key summary points from the 2011 Article IV context
- Background and challenges:
  - Crisis response broadly effective; post-crisis performance unimpressive despite high oil prices.
  - Exit from crisis-related fiscal stimulus slow; central bank initially hesitant to respond to rising inflation.
  - Poor business climate and high bank NPL stock hamper investment.
  - Key challenge: use commodity boom to achieve sustained higher growth and reduce vulnerabilities via less procyclical policies, stronger frameworks, and reinvigorated reforms.
  - Authorities broadly agreed with assessment but signaled difficult reforms may be postponed until after 2011–2012 elections.
- Authorities vs staff on monetary policy:
  - Authorities did not see clear need to tighten further, expecting slower money growth, moderation of food inflation, and ruble appreciation to reduce inflationary pressures.
  - Both parties agree on importance of improving investment climate.

### Credit conditions, gradual exit from crisis-related policies, and banking-sector support
- Fiscal exit:
  - Crisis fiscal stimulus: about 9 percent of GDP.
  - General government nonoil deficit fell by 1¾ percent of GDP in 2010 largely due to recovery and expenditure under-execution.
  - Medium-term budget plans: modest further reduction in federal nonoil deficit of some 2¼ percent of GDP by 2013.
  - Consolidation measures in the 2011-13 Budget (Percent of GDP):
    - Revenue: 1.6
    - Increase in payroll tax: 1.6
    - Expenditure: 0.7
    - Cuts to wage bill: 0.9
    - Social security (transfers): 0.2
    - Investment: 0.4
    - Other: -0.8
    - Total: 2.3
- Monetary policy and CBR actions:
  - CBR tightened policy starting end-2010; rate increases in December 2010, February, April, and May (rates unchanged in June).
  - Raised reserve requirements and differentiated them by residency; widened ruble floating band and scaled back interventions.
- Banking sector support unwound:
  - By mid-2010, extraordinary liquidity support ended; relaxed loan classification rules terminated.
  - Uncollateralized lending terminated end-2010; interbank guarantees unwound.

### Near-term outlook, risks, and staff projections
- Outlook summary:
  - Modest growth expected due to fragile banking system, investor risk aversion, and political uncertainty despite high oil prices.
  - Risks: oil prices and capital flows.
- Staff projections/expectations:
  - Staff projects real growth at 4.8 percent in 2011 (compared with over 7 percent during 2000–07).
  - Inflation projected to fall to 8 percent by end-2011, assuming food prices moderate.
- Near-term risk scenarios:
  - Upside: higher oil prices and return of capital inflows if political uncertainty eases.
  - Downside: lower oil prices, global risk aversion, lower external demand, domestic complacency, or stalled reforms could reduce growth.
  - Euro Area debt crisis intensification could significantly negatively impact Russia via trade and financial linkages.

### Medium-term outlook and scenarios
- Baseline:
  - Unchanged policies → medium-term growth constrained by weak policy frameworks and lack of diversification.
  - Real growth projected to fall to 3¾ percent by 2016 in the baseline.
  - Inflation to moderate but remain elevated; current account surplus to decline as oil prices stabilize and imports rise.
- Adverse scenario:
  - Sharp permanent decline in commodity prices: oil to $50 per barrel in 2012 and staying there in real terms thereafter → large external and fiscal pressures, potential recession, slow investor confidence return, continued capital outflows.
- Reform scenario:
  - Major policy strengthening → medium-term growth around 6 percent.
  - Preconditions: stronger fiscal retrenchment, monetary control of inflation, stronger competitive financial system, effective structural reforms.
  - Short-term fiscal drag offset by improved policy credibility and return of productive capital inflows.
- Scenario assumptions summary:
  - Baseline: current policies; monetary policy with multiple objectives; inflation elevated; fiscal policy implements 2011–13 medium-term budget with no additional consolidation after 2013; banking policies unchanged.
  - Adverse: oil to $50/bbl in 2012 and thereafter real terms; specified fiscal/monetary responses; no structural reform progress.
  - Reform: staff-recommended reforms fully implemented; monetary policy targets inflation down to 3 percent over medium term with flexible exchange rate; federal nonoil deficit declines to 4.7 percent of GDP by 2015; strengthened supervision; fundamental structural reforms enacted.

### Leveraging the oil boom — policy recommendations
- Strengthen fiscal policy:
  - Implement credible, ambitious, growth-friendly consolidation anchored in a sound fiscal framework.
  - Undertake fundamental reforms in pensions, healthcare, and social protection for durable consolidation.
- Monetary policy:
  - More decisive and well-communicated tightening with flexible exchange rate and improved framework to lower inflation.
- Financial sector:
  - Stronger oversight and supervisory powers for CBR; adopt consolidated supervision and connected lending legislation.
- Structural reforms and governance:
  - Improve business environment, governance, property rights, judiciary, civil service; pursue WTO accession; implement ambitious privatization to reduce state dominance and moral hazard.
- Fiscal vulnerability warnings:
  - Federal government nonoil deficit: 12¾ percent of GDP in 2010 (more than 8 percent of GDP above pre-crisis level).
  - Public and external debt (2010): below 12 percent of GDP and just over 30 percent of GDP respectively.
  - Reserve Fund largely run down during crisis, exposing public finances to oil price shocks.

### Fiscal stance, medium-term budget assessment, and POIM application
- Staff view: 2011–13 medium-term budget "falls short of what is needed to reduce fiscal risks."
- By 2013 the nonoil deficit projected to be "some 5¾ percent of GDP above the government’s long-term deficit target of 4.7 percent of GDP."
- Staff reaction:
  - Regretted supplemental budget for 2011 as delaying consolidation.
  - Preliminary 2012–14 budget plans seen as "a step backward" with nonoil deficit remaining in double digits through 2014.
- Growth impact:
  - Staff estimates 2011–13 adjustment could "shave off as much as 1½ percentage points of annual real growth by 2013," driven by demand withdrawal and payroll tax increase effects.
- Budget table highlights (Percent of GDP) — 2011–13 Budget vs Draft 2012–14 Budget (Ministry of Finance):
  - Total revenues: 19.3 17.0 18.5 16.8 18.4 18.0
  - Nonoil and gas revenues: 9.5 9.1 9.9 9.2 10.2 10.3
  - Total expenditures: 20.7 20.1 21.2 19.7 21.2 20.3
  - Overall deficit: -1.3 -3.1 -2.7 -2.9 -2.7 -2.3
  - Nonoil deficit: -11.2 -10.9 -11.3 -10.4 -11.0 -10.1
- POIM (Permanent Oil Income Model) application:
  - POIM-real criterion broadly consistent with government nonoil deficit target of 4.7 percent of GDP.
  - Based on July 2011 WEO oil price assumptions:
    - POIM-real consistent with consolidation to about 5½ percent of GDP by 2015.
    - POIM would imply consolidation to about 1½ percent of GDP in the medium term but permit higher outer-year consumption than POIM-real.
- Suggested fiscal institutional improvements:
  - Avoid excessive use of supplementary budgets.
  - Replenish Reserve Fund using high oil prices via ambitious consolidation.
  - Consider an independent fiscal agency.
  - Speed accounting and streamlining of tax expenditures.
  - Strengthen public financial management and procurement.

### Monetary policy recent actions and operational recommendations
- Recent tightening: CBR tightened policy starting late December 2010; further rate increases in February–May 2011.
- Staff inflation outlook:
  - Headline inflation: "9½ percent in June."
  - Staff leading indicators model: end-2011 inflation "8 percent" (outside CBR 6–7 percent target).
  - Staff advocates continued tightening to reach medium-term "3–5 percent."
- Authorities' stance:
  - Expected food-price moderation, money growth moderation, and ruble appreciation to reduce inflation to "7 percent by the end of the year"; considered it "already too late" to influence end-2011 inflation significantly.
- Operational framework recommendations:
  - Streamline instruments; drain excess reserves via open market operations; narrow policy corridor; move to a binding open market operations rate; publish time-bound path for changes.
- Authorities' response: broad agreement and some corridor narrowing already effected.

### Exchange-rate flexibility, capital flows, and financial stability
- CBR widened ruble operational band and reduced intervention amounts to allow monetary focus on inflation.
- Staff recommends continuing trend toward greater exchange-rate flexibility; allow more rapid appreciation if inflows return.
- First lines of defense against excessive inflows: flexible exchange rate and fiscal tightening; capital flow management measures should not substitute for macroeconomic adjustments.
- FSAP findings and stress tests:
  - Under a “severe” double-dip scenario (4 percent GDP contraction in 2011): net losses ≈ 22 percent of system capital; system-wide CAR = 14.1 percent; about 8 percent of system assets’ banks would have CAR < 10 percent.
  - Credit risk (including concentration) is primary vulnerability; liquidity risk also significant.
  - Stress tests may understate vulnerabilities due to possible overestimation of loan quality and under-provisioning.
- Banking sector structure:
  - End-2010 state banks held 52 percent of total deposits.
  - Crisis consolidation increased state banks' lending and capital shares, potentially raising moral hazard.
- FSAP recommendations (short and medium term) emphasize stronger supervisory powers, consolidated supervision, remedial action frameworks, and limitations on open-bank assistance to systemic cases.

### Improving the investment climate and President’s ten-point Action Plan
- Investment climate reforms needed to attract productive capital and diversify the economy; adverse demographics make productivity and investment key to long-term growth.
- President’s ten-point Action Plan (high-level items):
  1. Unwind the recent payroll tax increase; cut healthcare procurement costs by 15 percent.
  2. Develop a follow-up system for corruption complaints.
  3. Review business regulations obstructing activity.
  4. Appoint investment ombudsmen in federal districts.
  5. Reduce state interference: privatization, independent SOE directors, transparent procurement.
  6. Improve minority shareholder access to corporate information.
  7. Establish a state-backed private equity fund to facilitate FDI in non-resource sectors.
  8. Reduce authority of state commission on foreign investments in strategic sectors.
  9. Improve public services for businesses.
  10. Involve President’s Office in monitoring public service quality.
- Staff caveats: lost revenue from reversing payroll tax should be fully replaced (e.g., reduce subsidies, increase retirement age, rationalize early retirement, means-test pensions); ensure private equity fund independence and contain contingent liability risks.
- Staff urged decisive implementation of broader governance, property rights, judiciary, civil service reforms, and ambitious privatization plans.

### Staff appraisal and priorities
- Post-crisis rebound underway but medium-term outlook weak without bold reforms.
- Policy focus recommended:
  - Reduce fiscal vulnerabilities.
  - Rein in inflation.
  - Promote a stronger, more competitive banking system.
  - Improve investment climate and enact structural reforms to boost growth potential.
- Strategy 2020 process offers an opportunity to implement reforms supporting stronger growth.

### Macroeconomic outlook and selected projections (highlights)
- Real GDP (annual percent): 2008: 5.2; 2009: -7.8; 2010: 4.0; 2011 (Estimate): 4.8; 2012 (Projection): 4.5; medium-term baseline: 2013: 4.3; 2014: 4.1; 2015: 3.9; 2016: 3.8.
- Consumer prices (period average): 2008: 14.1; 2009: 11.7; 2010: 6.9; 2011: 9.1; 2012: 7.6.
- Nominal GDP:
  - Billions of rubles: 2008: 41,277; 2009: 38,786; 2010: 44,939; 2011: 53,980; 2012: 61,152.
  - Billions of U.S. dollars: 2008: 1,665; 2009: 1,231; 2010: 1,488; 2011: 1,909; 2012: 2,188.
- Federal government nonoil balance (percent of GDP): 2008: -7.6; 2009: -13.8; 2010: -12.7; 2011: -11.2; 2012: -10.9.
- Reserve Fund and oil funds (percent of GDP): Reserve Fund 2010: 1.7; 2011: 2.7; NWF 2010: 6.0; 2011: 5.0.
- External sector (billions of U.S. dollars): Current account 2011: 101.9; 2012: 86.8. Gross international reserves end-2011: 550.8; end-2012 (proj): 617.6.

### Russia’s foreign currency reserves — Annex I key findings
- Reserves and oil funds at end-2010:
  - Foreign currency reserves: $444bn.
  - Oil fund savings (RF + NWF) held at CBR: about $93bn.
- IMF composite metric (end-2010): total reserves = 197 percent of the metric; suggested adequacy range = 100–150 percent.
- Standard reserve cover measures (2010):
  - Imports (months): 16.6
  - Short-term debt (percent): 370.9
  - Broad money (percent): 56.4
- Policy implications:
  - Current reserves broadly adequate for precautionary needs and fiscal savings objectives.
  - Further accumulation of foreign assets desirable for intergenerational/fiscal smoothing reasons.
  - Invest non-precautionary reserves (particularly NWF) in higher-yielding, less-liquid assets subject to institutional capacity, without reducing usable reserves below precautionary adequacy.
  - Reduce reserve needs over time via stronger policy frameworks, greater exchange-rate flexibility, and economic diversification.

### Division of labor and coordination with World Bank
- Fund and Bank roles summarized across program areas:
  - Fund: fiscal reform options, pension reform options, FSAP stability module, monetary policy framework options.
  - Bank: new lending projects to strengthen fiscal regime and financial sector development, public expenditure review, technical assistance on public administration and fiscal efficiency.
- Requests and coordination:
  - Fund to keep Bank informed on macrocritical reforms.
  - Bank requests regular sharing of Fund policy notes and invitations to policy meetings.
- Joint and separate work programs listed for September 2010–March 2012; no joint products planned in next 12 months.

### Statistical issues and data quality assessments (selected)
- Data provision broadly adequate for surveillance; scope for improvements, especially for external vulnerabilities assessment.
- National accounts: broadly adequate but concerns about quarterly GDP estimate reliability and historical revisions; Rosstat national accounts development plan 2011–17 underway.
- Price statistics: monthly CPI and PPI compiled; limited CPI weight time series complicates component analysis.
- Government finance statistics: timeliness and level of detail can improve; lack of an integrated debt monitoring/reporting system; recommendation to consolidate fiscal statistical links.
- Monetary and external statistics: CBR provides summarized MFSM-format data; balance of payments compiled per BPM5 with BPM6 improvements ongoing; reserves data reported weekly (four-business-day lag) and in Reserves Template (20-day lag).
- Russia is an SDDS subscriber since January 31, 2005.
- Table of common indicators (as of June 30, 2011) provides latest observation dates and data-quality flags across series (exchange rates, reserves, money, CPI, fiscal, external).

*Source: IMF staff report excerpts (2011 Article IV Report and informational annexes).*

### 1.      This statement reports on information that has become available since the staff

### _cr11294 - 1.      This statement reports on information that has become available since the staff

### Incoming data, recent developments, and revisions to near-term outlook
- Recent data since mid-June were mixed:
  - Preliminary 2011Q2 outturn for GDP growth: seasonally-adjusted quarter-on-quarter growth was 0.1 percent compared to 0.9 percent in 2011Q1.
  - Short-term indicators had suggested robust performances in retail trade and fixed investment in April–June.
  - Inflation slowed in July to 9 percent year-on-year vs. 9.4 percent in June.
  - Financial conditions have worsened since the staff report was finalized at end-July:
    - MICEX index has dropped by more than 10 percent.
    - EMBI+ spread has increased by about 35 basis points.
    - Since end-July, the ruble has depreciated by about 5 percent vis-à-vis the currency basket.
  - Fiscal outturns were better than projected:
    - End-July federal government nonoil deficit was 5.1 percent of GDP.
    - End-May general government nonoil deficit was 1.4 percent of GDP.
    - Staff now forecasts a slightly more favorable federal government nonoil deficit of 11 percent in 2011, compared with 11.2 percent in the staff report.

- Staff revisions to forecasts and outlook:
  - GDP growth forecasts revised down to:
    - 4.3 percent for 2011 (down by half a percent from prior forecast).
    - 4.1 percent for 2012 (down by 0.4 percent from prior forecast).
  - Staff marked down its 2011 year-end inflation forecast by half a percent to 7.5 percent.
  - Balance of risks is tilted to the downside: global growth and oil prices could be weaker than expected.
  - Staff view on monetary policy: further monetary tightening remains necessary to bring inflation toward the medium-term level of 3–5 percent.
  - Staff condition for fiscal advice: unless oil prices decrease substantially and growth becomes much weaker, advice remains for a more ambitious medium-term fiscal consolidation than planned to return the nonoil deficit to a sustainable level, through growth-friendly, credible measures.

### Fiscal, monetary, and financial conditions (findings)
- Fiscal:
  - Latest outturns improved due to higher nonoil revenues and lower spending.
  - Staff now forecasts federal government nonoil deficit of 11 percent in 2011 (vs. 11.2 percent in the staff report).
  - Expectation of another supplemental budget later in the year.
  - Recommendation: credible, ambitious, and growth-friendly deficit reduction supported by a sound fiscal framework; difficulty noted by authorities to implement fiscal adjustment in a pre-election year.

- Monetary and inflation:
  - Yearly inflation: 9.4 percent in June; 9 percent in July.
  - End-2011 inflation forecast: 7.5 percent (staff).
  - Central bank’s own end-2011 target range: 6–7 percent.
  - Staff medium-term inflation objective: 3–5 percent.
  - Staff stance: further monetary tightening necessary.

- Financial sector and markets:
  - MICEX: rose 23 percent during 2010, then volatility erased most gains in 2011; more recent drop >10 percent.
  - Sovereign spreads: improved to around 160bp in early April from >300bp in May 2010, but rose again to around 200bp subsequently.
  - EMBI+ spread increased by about 35 basis points since end-July.
  - Net capital outflows persisted into 2011 despite strengthening current account.
  - Banking system: financial stability maintained but banks burdened with a high stock of nonperforming assets; staff welcomed FSAP recommendations to strengthen supervision and consolidate oversight (legislation on connected lending and consolidated supervision flagged as a key priority).

### Policy recommendations (staff advice)
- Fiscal policy:
  - Implement a more decisive fiscal consolidation that is credible, ambitious, and growth-friendly to restore sustainability of the nonoil deficit.
  - Use a sound fiscal framework to support deficit reduction.
  - Pursue growth-friendly, credible measures unless oil prices and growth deteriorate substantially.

- Monetary policy:
  - Focus monetary policy on lowering inflation; staff advocates further monetary tightening to bring inflation toward 3–5 percent medium-term.

- Financial supervision and intermediation:
  - Strengthen financial sector supervision to reduce risks and support sustainable credit growth.
  - Speed adoption of legislation on connected lending and consolidated supervision.

- Structural reforms and investment climate:
  - Improve the business and investment climate to diversify exports and achieve high-quality economic growth.
  - Staff supports the President’s plan to strengthen the business environment.

### Strategy 2020, political calendar, and process
- An initial draft of Strategy 2020 was released in August as an interim report developed by expert working groups commissioned by the government.
  - The report proposes recommendations to achieve high-quality economic growth by ensuring macroeconomic and social stability, improving the business and investment climate, and diversifying exports.
  - Discussion of Strategy 2020 is ongoing; authorities plan to seek input from foreign experts, including the Fund.
  - The process is expected to lead to changes in policy recommendations and should be completed by December 1.
  - Staff’s preliminary assessment: recommendations dovetail well with reforms discussed in the staff report and would help lay the basis for sustained growth.

- Political timetable:
  - Parliamentary elections date set for December 4.
  - Presidential elections to follow in the first part of 2012.

### Key summary points from the 2011 Article IV context
- Background and challenges:
  - Crisis response was broadly effective, but post-crisis economic performance has been unimpressive despite high oil prices.
  - Exit from crisis-related fiscal stimulus has been slow; central bank hesitant to respond to rising inflation.
  - Poor business climate hampers investment; banks carry a high stock of nonperforming assets.
  - Key challenge: leverage the commodity boom to achieve sustained higher growth and reduce vulnerabilities by breaking procyclical policies, strengthening policy frameworks, and reinvigorating reforms.
  - Authorities broadly agreed with the assessment but indicated that most difficult reforms may be postponed until after the 2011 parliamentary and 2012 presidential elections.

- Staff and authorities’ positions:
  - Authorities did not see a clear need to tighten monetary policy, expecting slower money growth, moderation of food inflation, and further ruble appreciation to reduce inflationary pressures.
  - Both authorities and staff attach great importance to improving the investment climate.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpt, August 4, 2011.*

### 6.      Credit growth has resumed,

### 6.      Credit growth has resumed,

### Credit conditions and banking sector
- Credit growth has resumed, but banks’ balance sheets still carry significant weak assets.
- Nonperforming loans (NPLs) have come down from a peak of 10 percent during the crisis to 8.1 percent of loans in April.
- Profitability has bounced back from crisis lows.
- Banks remain burdened by a high stock of nonperforming assets.
- Real credit growth reached only about 4 percent in 2010, although it has picked up further in recent months, reflecting stronger demand and improving funding conditions.

### Gradual exit from crisis-related policies
- The Russian authorities are gradually exiting from crisis policy support, but the exit has been slow and, in some areas, not sufficiently ambitious.
- Fiscal policy
  - The large and poorly-targeted fiscal stimulus, much of it in the form of permanent measures, is being only partially withdrawn.
  - Following a massive fiscal expansion of some 9 percent of GDP during the crisis, the general government nonoil deficit fell by 1¾ percent of GDP in 2010, mainly on account of the recovering economy and expenditure under-execution, rather than a deliberate tightening of fiscal policy.
  - The medium-term budget plans only a modest further reduction in the federal nonoil deficit of some 2¼ percent of GDP by 2013.
  - Over half of the planned adjustment stems from the increase in the rate of the payroll tax in 2011 from 26 to 34 percent; the remainder from a reduction in civil service employment (policy plans still being elaborated) and lower investment and transfers.
  - Consolidation measures in the 2011-13 Budget (Percent of GDP):
    - Revenue 1.6
    - Increase in payroll tax 1.6
    - Expenditure 0.7
    - Cuts to wage bill 0.9
    - Social security (transfers) 0.2
    - Investment 0.4
    - Other -0.8
    - Total 2.3
- Monetary policy and CBR actions
  - The CBR has been slow to respond to rising inflation. Even though inflation had been steadily increasing since the summer of 2010, a policy tightening was not initiated until the end of the year.
  - Following an initial increase in the CBR’s overnight deposit rate in December 2010, policy rates were tightened more comprehensively in February, April, and May (but rates were left unchanged in June).
  - The CBR raised reserve requirements and differentiated them by residency. The floating band for the ruble has been widened and intervention amounts scaled back.
- Banking sector support unwound
  - By mid-2010, the CBR had exited from the extraordinary liquidity support and terminated the relaxed loan classification rules introduced during the crisis.
  - The CBR’s uncollateralized lending to banks was terminated at end-2010, and interbank market guarantees were unwound.

### Near-term outlook and risks
- Outlook summary
  - Against the backdrop of a still-fragile banking system, increased risk aversion by investors, and continued political uncertainty, the outlook is for only modest growth, despite high oil prices.
  - Risks relate to oil prices and capital flows.
- IMF staff projections and expectations
  - Staff projects real growth at 4.8 percent in 2011, compared to over 7 percent during 2000–07, even as the output gap is still negative and oil prices are high.
  - Inflation is projected to fall to 8 percent by end-2011, assuming food prices continue to moderate.
- Near-term risks
  - Upside: higher oil prices and the return of large capital inflows, if political uncertainty lifts, could push growth up.
  - Downside: lower oil prices, increased global risk aversion, lower external demand, domestic complacency, or a lower appetite for reform could drag growth down.
  - An intensification of the Euro Area debt crisis could have a significant negative impact on the Russian economy through trade and financial linkages.

### Medium-term outlook and scenarios
- Baseline
  - Under unchanged policies, medium-term growth will be held back by weak policy frameworks and the lack of economic diversification.
  - Unless weaknesses are forcefully addressed, growth prospects will remain subdued, with real growth projected to fall to 3¾ percent by 2016 in the baseline scenario.
  - Long-term potential growth will be modest—below 4 percent—and Russia will remain vulnerable to shocks.
  - Inflation will come down somewhat on the back of a moderate withdrawal of government demand and an appreciating ruble, but will remain elevated.
  - The current account surplus will gradually decline as oil prices stabilize and imports pick up.
- Adverse scenario
  - A continuation of weak policies would amplify Russia’s vulnerability to external shocks.
  - The adverse scenario assumes a sharp and permanent decline in commodity prices—oil prices declining sharply to $50 per barrel in 2012 and staying there in real terms for the remainder of the forecast—putting considerable pressure on Russia’s external and fiscal accounts, triggering another recession.
  - Investor confidence would be slow to return and capital outflows would continue putting a drag on long-run growth.
- Reform scenario
  - Elevating the medium-term growth path would require a major strengthening of economic policies.
  - The reform scenario envisages higher medium-term growth—around 6 percent—supported by a stronger and more credible fiscal retrenchment, monetary policy taking control of inflation, a stronger and more competitive financial system, and effective implementation of structural reforms.
  - Short-term drag on growth from fiscal retrenchment would be offset by a more stable and business-friendly economic environment and greater credibility of government policies, boosting investor confidence and supporting an early return of productive capital inflows.
- Scenario assumptions (summary)
  - Baseline: continuation of current policies; monetary policy focuses on multiple objectives with some greater exchange-rate flexibility; inflation remains elevated; fiscal policy implements the 2011-13 medium-term budget with no additional consolidation after 2013; no major changes in banking sector policies; policy frameworks unreformed.
  - Adverse: permanent external shock (oil to $50 per barrel in 2012 and thereafter in real terms); fiscal and monetary responses as specified; no progress on structural reforms.
  - Reform: full implementation of staff-recommended reforms; monetary policy targets inflation down to 3 percent over the medium term with a flexible exchange rate; fiscal policy implements a more ambitious consolidation with the federal nonoil deficit declining to the government’s long-term target of 4.7 percent of GDP by 2015; supervisory framework strengthened; fundamental structural reforms enacted.

### Leveraging the oil boom: policy recommendations
- Strengthen fiscal policy
  - Implement a credible, ambitious, and growth-friendly fiscal consolidation anchored in a sound fiscal framework to reduce fiscal vulnerabilities.
  - Durable consolidation will require a credible and sustainable fiscal anchor and effective implementation of fundamental structural reforms, including in pensions, healthcare, and social protection.
- Monetary policy
  - A more decisive and better communicated monetary tightening—underpinned by a flexible exchange rate and an improved monetary framework—would help bring down inflation.
- Financial sector
  - Stronger oversight of the financial sector would promote stability and underpin faster growth.
- Structural reforms and governance
  - Better governance and a more welcoming business environment would help attract productive investment and facilitate economic diversification.
  - Staff encouraged authorities to incorporate these reforms into the 2020 social and economic strategy now being formulated.
- Fiscal vulnerability warning
  - Staff cautioned that continued high nonoil deficits would amplify fiscal vulnerabilities and undermine economic stability.
  - At 12¾ percent of GDP in 2010, the federal government nonoil deficit was more than 8 percent of GDP above its pre-crisis level.
  - Debt sustainability is currently not an issue, given the still-low public and external debt levels (below 12 percent of GDP, and just over 30 percent of GDP respectively, in 2010).
  - If the output gap closes sooner than expected and fiscal adjustment is delayed, fiscal policy risks becoming procyclical, fueling inflation and real appreciation, undermining competitiveness and contributing to another boom-bust cycle.
  - The oil Reserve Fund—used to finance Russia’s massive fiscal stimulus during the crisis—has been largely run down, leaving public finances vulnerable to a sudden drop in oil prices.

*Source: 2011 Article IV Report — Russian Federation (excerpts).*

### 15.      In this regard, staff views the

### _cr11294 - 15.      In this regard, staff views the

### Fiscal stance and medium-term budget assessment
- Staff view: the medium-term budget "falls short of what is needed to reduce fiscal risks."
- 2011–13 budget projection:
  - By 2013 the nonoil deficit will be "some 5¾ percent of GDP above the government’s long-term deficit target of 4.7 percent of GDP."
  - Government’s long-term deficit target: 4.7 percent of GDP (suspended during the crisis).
- Staff reaction to policy moves:
  - Regretted the recently-approved supplemental budget for 2011 as it "further delayed consolidation."
  - Preliminary 2012–14 budget plans (made public after the mission) are seen as "a step backward"—propose less ambitious retrenchment in 2012 and 2013, with "the nonoil deficit remaining in double digits through 2014."
  - The planned upward revision to the 2012 and 2013 nonoil deficit targets "puts in question the government’s commitment to fiscal sustainability and weakens the credibility of fiscal policy."
- Composition and growth impact:
  - Staff estimates the adjustment in the 2011–13 budget could "shave off as much as 1½ percentage points of annual real growth by 2013" because the government withdraws demand and employment contracts in response to an increase in the payroll tax.
  - "The negative growth impact of the higher payroll tax would persist in the medium term."
  - Authorities acknowledged potential harm from the payroll tax increase and announced plans to reduce it in 2012; government is discussing offsetting measures to compensate for lost revenue.

### Budget numbers (percent of GDP) — 2011–13 Budget vs. Draft 2012–14 Budget (Source: Ministry of Finance)
- Total revenues: 19.3 17.0 18.5 16.8 18.4 18.0
- Nonoil and gas revenues: 9.5 9.1 9.9 9.2 10.2 10.3
- Total expenditures: 20.7 20.1 21.2 19.7 21.2 20.3
- Overall deficit: -1.3 -3.1 -2.7 -2.9 -2.7 -2.3
- Nonoil deficit: -11.2 -10.9 -11.3 -10.4 -11.0 -10.1

### Fiscal framework weaknesses and risks
- Identified weaknesses that undermine sustainability and amplify growth costs of tightening:
  - Lack of a "credible and sustainable anchor for fiscal policy."
  - Policy focus on the overall rather than the nonoil balance.
  - Use of supplementary budgets to spend excess oil revenue, contributing to procyclicality and undermining budget target credibility.
- Additional concerns:
  - Weak budgeting practices restrain public service delivery quality, particularly in capital projects (citing World Bank Public Expenditure Review).
  - Fiscal vulnerabilities from contingent liabilities (deposit insurance scheme, state-controlled enterprises) need better assessment, disclosure, and management.

### Staff recommendations on fiscal consolidation: growth-friendly, credible, ambitious (Box 4 summary)
- Growth-friendly measures:
  - Direct adjustment toward growth-friendly instruments: reverse temporary subsidies extended to strategic enterprises during the crisis; reduce transfers and tax exemptions.
  - Focus on items with low fiscal multipliers; favorable external environment (including high oil prices) would help.
- Credibility-enhancing measures:
  - Front-load consolidation (example: "carrying out two-thirds of the adjustment in the first three years").
  - Strengthen the fiscal framework and clearly spell out planned policies.
  - Durable consolidation underpinned by fundamental structural reforms, especially in pensions and healthcare, and social protection.
  - Note: authorities convened an expert Working Group on pensions in January 2011 and will outline pension reform options later in the year, but implementation likely postponed until after elections.
- Ambitious target:
  - Staff advocated reinstating the government's nonoil deficit anchor of 4.7 percent of GDP and aiming to reach it by 2015.

### Possible consolidation measures (Percent of GDP) — Budget savings
- Short-term (<): 7.0
  - Increase excise taxes: 0.7
  - VAT reform: 1.0
  - Cut subsidies to enterprises 1/: 1.3
  - Cut tax expenditures 2/: < 4.0
- Medium-to-long-term: 6.1–7.1
  - Reduce wage bill: 0.9
  - Better target social transfers: 1.0
  - Increase retirement age: 2.0–3.0
  - Reduce early pensions: 0.7
  - Improve capital budgeting: 0.4
  - Improve regional expenditure efficiency: 1.1
- Total: < 13.1–14.1
- Notes:
  - 1/ Originally part of crisis-related stimulus.
  - 2/ As noted by Finance Minister Kudrin in 2010. Excludes potential savings from unifying VAT rates and reducing VAT exemptions, reported separately based on WB estimates.

### Permanent Oil Income Model (POIM) application to Russia (Box 3 key points)
- POIM basics:
  - Applies the permanent income hypothesis to allocate government wealth (including oil in the ground) across generations.
  - Basic POIM yields a constant per capita level of the primary nonoil deficit financed by perpetual income from oil wealth.
- POIM-real criterion alternative:
  - Maintains purchasing power of wealth distributed each year, keeping government spending constant in real terms.
  - Less restrictive early on; more conservative in outer years; suited to spend some oil wealth upfront for public services and infrastructure.
- Staff view:
  - POIM or POIM-real criterion appropriate for Russia because:
    - (i) sufficiently conservative to address long-run fiscal risks (pension reform costs, rising healthcare costs);
    - (ii) similar rule already in Russia’s budget code (temporarily suspended during the crisis), indicating ownership and political buy-in.
- Staff calculations:
  - POIM-real criterion approach "would be broadly consistent with the government’s nonoil deficit target of 4.7 percent of GDP."
  - Based on July 2011 WEO oil price assumptions:
    - POIM-real criteria rule would be consistent with fiscal consolidation to about 5½ percent of GDP by 2015.
    - POIM approach would imply consolidation to about 1½ percent of GDP in the medium term, but allow higher consumption of oil wealth in outer years than POIM-real.

### Strengthening fiscal policy framework and institutions
- Key elements proposed to enhance credibility and balanced growth:
  - Eschew excessive use of supplementary budgets to avoid procyclical spending increases.
  - Replenish the Reserve Fund using high oil prices through more ambitious consolidation to create a cushion against external shocks.
    - Authorities noted assets in the Reserve Fund "would double this year, to 1.4 trillion rubles (2.7 percent of GDP)."
  - Consider establishing an independent fiscal agency for impartial, transparent fiscal analysis and assessment of implementation.
  - Ministry of Finance established an external advisory group representing academia, think tanks, and the private sector.
  - Authorities plan accounting of tax expenditures—staff welcomed this and recommended speedy streamlining to improve allocation, reduce rent-seeking incentives, and support fiscal retrenchment.
  - Strengthen public financial management and procurement to improve spending effectiveness.

### Monetary policy: recent actions and staff assessment
- Recent tightening:
  - Monetary policy "has been slow to respond to rising inflation but has recently been tightened."
  - CBR tightening cycle began in late December 2010 after inflationary pressures built since summer 2010.
- Inflation outlook and staff forecast:
  - Headline inflation: "9½ percent in June."
  - Staff’s leading indicators model suggests inflation at end-2011 will reach "8 percent," "remaining well outside the CBR’s target range of 6–7 percent."
  - Staff advocated continued tightening to put inflation on a firm declining trend toward a medium-term level of "3–5 percent."
- Authorities' view:
  - Authorities expected food-price trends, money growth moderation, and some ruble appreciation could reduce inflation to "7 percent by the end of the year," close to the CBR target, weakening case for further tightening.
  - Authorities considered it "already too late for monetary policy to influence end-2011 inflation significantly."
- Operational framework recommendations:
  - Streamline policy instruments to improve transmission.
  - Drain remaining excess reserves via open market operations to make the refinance rate binding.
  - Gradually narrow the interest rate policy corridor to reduce interest rate volatility.
  - Move from a nonbinding refinance rate toward a binding open market operations rate centered in the policy-rate corridor as the main policy target.
  - Communicate a time-bound path for these changes to market participants.
- Authorities’ response:
  - Broad agreement with staff on the need to strengthen the operational framework and preparation of improvements.
  - In the context of recent interest rate increases, the authorities had already "effected some narrowing of the policy rate corridor."

*Source: _cr11294 - 15.      In this regard, staff views the (2011 Article IV Report, Russian Federation).*

### 24.      The staff welcomed recent steps by

### _cr11294 - 24.      The staff welcomed recent steps by

### Exchange-rate flexibility and monetary policy
- The CBR widened the operational band for the ruble and conducted smaller, less frequent interventions, creating room for monetary policy to focus more squarely on inflation.
- Authorities and staff agreed it was important that the trend toward a more flexible ruble is continued going forward.
- Some further appreciation that might result in the context of high oil prices and a more flexible exchange rate would not be an immediate concern for competitiveness since the ruble appears slightly undervalued at present.

### Defense against excessive capital inflows
- A flexible exchange rate and fiscal tightening should be the first lines of defense against excessive capital inflows.
- Staff view: differentiation of reserve requirements by residency appeared unwarranted at present, given that Russia was not seeing net capital inflows; the authorities conceded it was largely a preventative measure.
- Given that the ruble is somewhat undervalued, staff advocated allowing more rapid exchange-rate appreciation if inflows return in force.
- Recommended fiscal retrenchment would further reduce overheating pressures.
- Staff emphasized that capital flow management measures (especially capital controls) should not be used in place of these (necessary) macroeconomic policy adjustments.

### Financial stability: crisis response and current condition
- The authorities maintained financial stability during the global shock through liquidity support to banks and a carefully managed exchange-rate adjustment.
- The financial system is recovering and performance of financial institutions improved in 2010; financial soundness indicators are rebounding and compare broadly favorably with peers, though generally remain below pre-crisis levels and may understate problems owing to weaknesses in reporting.
- The FSAP financial stability assessment identified several areas for improving financial sector policies and bringing them in line with international standards; such improvements are essential to advance the authorities’ goal of turning Moscow into an international financial center.

### Stress tests and vulnerabilities
- FSAP stress tests: under a “severe” double-dip scenario that assumes a 4 percent contraction of GDP in 2011 (a 1.7 standard deviation shock relative to the 2000–10 average), net losses would amount to about 22 percent of system capital.
- Under that scenario:
  - System-wide capital adequacy ratio (CAR) would be 14.1 percent.
  - Banks representing about 8 percent of the system by assets would see their CAR fall below 10 percent.
- Single-factor tests indicate credit risk (including concentration risk) is the most important source of vulnerability; liquidity risk is also significant.
- FSAP caveat: the financial system may be more vulnerable than stress tests suggest because loan quality may be overestimated and provisioning remains lower than it should be; illustrative adjustments to banks’ balance sheets for these factors could well exceed stress-test impacts.

### Banking sector structure and moral hazard
- Recent consolidation favored a few large state-owned banks, reducing competition and potentially increasing moral hazard.
- Deposit shares:
  - At end-2010 the state banks held 52 percent of total deposits.
- State banks' market position:
  - Their share in lending and total system capital also rose during the crisis due to easier access to funding and capital.
- Consequences:
  - Some private banks are trending towards niche markets and possibly greater risk-taking.
  - Strong government support to systemic state-owned banks during the crisis may have increased moral hazard.

### FSAP short-term and medium-term recommendations (Box 5)
- Short term (implementation within 12 months):
  - Empower the CBR to use professional judgment in interpreting laws and regulations, issuing enforceable risk management guidance, and applying it to individual banks.
  - Approve pending amendments to expand CBR supervisory authority over bank holding companies and related parties, and eliminate restrictions on information-sharing with other domestic and foreign supervisors.
  - Allow the CBR to sanction individual directors and managers, raise capital requirements on individual institutions, and impose restrictions on transactions between affiliates.
  - Ensure the unified securities and insurance supervisor (FSFM) has the power to issue secondary regulation to interpret the law, as well as industry-wide binding norms.
  - Empower the FSFM to require insurers to have in place internal controls and risk management systems commensurate with the complexity of their business.
  - Apply fit and proper requirements to directors and key management of insurers on an ongoing basis.
  - Make home-host notifications and cross-border cooperation in insurance mandatory for the FSFM.
  - Adopt pending legislation that empowers the FSFM to appoint a provisional administrator, freeze assets, and wind down distressed securities firms.
- Medium term (implementation in 1–3 years):
  - Adopt a prompt remedial action framework for banks.
  - Give the chairman and key members of FSFM fixed-term appointments.
  - Require government guarantee for all CBR loans that are unsecured or not backed by marketable collateral or guarantees.
  - Require repo transactions to take place using central counterparty clearing.
  - Set limits on concentration of collateral in the repo market.
  - Introduce a unified administration regime for all banks (systemic or otherwise) with broad powers for the administrator.
  - Open-bank assistance such as loans, capital injections, nationalization by the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) should be restricted to systemic situations.

### Regulatory and supervisory gaps
- Key FSAP findings:
  - Lack of authority for the CBR to supervise bank holding companies and related parties, issue binding guidance on risk management by banks, and use supervisory discretion in applying laws and regulations to individual banks limits effective supervision (example: Bank of Moscow episode).
  - Merger of securities and insurance supervisors could be beneficial, but the merger process remains surrounded by uncertainties, including with respect to powers of the new agency.
- Authorities agreed a stronger regulatory and supervisory framework would safeguard soundness and promote sustainable credit growth.
  - Key improvements sought: greater supervisory authority for the CBR, adoption of pending legislation regarding connected lending and consolidated supervision, and greater discretion to use “professional judgment” in applying laws and regulations to individual banks.
  - Staff urged adoption of a transparent framework for prompt remedial action with mandatory escalating measures and ensured adequacy of provisions.
  - Authorities noted legislation on consolidated supervision had been submitted to the Duma but expressed concern it could be weakened; CBR exploring options for a transparent remedial action framework.

### Nonbank financial institutions and FSFM
- Nonbank sector is small and not systemically important, but the insurance sector is performing poorly and many companies will not meet increased minimum capital requirements in 2012, underscoring need for regulatory vigilance.
- Authorities noted the merger of securities and insurance supervisors offers prospects to:
  - Give supervisors a comprehensive market view.
  - Expand perimeter of oversight.
  - Harmonize supervisory approaches and requirements.
  - Realize economies of scale.
- Staff emphasized the new Federal Service for Financial Markets (FSFM) framework should provide power to issue secondary regulation and industry-wide binding norms, ensure independence and adequate resources; plans appear broadly appropriate but require full and effective implementation.

### Systemic risk monitoring
- Strengthening systemic risk monitoring is key to containing moral hazard and associated vulnerabilities given the outsize importance of a few large banks.
- Recent steps:
  - Establishment of an inter-agency working group under the Presidential Council.
  - Creation of a special department at the CBR in charge of macroprudential analysis.
- FSAP recommended including the Deposit Insurance Agency in the working group; authorities indicated this was being arranged.
- FSAP recommended the CBR maintain the possibility of permanent supervisory on-site presence in systemically important banks.

### Improving the investment climate and structural reforms
- Improving the investment climate is key to attracting productive capital inflows and promoting sustainable growth; broader structural and governance reforms are needed to boost investment and support economic diversification.
- Staff and authorities agreed that poor business environment and weak governance are key obstacles to economic diversification and vibrant growth.
- Adverse demographic trends imply investment and productivity gains must be primary sources of long-term growth, underscoring need for better business climate and governance.
- Authorities noted addressing these issues is a key reform priority as reflected in the ten-point plan by President Medvedev (Box 6).

### President’s ten-point Action Plan to Improve the Investment Climate (Box 6)
- Plan specifies ten priority measures:
  1. Unwind the recent increase in the payroll tax rate, and cut healthcare procurement costs by 15 percent.
  2. Develop a system to follow up on corruption complaints.
  3. Review business regulations to identify those obstructing business and investment activity.
  4. Appoint an investment ombudsman in each federal district to facilitate business development.
  5. Reduce interference of the state in private business through:
     - Further privatization efforts;
     - Replacement of government regulators on boards of SOEs with independent directors;
     - More transparent public communication regarding government procurement plans.
  6. Improve access of minority shareholders to corporate information.
  7. Establish a state-backed private equity fund to facilitate foreign direct investment in non-natural resource sectors.
  8. Reduce the authority of the state commission on foreign investments in strategic sectors.
  9. Improve public services for businesses.
  10. Involve the President’s Office in monitoring the quality of public services.
- Staff welcomed the ten-point plan and called for expeditious implementation, with caveats:
  - Lost revenue from reversing the payroll tax increase should be fully replaced, for example by reducing subsidies to connected enterprises, and eventually by increasing the retirement age, rationalizing early retirement schemes, and means-testing basic pensions.
  - Creation of a private equity fund with government partnership could encourage foreign investment by reducing operational uncertainties, but its political independence should be ensured and contingent liability risks to the sovereign balance sheet contained.
- Staff emphasized broader governance reforms are needed: strengthening property rights and the rule of law, reform of the judiciary system and civil service, and accession to the WTO to improve predictability of trade policy.
- Decisive implementation of planned extensive privatization—including in the banking sector—should help curtail state dominance, improve competition, and reduce moral hazard.
- Authorities confirmed intention to implement an ambitious privatization program in the next three years.

### Staff appraisal: outlook and policy priorities
- Russia’s post-crisis rebound is underway, but bold and decisive reforms are needed to strengthen the medium-term outlook.
- Despite strong pick up in commodity prices, growth has been relatively modest and inflation is high.
- The economy has been on an upward trajectory since the second half of 2009, but the recovery has been uneven.
- Weak economic policy frameworks, an unfavorable investment climate, and lack of economic diversification continue to weigh on the outlook, raising the specter of below-par growth and continued instability.
- The authorities have a window of opportunity, created by high commodity prices, to reduce vulnerabilities and lay the foundation for stronger growth.
- Policy focus recommended:
  - Reduce fiscal vulnerabilities.
  - Rein in inflation.
  - Promote a stronger and more competitive banking system.
  - Create a welcoming environment for investment.
  - Improve economic policy frameworks and reinvigorate long-stalled structural reforms to boost growth potential.
- The 2020 strategy under preparation provides an opportunity to put in place reforms to support stronger growth and generate positive spillovers for the region.

*Source: RUSSIAN FEDERATION 2011 ARTICLE IV REPORT, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.*

### 39.      Fiscal policy needs to be firmly

### 39.      Fiscal policy needs to be firmly

### Fiscal policy: sustainable nonoil deficit target
- Reinstate the government’s long-term nonoil deficit target of 4.7 percent of GDP.
- Reach this target by 2015 through concrete plans grounded in growth-friendly measures.
- Growth-friendly measures specified:
  - Reversal of the payroll tax increase.
  - Reductions in subsidies and tax exemptions.
  - Better targeting of social transfers.
- Objectives and expected outcomes:
  - Put public finances on a sustainable path.
  - Preserve oil wealth for future generations.
  - Rebuild fiscal buffers in the oil funds, in line with the authorities’ stated goal, thereby reducing fiscal vulnerabilities.
- Structural reforms required for durable adjustment:
  - Fundamental reforms to pensions, social protection, and healthcare.
- Sequencing and credibility:
  - Front-loading the consolidation, while strengthening fiscal institutions, would enhance credibility and help realize sooner the growth benefits.
  - The 2012–14 preliminary budget should be reconsidered because it further delays fiscal consolidation, exacerbates fiscal risks, and undermines the credibility of fiscal policy with potentially negative knock-on effects on growth.

### Monetary policy: rein in inflation
- Continued tightening of monetary policy is needed despite a still-negative output gap.
- Inflation goals and rationale:
  - Core inflation and inflation expectations are uncomfortably high.
  - Continued policy tightening will be needed this year to bring inflation down towards a medium-term rate of 3-5 percent.
- Measures to bolster effectiveness:
  - Improvements to the operational framework for monetary policy.
  - A consistent communications policy; transparency could be increased by publishing information on inflation expectations and medium-term inflation forecasts.
- Exchange rate policy:
  - Ongoing steps to enhance exchange rate flexibility are a positive development.
  - Flexible exchange rate and fiscal adjustment would serve as the first lines of defense against volatile capital flows and allow monetary policy to focus on inflation.

### Financial sector: regulatory and supervisory gaps
- Context:
  - Authorities successfully maintained financial stability in the recent global crisis, but the banking system remains vulnerable to shocks, including potential spillovers from the Euro area.
- Recommendations from the FSAP financial stability assessment:
  - Strengthen financial sector policies.
  - Grant the CBR greater supervisory powers.
  - Adopt legislation on consolidated supervision and connected lending.
- Expected benefits:
  - Effective implementation of the FSAP recommendations would reduce banking sector risks and bring supervision in line with international standards.

### Investment climate and diversification
- Strategic priority:
  - Enhance the attractiveness of the investment climate to increase the non-energy share of the economy, given the nonrenewable nature of oil and gas reserves.
- Means to achieve diversification and higher growth:
  - Attract durable and productive investment through macroeconomic stability and an enhanced business environment.
  - Effectively implement the President’s action plan as a potential contributor to this goal.
  - Sustain broader reform efforts to fully reap growth benefits, including:
    - WTO accession.
    - Reducing the role of the state in the economy.
    - Improving governance.

*2011 ARTICLE IV REPORT RUSSIAN FEDERATION*

### 43.      It is proposed that the next Article IV

### It is proposed that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard 12-month cycle.

### Macroeconomic outlook and key projections
- Real GDP:
  - 2008: 5.2
  - 2009: -7.8
  - 2010: 4.0
  - 2011 (Estimate): 4.8
  - 2012 (Projection): 4.5
  - Medium-term projections (Table 5 baseline): 2013: 4.3; 2014: 4.1; 2015: 3.9; 2016: 3.8
- Consumer prices (period average):
  - 2008: 14.1
  - 2009: 11.7
  - 2010: 6.9
  - 2011 (Estimate): 9.1
  - 2012 (Projection): 7.6
- GDP deflator:
  - 2008: 18.0
  - 2009: 1.9
  - 2010: 11.4
  - 2011: 14.6
  - 2012: 8.4
- Unemployment rate:
  - 2008: 6.4
  - 2009: 8.4
  - 2010: 7.5
  - 2011: 7.3
  - 2012: 7.1
- Nominal GDP:
  - Billions of rubles: 2008: 41,277; 2009: 38,786; 2010: 44,939; 2011: 53,980; 2012: 61,152
  - Billions of U.S. dollars: 2008: 1,665; 2009: 1,231; 2010: 1,488; 2011: 1,909; 2012: 2,188
- Exchange rate (rubles per U.S. dollar, period average):
  - 2008: 24.9
  - 2009: 31.7
  - 2010: 30.4

### Fiscal operations and public sector balances
- General government (percent of GDP):
  - Net lending/borrowing (overall balance): 2008: 4.9; 2009: -6.3; 2010: -3.5; 2011: -1.1; 2012: -1.5
  - Revenue: 2008: 39.2; 2009: 35.1; 2010: 35.0; 2011: 37.1; 2012: 36.0
  - Expenditures: 2008: 34.3; 2009: 41.4; 2010: 38.5; 2011: 38.2; 2012: 37.5
  - Primary balance: 2008: 5.3; 2009: -5.7; 2010: -2.9; 2011: -0.3; 2012: -0.4
  - Nonoil balance: 2008: -7.7; 2009: -15.2; 2010: -13.4; 2011: -12.2; 2012: -11.7
- Federal government (percent of GDP):
  - Net lending/borrowing (overall balance): 2008: 3.6; 2009: -5.9; 2010: -4.0; 2011: -1.3; 2012: -1.7
  - Nonoil balance: 2008: -7.6; 2009: -13.8; 2010: -12.7; 2011: -11.2; 2012: -10.9
- Fiscal memorandum (Table 3):
  - Oil fund(s): 2009: 11.9; 2010: 7.7; 2011: 7.7; 2012: 6.8
  - Reserve Fund: 2009: 4.7; 2010: 1.7; 2011: 2.7; 2012: 2.4
  - NWF: 2009: 7.1; 2010: 6.0; 2011: 5.0; 2012: 4.4
  - General government debt (percent of GDP): 2009: 11.0; 2010: 11.7; 2011: 11.6; 2012: 11.3

### External sector and balance of payments
- Current account (billions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2008: 103.7; 2009: 49.5; 2010: 71.1; 2011: 101.9; 2012: 86.8
  - Current account (percent of GDP): 2008: 6.2; 2009: 4.1; 2010: 4.8; 2011: 5.3; 2012: 4.0
- Trade balance (billions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2008: 179.7; 2009: 111.6; 2010: 151.4; 2011: 193.9; 2012: 185.4
  - Exports (f.o.b.): 2008: 471.6; 2009: 303.4; 2010: 400.1; 2011: 515.1; 2012: 543.1
    - Energy exports (billions): 2008: 310.1; 2009: 190.7; 2010: 254.0; 2011: 338.2; 2012: 351.2
      - Oil: 2008: 241.0; 2009: 148.7; 2010: 206.3; 2011: 286.3; 2012: 298.9
      - Gas: 2008: 69.1; 2009: 42.0; 2010: 47.7; 2011: 51.9; 2012: 52.3
    - Non-energy exports (billions): 2008: 161.5; 2009: 112.7; 2010: 146.1; 2011: 176.8; 2012: 191.9
  - Imports (f.o.b.): 2008: -291.9; 2009: -191.8; 2010: -248.7; 2011: -321.1; 2012: -357.7
- Capital and financial account (billions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2008: -131.0; 2009: -44.3; 2010: -28.5; 2011: -30.4; 2012: -19.9
  - Private sector capital: 2008: -122.6; 2009: -58.1; 2010: -29.0; 2011: -34.0; 2012: -20.0
- Gross international reserves (billions of U.S. dollars; end period):
  - 2008: 427.1; 2009: 439.5; 2010: 479.4; 2011: 550.8; 2012: 617.6
  - Months of imports (GNFS): 2008: 14.0; 2009: 20.8; 2010: 17.9; 2011: 15.9; 2012: 16.1
  - Percent of short-term debt: 2008: 288; 2009: 303; 2010: 349; 2011: 375; 2012: 422

### Monetary accounts and liquidity indicators
- Base money (12-month change):
  - 2008: 2.9; 2009: 7.4; 2010: 22.9; 2011: 25.5; 2012: 30.2 (Table 4 shows monthly ruble figures and projections)
- Ruble broad money (12-month change):
  - 2008: 0.8; 2009: 17.7; 2010: 35.0; 2011: 33.6; 2012: 35.0
- Credit to the economy (12-month change):
  - 2008: 37.2; 2009: 2.6; 2010: 12.9; 2011: 21.7; 2012: 20.4
- Net international reserves of monetary authorities (NIR, billions of U.S. dollars, Table 4 monthly series):
  - Dec 2008: 11,199; Dec 2009: 12,755; Dec 2010: 13,529; Dec 2011 (proj): 14,460; Dec 2012 (proj): 14,595

### Financial soundness and banking sector metrics
- Capital adequacy:
  - Capital to risk-weighted assets: 2008: 16.8; 2009: 20.9; 2010: 18.1
  - Core capital to risk-weighted assets: 2008: 10.6; 2009: 13.2; 2010: 11.1
- Asset quality:
  - NPLs to total loans: 2008: 3.8; 2009: 9.6; 2010: 8.2
  - Loan loss provisions to total loans: 2008: 4.5; 2009: 9.1; 2010: 8.5
- Liquidity:
  - Liquid assets to total assets: 2008: 25.9; 2009: 28.0; 2010: 26.8
  - Liquid assets to short-term liabilities: 2008: 92.1; 2009: 102.4; 2010: 94.3
- Profitability and margins:
  - Return on assets: 2008: 1.8; 2009: 0.7; 2010: 1.9
  - Return on equity: 2008: 13.3; 2009: 4.9; 2010: 12.5
  - Net interest margin for customer loans: 2008: 5.6; 2009: 12.2; 2010: 6.7

### External vulnerability and debt metrics
- Total external debt (billions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2008: 480.5; 2009: 467.2; 2010: 488.7; 2011: 482.2; 2012: 487.7
  - Total external debt (percent of GDP): 2008: 28.9; 2009: 38.2; 2010: 33.0; 2011: 25.3; 2012: 22.3
- Short-term external indicators (Table 8):
  - Official reserves (months of imports goods and services): 2008: 17.4; 2009: 20.3; 2010: 14.0; 2011: 20.8; 2012: 17.9
  - Total short-term external debt to reserves: 2008: 71.2; 2009: 30.9; 2010: 33.9; 2011: 31.3; 2012: 30.7
- External financing needs (Table 10):
  - Gross external financing need (billions of U.S. dollars): 2008: 112.4; 2009: 98.6; 2010: 74.2; 2011: 35.5; 2012: 60.3
  - External debt-to-exports ratio (percent): 2008: 91.9; 2009: 135.4; 2010: 109.9; 2011: 84.4; 2012: 82.5

### Public sector debt sustainability highlights
- Public sector debt (percent of GDP):
  - 2008: 7.9; 2009: 11.0; 2010: 11.7; 2011: 11.6; 2012: 11.3; 2016 projection: 17.8
- Debt-stabilizing primary balance and identified debt-creating flows (Table 9):
  - Change in public sector debt (percent of GDP): 2008: -0.6; 2009: 3.1; 2010: 0.8; 2011: -0.1; 2012: -0.4
  - Primary deficit (excluding deposits in oil funds from revenue): 2008: -1.0; 2009: -1.1; 2010: -0.2; 2011: 1.6; 2012: 0.4
  - Public sector debt-to-revenue ratio: 2008: 22.6; 2009: 26.2; 2010: 30.8; 2011: 32.4; 2012: 31.2
- Stress test scenarios (Table 9):
  - Scenario with key variables at their historical averages (selected years): 2011: 6.1; 2016: -1.2
  - Scenario with no policy change (constant primary balance) in 2009–15 (selected years): 2011: 9.1; 2016: -0.5

### Medium-term frameworks and reform scenario snapshots
- Medium-term baseline (Table 5) highlights:
  - External current account balance (percent of GDP): 2008: 6.2; 2009: 4.1; 2010: 4.8; 2011: 5.3; 2012: 4.0; 2016: 0.1
  - General government revenues and expenditures (percent of GDP) trend toward modest consolidation: Revenues from 39.2 (2008) → 36.0 (2012); Expenditures from 34.3 (2008) → 37.5 (2012)
- Reform scenario (Table 6) alternative projections (selected highlights):
  - Real GDP growth (percent): 2008: 5.2; 2009: -7.8; 2010: 4.0; 2011: 4.8; 2012: 4.8; 2016: 6.0
  - General government nonoil balance improves faster under reform scenario: 2012: -9.3 (Table 6) versus -11.7 (Table 5 baseline)

*Source: RUSSIAN FEDERATION 2011 ARTICLE IV REPORT, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.*

### ANNEX I. Russia’s Foreign Currency Reserves—Too Little, Too Much, or Just Right?

### ANNEX I. Russia’s Foreign Currency Reserves—Too Little, Too Much, or Just Right?

### Key findings and summary
- Russia built foreign currency reserves amounting to $444bn at the end of 2010.  
- Oil fund savings (the Reserve Fund and the National Wealth Fund) held at the CBR together amounted to some $93bn at the end of 2010.  
- Accounting for Russia’s large external vulnerabilities and the fact that some reserves reflect fiscal/intergenerational savings, Russia’s current reserves appear to be broadly adequate—no clear indication of under- or overaccumulation.  
- The IMF composite metric indicates total reserves at end-2010 equal 197 percent of the metric, compared with a suggested adequacy range of 100–150 percent.

### External vulnerabilities (evidence)
- Energy dependence: oil and gas account for some two-thirds of exports, exposing Russia to volatile energy prices and frequent terms-of-trade shocks.  
- Export shock example: exports receipts dropped by 34 percent in 2009 following the sharp decline in oil prices.  
- Weak policy and investment climate: Russia ranks 123rd on the World Bank “Doing Business” summary measure, increasing sensitivity to global risk appetite.  
- Capital flight propensity: capital outflows reached over $130 billion (or 8 percent of annual GDP) in Q4 2008, driven by portfolio withdrawals, flight into foreign currency cash, rising bank net foreign asset positions, and net corporate loan repayments.  
- Exchange rate stress: ruble depreciated by about 30 percent against the euro-dollar currency basket and 15 percent in real effective terms during December 2008–January 2009.  
- Reserve drawdown in crisis: authorities lost more than a third (some $210bn) of reserves in a matter of months during the recent crisis.

### Reserves composition and role
- Reserves accumulation reflects:  
  - conventional central bank interventions for exchange rate and precautionary purposes, and  
  - fiscal savings from oil revenues held in sovereign funds (Reserve Fund (RF) and National Wealth Fund (NWF)).  
- Purpose of funds:  
  - RF: medium-term fiscal stabilization (“rainy day” fund).  
  - NWF: longer-term investment to preserve oil wealth and backstop the pension system.  
- Policy-relevant observation: given the NWF’s longer-term objective, there is no clear need to hold all NWF savings in liquid assets; shifting an increasing share to higher-yield, less-liquid assets would likely improve returns and could reduce the portion that qualifies as usable reserves over time.

### Measures of reserve adequacy (standard indicators)
- Standard measures of reserve cover (2010):  
  - Imports (months): 16.6  
  - Short-term debt (percent): 370.9  
  - Broad money (percent): 56.4

### IMF composite metric and Russia-specific calibration
- IMF composite metric combines four channels of potential external drains: short-term debt, portfolio flows, domestic liquidity (broad money), and export volatility; each channel is assigned a risk weight from cross-country experience (tenth percentile loss in episodes of market pressure).  
- Applying the IMF metric (managed exchange rate weights) to Russia at end-2010: total reserves = 197 percent of the metric; suggested adequacy range = 100–150 percent.  
- Caveats for Russia:  
  - The metric focuses on precautionary reserves; fiscal/intergenerational savings held as reserves require separate consideration. Continued accumulation of oil fund savings is highly advisable for smoothing fiscal revenue volatility and supporting pensions.  
  - Russia experienced drains in the recent crisis that exceeded the tenth percentile in 3 out of 4 metric variables, implying cross-country weights may understate potential drains for Russia. An illustrative recalculation using Russia-specific crisis experience increases the suggested reserve adequacy range (text charts referenced).

### Metric weight comparisons (cross-country vs. Russia-specific experience)
- IMF weights (IMF, 2010) vs Russia weights (2008/09 crisis):  
  - Short-term debt: 0.30 vs 0.31  
  - Other portfolio liabilities: 0.15 vs 0.29  
  - Broad money: 0.10 vs 0.04  
  - Exports: 0.10 vs 0.34

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Reserves: current levels are broadly adequate given precautionary needs and fiscal savings objectives, but further accumulation of foreign assets is desirable for non-precautionary (intergenerational/fiscal smoothing) reasons.  
- Investment mix: it would be advisable to invest non-precautionary reserves (particularly NWF assets) in higher-yielding, less-liquid assets, subject to institutional capacity and without reducing usable reserves below precautionary adequacy.  
- Structural reforms to reduce reserve needs over time: to durably reduce external vulnerability and thus reserve requirements, authorities should:  
  - strengthen policy frameworks (fiscal and monetary),  
  - increase exchange rate flexibility, and  
  - reduce economic dependence on oil through diversification.  
- Complementary fiscal reforms (as part of wider IMF/World Bank macrocritical agenda): focus on the nonoil balance, implement a Permanent Oil Income Model (POIM) rule, avoid excessive use of supplemental budgets, and replenish the Reserve Fund to reduce fiscal and economic vulnerabilities and increase policy credibility.

*Source: ANNEX I. Russia’s Foreign Currency Reserves—Too Little, Too Much, or Just Right?*

### 4.      The teams agreed the following

### 4.      The teams agreed the following

### Division of labor: main program areas and roles
- Strengthening the fiscal framework
  - Fund: elaborated reform options and discussed them with the authorities during the 2011 Article IV consultation.
  - Bank: preparing a new lending project for FY13 to strengthen the fiscal regime to encourage business investment, streamline the intergovernmental fiscal system, and increase oversight of financial risks through policy advice and capacity building in the Ministry of Finance and the Federal Tax Service.
  - Bank: monitoring fiscal developments, reforms and policies as part of its regular Russian Economic Reports covering macroeconomic and structural issues.
  - Bank: providing technical assistance on program budgeting and public expenditure efficiency.

- Public expenditure reforms
  - Bank: elaborated reform options in its Public Expenditure Review, discussed with authorities and published in June 2011.
  - Bank: will further explore cooperation with authorities on improving the business environment and public administration reform, including in the regions.

- Reforming the pension system
  - Fund: plans to elaborate reform options, present them at a high-level conference in Moscow in January 2012 (including government, academia, private sector, and civil society), and discuss these options in the context of the 2012 Article IV consultation.
  - Fund: will assess reform proposals of the Working Group on Pensions instituted by the authorities as part of their Strategy 2020; the Working Group will present its report by end-2011.
  - Bank: completed several recent studies related to the pension system, including a study of long-term fiscal risks and a recent paper on the second, private pillar; Bank team has shared these studies and is ready to coordinate with the Fund team as needed.

- Strengthening the monetary policy framework
  - Fund: elaborated reform options and discussed them with the authorities during the 2011 Article IV consultation.

- Financial sector stability module assessment and financial sector development
  - Fund: conducted the assessment in March/April 2011 and discussed reform options with the authorities, with Bank staff participation.
  - Bank: appointed a new private sector/financial sector coordinator for Russia, stationed in Moscow to coordinate longer-term developmental work in the private/financial sector.
  - Bank: preparing a new lending project to:
    - (a) achieve an orderly financial market expansion and development of domestic capital markets to better serve the needs for corporate finance,
    - (b) enhance financial market stability through a modernized state-of-the-art regulatory framework and implementation of robust supervisory and enforcement mechanisms,
    - (c) reach global best practice standards in the market infrastructure and regulation, to achieve a broader international reach as a centre of finance.

### Requests for information and coordination
- Fund team requests
  - To be kept informed of progress in the macrocritical reform areas under the Bank’s purview.

- Bank team requests
  - That the Fund share on a regular basis with WB and invite, as needed, Bank’s comments on policy notes, draft staff reports, and other relevant materials.
  - That Bank staff be invited to attend policy meetings, as has been the case with the 2011 Article Consultation.
  - Timing: in the context of the Article IV and other missions (and at least semi-annually).

### Joint and separate work programs (September 2010–March 2012) — selected items and timing
- Bank work program (selected entries)
  - Country Partnership Strategy — Preparatory work is ongoing.
  - Russian Economic Reports (RER) — Ongoing; provisional mission timing: September 2011, March 2012.
  - Public Expenditure Review — Ongoing; Expected delivery date: June 2011.
  - Russia: Reshaping Economic Geography — Ongoing; Expected delivery date: July 2011.
  - Other analytical work (export diversification, growth and jobs, inequality and economic opportunities, financial sector analysis (pensions, banking, capital markets, and insurance) and technical assistance on diversification and innovation, customs, tax administration and judicial reform) — Ongoing.
  - Russia energy efficiency project — Ongoing.
  - Financial Intermediary Loan (FIL) — Ongoing; Board discussion expected March 2012.
  - Financial Sector Development Project — Ongoing; Board discussion expected March 2012.
  - Fiscal and Financial Development — Ongoing; Board discussion expected Feb. 2012.
  - [Unspecified entry] — Board discussion expected Dec. 2012.

- Fund work program (selected entries)
  - 2010 staff visit — December (n.a. expected delivery date).
  - FSAP stability module update — March/April (n.a. expected delivery date).
  - 2011 Article IV mission — June 2011; provisional timing: September 2011.
  - Presentation of pension fund paper at Gaidar Forum conference — January 2012; expected delivery date: n.a.

- Joint products in next 12 months
  - No joint products planned at this time.

### Statistical issues — Annex III: Assessment and data quality (selected findings)
A. Assessment of Data Adequacy for Surveillance
- General
  - Data provision is broadly adequate for surveillance.
  - Scope for further data improvements exists, notably for assessing external vulnerabilities.
  - Russia is an SDDS subscriber and reports data for the Fund’s statistical publications.

- National Accounts
  - Data are broadly adequate for surveillance, but concerns persist about reliability and consistency of quarterly GDP estimates among a wide range of users, including Fund staff.
  - Rosstat started a national accounts development plan for 2011–17 to expedite compilation of quarterly GDP estimates consistent with annual GDP estimates.
  - Historical revisions: historical revision of the industrial production index released in July 2010; historical revision of annual and quarterly GDP series incorporating results of the 2006 agriculture census and methodological improvements was made in the third quarter of 2010.
  - Rosstat generally follows the 1993 SNA; scope exists for methodological improvements in volume measures of production-based GDP estimates, including FISIM.
  - Imputed rental services of owner-occupied dwellings are undervalued.
  - Improvements constrained by inadequate response to business surveys.
  - Unavailability of balance sheet data is an obstacle for analyzing balance sheet vulnerabilities.

- Price statistics
  - Data are broadly adequate for surveillance, but detailed CPI component time series analyses are challenging due to limited time series data on CPI weights.
  - Monthly CPI and PPI compiled using the Two-State (Modified) Laspeyres (2000=100), cover all regions.
  - Since September 2010, Rosstat has published price indices broken down according to COICOP monthly.
  - Detailed CPI weight data available in Prices in Russia beginning in 1995 and on the Rosstat website beginning in 2006; detailed consumer expenditure data posted annually since 2009.
  - Detailed PPI weight data published on Rosstat website for 2006–2011.
  - Detailed weights are available only on the Russian version of the website.
  - Further efforts to improve treatment of seasonal items in the core inflation index and to implement a new household budget survey could strengthen data quality.

- Government finance statistics
  - Timeliness and level of detail can be improved for surveillance purposes.
  - Since July 2010, data on economic classification of expenditures published monthly with about a 1½ months lag, but consistent historical data problems remain.
  - Data on functional classification of expenditure and financing differ from international standards.
  - Historical data on maturity structure of domestic and external federal debt are not published, except the most recent observation available through SDDS.
  - Monthly data on the size and composition of ruble guarantees are not available prior to 2011.
  - Historical monthly data on foreign currency debt are not available prior to 2009; quarterly data available since 2006.
  - No integrated debt monitoring and reporting system.
  - Reconciliation of different fiscal datasets (budget execution, cash flow statement, GFSM 2001 format, SDDS) is difficult.
  - Recommendation: consolidate fiscal statistical links in a dedicated data dissemination page (Russian and English) and supplement with definitions, compilation methodology, and analytical materials.
  - Authorities are working to address recommendations of the 2010 ROSC Data Module Update.

- Monetary statistics
  - Since July 2008, CBR provides to the IMF summarized data in MFSM-recommended format for Central Bank Survey, Other Depository Corporations Survey, Depository Corporations Survey, Other Financial Corporation Survey, and Financial Corporations Survey.
  - Analysis of balance sheet effects hindered by lack of comparable data on currency and maturity breakdown of banking-sector assets and liabilities.
  - Adoption of full SRFs (as recommended in 2007 STA mission) would provide currency and instrument breakdowns.
  - Starting in July 2010, CBR includes breakdown of positions by currency in the Surveys.

- External sector statistics
  - Balance of payments data broadly adequate for surveillance, with scope for improving coverage of certain current, capital, and financial account components.
  - Balance of payments compiled according to BPM5; CBR actively implementing BPM6 recommendations.
  - CBR adjusts merchandise import data published by the Federal Customs Service to account for “shuttle trade,” smuggling, and undervaluation.
  - Statistical techniques used to estimate transactions and positions of foreign-owned enterprises with production sharing agreements; improvements ongoing.
  - Improvements made in coverage and quality of direct investment surveys; CBR participating in the Fund’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey.
  - Headline reserves data reported to the Fund and markets on a weekly basis with a four-business-day lag.
  - Comprehensive information reported in the Reserves Template with a lag of 20 days, exceeding SDDS timeliness requirement of one month.

B. Data Standards and Quality
- Russia is a subscriber to the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) since January 31, 2005.
- SDDS flexibility option used for the timeliness of data on central government operations.
- A data ROSC prepared in October 2003 was published on the IMF website on May 14, [text ends].

*2011 ARTICLE IV REPORT—INFORMATIONAL ANNEX RUSSIAN FEDERATION, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

### 2004. A data ROSC reassessment in June-July

### 2004. A data ROSC reassessment in June-July

### Summary finding on macroeconomic statistics
- The reassessment published on February 28, 2011 concluded that Russia’s macroeconomic statistics are generally of high quality.
- It found that compiling agencies have made significant progress in adopting international statistical methodologies and best practices.

### Reporting to STA (Optional)
- Data are being reported for publication in the International Financial Statistics (IFS), Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, the Direction of Trade Statistics, and the Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.
- Monetary data reported as the basis for publication in IFS are in the format of summarized surveys rather than in the full detail of the SRFs that present positions by financial instrument disaggregated by currency (national and foreign) and the economic sector of counterparty.

### Table of common indicators required for surveillance (as of June 30, 2011) — key entries and data-quality assessments
- Exchange Rates
  - Date of latest observation: 6/30/11
  - Date received: 6/30/11
  - Frequency of data: D
  - Frequency of reporting: D
  - Frequency of publication: D
- International Reserve Assets and Reserve Liabilities of the Monetary Authorities
  - Date of latest observation: 6/1/2011
  - Date received: 6/6/11
  - Frequency of data: M
  - Frequency of reporting: M
  - Frequency of publication: M
- Reserve/Base Money (narrow definition)
  - Date of latest observation: 6/20/11
  - Date received: 6/24/11
  - Frequency of data: D
  - Frequency of reporting: W
  - Frequency of publication: W
  - Data Quality – Methodological soundness: O, O, LO, LO
  - Data Quality – Accuracy and reliability: O, O, O, O, O
- Reserve/Base Money (broad definition)
  - Date of latest observation: 6/1/2011
  - Date received: 6/14/11
  - Frequency of data: D
  - Frequency of reporting: M
  - Frequency of publication: M
  - Data Quality – Methodological soundness: O,O,LO,LOO,O,O,O,O
- Broad Money
  - Date of latest observation: 6/1/2011
  - Date received: 6/27/11
  - Frequency of data: M
  - Frequency of reporting: M
  - Frequency of publication: M
  - Data Quality – Methodological soundness: O,O,LO,LOO,O,O,O,O
- Central Bank Balance Sheet (Central Bank Survey)
  - Date of latest observation: 6/1/2011
  - Date received: 6/14/11
  - Frequency of data: M
  - Frequency of reporting: M
  - Frequency of publication: M
  - Data Quality – Methodological soundness: O,O,LO,LOO,O,O,O,O
- Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Banking System
  - Date of latest observation: 6/1/2011
  - Date received: 6/30/11
  - Frequency of data: M
  - Frequency of reporting: M
  - Frequency of publication: M
  - Data Quality – Methodological soundness: O,O,LO,LOO,O,O,O,O
- Interest Rates (Both market-based and officially-determined)
  - Date of latest observation: 6/30/11
  - Date received: 6/30/11
  - Frequency of data: D/W/M
  - Frequency of reporting: D/W/M
  - Frequency of publication: D/W/M
- Consumer Price Index
  - Latest observation: May 2011
  - Date received: 6/6/11
  - Frequency of data: M
  - Frequency of reporting: M
  - Frequency of publication: M
  - Data Quality – Methodological soundness: O, LO, LNO, O
  - Data Quality – Accuracy and reliability: O, O, O, O, O, O
- Revenue, Expenditure, Balance and Composition of Financing – General Government
  - Latest observation: April, 2011
  - Date received: 6/7/11
  - Frequency of data: M
  - Frequency of reporting: M
  - Frequency of publication: M
  - Data Quality – Methodological soundness: LO, LNO, LO, O
  - Data Quality – Accuracy and reliability: O, O, LO, O, O
- Revenue, Expenditure, Balance and Composition of Financing – Central Government
  - Latest observation: May, 2011
  - Date received: 6/10/11
  - Frequency of data: M
  - Frequency of reporting: M
  - Frequency of publication: M
- Stocks of Central Government and Central Government-Guaranteed Debt (including currency and maturity composition)
  - Date of latest observation: 6/1/2011
  - Date received: 6/27/11
  - Frequency of data: M
  - Frequency of reporting: M
  - Frequency of publication: M
- External Current Account Balance (Balance of Payments)
  - Latest observation: Q1 2011
  - Date received: 4/5/11
  - Frequency of data: Q
  - Frequency of reporting: Q
  - Frequency of publication: Q
  - Data Quality – Methodological soundness: O, O, O, L O
  - Data Quality – Accuracy and reliability: LO, O, O, O, O, O
- Exports and Imports of Goods and Services
  - Latest observation: Q1 2011
  - Date received: 4/5/11
  - Frequency of data: Q
  - Frequency of reporting: Q
  - Frequency of publication: Q
- GDP/GNP
  - Latest observation: Q1 2011
  - Date received: 5/16/11
  - Frequency of data: Q
  - Frequency of reporting: Q
  - Frequency of publication: Q
  - Data Quality – Methodological soundness: O, LO, O, O
  - Data Quality – Accuracy and reliability: O, O, LO, O, LO
- Gross External Debt
  - Latest observation: Q1 2011
  - Date received: 6/30/11
  - Frequency of data: Q
  - Frequency of reporting: Q
  - Frequency of publication: Q
- International Investment Position
  - Latest observation: 2010
  - Date received: 6/30/11
  - Frequency of data: A
  - Frequency of reporting: A
  - Frequency of publication: A

### Executive Board assessment — key findings and policy recommendations
- Macroeconomic context and short-term outlook
  - Growth picked up to 4 percent in 2010.
  - Short-term indicators suggest a notable slowdown in the first half of 2011.
  - Inflation remains stubbornly high; unemployment has declined; real wages remain volatile.
  - Current account strengthened aided by high oil prices; net capital outflows persist.
- Financial sector
  - Banks are liquid; nonperforming loans came down from a peak of 10 percent during the crisis to just over 8 percent of loans in April.
  - A large capital deficiency discovered in June 2011 in the Bank of Moscow prompted a $14.2 billion rescue operation.
  - Remaining weaknesses in reporting and banking supervision pose risks.
- Fiscal policy
  - Crisis-related fiscal stimulus totaled some 9 percent of GDP during the crisis.
  - General government nonoil deficit fell by 1¾ percent of GDP in 2010.
  - 2011–13 budget plans a modest further reduction in the federal nonoil deficit of some 2¼ percent of GDP by 2013.
  - The 2012–14 preliminary budget scales down planned fiscal retrenchment and leaves the nonoil deficit in double-digits by 2014 and some 5½ percent of GDP above the government’s long-term target of 4.7 percent of GDP.
- Monetary policy
  - The Central Bank of Russia initiated policy tightening end-2010 and increased policy rates during February-May 2011; reserve requirements were raised and differentiated by residency.
  - The CBR has continued to increase exchange rate flexibility by widening the floating band for the ruble and scaling back intervention amounts.
  - Short-term growth projected at 4.8 percent in 2011.
  - Inflation projected to edge down to 8 percent by end-2011, assuming food prices continue to moderate.
- Directors’ recommendations
  - Undertake a growth-friendly, credible, and ambitious fiscal consolidation anchored on the long-term nonoil deficit target of 4.7 percent of GDP.
  - Implement fundamental fiscal reforms, including to pensions, social protection, and healthcare.
  - Consider front-loading consolidation while strengthening fiscal institutions and reconsider the 2012–14 preliminary budget.
  - Continue tightening monetary policy to bring inflation down towards a medium-term rate of 3–5 percent (noting some Directors preferred a more cautious approach given a still negative output gap).
  - Improve monetary operations framework and communications policy.
  - Enhance exchange rate flexibility to allow monetary policy to focus on inflation.
  - Address gaps in financial regulation and supervision, grant the CBR greater supervisory powers, and adopt pending legislation on consolidated supervision and connected lending.
  - Improve the business climate to bolster private investment and diversify the economy, including WTO accession, reducing the role of the state in the economy, and improving governance.

### Russian Federation: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators, 2008–12 (highlights)
- Production and prices (Annual percent change)
  - Real GDP: 2008 = 5.2; 2009 = -7.8; 2010 = 4.0; 2011 = 4.8; 2012 = 4.5
  - Consumer prices — Period average: 2008 = 14.1; 2009 = 11.7; 2010 = 6.9; 2011 = 9.1; 2012 = 7.6
  - Consumer prices — End of period: 2008 = 13.3; 2009 = 8.8; 2010 = 8.8; 2011 = 8.0; 2012 = 7.2
  - GDP deflator: 2008 = 18.0; 2009 = 1.9; 2010 = 11.4; 2011 = 14.6; 2012 = 8.4
- Public sector (Percent of GDP) — General government
  - Net lending/borrowing (overall balance): 2008 = 4.9; 2009 = -6.3; 2010 = -3.5; 2011 = -1.1; 2012 = -1.5
  - Revenue: 2008 = 39.2; 2009 = 35.1; 2010 = 35.0; 2011 = 37.1; 2012 = 36.0
  - Expenditures: 2008 = 34.3; 2009 = 41.4; 2010 = 38.5; 2011 = 38.2; 2012 = 37.5
  - Primary balance: 2008 = 5.3; 2009 = -5.7; 2010 = -2.9; 2011 = -0.3; 2012 = -0.4
  - Nonoil balance: 2008 = -7.7; 2009 = -15.2; 2010 = -13.4; 2011 = -12.2; 2012 = -11.7
  - Nonoil balance excl. one-off receipts: 2008 = -7.7; 2009 = -15.6; 2010 = -13.4; 2011 = -12.2; 2012 = -11.7
- Federal government
  - Net lending/borrowing (overall balance): 2008 = 3.6; 2009 = -5.9; 2010 = -4.0; 2011 = -1.3; 2012 = -1.7
  - Nonoil balance: 2008 = -7.6; 2009 = -13.8; 2010 = -12.7; 2011 = -11.2; 2012 = -10.9
  - Nonoil balance excl. one-off receipts: 2008 = -7.6; 2009 = -14.2; 2010 = -12.7; 2011 = -11.2; 2012 = -10.9
- Money (Annual percent change)
  - Base money: 2008 = 2.9; 2009 = 7.4; 2010 = 25.4; 2011 = 27.4; 2012 = 23.5
  - Ruble broad money: 2008 = 0.8; 2009 = 17.7; 2010 = 31.1; 2011 = 27.3; 2012 = 25.0
- External sector (Annual percent change)
  - Export volumes: 2008 = -2.6; 2009 = -9.8; 2010 = 8.4; 2011 = 3.4; 2012 = 3.5
  - Oil: 2008 = -2.6; 2009 = 3.0; 2010 = 5.7; 2011 = 1.5; 2012 = 1.5
  - Gas: 2008 = 1.8; 2009 = -13.8; 2010 = 23.5; 2011 = -0.9; 2012 = -0.9
  - Non-energy: 2008 = -4.4; 2009 = -18.2; 2010 = 10.7; 2011 = 8.0; 2012 = 8.2
  - Import volumes: 2008 = 11.1; 2009 = -31.0; 2010 = 25.7; 2011 = 18.8; 2012 = 10.8
- External sector (Billions of U.S. dollars)
  - Total merchandise exports, fob: 2008 = 471.6; 2009 = 303.4; 2010 = 400.1; 2011 = 515.1; 2012 = 543.1
  - Total merchandise imports, fob: 2008 = -291.9; 2009 = -191.8; 2010 = -248.7; 2011 = -321.1; 2012 = -357.7
  - External current account: 2008 = 103.7; 2009 = 49.5; 2010 = 71.1; 2011 = 101.9; 2012 = 86.8
  - External current account (in percent of GDP): 2008 = 6.2; 2009 = 4.1; 2010 = 4.8; 2011 = 5.3; 2012 = 4.0
  - Gross international reserves — Billions of U.S. dollars: 2008 = 427.1; 2009 = 439.5; 2010 = 479.4; 2011 = 550.8; 2012 = 617.6
  - Months of imports: 2008 = 14.0; 2009 = 20.8; 2010 = 17.9; 2011 = 15.9; 2012 = 16.1
  - Percent of short-term debt: 2008 = 288; 2009 = 303; 2010 = 349; 2011 = 375; 2012 = 422
- Memorandum items
  - Nominal GDP (billions of U.S. dollars): 2008 = 1,665; 2009 = 1,231; 2010 = 1,488; 2011 = 1,909; 2012 = 2,188
  - Exchange rate (rubles per U.S. dollar, period average): 2008 = 24.9; 2009 = 31.7; 2010 = 30.4
  - World oil price (U.S. dollars per barrel, WEO): 2008 = 97.0; 2009 = 61.8; 2010 = 79.0; 2011 = 106.3; 2012 = 109.3
  - Real effective exchange rate (average percent change): 2008 = 6.8; 2009 = -7.0; 2010 = 9.4

*Source: data ROSC reassessment published on February 28, 2011.*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/_cr11294.pdf_
