## _cr11298

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---

### Overview of programs covered
- Covers three PRGF/ESAF arrangements approved in 1999, 2003 and 2006 respectively.
- Program outcomes:
  - 1999 program: completed.
  - 2003 PRGF: went off track before the first review and was cancelled.
  - 2006 PRGF: suspended after three reviews in 2008 following a military coup and cancelled in November 2009.
- Country milestones:
  - HIPC completion point reached in 2002.
  - Benefited from debt relief under the MDRI in 2006.
- Data quality impact:
  - Discovery of misreporting in 2004–05 affected perceptions of reform record and complicated evaluation of quantitative frameworks for the 1999 and 2003 PRGFs because those programs were designed using distorted data.
- Access under programs:
  - 1999 PRGF: access equivalent to 66 percent of quota.
  - 2003 PRGF: access of 10 percent of quota.
  - 2006 PRGF: access of 25 percent of quota.

### Country context and vulnerabilities
- Structural characteristics:
  - coastline: 350 miles or 592 km;
  - economic dualism: modern capital-intensive sector (mining, fishing, small irrigated agriculture) versus traditional subsistence sectors (livestock and artisanal fishing);
  - mining (excluding oil) and fishing accounted for 80 percent of total exports.
- Per-capita income: 940 dollars in 2009.
- External dependence and risks:
  - Economy imports most consumption and capital goods and essential intermediate inputs.
  - Narrow export base; high vulnerability to external shocks and political instability.

### Objectives and evolution of program strategies
- Common objectives across the three programs:
  - consolidate macroeconomic stability;
  - support sustainable economic growth;
  - diversify the economy;
  - achieve a significant reduction in poverty.
- Macroeconomic frameworks:
  - Anchored on expected path of external debt conditional on debt reduction operations.
- Fiscal strategy:
  - Keep domestic demand growth in check and maximize social spending within space provided by debt relief.
  - Tax and expenditure reforms expected to increase fiscal space gradually.
- Exchange rate and monetary strategies:
  - Eliminate exchange rate restrictions and move to a more flexible exchange rate.
  - Monetary growth as main tool for controlling inflation.
- Structural reform emphasis by program:
  - 1999 PRGF: trade liberalization, exchange rate reforms, SOE reform, privatization.
  - 2003 PRGF: financial sector reform, capacity building, governance.
  - 2006 PRGF: oil revenue management, monitoring and control of budget execution, civil service reform.
- Role of technical assistance: considerable Fund and donor TA envisaged to strengthen administrative, absorptive, and implementation capacities.

### Misreporting and its consequences
- Key facts:
  - January 2004: safeguards assessment mission could not confirm end-2002 central bank (CBM) international reserves; authorities later admitted misreporting for more than a decade.
- Consequences and corrective steps:
  - First disbursement under 2003 PRGF and last two disbursements under 1999 PRGF found noncomplying under the Fund’s misreporting guidelines.
  - Authorities repaid all noncomplying purchases and requested cancellation of the 2003 PRGF.
  - Fund required corrective actions, including auditing and publication of the CBM’s financial statements under the 2006 SMP and phased governance corrections under the 2006 PRGF.
  - Some corrective measures had not been fully implemented at time of assessment.
- Ongoing impact: misreporting significantly shaped relations with the Fund and design/monitoring of subsequent programs.

### Reserve targets and central bank safeguards
- Reserve coverage targets and outcomes:
  - 1999 PRGF: targeted unchanged ratio of reserves to imports of about 5½ months.
  - 2003 PRGF: contemplated decline in reserve ratio from 7.2 to 5½ months.
  - Revised figures: reserves at 1.5 months at end-1999 and less than 1 month at end-2003.
  - 2006 PRGF: targeted increase in reserve coverage to 3 months of imports (excluding FDI and external aid-financed imports).
  - Targeted 3 months judged insufficient given uncertainty around oil export projections, volatile terms of trade, and aid disbursements.
- 2006 PRGF safeguards-related measures:
  - Structural benchmark: publication of CBM’s 2006 accounts and later resolution of auditor’s observations.
  - Performance criterion (PC): ordinance on the status of the CBM to protect the governor from arbitrary dismissal.
- Gaps in 2006 PRGF:
  - Lacked strategy to complete earlier interventions (e.g., internal audit mechanism, reserve management policies).
  - No formal conditionality on CBM adoption of IFRS.
- CBM transition to IFRS: General Council approved transition in 2004, but little action thereafter.

### Structural conditionality: volume, focus, and distribution
- Number of normalized conditions (as presented):
  - 1999 ESAF: Total 32.7 (prior actions 7.3; structural benchmarks 15.0; structural performance criteria 10.3).
  - 2003 PRGF: Total 26.0 (prior actions 2/6.0; structural benchmarks 14.0; structural performance criteria 6.0). (Note: 2/ No review was completed; length assumed for normalization of conditions was 0.5.)
  - 2006 PRGF: Total 2.7 (prior actions 0.7; structural benchmarks 0.0; structural performance criteria 2.0).
- Conditions per program year:
  - 1999 and 2003 programs had around ten times as many conditions per program year (32.7 and 26) as the 2006 PRGF (2.7).
- Thematic focus:
  - 1999 PRGF: privatization, trade and labor market reforms.
  - 2003 PRGF: public expenditure management, fiscal transparency, financial sector reform, governance.
  - 2006 PRGF: fiscal issues and financial sector; other areas expected to continue but not covered by formal conditionality.
- Note on fiscal transparency: 1999 PRGF contained only a few links to fiscal transparency and governance despite large volume of structural conditionality.

### Structural conditionality compliance
- Compliance scoring: 1 = met on time; 0.5 = met partially or with delay; 0 = not met.
- Average compliance by program (Table 5):
  - 1999 ESAF: Structural Benchmarks 0.49; Structural Performance Criteria 0.70; Total 0.59.
  - 2003 PRGF: Structural Benchmarks 0.29; Structural Performance Criteria 0.50; Total 0.35.
  - 2006 PRGF: Structural Benchmarks 0.71; Structural Performance Criteria 1.00; Total 0.82.
- Observations:
  - Compliance highest under 2006 PRGF and lowest under 2003 PRGF.
  - Under 1999 PRGF, about one third of structural benchmarks and 20 percent of structural performance criteria failed to be met, mainly in public enterprise reform and privatization.
  - Better 2006 scores may reflect streamlined approach and perceived strong ownership since 2006.
  - Many reform efforts halted with August 2008 military coup, with some backtracking including in safeguards-related areas.

### Macroeconomic record: growth, inflation, fiscal performance, and debt
- Growth:
  - Average growth in 1999–2009: 3.9 percent.
  - SSA growth for period: 5.4 percent.
  - Growth accelerated in 2006 with large mining projects and Chinguetti start-up, but momentum short-lived; growth negative in 2009.
  - Major shocks: 2002 severe drought; 2009 global economic slowdown.
  - Growth consistently underperformed Fund program projections due to shocks and reform delays.
- Inflation:
  - 1999 PRGF targeted reduction to 2.5 percent in final program year.
  - 2003 PRGF targeted 3.5 percent flat.
  - 2006 PRGF adjusted first-year inflation target to nearly 9 percent and aimed at lowering to 4 percent by final program year.
  - Program target met in 2000; subsequently missed due to drought-driven food price spike and domestic oil and gas price adjustments; 2003 targets missed widely; inflation declined markedly in 2006 and 2009 after tightening policies and price controls.
- Fiscal performance:
  - Central government balance excluding grants fluctuated within a range of 20 percentage points of GDP during 1999–2009.
  - Surplus of 3.8 percent of GDP in 2002 followed by deficit of 16.4 percent in 2003 due to off-budgetary spending and military buildup after failed coup.
  - Authorities regained control via tax reform and subsidy reductions: 1 percent surplus in 2006 and 0.6 percent deficit in 2007.
  - Large overruns led to deficits of 7.3 and 5.9 percent in 2008 and 2009 respectively, following another military coup.
  - Wage bill doubled from 4.9 percent of GDP in 2000 to 9.7 percent in 2009 (nearly 40 percent of government spending).
  - Central government capital spending compressed from 13 percent of GDP in 2003 to 6.5 percent in 2009.
- Public debt and arrears:
  - PPG debt to GDP fell by some 60 percentage points from an unsustainable level in 2002 to 2005, and fell another 70 points in 2006 mainly due to MDRI.
  - Since 2006 PPG debt ratio hovered around 90 percent of GDP, with an uptick in 2009 caused by GDP decline.
  - Substantial arrears (~35 percent of GDP in 2009) on "passive" debt owed to Kuwait (about US$1.1 billion at end-2009) included in PPG debt; DSAs assume these arrears to be rescheduled.
  - At time of 2009 Article IV consultation, Mauritania found to be at only a "moderate risk of distress."

### Economic structure, diversification, and volatility
- Composition of GDP (1999–2009):
  - Mining increased from 12 percent of GDP in 1999 to 19 percent in 2009.
  - Oil production began in 2006 and accounted for nearly 5 percent of GDP in 2009.
  - Agriculture remained around 18 percent of GDP.
  - Other activities (mainly services and manufacturing) became relatively less important.
- Chinguetti oil field episode:
  - Declared commercially viable in 2004 and began production in 2006 at a scale of 75,000 barrels per day (bpd).
  - Technical difficulties: daily output declined by more than half during 2006 and continued declining; by 2009 production had declined to 10,000 bpd or about 1/10 of the potential estimated initially.
- Volatility measures (coefficients of variation for 1999–2009, Table 4):
  - Mauritania: Terms of trade 0.20; Official development assistance 0.45; Current account excluding grants 0.97; GDP 0.86; Domestic demand 2.05; Private consumption 2.80.
  - Comparators: Algeria (Terms of trade 0.27; GDP 0.44; Domestic demand 0.66; Private consumption 0.42); Chad (GDP 1.60; Domestic demand 2.52; Private consumption 4.23).
  - Aid among most volatile external variables for Mauritania.
  - Domestic demand and private consumption volatility higher than most comparators.
- Institutional response to volatility:
  - Authorities created several committees during 1999–2009, but they were ad-hoc, lacked technical capability and clout, and were ineffective.

### Overall assessment of reforms and program performance
- Formal compliance with structural conditionality varied; highest under 2006 PRGF.
- Formal compliance metrics do not capture medium- and long-term reform impacts.
- Achievements and limits:
  - Some progress in strengthening policy framework.
  - Less success in improving business climate, reducing poverty, and raising living standards.
- Binding constraints limiting program success:
  - Delays in implementing growth-enhancing structural measures.
  - Unresolved financial problems of national electricity company and underdeveloped transport networks.
  - Unfriendly business environment.
  - Weak safeguards and incomplete CBM reforms.
  - Political shocks and lack of timely information sharing undermined implementation and donor coordination.

### Policy lessons and priorities going forward
- Four critical areas for successful engagement:
  - Enhance transparency in the public sector, especially the central bank.
  - Pursue structural reforms to strengthen macroeconomic policy framework, supported by technical assistance.
  - Identify and carefully monitor growth-oriented policies to create a market-friendly environment and reform the financial sector.
  - Target social spending more efficiently with increased focus on poverty reduction outside Nouakchott; protect fiscal space for social spending by containing other government expenditures.
- Fund effectiveness contingent on support from World Bank and other donors.

### Policy recommendations and operational guidance
- Proposed Fund vehicle: Extended Credit Facility (ECF) in environment of high reform commitment and ability to overcome political obstacles; supported by technical assistance.
- Central bank independence and transparency:
  - Prompt action to increase CBM independence and transparency.
  - Concrete measures: adoption of IFRS by CBM; development of internal control mechanisms; legal modifications to provide central bank independence.
  - Programs should identify intermediate actions (example sequence for IFRS adoption over a 2-3 year horizon: quantification of differences between IFRS and current accounting standards; preparation of pro-forma financial statements; ongoing staff training).
- Macroeconomic policy framework enhancements:
  - Fiscal: improve tax administration and tax system; improve PFM with emphasis on medium-term budgeting and poverty tracking.
  - Consider small fund financed with higher reserve targets to be drawn in case of temporary revenue shortfalls.
- Structural reforms for high-quality growth:
  - Strengthen financial system resilience; increase competition; address SME financing impediments.
  - Upgrade infrastructure and business environment; resolve unreliable electricity by improving SOE efficiency.
  - Rationalize and prioritize public spending to support infrastructure upgrades.
- Poverty-related spending:
  - Increase quantity and quality; mobilize additional domestic and external resources; protect spending discipline in other categories.
  - Improve targeting of subsidies and broaden anti-poverty efforts outside Nouakchott.
- Coordination with World Bank and donors:
  - Continue close cooperation on prioritization, sequencing, and monitoring of structural reforms; World Bank support critical.

### Continued need for international and Fund support
- "In all likelihood, Mauritania will continue to need the support of the international community, and the Fund in particular, beyond the current program."
- Reforms "needed to put the economy firmly on a sustainable, high growth path will take some years to implement and bear fruit."
- Interim Fund lending and donor financial support, along with technical assistance, can be valuable if met with strong ownership of reform.

### Authorities’ views and comments on the EPA report
- Authorities broadly agreed with the findings and recommendations and emphasized need to promote transparency and good governance.
- They asserted the Fund bears "some responsibility for the failures of previous programs because some of their objectives were excessively optimistic."
- Attributed poor performance in part to "the unusually high degree of political turbulence of the 2000s."
- Noted decline in bilateral funding after the first Gulf war and private sector response that "failed to provide the boost to growth that was expected."
- Agreed main contribution of programs was achievement of macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability, but noted gains remain fragile.

### CBM progress and remaining challenges (authorities’ perspective)
- Progress:
  - CBM’s internal audit unit operates de facto independently, though an independent audit committee needs formal establishment.
  - Some strengthening of CBM operational, supervisory, and regulatory capacity.
- Remaining needs:
  - Adoption of integrated information system to support auditing unit and transition to IFRS.
  - Legal protection for CBM management and staff in supervisory duties.
  - Capacity to mop up excessive liquidity through recapitalization or securitization of government claims.
  - Modernize payments system.
- Safeguards timeline and status:
  - January 2004 SA found about 85 percent of end-2002 foreign reserves could not be reliably confirmed.
  - Subsequent audits, external certifications, and publication commitments undertaken; progress uneven and disrupted by political events.
  - Latest assessment concluded in 2010 found significant risks persisted though governance oversight restored and audited financial statement publication resumed; further capacity building and procedure updates recommended.

### Misreporting timeline and corrective actions (selected items)
- January 2004: SA mission found major reserve confirmation problems.
- September 2004: authorities submitted revised fiscal and monetary figures for 2003 and first half of 2004; large off-budget expenditures and reserve drawdowns revealed; first-review targets missed.
- October 20, 2004: Management letter recommended special audit for end-August 2004 foreign reserves; external certification of end-2003 CBM financial statements; proof end-2002 and prior data submitted in 2001 were correct.
- November 2004: CBM governor volunteered to repay noncomplying purchase and requested cancellation of arrangement; corrective measures announced.
- October–November 2005: new authorities supplied revised monetary data covering 1992–2004; revealed earlier slippages and noncomplying disbursements.
- January 2006: Managing Director letter; CBM governor apologized and listed corrective actions incorporated into SMP.
- April 2007 update SA: little progress except appointment of international audit firm; recommended action plan and timetable for integrated accounting system and IFRS; special reviews of foreign reserves continue as conditionality.
- Mid-2008: transition to IFRS and chart of accounts implementation began but halted.
- 2010 assessment: 2008–09 economic and political challenges imposed toll on safeguards; governance oversight restored and audited financial statements publication resumed; further actions needed on financial reporting, information systems, internal audit, and data integrity procedures.

### Technical assistance (TA) highlights, 1999–2009 (selected dates preserved)
- Monetary and Financial Department TA examples:
  - "Technical assistance mission on deepening of financial sector reforms and strengthening of the financial system: February 18–March 3, 1999."
  - "Advisor to the CBM governor on the development of foreign exchange market and related operations: May 1999–February 2000."
  - "TA mission on central bank accounting: March 6–May 4, 2007."
  - "TA mission on central bank accounting: October 20, 2007 – October 20, 2008."
- Fiscal Affairs Department TA examples:
  - "TA mission on reinforcing fiscal administration and improving VAT performance: April 25–May 9, 1999."
  - "Long-term resident technical advisor on tax administration and tax system reform: April 25, 2000–April 24, 2001."
  - "TA mission on oil revenue management: October 24–November 7, 2006."
  - "TA mission on Public Financial Management: June 16–17, 2008."
- Statistics Department TA examples:
  - "TA mission on balance of payments statistics: August 30–September 9, 1999."
  - "TA mission on National Accounts Statistics: April 16–27, 2007."
- AFRITAC support: numerous missions in 2003–2009 including tax and customs administration, public expenditure computerization, external debt management, public finance statistics, microfinance supervision.

### World Bank operations (1999–2010) — selected approvals and amounts (US $ million)
- Phase II: EITI implementation — 0.28; Approval date: July 2010
- Urban Development Project (additional financing) — 22.5; Approval date: June 2010
- Transport Sector Institutional Development and Technical Assistance Project — 4.5; Approval date: July 2008
- Business Environment Enhancement Project — 5; Approval date: May 2008
- Education Sector Development Program — 14; Approval date: April 2008
- Integrated Development Program for Irrigated Agriculture — 39; Approval date: March 2005
- Urban Development Project — 70; Approval date: October 2001
- Fiscal Reform Support Operation — 30; Approval date: May 2000
- (Full list of projects and approval dates provided in appendix tables of the source.)

### IMF Public Information Notice (PIN) — EPA main points
- EPA purpose: review economic problems, assess progress under Fund-supported programs, and draw forward-looking lessons.
- Main EPA findings:
  - Programs helped achieve a basic degree of macroeconomic stability.
  - Less progress achieved on structural front.
  - Critical areas for successful engagement: transparency and governance; sound macroeconomic frameworks; market-friendly environment; better targeted social spending.
- Executive Board assessment:
  - Directors broadly agreed with EPA conclusions.
  - Newly finalized poverty-reduction strategy paper and current ECF-supported program appropriately address EPA-identified challenges.
  - Directors stressed structural reforms essential for sustainable employment and inclusive growth, including public enterprise restructuring, labor market enhancement, transparency strengthening, and business climate improvement.

*Source: Executive Summary, _cr11298.*

### Executive Summary ......................................................................................................

### Executive Summary

### Overview of the programs covered
- The report covers three PRGF/ESAF arrangements approved in 1999, 2003 and 2006 respectively.
- Only the 1999 program was completed; the 2003 PRGF went off track before the first review and was cancelled; the 2006 PRGF was suspended after three reviews in 2008 following a military coup and was cancelled in November 2009.
- Mauritania reached HIPC completion point in 2002 and benefited from debt relief under the MDRI in 2006.
- The discovery of misreporting in 2004–05 altered perceptions of Mauritania’s reform record and affected program design; it also complicates evaluation of the quantitative frameworks of the 1999 and 2003 PRGFs because those programs were designed using distorted data.
- Access under the programs differed: the 1999 PRGF provided access equivalent to 66 percent of quota, the 2003 PRGF provided access of 10 percent of quota, and the 2006 PRGF provided access of 25 percent of quota.

### Country context and vulnerabilities
- Mauritania’s economy is small, heavily dependent on a few extractive activities, and vulnerable to external shocks.
- Geographical and structural facts preserved from the source:
  - coastline: 350 miles or 592 km;
  - economic dualism: modern capital-intensive sector (mining, fishing, small irrigated agriculture) versus traditional subsistence sectors (livestock and artisanal fishing);
  - mining (excluding oil) and fishing accounted for 80 percent of total exports.
- Per-capita income: 940 dollars in 2009.
- The economy imports most consumption and capital goods and essential intermediate inputs, remains narrow in export base, and is highly vulnerable to external shocks and political instability.

### Objectives and evolution of program strategies
- Common objectives across the three programs:
  - consolidate macroeconomic stability;
  - support sustainable economic growth;
  - diversify the economy;
  - achieve a significant reduction in poverty.
- Macroeconomic frameworks were broadly similar and anchored on expected path of external debt conditional on debt reduction operations.
- Fiscal strategy: keep domestic demand growth in check and maximize social spending within space provided by debt relief; tax and expenditure reforms expected to increase fiscal space gradually.
- Exchange rate strategy: eliminate exchange rate restrictions and move to a more flexible exchange rate; monetary growth was the main tool for controlling inflation.
- Structural reform emphasis shifted across programs:
  - 1999 PRGF: trade liberalization and exchange rate reforms, SOE reform, privatization;
  - 2003 PRGF: financial sector reform, capacity building, governance;
  - 2006 PRGF: oil revenue management, monitoring and control of budget execution, civil service reform.
- Considerable technical assistance from the Fund and others was envisaged to strengthen administrative, absorptive, and implementation capacities.

### Misreporting and its consequences
- In January 2004, a safeguards assessment mission could not confirm the end-2002 level of international reserves of the central bank (CBM), prompting enquiries that led to authorities’ admission of misreporting of data for more than a decade.
- Consequences described in the source:
  - the first disbursement under the 2003 PRGF and the last two disbursements under the 1999 PRGF were found noncomplying under the Fund’s misreporting guidelines;
  - the authorities repaid all noncomplying purchases and requested cancellation of the 2003 PRGF;
  - the Fund required corrective actions, including auditing and publication of the CBM’s financial statements under the 2006 SMP and phased governance corrections under the 2006 PRGF;
  - some corrective measures had not yet been fully implemented at the time of the assessment.
- Misreporting significantly shaped relations with the Fund and the design and monitoring of subsequent programs.

### Macroeconomic and structural performance summary
- A basic degree of macroeconomic stability was achieved during the period under review, but structural gains were more modest.
- Key assessments preserved verbatim:
  - "macroeconomic stability is not yet underpinned by a sound policy framework";
  - "growth is not yet high enough to sustain significant poverty reduction and produce meaningful improvements in social indicators";
  - "the economy is still very vulnerable to external shocks and does not have built in mechanisms to cope with external volatility."
- The Chinguetti oil field episode (as presented in the source):
  - declared commercially viable in 2004 and began production in 2006 at a scale of 75,000 barrels per day (bpd);
  - ran into technical difficulties almost immediately, with daily output declining by more than half during 2006 and continuing to do so;
  - by 2009 production had declined to 10,000 bpd or about 1/10 of the potential estimated initially.
- Inflation and growth program targets and adjustments (as described in source):
  - 1999 PRGF targeted reduction of inflation to 2.5 percent in the final program year;
  - 2003 PRGF targeted a flat 3.5 percent inflation rate;
  - 2006 PRGF adjusted its first-year inflation target to nearly 9 percent and aimed at lowering inflation to 4 percent by the final program year;
  - growth expectations: 1999 and 2003 PRGFs expected growth to accelerate gradually from 4 to about 6 percent during the program period; the 2003 PRGF expected a surge to nearly 10 percent in 2006 with Chinguetti; the 2006 PRGF revised growth projections down significantly after technical setbacks in the oil field.
- Fiscal stance across programs:
  - 1999 PRGF targeted a government surplus of 1.3 percent of GDP for 2000 (excluding grants amounting to 3 percent of GDP that year), programmed to decline to 0.4 percent of GDP in 2002;
  - with HIPC completion point and improved debt profile, the 2003 PRGF targeted a government deficit excluding grants of 2.1 percent of GDP in 2003 and 2.7 percent in 2004;
  - the 2006 program relaxed targets further following debt relief under the MDRI.

### Key lessons and policy priorities going forward
- The evaluation identifies four critical areas for successful engagement to produce high and inclusive growth and poverty reduction while maintaining macroeconomic stability:
  - Enhance transparency in the public sector, especially the central bank.
  - Pursue structural reforms to strengthen the macroeconomic policy framework, supported by technical assistance.
  - Identify and carefully monitor growth-oriented policies aimed at creating a market-friendly environment and reforming the financial sector.
  - Target social spending more efficiently with increased focus on poverty reduction outside Nouakchott; protect fiscal space for social spending by containing other government expenditures.
- The Fund’s effectiveness in supporting the reform agenda depends on the support of the World Bank and other donors.

*Source: Executive Summary, _cr11298.*

### 2.9 percent in 2005. However, the 2003 deficit was expected to be more than financed by grants, external

### _cr11298 - 2.9 percent in 2005. However, the 2003 deficit was expected to be more than financed by grants, external

### Reserve targets and central bank safeguards
- The 1999 PRGF targeted an unchanged ratio of reserves to imports of about 5½ months.
- The 2003 PRGF contemplated a decline in the reserve ratio from 7.2 to 5½ months.
- Revised figures showed reserves at 1.5 months at end-1999 and less than 1 month at end-2003.
- The 2006 PRGF targeted an increase in reserve coverage to 3 months of imports (excluding FDI and external aid-financed imports).
- The targeted 3 months coverage was judged insufficient given uncertainty surrounding oil export projections, volatile terms of trade, and aid disbursements.
- The 2006 PRGF included:
  - a structural benchmark calling for publication of CBM’s 2006 accounts and later resolution of the auditor’s observations;
  - a performance criterion (PC) requiring an ordinance on the status of the CBM to protect the governor from arbitrary dismissal.
- The 2006 PRGF lacked:
  - a strategy to complete earlier interventions (e.g., establishment of an adequate internal audit mechanism, policies for management of external reserves);
  - formal conditionality on the CBM’s adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
- The CBM’s General Council approved the transition to IFRS in 2004, but little action occurred thereafter.

### Structural conditionality: volume, focus, and distribution
- Number of normalized conditions (Table 3):
  - 1999 ESAF: Total 32.7 (prior actions 7.3; structural benchmarks 15.0; structural performance criteria 10.3).
  - 2003 PRGF: Total 26.0 (prior actions 2/6.0; structural benchmarks 14.0; structural performance criteria 6.0). 2/ No review was completed; length assumed for normalization of conditions was 0.5.
  - 2006 PRGF: Total 2.7 (prior actions 0.7; structural benchmarks 0.0; structural performance criteria 2.0).
- The first two programs had around ten times as many conditions per program year (32.7 and 26) as the 2006 PRGF (2.7 conditions per program year).
- The 1999 PRGF focused on privatization and trade and labor market reforms to foster private sector development.
- The 2003 PRGF relied more heavily on public expenditure management, fiscal transparency, financial sector reform and governance.
- The 2006 PRGF focused almost exclusively on fiscal issues and the financial sector; other areas (e.g., public enterprise restructuring) were expected to continue but were not covered by formal conditionality.
- The 1999 PRGF contained only a few links to fiscal transparency and governance despite a large volume of structural conditionality (examples: preparation of a medium-term expenditure framework; revision of procurement code).

### Structural conditionality compliance
- Compliance scoring method: 1 for conditions met on time, 0.5 for met partially or with delay, 0 if not met.
- Average compliance by program (Table 5):
  - 1999 ESAF: Structural Benchmarks 0.49; Structural Performance Criteria 0.70; Total 0.59.
  - 2003 PRGF: Structural Benchmarks 0.29; Structural Performance Criteria 0.50; Total 0.35.
  - 2006 PRGF: Structural Benchmarks 0.71; Structural Performance Criteria 1.00; Total 0.82.
- Compliance was highest under the 2006 PRGF and lowest under the 2003 PRGF.
- Under the 1999 PRGF, average compliance was 0.59; about one third of structural benchmarks and 20 percent of structural performance criteria failed to be met, mainly in public enterprise reform and privatization.
- The better scores in 2006 may reflect a streamlined, selective approach and the perception of strong ownership by the authorities since 2006.
- Reform not covered by conditionality was also strong in the first half of the 2006 PRGF, including an ambitious 2007 fiscal reform program (tax administration; transparency; budget preparation, execution, and controls; civil service modernization; oil revenue management).
- Many reform efforts halted with the August 2008 military coup, with some backtracking, including in safeguards-related areas.

### Macroeconomic record: growth, inflation, fiscal performance, and debt
- Growth:
  - Average growth in 1999–2009: 3.9 percent.
  - Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) growth for the period: 5.4 percent.
  - Growth accelerated in 2006 with large mining projects and the start-up of the Chinguetti oil field, but the momentum was short-lived; growth became negative in 2009.
  - Major negative shocks: 2002 severe drought; 2009 global economic slowdown.
  - Growth underperformed Fund program projections consistently during the decade due to shocks and delays in implementing reforms.
- Inflation:
  - Program target met in 2000, then missed subsequently due to food price spike from drought and domestic oil and gas price adjustments.
  - 2003 PRGF targets were missed by wide margins due to monetary expansion associated with large fiscal overruns in 2003–04 and increases in international oil prices.
  - Inflation declined markedly in 2006 and again in 2009 following tightening macroeconomic policies and price-control measures on selected products.
- Fiscal performance:
  - Central government balance excluding grants fluctuated within a range of 20 percentage points of GDP during 1999–2009.
  - Surplus of 3.8 percent of GDP in 2002 was followed by a deficit of 16.4 percent in 2003 due to substantial off-budgetary spending (drought response) and a large military spending buildup after a failed military coup.
  - Authorities regained control through tax reform and subsidy reductions, running a 1 percent surplus in 2006 and a 0.6 percent deficit in 2007.
  - Large expenditure overruns led to deficits of 7.3 and 5.9 percent in 2008 and 2009 respectively, following another military coup.
  - The wage bill doubled from 4.9 percent of GDP in 2000 to 9.7 percent in 2009 (or nearly 40 percent of government spending).
  - Central government capital spending compressed from 13 percent of GDP in 2003 to 6.5 percent in 2009.
- Public debt and arrears:
  - The ratio of public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt to GDP fell by some 60 percentage points from an unsustainable level in 2002 to 2005, and fell another 70 points in 2006 mainly due to MDRI.
  - Since 2006 the PPG debt ratio hovered around 90 percent of GDP, with a marked uptick in 2009 caused by the decline in GDP.
  - Substantial arrears (some 35 percent of GDP in 2009) on "passive" debt owed to Kuwait (about US$1.1 billion at end-2009) are included in PPG debt figures; DSAs assume these arrears to be rescheduled.
  - At the time of the 2009 Article IV consultation, Mauritania was found to be at only a "moderate risk of distress."

### Economic structure, diversification, and volatility
- Composition of GDP (1999–2009):
  - Mining increased from 12 percent of GDP in 1999 to 19 percent in 2009.
  - Oil production began in 2006 and accounted for nearly 5 percent of GDP in 2009.
  - Agriculture remained around 18 percent of GDP throughout the period.
  - Other activities (mainly services and manufacturing) became relatively less important.
- Resulting vulnerabilities:
  - Greater reliance on extractive activities increased GDP vulnerability to commodity price swings.
  - Extractive-led growth was capital intensive and not inclusive, generating limited employment gains.
- Volatility comparisons (coefficients of variation for 1999–2009, Table 4):
  - Mauritania: Terms of trade 0.20; Official development assistance 0.45; Current account excluding grants 0.97; GDP 0.86; Domestic demand 2.05; Private consumption 2.80.
  - Comparators (select):
    - Algeria: Terms of trade 0.27; Official development assistance 0.33; Current account 0.88; GDP 0.44; Domestic demand 0.66; Private consumption 0.42.
    - Chad: Terms of trade 0.28; Official development assistance 0.27; Current account 0.86; GDP 1.60; Domestic demand 2.52; Private consumption 4.23.
  - Aid was among the most volatile external variables for Mauritania.
  - Domestic demand and private consumption volatility were higher than most comparators (domestic demand higher than Maghreb group and SSA comparators except Chad).
- Institutional response to volatility:
  - Authorities created several committees to address external volatility during 1999–2009, but these were ad-hoc, lacked technical capabilities and clout, and were ineffective in advising policy makers.

### Overall assessment of reforms and program performance
- Formal compliance with structural conditionality varied by program and was highest under the 2006 PRGF.
- Measures of formal compliance do not capture the medium- and long-term impact of reforms.
- While some progress was made in strengthening the policy framework, efforts to improve the business climate, reduce poverty, and improve living conditions were less successful.
- Key binding constraints that limited program success included:
  - delays in implementing growth-enhancing structural measures;
  - unresolved financial problems of the national electricity company and underdeveloped transportation networks;
  - an unfriendly business environment;
  - weak safeguards and incomplete reforms at the CBM.
- Political shocks (failed coup, military coups) and lack of timely information sharing (e.g., on off-budget spending) undermined program implementation and the effectiveness of development partner coordination.

*Italic: Source – IMF staff report content as provided in the supplied excerpt.*

### 27.      Important progress was made in upgrading the policy framework, although

### Important progress was made in upgrading the policy framework, although important challenges remain

### Policy framework: progress and remaining vulnerabilities
- Reforms in tax policy and administration:
  - Some simplification of tax procedures and higher tax revenues.
  - Need to strengthen budget preparation, execution, and monitoring.
  - World Bank CPIA scores: quality of budget and financial management = 2.6; fiscal policy = 2.8 (scale of 1 to 6).
  - CPIA recorded improvement in 2005–09, but Mauritania still scores significantly below Mali, Niger, and Senegal.
- Central Bank of Mauritania (CBM) capacity and safeguards:
  - Some progress in strengthening CBM operational, supervisory, and regulatory capacity.
  - Critical vulnerabilities remain in safeguards framework: financial reporting and oversight.
  - Important recommendations in Safeguard Assessment (SA) reports have not yet been implemented.
  - Central bank independence unresolved: appointment of Governor, Deputy Governor, Monetary Policy Council members, and General Council coincides with the electoral cycle.
- Governance and corruption:
  - Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2010 = 2.2 (scale of 0–10), rank = 143rd out of 178 countries.
  - CPI in 2006 = 3.1, rank = 84th out of 163 countries.
  - World Bank CPIA transparency/accountability/corruption in public sector average = 2.6 (scale of 1–6) for 2005–09.
  - CPIA peer comparisons: Sub-Saharan Africa = 2.8; regional peers = 3.1.
- Statistical data quality:
  - Staff reports: data provided by authorities are “broadly adequate for surveillance.”
  - SA reports: concerns about quality of data relevant for program monitoring persist.
- SA report recommendations (examples):
  - Prepare financial statements on the basis of IFRS.
  - Establish independent oversight of CBM financial reporting, audit, and control frameworks.

### Business environment and growth-enhancing measures
- Trade and exchange rate:
  - Significant progress in liberalizing trade; CPIA trade sub-score = 3.9.
  - Improvements in functioning of foreign exchange market; more flexible exchange rate (program goal in 1999 and 2006 PRGFs).
  - Parallel market premium history: as high as 10–20 percent until late 2005; virtually disappeared; re-emerged after late 2008 rationing; returned to very low levels.
- Business climate rankings:
  - World Economic Forum: quality of national business environment rank = 104th out of 127 countries.
  - World Bank Doing Business Index = 165th out of 183 countries.
  - Regulatory quality rank = 142nd out of 202 countries (dropped about 20 places between 2006 and 2008).
- Financial sector constraints:
  - Banking sector oligopolistic: eight of nine commercial banks belong to multi-sectoral conglomerates.
  - Financial intermediation weak; access to financing repeatedly cited as most problematic factor for doing business.
  - Nonperforming loans in excess of 25 percent at end-2009.
  - Financial sector reform has faced strong resistance from powerful economic groups.
- Public enterprises and fiscal drain:
  - Subsidies and transfers to public enterprises = 2.7 percent of GDP in the 2009 budget.
  - SOMELEC (electricity) continues to perform poorly; electricity cuts frequent and an important drag on growth.
  - Privatization successes limited; SONELEC separation in 2001 into SOMELEC and SNDE.

### Poverty reduction and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
- Poverty trends:
  - Incidence of extreme poverty declined from about 46 percent in 2000 to 42 percent in 2008.
  - Nouakchott extreme poverty incidence declined from 29.2 to 15.6 percent (period not explicitly restated).
- Human Development Index (UNDP) 2010:
  - Mauritania ranks 150th on health and on education out of 169 countries.
- Assessment: Mauritania at risk of missing majority of MDGs in 2015; progress slow, some targets look out of reach; gaps narrow for extreme poverty and primary enrollment; targets for maternal mortality and access to reproductive health unlikely to be achieved; access to reproductive health trails SSA average widely.

- Table 6 — MDG indicators (2015 Target | Current value)
  - Goal 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
    - Target 1. Halve the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day: 2015 Target = 28.3; Mauritania = 42.0; SSA = 51.0
    - Target 2. Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people: 2015 Target = 100.0; Mauritania = 27.0; SSA = 65.0
    - Target 3. halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger: 2015 Target = 0.0; Mauritania = 31.2; SSA = 26.0
  - Goal 2. Achieve universal primary education
    - Target 1. Ensure that children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling: 2015 Target = 100.0; Mauritania = 71.6; SSA = 76.0
  - Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women
    - Target 1. Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education: 2015 Target = 100.0; Mauritania = 100.0; SSA = 91.0
  - Goal 4. Reduce child mortality
    - Target 1. reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate: 2015 Target = 45.0; Mauritania = 122.0; SSA = 144.0
  - Goal 5. Improve maternal health
    - Target 1. Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio: 2015 Target = 232.0; Mauritania = 686.0; SSA = n.a.
    - Target 2. Achieve, by 2015, universal access to reproductive health: 2015 Target = 100.0; Mauritania = 9.0; SSA = 70.0

### Cooperation with the World Bank
- Cooperation generally effective despite absence of Bank budgetary support during most of period.
- Areas of close collaboration:
  - Public expenditure management (budget formulation and execution; sectoral medium-term expenditure frameworks).
  - Financial sector reform (mainly through the 2007 FSAP).
  - Poverty and social impact analysis (PSIA).
  - Implementation of EITI in nascent oil industry and management of oil revenues since 2005.
  - Elaboration of poverty reduction strategies (2000 and 2007) and preparations for HIPC and MDRI eligibility.
- World Bank led policy dialogue on structural reforms related to private sector development, rural development, infrastructure and urban development, public enterprise reform and divestiture, and poverty monitoring and evaluation.
- World Bank contribution example: restructuring of electricity company during 2006 PRGF, which reduced budget demands and helped meet structural benchmarks.

### Lessons and policy challenges
- Overall effectiveness:
  - Programs were moderately effective in meeting stated objectives.
  - Main contribution: delineating policy agenda and priorities; enabling technical assistance to overcome capacity constraints.
  - Helped secure macroeconomic stability—especially towards end of decade—but were less successful in promoting higher and sustainable growth.
- Political economy:
  - Reform impetus strongest when domestic politics provided opportunities.
  - Conditionality less effective amid deteriorating political climate; structural conditionality cannot be relied on to safeguard reform against adverse political developments.
  - Political instability poses risks for policy implementation and continuity of reforms.
- Macroeconomic framework:
  - Macroeconomic stability achieved but not yet underpinned by sound policy framework.
  - Shocks (droughts, food and oil price increases) threatened stability earlier in decade; later avoided exchange rate crisis and brought inflation under control.
  - Need to strengthen fiscal (PFM, transparency, poverty tracking) and monetary (central bank independence, supervisory capacities) areas.
- Mechanisms for volatility:
  - Virtually no progress in developing mechanisms to cope with macroeconomic volatility.
  - Budgets need medium-term framework and mechanisms to minimize impact of temporary shortfalls in tax revenues or aid disbursements.
  - A more ambitious reserve accumulation target may be needed.
- Structural reforms and growth:
  - Limited progress beyond macro framework; programs did not create basis for high, durable, inclusive growth.
  - Growth remains driven by capital intensive extractive activities that do not generate sufficient high quality employment.
  - Need to leverage natural resources to dynamize other sectors, including SMEs.
- Social impact:
  - Impact on social indicators disappointing; generalized subsidies used to mitigate higher food and oil prices at sizeable fiscal cost.
  - Poverty reduction outside Nouakchott requires additional resources and well-targeted social programs within coherent macroeconomic and social policy agenda.
  - Creating fiscal space and protecting it by controlling other public spending categories is paramount.
- Fund handling of misreporting:
  - Fund responded appropriately to misreporting episodes, but should have required stronger follow-up actions.
  - Corrective actions identified in SA reports; most pressing issues addressed by 2006 PRGF and preceding SMP.
  - Formal conditionality relied excessively on immediate-impact measures with little effect on underlying institutional problems (example: regular external audits without mandated institutional reforms and time-bound actions).

### Recommendations for future engagement
- Fund instrument and support:
  - Proposed vehicle: Extended Credit Facility (ECF) in an environment of high commitment to reform and ability to overcome political obstacles.
  - ECF to be supported with technical assistance to alleviate capacity constraints.
  - ECF should carefully focus on and monitor developments in four critical areas (detailed below).
- Central bank independence and transparency:
  - Take prompt action to increase independence and transparency of CBM.
  - Concrete measures include adoption by CBM of IFRS; development of proper internal control mechanisms; modifications to relevant laws to provide central bank independence from executive branch.
  - Previous SA missions identified these measures; implementation has been irregular or formal only.
  - Note: implementation may take time; programs should focus on identifying intermediate actions (example sequence for IFRS adoption over a 2-3 year horizon: quantification of differences between IFRS and current accounting standards; preparation of pro-forma financial statements; ongoing training of staff).
- Macroeconomic policy framework enhancements:
  - On fiscal front: improvements in tax administration and tax system; improvements in PFM, including increased emphasis on medium-term budgeting and improved poverty tracking.
  - To minimize impact of external and tax revenue uncertainty: consider setting up a small fund financed with higher reserve targets, to be drawn in case of temporary revenue shortfalls.
- Structural reforms to achieve high quality growth:
  - Strengthen financial system and its resilience; increase competition; address impediments to bank financing access, especially for SMEs.
  - Upgrade infrastructure and improve business environment; address supply-side bottlenecks such as unreliable electricity by improving SOE efficiency.
  - Rationalize and prioritize public spending to support infrastructure upgrading.
  - These medium- to long-run goals may be covered by formal conditionality where appropriate.
- Poverty-related spending:
  - Increase quantity and quality of poverty-related spending.
  - Mobilize additional domestic and external resources; maintain spending discipline in other categories.
  - Improve targeting of subsidies and broaden efforts to combat poverty outside Nouakchott.
- Coordination with World Bank and donors:
  - Fund will need support from World Bank and other donors to be effective in supporting reform agenda.
  - World Bank cooperation in prioritization, sequencing, and monitoring of structural reforms was critical during the period under review and should continue to be sought.

*Source: IMF staff report text contained in the provided PDF content unit.*

### 46.      In all likelihood, Mauritania will continue to need the support of the

### _cr11298 - 46.      In all likelihood, Mauritania will continue to need the support of the

### Continued need for international and Fund support
- "In all likelihood, Mauritania will continue to need the support of the international community, and the Fund in particular, beyond the current program."
- Reforms "needed to put the economy firmly on a sustainable, high growth path will take some years to implement and bear fruit."
- In the interim, Fund support through lending operations—along with financial support from the donor community—and technical assistance can be very valuable if met with strong ownership of reform.

### Authorities’ comments on the ex-post assessment (EPA) report
- Authorities "appreciated the initiative to assess, for the first time, the economic and social impact of the past three programs" and "welcomed the opportunity to comment on the EPA report."
- They "broadly agreed with the findings and recommendations" and emphasized "the need to promote transparency and good governance."
- They asserted that the Fund bears "some responsibility for the failures of previous programs because some of their objectives were excessively optimistic."
- Authorities attributed poor performance in part to "the unusually high degree of political turbulence of the 2000s."
- They noted that after the first Gulf war bilateral funding "had shrunk significantly," leading to rapid trade liberalization and a private sector response that "failed to provide the boost to growth that was expected under the programs."
- There was "general agreement that the main contribution of the programs was the achievement of macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability, and that these gains are still fragile."

### Central Bank of Mauritania (CBM): progress and remaining challenges
- Central bank officials indicated Fund support for central bank independence "has been valuable" and that "substantial progress had been made to strengthen the CBM more generally."
- Specific progress and outstanding items:
  - "The CBM’s internal audit unit is, de facto, operating independently, although an independent audit committee needs to be formally put in place."
  - A "key challenge continues to be the adoption of an integrated information system to support the auditing unit’s risk analysis."
  - "The lack of an integrated information system is also seen as the major factor for hampering CBM efforts to transition to international financial reporting standards."
  - Remaining challenges include:
    - "the provision of legal protection to CBM management and staff in their duties as bank supervisors;"
    - "bolstering the CBM’s capacity to mop up excessive liquidity through recapitalization or securitization of existing claims on the government;"
    - "modernizing the payments system."

### Fiscal and growth strategy views from Finance and Economic Affairs ministries
- Officials "agreed that growth had not been sufficiently high and had not generated enough employment opportunities."
- They stressed the need to develop "a clear growth strategy supported by sectoral policies that are in line with Fund recommendations."
- Priority areas for inclusive growth:
  - "Promoting the development of rural agriculture and integrating informal activities in the formal economy."
  - "A dynamic SME sector was also essential for achieving higher quality growth."
  - Need for "measures to support bank lending to this sector—beyond those already adopted."

### Business environment, anti-corruption, and aid absorption
- Authorities noted that "the various indicators of business climate used in the EPA report are subjective and do not reveal clearly the underlying problems" and raised concerns these indicators "could damage Mauritania’s image abroad."
- Actions already taken:
  - "introduction of a new investment code and a new procurement law."
  - Deployment of "a national strategy for fighting against corruption."
- Remaining needs:
  - "provide greater SME access to bank financing,"
  - "meet the large infrastructure investment needs,"
  - "reinforce the legal judicial system."
- On fiscal space and aid:
  - It is "imperative to build fiscal space to provide for much needed infrastructure and social spending through greater external resource mobilization and controlling current spending, particularly the public sector wage bill."
  - "Larger volumes of aid need to be coupled with improvements in Mauritania’s ability to absorb foreign aid, for which technical assistance would be welcome."
  - Authorities requested that "limits on concessional borrowing in Fund-supported programs are very costly and should be relaxed for large priority projects."
- Social protection targeting:
  - Authorities "agreed that poverty reduction policies could be better directed at those most in need" and intend to "put in place a less costly targeting mechanism aimed at the neediest population."
- They also "noted that World Bank’s financial and technical assistance had declined in recent years, and called for a stronger presence of the World Bank and other multilateral agencies."

### Misreporting and corrective actions: timeline and findings
- Background:
  - "In January 2004 a safeguards assessment (SA) mission found that about 85 percent of the CBM’s end-2002 foreign reserves could not be reliably confirmed by an external audit."
  - SA (May 2004) "identified serious deficiencies in the CBM’s financial reporting (including reporting of monetary data to the Fund) and internal controls, and in its internal audit mechanisms and legal structure."
  - Recommendations included audits of reserves and monetary program data, preparation of financial statements on the basis of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and improved controls in reserves management.
- First misreporting event:
  - In September 2004 authorities "submitted revised fiscal and monetary figures for 2003 and the first half of 2004" revealing "large extra-budgetary expenditures financed by monetary expansion and a drawdown of official reserves."
  - "All quantitative performance criteria and most other targets for the first review had been missed by wide margins."
  - A prior action related to "the accurate provision of monetary and fiscal data had not been met, which rendered the first disbursement noncomplying under the Misreporting Guidelines."
  - Management letter dated "October, 20 2004" stressed the need for:
    - "(a) a special audit for end-August 2004 foreign reserves;"
    - "(b) external certification of the end-2003 central bank financial statements;"
    - "(c) proof that end-2002 and prior data submitted to the Fund in 2001 were correct."
- Authorities’ response (November 2004):
  - The CBM governor "volunteered to repay the noncomplying purchase and requested the cancellation of the arrangement."
  - Fund Executive Board "agreed not to take further action."
  - Corrective measures announced included:
    - "approval by the General Council of the CBM of a transition to international reporting and accounting standards (October 2004);"
    - "incorporation of the recommendations made in past audits in the preparation of the CBM’s end-December 2004 financial statements;"
    - "reappointment of the external auditor that carried out the audits of the CBM’s 2000–02 financial statements."
  - External audit of 2004 financial statements expected to be finalized "by end-May 2005."
- Second misreporting event:
  - After the "military coup in August 2005," new authorities in October 2005 decided "to take immediate actions to resolve all pending data issues" and in November 2005 supplied "a set of revised monetary data covering the period 1992–2004."
  - Revised data showed fiscal and monetary slippages may have started earlier, revealing "program performance at end-December 2001 and end-June 2002 was substantially less favorable than reported" and that "the corresponding disbursements made after the completion of those reviews were noncomplying under the Misreporting Guidelines."
  - A letter was sent by the Managing Director to the CBM’s governor in "January 2006."
- Authorities’ response to MD letter:
  - The CBM’s governor "regretted the practice of providing erroneous data and provided assurances that these practices had been irrevocably stopped."
  - Corrective measures listed:
    - "(a) external audits for the CBM’s accounts in 2003 and 2004, and the initiation of the external audit for the 2005 accounts;"
    - "(b) progress in preparing fiscal reporting, reconciling Treasury and CBM’s accounts;"
    - "(c) preparation and publication of a report on economic statistics for the past decade."
  - These actions were "incorporated in the Staff Monitored Program (SMP) as structural indicators."
- Progress in safeguards implementation:
  - An update safeguards assessment "completed in April 2007" found that, "with the exception of appointing an international audit firm, the central bank had made little progress in strengthening the framework since the 2004 assessment."
  - Critical vulnerabilities remained in "financial reporting (including reporting of monetary data to the Fund), and controls."
  - The update recommended:
    - "establish an action plan and a timetable for the implementation of a new integrated accounting system and IFRS;"
    - "external auditor should continue to conduct special reviews of the foreign reserves data for each test date under the ongoing PRGF arrangement."
  - Conditionality under the PRGF included "structural benchmarks on the publication of the CBM’s financial statements and the resolution of the external auditor’s qualifications."
  - Authorities "met all the safeguards related conditionality through the 3rd review of the 2006 PRGF" and "began implementing a new chart of accounts and a program for transitioning to IFRS, but these efforts came to a halt in mid 2008."
  - The "latest assessment of the CBM concluded in 2010" found that "economic and political challenges in 2008–09 exacted a toll on the safeguards framework of the bank and that significant risks continue to exist."
  - Recommendations included restoring "independent governance oversight and timely publication of the financial statements," and "new procedures to ensure the integrity of data reported to the Fund."
  - The "permanent cessation of the cash operations of the CBM foreign offices was also identified as a safeguards priority."
  - Since the assessment completion, "governance oversight was restored, and timely publication of the audited financial statements resumed."
  - Further action needed: "developing capacity in the areas of financial reporting, information systems and internal audit; and updating procedures to ensure the integrity of data reported to the IMF."

### Structural conditionality (overview from appendices)
- Appendix Tables summarize structural conditionality across the 1999, 2003 and 2006 PRGF arrangements, categorizing prior actions, structural performance criteria, and structural benchmarks by policy area (fiscal measures, central bank operations and reforms, civil service reforms, pension and social sector reforms, public enterprise reform, financial sector legal reforms, exchange systems, trade policy, labor markets, economic statistics, private sector legal/regulatory environment, natural resource and agricultural policies, PRSP development and anti-corruption legislation/policy).
- Totals presented in the appendices include numeric aggregates such as "Total1050032205612224611221213" and "Total337" for specific PRGF datasets, and other totals like "Total100301322" in the 2006 PRGF table (as presented in the source tables).

### Technical assistance to Mauritania (1999–2009)
- A. Monetary and Financial Department TA highlights (dates preserved exactly as in source):
  - "Technical assistance mission on deepening of financial sector reforms and strengthening of the financial system: February 18–March 3, 1999."
  - "Advisor to the CBM governor on the development of foreign exchange market and related operations: May 1999–February 2000."
  - "Technical assistance mission on monetary instruments: May 6–20, 2000."
  - "Technical assistance mission on money market development and reform of monetary instruments: September 30–October 10, 2000."
  - "Follow-up TA mission on reform of monetary instruments and assessment of technical assistance needs: February 7–20, 2001."
  - "Peripatetic TA missions by panel expert on the exchange system reform: 1999–2002."
  - "Resident expert on banking supervision: August 1, 2001–February 2, 2003, and January 6–February 3, 2004."
  - "TA mission on foreign exchange market issues: January 9–23, 2005."
  - "Peripatetic TA missions by panel expert on foreign exchange reserves management: July 13–26, 2005."
  - "TA mission on money market instruments: March 7–19, 2006."
  - "TA mission on foreign exchange market: December 17–19, 2006."
  - "TA mission on central bank accounting: March 6–May 4, 2007."
  - "TA mission on securitization of government debt: September 9–21, 2007."
  - "TA mission on central bank accounting: October 20, 2007 – October 20, 2008."
- B. Fiscal Affairs Department TA highlights:
  - "TA mission on reinforcing fiscal administration and improving VAT performance: April 25–May 9, 1999."
  - "Follow-up mission on improving VAT performance: November 10–17, 2000."
  - "Long-term resident technical advisor on tax administration and tax system reform: April 25, 2000–April 24, 2001."
  - "TA mission on tracking poverty-reducing expenditures: October 10–17, 2001."
  - "TA mission on setting up a VAT refund system: November 18–23, 2001."
  - "TA mission on reforming taxes on income and profits: July 7–21, 2003."
  - "TA mission on public expenditure management: April 3–19, 2005."
  - "TA mission on fiscal administration reform: June 14–18, 2005."
  - "TA mission on tax policy: May 25–June 8, 2006."
  - "TA mission on customs administration: June 5–16, 2006."
  - "TA mission on oil revenue management: October 24–November 7, 2006."
  - "TA mission on tax administration: March 12–23, 2007."
  - "TA mission on tax policy: February 27–March 11, 2008."
  - "TA mission on Public Financial Management: June 16–17, 2008."
- C. Legal Department TA:
  - "TA mission on the drafting of laws to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism: February 23–March 1, 2005."
- D. Statistics Department TA:
  - "TA mission on balance of payments statistics: August 30–September 9, 1999."
  - "TA mission on monetary statistics: January 9–22, 2002."
  - "TA mission on real statistics: June 2–15, 2003."
  - "TA mission on GDDS: April 14–28, 2004."
  - "TA consultant on banking and monetary statistics: November 8–22, 2005."
  - "TA mission on balance of payments statistics: April 5–18, 2006."
  - "TA mission on monetary and financial statistics: July 13–26, 2006."
  - "TA mission on National Accounts Statistics: April 16–27, 2007."
- E. AFRITAC support:
  - "Several TA missions in 2003 and 2004, including on tax and customs administration, computerization of public expenditure chain, and external debt management."
  - "Several TA missions in 2005–07, including on tax and customs administration, computerization of public expenditure chain, external debt management, public finance statistics, and microfinance supervision and regulation."
  - "Several missions in late 2008 and early 2009, including microfinance supervision, tax and customs administration, public debt management and development of financial markets, and external debt statistics."
  - "Participation of PFM advisor in needs assessment visit, December 2009."

*Source: IMF staff report content provided in the supplied PDF excerpt.*

### APPENDIX IV. WORLD BANK OPERATIONS WITH MAURITANIA, 1999–2010

### APPENDIX IV. WORLD BANK OPERATIONS WITH MAURITANIA, 1999–2010

### World Bank operations (1999–2010)
- 1 Phase II: EITI implementation — 0.28 (US $ million); Approval date: July 2010
- 2 Urban Development Project (additional financing) — 22.5 (US $ million); Approval date: June 2010
- 3 Transport Sector Institutional Development and Technical Assistance Project — 4.5 (US $ million); Approval date: July 2008
- 4 Business Environment Enhancement Project — 5 (US $ million); Approval date: May 2008
- 5 Education Sector Development Program — 14 (US $ million); Approval date: April 2008
- 6 Avian Flu Rapid Assessment — 0.03 (US $ million); Approval date: February 2007
- 7 Second Mining Sector Capacity Building Supplemental — 5 (US $ million); Approval date: July 2006
- 8 Public Sector Capacity Building Project — 13 (US $ million); Approval date: July 2006
- 9 Community Based Watershed Management Project — 6.01 (US $ million); Approval date: June 2006
- 10 EITI implementation — 0.24 (US $ million); Approval date: June 2006
- 11 Health and Nutrition Support Project — 10 (US $ million); Approval date: June 2006
- 12 National Strategy for the Development of the Statistical System — 0.11 (US $ million); Approval date: December 2005
- 13 Integrated Development Program for Irrigated Agriculture — 39 (US $ million); Approval date: March 2005
- 14 Higher Education Project — 15 (US $ million); Approval date: August 2004
- 15 Community Based Rural Development — 45 (US $ million); Approval date: April 2004
- 16 Second Mining Sector Capacity Building Project — 18 (US $ million); Approval date: July 2003
- 17 Multi-sector HIV/AIDS Control Project — 21 (US $ million); Approval date: July 2003
- 18 Global Distance Learning Center — 3.3 (US $ million); Approval date: November 2001
- 19 Education Sector Development Program — 49.2 (US $ million); Approval date: October 2001
- 20 Urban Development Project — 70 (US $ million); Approval date: October 2001
- 21 Supplemental Credit to the Fiscal Reform Support Operation — 18.3 (US $ million); Approval date: December 2000
- 22 Cultural Heritage Project — 5 (US $ million); Approval date: June 2000
- 23 Energy/Water/Sanitation Sector Reform Technical Assistance Project — 9.9 (US $ million); Approval date: June 2000
- 24 Fiscal Reform Support Operation — 30 (US $ million); Approval date: May 2000
- 25 Fourth Amendment to Public Resource Management Credit — 0.14 (US $ million); Approval date: November 1999
- 26 Integrated Development Project for Irrigated Agriculture — 38.1 (US $ million); Approval date: July 1999
- 27 Telecommunication and Postal Service reform Project — 10.8 (US $ million); Approval date: June 1999
- 28 Mining Sector Capacity Building Project — 15 (US $ million); Approval date: May 1999
- 29 Nutrition, Food, Security, and Social Mobilization Project — 4.9 (US $ million); Approval date: March 1999
- 30 Public Resource Management Supplemental — 0.14 (US $ million); Approval date: February 1999

### IMF Public Information Notice (PIN) — Ex Post Assessment (EPA) of Longer Program Engagement with Mauritania
- Context and purpose:
  - An EPA is required for all members having longer-term program engagement with the Fund.
  - EPAs provide an opportunity to step back from continuing program relations to consider an analysis of the economic problems facing the country, review progress under Fund-supported programs, and draw forward-looking lessons for future Fund engagement.
  - The EPA examined Mauritania’s experience with three Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities approved in 1999, 2003 and 2006.

- Main findings of the EPA:
  - The programs helped achieve a basic degree of macroeconomic stability.
  - Less progress was achieved on the structural front.
  - The EPA identifies critical areas for successful engagement, including:
    - transparency and governance
    - sound macroeconomic frameworks
    - a market friendly economic environment
    - better targeted social spending

- Executive Board assessment:
  - Directors broadly agreed with the conclusions of the Ex-Post Assessment of Mauritania’s economic performance under the last three Fund-supported programs.
  - Directors agreed that the newly finalized poverty-reduction strategy paper and the current Extended Credit Facility (ECF)-supported program appropriately address the challenges identified by the EPA.
  - Directors stressed that structural reforms are essential to promote sustainable employment and broad-based inclusive growth, including reforms aimed at:
    - restructuring public enterprises
    - enhancing the labor market
    - strengthening transparency
    - improving the business climate

*Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 11/125 — October 4, 2011*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/_cr11298.pdf_
