## 1. Exceptional Access Criteria

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---

### I. Introduction and Executive Summary
- Mongolia was extended an 18-month Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) in April 2009 supported by Fund resources amounting to SDR 153.3 million, or 300 percent of quota, with more than 200 percent of quota to be made available within the year under the exceptional access policy.
- The 2009-10 program is assessed as a success in restoring stability and catalyzing donor financing, while concerns remain about the durability of post-program implementation of reforms.
- Key lessons:
  - Set streamlined and focused conditions in key areas of Fund’s core expertise and essential to program objectives.
  - Demonstrate flexibility in dealing with changing economic and political circumstances, while remaining focused on core policy measures.
  - Provide timely technical assistance (TA) which facilitates the implementation of program measures.
  - Explore ways to secure a lasting commitment to implement and sustain progresses made under the program.

### II. Cause of the 2008–09 Crisis and the Role of Exceptional Access
- Trigger and transmission:
  - Copper prices—the primary export—declined by 70 percent after reaching a peak in July 2008.
  - Copper contributed more than half of merchandise exports and about a quarter of government revenues in recent years.
  - The non-mineral deficit reached near 10 percent of GDP in 2007.
  - GDP growth was projected to decline to some 2½ percent for 2009 from the average 9 percent over the 2006-08 period.
- Financial system stresses:
  - By end-February 2009, net international reserves fell to US$ 500 million, more than halving from the peak in mid-2008.
  - Deposit withdrawals and shifts into foreign-exchange deposits occurred despite a blanket deposit guarantee introduced after a run on Anod bank in December 2008.
- Policy gaps:
  - Monetary policy had been accommodative, with inflation reaching double digits by late 2007 and real interest rates in negative territory.
  - Rapid double-digit credit growth left the banking sector over-extended and non-performing loans rising.

### III. Program Response and Outcomes
- Program objectives and instruments:
  - Four key planks: restoring health to government finances; allowing the exchange rate to adjust flexibly while safeguarding international reserves; bolstering confidence in the banking system; protecting the poor during adjustment.
  - The program combined significant fiscal adjustment and large, front-loaded financing to avert fiscal, banking, and balance of payments crises.
  - Structural measures aimed to reduce fiscal pro-cyclicality, improve social transfers, and enhance bank supervision.
- Financial stabilization and catalytic effects:
  - The central bank raised policy interest rates sharply and implemented twice-weekly foreign exchange auctions.
  - The central bank’s sale of foreign exchange turned to net purchase in March 2009 for the first time since late-2008.
  - Donor financing and government deposit guarantees helped bolster confidence in the banking sector.
- Macroeconomic trajectory:
  - Authorities restrained expenditure to keep the overall deficit within program targets despite weaker-than-expected revenues.
  - The central bank began lowering the policy interest rate in May as inflation fell and the exchange rate stabilized.
  - The economy bottomed out and growth resumed in late 2009 as copper prices rebounded.
  - By October 2010, real GDP growth was projected to exceed 8 percent in 2010 and international reserves stood at US$ 1.6 billion.
- Structural reform progress and gaps:
  - Fiscal structural benchmarks facilitated submission and passage of the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL), with modest delays and lingering implementation uncertainties.
  - Monetary and exchange rate policy was recalibrated to safeguard reserves and keep inflation on a downward path.
  - Legislative progress on bank supervision and restructuring was made, though implementation lagged.
  - Welfare reform made least progress: the targeted poverty benefit was not adopted; a social transfer reform law was still under parliamentary deliberation at program conclusion, while untargeted transfers were substantially increased.

### IV. Exceptional Access Assessment and Risk Management
- Rationale for exceptional access:
  - Total access approved: SDR 153.3 million (300 percent of quota), with 240 percent of quota available within 12 months.
  - Currency depreciated over 30 percent between November 2008 and early March 2009.
  - Foreign reserves declined by roughly US$ 100 million per month prior to the program.
- Evaluation against Box 1 criteria:
  - Criterion I: Met — exceptional BOP pressures with imminent need for Fund financing.
  - Criterion II: Met — staff DSA indicated a high probability that public debt would remain sustainable in the medium term (noting a prior reduction of debt from 87 to 33 percent of GDP between 2003 and 2008).
  - Criterion III: Considered met given strong prospects of FDI inflows and limited private market access.
  - Criterion IV: Most uncertain — Mongolia’s prior track record was weak (none of four previous programs completed; the 2001 PRGF arrangement did not go beyond the second review), and upcoming presidential elections posed ownership risks.
- Risk mitigation measures:
  - Front-loading of significant policy measures (fiscal adjustment in amended 2009 budget; non-discriminatory foreign exchange auctions implemented ahead of approval).
  - Ceilings on contracting non-concessional external debt as a performance criterion.
  - Authorities committed to returning to parliament for additional expenditure measures if revenues fell further.

### V. Program Chronology and Financing Phasing
- Purchases and review-linked disbursements:
  - April 1, 2009: 100 percent of quota — 51,100,000 SDR — Approved Stand-by Arrangement.
  - June 23, 2009: 50 percent of quota — 25,550,000 SDR — Completion of the first review.
  - September 21, 2009: 30 percent of quota — 15,330,000 SDR — Completion of the second review.
  - December 22, 2009: 30 percent of quota — 15,330,000 SDR — Completion of the third review.
  - March 19, 2010: 30 percent of quota — 15,330,000 SDR — Completion of the fourth review.
  - September 8, 2010: 60 percent of quota — 30,660,000 SDR — Completion of the fifth and sixth review.
  - Total: 300 percent of quota — 153,300,000 SDR.

### VI. Policy Recommendations and Implementation Priorities
- Maintain focused conditionality in areas central to program success to facilitate negotiation and implementation.
- Retain principled flexibility to adapt to evolving economic and political landscapes while preserving core policy objectives to enhance ownership.
- Provide timely and substantive TA to operationalize agreed reforms, particularly for bank restructuring and social transfer targeting.
- Strengthen mechanisms to secure sustained post-program commitment to reforms, given lingering uncertainties about implementation after program conclusion.

*Source: Ex-post evaluation of the 2009-10 Stand-By Arrangement for Mongolia (IMF staff report).*

---

### Program financing, conditionality, and fiscal outcomes

### Program financing and Fund role
- Estimated financing need: about US$ 200 million (US$ 144 million in 2009 and US$ 60 million in 2010) to be funded by bilateral donors and other international financial institutions.
- Pledges at donor conference: Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) together pledged US$ 160 million, filling in the bulk of the remaining financing gap.
- Fund commitment: up to US$ 232 million, which was 53 percent of the estimated total financing need of US$ 437 million.
- Comparative context: Fund’s share (53 percent) was close to the average of the Fund’s share of financing packages (56 percent) in the global financial crisis but considerably higher than that in past crises (40 percent).
- Donor engagement: successful donor conference immediately followed the staff-level agreement on the SBA; Fund management played a close role in persuading donors.

### Choice of arrangement and rationale
- Arrangement chosen: Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) was preferred due to exigent financing need and was more agreeable to the authorities than more concessional facilities.
- Alternative offered: early 2010 offer of an arrangement under the PRGF with more concessional financing and lower access, which authorities declined because they planned to access international financial markets in the near future.
- Other facilities: Exogenous Shocks Facility with a high access component (ESF-HAC, later superseded by the Standby Credit Facility) was available but considered inappropriate because the large BOP need also reflected domestic policy slippages and broad structural problems.

### Conditionality, flexibility, and ownership
- Quantitative conditionality:
  - Seven performance criteria (PCs) including on net international reserves (NIR), net domestic assets (NDA), net bank credit to government, and non-concessional external debt.
  - Fiscal deficit ceiling established as an indicative target (not a PC) given substantial uncertainties and the PC on net credit to government.
  - Coverage of quantitative targets comparable to previous Fund arrangements with Mongolia and contemporaneous SBAs after the breakout of the global financial crisis.
- Structural benchmarks:
  - Number and breadth were significantly fewer and more focused than in previous arrangements.
  - Five of eight structural benchmarks were on fiscal reforms; two applied to the banking sector.
  - All targets and benchmarks aligned with Fund core expertise and program objectives.
- Macroeconomic assumptions and outcomes:
  - Program assumed persistent weakness in global copper price and investment inflows, underestimating the quick and strong rebound of copper price.
  - 2009 annual average copper price was nearly 50 percent higher than the US$ 3500 projected in the program.
  - Conservative macroeconomic framework helped avoid large surprises between fiscal targets and outturns.
- Program adaptation and flexibility:
  - On-lending to gold mining companies was allowed during negotiation despite risk to NDA PC.
  - Quantitative PCs adjusted in successive reviews; structural benchmarks rescheduled multiple times to allow political gestation.
  - Fund delayed completion of the fifth review until tangible progress on fiscal structural reforms and expenditure restraint.
- Technical assistance (TA):
  - About 20 TAs provided by the Fund between November 2008 and October 2010, mainly from FAD and MCM.
  - MCM provided intensive TAs early in the program, including on the foreign exchange auction (a prior action) in March 2009, and on monetary policy, bank supervision and restructuring.
- Ownership and outreach:
  - Streamlined, flexible conditionality facilitated negotiation and strengthened ownership beyond previous engagements.
  - Commitment sustained through the end despite changes in leadership and disappearing financing need.
  - By early 2010, no need to tap remaining SDR 30.66 million tied to last two quarterly reviews.
  - Fund staff conducted regular meetings with speaker of parliament and key committee chairs and delivered parliamentary workshops on topics such as inflation and the FRL.

### Fiscal policy: objectives, targets, and outcomes
- Central objective: significant reduction in the overall balance deficit to reduce financing gap and move deficit toward sustainable range.
- Indicative target for 2009 fiscal deficit: set at 6 percent of GDP; implied reducing the non-mineral deficit by more than 5 percentage points of GDP from the 2008 outturn.
- Design and tradeoffs:
  - Target set in terms of overall balance to allow authorities discretion in choosing adjustment details; reflects light conditionality and stronger ownership but may weaken restraint on expenditure growth if revenues over-perform.
  - More emphasis could have been placed on primary deficit or non-mineral deficit PCs; however, in early 2009 downside risks dominated.
- Evolving context and fiscal recalibration:
  - Tradeoff between adjustment and financing shifted with changing copper prices and growth prospects.
  - Two main developments: further weakening in mid-2009; faster and stronger-than-expected recovery in mineral prices and contracting of a large copper mine in late 2009.
  - Result: outlook and government revenues strengthened, with double-digit real GDP growth projected for several years from 2013.
- Fiscal discipline and actual outcomes:
  - Fiscal targets were satisfied with a comfortable margin in most reviews—initially via disciplined spending and later aided by strong copper price recovery.
  - Policies: capital expenditures postponed; wages and current expenditures restrained; commitment to future overhaul of social transfer regime in a structural benchmark.
  - With revenue rebound, deficit targets revised down; fiscal expenditures increased to support the economy while financing need reduced.
  - 2010 budget deficit target eventually revised to 2¼ percent of GDP—nearly half the initial program level for 2010.

### Developments in fiscal projections (selected table highlights, percent of GDP)
- 2009 (1st, 2nd, 3rd, Act):
  - Total revenue and grants: 30.8, 30.8, 30.7, 32.9
  - Total expenditure and net lending: 36.8, 37.3, 37.2, 38.3
  - Current expenditure: 28.5, 29.4, 28.5, 29.6
  - Capital expenditure and net lending: 8.3, 7.9, 8.7, 8.7
  - Overall balance, projected and actual: -6.0, -6.5, -6.5, -5.4
  - Nonmineral overall balance: -9.9, -12.1, -12.7, -12.9
  - Structural balance: ..., ..., -5.0, -7.6
  - Memorandum items:
    - Nominal GDP (in billions of togrogs): 6,294, 6,209, 6,407, 6,056
    - Real GDP growth rate: 2.7, 0.5, -1.0, -1.6
    - Copper price assumption (US$ per ton): 3,500, 4,000, 5,000, 5,165
- 2010 (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th):
  - Total revenue and grants: 31.6, 30.1, 33.0, 34.5, 34.9
  - Total expenditure and net lending: 35.6, 35.0, 38.0, 38.5, 37.1
  - Current expenditure: 26.7, 27.2, 30.3, 30.8, 29.6
  - Capital expenditure and net lending: 8.9, 7.8, 7.7, 7.7, 7.5
  - Overall balance, projected and actual: -4.0, -5.0, -5.0, -4.0, -2.2
  - Nonmineral overall balance: -9.1, -9.0, -12.2, -12.2, -11.2
  - Structural balance: ..., ..., -5.1, -4.2, -5.6
  - Memorandum items:
    - Nominal GDP (in billions of togrogs): 7,180, 6,931, 7,373, 7,221, 7,911
    - Real GDP growth rate: 4.3, 3.0, 8.6, 7.3, 8.5
    - Copper price assumption (US$ per ton): 3,800, 4,100, 5,800, 6,500, 6,911

### Assessment of pro-cyclicality and FRL
- Pro-cyclicality:
  - 2009 outturn of non-mineral balance deficit exceeded initial program projection by 3 percentage points of GDP, implying greater reliance on cyclical mineral revenues.
  - Compared to 2008 outturn, 2009 non-mineral deficit declined by about 2 percentage points of GDP—about half the magnitude of fiscal adjustment targeted in original program at peak financing pressure.
  - Structural deficit (using 16-year moving average of mineral prices) exceeded the 3rd-review projection by 2½ percentage points of GDP in 2009, implying expenditure grew faster than long-term trend in mineral prices.
  - Policy preference placed more weight on short-term stimulus than pre-emptive reduction of fiscal pro-cyclicality, contributing to quick and strong recovery.
- Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL):
  - Legislation delayed to June 2010 from original deadline of December 2009 to rally political support.
  - By 2013, FRL would put in place three complementary ceilings on structural deficit, total debt, and expenditure growth.
  - Two-thirds majority required to amend the law.
  - FAD TA instrumental in FRL development and ongoing fiscal assistance.
- Box 2: Three Ceilings in the FRL
  - Floor of structural balance: deficit of 2 percent of GDP. Structural balance calculated using 16-year moving average price of major minerals (currently copper and coal—past 12 years, current year, and future three years). Provision takes effect in 2013.
  - Ceiling of expenditure growth: the non-mineral GDP growth rate, determined as the greater between its 12-year moving average value and the budget year’s GDP growth rate. Provision takes effect in 2013.
  - Net present value of public debt cannot exceed 40 percent of GDP. Provision takes effect from 2014, and the government can make loan guarantees for a development bank by 10 and 20 percent of GDP (net present value) in 2011 and 2012, respectively.
- Concerns on FRL implementation:
  - Some FRL provisions, including the floor of structural balance, were delayed from the 2011 budget to the 2013 budget without transitional deficit targets for intervening years.
  - FAD TA recommended transitional structural deficit targets of 4 and 3 percent for 2011 and 2012, respectively; 2011 budget envisaged a structural deficit of nearly 10 percent of GDP.
  - Fund bargaining power shrank as commodity prices and economic growth rebounded; Medium Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF) was adopted in parliament as a substitute arrangement, but finalized 2011 budget deviated from Fund recommendation.
- Social transfer reform:
  - Progress slower than for FRL. Initial plan to legislate by November 2009 to consolidate social benefits and introduce new targeted benefit; legislation submitted January 2010 and still pending four months after program conclusion.
  - Authorities introduced a new universal transfer regime (Human Development Fund) in 2010 budget.
  - Cultural and political reluctance to identify and target the poor hindered reform; Fund and other IFIs (ADB, World Bank) had limited influence.

---

### Monetary policy, exchange rate, and external balances

### Exchange rate regime and FX market operations
- Commitment to flexible exchange rate system reinforced under the program.
- Prior issues: rising currency premium in the informal parallel market and rapid loss of international reserves.
- Non-discriminatory foreign exchange auctions implemented (prior action in March 2009) with MCM TA, normalizing the FX market, improving price discovery, and eliminating informal-market premium.
- SBA approval brought immediate shift from exchange rate targeting to monetary aggregate targeting; flexible exchange rate agreed to provide shock absorption beyond program horizon.

### Monetary policy stance and instruments
- Monetary policy tightened at outset in support of exchange rate adjustment—policy rate increase by 425 basis points to signal regime change and limit capital outflow.
- Rate hikes were reversed within three months as exchange rate stabilized and remonetization progressed; policy rate lowered in a measured pace.
- Later, economic recovery and rising inflation pressure led to a tightening bias near the end of the program, involving an increase in the policy rate and a sizable nominal appreciation.
- Conduct of policy and instruments:
  - Shift from passive to proactive monetary policy during the program.
  - Real exchange rate adjustments achieved via nominal exchange rate adjustments, avoiding run-away inflation seen in pre-crisis years.
  - Auction system for central-bank bills improved, including introduction of a new auction system for 7-day central-bank bills.
  - Inflation targeting was discussed as desirable framework beyond the program horizon.
- Risks and constraints:
  - Sustaining progress requires vigilance because return of fiscal pro-cyclicality could severely constrain effectiveness of monetary policy and cause regress in policy conduct.

---

### Financial sector, supervision, and restructuring

### Financial-sector objective and immediate actions
- Primary goal: restore confidence in the banking system.
- Context: Mongolia was not directly impacted by the global financial crisis, but the pre-crisis credit boom had weakened bank balance sheets and confidence.
- Key actions and outcomes:
  - Deposit guarantee system was improved (a prior action).
  - Insolvent Anod Bank and Zoos Bank were placed under receivership by late 2009.
  - Program measures forestalled a system-wide spillover despite pervasive weakness in many less affected banks.

### Legislative and supervisory progress
- Fund and World Bank TA complemented the program and somewhat accelerated legislative progress.
- Revised banking law approved in parliament in January 2010, introducing:
  - consolidated supervision;
  - improved resolution framework.
- Bank of Mongolia (August) issued several new regulations under the revised law that:
  - increased provisioning for restructured loans;
  - tightened supervision of related-party loans.
- Authorities submitted to parliament the Empowering the Banking Sector and Capital Support Program to legislate a comprehensive restructuring framework fair to both banks and taxpayers.
- Awaiting passage of the Program, authorities (with MCM TA) were developing bank-by-bank implementation plans to address substantial capital deficiencies in some banks.

### Implementation shortfalls and vulnerabilities
- De jure reform progress has yet to be matched by de facto progress.
- Enforcement of bank regulation was not sufficiently strong; regulatory forbearance viewed as widespread.
- Four months after program conclusion, passage of the Banking Sector and Capital Support Program in parliament was not assured, despite urgency due to possible overstatement of capital adequacy in some systemic banks.
- Financial Sector Assessment Program (November 2010) recommendation: monitor loan quality of systemic exposures and ensure adequate provision for them.

### Future challenges and critical policy priorities
- Program failed to secure a durable pre-commitment to implement and sustain reforms, leaving several vulnerabilities unaddressed.
- Key priorities:
  - (i) lock in fiscal prudence including by fully implementing the FRL;
  - (ii) maintain improved monetary policy conduct by keeping inflation pressure at bay and maintaining exchange rate flexibility;
  - (iii) strengthen the banking system through prudential regulation and supervision;
  - (iv) improve the efficiency of social welfare program.
- Role of the Fund:
  - Facilitate fruition of reforms initiated under the SBA through constructive policy consultations.
  - Act as catalyzing advisor to help authorities navigate rapid socio-economic transformation accompanying the resource-driven boom.
- Conclusion:
  - 18-month program succeeded in achieving main objectives and providing sizable, front-loaded financing.
  - Remaining gaps: failure to secure proactive commitment to lock in reforms—priority areas include strict adherence to the FRL; social welfare reform; comprehensive bank restructuring.
  - Strong implementation essential to prevent return of boom-bust cycles driven by global commodity price volatility.

---

### Selected performance criteria and illustrative outcomes (selected indicators)
- Net international reserves (NIR) of the Bank of Mongolia (BOM) (floor, eop stock, in million US$):
  - 4/30/2009: Prog. 335; Outcome 441.
  - 6/30/2009: Prog. 315; Outcome 475.
  - 9/30/2009: Prog. 455; Outcome 537.
  - 12/31/2009: Prog. 575; Rev.1/ 798; Outcome 923.
  - 3/31/2010: Prog. 600; Rev.2/ 809; Outcome 957.
  - 6/30/2010: Prog. 535; Rev.3/ 776; Outcome 983.
- Net domestic asset (NDA) of the BOM (ceiling, eop stock, in billion togrog):
  - 4/30/2009: Prog. -32; Outcome -287.
  - 6/30/2009: Prog. 14; Outcome -243.
  - 9/30/2009: Prog. -195; Outcome -302.
  - 12/31/2009: Prog. -618; Rev.1/ -332; Outcome -542.
  - 3/31/2010: Prog. -728; Rev.2/ -331; Outcome -645.
  - 6/30/2010: Prog. -793; Rev.3/ -224; Outcome -477.
- Net credit to government (NCG) (ceiling, cumulative from beginning of fiscal year, in billion togrog):
  - 4/30/2009: Prog. 105; Outcome 82.
  - 6/30/2009: Prog. 156; Outcome -19.
  - 9/30/2009: Prog. 72; Rev.1/ -69; Outcome -150.
  - 12/31/2009: Prog. 81; Rev.2/ 58; Outcome -17.
  - 3/31/2010: Prog. 87; Rev.3/ 220; Outcome 16.
  - 6/30/2010: Prog. 227; Rev.3/ 270; Outcome 130.
- Indicative target — General government fiscal deficit (ceiling, cumulative since the beginning of fiscal year, in billion togrog):
  - 4/30/2009: Prog. 250; Outcome 144.
  - 6/30/2009: Prog. 325; Outcome 248.
  - 9/30/2009: Prog. 290; Rev.1/ 315; Outcome 333.
  - 12/31/2009: Prog. 380; Rev.2/ 416; Outcome 343.
  - 3/31/2010: Prog. 125; Rev.3/ 220; Outcome 9.
  - 6/30/2010: Prog. 200; Rev.3/ 270; Outcome 68.

*Italic: IMF staff report excerpt (pages 10–16) from the PDF titled “_cr1177 - 17.      The program succeeded in catalyzing funds from other sources. Despite the”*

### 1. Exceptional Access Criteria.............................................................................8

### 1. Exceptional Access Criteria

### I. Introduction and Executive Summary
- Mongolia was extended an 18-month Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) in April 2009 supported by Fund resources amounting to SDR 153.3 million, or 300 percent of quota, with more than 200 percent of quota to be made available within the year under the exceptional access policy.
- The 2009-10 program is assessed as a success in restoring stability and catalyzing donor financing, while concerns remain about the durability of post-program implementation of reforms.
- Key lessons:
  - Set streamlined and focused conditions in key areas of Fund’s core expertise and essential to program objectives.
  - Demonstrate flexibility in dealing with changing economic and political circumstances, while remaining focused on core policy measures.
  - Provide timely technical assistance (TA) which facilitates the implementation of program measures.
  - Explore ways to secure a lasting commitment to implement and sustain progresses made under the program.

### II. Cause of the 2008–09 Crisis and the Role of Exceptional Access
- Trigger and transmission:
  - Copper prices—the primary export—declined by 70 percent after reaching a peak in July 2008.
  - Copper contributed more than half of merchandise exports and about a quarter of government revenues in recent years.
  - The non-mineral deficit reached near 10 percent of GDP in 2007.
  - GDP growth was projected to decline to some 2½ percent for 2009 from the average 9 percent over the 2006-08 period.
- Financial system stresses:
  - By end-February 2009, net international reserves fell to US$ 500 million, more than halving from the peak in mid-2008.
  - Deposit withdrawals and shifts into foreign-exchange deposits occurred despite a blanket deposit guarantee introduced after a run on Anod bank in December 2008.
- Policy gaps:
  - Monetary policy had been accommodative, with inflation reaching double digits by late 2007 and real interest rates in negative territory.
  - Rapid double-digit credit growth left the banking sector over-extended and non-performing loans rising.

### III. Program Response and Outcomes
- Program objectives and instruments:
  - Four key planks: restoring health to government finances; allowing the exchange rate to adjust flexibly while safeguarding international reserves; bolstering confidence in the banking system; protecting the poor during adjustment.
  - The program combined significant fiscal adjustment and large, front-loaded financing to avert fiscal, banking, and balance of payments crises.
  - Structural measures aimed to reduce fiscal pro-cyclicality, improve social transfers, and enhance bank supervision.
- Financial stabilization and catalytic effects:
  - The central bank raised policy interest rates sharply and implemented twice-weekly foreign exchange auctions.
  - The central bank’s sale of foreign exchange turned to net purchase in March 2009 for the first time since late-2008.
  - Donor financing and government deposit guarantees helped bolster confidence in the banking sector.
- Macroeconomic trajectory:
  - The authorities restrained expenditure to keep the overall deficit within program targets despite weaker-than-expected revenues.
  - The central bank began lowering the policy interest rate in May as inflation fell and the exchange rate stabilized.
  - The economy bottomed out and growth resumed in late 2009 as copper prices rebounded.
  - By October 2010, real GDP growth was projected to exceed 8 percent in 2010 and international reserves stood at US$ 1.6 billion.
- Structural reform progress and gaps:
  - Fiscal structural benchmarks facilitated submission and passage of the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL), with modest delays and lingering implementation uncertainties.
  - Monetary and exchange rate policy was recalibrated to safeguard reserves and keep inflation on a downward path.
  - Legislative progress on bank supervision and restructuring was made, though implementation lagged.
  - Welfare reform made least progress: the targeted poverty benefit was not adopted; a social transfer reform law was still under parliamentary deliberation at program conclusion, while untargeted transfers were substantially increased.

### IV. Exceptional Access Assessment and Risk Management
- Rationale for exceptional access:
  - Total access approved: SDR 153.3 million (300 percent of quota), with 240 percent of quota available within 12 months.
  - Currency depreciated over 30 percent between November 2008 and early March 2009.
  - Foreign reserves declined by roughly US$ 100 million per month prior to the program.
- Evaluation against Box 1 criteria:
  - Criterion I: Met — exceptional BOP pressures with imminent need for Fund financing.
  - Criterion II: Met — staff DSA indicated a high probability that public debt would remain sustainable in the medium term (noting a prior reduction of debt from 87 to 33 percent of GDP between 2003 and 2008).
  - Criterion III: Considered met given strong prospects of FDI inflows and limited private market access.
  - Criterion IV: Most uncertain — Mongolia’s prior track record was weak (none of four previous programs completed; the 2001 PRGF arrangement did not go beyond the second review), and upcoming presidential elections posed ownership risks.
- Risk mitigation measures:
  - Front-loading of significant policy measures (fiscal adjustment in amended 2009 budget; non-discriminatory foreign exchange auctions implemented ahead of approval).
  - Ceilings on contracting non-concessional external debt as a performance criterion.
  - Authorities committed to returning to parliament for additional expenditure measures if revenues fell further.

### V. Program Chronology and Financing Phasing
- Purchases and review-linked disbursements:
  - April 1, 2009: 100 percent of quota — 51,100,000 SDR — Approved Stand-by Arrangement.
  - June 23, 2009: 50 percent of quota — 25,550,000 SDR — Completion of the first review.
  - September 21, 2009: 30 percent of quota — 15,330,000 SDR — Completion of the second review.
  - December 22, 2009: 30 percent of quota — 15,330,000 SDR — Completion of the third review.
  - March 19, 2010: 30 percent of quota — 15,330,000 SDR — Completion of the fourth review.
  - September 8, 2010: 60 percent of quota — 30,660,000 SDR — Completion of the fifth and sixth review.
  - Total: 300 percent of quota — 153,300,000 SDR.

### VI. Policy Recommendations and Implementation Priorities
- Maintain focused conditionality in areas central to program success to facilitate negotiation and implementation.
- Retain principled flexibility to adapt to evolving economic and political landscapes while preserving core policy objectives to enhance ownership.
- Provide timely and substantive TA to operationalize agreed reforms, particularly for bank restructuring and social transfer targeting.
- Strengthen mechanisms to secure sustained post-program commitment to reforms, given lingering uncertainties about implementation after program conclusion.

*Source: Ex-post evaluation of the 2009-10 Stand-By Arrangement for Mongolia (IMF staff report).*

### 17.      The program succeeded in catalyzing funds from other sources. Despite the

### 17.      The program succeeded in catalyzing funds from other sources. Despite the

### Program financing and Fund role
- Estimated financing need: about US$ 200 million (US$ 144 million in 2009 and US$ 60 million in 2010) to be funded by bilateral donors and other international financial institutions.
- Pledges at donor conference: Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) together pledged US$ 160 million, filling in the bulk of the remaining financing gap.
- Fund commitment: up to US$ 232 million, which was 53 percent of the estimated total financing need of US$ 437 million.
- Comparative context: Fund’s share (53 percent) was close to the average of the Fund’s share of financing packages (56 percent) in the global financial crisis but considerably higher than that in past crises (40 percent).
- Donor engagement: successful donor conference immediately followed the staff-level agreement on the SBA; Fund management played a close role in persuading donors.

### Choice of arrangement and rationale
- Arrangement chosen: Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) was preferred due to exigent financing need and was more agreeable to the authorities than more concessional facilities.
- Alternative offered: early 2010 offer of an arrangement under the PRGF with more concessional financing and lower access, which authorities declined because they planned to access international financial markets in the near future.
- Other facilities: Exogenous Shocks Facility with a high access component (ESF-HAC, later superseded by the Standby Credit Facility) was available but considered inappropriate because the large BOP need also reflected domestic policy slippages and broad structural problems.

### Conditionality, flexibility, and ownership
- Quantitative conditionality:
  - Seven performance criteria (PCs) including on net international reserves (NIR), net domestic assets (NDA), net bank credit to government, and non-concessional external debt.
  - Fiscal deficit ceiling established as an indicative target (not a PC) given substantial uncertainties and the PC on net credit to government.
  - Coverage of quantitative targets comparable to previous Fund arrangements with Mongolia and contemporaneous SBAs after the breakout of the global financial crisis.
- Structural benchmarks:
  - Number and breadth were significantly fewer and more focused than in previous arrangements.
  - Five of eight structural benchmarks were on fiscal reforms; two applied to the banking sector.
  - All targets and benchmarks aligned with Fund core expertise and program objectives.
- Macroeconomic assumptions and outcomes:
  - Program assumed persistent weakness in global copper price and investment inflows, underestimating the quick and strong rebound of copper price.
  - 2009 annual average copper price was nearly 50 percent higher than the US$ 3500 projected in the program.
  - Conservative macroeconomic framework helped avoid large surprises between fiscal targets and outturns.
- Program adaptation and flexibility:
  - On-lending to gold mining companies was allowed during negotiation despite risk to NDA PC.
  - Quantitative PCs adjusted in successive reviews; structural benchmarks rescheduled multiple times to allow political gestation.
  - Fund delayed completion of the fifth review until tangible progress on fiscal structural reforms and expenditure restraint.
- Technical assistance (TA):
  - About 20 TAs provided by the Fund between November 2008 and October 2010, mainly from FAD and MCM.
  - MCM provided intensive TAs early in the program, including on the foreign exchange auction (a prior action) in March 2009, and on monetary policy, bank supervision and restructuring.
- Ownership and outreach:
  - Streamlined, flexible conditionality facilitated negotiation and strengthened ownership beyond previous engagements.
  - Commitment sustained through the end despite changes in leadership and disappearing financing need.
  - By early 2010, no need to tap remaining SDR 30.66 million tied to last two quarterly reviews.
  - Fund staff conducted regular meetings with speaker of parliament and key committee chairs and delivered parliamentary workshops on topics such as inflation and the FRL.

### Fiscal policy: objectives, targets, and outcomes
- Central objective: significant reduction in the overall balance deficit to reduce financing gap and move deficit toward sustainable range.
- Indicative target for 2009 fiscal deficit: set at 6 percent of GDP; implied reducing the non-mineral deficit by more than 5 percentage points of GDP from the 2008 outturn.
- Design and tradeoffs:
  - Target set in terms of overall balance to allow authorities discretion in choosing adjustment details; reflects light conditionality and stronger ownership but may weaken restraint on expenditure growth if revenues over-perform.
  - More emphasis could have been placed on primary deficit or non-mineral deficit PCs; however, in early 2009 downside risks dominated.
- Evolving context and fiscal recalibration:
  - Tradeoff between adjustment and financing shifted with changing copper prices and growth prospects.
  - Two main developments: further weakening in mid-2009; faster and stronger-than-expected recovery in mineral prices and contracting of a large copper mine in late 2009.
  - Result: outlook and government revenues strengthened, with double-digit real GDP growth projected for several years from 2013.
- Fiscal discipline and actual outcomes:
  - Fiscal targets were satisfied with a comfortable margin in most reviews—initially via disciplined spending and later aided by strong copper price recovery.
  - Policies: capital expenditures postponed; wages and current expenditures restrained; commitment to future overhaul of social transfer regime in a structural benchmark.
  - With revenue rebound, deficit targets revised down; fiscal expenditures increased to support the economy while financing need reduced.
  - 2010 budget deficit target eventually revised to 2¼ percent of GDP—nearly half the initial program level for 2010.
- Table: Developments in fiscal projections for 2009 and 2010 (in percent of GDP)
  - 2009 (1st, 2nd, 3rd, Act):
    - Total revenue and grants: 30.8, 30.8, 30.7, 32.9
    - Total expenditure and net lending: 36.8, 37.3, 37.2, 38.3
    - Current expenditure: 28.5, 29.4, 28.5, 29.6
    - Capital expenditure and net lending: 8.3, 7.9, 8.7, 8.7
    - Overall balance, projected and actual: -6.0, -6.5, -6.5, -5.4
    - Nonmineral overall balance: -9.9, -12.1, -12.7, -12.9
    - Structural balance: ..., ..., -5.0, -7.6
    - Memorandum items:
      - Nominal GDP (in billions of togrogs): 6,294, 6,209, 6,407, 6,056
      - Real GDP growth rate: 2.7, 0.5, -1.0, -1.6
      - Copper price assumption (US$ per ton): 3,500, 4,000, 5,000, 5,165
  - 2010 (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th):
    - Total revenue and grants: 31.6, 30.1, 33.0, 34.5, 34.9
    - Total expenditure and net lending: 35.6, 35.0, 38.0, 38.5, 37.1
    - Current expenditure: 26.7, 27.2, 30.3, 30.8, 29.6
    - Capital expenditure and net lending: 8.9, 7.8, 7.7, 7.7, 7.5
    - Overall balance, projected and actual: -4.0, -5.0, -5.0, -4.0, -2.2
    - Nonmineral overall balance: -9.1, -9.0, -12.2, -12.2, -11.2
    - Structural balance: ..., ..., -5.1, -4.2, -5.6
    - Memorandum items:
      - Nominal GDP (in billions of togrogs): 7,180, 6,931, 7,373, 7,221, 7,911
      - Real GDP growth rate: 4.3, 3.0, 8.6, 7.3, 8.5
      - Copper price assumption (US$ per ton): 3,800, 4,100, 5,800, 6,500, 6,911
- Assessment of pro-cyclicality:
  - 2009 outturn of non-mineral balance deficit exceeded initial program projection by 3 percentage points of GDP, implying greater reliance on cyclical mineral revenues.
  - Compared to 2008 outturn, 2009 non-mineral deficit declined by about 2 percentage points of GDP—about half the magnitude of fiscal adjustment targeted in original program at peak financing pressure.
  - Structural deficit (using 16-year moving average of mineral prices) exceeded the 3rd-review projection by 2½ percentage points of GDP in 2009, implying expenditure grew faster than long-term trend in mineral prices.
  - Policy preference placed more weight on short-term stimulus than pre-emptive reduction of fiscal pro-cyclicality, contributing to quick and strong recovery.
- Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL):
  - Legislation delayed to June 2010 from original deadline of December 2009 to rally political support.
  - By 2013, FRL would put in place three complementary ceilings on structural deficit, total debt, and expenditure growth.
  - Two-thirds majority required to amend the law.
  - FAD TA instrumental in FRL development and ongoing fiscal assistance.
- Box 2: Three Ceilings in the FRL
  - Floor of structural balance: deficit of 2 percent of GDP. Structural balance calculated using 16-year moving average price of major minerals (currently copper and coal—past 12 years, current year, and future three years). Provision takes effect in 2013.
  - Ceiling of expenditure growth: the non-mineral GDP growth rate, determined as the greater between its 12-year moving average value and the budget year’s GDP growth rate. Provision takes effect in 2013.
  - Net present value of public debt cannot exceed 40 percent of GDP. Provision takes effect from 2014, and the government can make loan guarantees for a development bank by 10 and 20 percent of GDP (net present value) in 2011 and 2012, respectively.
- Concerns on FRL implementation:
  - Some FRL provisions, including the floor of structural balance, were delayed from the 2011 budget to the 2013 budget without transitional deficit targets for intervening years.
  - FAD TA recommended transitional structural deficit targets of 4 and 3 percent for 2011 and 2012, respectively; 2011 budget envisaged a structural deficit of nearly 10 percent of GDP.
  - Fund bargaining power shrank as commodity prices and economic growth rebounded; Medium Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF) was adopted in parliament as a substitute arrangement, but finalized 2011 budget deviated from Fund recommendation.
- Social transfer reform:
  - Progress slower than for FRL. Initial plan to legislate by November 2009 to consolidate social benefits and introduce new targeted benefit; legislation submitted January 2010 and still pending four months after program conclusion.
  - Authorities introduced a new universal transfer regime (Human Development Fund) in 2010 budget.
  - Cultural and political reluctance to identify and target the poor hindered reform; Fund and other IFIs (ADB, World Bank) had limited influence.

### Monetary policy and foreign exchange market
- Exchange rate regime:
  - Commitment to flexible exchange rate system reinforced under the program.
  - Prior issues: rising currency premium in the informal parallel market and rapid loss of international reserves.
  - Non-discriminatory foreign exchange auctions implemented (prior action in March 2009) with MCM TA, normalizing the FX market, improving price discovery, and eliminating informal-market premium.
  - SBA approval brought immediate shift from exchange rate targeting to monetary aggregate targeting; flexible exchange rate agreed to provide shock absorption beyond program horizon.
- Monetary policy stance and actions:
  - Monetary policy tightened at outset in support of exchange rate adjustment—policy rate increase by 425 basis points to signal regime change and limit capital outflow.
  - Rate hikes were reversed within three months as exchange rate stabilized and remonetization progressed; policy rate lowered in a measured pace.
  - Later, economic recovery and rising inflation pressure led to a tightening bias near the end of the program, involving an increase in the policy rate and a sizable nominal appreciation.
- Conduct of policy and instruments:
  - Shift from passive to proactive monetary policy during the program.
  - Real exchange rate adjustments achieved via nominal exchange rate adjustments, avoiding run-away inflation seen in pre-crisis years.
  - Auction system for central-bank bills improved, including introduction of a new auction system for 7-day central-bank bills.
  - Inflation targeting was discussed as desirable framework beyond the program horizon.
- Risks and constraints:
  - Sustaining progress requires vigilance because return of fiscal pro-cyclicality could severely constrain effectiveness of monetary policy and cause regress in policy conduct.

_Italic source: IMF staff report excerpt (pages 10–16) from the PDF titled “_cr1177 - 17.      The program succeeded in catalyzing funds from other sources. Despite the”_

### 34.      The primary goal of the program for the financial sector was to restore

### 34.      The primary goal of the program for the financial sector was to restore

### Financial-sector objective and immediate actions
- Primary goal: restore confidence in the banking system.
- Context: Mongolia was not directly impacted by the global financial crisis, but the pre-crisis credit boom had weakened bank balance sheets and confidence.
- Key actions and outcomes:
  - Deposit guarantee system was improved (a prior action).
  - Insolvent Anod Bank and Zoos Bank were placed under receivership by late 2009.
  - Program measures forestalled a system-wide spillover despite pervasive weakness in many less affected banks.

### Legislative and supervisory progress
- Fund and World Bank TA complemented the program and somewhat accelerated legislative progress.
- Revised banking law approved in parliament in January 2010, introducing:
  - consolidated supervision;
  - improved resolution framework.
- Bank of Mongolia (August) issued several new regulations under the revised law that:
  - increased provisioning for restructured loans;
  - tightened supervision of related-party loans.
- Authorities submitted to parliament the Empowering the Banking Sector and Capital Support Program to legislate a comprehensive restructuring framework fair to both banks and taxpayers.
- Awaiting passage of the Program, authorities (with MCM TA) were developing bank-by-bank implementation plans to address substantial capital deficiencies in some banks.

### Implementation shortfalls and ongoing vulnerabilities
- De jure reform progress has yet to be matched by de facto progress.
- Enforcement of bank regulation was not sufficiently strong; regulatory forbearance viewed as widespread.
- Four months after program conclusion, passage of the Banking Sector and Capital Support Program in parliament was not assured, despite urgency due to possible overstatement of capital adequacy in some systemic banks.
- Financial Sector Assessment Program (November 2010) recommendation: monitor loan quality of systemic exposures and ensure adequate provision for them.

### Future challenges (Section F)
- Program failed to secure a durable pre-commitment to implement and sustain reforms, leaving several vulnerabilities unaddressed.
- Fiscal risks:
  - Full and strict adherence to the FRL is not assured, given the 2011 budget deficits that rose significantly above levels discussed during the program.
- Social policy:
  - Comprehensive social welfare reform pending in parliament for nearly a year with unclear prospects.
- Banking sector:
  - Restructuring of some banks pending legislation of a comprehensive bank restructuring program.
- Urgency due to mineral-driven boom: need to complete or lock in reforms initiated under the SBA to maximize benefit and avoid amplified macro-financial vulnerability under a commodity boom or strong economic development.

### Critical policy priorities identified
- Medium-term oriented macroeconomic policy to avoid boom-bust cycles and Dutch disease.
- Critical areas:
  - (i) lock in fiscal prudence including by fully implementing the FRL;
  - (ii) maintain improved monetary policy conduct by keeping inflation pressure at bay and maintaining exchange rate flexibility;
  - (iii) strengthen the banking system through prudential regulation and supervision;
  - (iv) improve the efficiency of social welfare program.
- Role of the Fund:
  - Facilitate fruition of reforms initiated under the SBA through constructive policy consultations.
  - Fund to act as catalyzing advisor to help authorities navigate rapid socio-economic transformation accompanying the resource-driven boom.

### Conclusion (IV. CONCLUSION)
- Program duration: 18-month program.
- Achievements:
  - Succeeded in achieving main objectives.
  - Sizable, front-loaded financing helped Mongolia lessen adjustment pain from the global financial crisis.
  - Several structural reforms pushed forward to reduce pro-cyclicality and increase resilience to mineral export volatility.
- Design strengths:
  - Prompt SBA financing with streamlined conditionality for an emerging market economy (still eligible for PRGF).
  - Quantitative targets focused on capping the financing gap; structural benchmarks limited to the most germane macroeconomic vulnerabilities.
  - Focused conditionality, flexible implementation, and extensive outreach strengthened program ownership.
- Remaining gaps:
  - Program failed to secure proactive commitment to lock in reforms.
  - Fund should assist authorities to complete reforms, especially:
    - strict adherence to the FRL;
    - social welfare reform;
    - comprehensive bank restructuring.
  - Strong implementation essential to prevent return of boom-bust cycles driven by global commodity price volatility.

### Key structural benchmark progress (selected items from Table 1)
- Revising relevant laws to require Erdenet to pay taxes in Togrog.
  - Required by June 30, 2009.
  - Completed on July 9, 2009.
- Establishment of screen-based system for inter-bank foreign exchange transactions.
  - Required by June 30, 2009.
  - Not completed. Benchmark not reinstated in the second review because it was no longer macro-critical— the central bank will continue to use auctions.
- Announcement of a resolution plan for Anod bank based on diagnostic assessment of the external auditor.
  - Required by June 30, 2009.
  - Delayed to end-October. Complete on November 30, 2009. Anod bank was put into receivership.
- Comprehensive review of transfer programs and revision of relevant laws to streamline transfer programs and safeguard social safety.
  - Required by June 30, 2009.
  - Completed late June 2009, reform plan approved by Cabinet level Working Group.
- Submission to parliament of a revised banking law and other pertinent laws (including strengthened prompt corrective action clauses; requiring consolidated supervision; improved bank resolution framework; legal protection for supervisors; clearer definition of "group of connected parties"; reinforced prudential supervision requirements).
  - Required by June 30, 2009.
  - Completed on July 24, 2009.
- Pass a 2010 budget consistent with the IMF supported Stand-By Arrangement.
  - Required by December 1, 2009.
  - Completed on November 27, 2009.
- Submission to parliament and parliamentary passage of Fiscal Responsibility Law consistent with recommendations of Fund TA.
  - Required by December 31, 2009.
  - Delayed to June 15, 2010. Completed on June 24, 2010.
- Pass a comprehensive social transfer reform that saves money and protects the poor through better targeting.
  - Required by December 1, 2009.
  - Delays: to February 1, 2010; to June 15, 2010; to November, 2010.

### Selected performance criteria and targets (Table 2 — indicators and illustrative outcomes)
- Net international reserves (NIR) of the Bank of Mongolia (BOM) (floor, eop stock, in million US$):
  - 4/30/2009: Prog. 335; Outcome 441.
  - 6/30/2009: Prog. 315; Outcome 475.
  - 9/30/2009: Prog. 455; Outcome 537.
  - 12/31/2009: Prog. 575; Rev.1/ 798; Outcome 923.
  - 3/31/2010: Prog. 600; Rev.2/ 809; Outcome 957.
  - 6/30/2010: Prog. 535; Rev.3/ 776; Outcome 983.
- Net domestic asset (NDA) of the BOM (ceiling, eop stock, in billion togrog):
  - 4/30/2009: Prog. -32; Outcome -287.
  - 6/30/2009: Prog. 14; Outcome -243.
  - 9/30/2009: Prog. -195; Outcome -302.
  - 12/31/2009: Prog. -618; Rev.1/ -332; Outcome -542.
  - 3/31/2010: Prog. -728; Rev.2/ -331; Outcome -645.
  - 6/30/2010: Prog. -793; Rev.3/ -224; Outcome -477.
- Net credit to government (NCG) (ceiling, cumulative from beginning of fiscal year, in billion togrog):
  - 4/30/2009: Prog. 105; Outcome 82.
  - 6/30/2009: Prog. 156; Outcome -19.
  - 9/30/2009: Prog. 72; Rev.1/ -69; Outcome -150.
  - 12/31/2009: Prog. 81; Rev.2/ 58; Outcome -17.
  - 3/31/2010: Prog. 87; Rev.3/ 220; Outcome 16.
  - 6/30/2010: Prog. 227; Rev.3/ 270; Outcome 130.
- New nonconcessional external debt maturing in one year or more (ceiling, eop stock since April 2009, in million US$):
  - Programed ceilings frequently set at 200 with multiple review adjustments; repeated outcomes reported as 0 or 100 in table columns.
- New nonconcessional external debt maturing in less than one year (ceiling, eop stock since April 2009, in million US$): consistently Prog. 0 and Outcome 0.
- Accumulation of new external payment arrears (ceiling, eop, in million US$): Prog. 0 and Outcome 0 across dates.
- Accumulation of domestic payment arrears (ceiling, eop, in billion togrog): Prog. 0 and Outcome 0 across dates.
- Indicative target — General government fiscal deficit (ceiling, cumulative since the beginning of fiscal year, in billion togrog; 4/ Excludes bank restructuring cost):
  - 4/30/2009: Prog. 250; Outcome 144.
  - 6/30/2009: Prog. 325; Outcome 248.
  - 9/30/2009: Prog. 290; Rev.1/ 315; Outcome 333.
  - 12/31/2009: Prog. 380; Rev.2/ 416; Outcome 343.
  - 3/31/2010: Prog. 125; Rev.3/ 220; Outcome 9.
  - 6/30/2010: Prog. 200; Rev.3/ 270; Outcome 68.

### Macroeconomic developments (Figure 1 main messages)
- Main message: The economy was severely hit by the crisis, but rebounded strongly.
- Drivers and dynamics:
  - Sharp collapse of commodity prices, notably for copper, triggered Mongolia’s economic crisis in 2008 and 2009, with quick recovery in 2010.
  - Decline of revenue, especially mining, weakened key fiscal indicators.
  - Mineral export slowdown led to the current account deficit while FDI broadly remained stable.
  - Since late 2008, the exchange rate depreciated and international reserves dropped sharply.
  - Inflation spiked and the real interest rate turned negative before the crisis; inflation then fell rapidly with economic contraction.
  - Banking sector stress peaked in late 2009, followed by steady improvement in bank balance sheets.

*Italic: IMF staff report content as provided in the source document.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/_cr1177.pdf_
