## 1. Summary Implementation of the IOSCO Principles—Detailed Assessments (_cr12230)

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### Summary of main findings and recommendations
- High level of implementation of the IOSCO Principles in Japan.
- FSA has extensive powers to supervise regulated entities, investigate breaches, and cooperate domestically and internationally.
- FSA reorganized to upgrade capacity to identify, monitor, and mitigate systemic risk (creation of Office of Market Analysis and OSBM).
- Supervision of securities firms should be strengthened:
  - Develop a robust framework to identify and assess the scale and scope of risk posed by individual firms to determine intensity of regulatory intervention (including on-site inspections).
  - SESC should intensify inspection coverage for smaller firms; conduct issues not easily captured through off-site reporting.
  - Options: additional institution-based inspections, thematic reviews, and/or random inspections.
- Enforcement program review recommended:
  - Ensure proper balance among regulatory measures from orders for improvement to suspensions and cancellations of registration.
  - Review administrative money penalties framework to (i) ensure penalties are sufficient to deter misconduct, and (ii) expand types of misconducts subject to administrative money penalties.
- Organizational governance and resourcing recommendations:
  - Continue strengthening FSA governance arrangements and resources.
  - Explore mechanisms to hire and retain expert staff across departments, including reviewing the salary scale.
  - Review whether current resources suffice to ensure robustness of supervisory program.
  - Explore ways to enhance FSA legal independence.
- Continue implementation of new principles for identification of emerging and systemic risk:
  - Creation of the Office of Securities Business Monitoring (OSBM) is a positive step.
  - Establish arrangements to comprehensively and systematically identify and assess risks and determine need for regulatory intervention.

### Mission, scope, information and methodology
- Assessment conducted from November 28–December 16, 2011 by Ms. Ana Carvajal (MCM) and Mr. Martin Kinsky (external expert).
- Based on IOSCO Principles and Objectives of Securities Regulation (2010) and 2011 methodology.
- Principle 38 not assessed.
- Assessment excluded commodities derivatives exchanges where underlying is not a security.
- Sources: FSA self-assessment; review of laws/reports in English; meetings with FSA, SESC, CPAAOB, BOJ; meetings with market participants (issuers, securities firms, fund managers, exchanges, external auditors, CRAs, JSDA, ITAJ, JICPA, law firms).
- Limited availability of information in English presented challenges; full review of supervisory files constrained.

### Institutional structure and roles
- Primary authorities: FSA (agency within Cabinet), SESC (board within FSA), CPAAOB (board within FSA).
- Delegation hierarchy:
  - PM → FIEA delegates authority to FSA (except functions excluded by Cabinet Ordinance).
  - FIEA delegates authority of FSA to SESC for requests for reports, on-site inspections and investigations.
  - CPA Act delegates auditors’ oversight to CPAAOB.
- Operational responsibilities:
  - FSA: policy, off-site monitoring, imposition of enforcement actions.
  - SESC: on-site inspections and investigations; may recommend enforcement actions to FSA.
  - CPAAOB: oversees quality control program by JICPA, inspects auditors, may recommend enforcement to FSA.
- Third-level delegation to local finance bureaus:
  - Local finance bureaus review prospectuses and periodic information of issuers; review tender offer documents; register FIBOs; perform off-site monitoring and on-site inspections of FIBOs with capital less than ¥12 billion.
- Self-regulatory organizations (SROs):
  - Exchanges, TSE SRO, JSDA, ITAJ provide SRO functions.
  - JSIAA and Type II FIA exist; Type II FIA of recent creation (not covered).

### Market structure and key statistics
- Exchanges: six operating in Japan; only TSE and OSE have significant trading volumes.
- Listings and market capitalization (end-2010 / March 31, 2011 where noted):
  - Total listed companies on six exchanges: 3,647.
  - Listed in one exchange: 2,900.
  - TSE listed companies: 2,280.
  - TSE market capitalization: US$3,634,790 million as of March 31, 2011.
  - Large caps: account for 85 percent of market capitalization while representing one third of number of listed companies.
  - 12 foreign companies listed in Japan.
  - New listings on TSE in 2010: 26; delisted: 68.
- Listing distribution (end-2010) (verbatim table values):
  - Tokyo: Listed companies 2,280; Listed in one exchange 1,552; Listed in multiple exchanges 728; Five stock exchanges 24; Four stock exchanges 12; Three stock exchanges 81; Two stock exchanges 611
  - Osaka: Listed companies 1,745; Listed in one exchange 1,188; Listed in multiple exchanges 557; Five stock exchanges 24; Four stock exchanges 12; Three stock exchanges 78; Two stock exchanges 443
  - Nagoya: Listed companies 341; Listed in one exchange 101; Listed in multiple exchanges 240; Five stock exchanges 24; Four stock exchanges 11; Three stock exchanges 62; Two stock exchanges 143
  - Fukuoka: Listed companies 129; Listed in one exchange 38; Listed in multiple exchanges 91; Five stock exchanges 24; Four stock exchanges 10; Three stock exchanges 17; Two stock exchanges 40
  - Sapporo: Listed companies 76; Listed in one exchange 21; Listed in multiple exchanges 55; Five stock exchanges 24; Four stock exchanges 3; Three stock exchanges 5; Two stock exchanges 23
  - Total: Listed companies 3,647; Listed in one exchange 2,900; Listed in multiple exchanges 747; Five stock exchanges 24; Four stock exchanges 12; Three stock exchanges 81; Two stock exchanges 630
- Tokyo AIM / TOKYO PRO Market:
  - Tokyo AIM for growing companies open only to professional investors; TSE plans to integrate TOKYO AIM into TSE effective July 1, 2012 and re-brand as ‘TOKYO PRO Market.’
- Bond market (2010 totals):
  - Total bond issuance: ¥198,439 billion.
    - Corporate bonds: 4.8 percent of total issuance.
    - Municipal bonds: 3.9 percent of total issuance.
    - Japanese government bonds (JGBs): 83.6 percent of total issuance.
  - Convertible bonds (as of November 30, 2010): number of issuers 37; number of listed securities 39; total amount ¥1,239 billion.
- Collective investment schemes (AUM, end 2010):
  - Total AUM held by investment trusts: ¥98 trillion.
    - ¥63 trillion invested in publicly offered investment trusts.
    - ¥4 trillion invested in real estate investment trusts.
    - ¥31 trillion in privately placed investment trusts.
  - Of publicly offered investment trusts: ¥52 trillion in stock investment trusts; ¥9 trillion in bond investment trusts; ¥2 trillion in MMF.
- Securities intermediaries (as of November 2011 unless noted):
  - Type I FIBOs operating in Japan: 322, of which 22 are foreign firms (not incorporated).
  - 16 securities companies subject to consolidated supervision.
  - Subgroup of supervised firms receive more intense monitoring assigned to OSBM (16 firms meet criteria for consolidated supervision total assets over ¥1 trillion).
  - Other counts: 1,293 Type II; 1,122 Investment Advisory and Agency Business; 322 IMBOs.
  - Firms with overseas presence: 19 (main cities: New York, London, Singapore, Hong Kong).
- Trading platforms:
  - Six exchanges: TSE, OSE, Nagoya, Fukuoka, Sapporo, Tokyo AIM.
  - TSE accounts for roughly 90 percent of cash-side trading volumes.
  - OSE main market for derivatives.
  - Merger between TSE and OSE agreed; completion expected by 2013.
  - Five PTS trade equity, government debt, and corporate debt; trading volumes not significant.

### Corporate governance and market access (selected)
- Market participants call for stronger corporate governance:
  - Inclusion of additional independent directors.
  - Constitution of strong, independent bodies (e.g., committees) to support board oversight.
- Other conditions:
  - Foreign issuers and investors face no barriers; foreign corporations can register as FIBOs with same requirements as domestic.
  - Incorporation typically takes less than a week.
  - Insolvency framework includes rehabilitation procedures and out-of-court proceedings guidelines.
  - Judiciary perceived as impartial; prosecution has specialized financial crime offices in Tokyo and Osaka.
  - Accounting and auditing standards broadly consistent with international standards.

### Main findings by principle clusters (high-level)
- Principles for the regulator:
  - Responsibilities split across FSA, SESC, CPAAOB; some legal features raise independence concerns though no evidence of day-to-day interference.
  - FSA cannot impose money penalties except for limited misconducts.
  - FSA strengthened capacity to identify/monitor systemic risk (OSBM, Office of Market Analysis).
- Principles for SROs:
  - Multiple SROs active; FSA oversight tailored and appears to work well.
- Principles for enforcement:
  - Supervision needs strengthening: limited on-site coverage for smaller Type I, IMBOs, Type II, and investment advisors.
  - FSA using stronger measures (suspensions) in addition to orders for improvement; need periodic review of enforcement strategy; criminal convictions secured but commuted sentences reduce deterrence.
- Principles for issuers:
  - Disclosure obligations at registration and ongoing are in line with IOSCO Principles; EDINET provides public access.
  - Shareholder rights embedded in company law; mandatory tender offer rules and substantial holdings/insider holdings disclosure exist though no system of timely notification of insider transactions.
  - Financial statements prepared under local GAAP broadly consistent with IFRS.
- Principles for auditors, CRAs, and information providers:
  - Auditor quality control: JICPA reviews under CPAAOB oversight; independence required; issuer mechanisms to monitor auditor independence should be strengthened.
  - CRAs registered by FSA; subject to reporting and on-site inspections.
  - Sell-side analyst conflict framework based on disclosure.
- Principles for CIS:
  - Managers/distributors must register; IMBO registration includes capital, fit and proper, organizational requirements.
  - SESC inspection policy does not target newly registered CIS managers within short timeframe.
  - Assets must be entrusted to a custodian (not required to be independent); assets valued at fair value; ITAJ guidance exists for illiquid assets.
  - Conditions for suspension of redemptions disclosed; notifications to FSA required.
- Principles for securities intermediaries:
  - Registration required for financial instruments business; minimum capital and fit and proper requirements apply.
  - Ongoing capital requirements apply only to Type I FIBOs (capital ratio similar to Basel II).
  - Reporting extensive for Type I; smaller intermediaries not necessarily subject to external audit.
  - No formal plan to deal with failure of a securities firm though past experiences documented.

### Secondary markets, surveillance and market integrity (Principle 36 and related)
- Exchanges and PTS are the only secondary markets allowed to trade securities; each must comply with FSA criteria.
- SROs ensure orderly trading; SESC responsible for market surveillance for detecting unfair trading practices, supported by exchanges.
- Active enforcement against unfair trading; administrative and criminal penalties applied.
- CCPs manage exposures daily and can request members to post additional margin; default procedures known to members.
- Price limits apply in cash and derivatives; circuit breakers apply to derivatives; naked short selling prohibited.
- Related IOSCO Principle findings (selected):
  - Principle 33 (FI): exchanges and PTS require minimum capital, technology, and rule vetting; PTS can only be established by Type I FIBOs and require independent expert IT report.
  - Principle 34 (FI): SESC, exchanges and FIBOs conduct market surveillance; PTS provide monthly and annual reports to FSA and ad-hoc reports on market manipulation.
  - Principle 35 (FI): Bids, offers and trade info publicly available for exchanges (95 percent of all trading) and PTS; internalization and block trades permitted and must be reported.
  - Principle 37 (FI): Exposures of large complex firms monitored by OSBM; CCPs monitor clearing members daily and can request additional collateral; clear default procedures; price limits and circuit breakers apply; naked short selling prohibited.
- Recommended actions (excerpts):
  - Principle 33: consider including detailed IT systems assessment for exchanges as licensing criterion (internal expert or independent external expert).
  - Principle 35: consider development of regulations concerning treatment of dark pools.
  - Principle 37: consider introduction of a large traders report.

### Authorities' response and methodological concerns
- Authorities welcome being first jurisdiction assessed under new IOSCO Principles and methodologies.
- Generally accept IMF assessment of high level of compliance; IMF recommendations generally well received; some reforms already initiated since assessment.
- Concern that methodologies emphasize form over outcome and provide single set of policy actions irrespective of country risk profile (example: Principle 30 external audit requirement).
- Authorities commit to work with IOSCO and IMF to improve methodologies.

### Assessments, categories and select principle results (verbatim definitions and select assessments)
- Assessment categories: fully implemented; broadly implemented; partly implemented; not implemented; not applicable.
- Verbatim definitions provided in source for each category.
- Selected principle assessments and key comments (verbatim where provided):
  - Principle 1 (institutional structure): Assessment: Fully Implemented. Comment: cooperation between FSA and SESC satisfactory; consider extending OSBM approach.
  - Principle 2 (regulator independence and accountability): Assessment: Broadly Implemented. Key concerns (verbatim): Legal nature of agency and scope defined by cabinet order rather than by law; initial budget proposal subject to adjustments during discussion with MoF; functions delegated to local finance bureaus (part of MoF); certain functions retained by PM; lack of a term limit for the Commissioner can weaken accountability.
  - Principle 3 (powers, resources and capacity): Assessment: Partly Implemented. Concerns (verbatim): capacity to hire and retain expert staff and level of resources; civil service regime challenges; concern whether enough resources for inspection and supervisory effectiveness; existence of two main bodies (FSA/SESC) and delegation to local finance bureaus create challenges.
  - Principle 4 (clear and consistent regulatory processes): Assessment: Fully Implemented.
  - Principle 5 (professional standards and confidentiality): Assessment: Fully Implemented.
  - Principle 6 (contribution to monitoring and managing systemic risk): Assessment: Broadly Implemented. Comments (verbatim): need for holistic and systematic analysis integrating bottom-up and top-down approaches; benefit from greater cooperation with BOJ on crisis management and resolution procedures.
  - Principle 7 (perimeter of regulation): Assessment: Broadly Implemented.
  - Principle 8 (conflicts of interest and incentive alignment): Assessment: Fully Implemented.
  - Principle 9 (SRO oversight): Assessment: Fully Implemented. Recommendation: review inspection cycle for SROs and monitor SRO conflict of interest management.
  - Principle 10 (inspection, investigation and surveillance powers): Assessment: Fully Implemented.
  - Principle 11 (comprehensive enforcement powers): Assessment: Broadly Implemented. Key assessor comments: administrative penalties coverage limited; some penalty amounts too low to be deterrent; encourage expansion of money penalties.
  - Principle 12 (effectiveness and credibility of inspection, investigation and enforcement): Assessment: Partly Implemented. Recommendations: improve off-site monitoring; widen inspection coverage for smaller entities; use horizontal/thematic reviews and random inspections; expand use of money penalties; review criminal sanctions given suspended sentences common.
  - Principles 13–15 (cooperation and information sharing): Assessment: Fully Implemented.
  - Principles 16–18 (issuers and disclosure): Assessment: Broadly Implemented. Recommendation: review definition of CIS as it relates to public offering regime.
  - Principles 19–23 (auditors, CRA, analysts): Auditors oversight Assessment: Fully Implemented; auditors’ independence: Broadly Implemented. CRA: Fully Implemented. Sell-side analysts: Fully Implemented.
  - Principles 24–28 (CIS and funds): mix of Broadly Implemented and Fully Implemented findings; recommendations: strengthen inspection program for IMBOs; additional safeguards where custodian is related entity.
  - Principles 29–32 (market intermediaries, prudential requirements and failure): mixed assessments (Broadly Implemented and Partly Implemented). Key figures preserved verbatim for minimum capital as of November 2011: Type I — ¥50 million; Type II — ¥10 million; IMBO — ¥50 million; Investment Advisory/Agency — ¥5 million (deposits).
  - Principle 33 (trading systems): Assessment: Fully Implemented. Comment: lack of detailed IT systems assessment for exchanges not seen as major concern given TSE migration to arrowhead in 2010.
  - Principle 34 (ongoing supervision and market surveillance): Assessment: Fully Implemented.
  - Principle 35 (transparency of trading): Assessment: Fully Implemented.
  - Principle 36 (detecting/deterring manipulation): Assessment: Fully Implemented. Comment: SESC IT system does not automatically consolidate trading information from all exchanges and PTS; merger TSE/OSE should improve cross-market surveillance.
  - Principle 37 (management of large exposures, default risk and market disruption): Assessment: Fully Implemented.
  - Principle 38 (clearing and settlement systems): Not assessed.

### Inspection, surveillance and enforcement operational data (selected verbatim figures)
- SESC annual inspections: about 170 inspections per year; roughly half on Type I FIBOs.
- Number of entities inspected (table verbatim):
  - Number of entities 2008 2009 2010
    - Type I 322 132 92 100
    - Type II 1,293 2 8 18
    - IMBOs 323 21 18 18
    - Investment Advisory 1,122 30 46 35
    - Financial institutions (related to capital markets activities) 28 27 28
- Enforcement measures (2008–2010 verbatim totals):
  - Orders for improvement (Total): 2008 — 24; 2009 — 34; 2010 — 24.
  - Orders for suspension (Total): 2008 — 8; 2009 — 18; 2010 — 15.
  - Cancellation of registration (Total): 2008 — 14; 2009 — 6; 2010 — 9.
  - Orders for dismissal of officers: 2008 — 2; 2009 — 1; 2010 — 0.
- Market manipulation / insider trading / false statements (administrative penalties MP and criminal referrals CR by period verbatim):
  - Market Manipulation 08/09 MP 1 CR 0; 09/10 MP 5 CR 2; 10/11 MP 5 CR 0.
  - Insider Trading 08/09 MP 17 CR 6; 09/10 MP 34 CR 7; 10/11 MP 23 CR 2.
  - False statements 08/09 MP 13 CR 4; 09/10 MP 9 CR 1; 10/11 MP 22 CR 0.
  - Rumors 08/09 MP 0 CR 2; 09/10 MP 0 CR 3; 10/11 MP 0 CR 0.

### Clearing, CCPs, large exposures and market disruption controls
- CCPs (JSCC, OSE) monitor clearing members daily; can request additional collateral and prohibit further transactions if collateral not posted.
- CCPs and exchanges maintain default procedures and settlement funds; liquidity facilities with settling banks in place.
- Reporting granularity: CCPs receive clearing member information on a net basis; FSA can request more granular info.
- Short selling:
  - Naked short selling prohibited.
  - Reporting requirement if short position exceeds 0.25 percent of outstanding stock (FIEA Article 26-5).
  - Covered short sales subject to flagging and verification; market making and hedge transactions exempted (Order for Enforcement of FIEA Article 26-2-2).
- Market disruption measures:
  - Price limits and circuit breakers apply; derivatives circuit breakers trigger 15 minute halt.
  - FSA power to halt markets (FIEA Article 152) but practice relies on dialogue with exchanges.

### Failure management, investor protection and contingency planning
- Client asset segregation required (FIEA Article 43-2); Type I FIBOs required annual external audit for segregation compliance.
- Investor protection fund:
  - Type I FIBOs required to join investor protection fund (FIEA Article 79-20).
  - Maximum reimbursement per investor in event of bankruptcy: not more than ¥10 million.
  - Fund does not compensate for losses from decline in securities prices.
  - Fund established in 2006 and funded by compulsory contribution from members.
- Failure procedures:
  - FSA can file for rehabilitation procedures and select provisional administrator; court permission needed for non-ordinary business decisions by provisional administrator.
  - BOJ can provide financial assistance on request of PM and MoF under Article 38 of BOJ Act (used in past, e.g., Yamaichi).
- Practice and preparedness:
  - FSA issued orders in respect to Lehman Brothers Japan Inc. to require maintenance of assets in Japan.
  - FSA has not developed a specific joint plan or scenario analysis with BOJ for failure of large complex firms; assessors recommend FSA and BOJ jointly establish plans and consider developing a resolution regime for large complex firms.

### SRO oversight, inspections and outcomes (selected verbatim figures)
- JSDA outcomes (latest year presented):
  - JSDA: 291 member firms; 438,008 sales representatives; 102 number inspections on member firms (1 fine, 4 reprimands); 86 disciplinary actions (20 revocations and 66 suspensions on sales representatives).
- ITAJ outcomes:
  - ITAJ: 323 size of membership; 35 number inspections; 3 disciplinary actions (fine plus 1 confidential admonition).
- TSE outcomes:
  - TSE: 103 size of membership; 33 number inspections; 1 disciplinary action censure (2011 censure, 2 fines 5 and ¥20 m).
- SESC inspections of SROs:
  - JSDA comprehensive inspection in 2006 lasted approximately one month; TSE SRO in-depth inspection in 2009 lasted 42 business days; ITAJ last inspection completed in 2007.

### Staffing, budgets, IT and resourcing (selected verbatim figures)
- Regulated entities under IOSCO assessment (verbatim):
  - Issuers 2900
  - Type I FIBO 322
  - Type II FIBO 1,293
  - IMBO 323
  - Investment Advisory Business 1,122
  - Registered Financial Institutions 1,136
  - Exchanges 6
  - PTS 5
  - Credit Rating Agencies 6
- FSA budget and staffing trends:
  - From FY 2003 to FY 2011 the budget of the FSA has grown by 40 percent.
  - About 30 percent more staff in FY 2011 compared to FY 2003.
  - FSA (directly related to capital markets) staff: 2002 63; 2009 117; 2010 131; 2011 145.
  - SESC staff figures (verbatim entries in source): 2009 182; 2010 374; 2011 384; 2011 392 (table includes multiple functional lines).
  - CPAAOB staff: 2009 55; 2010 58; 2011 57.
- Specialist recruitment:
  - Recruiting of specialists via fixed term contracts (three to five years); 111 market experts, 43 CPAs and 21 lawyers recruited for securities related departments in recent years.
- IT systems:
  - “Data System for On-site and Off-site Supervision” and “Off-site Monitoring System” developed.
  - EDINET receives issuer information electronically and is accessible to the public.
- Staffing constraints:
  - FSA staff mostly civil servants; salaries determined under Remuneration Act; salaries not comparable with financial sector.
  - Turnover less than two percent for the last three years.

### Key recommendations (consolidated)
- Strengthen supervisory framework and inspection coverage:
  - Develop robust framework to assess scale/scope of risk posed by individual firms to guide intensity of regulatory intervention.
  - Increase on-site inspection coverage for smaller Type I, IMBOs, Type II and investment advisors.
  - Adopt horizontal/thematic reviews and random inspections as complements.
  - Inspect newly registered FIBOs and IMBOs within a short timeframe after registration.
- Enhance enforcement tools and strategy:
  - Review administrative money penalties to broaden coverage and ensure deterrence.
  - Periodically review enforcement strategy and balance between orders for improvement and suspensions/cancellations.
  - Review criminal sanctions and their application given prevalence of commuted/suspended sentences.
- Governance, resourcing and independence:
  - Continue strengthening FSA governance arrangements and resources.
  - Explore mechanisms to hire and retain expert staff across departments, including reviewing salary scales and use of fixed-term specialists.
  - Explore ways to enhance FSA legal and operational independence (consider statutory clarifications).
- Systemic risk monitoring and contingency planning:
  - Establish arrangements to comprehensively and systematically identify and assess emerging and systemic risks integrating bottom-up and top-down approaches.
  - Continue cooperation with BOJ on crisis management and resolution procedures; develop internal contingency plans and scenario analyses for failure of large complex firms.
  - Consider development of a resolution regime for large complex firms as international best practices evolve.
- Market structure and integrity enhancements:
  - Consider including detailed IT systems assessment as part of exchange licensing.
  - Consider regulations addressing dark pools.
  - Consider introduction of a large traders report to enhance market surveillance.
  - Improve SESC IT consolidation of trading information across exchanges and PTS.

*Source: IMF staff assessment chapter titled "1. Summary Implementation of the IOSCO Principles—Detailed Assessments" from the provided PDF content (_cr12230).*

### 1. Summary Implementation of the IOSCO Principles—Detailed Assessments ....................13

### 1. Summary Implementation of the IOSCO Principles—Detailed Assessments ....................13

### Summary of main findings and recommendations
- The legal and regulatory framework for the securities market in Japan exhibits a high level of implementation of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Principles.  
- The Financial Services Agency (FSA) has extensive powers to supervise regulated entities, investigate breaches of securities laws and regulations, and cooperate domestically and internationally.  
- The FSA has reorganized its structure to upgrade capacity to identify, monitor, and mitigate systemic risk.  
- Supervision of securities firms should be strengthened:
  - The FSA should develop a more robust framework to identify and assess the scale and scope of risk posed by individual firms to determine intensity of regulatory intervention (including on-site inspections).
  - The Securities Exchange and Surveillance Commission (SESC) should intensify inspection coverage for smaller firms; conduct issues are not easily captured through off-site reporting.
  - Options to intensify coverage include additional institution-based inspections, thematic reviews, and/or random inspections.
- Enforcement program review recommended:
  - Ensure proper balance among regulatory measures from orders for improvement to suspensions and cancellations of registration.
  - Review administrative money penalties framework to (i) ensure penalties are sufficient to deter misconduct, and (ii) expand the types of misconducts subject to administrative money penalties.
- Organizational governance and resourcing recommendations:
  - Continue strengthening FSA governance arrangements and resources.
  - Explore mechanisms to hire and retain expert staff across departments, including reviewing the salary scale.
  - Review whether current resources suffice to ensure robustness of supervisory program.
  - Explore ways to enhance FSA legal independence.
- Continue implementation of new principles, particularly for identification of emerging and systemic risk:
  - Creation of the Office of Securities Business Monitoring (OSBM) is a positive step.
  - Important to establish arrangements to comprehensively and systematically identify and assess risks and determine need for regulatory intervention.

### Introduction and mission scope
- Assessment conducted from November 28–December 16, 2011, as part of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) by Ms. Ana Carvajal (MCM) and Mr. Martin Kinsky (external expert).
- An initial IOSCO assessment was conducted in 2003; IOSCO approved a new set of principles in 2010 and a revised methodology in 2011.

### Information and methodology used for the assessment
- Assessment based on the IOSCO Principles and Objectives of Securities Regulation approved in 2010 and the 2011 methodology.
- Principle 38 not assessed due to existence of separate standard for securities settlement systems; a technical note on oversight framework for systemically important financial market infrastructures was delivered during the mission.
- Assessment did not cover commodities derivatives exchanges or other derivatives exchanges where the underlying asset is not a security.
- IOSCO methodology requires assessment of legal/regulatory framework and implementation in practice, including supervisory practices, inspection programs, cycle, scope, quality of inspections, and enforcement follow-up.
- Sources relied upon:
  - (i) a self-assessment developed by the FSA;
  - (ii) review of relevant laws and reports available in English;
  - (iii) meetings with staff from the FSA, the SESC, the Certified Public Accounting and Auditing Oversight Board (CPAAOB), and the Bank of Japan (BOJ);
  - (iv) meetings with market participants including issuers, securities firms, fund managers, exchanges, external auditors, credit rating agencies, the Japanese Securities Dealers Association (JSDA), the Investment Trust Association of Japan (ITAJ), the Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (JICPA), and law firms.
- Limited availability of information in English was a challenge; some gaps were addressed through discussions with authorities and market participants; review of supervisory files could not be conducted in an optimal manner.

### Institutional structure
- Regulation and supervision responsibilities: the FSA, the SESC, and the CPAAOB.
  - The FSA is an agency within the Cabinet.
  - The SESC and the CPAAOB are boards within the FSA but afforded a high degree of independence by the Financial Instruments Exchange Act (FIEA).
- Delegation hierarchy:
  - Prime Minister (PM) assigned responsibility for regulation and supervision of securities markets by the FIEA, which delegates authority and functions to the FSA except functions excluded by Cabinet Ordinance.
  - Second-level delegation: FIEA delegates authority of the FSA to the SESC to request reports and conduct on-site inspections and investigations.
  - CPA Act delegates oversight of auditors to the CPAAOB.
- Operational responsibilities:
  - FSA: policy, off-site monitoring, imposition of enforcement actions.
  - SESC: on-site inspections and investigations; may recommend enforcement actions to the FSA.
  - CPAAOB: oversees quality control program developed by JICPA, inspects auditors, and may recommend enforcement actions to the FSA.
- Third-level delegation to local finance bureaus:
  - FIEA authorizes the FSA and the SESC to delegate monitoring and inspection functions to local finance bureaus.
  - In practice local finance bureaus review prospectuses and periodic information of issuers; review tender offer documents; register financial instruments business operators (FIBOs); and perform off-site monitoring and on-site inspections of FIBOs with capital less than ¥12 billion.
- Self-regulatory organizations (SROs):
  - Three entity types may perform self regulatory functions: exchanges, associations, and SROs constituted by exchanges.
  - In practice SRO functions provided by exchanges, the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) SRO, the JSDA, and the ITAJ.
  - Two associations: Japan Securities Investment Advisers Association (JSIAA) and the Type II Financial Instruments Firms Association (Type II FIA).
    - JSIAA has some rulemaking functions and subjects investment advisers to off-site reporting but does not conduct on-site inspections nor exercise enforcement functions (it can withdraw membership).
    - Type II FIA has self regulatory functions for Type II FIBOs; it is of very recent creation and was not covered in this assessment.

### Basic legal framework for market participants
- Main laws: Financial Instruments Exchange Act (FIEA) and the Investment Trust and Investment Corporations Act (ITIC).
- Issuers:
  - Issuers of securities offered to the public must notify the FSA and file a registration statement.
  - Required to submit an annual report and either a quarterly report (for listed issuers) or a semiannual report (for non-listed issuers).
  - Required to notify a list of corporate events to the FSA.
  - The TSE requires timely disclosure of corporate actions that could materially affect investor decisions.
- Collective Investment Schemes (CIS):
  - CIS offered to the public must file offering documents with the FSA.
  - CIS can be constituted as trusts or corporations; law requires management by a financial instruments business operator (FIBO) registered as an investment management business operator (IMBO).
- Financial Instruments Business Operators (FIBOs):
  - Provision of securities activities requires registration as a FIBO.
  - Four main types of FIBOs:
    - Type I: broker-dealer able to trade a wide array of securities including stocks, bonds, shares of CIS, derivatives, etc.
    - Type II: broker-dealer trading a limited category of securities (those not in the Type I authorized list, commonly “illiquid” securities).
    - IMBO: asset manager.
    - Investment advisory firm: provides investment advisory services.
  - Registered financial institutions (banks, cooperatives, insurance companies) can provide a limited number of securities market services to retail investors, mainly distribution of government debt and CIS.
  - FSA established consolidated supervision for securities firms with assets equal or above ¥1 trillion.
- Regulated markets:
  - Exchanges require a license granted by the Minister of Financial Services (MoFS) on behalf of the PM.
  - Proprietary Trading System (PTS) must be registered as a Type I FIBO.
  - A trading volume limit of 10 percent is set on PTS (Article 1 of the Cabinet Order for Enforcement of the FIEA).

### Market structure and key statistics
- Equity markets:
  - A total of 2,900 companies are listed on any of the six exchanges operating in Japan.
  - 2,280 companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE).
  - TSE market capitalization: US$3,634,790 million as of March 31, 2011.
  - Large caps account for 85 percent of market capitalization while representing one third of the number of listed companies.
  - 12 foreign companies listed in Japan.
  - New listings trend: in 2010, 26 new companies listed on the TSE while 68 delisted.
  - Listing distribution table (end-2010) reproduced as in source:
    - Tokyo: Listed companies 2,280; Listed in one exchange 1,552; Listed in multiple exchanges 728; Five stock exchanges 24; Four stock exchanges 12; Three stock exchanges 81; Two stock exchanges 611
    - Osaka: Listed companies 1,745; Listed in one exchange 1,188; Listed in multiple exchanges 557; Five stock exchanges 24; Four stock exchanges 12; Three stock exchanges 78; Two stock exchanges 443
    - Nagoya: Listed companies 341; Listed in one exchange 101; Listed in multiple exchanges 240; Five stock exchanges 24; Four stock exchanges 11; Three stock exchanges 62; Two stock exchanges 143
    - Fukuoka: Listed companies 129; Listed in one exchange 38; Listed in multiple exchanges 91; Five stock exchanges 24; Four stock exchanges 10; Three stock exchanges 17; Two stock exchanges 40
    - Sapporo: Listed companies 76; Listed in one exchange 21; Listed in multiple exchanges 55; Five stock exchanges 24; Four stock exchanges 3; Three stock exchanges 5; Two stock exchanges 23
    - Total: Listed companies 3,647; Listed in one exchange 2,900; Listed in multiple exchanges 747; Five stock exchanges 24; Four stock exchanges 12; Three stock exchanges 81; Two stock exchanges 630
    - (Source) TSE, end-2010.
  - Tokyo AIM (joint venture TSE and London Stock Exchange) is a Tokyo equity market for growing companies open only to professional investors; early stage and considering a debt securities market for professional investors only.
  - Note from source: The TSE plans to integrate TOKYO AIM into the Tokyo Stock Exchange effective July 1, 2012, and re-brand the TOKYO AIM market as ‘TOKYO PRO Market.’
- Bond markets:
  - Total bond issuance in 2010: ¥198,439 billion.
    - Corporate bonds: 4.8 percent of total issuance.
    - Municipal bonds: 3.9 percent of total issuance.
    - Japanese government bonds (JGBs): 83.6 percent of total issuance.
  - Trading of debt is mostly OTC.
  - TSE is main securities exchange outside OTC though number of companies with listed debt is small compared to equities.
  - No straight bonds listed on TSE except certain government debt bonds.
  - Convertible bonds (as of November 30, 2010): number of issuers 37; number of listed securities 39; total amount ¥1,239 billion.
- Collective investment schemes (AUM, end 2010):
  - Total AUM held by investment trusts: ¥98 trillion.
    - ¥63 trillion invested in publicly offered investment trusts.
    - ¥4 trillion invested in real estate investment trusts.
    - ¥31 trillion in privately placed investment trusts.
  - Of publicly offered investment trusts:
    - ¥52 trillion invested in stock investment trusts.
    - ¥9 trillion invested in bond investment trusts.
    - ¥2 trillion in MMF.
  - Major securities firms and most major banks are the largest CIS managers.
- Securities intermediaries (as of November 2011 unless otherwise noted):
  - Type I FIBOs operating in Japan: 322, of which 22 are foreign firms (not incorporated).
  - Majority are small, retail-oriented firms; some large firms have complex business models including proprietary trading and derivatives portfolios.
  - 16 securities companies subject to consolidated supervision.
  - A subgroup of supervised firms receive more intense monitoring and supervision; supervision (off and onsite) for these firms is assigned to the OSBM.
  - 19 firms have presence overseas; main overseas cities: New York, London, Singapore, Hong Kong.
  - Other intermediaries counts: 1,293 Type II; 1,122 Investment Advisory and Agency Business; 322 IMBOs (as of November 2011).
- Trading platforms:
  - Six exchanges operate in Japan: TSE, Osaka Stock Exchange (OSE), Nagoya Stock Exchange, Fukuoka Stock Exchange, Sapporo Stock Exchange, Tokyo AIM.
  - Only TSE and OSE have significant trading volumes.
    - On cash side TSE accounts for roughly 90 percent of trading volumes.
    - OSE is main market for derivatives.
  - Merger between TSE and OSE agreed; completion expected by 2013.
  - Five PTS trade equity, government debt, and corporate debt; their trading volumes are not significant.

*Source: IMF staff assessment chapter titled "1. Summary Implementation of the IOSCO Principles—Detailed Assessments" from the provided PDF content.*

### 28.       Market participants highlighted the need to further strengthen corporate

### _cr12230 - 28.       Market participants highlighted the need to further strengthen corporate

### Corporate governance and market access
- Market participants highlighted the need to further strengthen corporate governance through:
  - Inclusion of additional independent directors.
  - Constitution of strong, independent bodies (such as a system of committees) to support the oversight function of the board.
- Other preconditions largely in place:
  - Foreign issuers can tap the markets under similar conditions to domestic issuers.
  - Foreign corporations can register as financial instruments business operators, with the same requirements than domestic corporations.
  - There are no barriers for foreign investors to invest in the domestic market.
  - Company law is modern and it is easy to constitute a corporation in Japan—incorporation typically takes less than a week.
  - Insolvency framework includes rehabilitation procedures.
  - Out of court proceedings can be worked out, and guidelines exist in this regard.
  - Judiciary system is perceived as impartial.
  - Prosecution office has created specialized offices in Tokyo, Japan, and Osaka, Japan, to deal with financial crime, but participants commented that courts might lack expertise.
  - Accounting and auditing standards do not have major differences from international standards.

### Main findings — Principles for the regulator
- Responsibilities for supervision of securities markets lie in the FSA, the SESC, and the CPAAOB.
- Certain features of the legal framework raise concerns regarding their independence; however, in practice there is no evidence of day-to-day interference from the government.
- In their competency areas, these agencies have broad powers vis-à-vis regulated entities.
- The FSA cannot impose money penalties except in connection with a limited number of misconducts.
- The FSA has taken important steps to strengthen its capacity to identify and monitor emerging and systemic risk.

### Main findings — Principles for SROs
- Several SROs are currently active and most have a long history of operation.
- SROs are subject to “authorization” and must meet criteria addressing capacity, management of conflict of interest, fair treatment of members, and confidentiality.
- The FSA has enforcement powers over SROs.
- The FSA has developed a system of oversight tailored to each SRO that appears to be working well.

### Main findings — Principles for enforcement
- Supervision of securities firms requires further strengthening:
  - The FSA has not yet developed a framework to identify and determine the scale and scope of risks of individual firms and determine the intensity of regulatory intervention (including on-site inspections).
  - Coverage of the on-site inspection program is limited, especially for smaller Type I and IMBOs as well as for Type II and investment advisors—most of which are inspected only by cause.
- Enforcement developments:
  - The FSA is making more use of stronger measures, such as suspensions, in addition to orders for improvement.
  - It is important that the FSA periodically reviews its strategy towards enforcement.
  - Criminal convictions have been secured, but commuted sentences can limit the effect of deterrence.

### Main findings — Principles for issuers
- Issuers of public offerings are subject to disclosure obligations at registration and on a periodic and on-going basis that are in line with the IOSCO Principles.
- The FSA and the SESC have a system to review offering documents and periodic reports to help ensure compliance.
- Basic rights of shareholders are embedded in company law.
- Additional protections in the FIEA include the requirement for a mandatory tender offer under certain conditions.
- Notification obligations exist for substantial holdings.
- Holdings of insiders must be included in disclosure documents, but a system of timely notification of transactions carried out by them is not in place.
- Financial statements must be prepared according to local GAAPs, which are broadly consistent with IFRS.

### Main findings — Principles for auditors, credit rating agencies and other information service providers
- A system of quality control for auditors is in place, involving reviews by JICPA under oversight of the CPAAOB, complemented by direct examinations by the CPAAOB.
- Auditors are required to be independent of the entities they audit.
- Issuers’ mechanisms to monitor auditors’ independence require strengthening.
- Credit rating agencies are registered by the FSA and are subject to ongoing supervision through reporting and on-site inspections.
- There is a framework in place for sell-side analysts to address conflicts of interest, which is based on disclosure.

### Main findings — Principles for collective investment schemes (CIS)
- Managers and distributors of CIS are required to register with the FSA.
- Registration requirements for managers (who must register as IMBOs) include capital requirements, fit and proper requirements and organizational requirements or deposits for operation.
- The SESC does not have a policy to inspect newly registered CIS managers within a short timeframe after registration.
- Current risk-based approach ensures regular on-site inspections for CIS managers, although the SESC should further strengthen the inspection program for CIS managers especially if the managed CIS is offered to the public and is subject to similar disclosure obligations to an issuer.
- Assets must be entrusted to a separate custodian. There is no obligation that the custodian be independent; however, custodians (trust banks) are subject to regulation and supervision by the FSA.
- Assets must be valued at fair value. ITAJ has developed guidance on valuation of assets, including illiquid assets.
- Conditions of suspensions of redemptions must be disclosed in the offering documents. Suspensions of redemptions are notified to the FSA.

### Main findings — Principles for securities intermediaries
- Financial instruments business may only be carried on in Japan by entities registered by the FSA and that comply with registration requirements, which include minimum capital, fit and proper and organizational requirements.
- The SESC does not have a policy to inspect newly registered FIBOs within a short timeframe after registration.
- Ongoing capital requirements apply only to Type I FIBOs, which must comply and report a capital ratio similar to Basel II.
- Reporting requirements are extensive for Type I FIBOs.
- Smaller intermediaries are not necessarily subject to external audit.
- The current risk-based approach ensures regular inspection of larger Type I FIBOs and IMBOs by the FSA, complemented by JSDA/TSE inspections and ITAJ inspections.
- Longer cycles apply to smaller Type I and IMBOs; Type II and investment advisors are inspected mainly by cause.
- The FSA has not developed a plan to deal with the failure of a securities firm, but experiences of how past failures were handled have been documented.

*Source: _cr12230 - 28.       Market participants highlighted the need to further strengthen corporate*

### 36.      Principles for secondary markets: Exchanges and PTS are the only secondary

### _cr12230 - 36.      Principles for secondary markets: Exchanges and PTS are the only secondary

### Principle 36 — Findings on secondary markets, trading surveillance, and market integrity
- "Exchanges and PTS are the only secondary markets that can trade securities and each must comply with criteria set down by FSA."
- "The SROs are responsible for ensuring orderly trading, while the SESC is responsible for market surveillance for purposes of detecting unfair trading practices—in such function, it is supported by the exchanges."
- "There has been active enforcement of the requirements prohibiting unfair trading practices."
- "CCPs manage exposures on a daily basis and have powers to request members to post additional margin."
- "Default procedures are known to members."
- "Price limits apply in both the cash and derivatives and circuit breakers apply to derivatives trading if there is excessive volatility."
- "Naked short selling is prohibited."

### Related assessments across IOSCO Principles (selected findings from Table 1)
- Principle 33 (FI): "Exchanges and PTS require minimum capital, appropriate technology systems and their rules must be vetted before approval. PTS can only be established by Type I FIBOs and require an independent expert IT report."
- Principle 34 (FI): "The SESC, exchanges, and the FIBOs in their condition of operators of PTS conduct market surveillance. The FSA authorizes changes to rules and maintains close supervision of operations by way of reports, ongoing dialogue and inspections. PTS provide monthly and annual reports to the FSA, as well as on an ad-hoc basis if they detect evidence of market manipulation."
- Principle 35 (FI): "Bids, offers, and trade information are made publicly available for exchanges (95 percent of all trading) and PTS. Electronic platforms for dark pools do not appear to be a cause of concern. Internalization and block trades are permitted and must be reported to exchanges."
- Principle 37 (FI): "Exposures of the larger complex firms are under intense monitoring by the OSBM. The CCPs monitor clearing members’ positions on a daily basis. If a participant’s exposure becomes a concern, the CCP has the power to request additional collateral. Further transactions will be prohibited and outstanding positions will closed out if this does not occur. There are clear procedures in the event of default which are available to members. Price limits apply to both the cash and derivatives and circuit breakers apply to derivatives trading if there is excessive volatility. Naked short selling is prohibited."

### Enforcement, surveillance, and CCP risk management — key operational points
- Market surveillance and enforcement
  - Active market surveillance by the SESC and the exchanges.
  - "Administrative and criminal penalties apply for unfair trading practices, including market manipulation, false rumors and insider dealing."
  - "Administrative penalties have been imposed and criminal convictions have been secured."
- CCP risk controls and default management
  - "CCPs manage exposures on a daily basis and have powers to request members to post additional margin."
  - "Default procedures are known to members."
  - CCPs can prohibit further transactions and close out outstanding positions if additional collateral is not posted.
- Trading halts, price controls, and short selling
  - "Price limits apply in both the cash and derivatives and circuit breakers apply to derivatives trading if there is excessive volatility."
  - "Naked short selling is prohibited."
- Transparency and reporting
  - "Bids, offers, and trade information are made publicly available for exchanges (95 percent of all trading) and PTS."
  - PTS reporting: monthly, annual, and ad-hoc when market manipulation is detected.

### Recommended actions relevant to secondary markets, exchanges, PTS, and market integrity (excerpts from Table 2)
- Principle 33
  - "The authorities should consider including as part of the licensing criteria for exchanges a detailed IT systems assessment on the robustness of the systems, either by internal expert staff or by an independent external expert with the appropriate knowledge and experience on exchange electronic trading systems."
- Principle 35
  - "The FSA should consider the development of regulations concerning the treatment of dark pools."
- Principle 37
  - "The FSA should consider the introduction of a large traders report."

*Source: _cr12230 - 36. Japan FSAP—Summary Implementation of the IOSCO Principles*

### 37.      The Japanese authorities welcome the opportunity to be assessed as the first

### The Japanese authorities welcome the opportunity to be assessed as the first jurisdiction under the new IOSCO Principles and Objectives

### Authorities' response and overall view (paragraphs 37–38)
- The Japanese authorities "welcome the opportunity to be assessed as the first jurisdiction under the new IOSCO Principles and Objectives published in 2010, and the methodologies published in September 2011."
- The authorities "express their sincere appreciation to the IMF and its experienced assessors for the dedication, time, and resources committed to this assessment."
- The assessment "provided the authorities with an opportunity to comprehensively review their regulatory and supervisory framework through their self-assessments and dialogue with the IMF."
- The authorities "welcome the overall assessment by the IMF that they have achieved a high level of compliance with the IOSCO Principles."
- The IMF recommendations "are generally well received."
- The authorities note that "some initiatives toward reform have already been taken since the time of the assessment" and "will thoroughly take into account these recommendations in their continuous efforts to strengthen their capacities for better regulation and supervision."

### Concerns about the Methodologies and emphasis on outcomes (paragraph 39)
- The authorities find that "the Methodologies need to be improved further to enable more risk-based assessments with more emphasis on the outcome, not on the form of policy action."
- Current Methodologies "provide only a single set of policy actions to be in compliance with each principle, irrespective of a country’s risk profile or differences in the effectiveness of the policies depending on the country’s circumstances."
- Example cited: "full compliance with Principle 30 would not be achieved until all market intermediaries holding client assets are subject to external audit, regardless of their risk profile."
- The authorities' position: "although external audit would be useful, other measures could also achieve the same objectives."
- The authorities warn that "an excessive emphasis on the form of regulation and supervision could lead to a box-ticking approach which does not lead to the desired outcomes of enhancing market integrity and efficient markets, as well as to ensure financial stability."
- The authorities "will continue to work with the IOSCO and the IMF for further improvement of the methodologies."

### Purpose of the detailed assessment of IOSCO Principles (paragraph 40)
- The purpose is "primarily to ascertain whether the legal and regulatory securities market requirements of the country and the operations of the securities regulatory authorities in implementing and enforcing these requirements in practice meet the standards set out in the IOSCO Principles."
- The assessment is "to be a means of identifying potential gaps, inconsistencies, weaknesses and areas where further powers and/or better implementation of the existing framework may be necessary."
- The assessment is to be "used as a basis for establishing priorities for improvements to the current regulatory scheme."

*Source: paragraphs 37–40 of the assessment document provided.*

### 41.      The assessment of the country’s observance of each individual Principle is made

### 41.      The assessment of the country’s observance of each individual Principle is made

### Assessment categories and methodology
- Assessment categories: fully implemented, broadly implemented, partly implemented, not implemented, and not applicable.
- IOSCO assessment methodology provides assessment criteria for each Principle to achieve designated benchmarks.
- Methodology recognizes variation in means of implementation depending on domestic context, structure, and stage of development of the country’s capital market.
- Definitions of categories (verbatim):
  - A principle is considered fully implemented when all assessment criteria specified for that Principle are generally met without any significant deficiencies.
  - A principle is considered broadly implemented when the exceptions to meeting the assessment criteria specified for that Principle are limited to those specified under the broadly implemented benchmark for that Principle and do not substantially affect the overall adequacy of the regulation that the Principle is intended to address.
  - A principle is considered partly implemented when the assessment criteria specified under the partly implemented benchmark for that principle are generally met without any significant deficiencies.
  - A principle is considered not implemented when major shortcomings (as specified in the not implemented benchmark for that Principle) are found in adhering to the assessment criteria specified for that Principle.
  - A principle is considered not applicable when it does not apply because of the nature of the country’s securities market and relevant structural, legal and institutional considerations.

### Principles Relating to the Regulator — institutional structure and responsibilities (Principal findings)
- Institutional structure:
  - The FSA is an integrated regulator responsible for regulation and supervision of entities that carry out financial services in Japan, including credit institutions, insurance companies and securities firms; responsibilities are delegated from the PM.
  - FSA mandate (Article 3 of the Act for the Establishment of the FSA): “ensure the stable functioning of the financial system of Japan and to protect depositors, policyholders, securities investors and other persons equivalent thereto, while facilitating finance.”
  - BOJ is not a regulatory authority per se under the Financial Instruments Exchange Act, but conducts supervisory activities (on-site examinations and off-site monitoring) under Articles 1 and 44 of the Bank of Japan Act.
- Responsibilities in securities markets:
  - Regulation and supervision of securities and financial derivatives markets is responsibility of the PM under the FIEA; Article 194-7(1) delegates functions to the FSA except those specified by Cabinet Order.
  - Day-to-day functions (registration, supervision, surveillance, imposition of enforcement actions) delegated to the FSA; licensing of exchanges, authorization of associations, approval of investor protection funds exercised by the MoFS on behalf of the PM.
  - Article 194-7(2) delegates market surveillance and on-site inspection functions of securities firms to the Securities Exchange and Surveillance Committee (SESC), a board within the FSA; SESC can recommend enforcement actions or filing criminal charges.
  - Article 35 CPA Act charges oversight of registered auditors to the CPAAOB, a board within the FSA; CPAAOB can recommend disciplinary measures/sanctions against audit firms; FSA has authority to impose sanctions by delegation from the PM.
- Operational distribution of responsibilities:
  - FSA: policy, off-site monitoring, imposition of enforcement actions on securities firms, CRAs and auditors, and on-site inspections of registered financial institutions that carry securities services.
  - SESC: market surveillance and on-site inspections of securities firms; can recommend enforcement actions to the FSA.
  - CPAAOB: auditors’ oversight; can carry out inspections and investigations to recommend enforcement actions.
  - Local finance bureaus (MoF offices): review securities registration statements and periodic information submitted by issuers; registration of FIBOs; off-site monitoring and on-site inspections of FIBOs with capital less than ¥12 million.
  - Several SROs perform self-regulatory functions; registration of sales representatives delegated by the FSA to the JSDA.
- Interpretation and public guidance:
  - FSA interprets laws through no action letters and public comments; responses generally given within 30 days and published on FSA website.
- Cooperation and information sharing:
  - Arrangements established between FSA and SESC; shared building and staff rotation foster informal cooperation.
  - FSA shares off-site monitoring findings with SESC to prepare annual inspection programs; increased flow of information between banking and securities units.
  - Creation of OSBM for complex firms incorporates off- and onsite supervision with staff from both FSA and SESC.
  - Periodic senior-level meetings attended by executives from FSA, SESC and CPAAOB at least once a week; senior officer of director general class coordinates securities market functions.
- Assessment for Principle 1:
  - Assessment: Fully Implemented
  - Comments: Division of responsibilities increases need for cooperation; cooperation between FSA and SESC satisfactory; authorities encouraged to consider extending OSBM approach to other organizational areas.

### Principle 2 — regulator independence and accountability (findings, assessments, concerns)
- Delegated authority and interference:
  - FSA, SESC and CPAAOB exercise functions delegated from the PM; some functions retained by the PM (licensing of exchanges, authorization of associations, approval of investor protection funds) exercised by MoFS on behalf of PM.
  - MoFS historically follows FSA recommendations and has not taken a different decision from FSA recommendation in practice.
- Legal nature and appointment:
  - FSA is an agency within the Cabinet; SESC and CPAAOB are boards within the FSA with heads (Commissioners) directly appointed by the PM.
  - Commissioner of the FSA is a civil servant; law does not stipulate a fixed period for appointment.
  - Article 75 of the NPSA prohibits dismissal, demotion or administrative leave of the Commissioner unless for due cause (e.g., mental illness diagnosed by two doctors or poor performance).
  - By practice Commissioner steps down every two to three years in July at the beginning of the fiscal year.
  - Commissioners of SESC and CPAAOB: fixed term appointment of three years and can be reelected; cannot be demoted unless with due cause.
- Funding and resources:
  - FSA (including SESC and CPAAOB) funded via central government budget; Commissioner proposes amount annually to MoF; adjustments are made during negotiation with MoF.
  - FSA staff indicated final budget is result of negotiation; level of resources and staff has not suffered cuts over time.
- Accountability and transparency:
  - FSA accountable to the National Diet; produces annual report (not required by law) strengthening accountability.
  - SESC produces report on delegated authority by law.
  - Financial statements of FSA audited by Audit Board of Japan; statements and audit report submitted to Diet.
  - FSA and SESC disseminate significant information on processes, procedures and individual decisions via website; most important laws and policy documents available in English.
- Individual redress and confidentiality:
  - Affected parties can request review of actions to the authority and bring administrative lawsuit; Article 13 APA provides right to notice and hearing when registration is cancelled or enforcement action imposed.
  - Confidentiality obligations under Information Disclosure Act (Article 5).
- Assessment for Principle 2:
  - Assessment: Broadly Implemented
  - Comments (verbatim key concerns):
    - Legal nature of the agency and scope defined by cabinet order rather than by law.
    - Initial budget proposal subject to adjustments during discussion with MoF.
    - Functions delegated to local finance bureaus (part of MoF).
    - Certain functions retained by the PM.
    - Lack of a term limit for the Commissioner can weaken accountability.
  - Assessors: legal features have not translated into material breaches to independence to date; encourage consideration of legal framework to strengthen operational independence.

### Principle 3 — powers, resources and capacity (powers, resources, staffing, assessment)
- Powers of FSA and SESC (verbatim list):
  - Register entities that want to engage in securities activities (FIBOs) as well as to rescind, cancel or suspend such registration, and issue orders to improve or suspend their business
  - Register issues of public offering, including CIS and require amendments to registration statements
  - Supervise regulated entities (including off site reporting and on-site inspections), as well as issuers (including off-site reporting; on-site inspections are permitted under certain circumstances)
  - Impose monetary penalties, for the misconduct established in legislation such as the FIEA in connection with issuers, CIS and unfair trading practices
  - Seek cease and desist orders against persons who have violated the FIEA
  - File criminal charges and investigative criminal offenses
- A few functions retained by PM: licensing of exchanges; approval of investor protection funds; authorization of certain associations.
- Number of Regulated Entities under the IOSCO Assessment (verbatim):
  - Issuers 2900
  - Type I FIBO 322
  - Type II FIBO 1,293
  - IMBO 323
  - Investment Advisory Business 1,122
  - Registered Financial Institutions 1,136
  - Exchanges 6
  - PTS 5
  - Credit Rating Agencies 6
- Budget and staff trends:
  - From FY 2003 to FY 2011 the budget of the FSA has grown by 40 percent.
  - About 30 percent more staff in FY 2011 compared to FY 2003.
  - FSA staff noted that the rest of government decreased staff by roughly 41 percent.
- FSA, SESC, CPAAOB Staff (table values preserved verbatim where given):
  - FSA (directly related to capital markets): 2002 63; 2009 117; 2010 131; 2011 145
  - SESC: 2009 182; 2010 374; 2011 384; 2011 392 (note: table includes multiple lines for coordination, market surveillance, inspection, civil penalties, etc.; specific entries in source)
  - Coordination: 118; 16; 16; 16
  - Market Surveillance: 46; 48; 49
  - Inspection: 110; 113; 118
  - Civil Penalties and Disclosure Documents Division: 96; 100; -
  - Administrative Money Penalties: -; -; 62
  - Disclosure Statement Division: -; -; 39
  - Investigation Division: 62; 103; 104; 105
  - CPAAOB: -; 55; 58; 57
- IT systems and disclosure:
  - “Data System for On-site and Off-site Supervision” and “Off-site Monitoring System” developed.
  - EDINET receives issuer information electronically and is accessible to the public.
- Staffing constraints and recruitment:
  - FSA staff mostly civil servants; salaries determined under Remuneration Act based on broader private sector reference; salaries not comparable with financial sector.
  - Turnover less than two percent for the last three years.
  - Recruiting of specialists via fixed term contracts (three to five years) under Act on Special Measures (effective November 27, 2000); by law fixed term cannot exceed five years.
  - 111 market experts, 43 CPAs and 21 lawyers recruited for securities related departments in recent years.
- Training and governance:
  - Financial Research and Training Center launched in 2001; staff exchange with IOSCO, FSB, diplomatic missions, foreign regulators, private sector and universities; 50 staff studied abroad for financial-related master degrees.
  - Rotation policy on a two to three year cycle.
  - Policy Evaluation Division supports strategic planning; tri-annual goals with annual self-evaluations shared with six external experts.
- Investor education:
  - FSA (Policy and Legal Division) and BOJ (Public Relations Department) cooperate with industry organizations; Counseling Office for Financial Services Users centralized handling of user questions and complaints.
- Assessment for Principle 3:
  - Assessment: Partly Implemented
  - Comments (verbatim concerns):
    - Capacity to hire and retain expert staff and level of resources allocated to securities markets issues.
    - Civil service regime poses challenges to hire and retain experts across organization (including SESC and CPAAOB).
    - Concern whether enough resources dedicated to inspection and effect on supervisory effectiveness.
    - Assessors encourage comprehensive assessment of risks to regulatory objectives to inform resource decisions.
    - Existence of two main bodies (FSA/SESC) and delegation to local finance bureaus create challenges; additional mechanisms to assess quality of work across departments would be useful.
    - Power to impose money penalties is limited (discussed under Principle 11).

### Principle 4 — clear and consistent regulatory processes (consultation, supervisory policies, due process)
- Consultation of regulations:
  - FSA follows public comment process for developing/amending regulations; includes cost-benefit analysis and analysis of alternatives.
  - Responses to requests for interpretation from the public are published.
- Supervisory policies and actions:
  - Laws, ordinances and regulations published on FSA website; FSA, SESC and CPAAOB disclose Annual Plans; Supervisory Guidelines and Inspection Manuals publicly available.
  - SESC makes public recommendations for regulatory actions submitted to FSA and criminal authorities; FSA discloses regulatory actions taken against individuals and firms (except orders related to financial soundness).
  - SESC inspection summary results are published.
  - Administrative criteria and case studies of regulatory actions are published to enhance transparency and predictability.
- Due process:
  - FSA bound by Administrative Procedures Act (APA); reasons for adverse actions must be presented; in practice reasons and inspection results provided in writing.
  - Right to request review and to bring administrative lawsuit; Article 13 APA provides right to notice and hearing when registration is cancelled.
- Confidentiality:
  - Confidentiality obligations under Information Disclosure Act (Article 5).
- Assessment for Principle 4:
  - Assessment: Fully Implemented

### Principle 5 — professional standards and confidentiality of staff
- Ethics framework:
  - Staff subject to National Public Service Act (NPSA) and National Public Service Ethics Act (NPSEA); NPSA requires public officials to act in public interest (Article 96); NPSEA imposes duties of fairness and neutrality and prohibits misuse of position (Article 3).
  - NPSEA reporting requirements (verbatim):
    - Gifts above ¥5,000 (Article 6)
    - Annual report on trading of shares (Article 7)
    - Annual income report (Article 8)
  - Violations of NPSA and NPSEA subject to penalties and disciplinary actions.
- FSA-specific guidance:
  - FSA guidelines prohibit sale and purchase of stocks of financial institutions subject to FSA supervision; prohibit short term transactions (six months or less) and derivative transactions for other securities; staff required to submit annual report on financial transactions.
  - Conflict of interest management: cool off policy where former FSA officials cannot engage with FSA on regulated entity applications for three years; inspectors with prior employment with a regulated entity not assigned to inspections of that entity by practice.
  - Annual ethics training for all staff.
- Enforcement:
  - Ethics Office within General Coordination Division monitors compliance; during last three years sanctions imposed on three staff for ethical violations.
- Assessment for Principle 5:
  - Assessment: Fully Implemented

### Principle 6 — contribution to monitoring and managing systemic risk
- Organizational changes to strengthen systemic risk capacity:
  - Office of Market Analysis created in 2008.
  - OSBM (Office for Supervision of Big Market participants?) created in 2010.
- Office of Market Analysis:
  - Responsible for regular monitoring of indicators (macroeconomic indicators, exchange rate, interest rate, CDS index, stock price changes) and events affecting markets.
  - Prepares daily reports (shared organization-wide) and weekly reports (shared at weekly meetings); current composition: 12 staff.
- OSBM:
  - Responsible for micro-prudential supervision of large/complex Type I FIBOs; composed of 13 staff.
  - Responsible for off- and onsite supervision of such firms to create seamless supervisory approach.
  - Selection basis: combination of scale, characteristics and complexity; basis selection: 16 firms that meet FIEA criteria for consolidated supervision (total assets over ¥1 trillion).
  - Monitoring focuses on governance, product control, market risk, operational risk, credit risk and liquidity risk; firms subject to consolidated supervision and additional higher-frequency reporting.
- Regular senior-level meetings:
  - Usually weekly meetings at senior levels of FSA and SESC to exchange information and determine regulatory actions.
- BOJ role and coordination:
  - BOJ aims to ensure smooth settlement and maintain financial stability per Bank of Japan Act; conducts on-site examinations of counterparties (Article 44).
  - BOJ off-site reporting includes quarterly detailed risk reports and daily liquidity reports; Financial Institutions Surveillance Division carries out monthly presentations to BOJ policy board.
  - BOJ produces Financial System Report (FSR) biannually.
  - No MoUs with BOJ, but cooperation mechanisms include regular exchange of contact lists, inspection schedules, and ad-hoc meetings/calls.
  - Article 44 BOJ Act authorizes FSA to request BOJ reports of onsite examinations; in practice regular information exchange occurs.
  - Regular calls between BOJ and OSBM usually monthly in normal times, more frequently during crises.
- Additional mechanisms and cross-border cooperation:
  - Article 38 BOJ Act authorizes BOJ, on request of PM and MoF, to provide loans to financial institutions to maintain stability; used in past (Yamaichi Securities failure).
  - Supervisory college and crisis management group created in 2010 for a large complex firm; FSA and BOJ participate along with foreign regulators; meetings annually and semiannual calls.
  - FSA and BOJ are members of supervisory colleges for large investment banks with operations in Japan; colleges meet once a year and have semiannual conference calls.
- Assessment for Principle 6:
  - Assessment: Broadly Implemented
  - Comments (verbatim):
    - IOSCO guidance limited; assessing contribution to systemic risk monitoring is challenging.
    - Key issues considered: arrangements to identify systemic risk; holistic analysis combining microprudential and macroprudential approaches; periodic reassessment; regulatory actions following assessments.
    - Acknowledged efforts: creation of OSBM and Office of Market Analysis; need for arrangement allowing holistic and systematic analysis integrating bottom-up and top-down approaches.
    - Authorities would benefit from greater cooperation with BOJ on crisis management and resolution procedures for systemically important institutions.

### Principle 7 — perimeter of regulation (review process, examples)
- Formal unit:
  - No unit formally singled out for reviewing perimeter of regulation.
- Practical arrangements:
  - Office of Market Analysis and OSBM play roles in identifying market risks and risks from large complex institutions.
  - Off-site monitoring and on-site inspections used to continually assess assumptions about regulated entities and products.
  - Findings have led to enforcement actions (e.g., injunctions against unlicensed firms) and regulatory and legal changes.
- Specific legal/regulatory changes (verbatim examples):
  - 2010 amendment to the FIEA: introduced (i) consolidated regulation of FIBOs of a certain size, and (ii) mandatory clearing for OTC derivative transactions to be implemented by 2012.
  - 2011 amendment to the FIEA: reasons for refusal of registration for Investment Advisory and Agency Business were improved as a result of SESC proposal.
- Assessment for Principle 7:
  - Assessment: Broadly Implemented
  - Comments:
    - IOSCO guidance limited; FSA actively uses ordinary functions and senior meetings to identify emerging risks.
    - System would benefit from a more robust framework to identify and prioritize cross-cutting risks and determine need for regulatory action.

### Principle 8 — conflicts of interest and incentive alignment
- Regulated entities:
  - Supervisory programs for securities intermediaries, CIS operators, auditors, sell-side analysts are key mechanisms to identify, monitor and address conflicts of interest.
  - Regulatory framework requires entities to put mechanisms in place to identify, monitor and mitigate conflicts of interest; mitigation approaches include bans on certain activities and disclosure requirements.
  - Examples: limitations on services for audit firms and credit rating agencies; disclosure requirements for related party transactions in CIS context.
  - Monitoring mainly via on-site inspections; inspection manuals include conflicts of interest focus.
- Issuers and securitization:
  - Measures taken post-crisis: registration regime for credit rating agencies effective April 2010; stronger accountability of FIBOs via April 2008 Supervisory Guidelines; revision of capital adequacy regulations (Basel 2.5 revisions implemented end of 2011).
  - Retention requirements not imposed, but originators tend to retain first loss portions in residential real estate securitizations.
  - 2009 JSDA regulations on distribution of securitized assets set information requirements for investors.
- Assessment for Principle 8:
  - Assessment: Fully Implemented
  - Comments:
    - Requirements for management of conflicts of interest embedded throughout IOSCO Principles.
    - Concern in market regarding robustness of corporate governance; FSA and TSE have taken actions (e.g., strengthened disclosure requirements in 2010; post-Olympus reviews).
    - FSA actively looked at securitization market and taken regulatory measures to mitigate misalignment of incentives.

### Principles for Self-Regulation — Principle 9 (SRO oversight and arrangements)
- Types of SROs and functions:
  - Three types perform self-regulatory functions: exchanges (licensed under FIEA Article 80), associations (authorized under FIEA Article 67-2 JSDA or approved under FIEA Article 78 ITAJ), and self-regulatory organizations established by exchanges (authorized under FIEA Article 102-14).
  - In practice SROs: securities exchanges (Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Sapporo, Fukuoka, Tokyo AIM), TSE SRO, JSDA and ITAJ. JSIAA and Type II FIA exist but assessment did not cover them.
  - Functions:
    - Exchanges: listing authority, admission of members, market surveillance and inspection of members (TSE created separate SRO for market surveillance/discipline).
    - JSDA: trade association with SRO functions including rulemaking, inspections, disciplinary action, accreditation of sales representatives and disclosure of trading information; membership mandatory for stock exchanges’ members; sales representatives’ qualification compulsory and annual requalification mandatory.
    - ITAJ: similar SRO functions for IMBOs; membership voluntary but all IMBOs are members.
    - TSE SRO: responsible for examination and disciplinary action for TSE members.
- Conditions for approval and ongoing criteria (verbatim highlights):
  - Basic criteria applicable to all three types include:
    - Capacity to carry out the mandate, including adequate resources and personnel (FIEA Article 82 and 102-16); capital requirements apply only to exchanges.
    - Submit articles of incorporation/operational rules and brokerage contract rules to the FSA (FIEA Articles 82, 102-16, 79-3).
    - Manage conflicts of interest (FIEA Articles 87-5, 102-23, 78-2).
    - Manage and protect confidential information (FIEA Articles 87-8, 79).
    - Sanction members (FIEA Articles 87, 79-2).
    - Fair treatment of members (FIEA Articles 87-9, 68, 79-6).
    - Cooperation with regulator (FIEA Articles 153, 73, 79-5).
  - Authorization from FSA required for material changes to articles, operational rules or brokerage contract rules (FIEA Article 149); notification required for other rule changes.
  - SROs must keep records and prepare reports as required by FIEA (Article 188).
- FSA powers over SROs (verbatim):
  - Authority to inspect operations (FIEA Article 151)
  - Ability to suspend business operations (also to dismiss executives in authority) (FIEA Article 150)
  - Require reports of operations (FIEA Article 151)
  - Approval of rule changes and direction to change rules (FIEA Article 149, 153)
  - Issue orders for improvement (Supervisory Guidelines IV)
- Authority balance:
  - FIEA does not delegate any of the FSA/SESC authority to SROs, except registration work of sales representatives (FIEA Article 64-7); FSA retains full authority.
  - FSA endorses SRO role and requires SROs to enforce their rules as matter of law.
- Coordination and oversight practices:
  - No formal MoUs with SROs; authorities consider MoUs unnecessary because SRO nature/functions defined by law.
  - Operational coordination via regular calls, formal meetings, off-site reporting, and on-site inspections tailored to SRO functions.
- JSDA oversight specifics:
  - Off-site reporting requirements to FSA/SESC: “Report of Actions” on noncompliance; quarterly results of member inspections; reporting of disciplinary actions when sanctions imposed; annual report on activities (FIEA Article 76).
  - Regular contact (usually daily) between JSDA and FSA officials regarding inspections and operational issues.
  - On-site coordination: JSDA and SESC meet three times a year to discuss supervisory program; monthly senior-level meeting to coordinate inspection planning and avoid overlap; SESC conducts inspections of JSDA’s SRO responsibilities (no specific inspection cycle; last formal in-depth inspection referenced in source).

*Source: IMF staff report as contained in the supplied PDF content.*

### 2006. Such inspection lasted for approximately one month. It was a comprehensive review of the

### _cr12230 - 2006. Such inspection lasted for approximately one month. It was a comprehensive review of the

### Off-site arrangements
- JSDA: reporting obligations include serious events reported as they occur, annual report requirement, and regular dialogue between officials.
- ITAJ: "The arrangements are the same for ITAJ as set above for JSDA as the same reporting obligations apply (serious events are reported as they occur) as well as annual report requirement and regular dialogue between officials."
- TSE SRO: "Similar arrangements as those described for the JSDA apply to TSE SRO. The TSE SRO reports separately to the reporting by TSE as it is a separate legal entity and has different functions. In addition, the TSE SRO must report any rule change and disciplinary action."

### On-site inspections and inspection cycles
- JSDA:
  - 2006 inspection: "Such inspection lasted for approximately one month. It was a comprehensive review of the JSDA which was fully documented. The written report included relevant working papers as evidence for the findings and guidance issued by SESC at the conclusion of the inspection."
- ITAJ:
  - Inspection cycle: "the SESC has not defined an inspection cycle."
  - Last inspection: "The last inspection was completed in 2007 and is fully documented"
  - SESC inspections: "As above, the SESC conducts inspections of ITAJ’s SRO responsibilities"
- TSE SRO:
  - Inspection cycle: "The SESC does not have a fixed inspection cycle for TSE SRO."
  - Last formal in-depth inspection: conducted in 2009.
  - Duration: "Such inspection lasted for 42 business days."
  - Documentation: "It was a comprehensive review of the TSE SRO which was fully documented in a written report. The report included relevant working papers as evidence for the findings and guidance issued by SESC at the"

### Meetings and stakeholder engagement
- SESC does not have official meetings like those described for JSDA.
- Annual meeting: "the FSA, the SESC and ITAJs senior management meet once per year to discuss industry developments and exchange views."
- Ad hoc discussions: "There are also discussions about specific member issues as they arise."

*Source: _cr12230 - 2006. Such inspection lasted for approximately one month. It was a comprehensive review of the*

### conclusion of the inspection.

### _cr12230 - conclusion of the inspection.

### Conflict of interest and SRO structure
- Article 105 of the FIEA requires an exchange (stock type) to establish a self-regulating committee composed of three or more members with a majority of outside members; chairperson elected from outside directors; term one year with reelection for a maximum of four years. Alternatively an exchange may establish a separate SRO.
- The TSE has established a separate SRO; other exchanges have constituted self-regulating committees.
- For other SROs the FIEA does not prescribe a specific structure; authorization requires an association to provide information on self-regulatory arrangements.
- JSDA: established a separate Self-regulation Board; by‑laws require the chair, vice-chair and public board members be independent; Self-regulatory committees report directly to the Self-regulation Board. JSDA Article 56.2: Board of Governors delegated disciplinary powers to the Self-regulation Board.
- ITAJ has established a self-regulatory committee.

### Inspections and enforcement by SROs — outcomes and assessment
- All SROs follow a risk-based approach to determine member firms for inspection.
  - JSDA inspection factors: capital adequacy (for regular members); past records of JSDA and SESC inspections; other information available (media, complaints); lines of business and customer profile.
  - ITAJ inspection factors: cases pointed out by the SESC; results of the fund survey carried out by ITAJ; notifications of violations and complaints.
- Annual coordination: every year each SRO holds a meeting with the SESC to coordinate inspection plans; JSDA and TSE coordinate inspections (TSE inspections are done jointly with the JSDA in practice).

- Outcomes achieved by SROs (latest year, as presented):
  - JSDA: 291 member firms; 438,008 sales representatives; 102 number inspections on member firms (1 fine, 4 reprimands); 86 disciplinary actions (20 revocations and 66 suspensions on sales representatives).
  - ITAJ: 323 size of membership; 35 number inspections; 3 disciplinary actions (fine plus 1 confidential admonition).
  - TSE: 103 size of membership; 33 number inspections; 1 disciplinary action censure (2011 censure, 2 fines 5 and ¥20 m).

- Assessment: Fully Implemented.
- Key assessor comments and recommendations:
  - Conversations with authorities and market participants conclude there is active oversight of SROs through different arrangements considered sufficient vis-à-vis the Principles.
  - Assessors encourage authorities to review the inspection cycle for SROs.
  - Assessors encourage continued monitoring of how SROs, particularly JSDA and ITAJ, manage conflicts of interest in their self-regulatory and enforcement functions.

### Principle 10 — Inspection, investigation and surveillance powers (summary)
- FSA powers over FIBOs (Article 56-2 and Article 194-7): request reports and information from any FIBOs and their holding companies; inspect business/property, books and documents of FIBOs, subsidiaries, and holding companies; inspections limited to what is necessary to understand the property of a FIBO; legal framework allows surprise inspections.
- FSA may order a major shareholder of a FIBO (Type I or investment management) to submit reports or materials or permit inspection limited to understanding the business of the FIBO.
- FSA powers over exchanges (Article 151 of FIEA): order Financial Instruments Exchange, Subsidiary Company, issuers listed, or outsourced service providers to submit reports/materials; inspect status of business or books and documents.
- FSA powers over SROs: request reports and information; inspect them.
- Record keeping: FIEA requires FIBOs to prepare and preserve books and documents on transactions with clients (FIEA Article 46-2 and 47; Cabinet Office Ordinance Article 157 (1), etc.) for a period of five to ten years; client account books and safe custody securities statements required (Cabinet Office Ordinance Articles 164 and 157).
- FSA access to identity of clients (including beneficial ownership) via inspections and requests under Article 56-2.
- Assessment: Fully Implemented.

### Principle 11 — Comprehensive enforcement powers (summary)
- FSA enforcement powers on FIBOs and registered FI:
  - Issue orders of improvement of business (Article 51 and 52); may require immediate remedy, investigations of management responsibilities, establishment of preventive measures, amendments to business operations; require reports and regular reporting; follow-ups conducted.
  - Issue suspension orders for a period not exceeding six months or rescind registration (Article 52 and 52-2). In practice suspensions are often limited by business line rather than entire operation.
  - Disclosure: both orders for improvement and suspensions are disclosed to the public, except orders for improvement related to financial soundness.
- Cease and desist orders: Article 192 authorizes FSA to request a district court to issue such orders where urgent necessity for public interest and investor protection exists.
- Administrative penalties: introduced 2005, expanded 2008. Penalties apply to limited categories of misconduct in FIEA; table of misconduct and penalties preserved verbatim (selected items):
  - Failure to submit registration statement — 172 — 2.25 percent of total offering amount.
  - False statements in registration statement — 172 — 2.25 percent of total offering amount.
  - Failure to submit periodic reports — 172 — Amount of audit fee from the previous year (half for quarterly or semiannual).
  - False statement in periodic reports — 172 — ¥6 million or 6/1000,000 of total market value.
  - Failure to issue tender offer notice — 172 — 25 percent of total amount bought.
  - Insider trading — 175 — Difference between value of sales and price.
  - Market manipulation — 174-2 — Aggregate of profit or loss and the difference between the value of sales (purchases).
  - Spreading rumors — 173 — Difference between value of sales until end of violation.
- For administrative money penalties, Article 177 gives the SESC authority to question persons, inspect business offices, and inspect books/documents.
- Criminal offenses: FIEA contains a longer list; SESC can conduct compulsory investigations (Article 211) and file complaints with public prosecutor (Article 226); SESC may conduct official inspection, search and seizure with prior judicial permit (Article 211).
- Private remedies: civil liability for damages; Act on Sales of Financial Instruments establishes civil liability of vendors; designated financial ADR for disputes; regulated entities have adhered to ADR.
- Assessment: Broadly Implemented.
- Key assessor comments and recommendations:
  - Administrative penalties coverage remains limited to issuers/CIS and unfair trading practices; does not include many breaches by securities firms (except unfair trading practices).
  - In some cases penalty amounts are too low to be deterrent.
  - Assessors encourage expansion of money penalties (see Principle 11).

### Principle 12 — Effectiveness and credibility of inspection, investigation and enforcement
- Inspection planning at SESC: three-step process — determine number of entities to inspect, select firms, determine focus. No comprehensive risk-based framework developed; expert judgment uses quantitative and qualitative factors.
- Inspection cycles:
  - Larger complex firms (under OSBM) usually inspected every three years; medium-size IMBOs on a five year cycle; smaller IMBOs longer.
  - Type II and Investment Advisory firms are not inspected regularly—inspected mainly for cause.
- SESC annual inspections: about 170 inspections per year; roughly half on Type I FIBOs; remaining categories get roughly 10 percent of resources.
- Number of entities inspected (table preserved verbatim):
  - Number of entities 2008 2009 2010
    - Type I 322 132 92 100
    - Type II 1,293 2 8 18
    - IMBOs 323 21 18 18
    - Investment Advisory 1,122 30 46 35
    - Financial institutions (related to capital markets activities) 28 27 28
- Inspections are generally of good quality; increased attention on internal controls and risk management for wholesale firms.
- Weaknesses:
  - No systematic use of horizontal/thematic reviews; random sampling not used to back-test.
  - Coverage limited for smaller Type I FIBOs, IMBOs; Type II and Investment Advisors inspected mainly for cause.
  - Newly registered firms not inspected within a reasonable timeframe after registration.
- Enforcement outcomes (measures on regulated entities — orders for improvement, suspensions, cancellations, etc. — table preserved verbatim for 2008–2010):
  - Orders for improvement (Total): 2008 — 24; 2009 — 34; 2010 — 24.
  - Orders for suspension (Total): 2008 — 8; 2009 — 18; 2010 — 15.
  - Cancellation of registration (Total): 2008 — 14; 2009 — 6; 2010 — 9.
  - Orders for dismissal of officers: 2008 — 2; 2009 — 1; 2010 — 0.
- Unfair practices (Market Manipulation (MP), Criminal (CR) etc. across years — table preserved verbatim):
  - 08/09 MP CR; 09/10 MP CR; 10/11 MP CR
    - Market Manipulation 1 0 5 2 5 2 5 0
    - Insider Trading 17 6 34 7 23 2
    - False statements 13 4 9 1 22 0
    - Rumors 0 2 0 3 0 0
- Assessment: Partly Implemented.
- Key assessor analysis and recommendations:
  - Off-site monitoring needs improvement to comprehensively identify, prioritize and determine scale/scope of risk.
  - Inspection coverage should be widened (smaller Type I, IMBOs, Type II, Investment Advisors).
  - Consider use of horizontal/thematic reviews and random inspections as complement.
  - Enhance enforcement: ensure harder measures used when appropriate; periodically review enforcement strategy; expand use of money penalties (Principle 11); review strength of criminal sanctions given suspended sentences common.

### Cooperation, information sharing and international assistance (Principles 13–15)
- Domestic cooperation: Act to Establish the FSA (Article 5) and National Civil Service Law permit sharing of confidential information among domestic regulators and staff when public interest outweighs confidentiality; equivalent confidentiality obligations required in requesting authority; FSA not required to seek external approval to release information domestically.
- International cooperation:
  - Article 189 of the FIEA provides legal foundation for FSA to share confidential information with overseas regulators; PM may order persons to submit reports/materials to respond to foreign requests when appropriate; PM may refuse if foreign authority does not assure reciprocal responses or risks to Japan’s capital markets/national interests.
  - In practice cooperation exercised directly by the FSA; FSA is a full signatory to the IOSCO MMoU (signed in 2008).
  - FSA attaches pro forma conditions to all releases to foreign regulators; requests generally answered within two weeks.
  - Over the last three years approximately 200 requests dealt with by FSA staff (about 20 percent via the MMoU).
- Assessment: Fully Implemented.

### Issuers and disclosure (Principles 16–18) — key findings
- Public offering threshold: public offering/public selling requires securities registration statement with FSA when total amount is ¥100 million (approximately US$1.275 million) or over (FIEA Article 4(1)).
- Registration statements and prospectuses must contain comprehensive issuer, group and securities information; FSA can request amendments and suspend effect of notification where false or lacking material information.
- Periodic reporting:
  - Annual securities report filed within three months from fiscal year end (FIEA Article 24); includes audited annual financial statements and MD&A and other material information.
  - Semiannual securities report: within three months after six months period for issuers not filing quarterly reports.
  - Quarterly securities report: within 45 days after three-month period for listed issuers.
  - Internal control report and confirmation letter required for listed issuers (FIEA Articles 24-4-2 and 24-4-4).
- Availability: reports available via EDINET; retention periods: five years for registration documents, annual reports and internal control reports; three years for quarterly and semiannual reports.
- Material events: extraordinary securities report required without delay in specified events; exchanges require timely disclosure via TDnet.
- Enforcement: civil, administrative and criminal liability for false statements; criminal penalty up to ten years imprisonment and fine up to ten million yen for individuals; fine up to ¥700 million for juridical persons (FIEA Article 197 (1) (i) and Article 207 (1) (i)).
- Review practices: FSA delegates review of registration statements and annual reports to local finance bureaus; desk reviews and sampling applied.
- Derogations: issuer may request non-disclosure on business secret grounds (FIEA Article 25 (4)); approvals rare.
- Assessment: Broadly Implemented.
- Recommendation: assessors encourage review of definition of CIS as it relates to public offering regime (Principle 24). Note Tokyo AIM market has less stringent disclosure; currently limited access to retail investors.

### Auditors, CRA, analysts and information providers (Principles 19–23) — highlights
- Auditors (Principle 19–21):
  - Audit oversight involves FSA (registration/discipline), JICPA (quality control reviews) and CPAAOB (oversight of JICPA and inspections).
  - JICPA performed 99 quality control reviews in fiscal year 2010; 81 reports submitted to CPAAOB; 79 of 81 included recommendations to remedy deficiencies; unqualified conclusions: 77 cases; qualified conclusions: 4 cases.
  - Enforcement powers include reprimand, orders for business improvement, suspension, cancellation of registration, administrative monetary penalties (since 2008), criminal charges for falsifying audit reports.
  - CPAAOB has been active and independent; FSA responses to CPAAOB recommendations: administrative actions in all cases where CPAAOB made recommendations (15 cases).
  - Assessment: Fully Implemented for oversight; auditors’ independence: Broadly Implemented (some governance and selection independence concerns for public issuers).
- Credit Rating Agencies (Principle 22):
  - CRA registration under FIEA introduced April 1, 2010; recognition as ECAI for regulatory use under Banking Act/Notification; designated ECAIs include Moody’s, S&P, Fitch, JCR and R&I (registered under FIEA).
  - Regulatory requirements: quality control systems, independence, conflict of interest management, disclosure of rating policies; annual business report required to FSA (FIEA Article 66-38).
  - On-site inspections: April–November 2011 — four of six registered CRAs inspected by SESC; inspections identified issues for correction.
  - Assessment: Fully Implemented.
- Sell-side analysts and other information providers (Principle 23):
  - FIBOs producing analytical services must be registered and follow conflict of interest management; JSDA rules require internal administrative systems, review processes, disclosure of conflicts, prohibition on analysts holding securities covered, prohibition on analysts participating in investment banking sales pitches, retention of research reports for three years, and prohibition on sharing research with companies pre-publication.
  - Assessment: Fully Implemented.
  - Recommendation: assessors encourage review of regulation for experts providing valuations to CIS and for independent valuations in tender offers.

### Collective Investment Schemes and funds (Principles 24–28)
- Definition and regulatory scope (Principle 24):
  - CIS treatment depends on legal form and asset composition; managers of IC or IT under ITIC must be registered regardless of assets; partnership-type funds investing less than 50 percent in securities may not be registered under FIEA; distributors remain subject to FIEA registration.
  - Real estate CIS: IC (subject to ITIC and FIEA disclosure if public offering); partnership form may not be regulated by ITIC; distributors have disclosure obligations.
- Eligibility, governance and oversight:
  - IMBO registration requirements include minimum capital of ¥50 million; sufficient resources; adequate internal controls and risk management; establishment of compliance unit independent of asset management; fit and proper officers.
  - IMBOs required to submit annual business reports and semiannual investment reports to FSA and investors (investment reports in practice semiannual).
  - SESC inspects larger IMBOs roughly every three years; medium-size on five year cycle; inspections can last four to six weeks for large IMBOs.
  - Enforcement on IMBOs 2008–2010: 9 orders for improvement and three suspensions.
- Asset custody and segregation (Principle 25):
  - ITIC and FIEA prohibit IMBO receiving CIS assets; custody must be entrusted to trust banks (IT) or asset custody companies (IC); segregation required.
  - No legal requirement that custodian be unaffiliated with IMBO; practice: custody often with trust bank from same financial group due to limited number of trust banks.
  - Assessors note need for additional safeguards where custodian is related (e.g., specific reporting to FSA/investors on intra-group transactions).
- Valuation, NAV, pricing and suspensions (Principle 27):
  - Japanese GAAPs required for valuing assets of IT and IC; ITAJ Rules require market pricing for liquid assets; independent valuation required for illiquid assets at acquisition and transfer.
  - NAV and base price per unit must be calculated daily (ITAJ Rules Articles 51(2),(3) and 52).
  - Pricing errors due to negligence borne by IMBO (ITIC Article 21).
  - Suspension of redemptions: ITAJ must be notified; FSA might use order for improvement to lift suspensions.
- Hedge funds (Principle 28):
  - Hedge fund managers fall under FIEA registration as IMBOs; same registration and supervisory requirements as other IMBOs.
  - Reporting to FSA on funds not as extensive for non-public offering funds; FSA conducts annual fund monitoring survey.
  - Assessment: Fully Implemented given small size of industry; FSA should impose specific reporting if industry grows.
- Assessments for CIS: Broadly Implemented for several areas; Fully Implemented for valuation and disclosure mechanics where applicable.
- Key recommendations:
  - Strengthen inspection program and risk framework for IMBOs and CIS managers (aligns with Principle 12).
  - Introduce additional safeguards where custodians are related entities (reports and disclosures on intra-group transactions).

### Market intermediaries, prudential requirements and internal controls (Principles 29–32)
- Registration and entry standards (Principle 29):
  - FIBOs must register with FSA; 18 categories of financial instruments business; four main FIBO categories: Type I, Type II, IMBO, Investment Advisory/Agency.
  - Minimum capital requirements (as of November 2011): Type I — ¥50 million; Type II — ¥10 million (deposits for operation); IMBO — ¥50 million; Investment Advisory/Agency — ¥5 million (deposits).
  - Registration processed at Local Finance Bureau; interviews and desk review; few applications rejected (common practice of withdrawal).
  - No standard policy to inspect a FIBO within a set period after commencement; first inspection for small FIBOs may occur only if issues arise.
  - Accreditation of sales representatives by JSDA; requalification every five years; JSDA keeps registry.
  - Assessment: Broadly Implemented.
  - Recommendation: strengthen registration process; review fit and proper definitions; consider pre-approval for key personnel or major shareholders changes.
- Capital, reporting and prudential framework (Principle 30):
  - Type I: capital adequacy ratio applies; numerator deducts illiquid assets; denominator includes credit, market (Basel II standard) and operational risk (operating cost × 25 percent). Type I required to prepare quarterly financial reports and monthly risk management report by the 20th of following month.
  - Thresholds and early warning: Type I should be aware daily; if capital adequacy falls below 140% mandatory reporting; below 120% FSA orders submission of corrective plans.
  - Consolidated regulation April 2011: Type I FIBO with total assets > one trillion JPY designated Special FIBO; required consolidated capital adequacy.
  - All other FIBOs: ongoing requirement is maintenance of minimum capital; annual business report is required.
  - No universal requirement for external audit of FIBO financial statements; most Type I and IMBOs are audited in practice; Type I required to submit annual external audit of segregation of clients’ assets.
  - Assessment: Partly Implemented.
  - Key assessor recommendations:
    - Consider adding an operational charge for IMBOs.
    - Reassess Type II definition/permitted activities or implement more comprehensive capital framework.
    - Expand external auditing requirement to at least all firms that can hold clients’ assets.
- Internal organization, compliance and client asset protection (Principle 31):
  - Supervisory Guidelines expect boards to establish internal controls, independent internal audit and compliance functions, and conflict of interest managers independent from sales lines.
  - Clients’ assets must be segregated; Type I FIBOs required to have annual audit on clients’ assets by a CPA/audit firm.
  - Strong Know Your Customer obligations (FIEA Article 40(i)); JSDA account opening procedures require face-to-face meeting and AML/suitability checks.
  - Complaints handling required; FIMAC as financial ADR.
  - Assessment: Partly Implemented.
  - Primary concern: limited inspection coverage for smaller Type I, IMBOs, Type II and Investment Advisors; internal control functions less developed in smaller firms; recommend exploring mechanisms to strengthen internal control/compliance in smaller firms.
- Failure procedures and systemic preparedness (Principle 32):
  - Type I early warning/early correction system described above (140% and 120% triggers).
  - For other FIBOs, notification when capital or deposits fall below minimum.
  - FSA has not developed a formal, maintained internal plan for intermediary failure; retains documents from past bankruptcies as precedents; exchanges information with BOJ; supervisory college for one large regulated entity includes crisis management group.
  - Powers available: request reports, orders for improvement, suspend or cancel registration, request bankruptcy proceedings or appointment of administrator.
  - Assessment: Partly Implemented.
  - Recommendation: consider developing an up-to-date internal contingency plan, routinely reviewed and coordinated with BOJ and other authorities.

*Source: _cr12230 - conclusion of the inspection.*

### Chapter 11 process).

### _cr12230 - Chapter 11 process)

### Rehabilitation, provisional administration and central bank support
- The FSA can file for rehabilitation procedures and select a provisional administrator by filing for administrative order under the Act; filing for administration orders needs to be made at the beginning of the rehabilitation procedures and therefore the FSA cannot file for administration orders without a basis of bankruptcy procedure initiation.
- A provisional administrator has the authority to manage and dispose of obligors’ assets after selection until the decision of initiation of the bankruptcy procedure; permission of a court is needed when a provisional administrator makes a decision not within the scope of ordinary business of the affected firm.
- Pursuant to Article 38 of the BOJ Act, on request of the PM and the MoF the BoJ could provide financial assistance to a securities firms for purposes of ensuring financial stability; this power has been used in the past by the BOJ in connection with the failure of Yamaichi.

### Investor protection (FIEA provisions and investor protection fund)
- Client assets must be managed separately by a FIBO from its own property (FIEA Article 43-2).
- Type I FIBOs require an annual external audit to check compliance with segregation obligations (as stated in Principle 31).
- On insolvency of a FIBO, the FSA can issue administrative orders to protect customers’ assets (e.g., orders to return segregated assets promptly or transfer customers’ assets to other FIBO) (Article 51-2 of the FIEA).
- Type I FIBOs are required to join an investor protection fund under which clients may be refunded certain assets if they do not receive the total amount of their claims against the intermediary (FIEA Article 79-20).
- The maximum reimbursement amount by the fund in the event of bankruptcy of a firm is not more than ¥10 million per investor.
- The fund does not compensate for loss to customers owing to decline of the securities holding prices.
- The Fund was established in 2006 and is funded by a compulsory contribution from its members.

### Practice, preparedness and recommendations
- The FSA issued orders in respect to Lehman Brothers Japan Inc. to require the company to maintain assets in Japan.
- Assessment status: Broadly Implemented.
- Findings and recommendations:
  - The FSA has not developed a specific plan nor conducted scenario analysis jointly with the BOJ for failure of large complex firms, despite documentation of past large failures (Yamaichi, Sanyo, Lehman) and substantial written “corporate memory”.
  - Discussions with the BOJ are ongoing; assessors recommend that the FSA continue to work jointly with the BoJ in establishing plans to address the failure of large complex securities firms.
  - Assessors encourage authorities to explore the development of a resolution regime for large complex firms, while acknowledging that best practices in this area are still evolving internationally.

### Principle 33 — Establishment and authorization of trading systems (Exchanges and PTS)
- Types of regulated markets in Japan:
  - A Financial Instruments Exchange (FIE)
  - A Proprietary Trading System (PTS)
- Licensing and authorization for Exchanges:
  - License required under Article 80 of the FIEA; license must be granted by the MoFS on behalf of the PM, with application review done at the FSA.
  - Capital must not be less than ¥1 billion (FIEA Article 83-2 and Cabinet Order for Enforcement of FIEA Article 19).
  - CCPs must be registered entities (FIEA Article 156) and have capital of at least one billion JPY as per Cabinet Ordinance.
  - Applicants must be “fit and proper” (no fines of applicant/officers/major shareholders in last five years, no license rescission) (FIEA Article82).
  - Requirements: adequate articles of incorporation, operational and brokerage contract rules sufficient for “fair and smooth” sales and purchases, appropriate personnel structure, detailed regulations relating to guarantee funds or clearing margins (FIEA Article 117).
  - Primary shareholder limitation: 20 percent maximum holding; local government can hold between 20–50 percent; an authorized Financial Instruments Firms Association, an exchange or an exchange holding company is permitted to hold over 50 percent (FIEA Article 106-10).
- Licensing process and IT assessment:
  - Financial Markets Division of FSA verifies documents, trading system checked by staff for conformity with operational rules; independent IT systems evaluation of trading system is not required for exchanges.
  - In practice on-site visits are not conducted until periodic post-licensing inspection.
- PTS authorization:
  - A PTS can only be established by a FIBO (Type 1, FIEA Article 30); authorization requires verification similar to exchanges.
  - Authorization criteria include methods to manage risk of loss and “decide” business; capital must exceed ¥300 million (substantially higher than the base requirement for a Type I FIBO of ¥50 million).
  - A PTS is required to be examined and reported on concerning its IT infrastructure by an independent expert without any conflict of interest (FIEA Article 30-3 and Cabinet Office Ordinance Article 18(4)).
  - FSA validates systems and operational rules; relies on independent third party IT report; no on-site visit during validation.
- Ongoing compliance and reporting:
  - Licensing criteria continue post-authorization; FSA does not require exchanges or PTS to submit an annual assessment report or formally assess compliance annually.
  - Exchanges must report condition of system management and maintenance monthly and notify outages immediately; Article 151 gives FSA authority to order reports or inspections (used during TSE future market migration).
  - PTS must report operational incidents to JSDA and FSA; operators subject to inspections by JSDA and SESC.
  - Authorization required for amendments to articles/operational rules of an exchange (FIEA Article 149); listing changes and suspension/lifting of trading suspensions require notification (FIEA Articles 121 and 128).
  - A PTS must notify and obtain registration from the FSA of any change (FIEA Article 31).
- Fairness of access:
  - Exchanges prohibited from unjust discriminatory treatment to a member (FIEA Article 87-9); operational rules must contain detailed trading participant regulations (FIEA Article 117).
  - Exchanges meet five times a year to exchange information; TSE concentrates roughly 90 percent of cash market trading volumes.
  - For PTS, fair market access verified in authorization and amendment reviews.
- Record keeping and market data:
  - Exchanges must keep trading records to permit reconstruction of past trading activity; FSA has access.
  - PTS must prepare and preserve “books and documents” including trading records (FIEA Article 46-2 and 3).
  - Exchange trade data and quote information available to members in real time and to the market via distribution services such as FLEX and API.
  - PTS trading information (pre and post trade) disclosed via JSDA publicly via its web site.
- Assessment status: Fully Implemented.
- Comment: Lack of detailed IT systems assessment for exchanges not seen as major concern given consolidation and prior technical reliance on FSA; TSE migration to arrowhead in 2010 improved reliability.

### Principle 34 — Ongoing regulatory supervision and market surveillance
- Market surveillance responsibilities:
  - Exchanges and TSE SRO responsible for real-time surveillance to ensure orderly trading and support SESC detection of unfair trading via t+1 surveillance; automated mechanisms with embedded alerts are used.
  - The TSE employs 50 people to monitor unfair trading practices, manipulation and insider trading; OSE employs 25 people.
  - Example investigation volumes: TSE concluded 149 investigation reports in 2010 and 220 in 2009 in connection with suspicions of unfair trading practices.
  - Exchanges have a formal agreement to cooperate and share information; they meet five times a year.
  - TSE concentrates roughly 90 percent of cash market trading volumes; closer cooperation exists between TSE and OSE for cross-market monitoring.
- SESC surveillance tools and data inputs:
  - SESC and local finance bureaus conduct t+1 surveillance to detect unfair trading practices.
  - Information sources include real-time vendor feeds, SCAN-IPS web “crawler”, a “reception desk” receiving on average 7000 items of information annually, and “Compliance WAN” (began operation on January 26, 2009) for electronic transfer of transaction data among securities firms, exchanges, JSDA, SESC and Local Finance Bureaus.
  - SESC uses SCAN system to consolidate and analyze data from exchanges, JSDA and FIBOs (including PTS) via Compliance WAN.
  - Investigation counts: SESC and local finance bureaus conducted 691 early-stage investigations in 2010 and 749 in 2009 related to unfair trading practices.
- Off-site and on-site supervision:
  - Off-site: regular monthly meetings between SESC and larger exchanges (TSE and OSE); monthly reporting by exchanges on activities including financial, prudential and settlement figures; annual report including audited financial statements (audit required only for TSE, Osaka, and Nagoya exchanges).
  - Trading outages: exchanges must immediately report outages to FSA; after a glitch on February 14, 2011 the FSA required a full report from TSE and actions remain on-going.
  - On-site: SESC conducts on-site inspections of exchanges; inspections are not on a fixed cycle (latest inspections were conducted seven months after the previous inspection for TSE and 16 months later for OSE). Inspection reports are completed but not made public unless in public interest.
  - For PTS, no separate inspection cycle for FIBO managing a PTS; PTS operation is a factor in inspection decisions.
- FSA powers:
  - FSA can order improvement of business operations; for Exchanges it may rescind license (via PM), suspend business, order dismissal of directors, or require changes to articles/operational rules or trading practices (FIEA Articles 150, 151, 152 and 153). Similar powers apply to PTS.
- Assessment status: Fully Implemented.

### Principle 35 — Transparency of trading (pre- and post-trade)
- Exchanges:
  - Public disclosure requirements for bids and offers derive from Cabinet Office Ordinance (Table 1–Article 74 and 75); post-trade transparency explicitly required by FIEA Article 130 and reporting to FSA under Article 131.
  - Post-trade disclosure must include total daily volume, highest price, lowest price, closing price for each listed security; Cabinet Office Ordinance requires immediate disclosure to members and the public after a trade.
  - TSE publicizes pre-trade quotation information and execution prices via its market information dissemination systems.
- PTS:
  - Bids, offers and completed transactions in listed securities must be disclosed to members and the public (FIEA Article 67-19 and Cabinet Office Ordinance); such information must also be provided to the FSA (FIEA Article 67-20).
  - PTS information consolidated by JSDA and disclosed via JSDA website.
- OTC markets:
  - JSDA publishes OTC bond and structured products trading information (day-to-day average price, highest and lowest price of selected bond issues) per Regulations Concerning Publication of OTC Reference Prices, Article 3.
  - JSDA and Japan Securities Depositary Centre are considering publication of transaction prices for all bonds.
  - Consideration being given to reporting all OTC derivatives transactions by November 2012; discussions on timing, items and related details are ongoing.
- FSA access and dark orders:
  - FSA has full access to pre- and post-trade information via exchange terminals and information vendors; JSDA provides PTS information; exchanges provide daily trading activity reports.
  - No specific regulations concerning dark orders; market participants noted dark order “venues” but often meant internalization by broker-dealers which require reporting.
  - No derogation from real-time transparency permitted for exchanges and PTS; internalization and block trades are permitted but must be reported.
- Assessment status: Fully Implemented.
- Comment: Some ambiguity around regulatory treatment of dark pools, but low activity reduces concern.

### Principle 36 — Detecting and deterring manipulation and unfair trading practices
- Legal framework and penalties:
  - FIEA imposes administrative and criminal penalties for unfair practices; administrative money penalties use formula approaches; additional surcharge payment orders possible for repeat offenders.
  - Criminal penalties include:
    - Market and price manipulation: Article 197 — imprisonment not more than 10 years or fine of not more than ¥10 million or both (maximum fine of ¥30 million if act done for property benefit).
    - Spread rumors and make false quotations: Article 197 — imprisonment not more than 10 years or fine of not more than ¥10 million or both (maximum fine of ¥30 million if act done for property benefit).
    - Insider dealing: Article 197-2 — imprisonment not more than five years or fine of not more than ¥5 million or both.
    - Wrongful acts and using fraudulent means: Article 197 — imprisonment not more than 10 years or fine of not more than ¥10 million or both (maximum fine of ¥30 million if act done for property benefit).
  - Administrative penalty formulas reference profit/loss and price differentials over specified post-violation windows (e.g., one month, two weeks, six months) as set out in the FIEA articles cited.
- Detection mechanisms and enforcement volumes:
  - Market surveillance by SESC, exchanges; on-site inspections by SESC, JSDA and exchanges.
  - Administrative penalties (MP) and criminal referrals (CR) by category and year:
    - Market Manipulation: 08/09 MP 1 CR 0; 09/10 MP 5 CR 2; 10/11 MP 5 CR 0.
    - Insider Trading: 08/09 MP 17 CR 6; 09/10 MP 34 CR 7; 10/11 MP 23 CR 2.
    - False statements: 08/09 MP 13 CR 4; 09/10 MP 9 CR 1; 10/11 MP 22 CR 0.
    - Rumors: 08/09 MP 0 CR 2; 09/10 MP 0 CR 3; 10/11 MP 0 CR 0.
  - Exchanges also impose sanctions (cautionary warnings, advisories, fines); in 2010 the TSE imposed four such measures (two related to market manipulation).
  - If misconduct occurs on a PTS, JSDA may take action against the operator.
- Cross-market supervision:
  - Exchanges have formal cooperation arrangements; TSE and OSE cooperate intensively for cash and derivatives monitoring.
  - FSA and SESC exchange information with foreign regulators pursuant to the IOSCO MMoU.
  - Commodity futures regulators (not FSA) require large trader positions and can access trader financial and market positions.
- Assessment status: Fully Implemented.
- Comment: SESC IT system does not automatically consolidate trading information from all exchanges and PTS; authorities encouraged to explore IT upgrades for cross-market surveillance. The announced merger between TSE and OSE should further enhance cross-market surveillance.

### Principle 37 — Management of large exposures, default risk and market disruption
- Monitoring by FSA/OSBM and SESC:
  - FSA established the OSBM in 2010 to conduct in-depth monitoring and analysis of large complex securities firms via specialists; performs off-site supervision and on-site inspections and checks large counterparty exposures and stress tests (emphasis on market and liquidity risks).
  - SESC has power to require reports and conduct inspections.
- CCPs, JSCC and clearing arrangements:
  - JSCC established in 2003 to consolidate clearing of securities transactions; clears for three PTS as well as futures and options transacted on TSE (and OTC derivatives).
  - FIEA Article 156 requires a CCP to be licensed as a Financial Instruments Obligation Assumption Service, have appropriate business rules (including clearing deposit), establish collateral management and monitor large exposures of clearing members; amendments to business rules require FSA authorization (FIEA Article 156-12).
  - OSE and JSCC criteria for clearing participants include minimum capital requirements, a capital ratio and a consolidated capital to risk ratio; clearing members must contribute to a settlement fund based on trading volumes.
  - Both OSE and JSCC monitor unsettled positions daily; soft position limits operate via collateral and margin arrangements; maximum loss calculations regularly undertaken.
- Powers in response to high risk or default:
  - CCPs can request reports when estimated position risk exceeds certain ratios, require increased collateral, instruct participants to reduce exposure or provide more margin/collateral; if non-compliant new trades will not be permitted (existing trades settled normally).
  - FSA is informed twice daily by OSE/JSCC of larger member positions with commentary.
  - Detailed default procedures required in CCP business rules (FIEA Article 156) covering liquidation and calculation of open positions.
  - On default, OSE/JSCC would suspend delivery of settlement funds and securities to defaulter, sell securities where delivery suspended, and use settlement fund per loss sharing rules; both CCPs have liquidity facilities with settling banks.
- Reporting granularity and segregation:
  - Currently CCPs receive clearing member information on a net basis; FSA can request more granular information based on general powers.
  - FIEA requires segregation of clients’ property from FIBOs (Article 43); margins for derivative transactions must be separated from other property of an exchange or CCP.
  - CCP business rules stipulate transfer of positions and margins belonging to customers of defaulting members to other non-defaulting members in a clearing members’ bankruptcy.
- Market disruption measures:
  - FSA has power to halt the market at an exchange in appropriate circumstances (FIEA Article 152) though in practice relies on dialogue with exchanges.
  - TSE sets daily price limits in absolute yen values to prevent wild day-to-day swings and provide “time-outs”; bids and offers may not be placed beyond set limits.
  - OSE has price limits for equity market; derivatives markets have published predetermined trigger points (based on previous day’s closing price) which result in a 15 minute halt and temporary restrictions on index arbitrage trading for proprietary trading on participant’s own account.
- Short selling:
  - Naked short selling is prohibited; covered short selling is allowed but prohibited at the last market price or a lower price when share price is falling.
  - Covered short sales are subject to flagging and verification (Order for Enforcement of FIEA Article 26-3); market making and hedge transactions are exempted (Order for Enforcement of FIEA Article 26-2-2).
  - Securities firms and stock exchanges must report and disclose if a short selling position by a person exceeds 0.25 percent of the outstanding stock (FIEA Article 26-5).
  - For covered short sales, securities firms must know the supplier of the stock traded; FSA monitors short selling via settlement reviews and number of settlement fails.
- Assessment status: Fully Implemented.

### Principle 38 — Clearing and settlement systems (note)
- Description: --
- Assessment: Not assessed
- Comments: --

*Source: _cr12230 - Chapter 11 process).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/_cr12230.pdf_
