## _cr12241 — IMF FSAP summary (2012)

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---

### Main findings on the banking sector
- The banking sector may face large recapitalization needs to cover past losses or if the economic situation worsens.
- Balance sheets of state-owned banks need restructuring and governance improvement to ensure commercial operation.
- Bank supervision needs strengthening after several years of neglect: introduce and enforce stricter regulatory and reporting requirements, including loan classification, assets and collateral valuation and provisioning, and compliance with international best practices.
- Financial soundness indicators suffer from deficiencies; banking sector data should be improved urgently.
- The CBT should develop an exit strategy to unwind its large liquidity support to banks.
- Implement a comprehensive capital market reform over time to support long-term investment.
- Authorities’ commitment to financial sector reform improved the assessment; the CBT established a working group to monitor FSAP recommendation implementation.
- The IMF is preparing a multi-year technical assistance (TA) program aimed at strengthening banking supervision.

### Executive summary — vulnerabilities, diagnostics, and near-term priorities
- Loan quality, solvency, and profitability have deteriorated; underwriting weaknesses led to inappropriate lending to well-connected borrowers.
- Weak supervisory reporting and data provision mean vulnerabilities could be much higher than reported.
- Urged creation of a uniform database and standardized template for frequent bank-by-bank performance monitoring.
- Estimated additional capital need to cover existing weaknesses and potential future losses: exceeding 5 percent of GDP.
- Encourage increase of minimum capital adequacy ratio (CAR) from 8 percent to 10 percent by 2014; impose higher solvency requirements on higher-risk banks.
- CBT initiated a medium-term plan to build effective banking supervision in February 2012 (new organization, staff reassignment/recruitment, new corporate governance regime).
- Full on-site inspections have not been held since 2006 and should be conducted urgently starting with all major banks.
- Require banks to apply international best practices for loss reporting, collateral valuation and classification, and provisioning of NPLs.
- Strengthen CBT enforcement regime, establish conflict-of-interest policies for staff, and increase transparency and accountability.
- Major state-owned banks should undergo in-depth audits by international firms and viability assessments if significant recapitalization needs are identified.
- Develop crisis-management arrangements, including a special bank resolution regime and preparation for an eventual deposit insurance scheme.
- CBT should develop an exit strategy to unwind its large liquidity support; 2011 liquidity injections supported credit growth but increased central bank credit exposure and led to a significant decline of foreign reserves.
- Capital market reform needed; CMA oversight must be strengthened, a reliable yield curve developed, and confiscated assets could be sold to jumpstart markets.
- Banking sector reform should improve access to finance for individuals and SMEs; implement the 2011 microfinance law and integrate microfinance institutions into national payment infrastructure.
- CBT established a working group comprising key financial sector stakeholders to monitor implementation of the 2012 FSAP recommendations.
- IMF preparing a multi-year TA program mainly to strengthen banking supervision.

### Key recommendations (high priority and timelines drawn from Table 1)
- Bank supervision (High priority, Short term)
  - Ensure appropriate independence of the supervisor, including regarding appointment and dismissal of senior officials (para 30).
  - Significantly increase resources, including hiring staff with banking and market experience (para 26).
  - Conduct in-depth on-site inspections starting with the largest banks (para 28).
  - Apply international standards for loan classification, provisioning, and valuation of collateral (paras 12–14).
  - Enhance collection and processing of bank data; create a uniform database and standardized template (para 12).
- Capital requirements (High priority, Medium term)
  - Increase minimum CAR to 10 percent by 2014 and to 12 percent by 2016; increase Tier 1 ratio to 7 percent by 2016 (para 29).
- Bank restructuring (High priority, Short term / Medium term)
  - Conduct in-depth independent assessment of balance sheets of the three large state-owned banks; develop strategy to ensure commercial orientation (paras 48–49).
  - Develop strategy to limit state ownership of banks to cases of clear public policy need (para 49).
  - Ensure same rules and governance requirements apply to state-owned and private banks (paras 30 and 48).
- Crisis management and resolution (High priority, Short term / Medium term)
  - Develop a crisis-management framework and a special bank resolution regime (paras 38–39).
  - Revise lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) framework to give explicit power to CBT to advance funds, secured by adequate collateral, to solvent but illiquid banks (para 43).
- Systemic liquidity (Medium priority)
  - Introduce a haircut on all collateral used for refinancing operations (para 35).
  - Consider asking banks to pledge only treasury bonds as collateral for regular central bank liquidity provision (para 35).
  - CBT should increase gradually the cost of banks’ refinancing from the central bank to unwind liquidity support (para 35).
- Nonbank financial institutions and capital markets (Medium priority)
  - Reform sovereign bond market to create benchmark for pricing fixed-income products (para 55).
  - Consider offering some confiscated assets and state-owned enterprises to the public (para 55).
  - Step up CMA supervision (para 56).

Notes on priority/timeframe: Short-term: < 12 months; Medium-term: 12 to 24 months.

### Background and macroeconomic context (selected exact figures)
- Real GDP contracted by 1.8 percent in 2011.
- Tourism receipts dropped by 30 percent and FDI fell by about 25 percent.
- Unemployment rate rose to 19 percent; youth unemployment reached 42 percent.
- Credit-to-GDP ratio increased from 60 percent in 2007 to almost 70 percent in 2011.
- CBT’s exposure to the banking system increased to about 25 percent of its assets by end-2011, up from 2.5 percent at end-2010.
- In 2011, average headline inflation remained moderate at 3.5 percent; non-administered prices increased by about 6 percent; headline inflation reached 5.7 percent in April 2012.
- Real growth projected to reach about 2 percent in 2012, below the 4 percent to 5 percent average during the 2000s.

### Implementation of the 2006 FSAP — overview and assessment
- Core 2006 recommendations (state-owned bank reform, NPL overhang, staffing rationalization) were not implemented.
- Selected assessment items (from Table 4):
  - 70 percent provisioning target for all NPLs (MT): The 70 percent target was not met.
  - Reduce NPL ratio to no more than 10 percent by 2009 (MT): NPLs stood at 13 percent in 2010.
  - Restructuring of tourism loans (ST): A few loans restructured; structural issues continued to increase problem loans in tourism.
  - Partial write-offs tax deductibility (ST): Not implemented.
  - Extrajudicial procedures for debt restructuring (ST): Regime unchanged; courts slow; pre-bankruptcy rescue rarely used.
  - Strengthen management of public commercial banks (ST): Little progress; governance needs examination and strengthening.
  - Program contracts with public bank management (ST): Not implemented.
  - Stand ready to recapitalize public banks if operating income insufficient (MT): No measures in place; provisioning inadequate and based on optimistic collateral assessments.
  - Prohibit dividend distribution for banks with inadequate NPL provisioning (ST): Not implemented.
  - Privatization and mergers of former development banks (ST): Initiatives taken but noticeable progress required.
  - Promote private credit bureaus (ST): No credit bureau established.
  - Enforce new rules on internal controls (ST): Circular issued but CBT has not adequately enforced it.
  - Assess internal audit quality and perform on-site inspections (MT): CBT has not assessed internal audit quality; no on-site inspections since 2006.
  - Prudential ratios on a consolidated basis (ST): Supervision still performed on a solo basis only.
  - Information-sharing agreements with other supervisors (ST): Cooperation weak.
  - Tighten regulations on equity investments and enforcement (ST): Not implemented; enforcement minimal.
  - Revisit disciplinary sanction regimes (ST): Not implemented.
  - Disclose monetary framework more clearly (ST): Noticeable efforts made to explain monetary policy decisions.
  - Deepen interbank markets (ST): Interest rate corridor introduced; interbank market did not deepen due to inconsistencies.
  - Publicize bond yield curve (ST): Monetary policy transparency improved slightly but not enough to establish a yield curve.
  - Repeal foreign exchange surrender requirement (ST): Not repealed.
  - Relax forward foreign exchange cover restrictions (ST): Not revised.
  - Promote expert workout specialists and speed judicial reorganizations (ST): Not implemented.
  - Review preferred creditor status of tax/social security claims (ST): Not implemented.
  - Speed up real estate titles and mortgage registration (ST): Progress under way; 2010 law enabled electronic exchanges but courts lack operational resources.

### Selected macroeconomic and financial indicators (2008–2017) — key items
- Production and income (percent change) — Nominal GDP: 10.9 6.3 7.8 2.2 8.6 8.2 7.7 8.5 8.6 9.4
- Real GDP: 4.5 3.1 3.0 -1.8 2.7 3.5 4.1 5.3 5.5 6.0
- GDP deflator: 6.1 3.1 4.7 4.1 5.8 4.6 3.5 3.0 2.9 3.2
- CPI, average: 4.9 3.5 4.4 3.5 5.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
- Gross national savings (percent of GDP): 22.1 21.9 21.6 16.8 18.1 18.9 20.1 21.0 21.9 22.8
- Gross investment (percent of GDP): 25.9 24.8 26.4 24.1 25.1 25.9 26.2 26.5 26.7 27.0
- External sector (percent change) — Exports of goods, f.o.b. (in $): 26.6 -24.8 14.0 8.5 0.9 5.3 7.5 9.3 9.8 10.6
- Imports of goods, f.o.b. (in $): 28.7 -21.9 15.9 7.7 2.2 5.6 5.2 6.7 7.3 8.3
- Trade balance (percent of GDP): -8.9 -8.5 -10.3 -10.4 -11.1 -11.4 -10.7 -9.8 -9.0 -8.2
- Current account, excluding grants (percent of GDP): -3.8 -2.8 -4.8 -7.3 -7.0 -6.9 -6.2 -5.5 -4.8 -4.2
- Foreign direct investment (percent of GDP): 5.7 3.3 3.0 0.9 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.7 4.2 4.6
- Central government (percent of GDP) — Total revenue: 23.8 22.8 22.8 24.5 23.8 23.0 23.1 23.2 23.5 23.7
- Total expenditure and net lending: 24.8 25.8 23.9 28.2 30.8 28.1 27.2 26.5 26.1 25.7
- Central government balance, excluding grants: -1.0 -3.0 -1.1 -3.7 -7.0 -5.1 -4.0 -3.4 -2.6 -2.0
- Total government debt: 43.3 42.8 40.4 44.4 45.7 50.5 50.7 49.9 48.7 46.4
- Foreign currency public debt (percent of total debt): 60.8 58.5 60.7 58.0 61.4 58.5 59.5 59.7 60.3 61.5
- Official reserves — Gross official reserves (US$ billions, e.o.p): 9.0 10.6 9.5 7.5 8.2 8.7 9.4 10.4 11.7 13.5
- In months of imports of goods and services, c.i.f.: 4.4 6.6 5.1 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.8
- Memorandum items — GDP at current prices (TD millions): 55,296 58,768 63,380 64,802 70,402 76,182 82,053 89,027 96,684 105,787
- GDP at current prices (US$ billions): 44.9 43.5 44.3 46.0 46.1 48.0 49.9 52.4 55.1 58.5
- GDP per capita (US$): 4,346 4,171 4,199 4,320 4,284 4,409 4,542 4,715 4,909 5,156
- Population (millions): 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.7 10.8 10.9 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3

### Risk Assessment Matrix — main threats and assessed impacts
- Worsening of the recession in Europe
  - Likelihood (next three years): Staff assessment: High
  - Expected impact on financial stability: Staff assessment: High
- Unidentified weaknesses in the banking sector
  - Likelihood: Staff assessment: High
  - Expected impact: Staff assessment: High
- Continued loss of external reserves
  - Likelihood: Staff assessment: Medium
  - Expected impact: Staff assessment: High
- Political instability and heightened social tensions
  - Likelihood: Staff assessment: Medium
  - Expected impact: Staff assessment: High
- Prolonged weakness in tourism sector
  - Likelihood: Staff assessment: High
  - Expected impact: Staff assessment: Medium

### Financial stability analysis and system structure (selected findings)
- Financial sector assets equal to about 115 percent of GDP in 2011.
- As of April 2012: 21 onshore banks — three large state-owned banks with 37 percent of banking sector assets; three large private domestic banks with 28 percent of total assets; six foreign-owned private banks with a 28 percent share.
- Five small development banks with universal banking licenses.
- Nonbank financial sector accounted for about 20 percent of all financial system assets in 2011.
- Insurance: 19 companies, primarily nonlife (85 percent of premiums); annual premiums to GDP of about 2 percent.
- Market capitalization equal to 24 percent of GDP.
- Leasing sector (nine institutions) accounted for 15½ percent of private gross fixed capital formation in 2010.

### Banking system vulnerabilities and data concerns — reported indicators (end-2011)
- Official level of NPLs: 13 percent (down from over 19 percent in 2006).
- Regulatory capital: 11.5 percent of risk-weighted assets.
- Average return on equity (ROE): 7.9 percent.
- Reasons to expect worse vulnerabilities than reported:
  - Mid-2011 CBT circular allowing rescheduling: reclassifying rescheduled loans as nonperforming would add about 5 percent to overall NPL ratio.
  - As of end-April 2012, volume of loans rescheduled under the circular rose to about TD 5 billion or 7.7 percent of GDP.
  - Loans to public enterprises are never classified because of presumed government guarantee.
  - Reported figures not compiled in line with international best practices; contain significant gaps and are not always subject to internal audits.
- Mission recommendations (selected):
  - Produce reliable FSIs.
  - Develop a uniform database and standardized template for frequent, detailed, and consistent monitoring.

### Financial Soundness Indicators (selected figures)
- Capital adequacy ratio (total): 11.8 11.6 11.7 12.2 11.6 11.5
  - Private: 12.1 9.7 11.0 11.6 11.7 11.7
  - Public: 9.3 9.9 9.6 10.5 10.0 9.8
- Gross nonperforming loans (percent of gross assets): 19.3 17.6 15.5 13.2 13.0 13.0
  - Private commercial banks: 19.0 18.0 15.3 12.5 10.4 10.2
  - Public commercial banks: 19.7 17.3 15.9 14.1 16.3 16.4
- Provisions (percent of nonperforming loans): 49.0 53.2 56.8 58.3 58.5 59.6
  - Private (of which): 48.4 52.0 55.0 59.2 67.7 67.9
  - Public (of which): 50.2 55.0 58.1 57.0 50.1 49.2
- Liquid assets to total assets: 34.2 37.5 37.1 37.2 34.7 30.5
- Liquid assets to liquid liabilities: 120.8 121.9 124.0 119.1 104.1 89.4
- Deposits to loans: 99.1 104.8 104.5 106.9 100.7 92.9
- Return on assets: 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.7
- Return on equity: 7.0 10.1 11.2 11.7 10.2 7.9

### Collateral valuation, provisioning, and asset quality
- Total reported collateral values represent about 50 percent of the value of NPLs; much of this collateral is more than five years old.
- International recovery rates cited range from 3 percent to 41 percent in various country experiences.
- Bank discussions suggest recovery rates could be well below 50 percent, and for some loans below 10 percent.
- Detailed review of one large troubled public bank concluded loan portfolios were significantly overvalued; proper revaluation of collateral could leave the bank insolvent.
- Inflated collateral valuation implies provisioning is likely inadequate because provisions are calculated net-of-collateral.
- Mission stressed applying international standards to loan classification, provisioning, and collateral valuation.

### Sector-specific exposures and risks
- Tourism sector: tourism revenues fell by about 40 percent over last 15 years of stress; out of 850 hotels, one-third likely in severe financial distress during 2011.
- Liquidity: CBT liquidity support mitigated shortages; capital controls limit deposit flight; deposit growth slowed while currency in circulation increased.
- Credit growth remained strong due to ample CBT liquidity at real negative interest rates.
- Interest rate risk: structural maturity mismatch with medium- to long-term asset maturities funded by short-term liabilities.
- Exchange rate risk: banks’ foreign currency lending averages less than 5 percent of total lending; foreign exchange regulation forbids banks from investing abroad.

### Stress tests — design, assumptions, and outcomes
- Coverage: 17 out of 21 banks, covering 97 percent of banking system assets.
- Key modelling assumptions:
  - 2011 leveling: collateral value divided by two; incorporate half of rescheduled loans into NPL stock.
  - Default rate: 2011 total NPL flow estimated at TD 2.6 Billion in both scenarios.
  - Credit growth: growth of total credit exposure by 10 percent every year.
  - RWA: calculated under Basel I.
  - Profit: no change; income retention rate fixed at 100 percent.
- Macro growth rates (Real GDP Growth (%)) — Actual baseline: 2011 -0.8; 2012 2.2; 2013 3.5; 2014 4.8; 2015 6.5; 2016 6.7
  - Adverse: 2011 -0.8; 2012 -1.6; 2013 -0.7; 2014 0.3; 2015 1.2; 2016 2.1
- Liquidity test assumptions:
  - Customer deposit outflow: 10 percent outflow during each period.
  - CBT funding outflow: 30 percent outflow of CBT funding, then 50 percent outflows.
- Stress test outcomes:
  - Solvency: Under the adverse scenario, additional capital equivalent to over 5 percent of GDP required to bring banks to the 8 percent minimum.
  - Baseline scenario: projected recapitalization need of almost 3 percent of GDP within two years.
  - Adverse scenario: two out of three public banks and some foreign-owned banks, representing almost two-fifths of banking sector assets, become insolvent within two years.
  - If public banks’ rescheduling rates increased to private-bank levels, recapitalization needs rise to 7 percent of GDP in the adverse scenario.
  - CAR ratios at end-2011 used in analysis differ from those reported by authorities due to lack of rescheduling adjustments.
  - Liquidity: A 50 percent reduction in seven-day CBT funding would cause four banks to become illiquid.
  - Banks can manage deposit withdrawals up to 10 percent; four banks become illiquid if term deposit withdrawals exceed 10 percent.

### Banking supervision, regulatory strengthening, and policy recommendations
- Supervision status: CBT started a medium-term plan in February 2012; BSD comprised 37 staff (about half the 2006 level); full on-site inspections absent since 2006.
- Resource and capacity recommendations:
  - Strengthen supervisory resources, train staff, modernize IT, hire market-experienced staff, and use international consultants.
  - Improve bank reporting: require full set of capital, liquidity, FX, loan quality, rescheduling indicators; improve CBT data-management capacity.
- Capital adequacy recommendations:
  - Minimum CAR path: increase from 8 percent to 10 percent by 2014; 12 percent by 2016.
  - Increasing minimum CAR to 10 percent by 2014 would require banks to increase capital by approximately 1.3 percent of GDP.
  - Impose higher solvency requirements on higher-risk banks.
  - Banks should immediately begin setting aside additional capital; large public-bank recapitalizations pose fiscal liability.
- Enforcement and governance:
  - Ensure CBT independence and accountability; clarify hiring/dismissal criteria for governor and board members.
  - Apply same rules to public and private banks; establish conflict-of-interest policies for CBT staff and former staff.
  - Strengthen enforcement: take action against noncompliant banks; consider a formalized prompt corrective action (PCA) framework.
- Liquidity policy recommendations:
  - De-link minimum liquidity ratio and reserve requirement to avoid procyclical reserve increases.
  - Stop liquidity drain from FX intervention; reform exchange rate framework to allow more flexibility.
  - Restore structural liquidity via outright purchases of government securities to reduce banks’ refinancing needs.
  - Prohibit use of central bank loans to finance debt restructuring; rely on fiscal resources instead.
  - CBT should accept collateral at current market value and provision part of 2011 profit to cover exposures.
  - Develop exit strategy to unwind liquidity support by gradually increasing refinancing costs.
  - Strengthen coordination between prudential supervision and monetary policy; BSD should flag solvency and portfolio problems during CBT refinancing deliberations.
  - Introduce a lender-of-last-resort facility to deal with banks with insufficient eligible collateral outside main refinancing operations.

### Crisis management framework and bank resolution
- MOU should define roles/responsibilities of institutions in systemic crisis; legal framework needs review to ensure authority to act.
- MOF should develop explicit mechanism for funding rescue of a systemic bank.
- Deposit insurance scheme (DIS):
  - Consider introducing a credible, explicit, and limited DIS once preconditions met.
  - Current Law on Credit Institutions provides for an unfunded, indeterminate deposit guarantee — insufficient to prevent contagion and poses fiscal risks.
  - Risks: moral hazard from ex post reimbursement determination; vulnerability to deposit flight.
  - Strengthening supervision is an important precondition for DIS.
- Bank resolution:
  - CBT can request MOF to revoke a bank license; MOF appoints liquidator to report to CBT.
  - Absence of reliable DIS would delay small depositor payments until funds secured.
  - Recommendations: introduce a special resolution regime; enable CBT to revoke licenses, trigger nonjudicial resolution, manage prompt payout of small depositors (preferably from a DIS), and liquidate/recover assets for other creditors.
- Liquidity support and LOLR:
  - Revise LOLR framework to give CBT explicit power to advance funds, secured by acceptable collateral, to solvent but illiquid banks; link support to corrective actions.
  - Current Central Bank Act does not distinguish CBT lending types; recommended segregation into monetary functions and an LOLR facility.

### Industry structure, competition, and state-owned banks restructuring
- Banking reforms since early 2000s did not yield expected financial deepening; product innovation and service quality limited.
- Regulatory issues: not a level playing field; weak/nonviable institutions harm competition.
- Foreign entry constrained by requirement to buy distressed institutions; green-field banks generally not allowed.
- State involvement distorts competition via state-owned banks and state-owned enterprises as major clients; poorly performing public banks recapitalized without governance changes.
- State-owned banks:
  - Subject to conflicting mandates and poor performance; laws force state intervention in management.
  - Authorities should limit state ownership to clear public policy needs.
  - Largest state-owned bank has large unrealized loan losses; recapitalization alone insufficient.
  - Suggested approach: separate into “good bank” and “bad bank”; replace management; mark bad assets-to-market and place in a special recovery company; any shortfall covered by transparent state recapitalization in fiscal budget.

### SME, housing finance, capital markets, and access to finance
- SME finance:
  - State initiatives need reassessment; partial credit guarantee and state-owned SME bank set up mid-2000s with limited impact; portfolio quality concerns.
  - NPLs in SME finance growing rapidly (19 percent in 2011).
  - Recommendation: assign CBT responsibility to collect and publish detailed SME finance information.
- Housing finance:
  - Developers’ loans deteriorating; 2011 NPLs at 13.1 percent of this portfolio.
  - Stock of NPLs increased by 55 percent; sharpest deterioration in substandard categories (classes 2 and 3).
  - CBT should monitor risks, prepare guidance on origination/rescheduling/oversight, and ensure early recognition and adequate provisions (including on rescheduled loans).
- Asset-liability management:
  - Banks need strengthened ALM; CBT required matching long maturities with long-term resources and fixed rates for >15-year loans, which induced shorter maturities to avoid constraints; regulations need better targeting and granularity.
- Capital markets:
  - Funds raised in capital markets represent only 2 percent of GDP versus private sector credit of 69 percent of GDP in 2011.
  - Sovereign bond market meets minimum size for global indexes but is underdeveloped and illiquid.
  - Equity and corporate bond primary markets small; secondary markets lack liquidity.
  - Confiscated assets and state-owned assets could be offered to the public to provide investment opportunities.
  - Pension system reform could help build long-term investment demand.
  - Banks not allowed to engage in brokerage directly; mutual funds managed by intermediaries and distributed to banks’ clients.
  - Recommendation: more independent CMA to step up surveillance and strictly enforce regulations.
- Access to finance:
  - Access remains limited and constrains regions and worker categories.
  - Microfinance law passed October 2011 is a major step; finalize regulations and create supervision unit for swift implementation; consider broadening microfinance activities and transferring supervision to banking supervision authority.
  - Central bank credit registry and databases could provide improved information and tools; revisit credit bureau possibility.
  - Post Office (five million customers and wide branch network) could partner with financial institutions to extend products.

### AML/CFT
- Tunisian AML/CFT regime last assessed in 2006 by the World Bank.
- Tunisia has taken steps to strengthen AML/CFT law in line with key recommendations.
- Political changes and asset-tracing efforts highlighted implementation challenges.
- A new assessment was planned toward the end of 2012.

*IMF FSAP summary (2012), as presented in the supplied document.*

### 2012. The team’s main findings are:

### _cr12241 - 2012. The team’s main findings are:

### Main findings on the banking sector
- The banking sector may face large recapitalization needs to cover past losses or if the economic situation worsens.
- The balance sheets of state-owned banks need to be restructured and their governance improved to ensure that they operate on a commercial basis.
- Bank supervision needs to be strengthened following several years of neglect. In particular, stricter regulatory and reporting requirements should be introduced and enforced, including with regard to loan classification, assets and collateral valuation and provisioning, and compliance with international best practices.
- Financial soundness indicators suffer from deficiencies and banking sector data should be improved as a matter of urgency.
- The CBT should develop an exit strategy to unwind its large liquidity support to banks.
- A comprehensive capital market reform should be implemented over time to support long-term investment.
- The authorities’ commitment to the reform of the financial sector helped improve the assessment, and the CBT has already established a working group to monitor the implementation of the FSAP recommendations.
- The IMF is preparing a multi-year technical assistance (TA) program, aimed at strengthening banking supervision.

### Executive summary — vulnerabilities, diagnostics, and near-term priorities
- Loan quality, solvency, and profitability have deteriorated; weaknesses in underwriting led to inappropriate lending to well-connected borrowers.
- Weak supervisory reporting and data provision mean vulnerabilities could be much higher than reported.
- The mission urged creation of a uniform database and standardized template to allow frequent and broad bank-by-bank performance monitoring.
- The team estimated that to cover existing weaknesses in loan quality and potential future losses, including those related to under-reporting, the system as a whole could require additional capital in an amount exceeding 5 percent of GDP.
- Authorities are encouraged to increase the minimum capital adequacy ratio (CAR) from 8 percent to 10 percent by 2014, and to impose higher solvency requirements on those banks with a higher risk profile.
- The CBT initiated a medium-term plan to build effective banking supervision in February 2012, including a new organization, reassignment and recruitment of staff, and adoption of a new corporate governance regime for commercial banks to increase the role and independence of their boards.
- Full on-site inspections have not been held since 2006 and should be conducted urgently first with all major banks.
- The CBT should require banks to apply international best practices for loss reporting, collateral valuation and classification, and provisioning of nonperforming loans (NPLs).
- The CBT needs to strengthen its enforcement regime, establish clear conflict-of-interest policies for its staff, and increase its transparency and accountability.
- Public banks have been used to support nonviable state-owned enterprises; major state-owned banks should be subject to in-depth audits by international firms, including assessments of their viability if significant recapitalization needs are identified.
- Crisis-management arrangements need development, including a special bank resolution regime and preparation for an eventual deposit insurance scheme.
- The CBT should develop an exit strategy to unwind gradually its large liquidity support to banks; liquidity injections in 2011 supported strong credit growth but significantly increased the credit exposure of the central bank and led to a significant decline of foreign reserves.
- A comprehensive capital market reform is needed; the Capital Market Authority (CMA) needs to strengthen oversight, a reliable yield curve should be developed, and confiscated assets of the old regime could be sold to jumpstart markets.
- Banking sector reform should improve access to finance for individuals, and small and medium enterprises (SMEs); swift implementation of the 2011 microfinance law and integration of microfinance institutions into the national payment infrastructure are recommended.
- The CBT has established a working group, comprised key financial sector stakeholders, to monitor implementation of the 2012 FSAP recommendations.
- The IMF is preparing a multi-year TA program aimed mainly at strengthening banking supervision.

### Key recommendations (high priority and timelines drawn from Table 1)
- Bank supervision (High priority, Short term)
  - Ensure appropriate independence of the supervisor, including regarding appointment and dismissal of senior officials (para 30).
  - Significantly increase resources, including hiring staff with banking and market experience (para 26).
  - Conduct in-depth on-site inspections starting with the largest banks (para 28).
  - Apply international standards for loan classification, provisioning, and valuation of collateral (paras 12–14).
  - Address serious weaknesses in data management by enhancing the collection and processing of bank data, and creating a uniform database and standardized template (para 12).
- Capital requirements (High priority, Medium term)
  - Increase the minimum CAR to 10 percent by 2014 and to 12 percent by 2016, and increase the Tier 1 ratio to 7 percent by 2016 (para 29).
- Bank restructuring (High priority, Short term / Medium term)
  - Conduct an in-depth independent assessment of the balance sheets of the three large state-owned banks, and develop a strategy for ensuring they operate on a commercially oriented basis (para 48–49).
  - Develop strategy to limit state ownership of banks to cases of clear public policy need (para 49). (Medium priority, Medium term)
  - Ensure the same rules and regulations, including those related to governance structure, apply to state-owned banks and private banks (para 30 and 48). (Medium priority, Medium term)
- Crisis management and resolution (High priority, Short term / Medium term)
  - Develop a crisis-management framework and a special bank resolution regime (paras 38–39). (High, Short term)
  - Revise the lender-of-last-resort framework to give explicit power to the CBT to advance funds, secured by adequate collateral, to solvent but illiquid banks (para 43). (Medium, Medium term)
- Systemic liquidity (Medium priority)
  - Introduce a haircut on all collateral used for refinancing operations (para 35). (Short term)
  - Consider asking banks to pledge only treasury bonds as collateral for regular central bank liquidity provision (para 35). (Medium term)
  - The CBT should increase gradually the cost of banks’ refinancing from the central bank in order to unwind CBT liquidity support to banks (para 35). (Medium term)
- Nonbank financial institutions and capital markets (Medium priority)
  - Reform the sovereign bond market to create a benchmark for pricing fixed-income products (para 55). (Short term)
  - Consider offering some confiscated assets and state-owned enterprises (as part of privatization programs) to the public (para 55). (Medium term)
  - Step up CMA supervision (para 56). (Short term)

Notes on priority/timeframe: Short-term: < 12 months; Medium-term: 12 to 24 months.

### Background and macroeconomic context (selected exact figures)
- Real GDP is estimated to have contracted by 1.8 percent in 2011.
- Tourism receipts dropped by 30 percent and FDI fell also by about 25 percent.
- The unemployment rate rose to 19 percent; youth unemployment reached 42 percent.
- The credit-to-GDP ratio increased from 60 percent in 2007 to almost 70 percent in 2011.
- The CBT’s exposure to the banking system increased to about 25 percent of its assets by end-2011, up from 2.5 percent at end-2010.
- In 2011, average headline inflation remained moderate at 3.5 percent but non-administered prices increased by about 6 percent, and headline inflation reached 5.7 percent in April 2012.
- Real growth is projected to reach about 2 percent in 2012, leaving growth well below the 4 percent to 5 percent average during the 2000s.

### Institutional and mission information
- The FSAP team comprised Messrs. Elias Kazarian (Mission Chief, IMF), Cédric Mousset (Mission Chief, WB); Joseph Crowley, Laurence de l’Escaille, Romain Veyrune, and Ms. Georgia Albertin (all IMF); Messrs. Alain Degroide (IMF expert, NBB), François Germain (IMF expert, BDF), and John Biggs (IMF external expert); and Messrs. Pierre-Laurent Chatain, Laurent Gonnet, Olivier Hassler, and Anderson Caputo da Silva; and Ms. Caroline Cerruti (all WB); and Mr. Laurent Le Mouël and Ms. Alice Negre (both WB experts).
- The main authors of this report are Elias Kazarian and Joseph Crowley, with input from other members of the FSAP team.

*IMF FSAP summary (2012), as presented in the supplied document.*

### 5.      The core recommendations of the 2006 FSAP were not implemented. These

### _cr12241 - 5.      The core recommendations of the 2006 FSAP were not implemented. These

### Implementation of 2006 FSAP: overview and assessment
- Core recommendations centered on: comprehensive reform of state-owned banks to improve their risk management; addressing the overhang of nonperforming loans; and the rationalization of staffing and duties.
- Summary assessment from Table 4 (selected items):
  - Ensure rigorous implementation of the authorities’ target of 70 percent provisioning for all NPLs, without regard for existing collateral (MT): The 70 percent target was not met.
  - Reduce by 2009 the ratio of NPLs to total loans to no more than 10 percent through proactive loan restructuring, including partial write-offs (MT): NPLs stood at 13 percent in 2010.
  - Accelerate restructuring of bank loans to the tourism sector on the basis of realistic assessments (ST): A few loans were restructured, but structural issues continued to increase problem loans in tourism.
  - Ensure that partial write-offs benefit from tax deductibility (ST): Not implemented.
  - Promote extrajudicial procedures for bank debt restructuring (ST): The regime remains unchanged; debt recovery through courts is still slow; pre-bankruptcy rescue procedures are not often used.
  - Strengthen management of public commercial banks (ST): Little progress; governance structure needs to be examined and strengthened.
  - Establish program contracts with management of public banks with quantitative operational targets (ST): Not implemented.
  - Stand ready to recapitalize public banks if operating income is not sufficient to reach the 70 percent provisioning target (MT): No measures in place; provisioning not adequate and based on optimistic collateral assessments.
  - Maintain prohibition of dividend distribution for banks with inadequate NPL provisioning (ST): Not implemented.
  - Speed up privatization and mergers of former development banks (ST): Initiatives taken but noticeable progress still required.
  - Improve information system for lending to SMEs and households by promoting private credit bureaus (ST): No credit bureau has been established.
  - Ensure implementation of new rules on management of credit risk envisaged by new circular on internal controls (ST): Not addressed; circular issued but CBT has not taken adequate action to enforce it.
  - Assess quality of banks’ internal audit functions (MT): The CBT has not assessed internal audit quality and no on-site inspections have been carried out since 2006.
  - Establish prudential ratios on a consolidated basis (ST): Supervision is still performed on a solo basis only.
  - Enter into information-sharing agreements with other Tunisian and foreign supervisors (ST): Cooperation remains weak.
  - Tighten regulations regarding equity investments and strengthen enforcement (ST): Not implemented; enforcement minimal.
  - Revisit disciplinary sanction regimes to vest sanction power in the Banking Commission rather than the governor (ST): Not implemented.
  - Disclose monetary framework more clearly in CBT publications (ST): Noticeable efforts have been made to explain monetary policy decisions.
  - Deepen interbank markets by allowing wider money market rate fluctuations (ST): CBT introduced an interest rate corridor; interbank market did not deepen because of inconsistencies in monetary and foreign exchange framework.
  - Publicize newly established bond yield curve (ST): Monetary policy transparency improved slightly, but not enough to establish a yield curve.
  - Repeal foreign exchange surrender requirement on banks (ST): Not repealed; 2008 MOF recommendation in favor of partial repeal (20 percent) not implemented.
  - Relax restrictions on forward foreign exchange cover for commercial operators (ST): Forward regulation not revised.
  - Promote use of expert workout specialists in judicial reorganizations (ST): Not implemented.
  - Ensure judicial proceedings for company restructuring are not hampered by excessive delays (ST): Not implemented.
  - Promote extra-judicial procedures with preset rules for creditors and debtors (ST): Not implemented.
  - Review preferred creditor status of tax authorities and social security claims (ST): Not implemented.
  - Speed up real estate titles registration and registration of mortgages (ST): Progress under way; 2010 law enabled electronic exchanges between land registrars and “Tribunal Immobilier,” but these courts lack operational resources.

### Selected macroeconomic and financial indicators (2008–2017) — key items from Table 2
- Production and income (percent change):
  - Nominal GDP: 10.9 6.3 7.8 2.2 8.6 8.2 7.7 8.5 8.6 9.4
  - Real GDP: 4.5 3.1 3.0 -1.8 2.7 3.5 4.1 5.3 5.5 6.0
  - GDP deflator: 6.1 3.1 4.7 4.1 5.8 4.6 3.5 3.0 2.9 3.2
  - CPI, average: 4.9 3.5 4.4 3.5 5.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
  - Gross national savings (in percent of GDP): 22.1 21.9 21.6 16.8 18.1 18.9 20.1 21.0 21.9 22.8
  - Gross investment (in percent of GDP): 25.9 24.8 26.4 24.1 25.1 25.9 26.2 26.5 26.7 27.0
- External sector (percent change):
  - Exports of goods, f.o.b. (in $): 26.6 -24.8 14.0 8.5 0.9 5.3 7.5 9.3 9.8 10.6
  - Imports of goods, f.o.b. (in $): 28.7 -21.9 15.9 7.7 2.2 5.6 5.2 6.7 7.3 8.3
  - Trade balance (in percent of GDP): -8.9 -8.5 -10.3 -10.4 -11.1 -11.4 -10.7 -9.8 -9.0 -8.2
  - Current account, excluding grants (in percent of GDP): -3.8 -2.8 -4.8 -7.3 -7.0 -6.9 -6.2 -5.5 -4.8 -4.2
  - Foreign direct investment (percent of GDP): 5.7 3.3 3.0 0.9 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.7 4.2 4.6
- Central government (percent of GDP):
  - Total revenue, excluding grants and privatization: 23.8 22.8 22.8 24.5 23.8 23.0 23.1 23.2 23.5 23.7
  - Total expenditure and net lending: 24.8 25.8 23.9 28.2 30.8 28.1 27.2 26.5 26.1 25.7
  - Central government balance, excluding grants and privatization: -1.0 -3.0 -1.1 -3.7 -7.0 -5.1 -4.0 -3.4 -2.6 -2.0
  - Total government debt (foreign and domestic): 43.3 42.8 40.4 44.4 45.7 50.5 50.7 49.9 48.7 46.4
  - Foreign currency public debt (percent of total debt): 60.8 58.5 60.7 58.0 61.4 58.5 59.5 59.7 60.3 61.5
- Official reserves:
  - Gross official reserves (US$ billions, e.o.p): 9.0 10.6 9.5 7.5 8.2 8.7 9.4 10.4 11.7 13.5
  - In months of imports of goods and services, c.i.f.: 4.4 6.6 5.1 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.8
- Memorandum items:
  - GDP at current prices (TD millions): 55,296 58,768 63,380 64,802 70,402 76,182 82,053 89,027 96,684 105,787
  - GDP at current prices (US$ billions): 44.9 43.5 44.3 46.0 46.1 48.0 49.9 52.4 55.1 58.5
  - GDP per capita (US$): 4,346 4,171 4,199 4,320 4,284 4,409 4,542 4,715 4,909 5,156
  - Population (millions): 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.7 10.8 10.9 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3

### Risk Assessment Matrix — main threats and assessed impacts (Table 3)
- Worsening of the recession in Europe
  - Likelihood (next three years): Staff assessment: High
  - Rationale: Macroeconomic indicators and IMF projections forecast negative growth in the euro region for 2012, with sizable downside risks.
  - Expected impact on financial stability: Staff assessment: High — Tunisia’s linkages with France and Italy via tourism, exports, FDI, and remittances imply a worse-than-expected recession in Europe would significantly undermine Tunisia’s growth prospects and could increase NPLs.
- Unidentified weaknesses in the banking sector
  - Likelihood: Staff assessment: High
  - Rationale: No comprehensive inspections since 2006; weak external auditing in some cases; banks lack good information technology; the CBT has a fragmented data management system.
  - Expected impact: Staff assessment: High — significant increase in recorded NPLs, requiring higher provisioning and lowering bank capital.
- Continued loss of external reserves
  - Likelihood: Staff assessment: Medium
  - Rationale: CBT has been providing large amounts of liquidity to banks, associated with widening current account deficit, decline in FDI inflows, and loss of reserves.
  - Expected impact: Staff assessment: High — exhaustion of reserves could force CBT to stop providing liquidity, necessitating restructuring of banks with weak loan portfolios or insufficient liquidity.
- Political instability and heightened social tensions
  - Likelihood: Staff assessment: Medium
  - Rationale: First democratic general elections held for a constituent assembly, but risk of political instability and social tensions remains; widespread strikes and sit-ins hamper investment and industrial activity.
  - Expected impact: Staff assessment: High — increased instability could hamper domestic and foreign investment and tourism, weakening growth and potentially increasing NPLs and deposit withdrawals.
- Prolonged weakness in tourism sector
  - Likelihood: Staff assessment: High
  - Rationale: Recent political events discouraged tourism; sector in severe slump; European recession expected to hurt tourism short-term.
  - Expected impact: Staff assessment: Medium — banks have large exposures to tourism; questions about recoverability of collateral; weakness has yet to show up as NPL increases but concerns about data distortion due to regulatory forbearance.

### Financial stability analysis and system structure (selected findings)
- Size and structure (2011):
  - Financial sector assets equal to about 115 percent of GDP in 2011.
  - As of April 2012, 21 onshore banks: three large state-owned banks with 37 percent of banking sector assets; three large private domestic banks with 28 percent of total assets; six foreign-owned private banks with a 28 percent share.
  - Five small development banks with universal banking licenses.
- Nonbank sector:
  - Nonbank financial sector accounted for about 20 percent of all financial system assets in 2011.
  - Insurance: 19 companies, primarily nonlife (85 percent of premiums); annual premiums to GDP of about 2 percent.
  - Market capitalization equal to 24 percent of GDP.
  - Leasing sector (nine institutions) accounted for 15½ percent of private gross fixed capital formation in 2010.

### Banking system vulnerabilities and data concerns
- Reported indicators (end-2011):
  - Official level of NPLs: 13 percent (down from over 19 percent in 2006).
  - Regulatory capital: 11.5 percent of risk-weighted assets.
  - Average return on equity (ROE): 7.9 percent.
- Reasons to expect worse vulnerabilities than reported:
  - Mid-2011 CBT circular allowing rescheduling of loans hurt by 2011 turmoil: reclassifying rescheduled loans as nonperforming would add about 5 percent to overall NPL ratio. (Footnote: as of end-April 2012, volume of loans rescheduled under the circular rose to about TD 5 billion or 7.7 percent of GDP.)
  - Loans to public enterprises are never classified because of a presumed government guarantee.
  - Weak reporting practices and supervisory deficiencies: reported figures not compiled in line with international best practices, contain significant gaps, and in several cases are not subject to banks’ internal audits.
- Mission recommendations (selected):
  - Produce reliable financial sector indicators (FSIs) to understand the banking sector state.
  - Develop a uniform database and standardized template to allow more frequent, detailed, and consistent monitoring of bank performance.

### Financial Soundness Indicators (selected figures, Table 5)
- Capital adequacy ratio (total): 11.8 11.6 11.7 12.2 11.6 11.5
  - Private: 12.1 9.7 11.0 11.6 11.7 11.7
  - Public: 9.3 9.9 9.6 10.5 10.0 9.8
- Gross nonperforming loans (percent of gross assets): 19.3 17.6 15.5 13.2 13.0 13.0
  - Private commercial banks: 19.0 18.0 15.3 12.5 10.4 10.2
  - Public commercial banks: 19.7 17.3 15.9 14.1 16.3 16.4
- Provisions (percent of nonperforming loans): 49.0 53.2 56.8 58.3 58.5 59.6
  - Private (of which): 48.4 52.0 55.0 59.2 67.7 67.9
  - Public (of which): 50.2 55.0 58.1 57.0 50.1 49.2
- Liquid assets to total assets: 34.2 37.5 37.1 37.2 34.7 30.5
- Liquid assets to liquid liabilities: 120.8 121.9 124.0 119.1 104.1 89.4
- Deposits to loans: 99.1 104.8 104.5 106.9 100.7 92.9
- Return on assets: 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.7
- Return on equity: 7.0 10.1 11.2 11.7 10.2 7.9

*Source: IMF staff report content as supplied in the chapter.*

### 14.      The value of banks’ collateral may be significantly overestimated. Total reported

### 14.      The value of banks’ collateral may be significantly overestimated. Total reported

### Collateral valuation, provisioning, and asset quality
- Total reported collateral values represent about 50 percent of the value of NPLs, even though a large share of this collateral is more than five years old.
- Experience in other countries with similar ratios of collateral value to NPLs suggests much lower recovery rates; recoveries as a share of loan value in the United States (1980–1994); Slovakia, 2001; Mexico, 2007 and 2008; and Indonesia, 2001–2005, ranged from 3 percent to 41 percent.
- Discussions with banks suggest recovery rates could be well below 50 percent, and for some loans below 10 percent.
- Detailed review of one large troubled public bank concluded its loan portfolios were significantly overvalued and that a proper revaluation of collateral could leave the bank insolvent.
- Inflated collateral valuation implies provisioning for bad loans is likely inadequate because provisions are calculated on a net-of-collateral basis.
- The mission stressed applying international standards to loan classification, provisioning, and valuation of collateral; weaknesses in these areas compromise the CBT’s ability to estimate and address banking sector vulnerability.

### Sector-specific exposures and risks
- Tourism sector: Over the last 15 years, structural issues undermined financial soundness; political instability and security concerns pushed the sector into a severe recession with tourism revenues falling by about 40 percent.
- Out of the 850 hotels, it is reported that one-third is likely to be in severe financial distress during 2011.
- Liquidity: Banks’ shortage of liquidity has been mitigated by central bank liquidity support. Banks are not reliant on external funding; capital controls limit possibilities for deposit flight. Depositors can shift into cash relatively easily; deposit growth slowed while currency in circulation increased.
- Credit growth remained strong because banks have been provided ample liquidity by the CBT at interest rates that are negative in real terms.
- Interest rate risk: Structural maturity mismatch—large share of assets have medium- to long-term maturities funded by short-term liabilities. Domestic interest rates have remained low but could change rapidly (illustrated when term deposit rates increased sharply in 2011).
- Exchange rate risk: Banks reported low exposures in foreign currency, averaging less than 5 percent of total lending. Foreign exchange regulation forbids banks from investing abroad.

### Stress tests — design and assumptions
- Coverage: Stress tests covered 17 out of 21 Tunisian banks with 97 percent of the assets of the banking system; constrained by significant shortcomings in supervisory data.
- Approach: Top-down, bank-by-bank prudential balance sheet data, applying Basel I capital metrics to risk weights. Solvency tests simulated outcomes for 2012 to 2014 under a baseline and an adverse scenario.
- Baseline scenario: included a moderate pick-up in growth in 2012, followed by strong medium-term performance.
- Adverse scenario: simulated a further negative growth shock in 2012, followed by a gradual but lower medium-term recovery to a moderate growth level; included downward revision in collateral value assigned to NPLs and provisioning for rescheduled loans.
- Specific modelling assumptions (selected):
  - 2011 leveling: Adjust provisioning by assuming value of collateral is divided by two; Adjust stock of NPL by incorporating half of rescheduled loans.
  - Default rate: 2011 total NPL flow is estimated at TD 2.6 Billion in both scenarios.
  - Credit growth: growth of total credit exposure by 10 percent every year.
  - RWA: calculated under Basel I; model allows decrease of RWAs for defaulted credit exposure.
  - Profit: no change. Income retention rate fixed at 100 percent.
- Macro growth rates table (Real GDP Growth (%)):
  - Actual baseline: 2011 -0.8; 2012 2.2; 2013 3.5; 2014 4.8; 2015 6.5; 2016 6.7
  - Adverse: 2011 -0.8; 2012 -1.6; 2013 -0.7; 2014 0.3; 2015 1.2; 2016 2.1
- Liquidity tests:
  - Two tests: (i) simulation of gradual outflow of customer deposits including fire sales of liquid assets; (ii) simulation of sudden outflow of CBT funding corresponding to non-renewal of short-term (7 days) refinancing.
  - Assumptions for customer deposit outflow: 10 percent outflow of customer deposits during each period (both portions of the then remaining deposits); fire sale haircuts: cash (0), Government bond and T-bills holding (0), half of them already encumbered; CBT accepts long-term loan as collateral (90 percent), assuming 50 percent already encumbered.
  - Assumptions for CBT funding outflow: 30 percent outflow of CBT funding (corresponding to half of the December 2011 percentage of 7 days refinancing), then 50 percent outflows (half of the 7 days refinancing as of June 2011); fire sales haircut for cash (0).

### Stress test outcomes and key quantitative findings
- Solvency:
  - Under the adverse scenario, additional capital equivalent to over 5 percent of GDP would be required to bring banks to the 8 percent minimum.
  - Even under the baseline scenario, there is a projected recapitalization need of almost 3 percent of GDP within two years.
  - In the adverse scenario, two out of three public banks and some foreign-owned banks, representing almost two-fifths of banking sector assets, become insolvent within two years.
  - Considering increasing public banks’ rescheduling rates to the same level as private banks would increase recapitalization needs to 7 percent of GDP in the adverse scenario.
  - Note: The CAR ratios at end-2011 used in the analysis differ substantially from those eventually reported by the authorities because the authorities did not make adjustments for rescheduling.
- Liquidity:
  - A 50 percent reduction in seven-day funding by the CBT would cause four banks to become illiquid.
  - Banks are able to manage deposit withdrawals of up to 10 percent without difficulty, but four banks become illiquid if term deposit withdrawals exceed 10 percent.

### Banking supervision, regulatory strengthening, and policy recommendations
- Supervision status:
  - Starting from an extremely weak position at end-2010, the CBT made strides in strengthening supervision; a medium-term plan to build effective banking supervision was initiated in February 2012.
  - The Banking Supervision Department (BSD) comprised 37 staff, about half the 2006 level.
  - Full on-site inspections have not been held since 2006 and should be conducted for all banks, starting with the largest and focusing on credit risk, large exposures, related-party lending, liquidity, subsidiary risk, internal control, and information systems.
- Resource and capacity recommendations:
  - Strengthen supervisory resources; develop well-trained staff; equip BSD with adequate and modern IT infrastructure; hire staff with market experience and use international consultancy firms.
  - Improve reporting and management of financial sector data; require banks to report a full set of financial sector and loan-portfolio indicators (capital, liquidity, foreign exchange, loan quality, rescheduling); improve CBT data-management capacity so statistics are complete, consistent, and accessible electronically.
- Capital adequacy recommendations:
  - Minimum CAR increase path: increase minimum CAR from 8 percent to 10 percent by 2014; increase to 12 percent by 2016.
  - Increasing the minimum CAR to 10 percent by 2014 would require banks to increase their capital by the equivalent of approximately 1.3 percent of GDP.
  - Impose higher solvency requirements on individual banks taking greater risk.
  - Banks should immediately begin setting aside additional capital given stress-test results; large recapitalizations of public banks represent a potential fiscal liability.
- Enforcement and governance:
  - CBT needs effective independence and accountability; criteria for hiring and dismissal of the governor and board members should be clear and transparent.
  - No restrictions on CBT’s capacity to intervene in public banks; same rules for state-owned and private banks.
  - Establish clear conflict-of-interest policies for CBT staff and former staff who move to commercial banks.
  - Strengthen enforcement regime: take action against banks that fail prudential and legal requirements; consider introducing a formalized prompt corrective action (PCA) framework.
- Liquidity policy recommendations:
  - De-link minimum liquidity ratio and reserve requirement to avoid procyclical increases in reserve requirements when systemic liquidity declines.
  - Stop liquidity drain from foreign exchange intervention; envisaged reform of exchange rate framework to allow a more flexible exchange rate and better management of CBT foreign exchange interventions.
  - To restore structural liquidity, rely on outright purchases of government securities to reduce banks’ refinancing needs to levels consistent with a functioning interbank market.
  - Banks should not use central bank loans to finance debt restructuring; instead rely on fiscal resources.
  - CBT should accept collateral at current market value and provision part of its 2011 profit to cover exposures; develop an exit strategy to unwind liquidity support by gradually increasing cost of refinancing.
  - Strengthen coordination between prudential supervision and monetary policy departments; BSD should flag solvency and portfolio problems during CBT refinancing deliberations; introduce a lender of last resort facility to deal with banks with insufficient eligible collateral outside main refinancing operations.

*Source: IMF staff report content unit _cr12241 - 14.      The value of banks’ collateral may be significantly overestimated. Total reported*

### 40.      Steps should be taken to put in place an effective crisis management framework.

### 40.      Steps should be taken to put in place an effective crisis management framework.

### Crisis management framework and funding
- A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) should define the roles and responsibilities of the main institutions and authorities in the event of a systemic crisis.
- The legal framework needs to be reviewed to ensure that these officials have sufficient legal authority to undertake actions envisaged in the MOU.
- The MOF should develop an explicit mechanism for funding the rescue of a systemic bank.

### Deposit insurance scheme (DIS)
- The authorities should consider the introduction of a credible, explicit, and limited DIS once the necessary preconditions are in place.
- Current Law on Credit Institutions provides for an unfunded, indeterminate deposit guarantee, which:
  - Is insufficient to prevent contagion.
  - Poses fiscal risks.
  - States that the CBT shall determine any deposit insurance at the time of bank failure, including the level of reimbursement, any reimbursement conditions, and the timeline for reimbursement.
- Risks identified:
  - Moral hazard from ex post determination of reimbursement.
  - Vulnerability to deposit flight in the event of a shock to confidence.
- Strengthening banking supervision is an important precondition to the introduction of DIS.

### Bank resolution
- The CBT has the power to mandate actions by a troubled bank, but current procedures fall short:
  - The CBT may request that the MOF revoke a bank license.
  - Once a license has been revoked, the MOF appoints a liquidator who reports to the CBT.
  - In the absence of a reliable DIS, payment of depositor claims, especially those of small depositors, would be delayed until funds could be secured through judicial or nonjudicial collection or sale.
  - The lack of any basis for ensuring prompt access to funds means vulnerability to rapid deposit flight.
- Recommendations:
  - Introduce a special resolution regime and streamline bank-restructuring processes.
  - The CBT must be able to:
    - Revoke a bank license.
    - Trigger a nonjudicial procedure for resolving a troubled bank.
    - Manage the prompt payout of small depositors preferably from a DIS.
    - Effectively liquidate and recover all remaining assets for other depositors and creditors generally.

### Liquidity support and LOLR
- A revised LOLR framework should give the CBT explicit power to advance funds, secured by acceptable collateral, to solvent but illiquid banks.
- Such support should be linked to corrective actions.
- Current Central Bank Act:
  - Does not distinguish between types of CBT lending (monetary policy, liquidity functions, or LOLR).
  - Explicitly grants authority only to lend to meet credit distribution or monetary goals, and the CBT uses this provision as a basis for its lending to banks.
- Recommendation:
  - The CBT should explicitly segregate its power into two parts—the first dealing with monetary functions and the second with an LOLR facility.

### Improving financial intermediation efficiency — industry structure and competition
- Banking reforms since the early 2000s did not lead to the anticipated financial deepening.
  - Reforms: making all banks universal, resolving small state-owned banks by selling them to foreign banks, and injecting resources into the three largest state-owned banks.
  - Financial deepening has been limited, despite annual economic growth close to 5 percent over the past decade.
  - Progress in product innovation and quality service has generally been low, though it varies across banks.
- Regulatory framework issues:
  - Not a level playing field; some banks allowed to operate without meeting risk-management standards and key regulatory requirements.
  - Existence of weak or nonviable institutions is detrimental to competition.
- Contestability:
  - Foreign entry was allowed only on condition that new banks buy distressed institutions at prices that represent significant barriers to entry; green-field banks generally not allowed.
- State involvement:
  - Heavy state involvement distorts competition via state-owned banks and state-owned enterprises as major clients.
  - Poorly performing public banks are recapitalized without changes to governance.

### State-owned banks’ restructuring
- State-owned banks subject to conflicting mandates and poor performance.
  - Direct state intervention in strategic direction and management mandated by law.
  - Laws make it difficult to build effective governance; need revision.
  - Authorities should develop a strategy to limit state ownership of banks to cases of clear public policy need.
- Largest state-owned bank:
  - Has large unrealized loan losses and needs restructuring.
  - Recapitalization alone would not be sufficient.
  - Suggested approach:
    - Separate assets into a “good bank” and a “bad bank.”
    - Replace current management.
    - Mark bad assets-to-market and place them in a special recovery company.
    - Any balance sheet shortfall should be covered by state recapitalization, with the cost transparently identified in the fiscal budget.

### Small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) finance
- State initiatives for SME finance need reassessment before scaling up.
  - Multiple initiatives created a complex, redundant, and difficult-to-assess framework.
  - A partial credit guarantee scheme and a state-owned SME bank were set up in the mid-2000s.
  - Impact limited; quality of the bank’s portfolio raises concerns.
  - NPLs have been growing at a rapid pace (19 percent in 2011), with associated risks not properly identified and provisioned for.
- Information gap:
  - Difficult to quantify and understand SME finance and assess effectiveness of state intervention.
  - Recommendation: assign the CBT responsibility to collect and publish detailed information on SME finance.

### Housing finance
- Developers’ loans deteriorating and require close monitoring:
  - In 2011, NPLs stood at a 13.1 percent of this portfolio.
  - Stock of NPLs increased by 55 percent, with sharpest deterioration in substandard categories (classes 2 and 3).
- Recommendations:
  - CBT should continue monitoring risks, prepare guidance on origination, rescheduling, and oversight, and ensure early recognition of risks and adequate specific and general provisions (including on rescheduled loans).
- Asset-liability management:
  - Banks need strengthened asset-liability management.
  - Mortgage loans need long maturities to be affordable, but banks have few long-term resources.
  - CBT required banks to:
    - Match all loans with a duration of over 10 years with long-term resources.
    - Provide all loans with a duration of over 15 years at fixed rates.
  - Result: many banks reduced loan maturities to avoid constraints.
  - Recommendation: regulations need to be better targeted with more granular thresholds.

### Capital market development
- Capital markets play a limited role:
  - Funds raised in capital markets represent only 2 percent of GDP compared to private sector credit of 69 percent of GDP in 2011.
  - Sovereign bond market meets minimum size for global indexes but is underdeveloped and illiquid.
  - Equity and corporate bond primary markets are small; secondary markets lack liquidity; listed companies do not reflect the economy’s structure.
- Opportunities and constraints:
  - Opportunities to increase supply of fixed-income and equity products and promote long-term institutional investment.
  - Constraints: dominant role of bank financing and small size of most firms.
  - Assets confiscated from the former president and relatives, and other state-owned assets, could be offered to the public to provide investment opportunities.
  - Reform of pension systems (financially strained) could help build long-term investment demand.
  - Short-term room for growth of foreign investor participation is uncertain.
- Intermediaries and regulation:
  - Banks not allowed to engage in brokerage but do so through subsidiaries with limited independence.
  - Mutual funds are managed by intermediaries and distributed to banks’ clients.
  - Recommendation: a more independent CMA needs to step up surveillance and strictly enforce regulations.

### Access to finance
- Access to finance remains limited and is a major constraint in several regions and for some worker categories.
- Microfinance:
  - A microfinance law passed in October 2011 is a major step forward.
  - Regulations should be finalized and the supervision unit created for swift implementation.
  - Additional reforms: broaden microfinance activities and transfer supervision to the banking supervision authority.
- Infrastructure and information:
  - Improvements in bank intermediation and modernization of infrastructures are essential.
  - The central bank operates a credit registry and other databases, including on balance sheets, which could provide improved information and tools (e.g., more reliable and comprehensive data, SME rating).
  - Opportunity to allow credit bureaus could be revisited.
- Post Office potential:
  - The Post Office has five million customers, a wide branch network, a performing information system, and offers cheap products primarily related to savings and payment.
  - It could explore partnerships with other financial institutions to extend its product range.

### AML/CFT
- The Tunisian AML/CFT regime was last assessed in 2006 by the World Bank.
- Tunisia appears to have taken steps to strengthen its AML/CFT law in line with key recommendations of the assessment.
- Political changes and asset-tracing efforts highlighted challenges in implementation of the existing framework.
- Given the authorities’ intention to strengthen AML/CFT and that the existing assessment is more than five years old, a new assessment would be conducted toward the end of 2012.

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/_cr12241.pdf_
